[Rule Tuning] Expand Scope of Entra ID Brute Force Sign-In Attempts

rules/integrations/azure/credential_access_entra_id_brute_force_activity.toml

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+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2024/09/06"
+integration = ["azure"]
+maturity = "production"
+min_stack_comments = "Elastic ES|QL values aggregation is more performant in 8.16.5 and above."
+min_stack_version = "8.17.0"
+updated_date = "2025/06/05"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+Identifies potential brute-force attacks targeting user accounts by analyzing failed sign-in patterns in Microsoft Entra
+ID Sign-In Logs. This detection focuses on a high volume of failed interactive or non-interactive authentication
+attempts within a short time window, often indicative of password spraying, credential stuffing, or password guessing.
+Adversaries may use these techniques to gain unauthorized access to applications integrated with Entra ID or to
+compromise valid user accounts.
+"""
+false_positives = [
+    """
+    Automated processes that attempt to authenticate using expired credentials or have misconfigured authentication
+    settings may lead to false positives.
+    """,
+]
+from = "now-60m"
+interval = "15m"
+language = "esql"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "Microsoft Entra ID Sign-In Brute Force Activity"
+note = """## Triage and analysis
+
+### Investigating Microsoft Entra ID Sign-In Brute Force Activity
+
+This rule detects brute-force authentication activity in Entra ID sign-in logs. It classifies failed sign-in attempts into behavior types such as password spraying, credential stuffing, or password guessing. The classification (`bf_type`) helps prioritize triage and incident response.
+
+### Possible investigation steps
+
+- Review `bf_type`: Determines the brute-force technique being used (`password_spraying`, `credential_stuffing`, or `password_guessing`).
+- Examine `user_id_list`: Identify if high-value accounts (e.g., administrators, service principals, federated identities) are being targeted.
+- Review `login_errors`: Repetitive error types like `"Invalid Grant"` or `"User Not Found"` suggest automated attacks.
+- Check `ip_list` and `source_orgs`: Investigate if the activity originates from suspicious infrastructure (VPNs, hosting providers, etc.).
+- Validate `unique_ips` and `countries`: Geographic diversity and IP volume may indicate distributed or botnet-based attacks.
+- Compare `total_attempts` vs `duration_seconds`: High rate of failures in a short time period implies automation.
+- Analyze `user_agent.original` and `device_detail_browser`: User agents like `curl`, `Python`, or generic libraries may indicate scripting tools.
+- Investigate `client_app_display_name` and `incoming_token_type`: Detect potential abuse of legacy or unattended login mechanisms.
+- Inspect `target_resource_display_name`: Understand what application or resource the attacker is trying to access.
+- Pivot using `session_id` and `device_detail_device_id`: Determine if a device is targeting multiple accounts.
+- Review `conditional_access_status`: If not enforced, ensure Conditional Access policies are scoped correctly.
+
+### False positive analysis
+
+- Legitimate automation (e.g., misconfigured scripts, sync processes) can trigger repeated failures.
+- Internal red team activity or penetration tests may mimic brute-force behaviors.
+- Certain service accounts or mobile clients may generate repetitive sign-in noise if not properly configured.
+
+### Response and remediation
+
+- Notify your identity security team for further analysis.
+- Investigate and lock or reset impacted accounts if compromise is suspected.
+- Block offending IPs or ASNs at the firewall, proxy, or using Conditional Access.
+- Confirm MFA and Conditional Access are enforced for all user types.
+- Audit targeted accounts for credential reuse across services.
+- Implement account lockout or throttling for failed sign-in attempts where possible.
+"""
+references = [
+    "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2025/05/27/new-russia-affiliated-actor-void-blizzard-targets-critical-sectors-for-espionage/",
+    "https://cloud.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-cloud/azure-security/az-unauthenticated-enum-and-initial-entry/az-password-spraying",
+    "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/operations/incident-response-playbook-password-spray",
+    "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/purview/audit-log-detailed-properties",
+    "https://securityscorecard.com/research/massive-botnet-targets-m365-with-stealthy-password-spraying-attacks/",
+    "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity-platform/reference-error-codes",
+    "https://github.com/0xZDH/Omnispray",
+    "https://github.com/0xZDH/o365spray",
+]
+risk_score = 47
+rule_id = "cca64114-fb8b-11ef-86e2-f661ea17fbce"
+severity = "medium"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Cloud",
+    "Domain: Identity",
+    "Data Source: Azure",
+    "Data Source: Entra ID",
+    "Data Source: Entra ID Sign-in Logs",
+    "Use Case: Identity and Access Audit",
+    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
+    "Tactic: Credential Access",
+    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "esql"
+
+query = '''
+FROM logs-azure.signinlogs*
+
+| EVAL
+    time_window = DATE_TRUNC(15 minutes, @timestamp),
+    user_id = TO_LOWER(azure.signinlogs.properties.user_principal_name),
+    ip = source.ip,
+    login_error = azure.signinlogs.result_description,
+    error_code = azure.signinlogs.properties.status.error_code,
+    request_type = TO_LOWER(azure.signinlogs.properties.incoming_token_type),
+    app_name = TO_LOWER(azure.signinlogs.properties.app_display_name),
+    asn_org = source.`as`.organization.name,
+    country = source.geo.country_name,
+    user_agent = user_agent.original,
+    event_time = @timestamp
+
+| WHERE event.dataset == "azure.signinlogs"
