Adora Cheung: Patrick, welcome. So Patrick is the co founder and CEO of Stripe, he launched the startup, or now pretty big company in 2010, correct? With his brother John.
Adora Cheung:帕特里克，欢迎。所以帕特里克是Stripe的联合创始人兼首席执行官，他在2010年创办了这家初创公司，或者现在是相当大的公司，对吗？和他弟弟约翰。
Patrick Collison: Well actually we started working on it full time and 2010. But it actually, to your comment just there about companies launching, it took us quite a while to launch because we had to get all these kind of banking partnerships in place, and so on.
Patrick Collison: 嗯，事实上，我们开始了全职工作，2010年。但事实上，就你刚才对公司成立的评论来说，我们花了很长时间才启动，因为我们必须建立所有这些银行合作伙伴关系，等等。
And so we didn't launch until September 2011, we've been working on for almost two years at that point.
因此，我们直到2011年9月才推出，我们在这一点上已经工作了近两年。
And every time we saw a PG or really anyone else from YC, all they would ask us is why we have not launched yet. Some things don't change.
每次我们看到一个PG或者YC的其他人，他们都会问我们为什么还没有上线。有些事情不会改变。
Adora Cheung: That's interesting. So two years until you have to-
Adora Cheung:这很有趣。所以两年后你就不得不.
Patrick Collison: Yeah, it was I think one year and 11 months from sort of first line of code to public launch. Which to be clear, I don't recommend, that is not a good idea. Just we had to, because we have to kind of get all these other things in place.
Patrick Collison: 是的，我认为从第一行代码到公开上线有一年零十一个月的时间。我不建议说清楚，这不是个好主意。我们不得不这样做，因为我们必须把所有其他的事情都准备好。
And because it sort of took us so long to publicly launch, we tried to be very disciplined about sort of gradually expanding the number of users every month.
因为我们花了很长时间才开始公开上线，所以我们试图严格遵守规则，逐步扩大每个月的用户数量。
And so even though we weren't publicly available ... We got our first user, like, first production user, just kind of three months in and then have every month we tried to add at least kind of a handful of users. And so by the time we publicly launched, we did have about a hundred users, which I mean, back then that seemed like a big deal.
所以即使我们没有公开的机会.。我们有了我们的第一个用户，比如，第一个生产用户，大约三个月，然后每个月我们都试着增加一些用户。所以当我们公开上线的时候，我们已经有了大约100个用户，我的意思是，在那时，这似乎是一件大事。
It's very, very large.
它非常大。
Adora Cheung: Speaking of, actually, when I was preparing for this interview, I was trying to jog my memories.
Adora Cheung:说到，实际上，当我准备这次访谈的时候，我正试着唤起我的记忆。
And I remember specifically because your office was near here in Palo Alto. And I remember back then people would always talk about the Collison brothers running around going to people's offices, and like, installing their AVI into the web apps.
我特别记得是因为你的办公室在帕洛阿尔托附近。我记得当时人们总是说，科里森兄弟跑来跑去人们的办公室，就像把他们的AVI安装到网络应用程序中一样。
And in true do things don't scale fashion.
事实是，事情并不是以时尚为尺度的。
And I assume you are not only trying to make sure they installed it, but also get user feedback.
我想你不仅仅是想确保他们安装了它，还想得到用户的反馈。
And it happened so much that actually, I don't know if Paul Graham, PG, now calls it the calls it the Collison installation.
事情发生得如此之多，事实上，我不知道保罗·格雷厄姆(PaulGraham)，PG，现在称它为科里森装置(Collison)。
And this is actually something we give, we tell founders to go do this, do the calls and installation. Because obviously in hindsight, it seems so obvious to do.
这实际上是我们给的东西，我们告诉创始人去做这个，做电话和安装。因为很明显，事后看来，这是显而易见的。
Patrick Collison: Well, it sort of served two purposes. One is to your point, I mean, it's a really good way to kind of get sort of, do user research and to get kind of UX feedback and so on.
Patrick Collison: 嗯，它有两个目的。一个是你的观点，我的意思是，这是一个很好的方式来获得某种程度的，做用户调查，获得某种用户体验反馈等等。
And I mean, if you've done this, I'm sure you've had the experience where you design what you are absolutely certain is the most streamlined, user friendly, straightforward, frictionless way to do whatever it is the product does.
我的意思是，如果你这样做了，我相信你有过这样的经验，你设计的东西-你绝对确定-是最精简的，用户友好的，直截了当的，没有摩擦的，不管产品是做什么的。
And then you kind okay, you kind of put it in front of a user, and you just kind of ask them to do whatever it is, and they find it completely impenetrable and they're clicking all the wrong links, and they can't find the next button, even though the next button is there blinking in green and stuff. And invariably, incredibly painful, the sort of nothing as sobering as watching somebody use kind of that the first version of some new product. But the other reason for us was we would suggest to somebody, they use Stripe, or they switch to Stripe, whatever. And invariably their response is "Oh, yeah, sure, that sounds awesome." But it can be postponed and postponed again, and just like, there's never a moment where it's like, okay, this is the evening where I'm going to switch to Stripe.
然后你很好，你把它放在用户面前，你让他们做任何事情，他们发现它是完全不可穿透的，他们点击了所有错误的链接，他们找不到下一个按钮，即使下一个按钮在绿色和其他东西中闪烁。而且总是令人难以置信的痛苦，没有什么比看着某人使用某种新产品的第一个版本更令人清醒了。但对我们来说，另一个原因是我们会建议一些人，他们使用条纹，或者他们转换成条纹，什么的。他们的回答总是“哦，是的，当然，听起来很棒。”但它可以被推迟，再次推迟，就像，从来没有一个时刻，它是这样的，好吧，这是一个晚上，我要转到斯特里普。
And so us going and sort of accosting them in person sort of helped ... People talk about in sales, it's always like a why you, and a why this, why now, and these kinds of questions.
所以我们会亲自帮助他们.人们在销售中谈论，总是像一个为什么你，为什么这个，为什么现在，以及诸如此类的问题。
And going in person kind of created a why now moment, it's like, well we're here at your house.
亲身体验创造了一个为什么现在的时刻，就像，我们在你的房子里。
Adora Cheung: Did you just show up? How did you-
Adora Cheung:你刚刚出现了吗？你怎么-
Patrick Collison: I don't think we ever actually just showed up, although, perhaps we should have. But we to be kind of, at least semi invited.
Patrick Collison: 我不认为我们真的出现过，尽管，也许我们应该出现。但我们至少是半邀请的。
Adora Cheung: Got it. So, so Stripe now today.
张：明白了。那么，今天的Stripe。
I mean, you've come a long way since back then.
我是说，从那以后你已经走了很长一段路了。
I mean, it's not even then it's really been a decade, not even. But I mean, today, you're you have 1,300 employees across nine offices across the world. You're doing ...
我是说，甚至都不是十年了，甚至都没有。但我的意思是，今天，你在世界各地的九个办事处有1300名员工。你在做.。
I have a list here. You manage 200 million API requests a day, you process billions a year for millions of companies across 130 companies, your [inaudible] funding Stripe is now worth 20 million dollars. Billion.
我这里有一份名单。您每天管理2亿个API请求，每年为130家公司的数百万家公司处理数十亿美元，您的[听不到]资金条带现在价值2000万美元。十亿
Anyway, the list could go on. I'll stop there. Otherwise, people are gonna think I'm your PR agent. But anyway, you've clearly done something right.
不管怎样，名单可能会继续下去。我就停在那儿。否则人们会认为我是你的公关经纪人。但不管怎样，你显然做对了一些事。
And so I want to spend a lot of the time today talking about running your startup from the perspective of the startups you, you yourself ...
所以今天我想花很多时间从创业公司的角度来谈论你的创业，你自己。
And it's kind of like zoom, like, what what do you think about from zooming in on the day to day operations, to zooming out to the long term strategic decisions. So maybe to help us ease into the discussion, one thing is when you start off one from the very beginning, a lot of friends get together and they come up with an idea, and they're super excited, and they start working on it.
就像变焦，你会怎么想，从每天放大操作，到放大到长期的战略决策。因此，也许为了帮助我们轻松地参与讨论，有一件事是，当你从一开始就开始讨论的时候，很多朋友聚在一起，他们想出了一个想法，他们非常兴奋，然后开始研究。
And then at some point, they need to decide, we need a CEO for this company.
然后，在某个时候，他们需要决定，我们需要一位首席执行官为这家公司。
And some people aren't meant to be CEOs. But for you and John, I've met both of you, you're very smart, ambitious people with great qualities and attributes that correlate to becoming great leader. How did you and John decide you would be the CEO?
有些人不应该成为CEO。但对你和约翰来说，我见过你们两个，你们是非常聪明的，雄心勃勃的人，有着伟大的品质和品质，与成为伟大的领导者相关。你和约翰是怎么决定要当首席执行官的？
Patrick Collison: Well, I think Stripe is unusual for John and I are obviously brothers, we've known each other for a long time.
Patrick Collison: 嗯，我认为斯特里普对约翰来说是不寻常的，我显然是兄弟，我们认识很久了。
And because of the relationship, we sort of place a lot of trust in each other.
因为这种关系，我们对彼此有很大的信任。
And we really do run the company together, there's no major decision that sort of Stripe has made that sort of, that we've not both been a part of.
我们确实共同经营着公司，没有一个重大的决定是Stripe做出的，我们都不是其中的一部分。
And it's not always the case that despite being the CEO that kind of I'm the person who ... Like in the case of disagreement it's not always the case that I prevail. Our kind of dispute resolution framework is kind of much more round which of us cares more, than kind of which of holds this title or that. John's title is president, there's kind of some, both are significant roles.
并不总是这样，尽管我是首席执行官，但我是那种.就像在意见不一致的情况下，我并不总是占上风。我们这种解决争端的框架更多的是我们中的哪一个更在意，而不是哪一个拥有这个或那个头衔。约翰的头衔是总统，有一些，都是重要的角色。
And so in that regard I think we're kind of an anomaly. The fact that I became CEO was honestly, semi random.
因此，在这方面，我认为我们是一种反常现象。我成为首席执行官的事实是诚实的，半随机的。
And I would say, yeah, I think because we're brothers [inaudible] get to this unusual situation where we really do run it together. Which may not be a helpful answer, because perhaps you're trying to encourage all these companies like shit, one of guys has got to be the CEO, but-
我会说，是的，我想，因为我们是兄弟(听不见的)，到了这种不寻常的情况，我们真的一起经营。这可能不是一个有帮助的答案，因为也许你想像狗屎一样鼓励所有这些公司，其中一个人必须是首席执行官，但是-
Adora Cheung: Well, do you think there's like a rubric for this? Here are five questions you should answer.
Adora Cheung:嗯，你觉得这有什么特别之处吗？这里有五个你应该回答的问题。
And maybe then you decide.
