Geoff Ralston: So our next speaker and I have something in common. We both started businesses to allow people to create websites.
Geoff Ralston: 所以我们的下一位演讲者和我有一些共同之处。我们开始做生意是为了让人们创建网站。
The differences that David's business was massively successful. David Rusenko is the founder of Weebly, which early this year sold to Square, and he's going to give us a talk about how Weebly found product market fit.
大卫的事业取得了巨大的成功。大卫·鲁先科(DavidRusenko)是Weeble公司的创始人，今年早些时候，该公司将出售给Square，他将向我们介绍Weeble是如何发现产品市场适合的。
Thanks.
David Rusenko: Thanks, Jeff.
谢谢大卫：谢谢，杰夫。
I'm really happy to be here.
我真的很高兴能在这里。
I'm actually very impressed with how full the room is given it's right after Burning Man. Did anyone go this year? Oh, not too many attendees.
实际上，我对这个房间的客满印象非常深刻，就在“燃烧人”之后。今年有人去吗？哦，出席的人不多。
All right, we got one over there. Okay. So, just by quick way of introduction, a little about myself.
好吧，那边有一个。好的。所以，简单地介绍一下我自己。
If you haven't heard of Weebly, Weebly is an easy way for entrepreneurs to build a website or an online store. Before Weebly got started, the only way to do that was to learn to code yourself. And now there are plenty of tools and services to allow you to drag and drop and build a site.
如果你还没听说过Weeble，Weeble是创业者建立网站或在线商店的一种简单方法。在Weeble开始之前，唯一能做到这一点的方法就是学会自己编写代码。现在有很多工具和服务可以让你拖放和构建一个站点。
I wrote the first line of code in February 2016. So, a little over 12 years ago now. Grew the company to 50 million users, and around 350 employees. Sold to square in May of this year for 365 million. And probably one of my favorite stats is that half of the US population visits a Weebly site every single month.
我在2016年2月写了第一行代码。那么，12年前的今天。公司用户达5000万，员工约350人。今年5月以3.65亿美元的价格卖给了Square。也许我最喜欢的统计数据之一是，一半的美国人口每个月都会访问一个Weeble网站。
The reason it's my favorite is because it's reflective of the success of the entrepreneurs, people building the websites themselves and actually having success and seeing those results. So, I'm here to talk to you today about how to find product market fit.
它之所以是我最喜欢的，是因为它反映了企业家的成功，人们自己建立了网站，并取得了成功，并看到了这些成果。所以，我今天来和你们谈谈如何找到合适的产品市场。
It's the top problem that anyone deals with.
这是任何人都要处理的首要问题。
I'm going to try to keep it fairly practical, not theoretical, because I think finding product market fit is really about the practical nitty gritty, the hustle.
我会尽量保持它的实用性，而不是理论性，因为我认为找到合适的产品市场实际上是关于实际的细节-匆忙。
I want to just preview real quick, talk to you a little bit about our journey. Like I said, I wrote the first line of code a little over 12 years ago, which sounds really weird that it has been that long.
我想马上预习一下，跟你谈谈我们的旅程。就像我说的，我在12年前写了第一行代码，这听起来很奇怪，因为它已经有那么长的时间了。
This is what it looked like.
这就是它看起来的样子。
This is a photo I took from February 2006 is where I was, Beaver Stadium at Penn State when I wrote the first line of code. Just gives you the setting in college in August of 2006, so this has been six months. Oh, I shouldn't use this graph. So, this is a graph of the new users per day signing up for Weebly. So, non-cumulative. Just whenever someone signs up you get one, and this is six months in. So, we still hadn't launched six months in, Dan, Chris and I were all doing internships that summer. You can see here are our massive record signup day was 12 users.
这张照片是我在2006年2月拍摄的，当时我在宾夕法尼亚州立大学的海狸体育场写了第一行代码。只是给你2006年8月的大学背景，所以这已经六个月了。我不应该用这个图表。因此，这是一张新用户每天注册Weeble的图表。所以，不是累积的。只要有人签字，你就会得到一个，这是六个月后的事了。所以，我们还没有启动六个月，丹，克里斯和我都在做实习那年夏天。你可以看到这里是我们的大量记录注册日是12个用户。
I think we just create accounts for friends and family. So, six months in, we still hadn't launched just to give you an idea of how long it takes. We worked for six months and hadn't launched.
我想我们只是为朋友和家人建立账户。因此，六个月后，我们还没有推出仅仅是为了让你知道它需要多长时间。我们工作了六个月，还没有启动。
In October of 2006, this is eight months later, still hadn't launched. We were hustling for buzz on forums.
2006年10月，这是8个月后的事了，至今仍未推出。我们在论坛上争先恐后。
And we'd created a sign up link. You can see here now we had 30 some users that signed up on our record day. But eight months in and still hadn't launched.
我们建立了一个注册链接。你可以看到，现在我们有30个用户在我们的记录日注册。但八个月后还没有发射。
In October of 2006, I read about Y Combinator on Slashdot.
2006年10月，我在Slashdot上读到关于Y组合器的文章。
The deadline was about three hours ago. So, I think it was about 1:00 AM Eastern when I read it, the deadline for application was midnight Pacific. So, I had about two hours to go to create a YC application.
截止日期是三个小时前。所以，我想是东部时间凌晨1点左右，我读到的时候，申请的截止日期是太平洋子夜。所以，我有两个小时的时间去创建一个YC应用程序。
I didn't have time to call up Dan and Chris, my co-founders and ask them if they want to drop out of school with me and move to San Francisco. So, I took a guess, my guess was that Chris was going to drop out of school and Dan wasn't going to.
我没有时间给我的联合创始人丹和克里斯打电话，问他们是否愿意和我一起辍学，搬到旧金山。所以，我猜了一下，我猜克里斯会辍学，而丹不会。
I called Chris up first the next morning and said, "Hey, Chris, you want to drop out of school with me and move to San Francisco? And just on the spot. He's like, "Hell yeah, let's do it." I called up Dan.
第二天早上，我给克里斯打了个电话，说：“嘿，克里斯，你想和我一起辍学搬到旧金山吗？就在现场。他说，”好吧，我们去吧。“我给丹打了电话。
I said, "Dan, you want to drop out of school with me and move to San Francisco?" He said, "You know what? This sounds like a really promising idea. Let me call my parents, I'll call you back in two hours." Is a much more responsible approach. But I applied with less than hour to go. We drove up, interviewed, and got accepted.
我说：“丹，你想和我一起辍学搬到旧金山吗？”他说：“你知道吗？这听起来是个很有前途的主意。让我给我父母打电话，两小时后再打给你。”是一种更负责任的方法。但我申请的时间还不到一小时。我们开车来面试，然后被录取了。
Actually, funny story, we finally were able to get on TechCrunch the day of our YC interview. So, I'm sure that that didn't hurt at all.
事实上，有趣的是，我们终于在YC面试的那天登上了TechCrunch。所以，我肯定这一点也不疼。
This is what that looked like.
这就是看起来的样子。
This isn't actually what a normal press spike looks like, you'll see a normal press spike later. But in this particular case we only had two servers and we were really worried about our servers burning down and AWS didn't exist back then. So, we basically decided to allow you to sign up and then say, "Hey, you're on the wait list, we'll contact you once you're able to access your account." Which is widespread over a few days. But the first tech crunching now this is much more normal of what it looks like after a press spike. You see it kind of goes down pretty low.
这并不是正常的按压尖峰看起来的样子，稍后你会看到一个正常的按压尖峰。但在这种特殊情况下，我们只有两台服务器，我们非常担心服务器被烧毁，而AWS当时并不存在。所以，我们基本上决定让你注册，然后说，“嘿，你在等待名单上，我们会联系你，一旦你能够访问你的帐户。”这在几天内很普遍。但是，现在的第一次技术崩溃-这比新闻发布后的情况要正常得多。你看，它会降得很低。
It's hovering around the same level.
它在同一层徘徊。
If you're observant, you'll notice here one day we had zero users.
如果你善于观察，总有一天你会注意到我们没有任何用户。
That presumably means that the whole site was down, which is great. But in January 2007, 11 months in, we dropped out of school, packed up all of our servers in my car, I drove cross country to San Francisco. Would not recommend driving 80 in January, got stuck in Wyoming for three days. But finally made it out here.
这大概意味着整个网站都倒塌了，这是很棒的。但在2007年1月，11个月后，我们辍学，把所有的服务器都装在我的车里，我开车越野去了旧金山。不推荐在一月份开80辆车，在怀俄明州呆了三天。但终于逃出来了。
And this is 11 months in. So, 11 months after writing the first line of code, we're working full-time in San Francisco as part of the YC program. Here's what that looked like.
现在是11个月了。因此，在编写第一行代码11个月后，作为YC程序的一部分，我们在旧金山全职工作。看上去是这样的。
It's still shocking to me that at one point this TV was current technology because it just looks so old now. But here we are. We rented a two bedroom apartment in the Y scraper. We pushed three desks together and we pretty much just worked all the time. We worked 24/7. Our only rules, we take Saturday's off. But other than that, we'd work until we were tired. We'd sleep until we weren't, we'd work until we were tired, we'd sleep until we weren't and just repeated that process. Here is a second TechCrunch press spike that we got in January.
我仍然感到震惊的是，这台电视一度是目前的技术，因为它现在看起来太老了。但我们到了。我们在Y刮板里租了一套两居室的公寓。我们把三张桌子挤在一起，几乎一直都在工作。我们全天候工作。我们唯一的规矩就是周六休息。但除此之外，我们会一直工作到累为止。我们会一直睡到不舒服，我们会一直工作到我们累了，我们会一直睡到不睡，然后重复这个过程。这里是我们一月份收到的第二个TechCrunch新闻尖峰。
This one's much more normal.
这个要正常得多。
This is exactly what you should expect if you get on TechCrunch or any press.
这正是你在TechCrunch或任何媒体上所期望的。
It goes straight up, and it's really exciting that day, and then it goes straight back down the next day. But at least settles a little bit higher.
它一直往上走，那一天真的很令人兴奋，第二天又一直往下走。但至少要高一点。
In April of 2007, this was 14 months in. Now, you notice we had a couple other press mentions. What you notice here, these are going in the wrong direction.
2007年4月，这个数字是14个月。你注意到我们还有几次媒体报道。你在这里注意到的是，这些正朝着错误的方向发展。
The number of new users per day is actually declining, declining, declining. Both of these are heading in the wrong direction.
每天新用户的数量实际上在减少，并在下降。这两种情况都朝错误的方向发展。
It means we didn't have product market fit yet. We're 14 months in, it's over a year, and we still don't have product market fit.
这意味着我们还没有适应产品市场。我们已经14个月了，已经一年多了，我们的产品市场还不适合我们。
This was an interesting moment in our history, because we found ourselves with less than $100 in our bank account. YC Demo Day was coming up soon, and we had some excitement and thought, talking to investors maybe we'll be able to raise money. But we certainly weren't sure of that. We had just gone to Costco. So, we had lots of food for a couple weeks, but rent was coming up and as everyone knows, rent in San Francisco isn't cheap. So, about a week after this, I came to this very room, pitched a whole bunch of investors at Demo Day and we were successful in raising a 650K.
这是我们历史上一个有趣的时刻，因为我们发现自己的银行账户不到100美元。YC演示日即将到来，我们有了一些兴奋和思考，与投资者交谈，也许我们能筹集到资金。但我们肯定不确定。我们刚去过好市多。所以，我们花了几个星期的时间吃了很多东西，但是房租很快就要涨了，大家都知道，旧金山的房租并不便宜。所以，大约一周后，我来到了这个房间，在Demo日吸引了一大群投资者，我们成功地筹集了650，000美元。
At the time, that was called a series A.
