draft-ietf-oauth-v2-1-12

Changes

• Added DPoP and Step-Up Auth to appendix of extensions
• Updated reference for case insensitivity of auth scheme to HTTP instead of ABNF (#186)
• Corrected an instance of "relying party" vs "client" (#169)
• Moved client_id requirement to the individual grant types
• Updated language around client registration to better reflect alternative registration methods such as those in use by OpenID Federation and open ecosystems
• fixed typos #185
• consolidated description of serialization #181 #190

draft-ietf-oauth-v2-1-11

Changes discussed at May 14 Interim

• resolves client credentials encoding issue #128
• Recommend against defining custom scopes that conflict with known scopes #163
• Explicitly mention that Bearer is case insensitive #166

Editorial Changes

• Remove duplicate "are" by @MozharAlhosni in #175
• clarify expires_in is a JSON number by @panva in #172
• Minor fix by @MozharAlhosni in #173
• Added paragraph about interaction between RO and AS

New Contributors

• @MozharAlhosni made their first contribution in #175
• @panva made their first contribution in #172

Full Changelog: draft-ietf-oauth-v2-1-10...draft-ietf-oauth-v2-1-11

Draft 10

• Clarify that the client id is an opaque string
• Extensions may define additional error codes on a resource request
• Improved formatting for error field definitions
• Moved and expanded "scope" definition to introduction section
• Split access token section into structure and request
• Renamed b64token to token68 for consistency with RFC7235
• Restored content from old appendix B about application/x-www-form-urlencoded
• Clarified that clients must not parse access tokens
• Expanded text around when redirect_uri parameter is required in the authorization request
• Changed "permissions" to "privileges" in refresh token section for consistency
• Consolidated authorization code flow security considerations
• Clarified authorization code reuse - an authorization code can only obtain an access token once

Draft 09

• AS MUST NOT support CORS requests at authorization endpoint
• more detail on asymmetric client authentication
• sync CSRF description from security BCP
• update and move sender-constrained access tokens section
• sync client impersonating resource owner with security BCP
• add reference to authorization request from redirect URI registration section
• sync refresh rotation section from security BCP
• sync redirect URI matching text from security BCP
• updated references to RAR (RFC9396)
• clarifications on URIs
• removed redirect_uri from the token request
• expanded security considerations around code_verifier
• revised introduction section

Draft 08

• Swap "by a trusted party" with "by an outside party" in client ID definition
• Replaced "verify the identity of the resource owner" with "authenticate"
• Clarified refresh token rotation to match RFC6819
• Added appendix to hold application/x-www-form-urlencoded examples
• Fixed references to entries in appendix
• Incorporated new "Phishing via AS" section from Security BCP
• Rephrase description of the motivation for client authentication
• Moved "scope" parameter in token request into specific grant types to match OAuth 2.0
• Updated Clickjacking and Open Redirection description from the latest version of the Security BCP
• Moved normative requirements out of authorization code security considerations section
• Security considerations clarifications, and removed a duplicate section
• Updated acknowledgments

Draft 07

• Removed "third party" from abstract
• Added MFA and passwordless as additional motiviations in introduction
• Mention PAR as one way redirect URI registration can happen
• Added a reference to requiring CORS headers on the token endpoint
• Updated reference to OMAP extension
• Fixed numbering in sequence diagram