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u-root: Format footnotes using Markdown extension
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Signed-off-by: Philip Molloy <[email protected]>
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Expand Up @@ -16,8 +16,8 @@ second, as it is compiled. Packages are only compiled once, so the slowest
build is always the first one, on boot, which takes about 3 seconds. Subsequent
invocations are very fast, usually a millisecond or so.

U-root blurs the line between script-based distros such as Perl Linux[24] and
binary-based distros such as BusyBox[26]. It has the flexibility of Perl Linux
U-root blurs the line between script-based distros such as Perl Linux[^24] and
binary-based distros such as BusyBox[^26]. It has the flexibility of Perl Linux
and the performance of BusyBox. Scripts and builtins are written in Go, not a
shell scripting language. U-root is a new way to package and distribute file
systems for embedded systems, and the use of Go promises a dramatic improvement
Expand All @@ -27,29 +27,29 @@ in their security.
## U-root and embedded systems

Embedding kernels and root file systems in BIOS flash is a common technique for
gaining boot time performance and platform customization[25][14][23]. Almost
gaining boot time performance and platform customization[^25][^14][^23]. Almost
all new firmware includes a multiprocess operating system with a full
complement of file systems, network drivers, and protocol stacks, all contained
in an embedded file system. In some cases, the kernel is only booted long
enough to boot another kernel. In others, the kernel that is booted and the
file system it contains constitute the operational environment of the
device[15]. These so-called “embedded root file systems” also contain a set of
device[^15]. These so-called “embedded root file systems” also contain a set of
standard Unix-style programs used for both normal operation and maintenance.
Space on the device is at a premium, so these programs are usually written in C
using the BusyBox toolkit[26], or in an interpretive language such as Perl[24]
using the BusyBox toolkit[^26], or in an interpretive language such as Perl[^24]
or Forth. BusyBox in particular has found wide usage in embedded appliance
environments, as the entire root file system can be contained in under one MiB.

Embedded systems, which were once standalone, are now almost always network
connected. Network connected systems face a far more challenging security
environment than even a few years ago. In response to the many successful
attacks against shell interpreters[11] and C programs[8], we have started to
attacks against shell interpreters[^11] and C programs[^8], we have started to
look at using a more secure, modern language in embedded root file systems,
namely, Go[21][16].
namely, Go[^21][^16].

Go is a new systems programming language created by Google. Go has strong
typing; language level support for concurrency; inter-process communication via
channels, a la Occam[13], Limbo[17], and Alef[27]; runtime type safety and
channels, a la Occam[^13], Limbo[^17], and Alef[^27]; runtime type safety and
other protective measures; dynamic allocation and garbage collection; closures;
and a package syntax, similar to Java, that makes it easy to determine what
packages a given program needs. The modern language constructs make Go a much
Expand All @@ -63,17 +63,17 @@ GHOST and the so-called FSVariable.c bug in Intel’s UEFI firmware. Buffer
overflows in Intel’s UEFI and Active Management Technology (AMT) have also been
discovered in several versions in recent years.

Both UEFI[12] and AMT[4] are embedded operating systems, loaded from flash that
Both UEFI[^12] and AMT[^4] are embedded operating systems, loaded from flash that
run network-facing software. Attacks against UEFI have been extensively
studied[9]. Most printers are network-attached and are a very popular
exploitation target[6]. Firmware is not visible to most users and is updated
studied[^9]. Most printers are network-attached and are a very popular
exploitation target[^6]. Firmware is not visible to most users and is updated
much less frequently (if at all) than programs. It is the first software to
run, at power on reset. Exploits in firmware are extremely difficult to detect,
because firmware is designed to be as invisible as possible. Firmware is
extremely complex; UEFI is roughly equivalent in size and capability to a Unix
kernel. Firmware is usually closed and proprietary, with nowhere near the level
of testing of kernels. These properties make firmware an ideal place for
so-called advanced persistent threats[10][18][5]. Once an exploit is installed,
so-called advanced persistent threats[^10][^18][^5]. Once an exploit is installed,
it is almost impossible to remove, since the exploit can inhibit its removal by
corrupting the firmware update process. The only sure way to mitigate a
firmware exploit is to destroy the hardware.
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -290,8 +290,8 @@ redirection. At the same time, the shell defines no language of its own for
scripting and builtins. Instead, the u-root shell uses the Go compiler. In that
sense, the u-root shell reflects a break in important ways with the last few
decades of shell development, which has seen shells and their language grow
ever more complex and, partially as a result, ever more insecure[19] and
fragile[11].
ever more complex and, partially as a result, ever more insecure[^19] and
fragile[^11].