当时，这被称为A系列。
Today, it would probably be called a pre-seed round of funding. 14 months in, this is what a price for round series A paperwork looks like. Just to give you a perspective too on a little bit how crazy things have gotten out here. We raised 650K on a $2 million pre-money valuation. So, 2.65 post.
今天，它可能会被称为种子前的一轮融资。14个月后，这就是A轮文件的价格。也是为了给你一个视角，看看这里发生了多么疯狂的事情。我们以200万美元的会前估值筹集了650，000美元。2.65个员额。
That was considered above average, slightly above average. We were all very jealous of Dropbox who had raised a $5 million post-money valuation and today I think that number would probably be 15, maybe 20. So, it just gives you a little bit of perspective on how you can still be very successful even if those valuation numbers today might seem low, or you might be angling for a higher one. But really puts it all in perspective.
这被认为高于平均水平，略高于平均水平。我们都非常嫉妒Dropbox，他筹集了500万美元的事后估值，今天我想这个数字可能是15，也许20。所以，这只是给了你一点视角，即使今天的估值数据看起来很低，或者你可能在寻找更高的估值，但你仍然可以非常成功。但实际上，这一切都是正确的。
This is May of 2007. So, we got featured in Newsweek magazine, which I don't even think is in print anymore. But you can see here, the spike goes up, it comes back down, it settles at a higher level which is great. But look, it's going in the wrong direction again, right? So, this is now 15 months in, still no product market fit. In August of 2007, here's 18 months in, we got featured in Time Magazine this time.
这是2007年5月。所以，我们上了“新闻周刊”杂志，我甚至不认为它已经出版了。但你可以在这里看到，尖峰上升，下降，在一个更高的层次，这是很棒的。但听着，又往错误的方向走了，对吧？所以，现在已经是15个月了，仍然没有适合的产品市场。在2007年8月，现在是18个月了，我们这次上了“时代”杂志。
Again, it goes up but now it's coming back down. Now, it's settling in a higher level, which is good but again, this is 18 months in. Were 18 months into the journey and we still have no product market fit. So, just to give you an idea of how long it can take before having something even as basic as just having users that enjoy using your product and are coming back, 18 months later we still didn't have it. Now, to skip through a little bit of the rest of story here. Here is October 2007. So, now 20 months in, you see we had this moment, and then boom, it turns around.
再一次，它上升了，但现在又开始下降了。现在，它正处于一个更高的水平，这是好的，但再次，这是18个月后。经过18个月的旅程，我们仍然没有适合的产品市场。所以，为了让你知道要花多长时间才能拥有一些东西，即使是有一些用户喜欢使用你的产品，而且还会回来，18个月后，我们仍然没有它。现在，略过一些剩下的故事。这是2007年10月。所以，现在20个月后，你看，我们有了这个时刻，然后繁荣，它反过来了。
It turns around and starts picking up.
它转过身开始捡起来。
And now all of a sudden, you can see every single day, we're getting almost 1000 people coming to our front door, which is more than we were getting featured in Newsweek Magazine or on TechCrunch. First real traction that we got. Fast forward again to February 2010, four years in and now you can see we're off to the races.
现在突然之间，你可以看到每一天，我们都有将近1000人来到我们的前门，这比我们在“新闻周刊”或TechCrunch上看到的更多。第一次真正的牵引力。快进到2010年2月，四年过去了，现在你可以看到我们要去参加比赛了。
I wanted to give you a little bit of snapshot of what it looked like for us to get product market fit in the early days before diving into some of the basics. So, let's start with a definition on what is product market fit. You've probably all heard Y Combinator's mantra, which is, there we go, make something people want.
我想给你一些快照，它看起来是什么样子，使我们的产品市场适应在早期，然后深入到一些基本知识。那么，让我们从一个定义开始，什么是适合的产品市场。你们可能都听过Y Combinator的咒语，就是，我们要做一些人们想要的东西。
Actually, if I was to modify this, I would say, make something a lot of people want. Because that incorporates a little bit about the market, but we'll talk about that. So, first to go over the stages of a company. Obviously, you start off with, I have an idea.
事实上，如果我要修改这个，我会说，做一些很多人想要的东西。因为这包含了一些关于市场的内容，但我们会讨论这个问题。所以，首先要回顾一家公司的各个阶段。很明显，你一开始我有个主意。
And everything is really exciting and you're telling all your friends about the idea.
一切都很令人兴奋，你把这个想法告诉了你所有的朋友。
This is the very birth of a company. Let's go through some of the phase.
这是一家公司的诞生。让我们经历一下这个阶段。
This is roughly all of the phases of a company.
这大概是一家公司的所有阶段。
It starts with idea. You get to prototype phase, you then get to launch, traction, monetization and growth.
从想法开始。你进入原型阶段，然后启动，牵引，货币化和增长。
I put monetization after traction, because oftentimes, that's the way it goes.
我把货币化放在牵引力之后，因为通常情况下，就是这样。
And actually going from launch and get into traction is product market fit, monetization is actually a much easier problem than product market fit.
实际上，从推出到牵引力是产品市场的契合，货币化实际上是一个比产品市场契合容易得多的问题。
This is the initial product market fit search.
这是最初的产品市场适合搜索。
Initial product market fit searches between idea and traction. So, getting from idea to traction is probably the hardest thing, and the thing that kills the most companies.
最初的产品市场适合于创意和牵引之间的搜索。所以，从一个想法到另一个动力可能是最困难的事情，也是杀死大多数公司的最困难的事情。
All right, here we go. One thing not to forget is that when you're in this phase too, you're still refining product market fit.
好了，开始吧。有一件事不要忘记，当你也在这个阶段，你仍然在完善产品市场适合。
A lot of companies forget that.
很多公司都忘了这一点。
They get so focused on scaling and so focused on continuing to grow the business and they completely forget that you're still refining and still building product market fit at this stage. So, really important not to forget this.
他们如此专注于扩展和继续发展业务，他们完全忘记了你仍然在完善和建立适合这个阶段的产品市场。所以，重要的是不要忘记这一点。
All right. So, what are the hardest things at a startup? I'm convinced that there's basically only two hard things. Number one is finding product market fit it's really, really, really hard. Most companies will not be able to find product market fit.
好的那么，创业中最困难的事情是什么呢？我确信基本上只有两件困难的事情。第一是找到合适的产品市场-这真的很难，真的很难。大多数公司都无法找到合适的产品市场。
It's incredibly challenging. Number two is hiring and building a world class team.
这是令人难以置信的挑战。第二是雇佣和建立一支世界级的团队。
That is also incredibly challenging.
这也是令人难以置信的挑战。
It's very intuitive, and it's very, very difficult to grow through that rapid growth phase, and to emerge on the other side with an enduring long lasting company and culture. Making money, I put as a very distant third.
这是非常直观的，而且很难在快速增长的阶段中成长，也很难在另一边形成一个持久而持久的公司和文化。赚钱的时候，我把自己当成了一个非常遥远的三分之一。
It is usually a lot harder to build a product that a lot of people really, really want than it is to figure out how to make money from that product. So, I would say that's usually a distant third. You could have lots of ideas how to make money.
通常，很多人非常想要的产品要比从这个产品中赚钱要难得多。所以，我想说，这通常是一个遥远的三分之一。你可以有很多如何赚钱的想法。
I'd say definitely try to make money, experiment learn, but it's a lot easier to figure out how to make money if you've already got people hooked.
我想说的是，一定要努力赚钱，实验学习，但如果你已经让人上瘾了，要想弄清楚如何赚钱要容易得多。
And then the fourth one, and we won't cover this too much, but to scale to a really big, long enduring company, you need to build an organization that's scalable and repeatedly launches great products. And that's really, really hard because it's not just going to be about the founders anymore.
然后是第四个，我们不会过多地讨论这个问题，但是要扩展到一个真正的，长期的公司，你需要建立一个可扩展的组织，并反复推出伟大的产品。这真的很难，因为这不再仅仅是创始人的问题了。
It's about the organization doing so scalable and reputably. One other sidebar is that the best companies will create a market.
这关系到组织的可扩展性和声誉。另一个侧边栏是，最好的公司将创造一个市场。
If you look at what Weebly has done, if you look at what Airbnb has done, if you look at what Dropbox has done, all companies have created their own market.
如果你看看Weeble做了什么，如果你看看Airbnb做了什么，如果你看看Dropbox做了什么，所有的公司都创造了自己的市场。
I say this because by definition here, market research is not going to help. Market researcher is research on existing markets, and you're going to create a new market. So, how do you do that? What does that look like? First of all, you need to find a hidden need.
我这么说是因为根据这里的定义，市场研究不会有帮助。市场研究者是对现有市场的研究，你将创建一个新的市场。那你是怎么做到的？那看起来像什么？首先，你需要找到一个隐藏的需求。
There is a need out in the market that a lot of companies or a lot of people don't realize exists.
市场上有一种需要，很多公司或很多人没有意识到它的存在。
And if people realized they existed, if it was obvious, then everyone would be doing it.
如果人们意识到他们的存在，如果这是显而易见的，那么每个人都会这么做。
And so, the hardest part is finding this hidden need. And everyone is going to tell you that the idea is dumb. Everyone's going to tell you it's stupid.
所以，最难的是找到这个隐藏的需求。每个人都会告诉你这个想法是愚蠢的。每个人都会告诉你这很愚蠢。
I remember in the summer of 2006, after writing that first line of code, I went and pitched Weebly at the New York Tech Meetup.
我记得在2006年夏天，在编写了第一行代码之后，我去纽约技术会议(NewYorkTechMeetup)上演讲。
And it was 1000 people. We were at alpha stage at that point.
当时有1000人。当时我们正处于阿尔法阶段。
And it was in front of 1000 people, and I gave a demo, a five minute demo.
在1000人面前，我做了一个演示，一个5分钟的演示。
And then Scott, the founder of meetup.com, came on stage and just said he thought it was the stupidest idea that he'd ever heard.
然后，Meetup.com的创始人斯科特来到舞台上说，他认为这是他听过的最愚蠢的想法。
And then no one need to make websites, and that people who need to make websites already could or people just had to learn to code.
然后，没有人需要建立网站，而那些需要建立网站的人已经可以或者人们只需要学习编码。
And in front of 1000 people told us that we had the stupidest fucking idea he'd ever heard.
当着1000人的面告诉我们有了他听过的最愚蠢的主意。
The point I'm making is if it's obvious then everyone will be doing it. So, you're finding a new reason now.
我要说的是，如果这是显而易见的，那么每个人都会这么做。所以，你现在找到了一个新的理由。
The hidden need in this particular case was that there was a lot of people who need to make a website themselves, and that was really hard. Because a lot of the tools at the time were geared towards people who were hand coding the websites, basically like FrontPage and Dreamweaver. We were able to realize that people wanted to do that and build a service that enabled people to do that. But figure out what are you a substitute for? What need are you serving better? What job are people hiring you to do? If you know the jobs to be done, book and framework that's really helpful to think about, what are people trying to do? People aren't trying to make a website, people are trying to launch and grow their business, right? So, understanding what's the job people are trying to do, and then what substitutes are there for that job? When you think from that mindset, you might think, well, there's a website, you can also create a Facebook page, you can ... So, there's lots of different substitutes for that job.
