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added wallet attestation scheme #52

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37 changes: 36 additions & 1 deletion draft-oid4vc-haip-sd-jwt-vc.md
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -139,7 +139,42 @@ Note: Issuers should be mindful of how long the usage of the refresh token is al

### Wallet Attestation Schema {#wallet-attestation-schema}

[Section 3.1 of wallet attestation draft would define the basics, and this profile will define the details.]
Wallets MUST use attestations following the definition given in [!I-D.ietf-looker-key-attestation-client-authentication].

In addition, the Wallet Attestation MUST contain the following claims:
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In addition to what? To the claims defined in draft-ietf-looker?

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In addition to "the definition given in [!I-D.ietf-looker-key-attestation-client-authentication]"


* `key_type`: this claim asserts the security mechanism the wallet can use to manage private keys. This capability is based on the capabilities of the execution environent of the wallet, this might be a secure element (in case of a wallet residing on a smartphone) or a Cloud-HSM (in case of a cloud wallet). This specification defines the following values for `key_type`: `STRONGBOX`, `TEE`, `SecureEnclave`, `Software`.
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are the values taken from somewhere or defined in HAIP? If the latter, why not use snake case?

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We define it in HAIP. I'm neutral on the style. Snake case would be consistent with https://fidoalliance.org/specs/common-specs/fido-registry-v2.2-rd-20210525.html#key-protection-types.

* `user_authentication`: this claim asserts the security mechanism the wallet can use to authenticate access to private keys. This specification defines the following values for `user_authentication`: `APP_PIN_6_DIGITS`, ...
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Again, where are the values being defined..? If not in HAIP should it point somewhere?

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I would prefer to reuse WebAuthn values. Let's discuss.

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if WebAuthn values are used I'm ok with that, we then need a ref to them


These additional claims inform the issuer about the security capabilities of the wallet and allows the issuer to refuse credential issuance if the achievble security level of a certain wallet does not fulfil the issuer's requirements.
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Do we have to defined error codes and messages for that?

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you mean in the credential issuance response?

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yes, do we have to give a ref to openid4vc?

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@Sakurann Sakurann Sep 11, 2023

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once this PR goes in (https://github.com/openid/OpenID4VCI/pull/64/files), we should probably add insufficient_wallet_security or something as an error code? for now, let's open an issue on this.

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#62


Wallet attestions MUST support web-based key resolution as defined in Section 5 of [@!I-D.terbu-sd-jwt-vc]. The JOSE header `kid` MUST be used to identify the respective key.
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This is an example of a wallet attestation:
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```json
{
"typ": "wallet-attestation+jwt",
"alg": "ES256",
"kid": "1"
}
.
{
"iss": "https://wallet.example.com",
"sub": "https://wallet.example.com",
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I'm not in favor of duplicating iss to sub

I have the strong assumption that the wallet provider and the wallet instance are different entities

In my current implementation we have decided to use the jwk thumbprint to identify the wallet instance and then we use this value in the sub

there's a good agreement to simply remove the sub claim, WDYT about this?

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@tlodderstedt tlodderstedt Jul 12, 2023

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It's not a duplication. It represents the fact that the wallet provider issues an attestation about itself. Whatever component uses this attestation with a valid proof of possession of the key in cnf can be considered a valid "representative" of the wallet provider. That is sufficient for authentication and authorization.
This value is especially used a client_id. If you want to make the client id instance specific, you can do so. I would prefer to have a client_id identifying the wallet provider. This information can be used in self service and customer care and makes sense to the user.

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With regard to eIDAS terms: iss describes the Wallet Solution Provider and sub descibes the specific Wallet Solution of a Wallet Instance

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sub descibes the specific Wallet Solution of a Wallet Instance
which includes the option to leave instances anonymous, right?

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yes, anonymous instances should be RECOMMENDED in my opinion

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According to the underlying draft-looker-oauth-attestation-based-client-auth, the iss is the entity the AS (here the wallet) trusts for the purpose of the issuance of attestations and the sub is the client id. The wallet can establish the trust be looking the iss value up in a trusted list, for example. The actual wallet product could be the sub value. The attributes (including capabilities and perhaps even authorization) need to be conveyed through claims in the attestation.
The difference between attester and wallet provider would be that if the wallet provider is in the iss, it needs to be entitled by the trusted list to issue it's own attestations whereas in the case of the attester, it's the attester who has that entitlement.

Does this sound reasonable?

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I'm in favor of having sub as optional and without any constraint about its value

the current proposal is concerning to me

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in the call yesterday we came to the conclusion that the fundamental question is:
"Is the Wallet Provider always the Attester of the Wallet Instance?"

Indeed, we have already seen the reality that wallet providers may not have the capacity/willingness to run an attestation service on their own. And nobody will force an wallet provider to use a different attestation service. But we should keep this option open. Therefore I am voting to use:

  • iss as the issuer of the wallet attestation
  • sub as the client id
    The version should not be referenced in there as this is responsibility of the wallet provider and not a burden to the issuer. If the Wallet Provider runs the attestation service on his own, we have two possibilities:
  • a) iss equals sub
  • b) sub may be omitted
    I'm in favor of a)

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@peppelinux making the sub optional cannot be done in HAIP and needs to be discussed in the IETF on the client attestation draft. For HAIP, I suggest we remove the concrete values and put in letter what the values are expected to be: code suggestion below.

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in the implementation I'm working on the sub value is the thumbprint of the cnf.jwk since this latter uniquely identify, anyway, the wallet instance

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Suggested change
"iss": "https://wallet.example.com",
"sub": "https://wallet.example.com",
"iss": "<identifier of the issuer of this wallet attestation>",
"sub": "<`client_id` of the OAuth client>",

@peppelinux

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I think that you found the best editorial compromise for this annoying issue of the sub

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I would also like to add to this discussion that we agreed that the claim client_id represents the unique client identifier, even if there are divisions about who is the real client: the wallet solution or the wallet instance. I'm in favour of the latter, by having the distinction between iss and sub when the wallet instance is installed on a personal mobile device and all the respective crytpographic keys are stored by each material owner (wallet provider has its own, then the wallet instance has its own).

However, "client_id" is not always used to specify a client identifier since there are many way in OAuth2 to uniquely identify a client within a flow, below I mention for instance methods like:

  • client_secret_basic
  • client_secret_jwt
  • private_key_jwt

even if these are not relevant for the wallet solution, I'd try to not mandate too many details within the specs at this current phase, by giving more flexibility in the material implementations on the way.

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incorporated Kristina's suggestion

"exp": 1516247022,
"key_type": "STRONGBOX",
"user_authentication": "APP_PIN_6_DIGITS",
"cnf": {
"jwk": {
"kty": "EC",
"crv": "P-256",
"x": "TCAER19Zvu3OHF4j4W4vfSVoHIP1ILilDls7vCeGemc",
"y": "ZxjiWWbZMQGHVWKVQ4hbSIirsVfuecCE6t4jT9F2HZQ"
}
}
}
```

## Credential Endpoint

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