然后你决定。
Patrick Collison: That's a good question.
Patrick Collison: 这是个好问题。
Adora Cheung: Maybe not.
Adora Cheung:也许不是。
Patrick Collison: Yeah, I'm guessing it quite okay.
Patrick Collison: 是的，我猜挺好的。
I think it is important to just have an efficient mechanism for reaching a decision.
我认为重要的是要有一个有效的机制来作出决定。
And it can't be sort of simply [oriented] around consensus, right? If there's sort of three co founders and sort of, none of you sort of quite want to, or nobody's a clear CEO.
它不能简单地围绕着协商一致，对吗？如果有三位联合创始人，或者说，你们谁都不想这样做，或者没有人是一个明确的CEO。
And you don't have some kind of efficient mechanism first for having decisions get made, I think that is a recipe for failure.
而且你没有一种有效的机制来首先做出决定，我认为这是一个失败的处方。
And, and even doing some kind of sort of quasi democratic voting is probably not a great idea either.
而且，即使是做某种准民主的投票，也可能不是一个好主意。
And so for myself John, we kind of both of areas we kind of respectively specialize in.
所以，对于我自己，约翰，我们对这两个领域都有各自的专长。
And so that doesn't mean we kind of have absolute autonomy and authority there. But so we kind of bias in that direction. So he spends more time for example, working externally with users, I spend more of my time working sort of internally on product and engineering things. That's not to say that he doesn't make decisions there, or I don't here. But again, there's a bias in that direction.
这并不意味着我们在那里有绝对的自主权和权威。但我们对这个方向有偏见。所以他花了更多的时间-例如，在外部和用户一起工作，我花更多的时间在产品和工程方面的内部工作。这并不是说他不在那里做决定，也不是说我不在这里。但同样，在这个方向上也有偏见。
And then second we have this kind of additional aspect where in the case of it being a major decision, and we sort of respectfully disagree, then, then we really do sort of try to make it based on sort of which of us is going to, is just more passionate about it.
第二，我们有这样一个额外的方面，如果它是一个重大的决定，我们有点不同意，然后，我们真的试着让它基于我们中的哪一个，只是对它更有热情了。
And because that will correlate with the outcome. One of us really wants to do something, or thinks that X or Y is the right thing to do. Simply sort of wanting [inaudible] so passionately is more, I mean, that can become a sort of self fulfilling prophecy.
因为这将与结果相关。我们中的一个人真的想做些什么，或者认为X或Y是正确的。我的意思是，仅仅是想[听不见]，那么激情就会变成一种自我实现的预言。
And so I think it's kind of not irrational to have that be a consideration.
因此，我认为这是一种非理性的考虑。
Adora Cheung: Yeah, I also see, like, the best teams that work well together are the ones in which everyone, they all want the best idea to win, not their idea to win.
张：是的，我也看到，最好的团队合作得很好，每个人，他们都想要最好的想法赢得，而不是他们的想法赢得。
And so there's a stepping back and an unselfish kind of way to, to get to that conclusion.
所以有一种退一步，一种无私的方式来得出这个结论。
Patrick Collison: Definitely.
Patrick Collison: 当然。
And I think that something that we're kind of lucky about that I think is very ... Well exactly to your point, I think is definitely present in sort of the most successful co founding relationships that I've seen, is some degree of sort of dispassion in disagreement.
我觉得我们很幸运的是我觉得.就你的观点而言，我认为，在我所见过的最成功的合作伙伴关系中，肯定存在着某种程度上的不一致。
And for us it was kind of easier to get to, because we'd been disagreeing with each other for 20 years.
对我们来说，这是比较容易的事情，因为我们之间的分歧已经持续了20年。
And so it had lost some of the emotional charge. But I think that sort of finding other mechanisms whereby you can get there such that it's not sort of this, this kind of ... But the notion of disagreeing strongly is not sort of a scary phenomenon, and kind of both parties are multiple parties if there are more than two are kind of suppressing their feelings for fear of there being this divergence.
所以它失去了一些情感上的负担。但我认为，找到其他的机制，你可以达到这样，它不是这样的，这类.但是强烈反对的概念并不是一种可怕的现象，如果有两个以上的人因为害怕出现这种分歧而压制他们的感情，那么双方都是多头的。
Adora Cheung: How many more siblings do you have? Do you have one more brother?
张：你还有几个兄弟姐妹？你还有一个哥哥吗？
Patrick Collison: One more sibling? Yes.
Patrick Collison: 还有一个兄弟姐妹？是
Adora Cheung: Okay.
Adora Cheung:好的。
Patrick Collison: Three of us in total.
Patrick Collison: 我们一共三个人。
Adora Cheung: Would you guys, would he join the, or is it just you and John, it's a special match there?
张：你们会不会，他会加入，还是只有你和约翰，这是一场特别的比赛？
Patrick Collison: Well, Tommy, my youngest sibling, he's sort of quite a bit younger than myself and John.
Patrick Collison: 嗯，汤米，我最小的兄弟姐妹，他比我和约翰小得多。
And so John is approximately two years younger than I am, and when we started Stripe I guess I was about 21 and I think I guess therefore John was 19.
所以约翰比我小两岁，当我们创办Stripe的时候，我想我大约21岁，所以我想约翰是19岁。
And Tommy was still kind of definitively midway through high school, and so just wasn't quite practical of the time.
汤米上高中的时候还很确定，所以当时不太实际。
Adora Cheung: Yes, finish high school.
张：是的，完成高中学业。
Patrick Collison: And now I think if you asked him he'd probably say he'd never throw his lot in with miscreants like us.
Patrick Collison: 现在我想如果你问他，他可能会说他永远不会把自己的命运交给像我们这样的恶棍。
Adora Cheung: Cool. So in terms of the role of CEO, often people say there's a threshold and time in which ...
Adora Cheung:酷。所以关于CEO的角色，人们常说有一个门槛和时间.
And it's related to product market fit, where you have a role as a pre product market fit CEO, which is completely different from your role as a post product market CEO. So I want to spend most of our time talking about pre product market fit. But just to calibrate those questions. What in terms for Stripe what was product market fit for you? Like, how did you define it, metrics to it, number of employees you're at when you reached it and so forth?
这与产品市场的契合有关，在产品市场上，你扮演的是产品前市场的首席执行官，这与你作为后产品市场首席执行官的角色完全不同。所以我想花大部分时间讨论产品前的市场适合。但只是为了校准这些问题。对条纹带来说，什么是适合你的产品市场？比如，你是如何定义它的，它的度量标准，当你到达它的时候你的员工数量等等？
Patrick Collison: Yeah, that's a really question.
Patrick Collison: 是的，这是一个真正的问题。
And I think you're exactly right to kind of divide things into sort of those kind of ... The story of a startup is two stories.
我觉得你把事情分成几种.创业的故事有两个故事。
And it's a story of getting to product market fit.
这是一个进入产品市场的故事。
And then the story of kind of what happens subsequently.
然后是后来发生的事情。
And obviously, there isn't like a totally definitive binary line between them. But I think it's kind of helpful to frame the narrative in that regard. For Stripe, and actually, around the time we launched publicly I think is basically when we had it.
很明显，它们之间并没有一条完全确定的二元线。但我认为这方面的叙述是有帮助的。对于Stripe来说，实际上，在我们公开上线的时候，我认为基本上是在我们拥有它的时候。
In that when we launched publicly in September 2011, we kind of rebuilt significant components of Stripe kind of multiple times in response to user feedback, like, we're kind of on the third version of our dashboard.
在2011年9月我们公开推出Stripe的时候，我们对Stripe的一些重要组件进行了多次重建，以响应用户的反馈，比如，我们的仪表板的第三个版本。
And the second or third, depending on how you count, major version of our API.
第二种或第三种，取决于你如何计算，我们API的主要版本。
And so we'd kind of gone through a lot of iteration in response to kind of the evidence challenges that users had, or the deficiencies the product seemed to possess.
因此，我们经历了大量的迭代，以应对用户面临的各种证据挑战，或者产品似乎存在的缺陷。
And when we launched, we were basically immediately bottle necked on sort of being able to serve user demand rather than generate user demand.
当我们推出的时候，我们基本上马上就能满足用户的需求，而不是产生用户的需求。
And I think sort of directionally that's kind of the inversion that happens, versus sort of in the early days, you're sort of really trying to figure out well, okay, kind of conditioned on, or given to some user, how do I make sure that it does what they need, and they end up a happy retained user in a sufficient fraction of cases or whatever.
我认为，从方向上看，这是发生的倒置，与早期的情况相比，你实际上是在努力弄清楚，好吧，某种程度上是以某个用户为条件的，或者是给某个用户的，我如何确保它能满足他们的需要，他们最终会成为一个满意的保留用户，在足够的情况下，或者其他的情况下。
And then kind of at some point it floats, where okay, the sort of, well I think it's kind of very different, do you sort of take a hundred users, and some fraction of them on board and some smaller fraction remain engaged or whatever.
然后在某种程度上，它会浮出水面，好吧，我认为这是很不一样的，你能接收上百个用户吗，他们中的一些人在飞机上，一些更小的部分仍然在使用，或者什么的。
And so, kind of a hundred users, the curve sort of asymptotes downwards.
因此，大约有100个用户，曲线呈渐近线向下移动。
And then you take a hundred users and kind of, again, a meaningful fraction have engaged, then they actually tell more people about it, or they sort of invite people.
然后你需要100个用户，再一次，一小部分有意义的用户参与进来，然后他们会告诉更多的人，或者他们会邀请更多的人。
I don't mean strictly just in a viral sense, but just kind of generally speaking, just that kind of leads to and generate more demand, such that things seem to be sort of, sort of in super linear fashion kind of growing.
我的意思并不是严格地说是病毒意义上的，只是一般地说，这种方式导致并产生了更多的需求，所以事情似乎在某种程度上，某种程度上是以超线性的方式增长的。
And I think when you sort of like being kind of less than one is just very different to being more than one. And it sort of seems again when we launched I mean, that didn't generate that many users.
我认为，当你喜欢比一个人少的时候，和不止一个人有很大的不同。当我们上线的时候，我的意思是，它并没有产生那么多的用户。
I mean, I don't exactly remember, but let's just pretend that sort of 500 businesses signed up on the day we launched. But sort of immediately those 500 businesses told other businesses, and people heard about it, and all the rest. So kind of the next day we had a lot of businesses as well and so forth, such that from the day we launched, the challenge became keeping up with demand rather than tweaking the product to somehow serve the market.
我的意思是，我不太记得了，但让我们假装一下，在我们成立的那天，有500家企业注册了。但这500家企业很快就告诉了其他企业，人们也听说了这件事，其他人也都听说了。所以第二天，我们也有了很多生意，所以从我们推出的那天起，这个挑战就与需求同步，而不是调整产品，以某种方式为市场服务。
Adora Cheung: When you launched, how many people were you at that point, employees?
