diff --git a/.DS_Store b/.DS_Store new file mode 100644 index 000000000..91ab24503 Binary files /dev/null and b/.DS_Store differ diff --git a/nomos/.DS_Store b/nomos/.DS_Store new file mode 100644 index 000000000..89dcafab4 Binary files /dev/null and b/nomos/.DS_Store differ diff --git a/nomos/38/claro.md b/nomos/38/claro.md index c35a39c8a..4517c9119 100644 --- a/nomos/38/claro.md +++ b/nomos/38/claro.md @@ -26,33 +26,80 @@ consensus mechanism. We outline a simple taxonomy of Byzantine adversaries, leaving explicit explorations of to subsequent publication. -NOTE: We have renamed this variant to `Claro` from `Glacier` in order to disambiguate from a previously released research endeavor by [Amores-Sesar, Cachin, and Tedeschi](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2210.03423.pdf). Their naming was coincidentally named the same as our work but is sufficiently differentiated from how ours works. - -## Motivation -This work is a part of a larger research endeavor to explore highly scalable Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) consensus protocols. Consensus lies at the heart of many decentralized protocols, and thus its characteristics and properties are inherited by applications built on top. Thus, we seek to improve upon the current state of the art in two main directions: base-layer scalability and censorship resistance. - -Avalanche has shown to exibit the former in a production environment in a way that is differentiated from Nakamoto consensus and other Proof of Stake (PoS) protocols based in practical Byzantine Fault Tolerant (pBFT) methodologies. We aim to understand its limitations and improve upon them. +NOTE: We have renamed this variant to `Claro` from `Glacier` +in order to disambiguate from a previously released research endeavor by +[Amores-Sesar, Cachin, and Tedeschi](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2210.03423.pdf). +Their naming was coincidentally named the same as our work but +is sufficiently differentiated from how ours works. + +## Motivation + +This work is a part of a larger research endeavor to +explore highly scalable Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) consensus protocols. +Consensus lies at the heart of many decentralized protocols, and +thus its characteristics and properties are inherited by applications built on top. +Thus, we seek to improve upon the current state of the art in two main directions: +base-layer scalability and censorship resistance. + +Avalanche has shown to exibit the former in a production environment in a way +that is differentiated from Nakamoto consensus and +other Proof of Stake (PoS) protocols based in practical Byzantine Fault Tolerant +(pBFT) methodologies. +We aim to understand its limitations and improve upon them. ## Background -Our starting point is Avalanche’s Binary Byzantine Agreement algorithm, called Snowball. As long as modifications allow a DAG to be constructed later on, this simplifies the design significantly. The DAG stays the same in principle: it supports confidence, but the core algorithm can be modeled without. - -The concept of the Snowball algorithm is relatively simple. Following is a simplified description (lacking some details, but giving an overview). For further details, please refer to the [Avalanche paper](https://assets.website-files.com/5d80307810123f5ffbb34d6e/6009805681b416f34dcae012_Avalanche%20Consensus%20Whitepaper.pdf). - -1. The objective is to vote yes/no on a decision (this decision could be a single bit, or, in our DAG use case, whether a vertex should be included or not). -2. Every node has an eventually-consistent complete view of the network. It will select at random k nodes, and will ask their opinion on the decision (yes/no). -3. After this sampling is finished, if there is a vote that has more than an `alpha` threshold, it accumulates one count for this opinion, as well as changes its opinion to this one. But, if a different opinion is received, the counter is reset to 1. If no threshold `alpha` is reached, the counter is reset to 0 instead. -4. After several iterations of this algorithm, we will reach a threshold `beta`, and decide on that as final. - -Next, we will proceed to describe our new algorithm, based on Snowball. - -We have identified a shortcoming of the Snowball algorithm that was a perfect starting point for devising improvements. The scenario is as follows: - -- There is a powerful adversary in the network, that controls a large percentage of the node population: 10% to ~50%. -- This adversary follows a strategy that allows them to rapidly change the decision bit (possibly even in a coordinated way) so as to maximally confuse the honest nodes. -- Under normal conditions, honest nodes will accumulate supermajorities soon enough, and reach the `beta` threshold. However, when an honest node performs a query and does not reach the threshold `alpha` of responses, the counter will be set to 0. -- The highest threat to Snowball is an adversary that keeps it from reaching the `beta` threshold, managing to