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5 changes: 3 additions & 2 deletions contents/english/5-7-social-markets.md
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Expand Up @@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ Building off these experiments, we are just able to glimpse what a comprehensive

1. Circular investment: One of the most remarkable results of economic theory is named after Henry George. Proved originally by Vickrey but first published by Richard Arnott and Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz, the Henry George Theorem states, roughly, that the taxes that can be raised from correctly designed common ownership taxes can fund all the subsidies required to fund supermodular investments.[^Arnott] While the result is much more general, a simple illustration is the way that building better local public schools tend to raise land values: if this value can be raised by a land tax, in principle any education investment worth funding can be supported. More generally, the result suggests a near limitless potential, like that realized in a superconducting circuit, for innovation in taxation/common property and allocation of funds to super-modular activity, to generate progress.
2. ⿻ property: How can these funds be raised? While partial common property schemes are an interesting start, they need to be paired with tools that can recognize and protect common interests in the way and stability with which land and other assets are used. The voting systems we described in the previous chapter are a natural answer here and there may be great potential in ⿻ property systems that [can bring these together](https://www.serpentinegalleries.org/whats-on/beyond-cultures-of-ownership/), returning much of the value of a range of wealth to intersecting publics ("fructus") while also giving important access ("usus") and disposal ("abusus") rights to these communities.
3. ⿻ funding across boundaries: ⿻ funding can also extend dramatically beyond its current bounds, to allocate the resources thus raised. Two of the most interesting directions are cross-jurisdictional and inter-temporal. Current international trade treaties focus primarily on breaking down trade barriers, including the subsidies that help support supermodular production as we discussed above. A future form of international economic cooperation could assemble matching funds for cross-jurisdictional economic ventures, harnessing a mechanism like ⿻ funding. One key advantage of capitalism is that it is one of the few scaled systems with a significant intertemporal planning component, where companies raise funds for profits that appear distant. One can imagine, however, even more ambitious inter-temporal economic systems with matching funds, for example, for institutions that promote cooperation across generations or with those who are not even born yet. This might overcome concerns about the lack of long-term planning, as well as the conservation of valued past institutions, in many quarters, creating an organic version of a "ministry for the future".[^Robinson]
3. ⿻ funding across boundaries: ⿻ funding can also extend dramatically beyond its current bounds, to allocate the resources thus raised. Two of the most interesting directions are cross-jurisdictional and inter-temporal. Current international trade treaties focus primarily on breaking down trade barriers, including the subsidies that help support supermodular production as we discussed above. A future form of international economic cooperation could assemble matching funds for cross-jurisdictional economic ventures, harnessing a mechanism like ⿻ funding. One key advantage of capitalism is that it is one of the few scaled systems with a significant intertemporal planning component, where companies raise funds for profits that appear distant. [^PICSY] One can imagine, however, even more ambitious inter-temporal economic systems with matching funds, for example, for institutions that promote cooperation across generations or with those who are not even born yet. This might overcome concerns about the lack of long-term planning, as well as the conservation of valued past institutions, in many quarters, creating an organic version of a "ministry for the future".[^Robinson]
4. Emergent publics: Possibilities are equally promising for how the organizations thus supported can be made truly accountable to their stakeholders. Stakeholding of various kinds (as workers, customers, suppliers, targets of negative externalities like pollution dumping or misinformation, etc.) could be tracked by harnessing the type of ⿻ identity systems we discussed above. These could then be linked to participation using voting and deliberation systems like those we highlighted earlier in ways that are much less demanding on individuals' time and attention and able to more quickly reach broadly legitimate decisions than existing collective governance.[^Optimism] These in turn can make truly democratic and ⿻ governance of emergent publics a realistic alternative to traditional corporate governance. One could then imagine a future where new democratic entities governing emerging technologies in ways that are close to as legitimate as governments emerge as frequently as start-ups, creating a web of dynamic and legitimate governance.
5. ⿻ management: Internally, it is also increasingly possible to see past the hierarchical structure that typically dominates corporate control. The [Plural Management Protocol](https://github.com/pluralitybook/plurality/issues/333) we used to create this book tracks the types and extent of contributions from diverse participants and harnesses mechanisms like we have described above to allow them to prioritize work (which then determines the recognition of those who address those issues) and determine which work should be incorporated into a project though a basis of exerting authority and predicting what others will decide.[^PMP] This allows for some of the important components of hierarchy (evaluation by trusted authorities, migration of this authority based on performance according to those authorities) without any direct hierarchical reporting structure, allowing networks to potentially supplant strict hierarchies.
6. Polypolitan migration policy: It is also increasingly possible to imagine breaking down the stringency of international labor markets through related mechanisms. As philosopher Danielle Allen has proposed, migration could be conditioned upon endorsement or support from one or more civil society groups in the receiving country, extending and combining existing practices in countries like Canada and Taiwan that respectively allow private community-based sponsorship and allow a diversity of qualifying pathways for long-term work permits.[^Poly] These could diffuse the stringent control of labor mobility by nation states while maintaining accountability to avoid harms or challenges with social integration.
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -142,5 +142,6 @@ Yet despite all their manifest dangers and limitations, those pursuing ⿻ shou
[^Marketarg]: Joseph Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* (New York: Harper & Brothers: 1942). Quinn Slobodian, *Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018).
[^interact]: See Erich Joachimsthaler, _The Interaction Field: The Revolutionary New Way to Create Shared Value for Businesses, Customers, and Society_, PublicAffairs, 2019. See also Gary Hamel, and Michele Zanini, _Humanocracy: Creating Organizations as Amazing as the People inside Them_, (Boston, Massachusetts: Harvard Business Review Press, 2020).
[^Arnott]: William Vickrey, "The City as a Firm" in Martin S. Feldstein and Robert P. Inman, eds., *The Economics of Public Services*: 334-343. Richard Arnott, and Joseph Stiglitz, “Aggregate Land Rents, Expenditure on Public Goods, and Optimal City Size,” _The Quarterly Journal of Economics_ 93, no. 4 (November 1979): 471. https://doi.org/10.2307/1884466.
[^PICSY]: A notable example of inter-temporal economic systems is PICSY (Propagational Investment Currency SYstem) developed by Ken Suzuki. PICSY is a value propagation system which tracks past transactions as contributions and assign a portion of recent contributions to past contributors. Thus, in the framework of PICSY, transactions are track records for investments. Ken Suzuki, Propagational investment currency system (PICSY): proposing a new currency system using social computing. PhD diss., Tokyo University, 2009. Ken Suzuki, "The Nameraka Society and its Enemies", Keiso Shobo Publishing (2013).
[^Robinson]: Robinson, op. cit.
[^CollabNote]: Pooling across diversity is a very general principle. Although size matters, bigger is not always better, and the strength of the connections formed can matter more. For example, families, teams or troops – small networks connected by high-value interactions – can outperform much larger ones in the production of ⿻ goods. If we consider the record of Paleolithic art, banding together to perform key social functions is extremely ancient, so collaborative pooling at a range of scales, albeit by non-state and non-market actors, seems an exception to the rule that 'public goods' are always under-supplie
[^CollabNote]: Pooling across diversity is a very general principle. Although size matters, bigger is not always better, and the strength of the connections formed can matter more. For example, families, teams or troops – small networks connected by high-value interactions – can outperform much larger ones in the production of ⿻ goods. If we consider the record of Paleolithic art, banding together to perform key social functions is extremely ancient, so collaborative pooling at a range of scales, albeit by non-state and non-market actors, seems an exception to the rule that 'public goods' are always under-supplie