Adora Cheung:当你启动的时候，你当时有多少人，员工？
Patrick Collison: We were about ten.
Patrick Collison: 我们当时大约十岁。
Adora Cheung: So, I guess before you launched your day to day sounds like it was just like what we were talking about earlier, just running around talking with users and fixing issues. Was that literally every single day was like that? Or what were you doing every day?
张爱多拉：所以，我想在你每天上线之前，听起来就像我们之前所说的那样，只是到处跟用户聊天，解决问题。真的每天都是这样吗？或者你每天都在做什么？
Patrick Collison: Okay, so not literally every single day. But I would say we really tried very hard to understand in very granular detail and what exactly it was that people were doing, where they were tripping up, and so on. So, just to give you some examples, we had a chat room for sort of providing support when people were integrating Stripe.
Patrick Collison: 好吧，所以不是每天都这样。但我要说的是，我们真的非常努力地去理解细节上的细节，以及人们到底在做什么，他们在哪里绊倒，等等。所以，为了给你举几个例子，我们有一个聊天室，当人们集成Stripe时，我们提供了一些支持。
And it was actually a public chat room, which can have had some downsides because if we'd broken something, or somebody had some kind of embarrassing issues, everyone would see it. We thought that was kind of good, because it would actually kind of put more pressure on us to sort of have the product be good.
它其实是一个公共聊天室，它可能有一些缺点，因为如果我们弄坏了什么东西，或者某个人遇到了一些令人尴尬的问题，每个人都会看到它。我们认为这是好的，因为它实际上会给我们带来更大的压力，让产品变得更好。
And we had, literally every time for the first call it ten years of Stripe, every time somebody sent an API requests to Stripe, like it sent an email to us. So we were like, looking at every single API request.
我们每一次第一次把它叫做Stripe十年，每次有人向Stripe发送API请求，就像它给我们发了一封电子邮件一样。所以我们就像，查看每一个API请求。
And if we saw users do something weird, why did they do that? Where were our docs confusing, or whatever.
如果我们看到用户做了一些奇怪的事情，他们为什么要这么做？我们的文档在哪里让人困惑，或者什么的。
And I'd go to dinner in the evening, it seemed like a lot at the time, I'd have maybe ten emails, because Stripe was not handling a lot of API requests back then. But so you're literally looking at sort of each individual action.
晚上我会去吃晚饭，当时似乎很多，我可能会收到10封电子邮件，因为当时Stripe没有处理很多API请求。但是你实际上是在观察每一个单独的行动。
And actually Stripe, we just kind of celebrated or at least passed, we're not very good at celebrating. But we passed our seventh anniversary just a few days ago, on September 29th. And so I was looking at our sort of, we had an hourly stats email that we use to send.
事实上，我们只是有点庆祝或者至少通过了，我们并不擅长庆祝。但就在几天前，也就是9月29日，我们度过了我们的七周年纪念日。所以我看了一下，我们收到了一封每小时发送一次的电子邮件。
And so on the day we launched we handled sort of 22 payments in the previous hour. Which again, sort of seemed huge to us back then. But I was noticing in that email, I'd actually forgotten this, that we had things like in the email we literally had a list of businesses that had submitted three or five or something API requests. But had sort of not gone live, they'd not launched their businesses, we literally had the emails of all these businesses. The idea was that we would then kind of literally individually reach out to them, it's like, "Hey, you kind of seem to use Stripe little bit. But you didn't, you didn't go live, like, did we screw up? Or was the product somehow inadequate, or whatever?" We did things like every time anyone ever hit an error of any sort that generated like, a high priority email to us.
因此，在我们推出的那天，我们在前一小时处理了大约22笔付款。在我们看来，这在当时是很重要的。但我在那封邮件中注意到，我实际上忘了这一点，我们的电子邮件中有这样的东西-我们确实收到了一份提交了三、五份或其他API请求的企业列表。但是，如果没有现场直播，他们没有启动他们的业务，我们确实收到了所有这些企业的电子邮件。当时的想法是，我们会逐个向他们伸出援手，就像“嘿，你似乎有点使用了Stripe。但是你没有，你没有去生活，比如，我们搞砸了吗？还是产品不够用，或者什么的？”我们所做的事情，就像每次有人碰到任何错误时，都会给我们发一封高优先级的电子邮件。
And so we sort of tried to immediately go solve it.
所以我们试着马上解决这个问题。
And that also kind of generated sort of, I think this pleasant kind of user experience, where I mean it's frustrating when you hit an error in some service. But we could then often sort of 15 minutes later, reach out to them and say, "Hey, we saw that you have encountered this problem, it's all fixed now." And sometimes we did that even in the case where sort of the users made a silly mistake.
这也产生了某种程度的，我认为这种令人愉快的用户体验，我的意思是，当你在某个服务中遇到错误时，它是令人沮丧的。但是我们可以在15分钟后，向他们伸出手，说：“嘿，我们看到你遇到了这个问题，现在一切都解决了。”有时我们会这样做，即使是在一些用户犯了一个愚蠢的错误的情况下。
And they kind of mistyped an API parameter or something, and we just reach out to them, they're like, "Hey, I noticed you had a typo in your code," which perhaps to some of them was a little bit unsettling, right? But at least going to help us increase the kind of the throughput product feedback. But so, I mean, these are all kind of examples, I would say, of the sort of general pattern of sort of really trying to be kind of hyper attentive to all the micro details of sort of what people were doing the product and kind of iterating rapidly in response to it.
他们把API参数输入错了，我们就联系他们，他们说，“嘿，我注意到你的代码中有一个错误”，对他们中的一些人来说，这可能有点令人不安，对吧？但至少可以帮助我们增加吞吐量产品反馈。但是，我的意思是，这些都是一些例子，我要说的是，这是一种普遍的模式，它试图对人们正在做的产品的所有微观细节进行高度关注，并对产品进行快速迭代。
And generally speaking I think that sort of pre product market fit metrics are actually relatively unhelpful, and I think you sort of, you really want to bias very strongly towards kind of as much sort of inspection and kind of high throughput qualitative feedback as possible, because probably not that many people are using your product, right? And so if it's 20 users, you can kind of, in some sense, afford to just like, look at everything they're doing, and try to understand kind of what's working what isn't.
一般说来，我认为某种产品前的市场适合标准实际上是相对没有帮助的，我认为你确实想要非常强烈地偏向于尽可能多的检查和某种高吞吐量的质量反馈，因为可能没有那么多人使用你的产品，对吗？所以如果是20个用户，从某种意义上说，你可以喜欢，看看他们做的每件事，试着去理解什么是有用的，什么是不管用的。
Adora Cheung: Yeah, in some sense, it's how much do they, you can tell subjectively, like, how much they love your product, how much are they going to probably be really upset if it just disappears.
张：是的，从某种意义上讲，你可以主观地说，他们有多喜欢你的产品，如果产品消失了，他们可能会很难过。
Patrick Collison: Totally.
Patrick Collison: 完全是。
And actually, on this point we had a thing, at the bottom of every web page we had a little sort of text box and kind of anchored to the bottom of the browser frame.
事实上，在这一点上，我们有一件事，在每个网页的底部，我们有一个小的文本框，并且某种程度上锚定在浏览器框架的底部。
And sort of one line "Hi," sort of text input, and, we had placeholder text in it to sort of try to prime people to tell us things.
有一行“嗨”，类似于文字输入，我们在其中有占位符文本，试图让人们告诉我们一些事情。
And so it had, "My favorite part of Stripe is ..." And people just fill it out.
“我最喜欢的是.”人们就会把它填好。
And can hit enter now. But also, of course, most of the problems were negative.
现在可以按回车。当然，大多数问题都是负面的。
It was, you know, like, "The worst thing about Stripe is, or the worst thing that this page is, or, I really hate the way Stripe does," or whatever.
它是，你知道，就像“Stripe的最坏的东西，或者这页是最坏的东西，或者，我真的很讨厌Stripe的方式，”或者什么的。
And, and again, we'd sort of, sort of at that stage you have to be kind of masochistic.
再说一遍，我们在那个阶段，你必须有点受虐。
And so again, we'd be sort of always waking up to all these emails telling us all the terrible things about Stripe, but that was helpful to do list for the day ahead.
再一次，我们总是会被这些电子邮件吵醒，告诉我们关于Stripe的所有可怕的事情，但这对我们今后的工作很有帮助。
Adora Cheung: How did you stay happy, if, like, in the early days [crosstalk] complains.
张爱多拉：如果，在早期(相声)抱怨的话，你是如何保持快乐的呢？
Patrick Collison: What makes you think we did? So it was, it was ... Happy is such a squishy concept, right? And because, like, there are lots of things that we, I guess, when I look back and look, maybe it's the rationalization I taught myself, but when I look back through life at the things that I'm sort of most glad I did, I wasn't exactly happy while I was doing them. Often I was very stressed out, or had to work really hard or whatever. But they're the things that kind of post hoc brought the most fulfillment.
Patrick Collison: 你凭什么认为我们做到了？所以它是，它是.。快乐这个概念太模糊了，对吧？因为，就像，我们，我想，当我回头看的时候，也许是我教会自己的合理化，但是当我回顾生活中我最高兴做的事情时，我并不是很高兴。我经常压力很大，或者不得不非常努力地工作。但它们是那种临时带来的最大满足感。
And I think that part of it is there's rich literature here.
我认为这部分是因为这里有丰富的文献。
And so I won't kind of dive too deeply into it. But I do think kind of happiness is a tricky concept to kind of pin down.
所以我不会太深入。但是我确实认为幸福是一个棘手的概念。
Is that kind of happiness in the moment? Is that sort of the sense that you have a year later, looking back, and then so on.
这就是当下的幸福吗？是那种感觉，一年后，回首，然后等等。
And so, I think ... Language is squishy, and it's not completely specifically defined, but I think, generally speaking, kind of a better utility function, and kind of gradient to try to climb is that of fulfillment.
所以我想.。语言很粗糙，没有完全明确的定义，但我认为，总的来说，它是一种更好的效用函数，并且尝试爬升的渐变是一种实现。
And so I would say kind of the experience of doing Stripe was, it was not especially happy, because we were sort of constantly, incredibly aware of all the ways in which the product was severely deficient.
所以我想说的是，做Stripe的经历并不是特别快乐，因为我们对产品严重缺陷的所有方式都有一种持续的，难以置信的意识。
And all the challenges we faced.
以及我们所面临的所有挑战。
And, I mean, it seems like, there was no FinTech category, back then, it was just like two teenagers, or just over teenagers trying to compete with PayPal. Which many people told us was not an especially kind of promising avenue to pursue.
而且，我的意思是，它似乎没有金融科技类别，当时，它就像两个青少年，或仅仅是青少年试图与贝宝竞争。许多人告诉我们，这并不是一种特别有希望的途径。
And so not especially happy per se. But it didn't feel kind of fulfilling. And I enjoyed working with John and the kind of people we subsequently hired.
