Add CONFIG_CC_IS_CLANG and CONFIG_CC_IS_GCC to the KSPP recommendations

It makes the tool show less FAILs.

kernel_hardening_checker/config_files/kspp-recommendations/kspp-kconfig-arm.config

@@ -250,6 +250,7 @@ CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT=y
 # arm
 
 CONFIG_ARM=y
+CONFIG_CC_IS_GCC=y
 
 # Disallow allocating the first 32k of memory (cannot be 64k due to ARM loader).
 CONFIG_DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR=32768

kernel_hardening_checker/config_files/kspp-recommendations/kspp-kconfig-arm64-clang.config

@@ -0,0 +1,291 @@
+# Linux/arm64 6.6.7 Kernel Configuration
+
+# Report BUG() conditions and kill the offending process.
+CONFIG_BUG=y
+
+# Make sure kernel page tables have safe permissions.
+CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX=y
+
+# Report any dangerous memory permissions (not available on all archs).
+CONFIG_DEBUG_WX=y
+
+# Use -fstack-protector-strong (gcc 4.9+) for best stack canary coverage.
+# Prior to v4.18, these are:
+#  CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y
+#  CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG=y
+CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR=y
+CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG=y
+
+# Do not allow direct physical memory access (but if you must have it, at least enable STRICT mode...)
+# CONFIG_DEVMEM is not set
+CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM=y
+CONFIG_IO_STRICT_DEVMEM=y
+
+# Provides some protections against SYN flooding.
+CONFIG_SYN_COOKIES=y
+
+# Perform additional validation of various commonly targeted structures.
+CONFIG_LIST_HARDENED=y
+CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS=y
+CONFIG_DEBUG_NOTIFIERS=y
+CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST=y
+CONFIG_DEBUG_SG=y
+CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL=y
+CONFIG_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION=y
+CONFIG_SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK=y
+
+# Provide userspace with seccomp BPF API for syscall attack surface reduction.
+CONFIG_SECCOMP=y
+CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER=y
+
+# Make sure line disciplines can't be autoloaded (since v5.1).
+# CONFIG_LDISC_AUTOLOAD is not set
+
+# Provide userspace with ptrace ancestry protections.
+# Make sure that "yama" is also present in the "CONFIG_LSM=yama,..." list.
+CONFIG_SECURITY=y
+CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA=y
+
+# Provide userspace with Landlock MAC interface.
+# Make sure that "landlock" is also present in the "CONFIG_LSM=landlock,..." list.
+CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK=y
+
+# Make sure SELinux cannot be disabled trivially.
+# CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM is not set
+# CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP is not set
+# CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG is not set
+# CONFIG_SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS is not set
+
+# Enable "lockdown" LSM for bright line between the root user and kernel memory.
+CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM=y
+CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM_EARLY=y
+CONFIG_LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL_FORCE_CONFIDENTIALITY=y
+
+# Perform usercopy bounds checking. (And disable fallback to gain full whitelist enforcement.)
+CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY=y
+# CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK is not set
+# CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_PAGESPAN is not set
+
+# Randomize allocator freelists, harden metadata.
+CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM=y
+CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED=y
+CONFIG_RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES=y
+
+# Make cross-slab heap attacks not as trivial when object sizes are the same. (Same as slab_nomerge boot param.)
+# CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT is not set
+
+# Allow for randomization of high-order page allocation freelist. Must be enabled with
+# the "page_alloc.shuffle=1" command line below).
+CONFIG_SHUFFLE_PAGE_ALLOCATOR=y
+
+# Sanity check userspace page table mappings (since v5.17)
+CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_CHECK=y
+CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_CHECK_ENFORCED=y
+
+# Allow allocator validation checking to be enabled (see "slub_debug=P" below).
+CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG=y
+
+# Wipe higher-level memory allocations when they are freed (needs "page_poison=1" command line below).