在这种特殊情况下，隐藏的需要是有很多人需要自己制作一个网站，这真的很难。因为当时的很多工具都是针对那些手工编写网站代码的人设计的，比如FrontPage和Dreamweaver。我们能够意识到，人们想要这样做，并建立了一个服务，使人们能够做到这一点。但弄清楚你是什么替代品吗？你还需要更好的服务吗？有人雇你做什么工作？如果你知道要做的工作，书和框架是真正有用的思考，人们想做什么呢？人们不是试图建立一个网站，而是在尝试发起和发展他们的业务，对吗？所以，了解人们想要做的工作是什么，然后有什么替代工作呢？当你从这种心态思考时，你可能会想，嗯，有一个网站，你也可以创建一个Facebook页面，你可以.所以，这份工作有很多不同的替代品。
I think a really important one is understanding where are you getting pulled? Where are your customers pulling you? You shouldn't be pushing your customers towards a solution. When things are working, your customers are beating a path to your front door and they're pulling you and saying, "No, you need to do this." And you're saying, "Yeah, but that's not what our product does." They say, "Well, I'm going to hack it to do that anyway." When you find people hacking your product to do something it wasn't intended to do, pay attention to that and double down on that. And then often what you initially create will seem to fit into an existing market but with less functionality.
我认为一个很重要的问题是了解你被拉到哪里去了？你的顾客把你拉到哪去了？你不应该把你的客户推向解决方案。当一切正常的时候，你的顾客就会走到你的前门，他们拉着你说：“不，你需要这样做。”你说，“是的，但这不是我们的产品。”他们说，“好吧，我无论如何都要黑进去。”当你发现有人攻击你的产品来做它不想做的事情时，要注意这一点，并加倍注意它。然后，通常情况下，您最初创建的内容似乎适合于现有市场，但功能较少。
It was the same thing with the iPhone, it was the same thing with Weebly. Oftentimes, it doesn't have 3G, it doesn't have apps, it doesn't have any of these things initially. But what it does do is it enables a whole new market, a whole set of new entrants to come and use your product. So, the success of the iPhone wasn't that it successfully competes against smartphones, it sure looked like a smartphone, but it wasn't competing against any smartphones that were out there. Because what happened is there was maybe at that point in time, that was a heavy [inaudible] user.
iPhone也是一样，Weeble也是一样。通常情况下，它没有3G，它没有应用程序，它最初没有任何这些东西。但它所做的是，它使一个全新的市场，一整套新的进入者来和使用您的产品。因此，iPhone的成功并不在于它成功地与智能手机竞争，它看起来确实像一部智能手机，但它并没有与任何一款智能手机竞争。因为发生的事情可能在那个时候，是一个沉重的(听不见的)用户。
There's maybe a couple million smartphone users in the United States. What the iPhone did is made everyone a smartphone user. So, there is all of a sudden a whole bunch of new entrants, and then over time it also cannibalized the existing smartphone market.
美国大概有几百万智能手机用户。iPhone所做的就是让每个人都成为智能手机用户。因此，突然有一大批新进入者，随着时间的推移，它也蚕食了现有的智能手机市场。
A lot of times people may mistake you for incumbents when you're creating entirely new market.
很多时候，当你创建全新的市场时，人们可能会把你误认为是现任者。
The next is on building a remarkable product. So, what is this process look like? I'll try to break it down into very literal steps about exactly what you should be doing. Everyone knows this, right? Step one, have a great idea. Step two, talks to customers, step three, something happens there and step four, profit, right? Everyone knows this. But what is step three, right? Because that's where everyone's plotting around in the desert trying to figure out what the hell to do, and nothing's working. So, let's talk about step three. Step three is literally this list of things. You talk to customers and develop a market thesis.
下一个是建立一个了不起的产品。那么，这个过程是什么样子的呢？我将尝试把它分解成非常简单的步骤，说明您应该做什么。大家都知道，对吧？第一步，有个好主意。第二步，和客户交谈，第三步，那里发生了一些事情，第四步，利润，对吗？每个人都知道这一点。但是第三步是什么，对吗？因为那是每个人都在沙漠里密谋的地方，试图找出到底该做什么，但什么都没有用。那么，让我们谈谈第三步。第三步实际上是一系列的事情。你与客户交谈，发展市场论题。
Try to understand exactly what their pain point is, what's that job they're trying to get done, and how can you help them get it done faster or better? This is really important. Listen to their problems, not their solutions. Customers will tell you the pain that they're facing, listen to that. When they talk about the solutions, their proposed solutions, you could just completely ignore that because they generally aren't that great. Number three, go through a rapid prototyping and user testing phase. Number four, you build a solution to their problems. Number five, test the solution with them. Number six, did it work? Go to one, repeat.
试着准确地理解他们的痛苦所在，他们想要完成的工作是什么，你如何才能帮助他们更快或更好地完成任务？这真的很重要。倾听他们的问题，而不是他们的解决方案。顾客会告诉你他们面临的痛苦，听听吧。当他们谈论解决方案，他们提出的解决方案时，你可以完全忽略这一点，因为它们通常不是很好。第三，进入快速原型和用户测试阶段。第四，你为他们的问题建立了一个解决方案。第五，用他们来测试解决方案。六号，起作用了吗？去一个，重复一遍。
And then number seven, by the time you've looped on points, one to six, you probably looped about 27 times and that has some interesting implications. But no one ever gets it right on the first shot. No one gets it right on the first shot. So, there's some implications there. Let's take you on a few of them, listen to their problem, not their solutions. Michael touched on this earlier too about the real Steve Jobs and fake Steve Jobs.
然后是数字7，当你在点上循环的时候，1到6，你可能循环了27次，这有一些有趣的含义。但第一枪就没人能做到。第一枪没人能拍到。所以，这里有一些暗示。让我们来看看他们中的几个，听听他们的问题，而不是他们的解决方案。迈克尔早些时候也谈到了真实的史蒂夫·乔布斯和假冒的史蒂夫·乔布斯。
There's this meme out there that Steve Jobs just didn't talk to customers and would just produce the magical product that the world needed in one shot just straight from his imagination.
有一个模因，史蒂夫乔布斯只是没有与客户交谈，只会产生神奇的产品，世界需要在一个镜头，只是直接从他的想象力。
That's not how it worked. Here's a quote, some people say give customers what they want, that's not my approach.
不是这样的。这里有句话，有些人说给客户他们想要的，这不是我的方法。
I think Henry Ford once said, "If I'd asked customers they wanted, they would have told me a faster horse." People don't know what they want until you show it to them.
我想亨利·福特曾经说过：“如果我问他们想要的顾客，他们会告诉我一匹更快的马。”人们不知道他们想要什么直到你展示给他们看。
That's why I never rely on market research.
所以我从不依赖市场调查。
That is all 100% true. Don't listen to people's proposed solutions.
这都是100%的事实。不要听别人提出的解决方案。
A market research is probably not going to show you the way. But what he didn't say is that he never talks to customers. He didn't say that he never listens to their problems. He didn't say that he never iterates because those are all things that Apple does a whole lot. So, it's absolutely critical, talk to customers, understand their pain, no solution was ever delivered perfectly in a vacuum. Number three, rapid prototyping user testing.
市场调查可能不会给你指明方向。但他没说的是他从来不和顾客说话。他没有说他从来不听他们的问题。他没有说他从不重复，因为这些都是苹果做的很多事情。因此，这是绝对重要的，与客户交谈，了解他们的痛苦，没有任何解决方案是在真空中完美交付的。第三，快速原型用户测试。
I think this is a really important point. Building up Weebly, we made this mistake a whole lot earlier on. Building a fully functional product just to figure out if it's going to work or not is a really really expensive way to test the hypothesis. You could get caught up in this loop of build the product, launch it, it doesn't work. Scrap, repeat. Build the product, launch, it doesn't work. Especially like Michael was saying, if you're always searching for that home run, and it takes you three months to build that product, that's a really long time to keep iterating.
我认为这是很重要的一点。我们更早犯了这个错误。构建一个功能齐全的产品，仅仅是为了弄清楚它是否有效，是检验假设的一种非常昂贵的方法。你可能会被困在这个构建产品的循环中，启动它，它就不起作用了。报废，重复。建立产品，推出，它不起作用。特别是像Michael说的，如果你总是在寻找本垒打，而你要花三个月的时间来构建这个产品，那就需要很长时间才能继续迭代。
The best thing you can do, however you end up doing it is focused on getting to a functional prototype as quickly as possible.
你能做的最好的事情，然而，你最终做它是专注于尽快获得一个功能原型。
That might be there's a whole bunch of tools now that allow you to take mockups and make them clickable and make them feel a lot like an app. You can do it by just writing throwaway code and just getting something really, really quickly out there.
也许现在有很多工具可以让你拍下模型，让它们可以点击，让它们感觉很像一个应用程序。你只需编写丢弃的代码，很快就能得到一些东西，就可以做到这一点。
There's a whole lot of ways to write functional prototypes, but get in front of users, don't worry yet about scaling.
编写功能原型有很多种方法，但是在用户面前，不要担心扩展。
I know we were really obsessed about writing code that was going to scale because the underlying assumption there is that as soon as we launch it, millions of people are going to be the path to our front door, it doesn't happen, not going to happen. So, don't worry about scaling until you need to. I would say initially, don't worry about monetization either. You want to focus on making sure that the product experiences right. Don't shy away from monetizing your products. Don't shy away from charging for them. But initially, you need to make sure that your product is working for people.
我知道我们非常痴迷于编写将要扩展的代码，因为基本的假设是，一旦我们启动它，数以百万计的人将成为通往我们前门的道路，它不会发生，也不会发生。所以，在你需要之前不要担心缩放。我想说的是，一开始，也不要担心货币化。你想要专注于确保产品体验正确。不要回避将你的产品货币化。不要回避为他们收费。但是一开始，你需要确保你的产品是为人们服务的。
And then expect that however many iterations you think it will take, expect it will take about 10 times that many iterations. So, what are the implications of that? And these are really important. Number one, keep your burn low. Because if you only have enough cash in the bank for two to three iterations, and it's going to take you 20 to 30, then that's not going to work.
然后，不管你认为需要多少次迭代，预计它的迭代次数大约是多次迭代的10倍。那么，这意味着什么呢？这些都很重要。第一，保持低调。因为如果你银行里只有2到3次的现金，而且要花20到30次，那就行不通了。
And number two, build a team that can do this really quickly.
第二，建立一个能够快速完成这一任务的团队。
This is, I think one of the primary reasons why outsourcing the coding in the early days generally doesn't work.
这就是我认为早期外包编码的主要原因之一。
It's because when you outsource a project, that's one shot. Well, if it's going to take you 20 to 30 shots, not going to work. You need to build a team that can very, very quickly iterate, rinse and repeat. Okay, this is another important point, test the solution with customers.
因为当你外包一个项目的时候，那只是一次机会。好吧，如果你要打20到30枪，那就不行了。您需要建立一个能够非常快地迭代、漂洗和重复的团队。好吧，这是另一个重点，和客户一起测试解决方案。
There's some helpful tools here, but the most important rules are number one, make sure you're talking to a target customer.
这里有一些有用的工具，但最重要的规则是第一条，确保您正在与目标客户交谈。
It's not helpful to just talk to anyone, make sure it's when you're targeting. But make sure that you are super flexible on changing your view on who those target customers are. So, when you talk to someone, and it seems like hey, this isn't my target customer, but then all of a sudden, there's a whole bunch of them showing up and they're hacking and doing really interesting things with your product, you should pay attention to that and potentially change who your target customer is. Number two, don't overthink it. I think this is a problem a lot of smart people can have. You obviously you want to rely on data, you want to rely on market research, you get really really into the weeds and the strategy and you super overthink everything. Don't overthink it.