所以就其本身而言并不是特别幸福。但这感觉一点也不满足。我很喜欢和约翰一起工作，以及我们后来雇佣的那种人。
It was really fun working with the kinds of customers we were serving. They're just sort of businesses doing all these kind of wonderful things.
和我们所服务的客户一起工作真的很有趣。他们只是在做一些很棒的事情。
And they were kind of really smart people.
他们是相当聪明的人。
And it felt like if it worked, it could be kind of consequential in the world.
如果成功的话，这可能会在世界上产生影响。
And so I would say, kind of, it sort of felt like, I mean I don't know what it feels like to be sort of a scientist or something. But I'm guessing when you're sort of pursuing, you have this kind of big question, and you're pursuing all these kind of avenues to sort of try to better understand.
所以我会说，有点感觉，我的意思是，我不知道做一个科学家或什么的感觉是什么感觉。但我猜当你在追求的时候，你有这样一个大问题，你在寻求所有这些途径，试图更好地理解。
I'm guessing day to day, it's sort of not especially happy because most of your experiments don't work or whatever, but sort of, perhaps there's some analog there in terms of it still feels in some sense meaningful.
我一天又一天地猜测，它并不是特别快乐，因为你的大多数实验都不起作用，但是，也许在某种意义上，这里有一些类似的东西，感觉还是很有意义的。
Adora Cheung: Yeah, there, in some sense, I mean, day to day, like you said, you're just you're running around with your head cut off. But maybe on a weekly or at least monthly basis is just taking a step back and seeing like, what progress have I actually made? Because week to week it's like 1% here, 1% here doesn't seem much. But from a monthly basis, or maybe longer than that it seems like there's movement.
Adora Cheung:是的，在某种意义上，我是说，每天，就像你说的，你只是在到处跑，你的头被砍掉了。但也许每周或至少每月一次，我只是后退一步，看看我到底取得了什么进展？因为一周又一周，这里是1%，这里是1%，这看上去不多。但从一个月的基础上看，或者可能更长的时间，似乎是有变化的。
Patrick Collison: Yeah, and I think that's true.
Patrick Collison: 是的，我认为这是真的。
And I think, I don't know, like, I think it's almost certainly a bad idea to sort of work in a company or to work on anything, if you're, like, truly unhappy working on it, right? And so there's kind of a [curious] balancing act there.
我想，我不知道，我觉得在一家公司工作或者在任何事情上工作都是个坏主意，如果你真的不满意的话，对吧？所以这里有一种(奇怪的)平衡行为。
And I think I mean, a lot of ... There are sort of so many different sort of difficult judgment calls to try to make in a start up. But of course part of it is if something is making you unhappy, or if it just didn't seem like an especially promising avenue, or it's not really working or whatever, your time has relatively high opportunity costs. Like, you don't get to start that many startups in your life, right? And so kind of knowing when to sort of call it quits, I think is actually ...
我想我是说很多.。在创业过程中，有很多不同的艰难判断要求。当然，其中的一部分是，如果有什么东西让你不开心，或者它看起来并不是一个特别有希望的途径，或者它没有真正发挥作用或其他什么，那么你的时间就会有相对高的机会成本。就像，你人生中没有那么多创业公司，对吧？所以知道什么时候该放弃，我想实际上是.
I mean, sort of in startupdom we really extol, and sort uphold the virtues of sort of determination at all costs. Never quit and so on.
我的意思是，在创业中，我们真的很赞许，并且不惜一切代价维护某种决心的优点。永远不要放弃等等。
And that's clearly not the right answer. Sometimes you should quit.
这显然不是正确的答案。有时候你应该退出。
And so I think kind of what you're getting at is true and right. Where I think there does need to be sort of some happiness, satisfaction, fulfillment. There's a good book of that name, "Satisfaction," which I recommend ... Kind of week to week, month to month, if you're on the right trajectory.
所以我认为你得到的是真实和正确的。我认为那里确实需要一些快乐、满足和满足。有一本很好的书名叫“满足感”，我推荐.一个星期，一个月，如果你走在正确的轨道上。
Adora Cheung: Oh, man, I wish I had known that ...
哦，伙计，我真希望我早知道.
I could have ...
我本可以.。
I remember when I was about to implement Stripe myself, I had these bad memories of trying to implement PayPal.
我记得当我自己要实施Stripe的时候，我有过尝试实现PayPal的糟糕记忆。
And the stacks of documentation, and taking like five days to figure it all out.
还有一堆文件，花了五天才弄清楚。
And so I sat down because you guys are saying, oh, it'll take you ten minutes.
所以我坐下来是因为你们说，哦，你们要花十分钟。
I was like, no way.
我就像，没门。
And it probably took me actually five minutes at that point.
那时候我大概花了五分钟。
And I was super happy. Maybe I should have sent you a review.
我很开心。也许我该给你发个评论。
Patrick Collison: Yeah that would have been great, especially if the review had sort of criticism for us. But no, it's definitely helpful to have competitors with not very good products.
Patrick Collison: 是的，那就太好了，尤其是如果这篇评论对我们有批评的话。但是不，如果有竞争对手的产品不是很好，那肯定是有帮助的。
Adora Cheung: Yes. Okay. So you were, in the early days, you were doing a lot of stuff yourself.
Adora Cheung:是的。好的。所以你，在早期，你自己做了很多事情。
At some point, I guess two part question. One is, where are the things that you weren't good at? And then two, at what point did you hire someone to what I assume is to do those things?
在某种程度上，我想两个部分的问题。一个是，你不擅长的东西在哪里？然后第二，你在什么时候雇了一个人来做我认为是做那些事情的事？
Patrick Collison: Well, I mean, I'm not that good at most things.
Patrick Collison: 嗯，我的意思是，我在大多数事情上都没那么擅长。
And I say this is in a non sort of fall modesty or, I mean don't mean to be artificially self deprecating. But sort of for almost anything that Stripe has to do, there are sort of people who are are better at that than I am.
我说这是一种非堕落的谦逊，或者，我的意思是，我的意思不是人为地贬低自我。但是对于Stripe必须做的任何事情，都有比我更好的人。
And so I think to some degree sort of the story of say product market fit and say our current stage is kind of implementing the recognition of that in kind of more and more areas. That said, I think maybe sort of embedded in that question is okay, well, acknowledging that you're probably not the world's experts in any single thing, it's kind of, in what order do you sort of replace yourself? And for Stripe the sort of, the important thing that we're sort of most obviously not that great at was kind of partnerships and working with the various banks that we had to sort of get on board and so on.
所以我认为在某种程度上说，产品市场适合，我们目前的阶段是在越来越多的领域实现对此的认可。话虽如此，我认为也许嵌入到这个问题中是可以的，嗯，承认你可能不是世界上任何一件事情上的专家，这是某种程度上，你是按照什么样的顺序取代你自己的？对于Stripe来说，最重要的是，我们最明显的不太擅长的就是与不同的银行建立合作伙伴关系，并与不同的银行合作，这些都是我们必须参与的事情，以此类推。
In fact Jeff Ralston, who is here in the room today, I think sort of was some combination of sort of very supportive and perhaps in the back of his mind slightly pitying where he saw us kind of trying to get these partnerships with these kind of big banks in place.
事实上，今天在这里的杰夫·拉斯顿，我认为是某种非常支持的组合，也许在他的脑海中，他看到我们试图与这些大银行建立合作关系时，心里有些怜悯。
And we really weren't sort of getting anywhere very fast.
我们真的不太快就能走到任何地方。
And so he told us that we had to hire this guy Billy Alvarado.
所以他告诉我们得雇一个叫比利·阿尔瓦拉多的人。
And told us, "Just, don't ask me questions, just hire this guy." And at the time everyone at Stripe was an engineer. And so we just kind of couldn't quite understand what a non engineer would do. Like, you're not writing code, what else is there? And so we're kind of suspicious of this idea.
然后告诉我们，“只要，别问我问题，就雇这个人。”当时斯特里普的每个人都是工程师。所以我们不太明白一个非工程师会做什么。比如，你不是在写代码，还有什么？所以我们对这个想法有点怀疑。
And we sort of, we went back to Jeff and we, we met Billy. He seemed like a wonderful guy. We really liked him. But we couldn't quite get past this, okay, but like, what does it actually, how does this work out in practice? And so Jeff told us that we should hire Billy, and for the first few months or whatever, that if it didn't work out, Jeff would sort of go back and pay his salary. So it's going to zero risk move for us.
我们回到杰夫身边，我们遇到了比利。他看起来是个很棒的人。我们真的很喜欢他。但是我们不能完全克服这一点，好吧，但是，它实际上是怎样的，这在实践中是如何运作的呢？所以杰夫告诉我们，我们应该雇佣比利，在最初的几个月里，如果不成功的话，杰夫会回去支付他的薪水。所以这对我们来说是零风险行动。
And so we did not have a whole lot of money at the time. So that was not insignificant. So we hired Billy.
所以当时我们没有很多钱。所以这并不是无足轻重的。所以我们雇了比利。
And that was sort of an immediately trajectory changing event, where previously when we'd gone and talked to a bank, I mean, I don't if they were literally doing this, but it certainly felt they're kind of pushing the security button under their desk.
这是一个立即改变轨道的事件，在此之前，当我们去和一家银行交谈时，我是说，如果他们真的这么做的话，我是不会这么做的，但这肯定会让他们感觉到，他们在他们的办公桌下按下了安全按钮。
It's like why these guys in my office? And then suddenly things start to go kind of much more smoothly.
就像为什么这些人在我办公室？然后突然之间事情开始变得更顺利了。
And Billy is still with Stripe today.
比利今天还和斯特里普在一起。
And he has been an enormously kind of pivotal presence. And so that was definitely very helpful advice.
他一直是一种非常重要的存在。所以这绝对是非常有用的建议。
Adora Cheung: That is interesting. Jeff as an inflection point for Stripe, never knew. Cool. So, it sounds like you had hired actually people before Billy.
Adora Cheung:这很有趣。杰夫是斯特里普的拐点，从来不知道。凉爽的听起来你在比利之前就雇过人了。
I guess your very first hire, third person with you and John was an engineer, I'm assuming?
我猜你的第一次雇用，和你一起的第三个人，约翰是个工程师，我猜是吗？
Patrick Collison: Well, he actually wasn't an engineer. But he joined Stripe.
Patrick Collison: 他其实不是工程师。但他加入了斯特里普。
And he started to become an engineer. He'd written a little bit of code previously. But he joined, there was a lot of code that had to be written. He was a guy I'd known from college. He's actually also Irish.
他开始成为一名工程师。他以前写过一点代码。但是他加入了，有很多代码需要编写。他是我从大学认识的人。他其实也是爱尔兰人。
And we had a lot of code to be written.
