change LD citation

Update author list

Author: vmooers

_bibliography/working_papers.bib

@@ -1,19 +1,18 @@
 ---
 ---
 
-@article{campbellLiquidDemocracyTwo2022,
+@article{campbellLiquidDemocracyTwo2024,
 	title = {Liquid Democracy. Two Experiments on Delegation in Voting},
-	author = {Campbell, Joseph and Casella, Alessandra and De Lara, Lucas and Mooers, Victoria and Ravindran, Dilip},
-	year = {2022},
-	month = dec,
+	author = {Mooers, Victoria and Campbell, Joseph and Casella, Alessandra and De Lara, Lucas and Ravindran, Dilip},
+	year = {2024},
+	month = apr,
 	number = {w30794},
-	journal = {NBER Working Paper},
 	institution = {National Bureau of Economic Research},
 	doi = {10.3386/w30794},
 	urldate = {2023-10-08},
-	html = {http://www.nber.org/papers/w30794.pdf},
+	nber={w30794},
 	langid = {english},
 	arxiv = {arXiv:2212.09715},
-	abstract = {Under Liquid Democracy (LD), decisions are taken by referendum, but voters are allowed to delegate their votes to other voters. Theory shows that in common interest problems where experts are correctly identified, the outcome can be superior to simple majority voting. However, even when experts are correctly identified, delegation must be used sparely because it reduces the variety of independent information sources. We report the results of two experiments, each studying two treatments: in one treatment, participants have the option of delegating to better informed individuals; in the second, participants can choose to abstain. The first experiment follows a tightly controlled design planned for the lab; the second is a perceptual task run online where information about signals’ precision is ambiguous. The two designs are very different, but the experiments reach the same result: in both, delegation rates are unexpectedly high and higher than abstention rates, and LD underperforms relative to both universal voting and abstention.},
+	abstract = {Proponents of participatory democracy praise Liquid Democracy: decisions are taken by referendum, but voters delegate their votes freely. When better informed voters are present, delegation can increase the probability of a correct decision. However, delegation must be used sparely because it reduces the information aggregated through voting. In two different experiments, we find that delegation underperforms both universal majority voting and the simpler option of abstention. In a tightly controlled lab experiment where the subjects' precision of information is conveyed in precise mathematical terms and very salient, the result is due to overdelegation. In a perceptual task run online where the precision of information is not known precisely, delegation remains very high and again underperforms both majority voting and abstention. In addition, subjects substantially overestimate the precision of the better informed voters, underlining that Liquid Democracy is fragile to multiple sources of noise. The paper makes an innovative methodological contribution by combining two very different experimental procedures: the study of voting rules would benefit from complementing controlled experiments with known precision of information with tests under ambiguity, a realistic assumption in many voting situations.},
 	my_type = {working papers}
 }

_config.yml

@@ -302,7 +302,7 @@ enable_publication_badges:
   dimensions: true # Dimensions badge (https://badge.dimensions.ai/)
 
 # Filter out certain bibtex entry keywords used internally from the bib output
-filtered_bibtex_keywords: [abbr, abstract, arxiv, bibtex_show, html, pdf, selected, supp, blog, code, poster, slides, website, preview, altmetric]
+filtered_bibtex_keywords: [abbr, abstract, arxiv, bibtex_show, html, pdf, selected, supp, blog, code, poster, slides, website, preview, altmetric, nber]
 
 # Maximum number of authors to be shown for each publication (more authors are visible on click)
 max_author_limit: 5  # leave blank to always show all authors

_layouts/bib.html

@@ -187,6 +187,9 @@
           {%- if entry.website %}
             <a href="{{ entry.website }}" class="btn btn-sm z-depth-0" role="button">Website</a>
           {%- endif %}
+          {%- if entry.nber %}
+            <a href="https://www.nber.org/papers/{{ entry.nber }}" class="btn btn-sm z-depth-0" role="button">NBER</a>
+          {%- endif %}
           </div>
           {% if site.enable_publication_badges %}
           {% assign entry_has_altmetric_badge = entry.altmetric or entry.doi or  entry.eprint or entry.pmid or entry.isbn %}