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# Terminology Matters: Why We Use MPC-TLS Attestations and Not zkTLS "Proofs" | ||
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**TL;DR:** | ||
Terminology matters, especially in the world of cryptography. In this post, we explain why **MPC-TLS attestations** are the preferred choice over *zkTLS "proofs"* within the context of TLSNotary. zkTLS is a misnomer. | ||
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We are seeing more and more occurrences of the term "zkTLS" [TODO: add links to Twitter]. The TLSNotary team believes this term is poorly chosen because it seems to imply that TLS sessions have all the typical properties of zero-knowledge proofs. In this blog post, we explain why we prefer the term **MPC-TLS Attestations** and choose not to use **zkTLS "Proofs."** | ||
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## TLS and TLSNotary: A Brief Overview | ||
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**TLS (Transport Layer Security)** is the protocol that underpins much of the secure communication on the internet. It is the "s" in https. TLS ensures that data sent between a client and server is encrypted and remains private. However, unless the data is cryptographically signed at the source, traditional TLS doesn't offer a straightforward way to prove to a third party what data was exchanged. | ||
Before we dive into zkTLS vs. MPC-TLS, let’s first recap TLS and TLSNotary. | ||
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**TLSNotary** is a tool designed to solve this problem by implementing an **MPC-TLS (Multi-Party Computation TLS)** protocol. In TLSNotary, both the Prover and the Verifier cooperate to establish a TLS connection, ensuring that the data exchanged is authentic. Through this collaboration, both parties receive cryptographic guarantees about the data’s authenticity and integrity. On the server’s side, this looks like a normal TLS session. TLSNotary is gaining popularity among developers for its ability to provide verifiable evidence of interactions with a server, ensuring that the data remains trustworthy for both parties involved. TLSNotary also protects the privacy of the user, but that is beyond the scope of this blog post. | ||
**TLS (Transport Layer Security)** is the protocol that underpins much of the secure communication on the internet. It is the “s” in https. TLS ensures that data sent between a client and server is encrypted and remains private. However, unless the data is cryptographically signed at the source, traditional TLS doesn’t offer a straightforward way to prove to a third party what data was exchanged. | ||
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## MPC or ZK? What’s the Difference? | ||
[TODO: add TLSNotary diagram here later] | ||
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**MPC (Multi-Party Computation)** and **ZK (Zero-Knowledge)** are two cryptographic techniques often mentioned together, but they serve different purposes. | ||
**TLSNotary** is a tool designed to solve this problem by implementing an **MPC-TLS (Multi-Party Computation TLS)** protocol. In TLSNotary, two parties—a Prover and a Verifier—cooperate to establish a TLS connection and retrieve authenticated data from a server. Through this collaboration, both parties receive cryptographic guarantees about the data’s authenticity and integrity. On the server’s side, this looks like a normal TLS session. | ||
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**MPC** allows multiple parties to jointly compute a function over their inputs while keeping those inputs private. In the context of TLSNotary, MPC is used to perform a TLS handshake so both the Prover and the Verifier each have a key share. They need to cooperate to encrypt requests and decrypt responses with TLS's symmetric encryption. Through this collaboration, both parties receive cryptographic guarantees about the data’s authenticity and integrity. Additionally, during the MPC-TLS process, the Verifier only sees encrypted information, thus protecting the user’s privacy. | ||
TLSNotary is gaining popularity among developers for its ability to provide verifiable evidence of interactions with a server, ensuring that the data remains trustworthy for both parties involved. TLSNotary also protects the privacy of the user, but that is beyond the scope of this blog post. | ||
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**ZK proofs** enable one party to prove to another that a statement is true without revealing any other information. Prefixing "zk" to a term is fashionable nowadays; however, **zkTLS** as a term is a misnomer. **True zero-knowledge proofs of TLS sessions are not feasible today**—TLS relies on interactive, stateful communication, which is too complex to fit into zk circuits. | ||
## Proofs vs. Attestations | ||
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TLSNotary uses ZK technology, but the main driver is MPC. | ||
When we talk about **proofs** in cryptography, we usually refer to something that is **publicly verifiable**—anyone with the proof can independently verify its validity without needing additional information. Publicly verifiable proofs are often associated with zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs) and allow anyone to verify the proof without needing to trust any specific party. These systems are highly desirable but unfortunately not always feasible. | ||
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## Attestations vs. Proofs | ||
**Designated verifier** systems delegate verification to one verifier (or a coordinated group of verifiers). After successful verification, a verifier can **attest** to the data for other parties by issuing a signed **attestation**. This approach requires trust in the designated verifier’s integrity. | ||
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When we talk about **proofs** in cryptography, we usually refer to something that is **publicly verifiable**; anyone with the proof can independently verify its validity without needing additional information. This is the strength of zero-knowledge proofs in general: they are self-contained and can be verified by anyone, anywhere. | ||
In the case of MPC-TLS, the Verifier knows the TLS session was authentic, so it can attest to it. However, the result is not something that everyone can independently verify without trust in the Verifier. | ||
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On the other hand, an **attestation** is a statement made by one party to another about something that has occurred, and it often requires some level of trust in the party making the statement. In the case of MPC-TLS, the Verifier knows the TLS session was authentic, so it can attest to it. But the result is not something that everyone can independently verify without trust in the Verifier. | ||
**Remark:** In the TLSNotary source code, the lines between a proof and an attestation can seem confusing. While TLSNotary generates something that is a proof to the Verifier, to anyone else, it is an attestation. | ||
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**Remark:** In the TLSNotary source code, the lines between a proof and an attestation blur. While the process generates something that is a proof to the Verifier, to anyone else, it is an attestation; they have to trust the Verifier’s claim about what happened. | ||
[TODO embed https://x.com/sinu_eth/status/1827135565185401239 here] | ||
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## Onchain Attestations | ||
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When dealing with blockchain and onchain attestations, the Verifier cannot run onchain. This means that the attestation put onchain by the Prover (or the Verifier) is not a standalone proof but an attestation. Consumers of this information need to trust that there wasn't any collusion between the Prover and Verifier. TLSNotary can be used to build oracles, but it does not solve the **oracle problem**. | ||
The Verifier cannot run onchain. The Verifier must be online simultaneously with both the Prover and the Server. This means that the attestation put onchain by the Prover (or the Verifier) is not a standalone proof but an attestation. And because an attester could attest to (or sign) whatever it wants, consumers of this information need to trust the attester. TLSNotary can be used to build oracles, but it does not solve the **oracle problem**. | ||
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## Conclusion | ||
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In the end, terminology matters because it shapes our understanding and expectations of the technology we use. The term zkTLS might sound appealing, but it is inaccurate. TLS sessions are not proven using zero-knowledge proofs. Instead, TLSNotary favors the term **MPC-TLS attestations**. | ||
In the end, terminology matters because it shapes our understanding and expectations of the technology we use. | ||
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By choosing the right terminology and understanding the implications of these choices, we can build more robust, efficient, and trustworthy cryptographic systems. | ||
The term zkTLS might sound appealing, but it is confusing. The "zk" prefix in zkTLS seems to imply public verifiability, which is not the case. This is the reason we prefer **MPC-TLS Attestations** instead. |