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<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN">
<html>
<head>
<title>COMSOC-2016: Sixth International Workshop on Computational Social Choice</title>
<link rel="stylesheet" href="web/comsoc.css" type="text/css">
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<center>

<!-- top banner starts here -->
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<tr><td background="images/toulouse.jpg" height="220px" valign="top">

<div id="top">
Sixth International Workshop on Computational Social Choice<br>
Toulouse, France, 22&ndash;24 June 2016
</div>
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</table>
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<table border="0" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" width="850px">
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<!-- menu starts here -->
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<div id="menu">
<a href="index.html">COMSOC-2016</a>
<!--<a href="program.html">Program</a>-->
<a href="acc.html">Accepted Papers</a>
<a href="program.html">Program</a>
<!--<a href="proceedings.html">Workshop Notes</a> -->
<a href="invited.html">Invited Speakers</a>
<!-- <a href="tutorial.html">LogICCC Tutorial Day</a> -->
<a href="pictures.html">Pictures</a>
<a href="pc.html">Committees</a>
<a href="cfp.html">Call for Papers</a>
<a href="dates.html">Important Dates</a>
<a href="industry.html">Industry Day</a>
<a href="submission.html">Paper submission</a>
<a href="registration.html">Registration</a>
<a href="location.html">Location</a>
<a href="travel.html">Travel and Accommodation</a>
<a href="sponsors.html">Sponsors</a>
<a href="http://www.illc.uva.nl/COMSOC/workshops.html" target="_blank">Previous COMSOCs</a>
<a href="contact.html">Contact</a>
</div>
</td>


<td>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</td>

<td width="100%">
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<h1>Accepted Papers</h1>

<p> The accepted papers are:

<ul>
<li> Cycles and Intractability in Social Choice Theory<br>
<i>William Zwicker</i>
<li> Pareto optimal matchings of students to courses in the presence of prerequisites<br>
<i>Katarina Cechlarova, Bettina Klaus and David Manlove</i>
<li> Who Can Win a Single-Elimination Tournament?<br>
<i>Michael P. Kim, Warut Suksompong and Virginia Vassilevska Williams</i>
<li> Fairness in voting: the tale of Blotto's lieutenants<br>
<i>Alessandra Casella, Jean-Francois Laslier and Antonin Mac&eacute</i>
<li> Proving the Incompatibility of Efficiency and Strategyproofness via SMT Solving<br>
<i>Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt and Christian Geist</i>
<li> Agenda Separability in Judgment Aggregation
<br>
<i>Jerome Lang, Marija Slavkovik and Srdjan Vesic</i>
<li> Arguing about Voting Rules<br>
<i>Olivier Cailloux and Ulle Endriss</i>
<li> Parameterized Complexity Results for the Kemeny Rule in Judgment Aggregation<br>
<i>Ronald de Haan</i>
<li> On Voting and Facility Location<br>
<i>Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat and Iddan Golomb</i>
<li> Bounds on Manipulation by Merging in Weighted Voting Games<br>
<i>Ramoni Lasisi and Abibat Lasisi</i>
<li> Strong and Weak Acyclicity in Iterative Voting<br>
<i>Reshef Meir</i>
<li> Ordinal power relations and social rankings<br>
<i> Stefano Moretti and Meltem Ozturk</i>
<li> Analyzing games with ambiguous types using the MINthenMAX decision model<br>
<i>Ilan Nehama</i>