只和任何人交谈是没有帮助的，确定是在你瞄准的时候。但是要确保你在改变你对那些目标客户的看法上是非常灵活的。所以，当你和某人交谈时，看起来这不是我的目标客户，但突然之间，有一大群人出现了，他们对你的产品进行黑客攻击和做一些有趣的事情，你应该注意到这一点，并有可能改变你的目标客户。第二，别想太多了。我认为这是很多聪明人可能会遇到的问题。很明显，你想依靠数据，你想依靠市场调查，你真的进入了杂草和战略，你对一切都进行了过度的思考。别想太多了。
Anecdotal is okay, just getting in there and building and launching something and trying it out, and iterating is the most important thing you can do. Doing all of your homework, all of your research, looking at the market, looking at the strategy, it's going to be the perfect strategy but no one's going to use your product. So, don't overthink it. Here are basically three tools.
轶事是可以的，只是进入到那里，建立和启动一些东西，并尝试它，和迭代是你能做的最重要的事情。做你所有的家庭作业，做所有的研究，看市场，看策略，这将是一个完美的策略，但没有人会使用你的产品。所以，别想太多了。这里基本上有三个工具。
I think these are probably the only three that you need. Number one, customer interviews. You probably need about five to 10 of these. Basically what this is, is it's talking to a customer probably for about an hour, maybe a little bit longer, whether it's on the phone or going into their place of business, or going to where they are and just understanding everything about what motivates them, what their problems are, what their pain is, and just getting that qualitative view of what they're experiencing. Number two, UX testing sessions. You only need about three to five of these, and we'll go over how to run a good UX testing session, I think on the next slide. Number three, metrics. Metrics are obviously really important.
我想这可能是你唯一需要的三个。第一，客户访谈。你可能需要五到十个这样的。基本上，这是和一个顾客交谈大概一个小时，也许更长一点，不管是打电话，还是去他们的工作场所，或者去他们所在的地方，只是了解了什么是他们的动机，他们的问题是什么，他们的痛苦是什么，。从定性的角度了解他们所经历的一切。第二，UX测试过程。您只需要三到五个这样的，我们将研究如何运行一个良好的UX测试会话，我想在下一个幻灯片。第三，指标。指标显然是非常重要的。
Tracking the right metrics is really important.
跟踪正确的指标是非常重要的。
The one thing I'll say is you'll never have as large enough sample size as you want. Even at Weebly scale today, we still sometimes have difficulty with getting statistical significance for some of our tests. Be very careful about telling too many stories with your metrics that maybe aren't supported by the statistical significance. You'll oftentimes find this, there'll be blogs writing about an A/B test and how you change the color from red to blue and it increased conversions by 27%.
有一件事我要说的是，你永远不会有足够大的样本大小，你想要的。即使在今天的WeebleScale中，我们有时仍然很难在某些测试中获得统计意义。在使用可能没有统计意义支持的度量来讲述太多的故事时，要非常小心。你经常会发现这一点，会有博客写一个A/B测试，以及你如何将颜色从红色变成蓝色，它增加了27%的转化率。
And it's like, oh yeah, how many people are ... Oh yeah, there are 17 people that ran through your test.
就像，哦，是的，有多少人.是啊，有17个人通过了你的测试。
I'm not sure that I would pay attention to that. Okay, UX testing sessions.
我不确定我是否会注意到这一点。好的，UX测试。
I think these are the most important thing that you can do.
我认为这是你能做的最重要的事情。
It's really, really simple, but it can be really painful. Number one, get someone to use your product or service in front of you in person. Whether that's on your phone, whether it's sitting in front of a laptop or desktop, get them to use it. Number two, encourage them to give open and honest feedback.
这真的很简单，但也会很痛苦。第一，找人亲自使用你的产品或服务。不管是在你的手机上，不管它是坐在笔记本电脑前还是台式机前，让他们使用它。第二，鼓励他们给予公开和诚实的反馈。
They will not want to give you open and honest feedback because it feels awkward telling someone that their baby's ugly, but you have to try your best to encourage open and honest feedback. Number three, ask them to perform a task. You are not allowed to touch the phone or keyboard. You are not allowed to do anything once you tell them to perform the task. Number four, and this is most difficult, do not say anything.
他们不会想给你开诚布公的反馈，因为告诉别人他们的孩子很丑是很尴尬的，但是你必须尽力鼓励他们坦诚的反馈。第三，让他们完成一项任务。您不允许触摸电话或键盘。一旦你让他们执行任务，你就不能做任何事情。第四，这是最困难的，什么都别说。
It's really, really, really hard. You will go through extreme agony as they struggle to figure out how the hell to do something really basic, like sign up for your app.
真的很难。你会经历极度的痛苦，因为他们挣扎着弄清楚如何做一些真正基本的事情，比如注册你的应用程序。
And you'll go through all this pain and it'll probably take them two to three minutes, and you'll get this visceral gut feeling. You are not allowed to touch or tell them to do anything until they successfully complete the task even when they ask for your help.
你会经历所有的痛苦，可能要花两到三分钟的时间，你会有一种发自内心的感觉。在他们成功完成任务之前，你不允许他们触摸或告诉他们做任何事情，即使他们请求你的帮助。
It's really, really hard. You only need three to five testing sessions.
真的很难。您只需要三到五个测试会话。
I think you really only need three to be able to tell the most critical and important UX bugs, if you will, that you have.
我认为，如果你愿意的话，你只需要三个就能告诉最关键和最重要的UX错误了。
I'll tell you one story on this, we were about to launch a homepage once and we want to get those signup form fields down to as few as possible to reduce the friction of signing up to Weebly.
我会告诉你一个故事，我们即将推出一个主页一次，我们想让这些注册表单字段减少到尽可能少，以减少报名的摩擦。
And so we figured, well, you don't really need Confirm Password, so, we got rid of that one.
所以我们想，嗯，你真的不需要确认密码，所以，我们去掉了那个密码。
In fact, you don't really need to confirm your email, which used to be a thing. So, we figured, well, we could just ask for email and password.
事实上，你不需要确认你的电子邮件，这曾经是一件事。所以，我们想，嗯，我们只需要电子邮件和密码。
That'll be enough.
那就够了。
And then the off case someone mistypes their password, that just resets their email.
然后，关闭的情况下，有人错误输入他们的密码，这只是重置他们的电子邮件。
And the chance that someone mistypes both their email and their password, then I guess they are going to have to create a new account, but that's not that big of a deal. So, we put the sign up form and it said, sign up here, in probably like 100 point font.
如果有人同时输入了他们的电子邮件和密码，那么我想他们将不得不创建一个新的账户，但这并不是什么大不了的事情。所以，我们把注册表格放在这里，上面写着，在这里注册，大概是100分字体。
And then it had two fields it said, email address, password.
然后它有两个字段，电子邮件地址，密码。
And we're about to launch it, but we had the practice of doing this before we launch anything.
我们即将推出它，但我们在推出之前就已经有了这样的实践。
And so I got a couple people down, they were just friends, and I sat them in front of a laptop and said, sign up.
于是我找了几个人，他们只是朋友，我把他们放在笔记本电脑前，说，注册吧。
And these are tech people.
这些都是技术人员。
About 45 seconds later, he turns, I don't know how to sign up. How do you not know how to sign up? It says sign up here in 100 point font. What the hell's going on? Another sad point, people don't read.
大约45秒后，他转过身来，我不知道怎么报名。你怎么不知道怎么注册？上面写着用100分字体注册。到底是怎么回事？另一个可悲的问题是人们不读书。
And I said, "Well, why don't you know how to sign up? It's right here?" And said, "Oh, that makes so much sense. Well, I just didn't look at that because I assumed email, password, there's a login form obvious." So, it wasn't a signup form, it was a login form. So, we added a gratuitous field that just says your name, so we could have three fields.
我说，“为什么你不知道怎么报名？就在这里？”然后说，“哦，这很有道理。嗯，我只是没有看过，因为我假设了电子邮件，密码，有一个明显的登录形式。”所以，这不是一个注册表单，而是一个登录表单。所以，我们添加了一个免费的字段，上面写着您的名字，所以我们可以有三个字段。
And all sudden, people saw. Oh, it's a sign up form, which is incredible.
突然，人们看到。哦，这是个注册表格，太不可思议了。
This is the kind of thing we would have never discovered if we hadn't done UX testing. So, I'd recommend doing it all the time for everything you launch. You don't need that many sessions. Here's another question comes up. When should we launch? There's this whole minimum viable product, which I think is a lot of the thinking is good, it's new since we launched. But I don't really like the word viable, because it's insinuating that you're going to put just the least crappy thing you can out there.
如果我们没有做过UX测试，这是我们永远不会发现的事情。所以，我建议在你发射的任何时候都这么做。你不需要那么多时间。这是另一个问题。我们什么时候发射？有一个最起码可行的产品，我认为很多想法都是好的，这是我们推出以来的新产品。但我真的不喜欢“可行”这个词，因为它暗示你要把你能做的最不烂的东西放在那里。
I much prefer the word remarkable. So, minimum remarkable product.
我更喜欢“非凡”这个词。所以，最小的非凡产品。
The product that is the least you can build to be remarkable.
最起码你可以建造的产品是卓越的。
All right, so this is a quote from Pablo [inaudible] , it says, launch when your product is better than what's out there.
好吧，这是Pablo(听不见的)的引语，它说，当你的产品比外面的产品更好的时候推出。
I think this is really important because it basically incorporates this idea that you should build something that's better than anything else out there, and don't launch until you have that. But as soon as you have it, then go ahead and launch. So, I think that's a right time to launch. Prioritizing. Okay, I think this is another important point to make is, how do you prioritize? Because in the early days, it seems like there's an infinite amount of things to build, and you don't have enough time to build any of them.
我认为这是非常重要的，因为它基本上包含了这样的想法：你应该建立一个比其他任何东西都更好的东西，并且在你拥有它之前不要发布。但一旦你有了它，那就开始发射吧。所以，我认为现在是发射的合适时机。确定优先次序。好吧，我认为这是另一个重要的问题，你是如何确定优先顺序的？因为在早期，似乎有无限的东西需要构建，而你没有足够的时间去构建它们。
And so, how do you figure out what the hell to build next? I think there's two important points on prioritizing. Number one, there's only one thing that matters.
那么，你怎么知道下一步该建什么呢？我认为排序有两个要点。第一，只有一件事重要。
Think about that startup journey from idea to growth stage. Focus only on the thing that gets you to that next stage. Don't focus on anything else. Don't go to conferences, don't write blog posts. Don't read the news. Now, I'm telling you this because I did all those things. It's impossible not to, but if you can't don't do any of them. Don't do any of the things that aren't getting you to your next milestone.
想想从创意到成长阶段的创业之旅。只关注能让你进入下一阶段的事情。别把注意力放在其他事情上。不要去参加会议，也不要写博客文章。别看新闻。我告诉你这些是因为我做了那些事。这是不可能的，但如果你不能做任何一个。不要做任何不让你到达下一个里程碑的事情。
In this particular case, next milestone being product market fit. Number two, I think is a really interesting point.
在这种特殊情况下，下一个里程碑是产品市场的契合。第二，我认为这是一个非常有趣的观点。
I heard this from Astro Teller who ran Google X. Most people prioritize, almost everyone prioritizes their list exactly the same way, which is effectively some kind of spreadsheet of all the tasks you can do.
我从运行谷歌X的AstroTeller那里听到了这个消息。大多数人都会优先排序，几乎每个人都会按照相同的方式排列他们的列表，这实际上是某种你可以完成的任务的电子表格。
And then the difficulty of each, and then the expected pay off of each, how impactful.
