Publish image attestations

[almet]

This pull request introduces a new workflow to automate the release of container images. Each night, the worflow builds a container image and uploads it to the container registry.

Note

Please note that, while signatures are involved in this workflow, the produced images are not signed by our release key. So, this is not to be confused with cosign sign commands, which are also used for independent container updates, but is different that the signatures involved when producing attestations.

Here is a list of the produced assets:

• resulting container image
• transparency log
• attestation

Verifying the validity of the attestation can be done with the following commands:

We should be able to also do it using sigstore-python and raw HTTP calls, but because the main goal here is to see how it works, I stopped there.

# First, login to the container registry.
# (We only need this because images are not publicly available yet)
# Enter "USERNAME" instead of your username
# and use your PAT as a password
regctl registry login ghcr.io

# Get the manifest from the latest tag
regctl manifest get --format raw-body ghcr.io/freedomofpress/dangerzone/dangerzone:latest > manifest.json

# The attestation for this manifest hash is available
# at the tag named "sha256-sha256(manifest.json)"
DIGEST="sha256-$(sha256sum manifest.json | awk '{ print $1 }')"
regctl artifact get ghcr.io/freedomofpress/dangerzone/dangerzone:${DIGEST} > bundle.json

# Finally verify that the attestation is the right one
cosign verify-blob-attestation --bundle bundle.json --new-bundle-format --certificate-oidc-issuer="https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com" --certificate-identity-regexp="^https://github.com/freedomofpress/dangerzone/.github/workflows/release-container-image.yml@refs/heads/test/image-publication-cosign" manifest.json

Related to #745

[almet]

ℹ️ One of the things that isn't clear yet is why the attestations show up as sha256-$(sha256sum manifest.json) in the container registry.

It seems related to the Reference Types effort effort which might not be implemented by the GHCR.

[almet]

In order to get the attestation from the container registry, one need to do a few HTTP requests. We found these do be hard to put together, so here is a summary of the calls we had to do (testing on my personal user in order to have the container be public):

Step	Endpoint	Headers
1. Get authentication token	https://ghcr.io/token	None
2. Fetch manifest for tag	https://ghcr.io/v2/almet/dangerzone/dangerzone/manifests/{tag}	Accept: application/vnd.docker.distribution.manifest.v2+json
3. Get manifest list for attestation	https://ghcr.io/v2/almet/dangerzone/dangerzone/manifests/sha256-{manifest_hash}	Accept: application/vnd.oci.image.index.v1+json
4. Get Sigstore bundle manifest	https://ghcr.io/v2/almet/dangerzone/dangerzone/manifests/{blob_manifest_digest}	Accept: application/vnd.oci.image.manifest.v1+json
5. Retrieve attestation blob	https://ghcr.io/v2/almet/dangerzone/dangerzone/blobs/{blob_hash}	None

Variable definitions:

• {tag}: Usually "latest" or a specific version
• {manifest_hash}: SHA256 hash of the original manifest content
• {blob_manifest_digest}: Digest from manifest list with artifactType = "application/vnd.dev.sigstore.bundle.v0.3+json"
• {blob_hash}: Digest from layers where mediaType = "application/vnd.dev.sigstore.bundle.v0.3+json"

Authentication:

• All requests (except token request) require header: Authorization: Bearer {token}
• Token obtained from /token endpoint with:
  • service=ghcr.io
  • scope=repository:almet/dangerzone/dangerzone:pull

These calls have been put together in a small script I wrote to download the attestations from a container registry for a specific tag.

[almet]

While trying to build our own attestations (without using the GHA), we've been puzzled by how the container registry was populated in different ways.

It turns out that attestations are different from plain signatures:

1. The Cosign Signature spec explains how plain signatures are represented. This is what's being used via cosign sign. It's using annotations (not to be confused with attestations), attaching them to the container registry. The signed payload are represented by the "simple signing" format.
2. The Cosign Bundle Specification explains how image attestations are to be represented as OCI artifacts, and attached to the container registry. This is what's being used via cosign attest
   • Currently the Attestation Specification is used, which uses Layers to represent attestations and annotations to specify the verification material.
   • The cosign bundle spec is currently being implemented in cosign but this isn't done yet.

---

What's been complex to understand is that cosign, in their documentation, points us to use cosign sign in order to sign our container images. This will add plain signatures and is different from an attestation.

(the attest-build-provenance this PR has been using uses the Cosign Bundle Specification)