Clarify note slightly.

LLFourn · May 29, 2020 · 2ddc7ca · 2ddc7ca
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diff --git a/main.tex b/main.tex
@@ -761,8 +761,9 @@ \section{ Proof for Theorem \ref{claim-ecdsa-eufcma}}
   $\Ocdh$ oracle we implicitly make the discrete logarithm problem
   easy\cite{Kushwaha16} making the reduction from the discrete logarithm
   pointless. I am in the process of fixing the proof so that it no longer
-  requires such a powerful oracle and can be reduced to the static
-  Diffie-Hellman problem \cite{SDHP}}
+  requires such a powerful oracle and can be reduced from the discrete logarithm
+  problem with a static Diffie-Hellman oracle. Technically, this is slightly easier than the
+  usual discrete logarithm problem but still secure in practice.\cite{SDHP}}
 
 \label{proof-ecdsa-eufcma}
 As we have proved, the ECDSA one-time VES is not \EUFCMAVES secure if the CDH problem is hard. We now wish to show that if the CDH problem were easy then it would satisfy \EUFCMAVES i.e.\ leak no useful information to a forger. Thus we give our reduction access to an $\Ocdh$ oracle which when queried with $\Ocdh(X,Y)$ returns $Z$ such that (X,Y,Z) is a Diffie-Hellman tuple with respect to $g$. Additionally, in the reduction we simulate the NIZK $\DLEQ$ proof $\pi$ with $\Sdleq$.