+# (If you can afford even more performance penalty, leave CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_NO_SANITY=n)
+CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING=y
+CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_NO_SANITY=y
+CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_ZERO=y
+
+# Wipe slab and page allocations (since v5.3)
+# Instead of "slub_debug=P" and "page_poison=1", a single place can control memory allocation wiping now.
+# The init_on_free is only needed if there is concern about minimizing stale data lifetime.
+CONFIG_INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON=y
+CONFIG_INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON=y
+
+# Initialize all stack variables on function entry. (Clang and GCC 12+ builds only. For earlier GCC, see CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL=y below)
+CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO=y
+
+# Adds guard pages to kernel stacks (not all architectures support this yet).
+CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y
+
+# Perform extensive checks on reference counting.
+CONFIG_REFCOUNT_FULL=y
+
+# Check for memory copies that might overflow a structure in str*() and mem*() functions both at build-time and run-time.
+CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE=y
+
+# Avoid kernel memory address exposures via dmesg (sets sysctl kernel.dmesg_restrict initial value to 1)
+CONFIG_SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT=y
+
+# Enable trapping bounds checking of array indexes (since v5.11). All the other UBSAN checks should be disabled.
+CONFIG_UBSAN=y
+CONFIG_UBSAN_TRAP=y
+CONFIG_UBSAN_BOUNDS=y
+CONFIG_UBSAN_SANITIZE_ALL=y
+# CONFIG_UBSAN_SHIFT is not set
+# CONFIG_UBSAN_DIV_ZERO is not set
+# CONFIG_UBSAN_UNREACHABLE is not set
+# CONFIG_UBSAN_BOOL is not set
+# CONFIG_UBSAN_ENUM is not set
+# CONFIG_UBSAN_ALIGNMENT is not set
+# This is only available on Clang builds, and is likely already enabled if CONFIG_UBSAN_BOUNDS=y is set:
+CONFIG_UBSAN_LOCAL_BOUNDS=y
+
+# Enable sampling-based overflow detection (since v5.12). This is similar to KASAN coverage, but with almost zero runtime overhead.
+CONFIG_KFENCE=y
+CONFIG_KFENCE_SAMPLE_INTERVAL=100
+
+# Randomize kernel stack offset on syscall entry (since v5.13).
+CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET_DEFAULT=y
+
+# Do not ignore compile-time warnings (since v5.15)
+CONFIG_WERROR=y
+
+# Disable DMA between EFI hand-off and the kernel's IOMMU setup.
+CONFIG_EFI_DISABLE_PCI_DMA=y
+
+# Force IOMMU TLB invalidation so devices will never be able to access stale data contents (or set "iommu.passthrough=0 iommu.strict=1" at boot)
+CONFIG_IOMMU_SUPPORT=y
+CONFIG_IOMMU_DEFAULT_DMA_STRICT=y
+
+# Enable feeding RNG entropy from TPM, if available.
+CONFIG_HW_RANDOM_TPM=y
+
+# Get as much entropy as possible from external sources. The Chacha mixer isn't vulnerable to injected entropy, so even
+# malicious sources should not cause problems.
+CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER=y
+CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU=y
+
+# Make scheduler aware of SMT Cores. Program needs to opt-in to using this feature with prctl(PR_SCHED_CORE).
+CONFIG_SCHED_CORE=y
+
+# Wipe all caller-used registers on exit from the function (reduces available ROP gadgets and
+# minimizes stale data in registers). (Since v5.15)
+CONFIG_ZERO_CALL_USED_REGS=y
+
+# Wipe RAM at reboot via EFI.
+# For more details, see:
+# https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/pc-client-work-group-platform-reset-attack-mitigation-specification/
+# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1532058
+CONFIG_RESET_ATTACK_MITIGATION=y
+
+# This needs userspace support, and will break "regular" distros. See: https://github.com/tych0/huldufolk
+CONFIG_STATIC_USERMODEHELPER=y
+
+# Dangerous; enabling this allows direct physical memory writing.
+# CONFIG_ACPI_CUSTOM_METHOD is not set
+
+# Dangerous; enabling this disables brk ASLR.
+# CONFIG_COMPAT_BRK is not set
+
+# Dangerous; enabling this allows direct kernel memory writing.
+# CONFIG_DEVKMEM is not set
+
+# Dangerous; exposes kernel text image layout.
+# CONFIG_PROC_KCORE is not set
+
+# Dangerous; enabling this disables VDSO ASLR.
+# CONFIG_COMPAT_VDSO is not set
+
+# Dangerous; enabling this allows replacement of running kernel.
+# CONFIG_KEXEC is not set
+
+# Dangerous; enabling this allows replacement of running kernel.
+# CONFIG_HIBERNATION is not set
+
+# Prior to v4.1, assists heap memory attacks; best to keep interface disabled.
+# CONFIG_INET_DIAG is not set
+
+# Easily confused by misconfigured userspace, keep off.