我们有很多代码要写。
And so he was the kind of person who would sort of survey the landscape and just do whatever was most important and required.
因此，他是那种会对景观进行调查的人，只要做最重要和最需要的事情就行了。
And at the time it was writing code.
当时它在写代码。
And so off he went.
于是他就走了。
Adora Cheung: So kind of the transition from pre product market fit to post product market fit, a lot of CEOs, when they think back, this is the one point in which they think ah, I could have done that better. So how did you how do you grade your success of that transition? Because a lot of it is just taking stuff, delegating stuff better and doing other functions of the business. So, what exactly was your transition like? And how would you, how could I, if I was going in your shoes tell that I was doing it well?
Adora Cheung:所以从产品前的市场适应到产品市场的适应，很多CEO，当他们回想起来，这是他们认为啊，我可以做得更好的一点。那么，你是如何评价你在这一转变中所取得的成功的呢？因为很多事情只是拿东西，更好地委派东西和做生意的其他功能。那么，你的过渡到底是什么样的？如果我以你的身份去做，你怎么知道我做得很好呢？
Patrick Collison: Yeah, so I don't think I did it especially well, and I think it kind of fortunately sort of worked out. But I think if I was doing it all over again, I think we could have sort of accelerated ourselves by a year or two if we'd sort of going about it in a somewhat more disciplined and kind of self aware fashion.
Patrick Collison: 是的，所以我不认为我做得特别好，我认为这是幸运的结果。但我想如果我再做一次，我想如果我们能以一种更有纪律性和自觉性的方式去做的话，我们可以加快一两年的速度。
I think one of those kind of pernicious sort of mental models you can have here is that kind of you are on some growth curve, and it is sort of your job to sustain, or marginally inflect upwards, or kind of somehow ...
我认为你可以拥有的那种有害的心理模型之一是，你处在某种增长曲线上，你的工作就是维持，或者稍微向上弯曲，或者某种程度上…。
Is curling the sport where you're kind of wiping the ice while the whatever it is, the weight, proceeds down along? Sorry, I'm not Canadian, but kind of, somehow, you're kind of making kind of these very small interventions and perturbations on some underlying growth curve.
冰壶运动中，你在擦拭冰，而不管它是什么，重量，继续下去吗？抱歉，我不是加拿大人，但不知怎么的，你在某种程度上对一些潜在的生长曲线进行了一些很小的干预和干扰。
I think that's an easy mental model to have.
我觉得这是一个很容易的心理模型。
And I think it's kind of actively kind of fallacious and mistaken.
我认为这是一种积极的谬误和错误。
I think that a much better mental model have is you're serving some market, the market is, I mean, it's relatively finite in size. You can always change the project and increase the market size, but you can think of it as being finite.
我认为一个更好的心理模型是，你在为一些市场服务，市场是，我是说，它的规模相对有限。你可以随时改变项目，增加市场规模，但你可以认为它是有限的。
And then there's sort of the percentage of the market that you're serving, and then whatever percentage you are not serving is kind of you just haven't built the sort of go to market functions and organization that's kind of capable, or at least has yet sort of brought the product to those market segments.
然后是你所服务的市场的百分比，不管你没有提供什么，你只是还没有建立起市场功能和组织的那种能力，或者至少还没有把产品引入到这些市场的细分市场中去。
And that kind of the growth curve or adoption curve is just kind of a function of, of that go to market apparatus. But basically, it's not some kind of cosmic trajectory, it's something kind of very much of your creation and under your control.
而这种增长曲线或采用曲线只是一种函数，它进入市场机制。但基本上，这不是某种宇宙轨迹，它是某种很大程度上属于你的创造和控制之下的东西。
And so what we did not do but what I wish we did is kind of maybe whatever ... Just after we launched there's a whole bunch of immediate scaling work we had to do. But say, six months after launch, that we should have sort of mapped out the kind of concentric circles of our market, like, maybe there's kind of very early stage startups that were kind of our initial constituency. Then there's kind of all technical startups, but not necessarily very early stage. And it's kind of, I don't know, you keep going in these kind of successive increments until eventually you get to, say, all companies handling online payments or something, right? And [inaudible] figure out, okay, kind of what's the size of this market? What fraction of what we currently serving? What would it take to serve more? And so on. And I think it's quite striking, you see that kind of when repeat founders go and start companies, they almost invariably are willing to kind of build the organization post product market fit. So it's invariably willing to kind of build the organization ahead of where things are today. Which I think is exactly the right thing to do. Because they're thinking, Okay, I have the right product. Now, let's kind of work backwards from, Okay, what would the organism look like that was serving the entire market, and let's just start building that organization. Because, again, the growth curve is under my control.
所以我们没有做但我希望我们做的也许是.就在我们启动之后，我们必须立即进行大量的缩放工作。但是，在成立六个月后，我们应该制定出我们市场的同心圆，比如，也许有一些早期的初创公司，它们是我们最初的支持者。然后是所有的技术初创公司，但不一定是非常早期的阶段。这有点，我不知道，你一直在连续递增，直到最终，比如说，所有处理在线支付的公司，对吧？然后(听不见)想出，好吧，这个市场有多大？我们目前服务的分数是多少？怎样才能提供更多的服务？诸若此类我认为这是相当惊人的，你可以看到，当重复的创始人去创办公司的时候，他们几乎总是愿意建立某种组织后的产品市场。所以它总是愿意在今天的事情发生之前建立一个组织。我认为这是正确的做法。因为他们在想，好吧，我有正确的产品。现在，让我们倒转一下，好吧，这个有机体是如何为整个市场服务的，让我们开始建立这个组织。因为，再一次，增长曲线在我的控制之下。
And of course, it's not like 100% under your control. But I think it's much more under your control than, than the things that people tend to think. There's also, of course, the difference here, a major difference when you can use or think about sort of consumer versus kind of B2B use cases. For a consumer it's a bit more, I mean, people don't necessarily know exactly what they want. What's the market size for a news reading app, or a dating app or something.
当然，这也不像是100%在你的控制之下。但我认为这更多的是在你的控制之下，而不是人们所想的事情。当然，这里也有不同之处，当您可以使用或考虑某种消费者和B2B用例时，这是一个很大的区别。对于一个消费者来说，我的意思是，人们并不一定确切地知道他们想要什么。新闻阅读应用、约会应用等的市场规模是多少？
I mean, it's, it kind of depends a lot on the products. Like maybe way more people should be reading news or something. But for sort of a, for some service or product that sort of serves a discrete logical, concrete function, that sort of set of businesses or entities to finish we have or don't have, I think it's kind of much more rational and much more mappable.
我是说，这在很大程度上取决于产品。好像更多的人应该看新闻之类的。但是对于某种服务或产品，它提供了一个离散的逻辑，具体的功能，那些需要完成或没有完成的业务或实体，我认为它更理性，更易于映射。
And I partly had this epiphany when Aaron Levie, who's the CEO of Box ... John I eventually, we started in Palo Alto, we moved up to San Francisco.
当亚伦·列维是Box公司的首席执行官时，我有部分的顿悟.约翰我最后，我们开始在帕洛阿尔托，我们搬到旧金山。
Aaron Levie had Facebook messaged John, and we'd never heard of him. We we hadn't heard of most people in Silicon Valley. But he Facebook messaged us very early on asking to invest in Stripe.
艾伦·列维在Facebook上给约翰发了短信，我们从没听说过他。我们没有听说过硅谷的大多数人。但他在Facebook上很早就给我们发了条短信，要求我们投资Stripe。
And I think John didn't know, who's this random guy? And so we never replied, but then we heard of Box and we heard of Aaron, and we read his funny tweets, and all the rest.
我想约翰不知道，这个随机的家伙是谁？所以我们没有回复，但后来我们听说了Box和Aaron，我们读到了他有趣的推文，还有其他的。
And so we moved to San Francisco and we invited him to our house warming.
于是我们搬到了旧金山，邀请他来我们的房子取暖。
I think was the first time we ever met him.
我想这是我们第一次见到他。
And sort of like, we're not very good at partying.
就像，我们不太擅长聚会。
And so by sort of 11 p.m. Or midnight or something kind of everyone was going home. But Aaron was still there, and Aaron stayed until, like 2 a.m., I still remember kind of sitting in our friend room telling us how much better it was to be building B2B software than consumer software for this reason. Sort of consumer software, it's so hard to predict sort of what people want, they don't even know themselves what they want.
所以到了晚上11点左右。或者午夜之类的人都要回家了。但是Aaron仍然在那里，直到凌晨2点，我仍然记得坐在我们朋友的房间里，告诉我们，出于这个原因，构建B2B软件比开发消费者软件要好得多。一种消费软件，很难预测人们想要什么，他们甚至不知道自己想要什么。
It's such an amorphous space. Whereas when you're selling software to businesses, businesses are kind of mostly rational, I don't know what the opposite of inscrutable is. Scrutable, I guess.
这是一个无定形的空间。然而，当你向企业销售软件时，企业基本上是理性的，我不知道什么是不可理解的反面。我想是可有可无的。
And so you can sort of work backwards in a way that sort of, it's just much more comprehensible.
所以你可以在某种程度上反向工作，这是更容易理解的。
And so I still have this kind of ...
所以我仍然有这种.。
It's like the angel and demon on your shoulder, I still have 2:00 a.m.
就像你肩膀上的天使和恶魔，我还有凌晨2点。
Aaron Levie sitting on my shoulders of extolling the virtues of building software for entities that know what they want.
亚伦·列维坐在我的肩膀上，赞美为那些知道自己想要什么的实体构建软件的优点。
Adora Cheung: You've made the right choice. Yeah, in some sense there's a lot less variables, or in consumer there's a lot more variables to to consider.
Adora Cheung:你做出了正确的选择。是的，从某种意义上说，变量要少得多，或者消费者需要考虑的变量更多。
And they're quite unknown.
而且他们是非常不知名的。
I want to take a step back, you talked a little bit about thinking ahead about what your team is, or what your company structure is going to look like. How do you ... Maybe this is too big of a question. So maybe we can whittle it down a little bit, but how do you think about that? Like I'm sitting, if I'm starting a start up today, I'm close to maybe product market fit. But before that stage, like am I thinking about this sort of thing, like, what should my team look like? What should my culture be, and stuff like that?
我想退一步，你说过要提前思考你的团队是什么，或者你的公司结构会是什么样子。你怎么.。也许这是个大问题。所以也许我们可以把它删减一点，但你怎么想呢？就像我正坐着，如果我今天要开始创业，我很接近于产品市场的适合。但是在那个阶段之前，就像我在想这样的事情，比如，我的团队应该是什么样的？我的文化应该是什么，诸如此类的东西？
Patrick Collison: I think that ... Well, okay, so pre product market fit. The goal is really just to [guess] your product market fit.
Patrick Collison: 我认为.好吧，所以产品前市场适合。目标实际上只是猜测你的产品市场是否合适。
And so I actually wouldn't bother thinking too much about all these kind of distribution mechanics questions. Now, you can get product market fit sort of relatively quickly.