The shell has several builtin commands, and you can extend it with builtin
commands of your own. First, you need to understand the basic source structure
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -413,7 +413,7 @@ the builtin command again and create a shell that further extends the new
shell. Processes outside the new shell’s process hierarchy can not use this new
shell or the builtin source. When the new shell exits, the builtins are no
longer visible in any part of the file system. We use Linux mount name spaces
to create this effect[22]. Once the builtin command has verified that the Go
to create this effect[^22]. Once the builtin command has verified that the Go
fragment is valid, it builds a new, private namespace with the shell source,
including the new builtin source. From that point on, the new shell and its
children will only use the new shell. The parent process and other processes
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -487,23 +487,23 @@ testing. The entire server is 18 lines of Go.
## On-Demand Compilation

On-Demand compilation is one of the oldest ideas in computer science.
Slimline Open Firmware (SLOF)[7] is a FORTHbased implementation of Open
Slimline Open Firmware (SLOF)[^7] is a FORTHbased implementation of Open
Firmware developed by IBM for some of its Power and Cell processors. SLOF is
capable of storing all of Open Firmware as source in the flash memory and
compiling components to indirect threading on demand[2].
compiling components to indirect threading on demand[^2].

In the last few decades, as our compiler infrastructure has gotten slower and
more complex, true on-demand compilation has split into two different forms.
First is the on-demand compilation of source into executable byte codes, as in
Python. The byte codes are not native but are more efficient than source. If
the python interpreter finds the byte code it will interpret that instead of
source to provide improved performance. Java takes the process one step further
with the Just In Time compilation of byte code to machine code[20] to boost
with the Just In Time compilation of byte code to machine code[^20] to boost
performance.

## Embedding kernel and root file systems in flash

The LinuxBIOS project[14][1], together with clustermatic[25], used an embedded
The LinuxBIOS project[^14][^1], together with clustermatic[^25], used an embedded
kernel and simple root file system to manage supercomputing clusters. Due to
space constraints of 1 MiB or less of flash, clusters embedded only a
single-processor Linux kernel with a daemon. The daemon was a network
Expand All @@ -526,7 +526,7 @@ with a Linux-As-Bootloader for the iPaq.
Car computers and other embedded ARM systems frequently contain a kernel and an
ext2 formatted file system in NOR flash, that is, flash that can be treated as
memory instead of a block device. Many of these kernels use the so-called
eXecute In Place[3] (XIP) patch, which allows the kernel to page binaries
eXecute In Place[^3] (XIP) patch, which allows the kernel to page binaries
directly from the memory-addressable flash rather than copying it to RAM,
providing a significant savings in system startup time. A downside of this
approach is that the executables can not be compressed, which puts further
Expand All @@ -535,11 +535,11 @@ paging from it comes at a significant performance cost. Finally, an
uncompressed binary image stored in NOR flash has a much higher monetary cost
than the same image stored in RAM since the cost per bit is so much higher.

UEFI[12] contains a non-Linux kernel (the UEFI firmware binary) and a full set
UEFI[^12] contains a non-Linux kernel (the UEFI firmware binary) and a full set
of drivers, file systems, network protocol stacks, and command binaries in the
firmware image. It is a full operating system environment realized as firmware.

The ONIE project[23] is a more recent realization of the Kernel-in-flash idea,
The ONIE project[^23] is a more recent realization of the Kernel-in-flash idea,
based on Linux. ONIE packs a Linux kernel and Busybox binaries into a very
small package. Since the Linux build process allows an initial RAM file system
(initramfs) to be built directly into the kernel binary, some companies are now
Expand All @@ -550,57 +550,65 @@ a fast, capable boot system.

## References

[1] AGNEW, A., SULMICKI, A., MINNICH, R., AND ARBAUGH, W. A. Flexibility in rom: A stackable open source bios. In USENIX Annual Technical Conference, FREENIX Track (2003), pp. 115–124.

[2] (AUTHOR OF SLOF), S. B. Personal conversation.

[3] BENAVIDES, T., TREON, J., HULBERT, J., AND CHANG, W. The enabling of an execute-in-place architecture to reduce the embedded system memory footprint and boot time. Journal of computers 3, 1 (2008), 79–89.

[4] BOGOWITZ, B., AND SWINFORD, T. Intel⃝R active management technology reduces it costs with improved pc manageability. Technology@ Intel Magazine (2004).