continuously reset the counter, and steering Snowball away from making a decision. -This document only outlines the specification to Claro. Subsequent analysis work on Claro (both on its performance and how it differentiates with Snowball) will be published shortly and this document will be updated. +Our starting point is Avalanche’s Binary Byzantine Agreement algorithm, +called Snowball. +As long as modifications allow a DAG to be constructed later on, +this simplifies the design significantly. +The DAG stays the same in principle: it supports confidence, +but the core algorithm can be modeled without. + +The concept of the Snowball algorithm is relatively simple. +Following is a simplified description (lacking some details, but giving an overview). +For further details, please refer to the [Avalanche paper](https://assets.website-files.com/5d80307810123f5ffbb34d6e/6009805681b416f34dcae012_Avalanche%20Consensus%20Whitepaper.pdf). + +1. The objective is to vote yes/no on a decision +(this decision could be a single bit or, +in our DAG use case, whether a vertex should be included or not). +2. Every node has an eventually-consistent complete view of the network. +It will select at random k nodes, and +will ask their opinion on the decision (yes/no). +3. After this sampling is finished, +if there is a vote that has more than an `alpha` threshold, +it accumulates one count for this opinion, +as well as changes its opinion to this one. +But, if a different opinion is received, the counter is reset to 1. +If no threshold `alpha` is reached, the counter is reset to 0 instead. +4. After several iterations of this algorithm, +we will reach a threshold `beta`, and decide on that as final. + +Next, we will proceed to describe our new algorithm, based on Snowball. + +We have identified a shortcoming of the Snowball algorithm +that was a perfect starting point for devising improvements. +The scenario is as follows: + +- There is a powerful adversary in the network, +that controls a large percentage of the node population: 10% to ~50%. +- This adversary follows a strategy that allows them to +rapidly change the decision bit +(possibly even in a coordinated way) so as to maximally confuse the honest nodes. +- Under normal conditions, +honest nodes will accumulate supermajorities soon enough, and +reach the `beta` threshold. +However, when an honest node performs a query and does not reach the threshold +`alpha` of responses, the counter will be set to 0. +- The highest threat to Snowball is an adversary +that keeps it from reaching the `beta` threshold, +managing to continuously reset the counter, and +steering Snowball away from making a decision. + +This document only outlines the specification to Claro. +Subsequent analysis work on Claro +(both on its performance and how it differentiates with Snowball) +will be published shortly and this document will be updated. ## Claro Algorithm Specification @@ -63,29 +110,64 @@ finality that provides good reliability for network and Byzantine fault tolerance. ### Algorithmic concept -Claro is an evolution of the Snowball Byzantine Binary Agreement (BBA) algorithm, in which we tackle specifically the perceived weakness described above. The main focus is going to be the counter and the triggering of the reset. Following, we elaborate the different modifications and features that have been added to the reference algorithm: - -1. Instead of allowing the latest evidence to change the opinion completely, we take into account all accumulated evidence, to reduce the impact of high variability when there is already a large amount of evidence collected. -2. Eliminate the counter and threshold scheme, and introduce instead two regimes of operation: - - One focused on grabbing opinions and reacting as soon as possible. This part is somewhat closer conceptually to the reference algorithm. - - Another one focused on interpreting the accumulated data instead of reacting to the latest information gathered. -3. Finally, combine those two phases via a transition function. This avoids the creation of a step function, or a sudden change in behavior that could complicate analysis and understanding of the dynamics. Instead, we can have a single algorithm that transfers weight from one operation to the other as more evidence is gathered. -4. Additionally, we introduce a function for weighted sampling. This will allow the combination of different forms of weighting: + +Claro is an evolution of the Snowball Byzantine Binary Agreement (BBA) algorithm, +in which we tackle specifically the perceived weakness described above. +The main focus is going to be the counter and the triggering of the reset. +Following, we elaborate the different modifications and +features that have been added to the reference algorithm: + +1. Instead of allowing the latest evidence to change the opinion completely, +we take into account all accumulated evidence, +to reduce the impact of high variability when there is already a +large amount of evidence collected. +2. Eliminate the counter and threshold