所以我不会费心去想所有这些分布力学的问题。现在，您可以比较快地使产品市场适应。
And so, kind of, that pre product market fit stage might only last six months. You're not necessarily like Stripe where you're kind of in it for various reasons for multiple years.
因此，在某种程度上，产品前市场的适配阶段可能只持续六个月。你不一定像Stripe，因为不同的原因，你在里面呆了好几年。
And so it may not last very long. However, until that point, I really think you should just be thinking about, okay, how do I get there? The main thing I think companies screw up at the pre product market fit stage and is sort of speed of iteration. Speed of fruitful iteration. If you're repeatedly rebuilding your products, but not in response to user feedback, I mean, that's kind of far less likely to be kind of bringing you in sort of a, in a productive direction. But if you have some kind of meaningful, albeit perhaps small initial set of users and you're rapidly iterating a response to sort of their feedback and sort of observed behavior and so on, then I think that's like a really good spot to be in.
因此，它可能不会持续很长时间。不过，在那之前，我真的认为你应该考虑一下，好吧，我该怎么去呢？我认为公司在产品上市前的合适阶段出现问题的主要原因是迭代的速度。有效迭代的速度。如果你在反复地重建你的产品，但不是为了回应用户的反馈，我的意思是，这不太可能把你带到一个有成效的方向。但是如果你有一些有意义的，虽然可能是很小的初始用户群，并且你正在快速地迭代一个响应来回应他们的反馈和观察到的行为等等，那么我认为这是一个非常好的位置。
And I think, again, at that juncture, pre product market fit, it is kind of this, you should be sort of doing everything you can to tighten that sort of feedback cycle. There's a fighter pilot who kind of revolutionized airborne combat in the US in the second half of the 20th century, so Korean War onwards, called Boyd.
我认为，再一次，在那个时刻，产品前市场适合，这是一种，你应该做一些你能做的事情来收紧那种反馈周期。20世纪下半叶，有一位战斗机飞行员在美国进行了一场革命性的空降战斗，因此朝鲜战争之后，名为博伊德(Boyd)。
And he had this concept of the ooda loop, which was sort of a similar notion of ... Previously [inaudible] just like the fastest aircraft, or the most sophisticated weaponry and so on. Where he was all about sort of no, you actually want to aircraft and sort of pilots and training that are really oriented around sort of the the fastest responsiveness and iteration to the particulars of the situation.
他有一个ODA循环的概念，这是一个类似的概念.以前[听不见的]就像最快的飞机，或最尖端的武器等等。他说的是“不”，你实际上想要的是飞机、飞行员和训练，这些都是围绕着对具体情况的最快反应和迭代而进行的。
In the way that kind of subsequently went on to really inform modern aircraft design.
以那种后来的方式，真正为现代飞机设计提供了信息。
And so I think you want to be like one of these sort of these modern fighters. Where you're sort of really optimized to respond as quickly as possible to sort of rapidly evolving situations.
所以我认为你想成为这些现代战士中的一员。在那里，你是真正优化的，以尽快作出反应，以某种快速发展的情况。
Again, in this kind of pre product market fit stage.
再一次，在这种预产品市场适销对路阶段。
And so then, from a hiring standpoint, I think it should really be about okay, well, what's going to get you there faster? And I mean, I think at an early stage it's most likely people will help you kind of build a product. But of course not too many. Because, I mean, at some point, like, you might be able to do more, but you might actually be less responsive, because you have a bigger team to manage or something, right? And so as an empirical matter, it seems that somewhere between kind of, to intend, depending on exactly what you're building is kind of the optimally responsive size. But I think it really is about that sort of time from observed sort of necessity or deficiency, or just characteristic of your users' behavior to executed fix, or improvement.
所以，从招聘的角度来看，我认为应该是好的，那么，怎样才能让你更快地到达那里呢？我的意思是，我认为，在早期阶段，人们很可能会帮助你制造一种产品。但当然不要太多。因为，我的意思是，在某种程度上，你可能可以做得更多，但实际上你的反应可能不那么积极，因为你有一个更大的团队来管理，对吧？因此，作为一个经验性的问题，似乎在某种程度上，意愿之间，取决于你正在构建的是什么，是某种最优响应的大小。但我认为，从观察到的必要性或缺陷，或者仅仅是用户行为的特点，到执行修复或改进的时间，都是这样的。
And whatever it is that kind of minimizes that.
不管是什么，那都会使它最小化。
Adora Cheung: Is there, I mean, you say, two to ten, which is helpful. But is there, are there observations or evidence in which you have hit the peak, like, you should not add an ... This extra person is going to be negative value add to the whole operation?
Adora Cheung:我的意思是，你说，有二到十，这是有帮助的吗？但是，有没有观察到或者有证据表明你达到了顶峰，比如，你不应该添加一个.这个额外的人会给整个操作增加负值吗？
Patrick Collison: Yeah, I mean, every person ... Well, startups in general, involve all these kind of impossibly difficult sort of judgment calls in this kind of high dimensional possibility space.
Patrick Collison: 是的，我是说，每个人.嗯，一般来说，在这种高维的可能性空间中，创业涉及到所有这些不可能的、困难的判断要求。
And so, it'd be great if you could sort of collapse it down to kind of a fairly simple set of trade offs, it's just I don't think you can. However, I think in principle the calculation you're sort of trying to run is okay, each successive person takes time to hire, and so slows us down in that regard, takes time to onboard slows down that regard. Kind of takes time to just kind of meld with the culture and learn the stack, all that stuff, that that also takes cost and time. Then involves subsequent ongoing cost of just like coordination and alignment. The organization is now distributed across more neurons.
所以，如果你能把它分解成一套相当简单的权衡，那就太好了，只是我觉得你做不到。然而，我认为，原则上，你试图运行的计算是可以的，每一个连续的人都需要时间来雇用，因此在这方面我们会慢下来，上船需要时间来减缓这一点。这需要时间才能和文化融合起来，学习这些东西，这也需要花费成本和时间。然后是后续的持续成本，就像协调和调整一样。这个组织现在分布在更多的神经元上。
And so, there's that kind of persistent tax. And that's not just necessarily a linear cost. But it can be sort of quadratic or something, kind of given you have the multi way communication problem. So you have all these costs of an additional person.
所以，这是一种持久化的税收。而这不一定只是一个线性成本。但是它可以是二次型的，或者什么的，如果你有多路通信问题的话。所以你有额外的人的所有这些费用。
And so the question is, okay, but this person can help us like get more shit done, right? They can write more code or talk to more users or whatever.
所以问题是，好吧，但这个人可以帮我们做更多的事情，对吧？他们可以编写更多的代码，或者和更多的用户交谈。
And so it's kind of, is that fixed benefit to sort of that additional person worth all these other costs? And again, with I think the ultimate arbiter being, will we be more responsive to what we're learning about our users, given the presence of this additional person? And I think whether or not you will be depends on the complexity of the product and the complexity of the market, and all that stuff. But I think that's [inaudible] the calculation you want to be running.
所以，这是一种固定的收益，就是额外的人，值得所有的其他费用吗？再一次，我认为最终的仲裁者是，考虑到这个额外的人的存在，我们会对我们正在了解的用户更有反应吗？我认为你是否会取决于产品的复杂性，市场的复杂性，以及所有这些东西。但我认为这是(听不见的)你想要运行的计算。
Adora Cheung: I've heard you said, speaking of hiring people I've heard you say the key qualities that you look for in a future Stripe employee is intellectually honest, cares a great deal, and just loves getting things done. Which are great attributes, because some people just don't fit in those categories. So, it's good to have the separation there. How do you ... When you meet someone, how do you figure out this is the right person?
张：我听过你说过，说到招人，我听你说过，你在未来的Stripe员工身上寻找的关键品质是理智的诚实，关心很多，只是喜欢把事情做完。这些都是很好的属性，因为有些人只是不适合这些类别。所以，分离很好。你怎么.。当你遇到一个人时，你怎么知道这个人是对的？
Patrick Collison: It's very hard.
Patrick Collison: 这很难。
I wish I had a more sort of definitive rubric, and a particular set of questions.
我希望我有一个更明确的标题，和一套特定的问题。
Although if I had a particular set of questions, maybe they stop working, because people would learn how to game them or something.
虽然如果我有一套特别的问题，也许他们停止工作，因为人们会学会如何玩他们或其他什么。
And so, I mean, it's hard to fake just being smart, right? And so that ones kind of not as hard to discern.
所以，我是说，假装聪明是很难的，对吧？这样他们就不那么难分辨了。
And it's oddly hard to fake being intellectually honest.
奇怪的是，要假装在智力上诚实是很难的。
And the characteristic of being able to see multiple sides of a debate or an argument. There are so many kind of complicated questions where sort of the only think that I'm really skeptical of is certainty in either direction. Just because the questions are intrinsically, involve very contingent trade offs.
能够看到一场辩论或一场辩论的多个方面的特点。有那么多复杂的问题，我唯一怀疑的是在任何一个方向上的确定性。仅仅因为这些问题本质上来说，涉及非常偶然的权衡。
It's also, it's not impossible, but it's hard-ish to fake just being nice. Like, something we care a lot about at Stripe is just sort of people who are pleasant, and warm, and sort of make others happier as a result of their presence.
而且，这也不是不可能的，但假装友好是很难的。就像，我们在Stripe非常关心的是，一些人是愉快的，温暖的，并且因为他们的存在而使其他人更快乐。
And, you know, if you can fake that perfectly forever it's fine, right? But yeah, they're all sort of ...
而且，你知道，如果你能永远完美地假装，那就好了，对吧？但他们都有点.。
Actually there's no clear rubric for them.
实际上对他们没有明确的要求。
And I'm not sure that a clear rubric could even work.
我也不确定一个清晰的符号学能不能起作用。
Adora Cheung: So you talk about get people who help move the organization faster, if at all possible.
张：如果可能的话，你会谈论让那些帮助组织更快发展的人。
And I think there are two issues usually that start slowing down the organization as you start scaling, just because each person adds just more complexity to the organization. But also I think one is asymmetric information. Just, people are never on the same page.
我认为，当你开始扩展时，通常有两个问题开始减缓组织的速度，仅仅是因为每个人都给组织增加了更多的复杂性。但我也认为其中之一是信息不对称。只是，人们从来没有在同一页上。
And I think, you've talked a lot about this, I think. Everyone can Google around for lectures you've given on this, you've done email transparency. Obviously having metrics transparent to the whole organization. But the second problem to that is if you fix that there's also this asymmetric interpretation problem. Which is everyone's ... There's this, like, black box function to how people interpret ... Even if all the inputs are the same, the outputs are all different.