然后是每个人的困难，然后是每个人的预期回报，有多大的影响。
Then you basically sort by cost, times benefit. But instead, I think when you're trying to make continuous improvement, that's actually a pretty good approach. When you're trying to make discontinuous improvement, optimize for learning. So, basically, ask yourself what is my biggest unknown right now? What's the number one thing that I do not know about my business that I need to learn? Optimize to learn that thing? Because when you do that, it might not seem like the biggest thing. It might be a low effort task, it might seem like a low priority task. But when you optimize to learn the most, what do you do? You rewrite your whole priority list. Because when you learn that thing that actually completely, you throw out all your old priorities and have a new list of new ones. Okay, how do I know when I've achieved product market fit? This is another common question.
然后你基本上按照成本，时间效益排序。但是，相反，我认为当你试图持续改进的时候，这实际上是一个很好的方法。当你试图做不连续的改进时，优化学习。所以，基本上，问问自己，我现在最大的未知是什么？什么是我不知道我的业务，我需要学习的第一件事？优化来学习那个东西？因为当你这样做的时候，这似乎并不是最重要的事情。这可能是一个低努力的任务，它似乎是一个低优先级的任务。但是，当你优化学习最多的时候，你会做什么呢？你重写你所有的优先顺序。因为当你完全学会了这件事的时候，你就会抛开所有旧的优先事项，有一份新的清单。好吧，我怎么知道我什么时候达到了产品市场的适配呢？这是另一个常见的问题。
I think there's basically three key metrics you should be tracking. Number one, returning usage. Number two, NPS, and number three, paying customer renewal rates. Returning usage, is basically just look at people who sign up or come to your site or your app and look at the number of people who come back within a day, within three days, within seven days, within 30 days.
我认为基本上有三个关键指标是你应该跟踪的。第一，返回用法。第二，NPS和第三，支付客户更新费率。返回用法，基本上就是查看注册或访问您的站点或应用程序的人，并查看一天内、3天内、7天内、30天内返回的人数。
If you track that metric, more than anything else, that is the indicator that things are working.
如果你跟踪这个指标，比任何其他指标都要多，那就是事物运行正常的指标。
In the early stages, I remember handing out Weebly logins to all my friends and family and none of them came back.
在早期阶段，我记得给我所有的朋友和家人发了Weeble登录，但他们都没有回来。
And those are the people who like you the most, and those are the people who would really want you to be successful.
他们是最喜欢你的人，也是那些真正希望你成功的人。
And if they're not coming back then no one's going to come back.
如果他们不回来，那就没人会回来了。
And so, I think number one, tracking returning usage is really important. Number two, track NPS.
因此，我认为第一，跟踪返回的使用情况是非常重要的。第二轨道NPS。
There's all kinds of tools to do this. Now, your NPS, some people say 40, I think about 50.
有各种各样的工具可以做到这一点。现在，你的核动力源，有些人说40，我想大约50。
If it's above 50, then you probably achieve product market fit. NPS if you've ever answered that question, would you recommend this product or service to a friend? That's NPS.
如果它超过50，那么你可能达到产品市场的适合。如果你曾经回答过这个问题，你会向朋友推荐这个产品或服务吗？那是NPS。
It's one question. You rank from zero to 10. Basically, the percentage of people who answer nine or 10 those are promoters.
只有一个问题。你的排名从0到10。基本上，回答9或10人的人是推动者的百分比。
The percentage of people who answered zero to six, those are detractors.
回答为零到六的人的百分比，他们是诋毁者。
And people who answer seven or eight are thrown out.
回答七八个的人会被赶出去。
In the early days, Weebly had an NPS of 80%, that was basically 88% of people answered nine or 10. 8% of people answered zero to six.
在早期，Weeble有80%的NPS，基本上88%的人回答了9或10。8%的人回答零到六。
And if my math is right, 12% of people answered seven or eight. So, you best take that 88% minus 8% equals 80.
如果我的数学是正确的，12%的人回答了7或8个。所以，你最好把88%-8%等于80。
If it's above 50, you're doing pretty well.
如果它超过50，你会做得很好。
The way this metric is built, it can get negative, and that's probably where it will start.
这个度量的方式，它可能会变成负值，这可能就是它开始的地方。
Then number three, paying customer renewal rates. When you have paying customers, look at their renewal rates.
然后第三，支付客户更新费率。当你有付费客户，看看他们的更新率。
A quick sidebar.
一个快速的侧边栏。
I don't like the churn metric for looking at this.
我不喜欢看这个的搅动度。
A lot of people use that because it's easier to calculate. But basically, churn is not cohort based renewals cohort based. So churn is just looking at number of subscribers lost divided by total active subscribers in any given period.
很多人使用它，因为它更容易计算。但基本上，流失不是基于队列的更新，而是基于队列的。因此，Cloun只是查看在任何给定时间内丢失的用户数除以活动订阅者的总数。
I don't like that because if your denominator is changing, let's say you're growing really, really quickly, your dominant is changing faster than your numerator.
我不喜欢这样，因为如果你的分母在变化，假设你增长得非常快，你的主导地位比你的分子变化得更快。
The numerator is based on last year's denominator. So, basically, it could be deceptive as to what your actual churn is. But your renewal rates are great, because that's looking at the percentage of people who are eligible to renew, and what percentage of those people actually renewed, and that's cohort based. So, I like renewal rates a lot better.
分子是以去年的分母为基础的。所以，基本上，它可能是欺骗性的，你的实际流失是什么。但是你的续约率是很高的，因为这是看有资格续约的人的百分比，以及这些人中实际续约的百分比，这是基于队列的。所以，我更喜欢续约率。
All right. Next metrics that are included. Number one metric that is not included is signups.
好吧。包含的下一个指标。不包括的第一个指标是注册。
This is something that was not very well understood when we got started.
这是我们刚开始的时候还不太清楚的事情。
I would not pay that much attention to signups.
我不会那么重视注册。
I would pay a lot of attention to active users.
我会非常关注活跃用户。
If you have good returning usage and signups translates active users pretty well.
如果您有良好的返回使用和注册翻译活动用户相当好。
If you have bad returning usage, then signups basically completely drops off, and you have very little active users.
如果您有不好的返回使用，那么注册基本上完全下降，您有非常少的活跃用户。
In fact that number may even be shrinking even when your signups are growing if people aren't returning. Number two, conversion rate.
事实上，如果人们不回来的话，即使你的注册人数在增加，这个数字也可能在减少。第二，转换率。
If you're thinking of building a SAS business, conversion rates, they all start low, they build over time, I wouldn't pay a lot of attention to conversion rate in the beginning, I'd pay attention to some of the other metrics.
如果你想建立一个SAS业务，转换率，它们都是低的，随着时间的推移，我不会对转换率给予太多的关注，我会关注其他一些指标。
I think this is the last point. Just how does it feel when you get product market fit? You'll know when you achieved it when your customers are beating a path to your door. When you don't have it, everything feels hard.
我想这是最后一点。当你适应产品市场的时候，你会有什么感觉？你会知道当你的顾客在你的门上走过一条路时，你什么时候实现了它。当你没有它的时候，一切都感觉很艰难。
It feels like you're pushing this huge rock up a mountain, you're pushing your customers towards a solution.
感觉就像你把这块巨大的石头推上了一座山，把你的客户推向了一个解决方案。
They're too nice to tell you no, but they're not really coming back, they're not really using it. When you have it, the whole world is beating a path to your door. Everyone wants to use it.
他们太好了，不会告诉你不，但他们不会真的回来了，他们没有真正使用它。当你拥有它的时候，整个世界都在为你的门开辟一条道路。每个人都想用它。
The press is writing about it. Everything feels easy, and every decision you make feels like you're a genius because they all go well. Spoiler alert, it's somewhere in between.
媒体正在报道这件事。每件事都感觉很简单，你做的每一个决定都觉得你是个天才，因为他们都做得很好。剧透警报，在中间。
It turns out that as you're scaling your business over time, you'll discover you're maybe a little less smart than you thought you were. But, that comes later. But I think this is what it feels like. So, if you're not feeling that customers pulling you in a direction, beating a path to your door, then you probably don't have it yet.
事实证明，随着时间的推移，你的业务在不断扩展，你会发现你可能没有想象中的那么聪明。不过，以后再说。但我想这就是那种感觉。所以，如果你不觉得顾客把你拉向了一个方向，走到了你的门口，那么你可能还没有。
All right. Now, a couple more points beyond product market fit.
好吧。现在，比产品市场更适合的几个点。
This is a little bit more theoretical, I think the most important is just the very tactical, how do you go and build a product? Just talk to customers, listen to their problems, not their solutions, iterate a ton, and then keep launching until you get something out there. Focus on a couple of key metrics. But a couple points I want to make. Number one, there's fundamentally three things that a startup needs to do in order to be successful.
这是有点理论，我认为最重要的是非常战术，你如何去建造一个产品？只需与客户交谈，倾听他们的问题，而不是他们的解决方案，重复一堆，然后继续推出，直到你得到一些东西。关注几个关键指标。但我想说几点。首先，要想成功，创业公司需要做三件事。
And this is a little bit past just product market fit. Number one, product needs to be meaningfully better than the alternatives.
这有点超出了产品市场的范围。第一，产品需要比替代产品更有意义地更好。
I think this is described the [inaudible] quote of launch when what you have is better than anything else out there. Number two, you'll need to learn how to acquire customers in a differentiated way that scales. And number three, you'll need to invent your business model without killing your traction.
我认为这是描述[听不见的]发射的话，当你拥有的比其他任何东西都要好的时候。第二，你需要学习如何以不同的方式获得客户。第三，你需要在不扼杀你的吸引力的情况下发明你的商业模式。
This gets into a little bit more than product market fit an expanded version here, but basically, product market channel model fit. What this goes to show is you can build a product that works really well for a market but the model's busted.
这比产品市场更适合一个扩展版本，但基本上，产品市场渠道模式适合。这表明，你可以建立一个产品，真的很好的一个市场，但模型是坏的。
The model, the way that you charge people doesn't work, maybe you're not charging enough, maybe you're charging too much, that has a lot of interplay with your channel.
这种模式，你向人们收费的方式不起作用，也许你的收费不够，也许你收费过高，这与你的频道有很大的相互影响。
This is how you acquire customers right? So, if your model ... For example, if you're building a solution and you're trying to charge $75 a month for it, that's probably going to be a pretty tough spot to businesses because you're going to be in the middle. You're not going to be able to afford a Salesforce. You're not going to build for an actual people selling your product to the customers directly. But it's too much money that people are going to want to just whip out their credit card and start paying that.
你就是这样获得顾客的对吧？所以如果你的模特.。例如，如果你正在建立一个解决方案，并且试图每月收取75美元，那对企业来说可能是一个相当棘手的问题，因为你将处于中间地位。你买不起一支军力。你不会为一个真正的人直接把你的产品卖给客户。但人们只想掏出他们的信用卡并开始支付，这是太多的钱了。
That's why oftentimes between the model and the channel there needs to be a fit there as well. Because if you're going to have a Salesforce, you're probably going to need to charge people at least $200 to $300 a month to be able to afford the Salesforce.
这就是为什么在模型和渠道之间经常需要有一个合适的，以及。因为如果你要有一支Salesforce，你可能需要向人们收取每月至少200到300美元的费用才能买得起Salesforce。
And if you aren't going to have a Salesforce then you should probably charge $25 a month or less.
如果你不打算拥有一支销售队伍，那么你应该每月收取25美元或更少的费用。
This of course plays with the product and market fit, which is how this all works together. So, there's an essay here, which the HubSpot growth framework, which I'd highly recommend reading for a little bit more on this.
这当然是与产品和市场相适应，这是如何这一切一起工作。因此，这里有一篇文章，这篇文章是HubSpot增长框架，我强烈推荐阅读它，在这个问题上再读一些。
Another sidebar is on scaling the team. So, I think this is a really important point to make. Don't scale the team until you have product market fit.