[5] CELEDA, P., KREJCI, R., VYKOPAL, J., AND DRASAR, M. Embedded malware-an analysis of the chuck norris botnet. In Computer Network Defense (EC2ND), 2010 European Conference on (2010), IEEE, pp. 3–10.

[6] CUI, A., COSTELLO, M., AND STOLFO, S. J. When firmware modifications attack: A case study of embedded exploitation. In NDSS (2013).

[7] DALY, D., CHOI, J. H., MOREIRA, J. E., AND WATERLAND, A. Base operating system provisioning and bringup for a commercial supercomputer. In Parallel and Distributed Processing Symposium, 2007. IPDPS 2007. IEEE International (2007), IEEE, pp. 1–7.

[8] DURUMERIC, Z., KASTEN, J., ADRIAN, D., HALDERMAN, J. A., BAILEY, M., LI, F., WEAVER, N., AMANN, J., BEEKMAN, J., PAYER, M., ET AL. The matter of heartbleed. In Proceedings of the 2014 Conference on Internet Measurement Conference (2014), ACM, pp. 475–488.

[9] KALLENBERG, C., AND BULYGIN, Y. All your boot are belong to us intel, mitre. cansecwest 2014.

[10] KALLENBERG, C., KOVAH, X., BUTTERWORTH, J., AND CORNWELL, S. Extreme privilege escalation on windows 8/uefi systems.

[11] KOZIOL, J., LITCHFIELD, D., AITEL, D., ANLEY, C., EREN, S., MEHTA, N., AND HASSELL, R. The Shellcoder’s Handbook. Wiley Indianapolis, 2004.

[12] LEWIS, T. Uefi overview, 2007.

[13] MAY,D.Occam.ACMSigplanNotices18,4(1983),69–79.

[14] MINNICH, R. G. Linuxbios at four. Linux J. 2004, 118 (Feb. 2004), 8–.

[15] MOON, S.-P., KIM, J.-W., BAE, K.-H., LEE, J.-C., AND SEO, D.-W. Embedded linux implementation on a commercial digital tv system. Consumer Electronics, IEEE Transactions on 49, 4 (Nov 2003), 1402–1407.

[16] PIKE, R. Another go at language design. Stanford University Computer Systems Laboratory Colloquium.

[17] RITCHIE, D. M. The limbo programming language. Inferno Programmer’s Manual 2 (1997).

[18] SACCO, A. L., AND ORTEGA, A. A. Persistent bios infection. In CanSecWest Applied Security Conference (2009).

[19] SAMPATHKUMAR, R. Vulnerability Management for Cloud Computing-2014: A Cloud Computing Security Essential. Rajakumar Sampathkumar, 2014.

[20] SUGANUMA, T., OGASAWARA, T., TAKEUCHI, M., YASUE, T., KAWAHITO, M., ISHIZAKI, K., KOMATSU, H., AND NAKATANI, T. Overview of the ibm java just-in-time compiler. IBM systems Journal 39, 1 (2000), 175–193.

[21] TEAM, G. The go programming language specification. Tech. rep., Technical Report [http://golang](http://golang/). org/doc/doc/go spec. html, Google Inc, 2009.

[22] VAN HENSBERGEN, E., AND MINNICH, R. Grave robbers from outer space: Using 9p2000 under linux. In USENIX Annual Technical Conference, FREENIX Track (2005), pp. 83–94.

[23] VARIOUS. No papers have been published on onie; see onie.org.

[24] VARIOUS. No papers were published; see perllinux.sourceforge.net.

[25] WATSON, G. R., SOTTILE, M. J., MINNICH, R. G., CHOI, S.-E., AND HERTDRIKS, E. Pink: A 1024-node single-system image linux cluster. In High Performance Computing and Grid in Asia Pacific Region, 2004. Proceedings. Seventh International Conference on (2004), IEEE, pp. 454–461.

[26] WELLS, N. Busybox: A swiss army knife for linux. Linux J. 2000, 78es (Oct. 2000).

[27] WINTERBOTTOM, P. Alef language reference manual. Plan 9 Programmer’s Man (1995).

