chore: add pull_request_target event to GitHub workflows #941
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WalkthroughThis pull request modifies GitHub Actions workflow configurations for deployment and testing processes. The changes primarily focus on adding Changes
Sequence DiagramsequenceDiagram
participant PR as Pull Request
participant Workflow as GitHub Actions
participant Deploy as Deployment Job
participant Test as Test Job
PR ->> Workflow: Trigger pull_request_target
Workflow ->> Deploy: Conditional Stage & Certificate Selection
Workflow ->> Test: Conditional FQDN Selection
Deploy -->> Workflow: Deploy Artifacts
Test -->> Workflow: Run Tests
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Actionable comments posted: 1
🔭 Outside diff range comments (1)
.github/workflows/deploy-test-buffered.yml (1)
Line range hint
69-72: Maintain consistent action versions across jobsThe
pnpm/action-setupversion (v2) differs from the version used in the deploy job (v4). This inconsistency could lead to unexpected behavior.Update to use the same version:
- uses: pnpm/action-setup@v2 + uses: pnpm/action-setup@v4
🧹 Nitpick comments (2)
.github/workflows/deploy-test-buffered.yml (1)
Line range hint
44-49: Consider simplifying environment variable conditionalsThe environment variable declarations are correct but could be more maintainable. Consider extracting the complex certificate ARN conditional into a reusable GitHub Actions expression or composite action.
Example approach:
# Create a reusable expression in .github/workflows/expressions.yml certificateArn: | ${{ { 'lambda-mono': secrets.BUFFERED_LAMBDA_MONO_CERTIFICATE_ARN, 'lambda-s3': secrets.BUFFERED_LAMBDA_S3_CERTIFICATE_ARN, 'edge-unbundled': secrets.BUFFERED_EDGE_UNBUNDLED_CERTIFICATE_ARN }[matrix.architecture] }}.github/workflows/deploy-test.yml (1)
Line range hint
1-85: Consider unifying workflow configurationsThe workflows are well-aligned in structure and logic, which is good for maintainability. Consider:
- Creating shared workflow components for common job configurations
- Using workflow composition with
reusable workflows- Maintaining a single source of truth for shared configurations
This would help prevent inconsistencies like the pnpm version difference and reduce duplication.
Example approach:
# .github/workflows/shared/deploy-job.yml name: Shared Deploy Job on: workflow_call: inputs: architecture: required: true type: string secrets: certificate_arn: required: true jobs: deploy: runs-on: ubuntu-latest steps: # Common deployment steps
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📒 Files selected for processing (3)
.github/workflows/deploy-test-buffered.yml(1 hunks).github/workflows/deploy-test.yml(1 hunks)package.json(1 hunks)
✅ Files skipped from review due to trivial changes (1)
- package.json
🔇 Additional comments (1)
.github/workflows/deploy-test.yml (1)
8-9: Security concerns with pull_request_target
The same security considerations mentioned in the buffered workflow apply here.
| pull_request_target: | ||
| branches: main |
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💡 Codebase verification
Critical Security Issue: Unsafe pull_request_target implementation detected
The workflows are using pull_request_target trigger while checking out code and accessing sensitive repository secrets (AWS credentials) without explicitly specifying the base ref. This creates a security vulnerability where malicious PR code could potentially access production AWS credentials.
Current security issues:
- Both workflows use
actions/checkout@v4without specifyingref - AWS credentials and certificate ARNs are exposed to PR code
- Build and test steps run untrusted PR code with access to secrets
Required fixes:
- Remove
pull_request_targettrigger as it's unnecessary (workflows already havepull_requesttrigger) - If
pull_request_targetmust be kept, addref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.base.ref }}to checkout action - Split the workflow into two parts:
- One with
pull_requesttrigger for building/testing PR code - Another with
pull_request_targetfor tasks requiring secrets
- One with
🔗 Analysis chain
Security Warning: Carefully review pull_request_target implementation
Adding pull_request_target trigger requires careful consideration as it runs with repository context and has access to secrets, even from fork PRs. This can be dangerous if the workflow checks out and runs untrusted PR code with access to secrets.
To ensure security:
- Always use the base ref for checkout (
ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.base.ref }}) - Never checkout PR code when using repository secrets
- Implement proper input validation
Let's verify the checkout configuration:
Let me check the complete workflow file content to verify the checkout configuration and job permissions:
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Check if any workflow files use pull_request_target without explicit ref
rg -l 'pull_request_target' .github/workflows/ | xargs rg 'uses: actions/checkout@' -A 2
Length of output: 983
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Get full content of the workflow files using pull_request_target
cat .github/workflows/deploy-test-buffered.yml .github/workflows/deploy-test.yml
Length of output: 5790
Summary by CodeRabbit
New Features
pull_request_targetevents on themainbranch for deployment workflows.Bug Fixes
Chores
@jill64/sveltekit-adapter-awspackage inpackage.json.