我想，你已经谈了很多这件事了，我想。每个人都可以在谷歌上搜索你在这方面所做的演讲，你已经做了电子邮件的透明度。显然，度量对整个组织是透明的。但第二个问题是，如果你解决了这个不对称的解释问题。每个人的.。就像，黑匣子功能来解释.即使所有的输入都是相同的，输出也是不同的。
And especially at your scale now, it's nearly impossible to figure out everybody's function. So, when you're thinking about quitting your organization and building it out, like, how do you reduce that noise, and try to get everyone on the same page?
尤其是在你现在的规模上，几乎不可能搞清楚每个人的功能。所以，当你想要退出你的组织并建立起来的时候，比如，你如何减少这种噪音，并试图让每个人都站在同一条战线上？
Patrick Collison: Well, the first thing is I wish we had actually ... Between say, five and fifty people, I think we were much too consensus oriented. We of course weren't completely consensus oriented.
Patrick Collison: 嗯，第一件事是我希望我们真的.在五到五十人之间，我认为我们太过以共识为导向。当然，我们并不是完全以共识为导向的。
I mean, we couldn't have gotten anything done if we were. But I think we kind of biased too much in that direction.
我是说，如果是的话我们就什么都干不成了。但我觉得我们在这个方向上有太多偏见了。
And it's just not that efficient.
只是效率不高。
And then sort of, it's necessarily not the case.
然后，情况就不一定是这样了。
And so, kind of, you can sort of perhaps maintain some kind of fiction for, you know, more or less time. But sort of ultimately speaking, there is no way of sustaining that.
所以，某种程度上，你可以保持某种虚构，你知道，或多或少的时间。但从根本上说，这是无法维持的。
And I think that's a relatively common mistake. Because you almost invariably come from some kind of [N Muskateers] , small [N] sort of orientation, where there's no particular need for formal decision making mechanisms, or sort of subsequent communication of said decisions or whatever, right? But then you hit 15 people, and now there is.
我认为这是一个比较常见的错误。因为你几乎总是来自某种[N Muskateers]，小的[N]方向，在那里不需要正式的决策机制，也不需要随后的交流，或者其他什么的，对吧？但你打了15个人，现在有了。
And I think companies don't adjust quickly enough to that new necessity.
我认为公司没有足够快地适应这种新的需求。
Again, very much us included.
再说一次，包括我们在内。
And so, actually I think we did relatively well on the kind of ambient availability of sort of context, information, so on. But actually kind of in some sense poorly at sort deliberate, explicit communication of decisions. Decisions being, I mean, actual kind of tactical decisions, or even bigger decisions like what are our priorities the next six months, or things of that nature. And so the high order piece of advice, and perhaps I'm over extrapolating from our personal experience, but the high order of advice, just kind of reflecting back would be to kind of ...
所以，实际上，我认为我们在环境可用性方面做得比较好，比如上下文、信息等等。但实际上，在某种意义上，在某种程度上，故意地、明确地传达决定的我的意思是，决策是一种实际的战术决定，甚至是更大的决定，比如我们未来六个月的优先事项，或者类似的事情。所以高层次的建议，也许我是从我们个人的经验中推断出来的，但是高层次的建议，仅仅是一种反思，会是某种.。
It's kind of like the pre and post product market fit thing, except it's actually about the size of the organization, where kind of, when you hit a certain size, again, I'm just gonna say ten people for the sake of simplicity. Maybe it's a bit before, a bit after.
这有点像产品市场的前后契合，只是实际上是关于组织的规模，当你达到一定的规模时，再一次，为了简单起见，我只想说十个人。也许是以前的事，之后的事。
I think you have to kind of adjust more deliberately to this kind of explicit communication model of sort of, of being sort of quite firmly non consensus based, and sort of ... Nobody likes the idea of being hierarchical. That sounds pejorative. But like, in some sense hierarchical.
我认为你必须更有意识地适应这种明确的沟通模式没有人喜欢分级的想法。听起来有点贬义。但从某种意义上说是分层的。
Adora Cheung: Sort of the top down, it does move things faster. Maybe some people don't like that.
张：有点自上而下，它确实移动得更快。也许有些人不喜欢这样。
Patrick Collison: Yes
Patrick Collison: 是的
Adora Cheung: But it does move faster.
Adora Cheung:但它的速度确实更快。
Patrick Collison: That's right.
Patrick Collison: 没错。
And the reason is it's kind of a delicate balancing act. You want to sort of orchestrate, where kind of on the one hand you want to sort of really prioritize speed and agility, which involves being kind of somewhat hierarchical, because those are sort of efficient, sort of symmetry breaking mechanisms, and ways to have shots get called. But, like I said, you really do want people to have this kind of strong ownership mentality.
原因是这是一种微妙的平衡。你想要进行某种编排，一方面你想要把速度和敏捷性区分开来，这涉及到某种层次，因为这是一种高效的、对称的破坏机制，也是让镜头被调用的方法。但是，就像我说的，你真的希望人们有这种强烈的所有权心态。
And real sense that sort of, that they can cause things to change, or identify problems, or sort of inject new ideas even in unrelated areas.
真正的感觉是，它们可以导致事物的改变，或者发现问题，甚至在不相关的领域也会注入新的想法。
And so it's this delicate act where, I mean, you definitely can be excessively hierarchical. But sort of, how do you sort of facilitate enough autonomy and agency, but also not have things devolve into this kind of, I don't know, sort of uniform morass of brownian motion.
所以这是一种微妙的行为，我的意思是，你肯定会变得过于分层。但是在某种程度上，你是如何促进足够的自主性和代理的，但也没有事情发展成这种，我不知道，类似于布朗运动的统一的泥潭。
And I think that's hard, and requires all these kind of ongoing tweaks and nudges.
我认为这很难，而且需要所有这些不断的调整和推动。
And I mean, depending on the personalities involved and all the rest ... And, again, I really wish there was kind of the sort of rote simple, we'll just to X, Y and Z and you'll be good. But sort of, if such X, Y's and Z's exist, no one's told me yet.
我是说，取决于你的个性和其他人.再说一遍，我真的希望有那种死记硬背的简单，我们只需要X，Y和Z，你就会很好。但某种程度上说，如果X，Y，Z的存在，还没有人告诉我。
Adora Cheung: If only there was a formula for everything.
张：要是一切都有公式就好了。
Patrick Collison: If only.
Patrick Collison: 但愿如此。
Adora Cheung: So, riding on the same theme, as Stripe grows, you strike me as a company that does the opposite of most companies, which as they get bigger they just slow down and they get less innovative. But for you guys, and it's hard to even keep up, you're just pumping out new products. Which seem to be successful to me, like Stripe Atlas, Stripe Press, Stripe Terminals, and so forth. So, in the early days, when there's just nine or ten of you, if someone had a new idea, it's probably really easy to get to you, and then you guys would decide. How has that changed over time to make sure that someone who's six degrees away from you, that a good idea actually gets to you, and then how is that decision made to actually execute upon it?
Adora Cheung:所以，在同一个主题上，随着条纹的增长，我觉得你是一家与大多数公司相反的公司。随着公司规模的扩大，它们的发展速度就会放慢，创新能力也会降低。但对你们来说，甚至很难跟上，你们只是在推出新产品。在我看来是成功的，比如条纹图集，条纹出版社，条纹终点站，等等。所以，在早期，当只有九到十个人的时候，如果有人有了新的想法，很可能很容易找到你，然后你们就会做出决定。随着时间的推移，这种情况是如何改变的，以确保一个离你6度的人，一个好的主意真的会传到你身上，然后这个决定是如何真正付诸实施的呢？
Patrick Collison: Well, it's very nice of you to say that you feel like we're getting faster as we get bigger. We're constantly sort of self flagellating over how frickin' slow we are.
Patrick Collison: 嗯，很高兴你说你觉得我们变得越来越快了。我们总是自责我们有多慢。
And, like, paranoid about sort of degenerating into some kind of immobile stupor.
就像，妄想症会退化成某种静止的昏迷。
And so, to whatever extent we do get things done, or appear fast, I think it's largely because we, we're very paranoid in this dimension.
所以，无论我们在多大程度上完成了事情，或者表现得很快，我认为这很大程度上是因为我们，我们在这个维度上非常偏执。
And I think kind of the default outcome of companies, of course, as they scale is to become sort of more ossified, and rigid, and sort of closed to new ideas, and directions, and things that contradict their prevailing orthodoxies and all of that.
当然，随着公司规模的扩大，我认为公司的默认结果是变得更加僵化、僵化，对新思想、新方向以及与他们盛行的正统观念和所有这些相矛盾的东西都会变得更加封闭。
As to how we kind of avoid that, I mean, there's lots of kind of obvious things. Like, partly it's sort of having leaders that care about the rate of progress, and just love seeing things happen quickly, and lots of things of that nature.
至于我们如何避免这种情况，我的意思是，有很多显而易见的事情。比如，在某种程度上，有一些领导人关心进步的速度，喜欢看到事情发生得很快，还有很多类似的事情。
I think it may be sort of deeper rooted is we try to be a kind of yes and culture.
我认为它可能有更深层次的根源，那就是我们试图成为一种“是”和“文化”。
In that, I mean, I personally love ideas, and potential things we could do.
在这方面，我的意思是，我个人喜欢想法，以及我们可以做的潜在的事情。
I mean, most of them are ...
我是说，他们中的大多数都是.。
I mean, no matter how good the idea is we should not pursue most ideas. Even if independently it can be a super successful company or something, but there is a fairly finite number of things we can do.
我的意思是，不管这个想法有多好，我们都不应该追求大多数的想法。即使是独立的，它也可以是一家超级成功的公司，但是我们可以做的事情是有限的。
And so, sort of, you kind of on the one hand need to recognize that intellectually and just not pursue most things, while on the other hand enjoying the exercise of contemplating, "Well, how would it look like if we did it?" And so, one thing we do every year, for example, is we have this kind of crazy ideas process we call it, where we literally send a document to the whole company, a [hackpod] document that's open to everyone.
所以，在某种程度上，你一方面需要从智力上认识到这一点，而不是追求大多数事情，另一方面享受冥想的锻炼，“如果我们这样做会是什么样子呢？”因此，我们每年都要做的一件事，就是我们有这样一个疯狂的想法过程，我们称之为它，我们实际上是把一个文件发送给整个公司，一个对每个人都开放的[hackpod]文档。
And people can sort of add ideas to it that they think are probably a bad idea, but if they worked, might be a great idea. And it's very important that they have to be probably a bad idea. Because if they're probably a good idea then it's not that risky, and I mean, kind of definition we should probably do it, and so whatever. Maybe we should just do it. And so, people really self censor a lot in most organizations, because they don't want to look stupid, and they don't want to sort of associated with just having all these wacky, bad ideas and so on.