+    AND event.category == "authentication"
+    AND azure.signinlogs.category IN ("NonInteractiveUserSignInLogs", "SignInLogs")
+    AND event.outcome == "failure"
+    AND azure.signinlogs.properties.authentication_requirement == "singleFactorAuthentication"
+    AND error_code != 50053
+| WHERE azure.signinlogs.properties.status.error_code IN (
+    50034,  // UserAccountNotFound
+    50126,  // InvalidUsernameOrPassword
+    50055,  // PasswordExpired
+    50056,  // InvalidPassword
+    50057,  // UserDisabled
+    50064,  // CredentialValidationFailure
+    50076,  // MFARequiredButNotPassed
+    50079,  // MFARegistrationRequired
+    50105,  // EntitlementGrantsNotFound
+    70000,  // InvalidGrant
+    70008,  // ExpiredOrRevokedRefreshToken
+    70043,  // BadTokenDueToSignInFrequency
+    80002,  // OnPremisePasswordValidatorRequestTimedOut
+    80005,  // OnPremisePasswordValidatorUnpredictableWebException
+    50144,  // InvalidPasswordExpiredOnPremPassword
+    50135,  // PasswordChangeCompromisedPassword
+    50142,  // PasswordChangeRequiredConditionalAccess
+    120000, // PasswordChangeIncorrectCurrentPassword
+    120002, // PasswordChangeInvalidNewPasswordWeak
+    120020  // PasswordChangeFailure
+)
+    AND user_id IS NOT NULL AND user_id != ""
+    AND user_agent != "Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSAL 1.0) PKeyAuth/1.0"
+    AND asn_org != "MICROSOFT-CORP-MSN-AS-BLOCK"
+
+| STATS
+    authentication_requirement = VALUES(azure.signinlogs.properties.authentication_requirement),
+    client_app_id = VALUES(azure.signinlogs.properties.app_id),
+    client_app_display_name = VALUES(azure.signinlogs.properties.app_display_name),
+    target_resource_id = VALUES(azure.signinlogs.properties.resource_id),
+    target_resource_display_name = VALUES(azure.signinlogs.properties.resource_display_name),
+    conditional_access_status = VALUES(azure.signinlogs.properties.conditional_access_status),
+    device_detail_browser = VALUES(azure.signinlogs.properties.device_detail.browser),
+    device_detail_device_id = VALUES(azure.signinlogs.properties.device_detail.device_id),
+    device_detail_operating_system = VALUES(azure.signinlogs.properties.device_detail.operating_system),
+    incoming_token_type = VALUES(azure.signinlogs.properties.incoming_token_type),
+    risk_state = VALUES(azure.signinlogs.properties.risk_state),
+    session_id = VALUES(azure.signinlogs.properties.session_id),
+    user_id = VALUES(azure.signinlogs.properties.user_id),
+    user_principal_name = VALUES(azure.signinlogs.properties.user_principal_name),
+    result_description = VALUES(azure.signinlogs.result_description),
+    result_signature = VALUES(azure.signinlogs.result_signature),
+    result_type = VALUES(azure.signinlogs.result_type),
+
+    unique_users = COUNT_DISTINCT(user_id),
+    user_id_list = VALUES(user_id),
+    login_errors = VALUES(login_error),
+    unique_login_errors = COUNT_DISTINCT(login_error),
+    error_codes = VALUES(error_code),
+    unique_error_codes = COUNT_DISTINCT(error_code),
+    request_types = VALUES(request_type),
+    app_names = VALUES(app_name),
+    ip_list = VALUES(ip),
+    unique_ips = COUNT_DISTINCT(ip),
+    source_orgs = VALUES(asn_org),
+    countries = VALUES(country),
+    unique_country_count = COUNT_DISTINCT(country),
+    unique_asn_orgs = COUNT_DISTINCT(asn_org),
+    first_seen = MIN(event_time),
+    last_seen = MAX(event_time),
+    total_attempts = COUNT()
+BY time_window
+
+| EVAL
+    duration_seconds = DATE_DIFF("seconds", first_seen, last_seen),
+    bf_type = CASE(
+        // Many users, relatively few distinct login errors, distributed over multiple IPs (but not too many),
+        // and happens quickly. Often bots using leaked credentials.
+        unique_users >= 10 AND total_attempts >= 30 AND unique_login_errors <= 3
+            AND unique_ips >= 5
+            AND duration_seconds <= 600
+            AND unique_users > unique_ips,
+        "credential_stuffing",
+
+        // One password against many users. Single error (e.g., "InvalidPassword"), not necessarily fast.
+        unique_users >= 15 AND unique_login_errors == 1 AND total_attempts >= 15 AND duration_seconds <= 1800,
+        "password_spraying",
+
+        // One user targeted repeatedly (same error), OR extremely noisy pattern from many IPs.
+        (unique_users == 1 AND unique_login_errors == 1 AND total_attempts >= 30 AND duration_seconds <= 300)
+            OR (unique_users <= 3 AND unique_ips > 30 AND total_attempts >= 100),
+        "password_guessing",
+
+        // everything else
+        "other"
+    )
+
+| KEEP
+    time_window, bf_type, duration_seconds, total_attempts, first_seen, last_seen,
+    unique_users, user_id_list, login_errors, unique_login_errors,
+    unique_error_codes, error_codes, request_types, app_names,
+    ip_list, unique_ips, source_orgs, countries,
+    unique_country_count, unique_asn_orgs,
+    authentication_requirement, client_app_id, client_app_display_name,
+    target_resource_id, target_resource_display_name, conditional_access_status,
+    device_detail_browser, device_detail_device_id, device_detail_operating_system,
+    incoming_token_type, risk_state, session_id, user_id,
+    user_principal_name, result_description, result_signature, result_type
+
+| WHERE bf_type != "other"
+'''
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1110"
+name = "Brute Force"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1110.001"
+name = "Password Guessing"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/001/"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1110.003"
+name = "Password Spraying"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/"
+
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1110.004"
+name = "Credential Stuffing"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/004/"
+
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0006"
+name = "Credential Access"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/"
+