scheme, +and introduce instead two regimes of operation: + - One focused on grabbing opinions and reacting as soon as possible. + This part is somewhat closer conceptually to the reference algorithm. + - Another one focused on interpreting the accumulated data + instead of reacting to the latest information gathered. +3. Finally, combine those two phases via a transition function. +This avoids the creation of a step function, or +a sudden change in behavior that could complicate analysis and +understanding of the dynamics. +Instead, we can have a single algorithm that transfers weight +from one operation to the other as more evidence is gathered. +4. Additionally, we introduce a function for weighted sampling. +This will allow the combination of different forms of weighting: - Staking - Heuristic reputation - Manual reputation. -It’s worth delving a bit into the way the data is interpreted in order to reach a decision. Our approach is based conceptually on the paper [Confidence as Higher-Order Uncertainty](https://cis.temple.edu/~pwang/Publication/confidence.pdf), which describes a frequentist approach to decision certainty. The first-order certainty, measured by frequency, is caused by known positive evidence, and the higher-order certainty is caused by potential positive evidence. Because confidence is a relative measurement defined on evidence, it naturally follows comparing the amount of evidence the system knows with the amount that it will know in the near future (defining “near” as a constant). - -Intuitively, we are looking for a function of evidence, **`w`**, call it **`c`** for confidence, that satisfies the following conditions: - -1. Confidence `c` is a continuous and monotonically increasing function of `w`. (More evidence, higher confidence.) +It’s worth delving a bit into the way the data is interpreted +in order to reach a decision. +Our approach is based conceptually on the paper [Confidence as Higher-Order Uncertainty](https://cis.temple.edu/~pwang/Publication/confidence.pdf), +which describes a frequentist approach to decision certainty. +The first-order certainty, measured by frequency, +is caused by known positive evidence, and +the higher-order certainty is caused by potential positive evidence. +Because confidence is a relative measurement defined on evidence, +it naturally follows comparing the amount of evidence the system knows +with the amount that it will know in the near future (defining “near” as a constant). + +Intuitively, we are looking for a function of evidence, **`w`**, +call it **`c`** for confidence, that satisfies the following conditions: + +1. Confidence `c` is a continuous and monotonically increasing function of `w`. +(More evidence, higher confidence.) 2. When `w = 0`, `c = 0`. (Without any evidence, confidence is minimum.) -3. When `w` goes to infinity, `c` converges to 1. (With infinite evidence, confidence is maximum.) +3. When `w` goes to infinity, `c` converges to 1. +(With infinite evidence, confidence is maximum.) -The paper describes also a set of operations for the evidence/confidence pairs, so that different sources of knowledge could be combined. However, we leave here the suggestion of a possible research line in the future combining an algebra of evidence/confidence pairs with swarm-propagation algorithm like the one described in [this paper](http://replicated.cc/files/schmebulock.pdf). +The paper describes also a set of operations for the evidence/confidence pairs, +so that different sources of knowledge could be combined. +However, we leave here the suggestion of a possible research line in the future +combining an algebra of evidence/confidence pairs with +swarm-propagation algorithm like the one described in +[this paper](http://replicated.cc/files/schmebulock.pdf). ### Initial opinion + A proposal is formulated to which consensus of truth or falsity is desired. Each node that participates starts the protocol with an opinion on the proposal, represented in the sequel as `NO`, `NONE`, @@ -97,8 +179,11 @@ compute a justification of the proposal, it sets its opinion to one of `YES` or `NO`. If it cannot form an opinion, it leaves its opinion as `NONE`. -For now, we will ignore the proposal dissemination process and assume all nodes participating have an initial opinion to respond to within a given request. Further research will relax this assumption and analyze timing attacks on proposal propagation through the network. - +For now, we will ignore the proposal dissemination process and +assume all nodes participating have an initial opinion +to respond to within a given request. +Further research will relax this assumption and +analyze timing attacks on proposal propagation through the network. The node then participates in a number of query rounds in which it solicits other node's opinion in query rounds. Given a set of `N` @@ -114,6 +199,7 @@ may not have a view on the complete members participating in the consensus on a proposal in a given round. The algorithm is divided into 4 phases: + 1. Querying 2. Computing `confidence`, `evidence`, and `accumulated evidence` 3. Transition function @@ -141,7 +227,8 @@ final opinion on the truth of the proposal. --> ### Setup Parameters The node initializes the following integer ratios as constants: -``` + +``` markdown # The following values are constants chosen with justification from experiments # performed with the adversarial models @@ -177,10 +264,10 @@ k_initial max_rounds ;; placeholder for simulation work, no justification yet <-- 100 ``` - + The following variables are needed to keep the state of Claro: -``` +``` markdown ;; current number of nodes to attempt to query in a round k <-- k_original @@ -196,20 +283,20 @@ round <-- 0 ``` - -### Phase One: Query +### Phase One: Query A node selects `k` nodes randomly from the complete pool of peers in the network. This query is can optionally be weighted, so the probability -of selecting nodes is proportional to their +of selecting nodes is proportional to their Node Weighting -$$ -P(i) = \frac{w_i}{\sum_{j=0}^{j=N} w_j} +$$ +P(i) = \frac{w_i}{\sum_{j=0}^{j=N} w_j} $$ -where `w` is evidence. The list of nodes is maintained by a separate protocol (the network -layer), and eventual consistency of this knowledge in the network +where `w` is evidence. +The list of nodes is maintained by a separate protocol (the network layer), +and eventual consistency of this knowledge in the network suffices. Even if there are slight divergences in the network view from different nodes, the algorithm is resilient to those. @@ -244,12 +331,15 @@ nodes queried is too high. When the query finishes, the node now initializes the following two values: +```markdown new_votes <-- |total vote replies received in this round to the current query| positive_votes <-- |YES votes received from the query| - +``` + ### Phase Two: Computation + When the query returns, three ratios are used later on to compute the transition function and the opinion forming. Confidence encapsulates the notion of how much we know (as a node) in relation to how much we @@ -270,15 +360,20 @@ $$ Computation $$ \begin{array}{lc} -\text{Confidence} & c_{accum} \impliedby \frac{total\ votes}{total\ votes + l} \newline -\text{Total accumulated evidence}& e_{accum} \impliedby \frac{total\ positive\ votes}{total\ votes} \newline -\text{Evidence per round} & e_{round} \impliedby \frac{round\ positive\ votes}{round\ votes} \newline +\text{Confidence} & c_{accum} \impliedby \frac{total\ votes} +{total\ votes + l} \newline +\text{Total accumulated evidence}& e_{accum} \impliedby \frac{total\ positive\ +votes}{total\ votes} \newline +\text{Evidence per round} & e_{round} \impliedby \frac{round\ positive\ +votes}{round\ votes} \newline \end{array} $$ The node runs the `new_votes` and `positive_votes` parameters received in the query round through the following algorithm: +```markdown + total_votes +== new_votes total_positive @@ -293,8 +388,10 @@ in the query round through the following algorithm: <-- new_evidence * ( 1 - confidence ) + total_evidence * confidence alpha <-- doubt * ( 1 - confidence ) + certainty * confidence - +``` + ### Phase Three: Computation + In order to eliminate the need for a step function (a conditional in the code), we introduce a transition function from one regime to the other. Our interest in removing the step function is twofold: @@ -314,9 +411,9 @@ $$ \begin{array}{cl} evidence & \impliedby e_{round} (1 - c_{accum}) + e_{accum} c_{accum} \newline \alpha & \impliedby \alpha_1 (1 - c_{accum}) + \alpha_2 c_{accum} \newline -\end{array} +\end{array} $$ - + Since the confidence is modeled as a ratio that depends on the constant *`l`*, we can visualize the transition function at different values of *`l`*. Recall that this constant encapsulates @@ -327,11 +424,11 @@ valuable input of evidence to happen. We have observed via experiment that for a transition function to be useful, we need establish two requirements: -1. The change has to be balanced and smooth, giving an +1. The change has to be balanced and smooth, giving an opportunity to the first regime to operate and not jump directly to the second regime. -2. The convergence to 1.0 (fully operating in the second regime) +2. The convergence to 1.0 (fully operating in the second regime) should happen within a reasonable time-frame. We’ve set this time-frame experimentally at 1000 votes, which is in the order of ~100 queries given a *`k`* of 9. @@ -344,6 +441,7 @@ The node updates its local opinion on the consensus proposal by examining the relationship between the evidence accumulated for a proposal with the confidence encoded in the `alpha` parameter: +```php IF evidence > alpha THEN @@ -352,12 +450,15 @@ proposal with the confidence encoded in the `alpha` parameter: evidence < 1 - alpha THEN opinion <-- NO - +``` + If the opinion of the node is `NONE` after evaluating the relation between `evidence` and `alpha`, adjust the number of uniform randomly queried nodes by multiplying the neighbors `k` by the `k_multiplier` up to the limit of `k_max_multiplier_power` query size increases. - + +```php + ;; possibly