fix: Ensure that input doesn't exceed the modulus, this time for real #37
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vadorovsky
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Apparently, `from_random_bytes` doesn't do it reliably. An another alternative we considered from ark-ff is `F::from_bigint`, but it can panic... Therefore, it's just better if we convert an array to `BigUint` (and then to `F::BigInt`) and do the modulus check ourselves. Fixes: #36
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ananas-block
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Oct 31, 2023
samkim-crypto
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That new release contains an important change which prevents a potential DDoS. * Lightprotocol/light-poseidon#32 Invoking `from_bytes_be` function light-poseidon 0.1.1 inverts all the inputs before performing a check whether their length exceeds the modulus of the prime field. Therefore, it was prone to an attack, where a mailicious user could submit long byte slices just to DDoS the validator, being stuck on inverting large byte sequences. The update and mentioned change fixes the same issue as #33363 aims to address. The new release contains also few other less important changes like: * Lightprotocol/light-poseidon#37 * Lightprotocol/light-poseidon#38 * Lightprotocol/light-poseidon#39
mergify bot
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Nov 28, 2023
That new release contains an important change which prevents a potential DDoS. * Lightprotocol/light-poseidon#32 Invoking `from_bytes_be` function light-poseidon 0.1.1 inverts all the inputs before performing a check whether their length exceeds the modulus of the prime field. Therefore, it was prone to an attack, where a mailicious user could submit long byte slices just to DDoS the validator, being stuck on inverting large byte sequences. The update and mentioned change fixes the same issue as #33363 aims to address. The new release contains also few other less important changes like: * Lightprotocol/light-poseidon#37 * Lightprotocol/light-poseidon#38 * Lightprotocol/light-poseidon#39 (cherry picked from commit 67f8daf) # Conflicts: # Cargo.lock # Cargo.toml # programs/sbf/Cargo.lock
Lichtso
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Nov 28, 2023
That new release contains an important change which prevents a potential DDoS. * Lightprotocol/light-poseidon#32 Invoking `from_bytes_be` function light-poseidon 0.1.1 inverts all the inputs before performing a check whether their length exceeds the modulus of the prime field. Therefore, it was prone to an attack, where a mailicious user could submit long byte slices just to DDoS the validator, being stuck on inverting large byte sequences. The update and mentioned change fixes the same issue as #33363 aims to address. The new release contains also few other less important changes like: * Lightprotocol/light-poseidon#37 * Lightprotocol/light-poseidon#38 * Lightprotocol/light-poseidon#39 (cherry picked from commit 67f8daf)
samkim-crypto
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…4247) chore: Update light-poseidon to 0.2.0 (#33923) That new release contains an important change which prevents a potential DDoS. * Lightprotocol/light-poseidon#32 Invoking `from_bytes_be` function light-poseidon 0.1.1 inverts all the inputs before performing a check whether their length exceeds the modulus of the prime field. Therefore, it was prone to an attack, where a mailicious user could submit long byte slices just to DDoS the validator, being stuck on inverting large byte sequences. The update and mentioned change fixes the same issue as #33363 aims to address. The new release contains also few other less important changes like: * Lightprotocol/light-poseidon#37 * Lightprotocol/light-poseidon#38 * Lightprotocol/light-poseidon#39 (cherry picked from commit 67f8daf) Co-authored-by: vadorovsky <[email protected]>
crossdev24
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That new release contains an important change which prevents a potential DDoS. * Lightprotocol/light-poseidon#32 Invoking `from_bytes_be` function light-poseidon 0.1.1 inverts all the inputs before performing a check whether their length exceeds the modulus of the prime field. Therefore, it was prone to an attack, where a mailicious user could submit long byte slices just to DDoS the validator, being stuck on inverting large byte sequences. The update and mentioned change fixes the same issue as #33363 aims to address. The new release contains also few other less important changes like: * Lightprotocol/light-poseidon#37 * Lightprotocol/light-poseidon#38 * Lightprotocol/light-poseidon#39
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Apparently,
from_random_bytesdoesn't do it reliably, so we have to useF::from_bigint. To be absolutely sure there will be no surprises, let's keep an explicit check.Fixes: #36