另一个侧边栏是关于扩展团队的。所以，我认为这是一个非常重要的观点。在产品市场合适之前，不要扩大团队规模。
I would not scale past about 20 people.
我不会超过20个人。
Around 20 people, choose between about 23 and 25 is when everything breaks in the startup. Because you can no longer be just completely flat.
大约20人左右，在23人和25人之间的选择是当一切在创业中崩溃。因为你不能再平平淡淡了。
If you look at any of the essays, if you look at you know back in the day, 37 Signals, had this essay about how being a perfectly flat company is amazing and no one ever needs to hire managers. And it's like, I could predict to within one or two employees exactly the size you are, and it's about 23 to 25, and it turns out that was true. Because about 23 to 25 it feels amazing, it's completely flat, just another couple of people and everything breaks. What you need to do is you need to start implementing your first layers of management.
如果你看看这些文章中的任何一篇，如果你回顾当时的37篇信号，你就会看到这篇关于成为一家完美平平的公司是多么令人惊叹的文章，而且从来没有人需要雇佣经理。就像，我可以预测到一两个员工和你一样大，大概是23到25人，事实证明这是真的。因为大约在23到25之间，感觉很棒，它是完全平坦的，只是另外几个人，一切都破裂了。您需要做的是，您需要开始实现您的第一层管理。
It turns out that that structure is not very good for finding product market fit.
结果表明，这种结构对寻找适合的产品市场并不是很好。
It's not very optimal for that. So, keep your team small.
这并不是最理想的。所以，让你的团队保持小规模。
I would say it's okay to micromanage a little bit.
我想说的是，微观管理一点是可以的。
At this stage, you should know everything that's going on. You should know everything important there is to know about your customers, your product, your market, your channels. You should know all of that. What does that mean? That helps you make really great decisions, right? Because you have all this information, it's actually a huge advantage. Once a company scales up, then all this knowledge is distributed across people.
在这个阶段，你应该知道发生的一切。你应该知道关于你的客户、你的产品、你的市场、你的渠道的一切重要的事情。你应该知道所有这些。那是什么意思？这能帮你做出很好的决定，对吧？因为你拥有所有这些信息，这实际上是一个巨大的优势。一旦一家公司扩大规模，那么所有这些知识就会分布在人的身上。
And it's really difficult to get all that knowledge to make a really good decision in one spot when it's scattered across a bunch of different people, and takes a lot of different opinions to get something done. So, don't delegate anything important yet. However, once you achieve product market fit, and I think this is a mistake that we made, scale aggressively once you've achieved product market fit. At this point presumably, you've either found or created a new market, but it's likely you're not the only one. You may not have heard of your competitors yet. But there's probably other people out there doing the same thing. You are in a race to capture this new market, and advantages accrue to the number one player, they always do. Even if there's not network effects in your business, just having more people can build products faster, that generates more revenue, that attracts more financing, that allows you to hire more people, that generates more revenue. So, there's all these flywheels and cycles and advantages that accrue to the number one company, be that company. Build the team aggressively but thoughtfully.
当这些知识分散在一群不同的人身上，并且需要很多不同的意见来完成一些事情的时候，要想在一个地方做出一个很好的决定是非常困难的。所以，现在不要委托任何重要的事情。然而，一旦你达到了产品市场的适合，我认为这是一个错误，我们犯了一个错误，一旦你达到了产品市场的适合度，就积极地扩大规模。在这一点上，你可能已经找到或创造了一个新的市场，但很可能你不是唯一一个。你可能还没听说过你的竞争对手。但可能还有其他人在做同样的事情。你在争夺这个新的市场，优势在第一位球员身上，他们总是这样做的。即使你的企业没有网络效应，只要有更多的人可以更快地生产产品，创造更多的收入，吸引更多的资金，让你雇佣更多的人，创造更多的收入。所以，所有这些飞轮，自行车和优势，都是第一大公司，也就是那家公司。积极但深思熟虑地组建团队。
I think that you should probably never more than double the size of your company in any given year. So, I don't think I know of an example of hyper growth that works out. Of companies that go from 20 employees to 300 in a year, and that works out. Because what you end up doing is you build a foundation on sand, on really shaky soil, and eventually, it's all great while you're scaling, and eventually the skyscraper comes crashing down.
我认为，在任何一年里，你都不应该超过公司规模的两倍。所以，我想我不知道一个超高速增长的例子。每年从20名员工到300名员工的公司，这是可行的。因为你最终所做的是在沙子上，在非常不稳定的土壤上建立一个基础，最终，当你在攀登的时候，这一切都是很棒的，最终摩天大楼就会倒塌。
And that always seems to happen. You will need to completely change the way that you work, including a lot more delegating at this point, and no more micromanagement after you do that. So, there's this inflection point in scaling a company, I think it's really important to think about. Because I would not scale a company past about 20 people before you have product market fit.
而这种情况似乎总是会发生的。您将需要彻底改变您的工作方式，包括在此时进行更多的委托，并且在此之后不再进行微观管理。所以，在扩大公司规模的过程中，有一个拐点，我认为这是非常重要的。因为我不会把公司规模扩大到20人左右，然后你才会有适合的产品市场。
As soon as you've found it, go and scale aggressively as you can.
一旦你发现了它，就去尽可能积极地扩大规模。
And then lastly, I'll talk a little bit about building a brand, because I don't think it's worth spending too much time thinking about, but I think it's worth spending some time thinking about when you're in the early stages. So, great brands are built around a fundamental insight, a consumer insight that some truth that's just not really acknowledged out there.
最后，我要谈一谈建立一个品牌，因为我不认为花太多的时间去思考，但我认为当你处于早期阶段时，花点时间去思考是值得的。因此，伟大的品牌是建立在一个基本的洞察力，一个消费者的洞察力，一些真理，但这是没有真正承认的。
Ideally, this is the same one that your product is built on. So, it's really, really powerful if you can identify that insight early on, know what you stand for, and build that into all of your messaging, build that through into your product. That becomes the foundation of your brand. So, let me give you one example.
理想情况下，这是您的产品的基础。所以，如果你能在一开始就识别出你的洞察力，知道你的立场，并把它构建到你所有的消息传递中，把它构建到你的产品中，那将是非常强大的。这将成为你品牌的基础。让我举一个例子。
I talked to the person who built Virgin America's brand. Here is their story. When they got started, they were doing a startup airline.
我和创建维珍美国品牌的人谈过了。这是他们的故事。当他们开始工作的时候，他们正在做一家创业航空公司。
There are lots of economies of scale in airlines.
航空公司有很多规模经济。
They went out and started talking to customers and they realized that there's only four reasons why people select one airline over another.
他们出去和顾客交谈，他们意识到人们选择一家航空公司而不是另一家航空公司的原因只有四个。
The reasons were schedule, price. So again, if it was $3 cheaper, I'll select that airline.
原因是时间，价格。所以，如果便宜3美元，我会选择那家航空公司。
It was destination. So if you want to fly to SFO or Oakland, and it was frequent flyer programs. They looked at each one of those and said, "We're not going to win, we can't win.
那是目的地。所以，如果你想飞到SFO或Oakland，这是经常飞行的项目。他们看了看每一个，然后说：“我们不会赢，我们赢不了。
It's impossible to win on any of these." They said, "Okay, well, what's our market thesis? What are we going to do differently?" Then they went out there and talked to lots of people.
他们说：“好吧，我们的市场论断是什么？”我们要做些什么呢？“然后他们出去和很多人交谈。
And they said, "You know what, the experience of flying sucks.
他们说，“你知道吗，飞行的经历糟透了。
The experience of flying really, really sucks. So, why don't we create an airline where it's not going to be a super-premium airline, but it might cost $15 more for that ticket, but it's going to be an amazing flying experience?" That was their brand, that was their product and their brand.
飞行的经历真的很糟糕。那么，为什么我们不创建一家航空公司，它不会是一家超级高级航空公司，但它可能要花费15美元的机票，但这将是一个惊人的飞行体验？“这是他们的品牌，那是他们的产品和他们的品牌。
They built it in right from the very beginning.
他们从一开始就把它建好了。
And everything that they did revolved around that flying experience. So, that's why you make a decision to invest in the super cool lighting that doesn't make any sense financially, but that is exactly about the flying experience.
他们所做的一切都围绕着飞行经历。所以，这就是为什么你决定投资于超酷的照明，这在经济上是没有任何意义的，但这恰恰是关于飞行体验的。
That's why you're going to go and pay your staff more, and they're going to have a really great attitude as they're serving the flyers.
这就是为什么你要去给你的员工更多的薪水，他们会有一个非常好的态度，因为他们为传单服务。
That's why for every single PR event that they ever did, they did it on an airplane because they wanted to highlight that flying experience.
这就是为什么他们曾经做过的每一次公关活动，他们都是在飞机上做的，因为他们想突出这种飞行体验。
And they create a new reason for people to buy their tickets, and they were very successful at doing that.
他们为人们买票创造了一个新的理由，而且他们非常成功地做到了这一点。
I think it's one thing to understand is, I won't spend too much time overthinking this. But to the extent that you can understand what is that insight, it should be infused in both your product and that becomes the basis for your brand over time. So, that is it.
我想这是一件需要理解的事情，我不会花太多的时间去想这件事。但是，只要你能理解这种洞察力是什么，它就应该被注入到你的产品中，并且随着时间的推移，它将成为你品牌的基础。所以，就是这样。
I think I'll take a pause there.
我想我要在那里停一下。
That's it. So, any questions? Speaker 3: You said it takes time to apply for [inaudible] what kept you motivated [inaudible] . David Rusenko: The question is, it took 18 months to find product market fit and what motivated us? I like to say that it was just that we were young and stupid, which is super helpful. But I think, my theory on entrepreneurs is that a lot of people think that entrepreneurs are risk takers.
就这样有什么问题吗？演讲者3：你说申请(听不见的)是什么使你有动力[听不见的]是需要时间的。大卫·鲁先科：问题是，花了18个月才找到合适的产品市场，是什么激励了我们？我想说的是，这只是因为我们年轻而愚蠢，这是非常有帮助的。但我认为，我对企业家的理论是，很多人认为企业家是风险承担者。
I don't actually think most entrepreneurs I know are heavy risk takers.
我并不认为大多数我认识的企业家都是冒风险的人。
I think they're calculated risk takers.
我觉得他们是有计划的风险承担者。
I think that entrepreneurs are really two primary qualities. Number one is they're optimists. So, they don't see risks where other people see risks.
我认为企业家确实是两大素质。第一，他们是乐观主义者。所以，当别人看到风险时，他们看不到风险。
And number two is they're determined. So, they just don't give up.
第二点是他们决定了。所以他们就是不放弃。
I think, generally speaking, those are the two things. Your company only fails when you give up, right? While you're still working on a by definition, it's still going. So, I think, having that determination I wouldn't blindly plot on when all of the evidence shows that this is not going to work out. But I think just continue to be determined and knowing, just having the confidence of knowing this is something people need and just continue to work on it is key. Speaker 4: [inaudible] How did you approach that in your early days as this is what everyone [inaudible] David Rusenko: Yeah, so the question is, common advice is targeted niche audience are verticalized, right? Which is another way to say that.