+# CONFIG_BINFMT_MISC is not set
+
+# Use the modern PTY interface (devpts) only.
+# CONFIG_LEGACY_PTYS is not set
+
+# Block TTY stuffing attacks (this will break screen readers, see "dev.tty.legacy_tiocsti" sysctl below).
+# CONFIG_LEGACY_TIOCSTI is not set
+
+# If SELinux can be disabled at runtime, the LSM structures cannot be read-only; keep off.
+# CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE is not set
+
+# Reboot devices immediately if kernel experiences an Oops.
+CONFIG_PANIC_ON_OOPS=y
+CONFIG_PANIC_TIMEOUT=-1
+
+# Limit sysrq to sync,unmount,reboot. For more details see the sysrq bit field table.
+CONFIG_MAGIC_SYSRQ_DEFAULT_ENABLE=176
+
+# Keep root from altering kernel memory via loadable modules.
+# CONFIG_MODULES is not set
+
+# But if CONFIG_MODULE=y is needed, at least they must be signed with a per-build key.
+# See also kernel.modules_disabled sysctl below.
+CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX=y
+CONFIG_MODULE_SIG=y
+CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE=y
+CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_ALL=y
+CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA512=y
+CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_HASH="sha512"
+CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY="certs/signing_key.pem"
+# CONFIG_MODULE_FORCE_LOAD is not set
+
+# GCC plugins
+
+# Enable GCC Plugins
+CONFIG_GCC_PLUGINS=y
+
+# Gather additional entropy at boot time for systems that may not have appropriate entropy sources.
+CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY=y
+
+# Force all structures to be initialized before they are passed to other functions.
+# When building with GCC:
+CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK=y
+CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL=y
+
+# Wipe stack contents on syscall exit (reduces stale data lifetime in stack)
+CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK=y
+# CONFIG_STACKLEAK_METRICS is not set
+# CONFIG_STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE is not set
+
+# Randomize the layout of system structures. This may have dramatic performance impact, so
+# use with caution or also use CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT_PERFORMANCE=y
+CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT=y
+# CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT_PERFORMANCE is not set
+
+# arm64
+
+CONFIG_ARM64=y
+CONFIG_CC_IS_CLANG=y
+
+# Disallow allocating the first 32k of memory (cannot be 64k due to ARM loader).
+CONFIG_DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR=32768
+
+# Randomize position of kernel (requires UEFI RNG or bootloader support for /chosen/kaslr-seed DT property).
+CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE=y
+
+# Remove arm32 support to reduce syscall attack surface.
+# CONFIG_COMPAT is not set
+
+# Make sure PAN emulation is enabled.
+CONFIG_ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN=y
+
+# Enable Kernel Page Table Isolation to remove an entire class of cache timing side-channels.
+CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0=y
+
+# Enable Software Shadow Stack when hardware Pointer Authentication (PAC) isn't available.
+CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK=y
+CONFIG_UNWIND_PATCH_PAC_INTO_SCS=y
+
+# Pointer authentication (ARMv8.3 and later). If hardware actually supports it, one can
+# turn off CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG with this enabled.
+CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH=y
+CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL=y
+
+# Available in ARMv8.5 and later.
+CONFIG_ARM64_BTI=y
+CONFIG_ARM64_BTI_KERNEL=y
+CONFIG_ARM64_MTE=y
+CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS=y
+CONFIG_ARM64_E0PD=y
+
+# Available in ARMv8.7 and later.
+CONFIG_ARM64_EPAN=y
+
+# Enable Control Flow Integrity
+CONFIG_CFI_CLANG=y
+# CONFIG_CFI_PERMISSIVE is not set

kernel_hardening_checker/config_files/kspp-recommendations/kspp-kconfig-arm64.config → kernel_hardening_checker/config_files/kspp-recommendations/kspp-kconfig-arm64-gcc.config

@@ -250,6 +250,7 @@ CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT=y
 # arm64
 
 CONFIG_ARM64=y
+CONFIG_CC_IS_GCC=y
 
 # Disallow allocating the first 32k of memory (cannot be 64k due to ARM loader).
 CONFIG_DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR=32768

kernel_hardening_checker/config_files/kspp-recommendations/kspp-kconfig-x86-32.config

@@ -250,6 +250,7 @@ CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT=y
 # x86_32
 
 CONFIG_X86_32=y
+CONFIG_CC_IS_GCC=y
 
 # On 32-bit kernels, require PAE for NX bit support.
 # CONFIG_M486 is not set