Only use score and not quality as a term #475
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cowmarketing
approved these changes
Apr 14, 2025
fhenneke
approved these changes
Apr 14, 2025
pretf00d
reviewed
Apr 14, 2025
| @@ -92,12 +92,12 @@ At CoW DAO's discretion, systematic violation of these rules may lead to penaliz | |||
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| More details about how a certificate of an EBBO violation is computed, and what are the steps taken in case such a violation occurs can be found in [this](/cow-protocol/reference/core/auctions/ebbo-rules) section. | |||
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| - Inflation of the objective function ([CIP-11](https://snapshot.org/#/cow.eth/proposal/0x16d8c681d52b24f1ccd854084e07a99fce6a7af1e25fd21ddae6534b411df870)). Using tokens for the sole purpose of inflating the objective value or maximizing the reward is forbidden (e.g., by creating fake tokens, or wash-trading with real tokens). | |||
| - Inflation of the score ([CIP-11](https://snapshot.org/#/cow.eth/proposal/0x16d8c681d52b24f1ccd854084e07a99fce6a7af1e25fd21ddae6534b411df870)). Using tokens for the sole purpose of inflating the score of a solution or maximizing the reward is forbidden (e.g., by creating fake tokens, or wash-trading with real tokens). | |||
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| - Illegal use of internal buffers ([CIP-11](https://snapshot.org/#/cow.eth/proposal/0x16d8c681d52b24f1ccd854084e07a99fce6a7af1e25fd21ddae6534b411df870)). The internal buffers may only be used to replace legitimate AMM interactions available to the general public for the purpose of saving transaction costs, and also to allow for the successful execution of settlements that occur some slippage. However, systematic and intentional buffer trading with tokens that are not safe, although will be accounted for as slippage, is discouraged as it poses a significant inventory risk to the protocol, and solvers that do so can be flagged and potentially slashed. In general, any attack vector to the internal buffers that is created by a solver can be considered a malicious and illegal behavior. | |||
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"occur some slippage" needs to change to "incur slippage"
pretf00d
reviewed
Apr 14, 2025
| @@ -41,11 +41,11 @@ The payment is capped from above and below using the function $$\textrm{cap}(x) | |||
| - Ethereum mainnet, Arbitrum, and Base chain: $$c_l = 0.010 \;\textrm{ETH}$$ and $$c_u = 0.012 \;\textrm{ETH}$$, | |||
| - Gnosis Chain: $$c_l = c_u = 10 \;\textrm{xDAI}$$. | |||
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| Submitted scores that are non-positive will be ignored. If only one solution is submitted, $$\textrm{referenceQuality}$$ is set to zero. Formally, this corresponds to always considering the empty solution which does not settle any trades and has quality zero as part of the submitted solutions. | |||
| Submitted scores that are non-positive will be ignored. If only one solution is submitted, $$\textrm{referenceScore}$$ is set to zero. Formally, this corresponds to always considering the empty solution which does not settle any trades and has score equal to zero as part of the submitted solutions. | |||
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"does not settle any trades and has score equal to" --> "does not settle any trades and has a score equal to"
pretf00d
reviewed
Apr 14, 2025
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| :::note | ||
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| There is no guarantee that the per-auction rewards are greater than the gas costs of executing a transaction. Hence, solvers cover these costs by adjusting their reported quality. Of course, a solver who adjusts quality downward too aggressively is then at a disadvantage in the auction. The mechanism, therefore, incentivizes the accurate estimation of gas costs. | ||
| There is no guarantee that the per-auction rewards are greater than the gas costs of executing a transaction. Hence, solvers cover these costs by adjusting their reported score. Of course, a solver who adjusts score downward too aggressively is then at a disadvantage in the auction. The mechanism, therefore, incentivizes the accurate estimation of gas costs. |
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"Of course, a solver who adjusts score downward too aggressively is then at a disadvantage in the auction." --> "Of course, a solver who adjusts their score downward too aggressively is at a disadvantage in the auction."
pretf00d
requested changes
Apr 14, 2025
Thanks! Addressed all comments |
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Merging as we need to do a follow-up PR with the CIP-65 changes |
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This PR removes the term "quality" that was still used in the solver/mechanism documentation and only uses score, as using both terms created unnecessary confusion.