我认为，一般来说，这是两件事。你的公司只有在你放弃的时候才会倒闭，对吧？当你还在做定义上的工作时，它还在继续。所以，我认为，有了这样的决心，我不会盲目地在所有的证据表明这是行不通的时候进行规划。但我认为，只要继续有决心和知道，仅仅有信心知道这是人们需要的，只是继续努力，这是关键。演讲者4：(听不见的)在你早期的时候，你是怎么处理这个问题的，因为这就是每个人(听不见的)大卫·鲁先科(David Rusenko)：是的，所以问题是，共同的建议是有针对性的，利基受众是垂直的，对吗？这是另一种说法。
I think you're right. We've always been an anti-pattern, runs counter to that pattern.
我觉得你是对的。我们一直都是反模式，与这种模式背道而驰。
I'm not 100% sure why, but I think it's because in our particular case, the verticals were not deep enough to be able to support the pretty heavy investment that you need to make in a product. Basically, every single person required actually a ton of functionality.
我不能百分之百确定原因，但我认为这是因为在我们的特殊情况下，垂直线不够深，无法支持你在产品上进行相当大的投资。基本上，每个人都需要大量的功能。
It was, we need blogging, we need E-commerce, we need forums, we need a full CMS, we need all these things.
这是，我们需要博客，我们需要电子商务，我们需要论坛，我们需要一个完整的CMS，我们需要所有这些东西。
And we need it to be world class and every single vertical wanted that and no vertical was deep enough to fully support that on their own. So, the pattern of what happened to Weebly and just website builders or E-commerce platforms in general is that we all started off vertical horizontal, and built a platform, and then over time, once all that functionality is built out, that we started to customize the verticals. So, I think that's what worked in our case. But building to a specific vertical is generally good advice. Speaker 5: Thank you for all you're sharing with us. Looking back at my notes, you mentioned that at some point, you have to create a market. When you figured out that hidden need, what changed and what were you telling people to either ask them questions or sell them on you having this new secret in the market that none of them knew they needed? David Rusenko: Yeah. So, the question is, when you're creating a market, what changed to telling people you have this new thing that they didn't know they needed? I think the experiences is likely to be similar for everyone, which is basically the first chunk. So, I'd say the first three to four years of Weebly's history, we were mostly just trying ...
我们需要它成为世界级的，每一个垂直的人都想要它，没有一个垂直的深度足以完全支持它们自己。所以，Weeble的模式，也就是一般的网站建设者或者电子商务平台，我们都是从垂直的水平开始，构建了一个平台，然后，随着时间的推移，一旦所有的功能都被构建出来，我们就开始定制垂直平台。所以，我认为这就是我们案子中起作用的原因。但是，建立一个特定的垂直通常是好的建议。演讲者5：谢谢你与我们分享的一切。回顾我的笔记，你提到在某一时刻，你必须创造一个市场。当你发现了隐藏的需求，什么改变了，你告诉人们要么问他们问题，要么把他们卖给你，因为你在市场上有这样一个新的秘密，他们谁也不知道他们需要什么？大卫·鲁先科：是的。所以，问题是，当你创建一个市场时，是什么改变了告诉人们你有一个他们不知道自己需要的新东西？我认为每个人的经历都可能是相似的，这基本上是第一部分。所以，我想说的是，在韦布里最初的三到四年的历史中，我们主要是在尝试.
I remember telling reporters, why do we need to write a story? I was like, "You need to write started because no one realizes this as possible right?" The first three to four years were us just trying to convince people like, no, you really can build a website.
我记得我告诉记者，为什么我们要写一个故事？我说，“你需要开始写作，因为没有人意识到这一点，对吧？”前三到四年，我们只是想说服人们，不，你真的可以建一个网站。
This is possible because everyone, I mean everyone assumed unless they knew how to code, everyone assumed that is beyond my capabilities, that is beyond my abilities. So, we spent four years probably just trying to tell people.
这是可能的，因为每个人，我是说，每个人都假设，除非他们知道如何编码，每个人都认为这超出了我的能力，那是我的能力范围之外的所以，我们花了四年时间可能只是想告诉别人。
And then eventually little by little people tried, people try it, and that's that market is created. So, that boom moment when all of a sudden people realize that this is possible. I think another probably great example would be the Uber or Airbnb.
最后，人们一点地尝试着，人们尝试着去尝试，那就是市场已经被创造出来了。所以，当人们突然意识到这是可能的时候。我认为另一个可能很好的例子是优步(Uber)或Airbnb。
Airbnb was something that I remember even early on, I was like, "I don't really want to stay with other people.
Airbnb是我很早就记得的事情，我说：“我真的不想和其他人呆在一起。
That sounds weird.
听起来很奇怪。
I don't want to get in someone else's car, that's shady." But then all sudden, the word just gets around. You try it once, enough people try it once, they really enjoy the experience. Word gets around. Once it does, that's that big bag moment where the market's created.
我不想上别人的车，这很可疑。“但是突然之间，这个词就传开了。你试过一次，足够多的人试一次，他们真的很享受这段经历。消息传开了。一旦有了，那就是创造市场的那个大袋子时刻。
And then at that point, your problems are completely different.
到那时，你的问题就完全不同了。
At that point, you don't need to convince anyone anymore because people just think it's going to be inevitable. But then your problems are more about scaling and continuing to refine the product at that point. Speaker 5: Thank you. Speaker 6: Generally talk about your key KPIs during that 18 months or period. What you were measuring to make sure that you are moving in the right direction. David Rusenko: Yeah. So, the question is on the key KPIs during that 18 month period.
在这一点上，你不需要再说服任何人，因为人们只是认为这将是不可避免的。但是，您的问题更多的是关于扩展和继续完善产品在这一点上。演讲者5：谢谢。演讲者6：通常在18个月或18个月内谈论你的关键KPI。你在测量什么，以确保你正朝着正确的方向前进。大卫·鲁先科：是的。因此，问题是关键的KPI在这18个月期间。
The sad answer is we were not monitoring them, we were not measuring them.
可悲的是，我们没有监视他们，也没有测量他们。
That's probably why it took us 18 months.
所以我们花了18个月。
It probably could have been a lot shorter.
它可能会短得多。
I think we were looking at signups, which was the thing that most people were looking at that point in time.
我想我们是在看注册，这也是大多数人在那个时候看到的。
It's a very poor metric.
这是一个非常糟糕的指标。
I think if you look at how our signups convert to active users, that was very low.
我想如果你看看我们的注册用户是如何转换为活跃用户的，那是非常低的。
If you would look at how our signups were trending on a daily and weekly basis, that was trending down. So, by all accounts, we didn't have product market fit and we knew we didn't have product market fit.
如果你看看我们的注册人数是如何在每日和每周的基础上趋势，这是趋势下降。所以，根据所有的说法，我们没有产品市场适合，我们知道我们没有产品市场适合。
It wasn't a big surprise. So, it's really just a matter of continuing to iterate, continue to iterate until you finally get something that that clicks. Speaker 7: Can you talk to us a little bit about your pricing and the journey that you went through with pricing if you can? David Rusenko: Sure.
这不是什么大惊喜。所以，这实际上只是一个继续迭代的问题，继续迭代，直到你最终得到一些点击的东西。演讲者7：如果可以的话，你能和我们谈谈你的定价和你经历的价格之旅吗？大卫·鲁先科：当然。
The question on pricing was a journey we went through.
关于定价的问题是我们经历过的一次旅程。
I think people are a lot more rational about pricing today then when we got started because in 2007 and 2008, the prevailing thinking in Silicon Valley was that you should actively not charge money. You should actively be not making money.
我认为今天人们对定价的看法比我们开始的时候要理性得多，因为在2007年和2008年，硅谷的主流思想是，你不应该主动收费。你不应该积极赚钱。
That was the prevailing thinking, it sounds really really crazy now. But at the time, the logic went that Twitter was the example that if you charge money, then you would have revenues, and once you had revenues they wouldn't be that big, and then you would just be valued on a multiple year revenues. So, way better to sell the dream and not show any revenues than to make money and then have your valuation come down.
这是当时流行的想法，现在听起来很疯狂。但当时的逻辑是，Twitter就是这样一个例子：如果你收费，那么你就会有收入，一旦你有了收入，它们就不会那么大，然后你就会得到多年的收入。所以，与赚钱相比，更好的方法是卖掉梦想而不显示任何收入，然后让你的估值下降。
That's how people thought at the time. We started up by not charging any money. So, it was just completely free from basically when we launched in 2006 through the summer 2008.
当时人们就是这么想的。我们一开始就是不收任何钱。所以，我们在2006年到2008年夏天推出的时候，它基本上是完全免费的。
I'm not even kidding, we had people who would just unsolicited just mail us a check for 100 bucks because they were like, "You're going to run out of money.
我甚至没有开玩笑，我们有一些人会主动寄给我们一张100美元的支票，因为他们会说，“你的钱快用完了。”
I'm just going to give you money." We were like, "Thanks." But it was a completely free product.
我只是要给你钱。“我们说，”谢谢。“但这是一个完全免费的产品。
There's no way to give us money unless you mail us a check. We knew we're going to run out of money from the round that we raised in around September of 2009 ... Sorry, September of 2008.
除非你寄给我们一张支票，否则是不可能给我们钱的。我们知道我们将耗尽我们在2009年9月左右筹集到的资金。对不起，2008年9月。
In January of 2008, we decided to try to make money because we figured making money was much cooler than raising another round. We worked for six months from January to June on launching Weebly Pro, which was the first version, it was $4 a month.
2008年1月，我们决定努力赚钱，因为我们认为赚钱比再筹集一轮要酷得多。从一月到六月，我们花了六个月的时间推出WeeblePro，这是第一个版本，每月4美元。
It was the first version that you could pay us any money for. We had all of our friends over in our apartment the night before we launched it and we all took bets on clearly how many millions of dollars we we're going to be making the next day. It was like, as soon as you press that button, it was just going to come flowing in.
这是你能付我们钱的第一个版本。我们所有的朋友都在我们的公寓启动的前一晚，我们都打赌，我们将在第二天赚多少百万美元。就像，只要你按下那个按钮，它就会流进来。
Then we launch it the next day, and then after a week we looked at the sales, and it turns out that we made 10 times less than the lowest bet. So, it was like, okay, I guess it's not going to work out quite that well that fast. But then we kept iterating, we kept growing from June 2008 to December. We almost ran out of money again, but had the option of cutting the founders salaries, and we were going to be cash flow positive. We basically became cashflow positive in January 2009, and more or less work through the rest of history of the company. Speaker 8: Most of all, thanks a lot for doing this.
然后我们在第二天推出，一周后我们查看了销售情况，结果发现我们赚的钱比最低的赌注少了10倍。所以，就像，好吧，我想事情不会那么快解决。但后来我们继续迭代，从2008年6月到12月一直在增长。我们又一次几乎没钱了，但我们可以选择削减创始人的薪水，而且我们的现金流将是正数。2009年1月，我们基本上实现了现金流的正数，在公司历史的剩余时间里，我们或多或少地都在努力工作。演讲者8：最重要的是，非常感谢你这样做。
I'm a user of Weebly ever since, I don't know even to pronounce.
从那以后，我就成了Weeble的使用者，甚至连发音都不知道。
I know the old interface and the new interface since actually building it.
我知道旧的界面和新的界面，因为它实际上是建立起来的。
In my personal experience and my experience working with website [inaudible] I've seen that users actually use it for more to meet [inaudible] In that case, how did you actually get active usage? Because even if it's a real user, your customer is [inaudible] David Rusenko: The question is, it's awesome that you're a Weebly user. So, how do you calculate active users when people flake off? I think you can still calculate it the same way, and I think it's still a valuable metric. So, there's a question with whether talking to inside baseball with website builders of are they successfully using your product even if they're not coming back every single day and maybe they come back once every six months.