[^1]: AGNEW, A., SULMICKI, A., MINNICH, R., AND ARBAUGH, W. A. Flexibility in
rom: A stackable open source bios. In USENIX Annual Technical Conference,
FREENIX Track (2003), pp. 115–124.
[^2]: (AUTHOR OF SLOF), S. B. Personal conversation.
[^3]: BENAVIDES, T., TREON, J., HULBERT, J., AND CHANG, W. The enabling of an
execute-in-place architecture to reduce the embedded system memory
footprint and boot time. Journal of computers 3, 1 (2008), 79–89.
[^4]: BOGOWITZ, B., AND SWINFORD, T. Intel⃝R active management technology
reduces it costs with improved pc manageability. Technology@ Intel Magazine
(2004).
[^5]: CELEDA, P., KREJCI, R., VYKOPAL, J., AND DRASAR, M. Embedded malware-an
analysis of the chuck norris botnet. In Computer Network Defense (EC2ND),
2010 European Conference on (2010), IEEE, pp. 3–10.
[^6]: CUI, A., COSTELLO, M., AND STOLFO, S. J. When firmware modifications
attack: A case study of embedded exploitation. In NDSS (2013).
[^7]: DALY, D., CHOI, J. H., MOREIRA, J. E., AND WATERLAND, A. Base operating
system provisioning and bringup for a commercial supercomputer. In Parallel
and Distributed Processing Symposium, 2007. IPDPS 2007. IEEE International
(2007), IEEE, pp. 1–7.
[^8]: DURUMERIC, Z., KASTEN, J., ADRIAN, D., HALDERMAN, J. A., BAILEY, M., LI,
F., WEAVER, N., AMANN, J., BEEKMAN, J., PAYER, M., ET AL. The matter of
heartbleed. In Proceedings of the 2014 Conference on Internet Measurement
Conference (2014), ACM, pp. 475–488.
[^9]: KALLENBERG, C., AND BULYGIN, Y. All your boot are belong to us intel,
mitre. cansecwest 2014.
[^10]: KALLENBERG, C., KOVAH, X., BUTTERWORTH, J., AND CORNWELL, S. Extreme
privilege escalation on windows 8/uefi systems.
[^11]: KOZIOL, J., LITCHFIELD, D., AITEL, D., ANLEY, C., EREN, S., MEHTA, N.,
AND HASSELL, R. The Shellcoder’s Handbook. Wiley Indianapolis, 2004.
[^12]: LEWIS, T. Uefi overview, 2007.
[^13]: MAY,D.Occam.ACMSigplanNotices18,4(1983),69–79.
[^14]: MINNICH, R. G. Linuxbios at four. Linux J. 2004, 118 (Feb. 2004), 8–.
[^15]: MOON, S.-P., KIM, J.-W., BAE, K.-H., LEE, J.-C., AND SEO, D.-W. Embedded
linux implementation on a commercial digital tv system. Consumer
Electronics, IEEE Transactions on 49, 4 (Nov 2003), 1402–1407.
[^16]: PIKE, R. Another go at language design. Stanford University Computer
Systems Laboratory Colloquium.
[^17]: RITCHIE, D. M. The limbo programming language. Inferno Programmer’s
Manual 2 (1997).
[^18]: SACCO, A. L., AND ORTEGA, A. A. Persistent bios infection. In CanSecWest
Applied Security Conference (2009).
[^19]: SAMPATHKUMAR, R. Vulnerability Management for Cloud Computing-2014: A
Cloud Computing Security Essential. Rajakumar Sampathkumar, 2014.
[^20]: SUGANUMA, T., OGASAWARA, T., TAKEUCHI, M., YASUE, T., KAWAHITO, M.,
ISHIZAKI, K., KOMATSU, H., AND NAKATANI, T. Overview of the ibm java
just-in-time compiler. IBM systems Journal 39, 1 (2000), 175–193.
[^21]: TEAM, G. The go programming language specification. Tech. rep.,
Technical Report [http://golang](http://golang/). org/doc/doc/go spec.
html, Google Inc, 2009.
[^22]: VAN HENSBERGEN, E., AND MINNICH, R. Grave robbers from outer space:
Using 9p2000 under linux. In USENIX Annual Technical Conference, FREENIX
Track (2005), pp. 83–94.
[^23]: VARIOUS. No papers have been published on onie; see onie.org.
[^24]: VARIOUS. No papers were published; see perllinux.sourceforge.net.
[^25]: WATSON, G. R., SOTTILE, M. J., MINNICH, R. G., CHOI, S.-E., AND
HERTDRIKS, E. Pink: A 1024-node single-system image linux cluster. In High
Performance Computing and Grid in Asia Pacific Region, 2004. Proceedings.
Seventh International Conference on (2004), IEEE, pp. 454–461.
[^26]: WELLS, N. Busybox: A swiss army knife for linux. Linux J. 2000, 78es
(Oct. 2000).
[^27]: WINTERBOTTOM, P. Alef language reference manual. Plan 9 Programmer’s Man
(1995).

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