increase number nodes to uniformly randomly query in next round WHEN opinion is NONE @@ -365,8 +466,10 @@ up to the limit of `k_max_multiplier_power` query size increases. k < k_original * k_multiplier ^ max_k_multiplier_power THEN k <-- k * k_multiplier +``` + +### Decision -### Decision The next step is a simple one: change our opinion if the threshold *`alpha`* is reached. This needs to be done separately for the `YES/NO` decision, checking both boundaries. The last step is then to *`decide`* @@ -389,7 +492,9 @@ network size and directly related to the total votes received, an honest node marks the decision as final, and always returns this opinion is response to further queries from other nodes on the network. - + +```php + IF confidence > confidence_threshold OR @@ -400,27 +505,27 @@ network. ELSE round +== 1 QUERY LOOP CONTINUES +``` Thus, after the decision phase, either a decision has been finalized and the local node becomes quiescent never initiating a new query, or -it initiates a [new query](#query). +it initiates a [new query](query). ### Termination A local round of Claro terminates in one of the following execution model considerations: - -1. No queries are received for any newly initiated round for temporal +1. No queries are received for any newly initiated round for temporal periods observed via a locally computed passage of time. See [the following point on local time](#clock). -2. The `confidence` on the proposal exceeds our threshold for +2. The `confidence` on the proposal exceeds our threshold for finalization. - -3. The number of `rounds` executed would be greater than - `max_rounds`. - + +3. The number of `rounds` executed would be greater than + `max_rounds`. + #### Quiescence After a local node has finalized an `opinion` into a `decision`, it enters a quiescent @@ -438,6 +543,7 @@ of a phase locked-loop feedback to measure local clock drift see ## Further points ### Node receives information during round + In the query step, the node is envisioned as packing information into the query to cut down on the communication overhead a query to each of this `k` nodes containing the node's own current opinion on the @@ -448,24 +554,27 @@ active round, and discard the information if the node is in a quiescent state. #### Problems with Weighting Node Value of Opinions + If the view of other nodes is incomplete, then the sum of the optional weighting will not be a probability distribution normalized to 1. The current algorithm doesn't describe how the initial opinions are formed. ## Implementation status -The following implementations have been created for various testing and simulation purposes: + +The following implementations have been created for various testing and +simulation purposes: + - [Rust](https://github.com/logos-co/consensus-research) -- [Python]() - FILL THIS IN WITH NEWLY CREATED REPO -- [Common Lisp]() - FILL THIS IN WITH NEWLY CREATED REPO +- [Python](none) - FILL THIS IN WITH NEWLY CREATED REPO +- [Common Lisp](none) - FILL THIS IN WITH NEWLY CREATED REPO -## Wire Protocol +## Wire Protocol For interoperability we present a wire protocol semantics by requiring the validity of the following statements expressed in Notation3 (aka `n3`) about any query performed by a query node: - ```n3 @prefix rdf: . @prefix rdfs: . @@ -515,18 +624,17 @@ canonical mapping to UTF-8 JSON. At their core, the query messages are a simple enumeration of the three possible values of the opinion: - { NO, NONE, YES } +> { NO, NONE, YES } -When represented via integers, such as choosing - - { -1, 0, +1 } +When represented via integers, such as choosing + +> { -1, 0, +1 } the parity summations across network invariants often become easier to manipulate. ## Security Considerations - ### Privacy In practice, each honest node gossips its current opinion which @@ -534,7 +642,7 @@ reduces the number of messages that need to be gossiped for a given proposal. The resulting impact on the privacy of the node's opinion is not currently analyzed. -### Security with respect to various Adversarial Models +### Security with respect to various Adversarial Models Adversarial models have been tested for which the values for current parameters of Claro have been tuned. Exposition of the @@ -585,7 +693,7 @@ Although we have proposed a normative description of the implementation of the underlying binary consensus algorithm (Claro), we believe we have prepared for analysis its adversarial performance in a manner that is amenable to replacement by another member of the -[snow*](#snow*) family. +[snow*](snow) family. We have presumed the existence of a general family of algorithms that can be counted on to vote on nodes in the DAG in a fair manner. @@ -594,7 +702,7 @@ transactions. One can express all state machine, i.e. account-based models as checkpoints anchored in UTXO trust, so we believe that this presupposition has some justification. We can envision a need for tooling abstraction that allow one to just program the DAG itself, as -they should be of stable interest no matter if Claro