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[KIP-002] Establish Criteria to Explore Lowering the Stability Fee #3

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Add KIP-002
Keefer Taylor committed Aug 5, 2021
commit 8f0b61971758501e4797c3fa5454f57e931e4457
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# Kolibri Improvement Proposal #002

Author: Keefer Taylor, Hover Labs <[email protected]>"
Created: 04/08/2021
State: Draft

### Summary

Sets economic parameters in which we'd consider lowering the stability fee based on economic data.

### Motivation

Kolibri's `stability fee` (the rate charged to borrowers) is currently 22%. While this has helped keep peg stable, the high rate may be hindering the growth and adoption of Kolibri.

In the early days of `kUSD` there was nothing to do with the asset besides sell it for `XTZ`. This effectively meant `kUSD` minters could take long positions on the price of `XTZ`. The other use case available to minters were peer to peer transactions of `kUSD` and holding `kUSD` to liquidate ovens. Demand for long positions greatly outstripped other use cases, and [KIP006](https://forum.tezosagora.org/t/kolibri-governance-proposal-6-continuous-increase-of-the-stability-fee-to-reach-peg/2851) continuously raised the stability fee until peg was achieved.
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I'm not sure I'd refer to that former gov proposal as KIP006, that's pretty confusing IMO.

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Renamed to "our initial fee raising proposal" but I don't love it. Happy to take a name suggestion.


Since the early days, several new use cases for kUSD have `emerged`:
- [Liquidity Providing on Quipuswap](https://analytics.quipuswap.com/pairs/KT1K4EwTpbvYN9agJdjpyJm4ZZdhpUNKB3F6): Earn fees by providing liquidity; Currently ~$1.3M `kUSD` are locked
- [Kolibri Liquidity Pool](https://kolibri.finance/liquidity-pool): Pool money to help liquidate undercollateralized ovens; Currently ~$680k `kUSD` are locked
- [Kolibri Farms](https://kolibri.finance/farming): Stake your `kUSD` to receive `kDAO`; currently +$1.5M `kUSD` locked
- [Crunchy Farms](https://app.crunchy.network/#/farms): Stake your `kUSD` to receive `crDAO`; currently ~$340k `kUSD` locked
- [Rocket Launchpad](https://twitter.com/Rocketlaunchpd/status/1422394040839024641?s=20): Will accept `kUSD` in their upcoming token sale

We also anticipate new products coming online, specifically:
- [sexp](https://gitlab.com/smartcontractlabs/sexp-binary-options/-/blob/master/README.md): Trustless binary options settled in `kUSD`
- Additional Decentralized Exchanges, notably SpicySwap and Plenty Finance, where users can provie liquidity
- Lending platforms that will provide return on lending kUSD (Specifically [Tezos.Finance](https://tezos.finance/) and [Yupana](https://yupana.finance/) and [Hera](https://docs.heranetwork.co/#2-2-lending)). Hover Labs has also stated that we may want to launch a `kUSD` lending platform
- Upon activation of the Tezos Granada Protocol (~48 hours from now), Kolibri farms will return double with the increased block time.

These additional use cases give folks reasons to have reason to want to balance out the adoption of `kUSD`, however, the high stability fee may be limiting demand for these use cases.

### Details

As in [KIP006](https://forum.tezosagora.org/t/kolibri-governance-proposal-6-continuous-increase-of-the-stability-fee-to-reach-peg/2851), we propose lowering the stability fee according to an exponentially weighted moving average of the last 10 days.

During KIP006, adjustments were done via a multisig with an 8 hour timelock, which allowed fine-grained, frequent, adjustments. Now that Kolibri is governed by Kolibri DAO, proposals will take 10 days to pass (7 days voting, 3 days timelock). This means that criteria for lowering the stability fee may need to be forward looking, and may need to be cancelled if passed.

I propose the following set of criteria:
- When EMA10 of the Quipuswap Kolibri Peg (as determined by [Kolibri Stats](https://p.datadoghq.com/sb/e72980047-41e546b0c453a72015620c4d8002646b?theme=dark&tile_size=xl&tpl_var_network=mainnet&from_ts=1627510220124&to_ts=1628115020124&live=true)) reaches -.5%, Hover Labs will submit a proposal to lower the stability fee
- We shall lower the stability fee to 20% yearly
- If, during the period of voting and timelock, the EMA10 of the Quipuswap Kolibri Peg (as determined by [Kolibri Stats](https://p.datadoghq.com/sb/e72980047-41e546b0c453a72015620c4d8002646b?theme=dark&tile_size=xl&tpl_var_network=mainnet&from_ts=1627510220124&to_ts=1628115020124&live=true)) reaches above +5%, Hover Labs will commit to cancelling the proposal
- Any additional DEXes that come online during the next 30 days will be disregarded, since liquidity may be low and prices therefore volatile

This set of criteria affords us several benefits;
- **Small Cut**: A small cut to the fee is unlikely to massively destabilize the protocol, and provides additional data
- **Forward Looking**: A down trend to -.5% indicates a direction of the `kUSD` peg where we could begin voting
- **Reversible**: If, during voting, peg destabilizes then the proposal is always cancellable. If `kUSD` fails to hold peg at 20% stability fee, we can always submit n additional proposal.

This adjustment can be codified with the following proposal lambda, submitted to Kolibri DAO:
```
TODO(keefertaylor): Write this lambda when we have consensus
```