人们可以给它添加一些他们认为可能是不好的想法，但如果他们成功了，可能是个好主意。很重要的一点是，他们可能是个坏主意。因为如果他们可能是个好主意，那就没那么危险了，我是说，我的意思是，我们应该这么做，诸如此类。也许我们应该这么做。所以，在大多数组织里，人们都会自我审查，因为他们不想看上去很愚蠢，他们也不想把这些古怪的、糟糕的想法联系在一起，等等。
And so, we try to be fairly firm that if you add ideas to this, it has to be probably a bad idea. And actually a lot of cool things we've subsequently got on and done first came from that process. Stripe Atlas being one of them.
所以，我们试图变得相当坚定，如果你在这个基础上加上一些想法，这可能是个糟糕的主意。事实上，我们后来做的很多很酷的事情都是从这个过程中开始的。条纹阿特拉斯就是其中之一。
And also we sort of helped Stellar get off the ground, this sort of cryptocurrency back a few years ago.
此外，我们还帮助恒星起步，几年前，这种加密货币。
And that also sort of came from this process.
这也来自于这个过程。
And so, that's one of the mechanisms by which we try to have a kind of yes and culture.
因此，这是我们试图获得一种是和文化的机制之一。
And I really think there aren't that many, just as an empirical matter there aren't that many large organizations that I think sort of really do this successfully. But I think that sort of the most successful larger organizations somehow do succeed in sort of this iterative, repeated process of kind of augmentation.
我真的认为没有那么多，作为一个经验性的问题，没有那么多大型组织，我认为这是成功的。但我认为，最成功的大型组织在某种程度上确实成功地实现了这种反复的、重复的增强过程。
Amazon and Google being the most prominent examples. Obviously when Google launched there was no Gmail, or YouTube, or Android, or Google Maps, or whatever. And Amazon is kind of an even more conspicuous example, in some sense. This kind of repeated attach of successful ancillary businesses. Yeah, it's a very natural temptation as you grow to, I think, become increasingly close to this.
亚马逊和谷歌就是最突出的例子。显然，当谷歌推出时，没有Gmail、YouTube、Android、GoogleMaps之类的东西。从某种意义上说，亚马逊是一个更加引人注目的例子。这种重复附加的成功的附属业务。是的，这是一个非常自然的诱惑，随着你的成长，我认为，变得越来越接近这一点。
I think it's very important to avoid.
我认为这是非常重要的避免。
Adora Cheung: Cool. So, I have couple more questions, and then maybe we'll have time to take questions from the audience. One is, looking back, is there something ... Did you have a strong opinion of how startups should be run as a CEO that have just completely reversed because you're now the CEO?
Adora Cheung:酷。所以，我还有几个问题，也许我们会有时间回答观众的问题。一个是，回头看，有没有什么.你有强烈的看法，作为一个刚刚完全相反的CEO，你应该如何经营创业公司，因为你现在是首席执行官？
Patrick Collison: That's a good question.
Patrick Collison: 这是个好问题。
Adora Cheung: Another way to potentially put it is what are things that you did where you're like, "I know for sure this should have been done," and then just turn out to be a mistake?
张爱多拉：另一种可能的说法是，你所做的事情是什么，“我知道这是应该做的”，但结果却是个错误？
Patrick Collison: Well, I already mentioned the sort of, the consensus orientation. The one that we're going through right now, which is a quite significant divergence is we were sort of fairly centralized up until sort of relatively recently.
Patrick Collison: 嗯，我已经提到了共识导向。我们现在正在经历的，这是一个相当大的分歧是，我们是相当集中的，直到最近。
I mean, we had some remote employees from a pretty early stage. But by and large Stripe was kind of concentrated in San Francisco.
我是说，我们有一些早期的远程员工。但总的来说，Stripe集中在旧金山。
And last week we announced our fourth global hub.
上周我们宣布了我们的第四个全球中心。
And basically what we've decided to do is we're gonna have kind of major sort of product and engineering efforts, and teams, and functions, and all the rest, in San Francisco.
基本上，我们决定做的是，在旧金山，我们将有一些主要的产品和工程工作，团队，功能，以及所有其他的东西。
Also in Seattle.
也在西雅图。
Also in Dublin, and also in Singapore.
也在都柏林，也在新加坡。
And so that these non San Francisco locations are not gonna be sort of operations offices, or satellite offices, or places where we do sort of localization, and local market adaptation. We want to have kind of completely [denovo] new products that sort of become super successful started out of these offices.
这样，这些非旧金山地区就不会成为运营办公室，卫星办公室，或者我们进行本地化的地方，以及适应当地市场的地方。我们希望有一种完全(新的)新产品，这种新产品会变得非常成功，从这些办公室开始。
And that's not the sort of standard, obviously, kind of Silicon Valley pattern, where sort of Apple, and Amazon, and Facebook, and Google, and all these companies tend to be sort of highly concentrated in these sort of very sort of monolithic corporate headquarters.
很明显，这不是那种标准的硅谷模式，苹果、亚马逊、Facebook和谷歌，以及所有这些公司，都倾向于高度集中在这种非常单一的公司总部中。
And our thesis is kind of several fold. Partly that the availability of talent is becoming far more geographically dispersed, partly that sort of the Bay Area is becoming an increasingly untenably expensive location to locate.
我们的论文有几个方面。部分原因是人才的供应正变得更加分散，部分原因是海湾地区正在成为一个越来越昂贵的选址地点。
And partly that sort of, we really want Stripe to be global infrastructure that works kind of just as well in sort of Asian markets or in Latin American markets or whatever, as it does for businesses in the U.S., and kind of the era of the internet being sort of a predominately North American, or North American, western European or whatever. The days of being kind of such a phenomenon are over.
在某种程度上，我们希望Stripe成为全球基础设施，在某种程度上，在亚洲市场、拉丁美洲市场或其他地方运作得同样好，就像它在美国的企业所做的那样，在某种程度上，互联网是一个以北美为主的时代，或者是北美、西欧或诸如此类的时代。这种现象的日子已经结束了。
And so, I think that's sort of a fairly substantial break with kind of, you know, descriptive best practice of the past.
所以，我认为这是一个相当大的突破，你知道，描述过去的最佳实践。
I mean, we obviously think it'll work, we wouldn't do it if we didn't. But it is also, on some level, risky. We don't have good, you know, prior examples to point to.
我的意思是，我们显然认为它会成功，如果我们不这样做，我们就不会这么做了。但在某种程度上，这也是有风险的。我们没有好的，你知道，前面的例子可以指出。
And there's some great companies in Singapore, like Grab and Carousel, but there aren't really any examples yet of sort of American companies establishing kind of major product and engineering hubs there. We're pretty optimistic it can be done. But, you know, if it works we'll be the first, or one of the first.
新加坡也有一些很棒的公司，比如RAP和Carousel，但是还没有任何美国公司在新加坡建立主要的产品和工程中心的例子。我们非常乐观，这是可以做到的。但是，你知道，如果成功的话，我们会是第一个，或者第一个。
Adora Cheung: Cool. Last question. So, in a hundred years from now, what is Stripe gonna be? What do you imagine it to be?
Adora Cheung:酷。最后一个问题。那么，再过一百年，斯特里普会是什么样子？你觉得那是什么？
Patrick Collison: We're only seven years old. So, that's a difficult question to answer.
Patrick Collison: 我们才七岁。所以，这是一个很难回答的问题。
I mean, we're trying to build this kind of economic infrastructure for the internet.
我的意思是，我们正试图为互联网建立这样的经济基础设施。
And this sort of platform for globalization, and kind of, I don't know, sort of technological progress in the sense that it ought to be just as easy to start a company in sort of Nigeria as it is in New York.
这种全球化的平台，我不知道，这是一种技术进步，也就是说，在尼日利亚创办一家公司应该像在纽约一样容易。
And it should be just as easy for somebody in Brazil to buy something from any of these companies as it is for, again, somebody in the western world.
对于巴西人来说，从这些公司中的任何一家买东西应该和西方世界的人一样容易。
And it just seems so crazy to me that that hasn't happened yet, it sort of feels that Stripe should have happened 10 or 20 years before it did.
对我来说，这似乎太疯狂了，还没有发生过，我觉得Stripe应该比它早10到20年才发生。
And I don't so much think that we're sort of pursuing this kind of unprecedented kind of inconceivable idea, so much as sort of correcting a deficiency in sort of a rip in the fabric of internet infrastructure.
我不认为我们追求的是这种前所未有的不可思议的想法，而是纠正了互联网基础设施结构上的缺陷。
And so, anyway, I think we still have at least five years to go in sort of correcting this inadequacy. So, what happens after that I'm not sure.
因此，无论如何，我认为我们还有至少五年的时间来纠正这一不足。那之后会发生什么我不确定。
Adora Cheung: Got it.
张：明白了。
In some sense, in the future all transactions should be digital, and they could very well just be all going through Stripe.
从某种意义上说，未来所有的交易都应该是数字化的，而且它们很可能都是通过Stripe进行的。
I mean, right now in the U.S. Someone was telling me, like, 80% of all Americans have done some transaction through Stripe, right?
我是说，现在美国。有人告诉我，大约80%的美国人都是通过Stripe做交易的，对吧？
Patrick Collison: Yeah, that's right, in the last 12 months more than 80% of American adults have bought something from a Stripe business.
Patrick Collison: 是的，是的，在过去的12个月里，超过80%的美国成年人从Stripe公司买了东西。
At least one thing from a Stripe business.
至少有一件事是来自条纹生意的。
And it's not just the case in the U.S., like in Singapore where I was last week, that figure is about 70%. But I guess we don't think about ... Well, I think about it more in terms of the things that are possible, or get started.
不仅仅是在美国，就像我上周在新加坡那样，这个数字大约是70%。但我想我们不会考虑.。嗯，我更多地考虑的是那些可能的事情，或者说是开始。
As in, we think a lot about the rate of sort of new firm creation, what companies are getting started, how successful are those companies, which markets can they serve and so on.
正如我们所想的，很多关于新公司创建的速度，什么公司正在起步，这些公司有多成功，他们能为哪些市场服务等等。
And every now and again we look back, and we look at sort of those kinds of market coverage stats. But I guess that's not really what motivates us.
我们时不时地回顾一下，我们会看到类似于市场覆盖范围的统计数据。但我想这并不是真正激励我们的原因。
It's more that sort of are these businesses that should exist, and/or should be able to offer their products and services in these places where they currently can't? And that's the kind of thinking that we use to kind of inform the product, and that sort of is kind of the core locomotion day to day.
更重要的是，这些企业是否应该存在，或者应该能够在目前无法提供的地方提供自己的产品和服务？这就是我们用来告知产品的一种想法，而这是一种日复一日的核心运动。
And then maybe the outcome of that is that all these people get to benefit from it.
结果可能是所有这些人都能从中受益。
Adora Cheung: All right. Thank you so much, Patrick. This was great.
Adora Cheung:好的。非常感谢帕特里克。太棒了。
Patrick Collison: Thank you.
Patrick Collison: 谢谢。