isn't. +they should be of stable interest no matter if Claro isn't. ## Informative References @@ -607,15 +715,15 @@ they should be of stable interest no matter if Claro isn't. 3. [snow*]() The Snow family of algorithms - + 4. [Move]() - Move: a Language for Writing DAG Abstractions + Move: a Language for Writing DAG Abstractions 5. [rdf]() 6. [rdfs]() -7. [xsd]() +7. [xsd]() 8. [n3-w3c-notes]() @@ -632,4 +740,4 @@ they should be of stable interest no matter if Claro isn't. ## Copyright Copyright and related rights waived via -[CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). +[CC0](https://creativecommons.org/public) diff --git a/status/.DS_Store b/status/.DS_Store new file mode 100644 index 000000000..8043d3f21 Binary files /dev/null and b/status/.DS_Store differ diff --git a/status/24/curation.md b/status/24/curation.md index 3dcd39486..952321487 100644 --- a/status/24/curation.md +++ b/status/24/curation.md @@ -9,44 +9,61 @@ editor: Szymon Szlachtowicz --- ## Abstract -This specification is a voting protocol for peers to submit votes to a smart contract. Voting is immutable, + +This specification is a voting protocol for peers to submit votes to a smart contract. +Voting is immutable, this will help avoid sabotage from malicious peers. ## Motivation -In open p2p protocol there is an issue with voting off-chain as there is much room for malicious peers to only include votes that support their case when submitting votes to chain. +In open p2p protocol there is an issue with voting off-chain +as there is much room for malicious peers to only include votes that support +their case when submitting votes to chain. -Proposed solution is to aggregate votes over waku and allow users to submit votes to smart contract that aren't already submitted. +Proposed solution is to aggregate votes over waku and +allow users to submit votes to smart contract that aren't already submitted. ### Smart contract Voting should be finalized on chain so that the finished vote is immutable. Because of that, smart contract needs to be deployed. -When votes are submitted smart contract has to verify what votes are properly signed and that sender has correct amount of SNT. -When Vote is verified the amount of SNT voted on specific topic by specific sender is saved on chain. +When votes are submitted +smart contract has to verify what votes are properly signed and +that sender has correct amount of SNT. +When Vote is verified +the amount of SNT voted on specific topic by specific sender is saved on chain. ### Double voting -Smart contract should also keep a list of all signatures so that no one can send the same vote twice. +Smart contract should also keep a list of all signatures so +that no one can send the same vote twice. Another possibility is to allow each sender to only vote once. ### Initializing Vote -When someone wants to initialize vote he has to send a transaction to smart contract that will create a new voting session. -When initializing a user has to specify type of vote (Addition, Deletion), amount of his initial SNT to submit and public key of community under vote. +When someone wants to initialize vote +he has to send a transaction to smart contract that will create a new voting session. +When initializing a user has to specify type of vote (Addition, Deletion), +amount of his initial SNT to submit and public key of community under vote. Smart contract will return a ID which is identifier of voting session. -Also there will be function on Smart Contract that when given community public key it will return voting session ID or undefined if community isn't under vote. +Also there will be function on Smart Contract that +when given community public key it will return voting session ID or +undefined if community isn't under vote. ## Voting ### Sending votes -Sending votes is simple every peer is able to send a message to Waku topic specific to given application: -``` +Sending votes is simple every peer is able to send a message to Waku topic +specific to given application: + +```json + /status-community-directory-curation-vote/1/{voting-session-id}/json + ``` -vote object that is sent over waku should contain information about: +vote object that is sent over waku should contain information about: ```ts type Vote = { @@ -54,28 +71,36 @@ type Vote = { vote: string // vote sent eg. 