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PolicyEngine · Nov 6, 2024 · 5083822 · 5083822
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Showing 1 changed file with 11 additions and 11 deletions.
diff --git a/src/posts/articles/cgt-autumn-budget.md b/src/posts/articles/cgt-autumn-budget.md
@@ -6,17 +6,17 @@ When accounting for behavioural responses, we project that these changes will ra
 
 We project the CGT reforms will raise £6.4 billion from 2025 to 2029\.
 
-| Fiscal Year | 2024-25 | 2025-26 | 2026-27 | 2027-28 | 2028-29 | 2029-30 | Total |
-| :---- | :---- | :---- | :---- | :---- | :---- | :---- | :---- |
-| Revenue (£bn) | 0.0 | [1.0](https://policyengine.org/uk/policy?focus=policyOutput.policyBreakdown&reform=69739&region=uk&timePeriod=2025&baseline=1) | [1.2](https://policyengine.org/uk/policy?focus=policyOutput.policyBreakdown&reform=69739&region=uk&timePeriod=2026&baseline=1) | [1.4](https://policyengine.org/uk/policy?focus=policyOutput.policyBreakdown&reform=69739&region=uk&timePeriod=2027&baseline=1) | [1.4](https://policyengine.org/uk/policy?focus=policyOutput.policyBreakdown&reform=69739&region=uk&timePeriod=2028&baseline=1) | [1.4](https://policyengine.org/uk/policy?focus=policyOutput.policyBreakdown&reform=69739&region=uk&timePeriod=2029&baseline=1) | 6.4 |
+| Fiscal Year   | 2024-25 | 2025-26                                                                                                                        | 2026-27                                                                                                                        | 2027-28                                                                                                                        | 2028-29                                                                                                                        | 2029-30                                                                                                                        | Total |
+| :------------ | :------ | :----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | :----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | :----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | :----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | :----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | :---- |
+| Revenue (£bn) | 0.0     | [1.0](https://policyengine.org/uk/policy?focus=policyOutput.policyBreakdown&reform=69739&region=uk&timePeriod=2025&baseline=1) | [1.2](https://policyengine.org/uk/policy?focus=policyOutput.policyBreakdown&reform=69739&region=uk&timePeriod=2026&baseline=1) | [1.4](https://policyengine.org/uk/policy?focus=policyOutput.policyBreakdown&reform=69739&region=uk&timePeriod=2027&baseline=1) | [1.4](https://policyengine.org/uk/policy?focus=policyOutput.policyBreakdown&reform=69739&region=uk&timePeriod=2028&baseline=1) | [1.4](https://policyengine.org/uk/policy?focus=policyOutput.policyBreakdown&reform=69739&region=uk&timePeriod=2029&baseline=1) | 6.4   |
 
 These estimates are 29% less than HMT and 26% less than the OBR. These variations may stem from different assumptions about behavioural responses. In our model, we assume individuals will adjust their capital gains realisations with an elasticity of \-0.7 with respect to the marginal tax rate; neither HMT nor OBR specify their assumptions on this front.
 
-| Source | 2024-25 | 2025-26 | 2026-27 | 2027-28 | 2028-29 | 2029-30 | Total |
-| ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- |
-| PolicyEngine | 0.0 | 1.0 | 1.2 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 6.4 |
-| HM Treasury | 0.1 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 2.2 | 2.5 | 9.0 |
-| OBR | 0.1 | 1.4 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 2.1 | 2.4 | 8.6 |
+| Source       | 2024-25 | 2025-26 | 2026-27 | 2027-28 | 2028-29 | 2029-30 | Total |
+| ------------ | ------- | ------- | ------- | ------- | ------- | ------- | ----- |
+| PolicyEngine | 0.0     | 1.0     | 1.2     | 1.4     | 1.4     | 1.4     | 6.4   |
+| HM Treasury  | 0.1     | 1.4     | 1.4     | 1.4     | 2.2     | 2.5     | 9.0   |
+| OBR          | 0.1     | 1.4     | 1.3     | 1.3     | 2.1     | 2.4     | 8.6   |
 
 Assuming [no behavioural change](https://policyengine.org/uk/policy?focus=policyOutput.policyBreakdown&reform=69732&region=uk&timePeriod=2025&baseline=1), we project the change to generate £22.2 billion from 2025 to 2029\. While the OBR also provides estimates it describes as static, those account for changes in realisation behaviour, making them incomparable to our static results.
 
@@ -30,6 +30,6 @@ Our [distributional analysis](https://policyengine.org/uk/policy?focus=policyOut
 
 Read more of PolicyEngine’s Autumn Budget 2024 coverage:
 
-- [Employer National Insurance reforms](https://policyengine.org/uk/research/autumn-budget-24-employer-ni)  
-- [Private school VAT changes](https://policyengine.org/uk/research/vat-school-comparison)  
-- [Fuel Duty freeze](https://policyengine.org/uk/research/autumn-budget-24-fuel-duty)
+- [Employer National Insurance reforms](https://policyengine.org/uk/research/autumn-budget-24-employer-ni)
+- [Private school VAT changes](https://policyengine.org/uk/research/vat-school-comparison)
+- [Fuel Duty freeze](https://policyengine.org/uk/research/autumn-budget-24-fuel-duty)