<li>Rules for Choosing Societal Tradeoffs<br>
<i>Vincent Conitzer, Rupert Freeman, Markus Brill and Yuqian Li</i>
<li>Condorcet Domains and Median Graphs<br>
<i> Clemens Puppe and Arkadii Slinko</i>
<li>Fair Social Choice in Dynamic Settings<br>
<i> Rupert Freeman, Seyed Majid Zahedi and Vincent Conitzer</i>
<li>Computing Pareto Optimal Committees<br>
<i> Haris Aziz, Jerome Lang and Jerome Monnot</i>
<li>Altruistic Hedonic Games<br>
<i> Nhan-Tam Nguyen, Anja Rey, Lisa Rey, Jorg Rothe and Lena Schend</i>
<li>Verification in Incomplete Argumentation Frameworks<br>
<i>Dorothea Baumeister, Daniel Neugebauer, Jorg Rothe and Hilmar Schadrack</i>
<li>Natural Interviewing Equilibria for Stable Matching<br>
<i>Joanna Drummond, Allan Borodin and Kate Larson</i>
<li>Strategy-Proofness of Scoring Allocation Correspondences<br>
<i>Nhan-Tam Nguyen, Dorothea Baumeister and Jorg Rothe</i>
<li> Single-peakedness Based on the Net Preference Matrix: Characterization and Algorithms<br>
<i>Olivier Spanjaard and Paul Weng</i>
<li> Pareto optimal matchings with lower quotas
<br>
<i>Katarina Cechlarova and Tam&aacutes Fleiner</i>
<li> Bayesian Estimators As Voting Rules
<br>
<i>Lirong Xia</i>
<li>The Single-Peaked Domain Revisited: A Simple Global Characterization<br>
<i>Clemens Puppe</i>
<li>Learning Mixtures of Plackett-Luce models<br>
<i>Zhibing Zhao, Peter Piech and Lirong Xia</i>
<li> Misrepresentation in District Voting<br>
<i>Yoram Bachrach, Omer Lev, Yoad Lewenberg and Yair Zick</i>
<li> Divide and Conquer: Using Geographic Manipulation to Win District-Based Elections<br>
<i>Yoad Lewenberg and Omer Lev</i>
<li> How effective can simple ordinal peer grading be?<br>
<i>Ioannis Caragiannis, George Krimpas and Alexandros Voudouris</i>
<li> Recognising Multidimensional Euclidean Preferences<br>
<i>Dominik Peters</i>
<li> How Hard Is It to Control a Group?<br>
<i>Yongjie Yang and Dinko Dimitrov</i>
<li> Efficiency and Sequenceability in Fair Division of Indivisible Goods with Additive Preferences<br>
<i>Sylvain Bouveret and Michel Lema&icirctre</i>
<li>Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations<br>
<i>Matias Nunez and Marcus Pivato</i>
<li>On Truthful Mechanisms for Maximin Share Allocations<br>
<i>Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas and Evangelos Markakis</i>
<li>Object allocation problems under constraints<br>
<i>Laurent Gourves, Carlos Martinhon and Jerome Monnot</i>
<li>Conditional and Sequential Approval Voting on Combinatorial Domains<br>
<i>Nathana&eumll Barrot and Jerome Lang</i>
<li>A Majoritarian Representative Voting System<br>
<i>Pietro Speroni di Fenizio and Daniele A. Gewurz</i>
<li>Structure in Dichotomous Preferences<br>
<i>Edith Elkind and Martin Lackner</i>
<li>Borda, Condorcet, and Pareto optimality in ordinal group activity selection<br>
<i>Andreas Darmann</i>
<li>Proportional Borda Allocations<br>
<i>Andreas Darmann and Christian Klamler</i>
<li>Majority Graphs of Assignment Problems and Properties of Popular Random Assignments<br>
<i>Felix Brandt, Johannes Hofbauer and Martin Suderland</i>
<li>Optimal Reallocation under Additive and Ordinal Preferences<br>
<i>Haris Aziz, Peter Biro, Jerome Lang, Julien Lesca and Jerome Monnot</i>
<li>Committee Scoring Rules<br>
<i>Piotr Faliszewski, Piotr Skowron, Arkadii Slinko and Nimrod Talmon</i>
<li>Analyzing the Practical Relevance of Voting Paradoxes via Ehrhart Theory, Computer Simulations, and Empirical Data<br>
<i>Felix Brandt, Christian Geist and Martin Strobel</i>
<li>The one-dimensional Euclidean preferences: Finitely many forbidden substructures are not enough<br>
<i>Jiehua Chen, Kirk Pruhs and Gerhard J. Woeginger</i>
<li>And the winner is ... Chevalier de Borda: Neural networks vote according to Borda's Rule<br>
<i>D&aacutevid Burka, Clemens Puppe, L&aacuteszl&oacute Szepesv&aacutery and Attila Tasnadi</i>
<li>Axiomatic Characterization of Committee Scoring Rules<br>
<i>Piotr Skowron, Piotr Faliszewski and Arkadii Slinko</i>
<li>Incremental Approval Voting for Multi-agent Knapsack Problems<br>
<i>Nawal Benabbou and Patrice Perny</i>
<li>Edge-Compressed Majority Graph: Where Social Choice Meets Information Visualization<br>
<i>Nikos Karanikolas, Renaud Blanch and Sylvain Bouveret</i>
<li>Doodle Poll Games<br>
<i>Svetlana Obraztsova, Maria Polukarov, Zinovi Rabinovich and Edith Elkind</i>
<li> Automated Verification for Functional and Relational Properties of Voting Rules<br>
<i>Bernhard Beckert, Thorsten Bormer, Michael Kirsten, Till Neuber and Mattias Ulbrich</i>
<li> Complexity of Manipulative Actions When Voting with Ties<br>
<i>Zack Fitzsimmons and Edith Hemaspaandra</i>
<li>The Random Pairs Voting Rule: Introduction and Evaluation With a Large Dataset<br>
<i>Jeremy Hansen</i>
<li>Equilibria of Plurality Voting: Lazy and Truth-biased Voters<br>
<i>Edith Elkind, Evangelos Markakis, Svetlana Obraztsova and Piotr Skowron</i>
<li>Refinement and randomised versions of some tournament solutions<br>
<i>Justin Kruger, St&eacutephane Airiau and J&eacuter&ocircme Lang</i>