'yes' 'no' sntAmount: BigNumber //number of snt cast on vote sign: string // cryptographic signature of a transaction (signed fields: sender,vote,sntAmount,nonce,sessionID) - nonce: number // number of votes cast from this address on current vote (only if we allow multiple votes from the same sender) + nonce: number // number of votes cast from this address on current vote + // (only if we allow multiple votes from the same sender) sessionID: number // ID of voting session } ``` ### Aggregating votes -Every peer that is opening specific voting session will listen to votes sent over p2p network, and aggregate them for a single transaction to chain. +Every peer that is opening specific voting session +will listen to votes sent over p2p network, and +aggregate them for a single transaction to chain. ### Submitting to chain -Every peer that has aggregated at least one vote will be able to send them to smart contract. -When someone votes he will aggregate his own vote and will be able to immediately send it. +Every peer that has aggregated at least one vote +will be able to send them to smart contract. +When someone votes he will aggregate his own vote and +will be able to immediately send it. Peer doesn't need to vote to be able to submit the votes to the chain. -Smart contract needs to verify that all votes are valid (eg. all senders had enough SNT, all votes are correctly signed) and that votes aren't duplicated on smart contract. +Smart contract needs to verify that all votes are valid +(eg. all senders had enough SNT, all votes are correctly signed) and +that votes aren't duplicated on smart contract. -### Finalizing +### Finalizing Once the vote deadline has expired, the smart contract will not accept votes anymore. -Also directory will be updated according to vote results (community added to directory, removed etc.) +Also directory will be updated according to vote results +(community added to directory, removed etc.) ## Copyright diff --git a/status/28/featuring.md b/status/28/featuring.md index 49794df57..0c9b47d91 100644 --- a/status/28/featuring.md +++ b/status/28/featuring.md @@ -9,26 +9,32 @@ editor: Szymon Szlachtowicz --- ## Abstract + This specification describes a voting method to feature different active Status Communities. ## Overview -When there is a active community that is seeking new members, current users of community should be able to feature their community so that it will be accessible to larger audience. +When there is a active community that is seeking new members, +current users of community should be able to feature their community so +that it will be accessible to larger audience. Status community curation DApp should provide such a tool. Rules of featuring: - Given community can't be featured twice in a row. - Only one vote per user per community (single user can vote on multiple communities) - Voting will be done off-chain - - If community hasn't been featured votes for given community are still valid for the next 4 weeks + - If community hasn't been featured + votes for given community are still valid for the next 4 weeks -Since voting for featuring is similar to polling solutions proposed in this spec could be also used for different applications. +Since voting for featuring is similar to polling solutions proposed +in this spec could be also used for different applications. ### Voting -Voting for featuring will be done through waku v2. +Voting for featuring will be done through waku v2. Payload of waku message will be : + ```ts type FeatureVote = { voter: string // address of a voter @@ -44,12 +50,16 @@ timestamp is necessary so that votes can't be reused after 4 week period ### Counting Votes Votes will be counted by the DApp itself. -DApp will aggregate all the votes in the last 4 weeks and calculate which communities should be displayed in the Featured tab of DApp. +DApp will aggregate all the votes in the last 4 weeks and +calculate which communities should be displayed in the Featured tab of DApp. Rules of counting: - - When multiple votes from the same address on the same community are encountered only the vote with highest timestamp is considered valid. - - If a community has been featured in a previous week it can't be featured in current week. - - In a current week top 5 (or 10) communities with highest amount of SNT votes up to previous Sunday 23:59:59 UTC are considered featured. + - When multiple votes from the same address on the same community are encountered + only the vote with highest timestamp is considered valid. + - If a community has been featured in a previous week + it can't be featured in current week. + - In a current week top 5 (or 10) communities with highest amount of SNT votes + up to previous Sunday 23:59:59 UTC are considered featured. ## Copyright diff --git a/status/55/1to1-chat.md b/status/55/1to1-chat.md index 9f6490352..9c735bc0a 100644 --- a/status/55/1to1-chat.md +++ b/status/55/1to1-chat.md @@ -17,7 +17,8 @@ contributors: ## Abstract -This specification describes how the Status 1-to-1 chat protocol is implemented on top of the Waku v2 protocol. +This specification describes how the Status 1-to-1 chat protocol is implemented +on top of the Waku v2 protocol. This protocol can be used to send messages to a single recipient. ## Terminology @@ -27,11 +28,13 @@ This protocol can be used to send messages to a single recipient. - **Public chat**: A chat where any participant can join and read messages. - **Private chat**: A chat where only invited participants can join and read messages. - **Group chat**: A chat where multiple select participants can join and read messages. -- **Group admin**: A participant that is able to add/remove participants from a group chat. +- **Group admin**: A participant that is able to +add/remove participants