在我的个人经历和我在网站工作的经验中，我看到用户实际上使用它来满足(听不到)，在这种情况下，你是如何得到积极的使用呢？因为即使你的用户是真正的用户，你的客户也是大卫·鲁先科(David Rusenko)：问题是，你是一个非常棒的用户。那么，当人们崩溃时，如何计算活跃用户呢？我认为你仍然可以用同样的方法计算它，而且我认为它仍然是一个有价值的度量。因此，有一个问题是，是否与网站建设者交谈，他们是否成功地使用了你的产品，即使他们不是每一天回来，也许他们每六个月回来一次。
I still think it's useful to look at the metric, because otherwise you're just flying blind. Speaker 9: Can you talk a little bit more about the [inaudible] David Rusenko: The question is around just the word discontinuous improvement, and what does that mean, and a lot of the writings about continuous improvement.
我仍然认为它是有用的，看看公制，因为否则你只是飞行盲目。演讲者9：你能多谈谈大卫·鲁先科(David Rusenko)的问题吗？这个问题仅仅是关于间断改进这个词，这意味着什么，以及很多关于持续改进的著作。
I think discontinuous improvement is effectively when you're making a big leap. Sometimes small incremental improvements don't get you to that big leap.
我认为当你迈出一大步时，不连续的改进是有效的。有时候，小小的增量改进并不能让你实现这一飞跃。
I think, imagine yourself starting with the Palm Treo, and you're trying to make continuous improvement, right? What would you do? You'd improve the OS a little bit, maybe you'd improve maybe the way the apps can exist a little bit, maybe you would take that keyboard and just make the clicking a little bit better or the typing little bit better, whatever it is. But by definition, if you're going to create a new market, oftentimes it's discontinuous improvement. What that means is taking a really big leap. And taking a really big leap, it doesn't often happen the same way as taking small steps. So, I think, again, it's really about finding that hidden need, figuring out what people want, and building that solution, iterating really quickly on that front, but optimizing for learning.
我想，想象一下你是从PalmTreo开始的，你正在尝试不断地改进，对吗？你怎么做？你会对操作系统做一点改进，也许你会改进应用程序存在的方式，也许你会拿着键盘让点击更好，或者打字更好，不管它是什么。但从定义上来说，如果你要创造一个新的市场，往往是不连续的改进。这意味着要迈出一大步。采取一个真正的大飞跃，它不经常发生的方式与采取的小步骤。所以，我想，再次强调的是，找到隐藏的需求，找出人们想要的东西，构建解决方案，在这方面进行非常快的迭代，但为了学习而优化。
I think optimizing for learning is the key here where you can say, what's the biggest unknown that I have, and how do I go about answering that question? Okay, two more questions. Speaker 10: So, how do you deal with the demographic split between purchasers and users? We're a hardware company, and our primary purchasers are probably going to be Gen X, they want an analog version, because they believe it's more reliable, and the primary users of the product will be millennials, and they all want to touch screens, which actually works better for us. How do you deal with convincing people later on in the tech roadmap, we'd actually like to even have maybe your old equipment back and we'll just give you a new one? David Rusenko: Yeah.
我认为优化学习是这里的关键，你可以说，我最大的未知是什么，我该如何回答这个问题？好吧，再问两个问题。演讲者10：那么，你是如何处理消费者和用户之间的人口分化的呢？我们是一家硬件公司，我们的主要购买者可能是X代，他们想要一个模拟版本，因为他们认为它更可靠，产品的主要用户将是千禧一代，他们都希望触摸屏，这实际上更适合我们。在技术路线图中，你是如何说服人们的？我们甚至想要把你的旧设备还给你，我们就给你一个新的？大卫·鲁先科：是的。
The question is hardware startup, your purchasers and your users are different demographics, and they want different things. How do you make the transition smooth? I don't have that much information.
问题是硬件启动，你的购买者和你的用户是不同的人口统计，他们想要不同的东西。如何使过渡顺利？我没有那么多信息。
I'm guessing education ... Oh, what coffee? Okay, then, I have no idea. But if you want to come talk to me afterwards, we could dig into it a little bit more. Speaker 11: On your way to product market fit, can you talk about how do you think about when to start the whole fundraising process? David Rusenko: Oh, yeah, that's a great question. On your way to product market fit, when do you start the whole fundraising process? I think the most helpful thing to me that I end up explain to a lot of people is look at that slide on the stages of a company. Most companies will not be able to raise money until they're at the early traction phase, just entering traction. Now, things may be different for you. You may have some friends and family who may be able to stake you early on. You may get into a program like Y Combinator. You may be different. That's certainly possible, but most companies, when you look at those large early rounds that are raised.
我猜教育.。什么咖啡？好吧，那么，我不知道。但如果你以后想和我谈谈，我们可以再深入研究一下。演讲者11：在你去产品市场的路上，你能谈谈你如何思考什么时候开始整个筹资过程？大卫·鲁辛科：哦，是的，这是个很棒的问题。在你去产品市场的路上，你什么时候开始整个筹资过程？我认为，对我最有帮助的事情，我最后向很多人解释的是，看看这张幻灯片在一个公司的各个阶段。大多数公司将无法筹集资金，直到他们处于初期牵引阶段，只是进入牵引阶段。现在，事情对你来说可能不一样了。你可能会有一些朋友和家人，他们可能会很早就把你关起来。你可以进入像Y组合器这样的程序。你可能不一样。当然，这是可能的，但大多数公司，当你看看那些大的早期轮融资。
This company raised $40 million at launching a product, and you're like, "I can do that too." You can't.
这家公司在推出一款产品时筹集了4000万美元，你会说，“我也能做到。”你不能。
That's what I thought.
我也是这么认为
It turns out in all those cases have some kind of history.
事实证明，在所有这些案例中，都有某种历史。
It's the founder or founders of that company have created massively successful products before, or maybe they're huge coming in some part of the industry or whatever it is.
这是该公司的创始人或创始人以前曾创造过非常成功的产品，或者他们可能是在行业的某一部分或其他方面的巨大收入。
I think, if your expectation is that you can't raise a round until you get to early traction, that's probably a realistic expectation.
我认为，如果你的期望是，你不能提高一个回合，直到你得到早期牵引力，这可能是一个现实的期望。
And then at that point, what are the implications of that? How the hell do you get to early traction without raising money? It's the chicken and egg problem. Everyone solves it differently, right? Everyone wound up solving it differently.
到了那个时候，这意味着什么呢？你怎么能在不筹钱的情况下提前牵引力呢？是鸡和蛋的问题。每个人都有不同的解决方法，对吧？每个人都以不同的方式解决这个问题。
It's really, really hard, though.
不过，这真的很难。
And I think the way that a lot of people solve it is just effectively sweat equity.
我认为很多人解决这个问题的方法就是有效地为公平出汗。
It's just getting a few really smart people together, who can build what they need to build without anyone else, without outsourcing, without hiring anyone else, and keeping their burn really, really low, and basically lock themselves in a room and continue to just build as quickly as they can until they get to that point.
这只是让一些非常聪明的人聚在一起，他们可以在没有其他人的情况下建造他们需要建造的建筑，不需要外包，不需要雇佣任何人，而且他们的烧伤程度很低，基本上是把自己锁在一个房间里，然后继续尽可能快地建造，直到他们达到那个程度。
And it looks like you have a follow up. Speaker 11: Yes. On one side, you say that you launch an app or something that is better than what [inaudible] David Rusenko: No.
看来你有后续行动了。演讲者11：是的。一方面，你说你推出了一款比大卫·鲁先科(DavidRusenko)更好的应用程序。
The question is launch when you have something that is better than what's out there. Which means a full blown product. No, I think, maybe this is something I could add in here. Don't look at your product in terms of like a feature grid, like a feature checklist.
问题是，当你有比外面的东西更好的东西时，就开始吧。这意味着一个完整的产品。不，我想，也许这是我可以加进去的东西。不要把你的产品看作是一个功能网格，就像一个功能清单。
If you think about it like that you can never win because you're behind and you can never catch up. Especially if you're comparing to ...
如果你这样想，你就永远赢不了，因为你落后了，永远也追不上了。尤其是当你和.
I like this phrase of customers over competitors. Because if you're looking at what your competitors are doing, then you're inherently following. Because whatever they've just launched, they started building three months ago, right? So, by the time you build that, and you launch that, then they're going to be launching the new thing.
我喜欢顾客胜过竞争对手这句话。因为如果你看到你的竞争对手在做什么，那么你天生就是在跟随。因为不管他们刚刚发射了什么，他们三个月前就开始建造了，对吧？所以，当你构建它的时候，你启动它的时候，他们就会启动这个新的东西。
And it could be ... I remember one of our competitors, I won't name them, but they're from South Africa, and they had raised 40 million bucks, and we'd raised 650K.
可能是.。我记得我们的竞争对手之一，我不愿透露他们的名字，但他们来自南非，他们筹集了4000万美元，我们筹集了650，000美元。
Things were not going that great for them.
事情对他们来说并没有那么好。
And so they completely ripped off our interface, and they just completely cloned it and launched it. We were laughing our asses off because we were about to launch in UpDate, we're at the time that sidebar of the elements was on top, and we were about to put on the left. We spent a lot of time building that, and they launched two weeks before we built it.
所以他们完全撕毁了我们的界面，他们只是完全克隆并推出了它。我们嘲笑我们的屁股，因为我们即将在更新中发布，我们当时元素的侧边栏在顶部，我们准备把它放在左边。我们花了很多时间来建造它，他们在我们建造它前两周就启动了。
I think you have to focus on your customers, not your competitors.
我认为你必须关注你的客户，而不是你的竞争对手。
And it's not about the feature grid. Because there's going to be one particular feature or one aspect of your product. Maybe it's the ease of use and the usability that opens it up to a new market. Maybe it's one feature that people are just killing for, that's going to make up for the lack of the rest. So, people are going to look at that and say, "Well, it doesn't have X, Y, Z, which I do kind of want and those other products do, but this is the one thing that I need, and they're going to come and use your product for that.
这与功能网格无关。因为你的产品会有一个特定的特性或一个方面。也许是它的易用性和可用性打开了它进入一个新的市场。也许这是人们正在为之杀人的一个特点，这将弥补其余的不足。所以，人们会看这个，然后说，“它没有X，Y，Z，这是我想要的，其他的产品，但是这是我需要的，他们会来用你的产品。
It's not that your product has more features than anyone else.
这并不是说你的产品比任何人都有更多的功能。
Is that your practice that one thing, that one job you're trying to do, it does that better than anyone else.
这就是你的实践，你想做的一件事，一份工作，它比任何人都做得更好。
Thanks, guys. Geoff Ralston: Okay, that concludes today. Sorry that we ran a little late.
谢谢伙计们。Geoff Ralston: 好的，今天结束了。抱歉我们迟到了。
It's hard to constrain fantastic speakers from getting through their material and all the great questions you guys were asking. Next week, Suhail Doshi and Gustaf Alstromer from Mixpanel and Y Combinator respectively, will continue on our dive into product.
这是很难限制出色的演讲者通过他们的材料和所有伟大的问题，你们是问。下周，来自MixPanel和Y Combinator的SuhareDoshi和GustafAlstromer将继续深入我们的产品。
Talking about measurement and growth, two very important things. We'll also be posting another video of a conversation this week that [inaudible] is going to have with Ooshma Garg the founder of Gobble and they, like the Bee Gees are going to be talking about staying alive if anyone gets that reference.
谈到测量和生长，两件非常重要的事情。我们还将在本周发布另一段视频，内容是(无法听到的)与Gobble创始人Ooshma Garg的对话，他们，就像蜜蜂之家一样，将讨论如果有人得到这样的信息，他们就会继续活着。
All right, thanks everyone.
好吧，谢谢大家。