<!--<li>Minimising the Rank Aggregation Error<br>
<i>Mathijs De Weerdt, Enrico Gerding and Sebastian Stein</i>
<li> Parameterized Complexity of Group Activity Selection Problem and Stable Invitations Problem<br>
<i>Hooyeon Lee and Virginia Vassilevska Williams</i>
-->

<ul>

</p>


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<tr><td><div id="footer">Last modified on ### (<a href="mailto:[email protected]">U. Grandi</a>)
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126 changes: 126 additions & 0 deletions comsoc-website/archive/comsoc-2016/acc3.html
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<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN">
<html>
<head>
<title>COMSOC-2016: Sixth International Workshop on Computational Social Choice</title>
<link rel="stylesheet" href="web/comsoc.css" type="text/css">
</head>

<body>

<center>

<!-- top banner starts here -->
<table border="0" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" width="850px">
<tr><td background="images/toulouse.jpg" height="220px" valign="top">

<div id="top">
Sixth International Workshop on Computational Social Choice<br>
Toulouse, France, 22&ndash;24 June 2016
</div>
</td></tr>
</table>
<!-- top banner ends here -->

<table border="0" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" width="850px">
<tr><td height="2px"></td></tr>
<tr valign="top">

<!-- menu starts here -->
<td width="175px" align="left">
<div id="menu">
<a href="index.html">COMSOC-2016</a>
<!--<a href="program.html">Program</a>-->
<a href="acc.html">Accepted Papers</a>
<a href="program.html">Program</a>
<!--<a href="proceedings.html">Workshop Notes</a> -->
<a href="invited.html">Invited Speakers</a>
<!-- <a href="tutorial.html">LogICCC Tutorial Day</a> -->
<a href="pictures.html">Pictures</a>
<a href="pc.html">Committees</a>
<a href="cfp.html">Call for Papers</a>
<a href="dates.html">Important Dates</a>
<a href="industry.html">Industry Day</a>
<a href="submission.html">Paper submission</a>
<a href="registration.html">Registration</a>
<a href="location.html">Location</a>
<a href="travel.html">Travel and Accommodation</a>
<a href="sponsors.html">Sponsors</a>
<a href="http://www.illc.uva.nl/COMSOC/workshops.html" target="_blank">Previous COMSOCs</a>
<a href="contact.html">Contact</a>
</div>
</td>


<td>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</td>

<td width="100%">
<!-- page content starts here -->


<h1>Accepted Papers</h1>

<p> The accepted papers are:

<ul>
<li> Cycles and Intractability in Social Choice Theory<br>
<i>William Zwicker</i>
<li> Pareto optimal matchings of students to courses in the presence of prerequisites<br>
<i>Katarina Cechlarova, Bettina Klaus and David Manlove</i>
<li> Who Can Win a Single-Elimination Tournament?<br>
<i>Michael P. Kim, Warut Suksompong and Virginia Vassilevska Williams</i>
<li> Fairness in voting: the tale of Blotto's lieutenants<br>
<i>Alessandra Casella, Jean-Francois Laslier and Antonin Macé</i>
<li> Proving the Incompatibility of Efficiency and Strategyproofness via SMT Solving<br>
<i>Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt and Christian Geist</i>
<li> Agenda Separability in Judgment Aggregation
<br>
<i>Jérôme Lang, Marija Slavkovik and Srdjan Vesic</i>
<li> Arguing about Voting Rules<br>
<i>Olivier Cailloux and Ulle Endriss</i>
<li> Parameterized Complexity Results for the Kemeny Rule in Judgment Aggregation<br>
<i>Ronald de Haan</i>
<li> On Voting and Facility Location<br>
<i>Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat and Iddan Golomb</i>
<li> Bounds on Manipulation by Merging in Weighted Voting Games<br>
<i>Ramoni Lasisi and Abibat Lasisi</i>
<li> Strong and Weak Acyclicity in Iterative Voting<br>
<i>Reshef Meir</i>
<li> Ordinal power relations and social rankings<br>
<i> Stefano Moretti and Meltem Ozturk</i>
<li> Analyzing games with ambiguous types using the MINthenMAX decision model<br>
<i>Ilan Nehama</i>
<li> Parameterized Complexity of Group Activity Selection Problem and Stable Invitations Problem<br>
<i>Hooyeon Lee and Virginia Vassilevska Williams</i>
<li>Rules for Choosing Societal Tradeoffs<br>
<i>Vincent Conitzer, Rupert Freeman, Markus Brill and Yuqian Li</i>
<li>Fair Social Choice in Dynamic Settings<br>
<i> Rupert Freeman, Seyed Majid Zahedi and Vincent Conitzer</i>
<li>Computing Pareto Optimal Committees<br>
<i> Haris Aziz, Jérôme Lang and Jerome Monnot</i>

<ul>

<p> Accepted papers will be distributed through the webpage. </p>

</p>

<!-- page content ends here -->
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<tr><td bgcolor="#18345A" height="2px"></td></tr>
<tr><td><div id="footer">Last modified on ### (<a href="mailto:[email protected]">U. Grandi</a>)
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