from a group chat. ## Background -This document describes how 2 peers communicate with each other to send messages in a 1-to-1 chat, with privacy and authenticity guarantees. +This document describes how 2 peers communicate with each other +to send messages in a 1-to-1 chat, with privacy and authenticity guarantees. ## Specification @@ -39,47 +42,61 @@ This document describes how 2 peers communicate with each other to send messages This protocol MAY use any key-exchange mechanism previously discussed - -1. [53/WAKU2-X3DH](../../waku/standards/application/53/x3dh.md) +1. [53/WAKU2-X3DH](../../waku/standards/application/53/x3dh.md) 2. [WAKU2-NOISE](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/master/standards/application/noise.md) -This protocol can provide end-to-end encryption to give peers a strong degree of privacy and security. -Public chat messages are publicly readable by anyone since there's no permission model for who is participating in a public chat. +This protocol can provide end-to-end encryption +to give peers a strong degree of privacy and security. +Public chat messages are publicly readable by anyone since +there's no permission model for who is participating in a public chat. -## Flow +## Chat Flow ### Negotiation of a 1:1 chat There are two phases in the initial negotiation of a 1:1 chat: -1. **Identity verification** (e.g., face-to-face contact exchange through QR code, Identicon matching). -A QR code serves two purposes simultaneously - identity verification and initial key material retrieval; + +1. **Identity verification** +(e.g., face-to-face contact exchange through QR code, Identicon matching). +A QR code serves two purposes simultaneously - +identity verification and initial key material retrieval; 1. **Asynchronous initial key exchange** -For more information on account generation and trust establishment, see [65/STATUS-ACCOUNT-ADDRESS](../65/account-address.md) +For more information on account generation and trust establishment, see [65/ACCOUNT-ADDRESS](../65/account-address.md) ### Post Negotiation -After the peers have shared their public key material, a 1:1 chat can be established using the methods described in the key-exchange protocols mentioned above. +After the peers have shared their public key material, +a 1:1 chat can be established using the methods described in the +key-exchange protocols mentioned above. ### Session management The 1:1 chat is made robust by having sessions between peers. It is handled by the key-exchange protocol used. For example, -1. [53/WAKU2-X3DH](../../waku/standards/application/53/x3dh.md), the session management is described in [54/WAKU2-X3DH-SESSIONS](../../waku/standards/application/54/x3dh-sessions.md) +1. [53/WAKU2-X3DH](../../waku/standards/application/53/x3dh.md), +the session management is described in [54/WAKU2-X3DH-SESSIONS](../../waku/standards/application/54/x3dh-sessions.md) -2. [WAKU2-NOISE](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/master/standards/application/noise.md), the session management is described in [WAKU2-NOISE-SESSIONS](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/master/standards/application/noise-sessions.md) +2. [WAKU2-NOISE](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/master/standards/application/noise.md), +the session management is described in [WAKU2-NOISE-SESSIONS](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/master/standards/application/noise-sessions.md) ## Negotiation of a 1:1 chat amongst multiple participants (group chat) -A small, private group chat can be constructed by having multiple participants negotiate a 1:1 chat amongst each other. -Each participant MUST maintain a session with all other participants in the group chat. +A small, private group chat can be constructed by having multiple participants +negotiate a 1:1 chat amongst each other. +Each participant MUST +maintain a session with all other participants in the group chat. This allows for a group chat to be created with a small number of participants. -However, this method does not scale as the number of participants increases, for the following reasons - +However, this method does not scale as the number of participants increases, +for the following reasons - + 1. The number of messages sent over the network increases with the number of participants. 2. Handling the X3DH key exchange for each participant is computationally expensive. -The above issues are addressed in [56/STATUS-COMMUNITIES](../56/communities.md), with other trade-offs. +The above issues are addressed in [56/STATUS-COMMUNITIES](../56/communities.md), +with other trade-offs. ### Flow @@ -96,7 +113,8 @@ message MembershipUpdateMessage { // chat_id = hex(chat_creator_public_key) + "-" + random_uuid // This chat_id MUST be validated by all participants string chat_id = 1; - // A list of events for this group chat, first 65 bytes are the signature, then is a + // A list of events for this group chat, first 65 bytes are the signature, + then is a // protobuf encoded MembershipUpdateEvent repeated bytes events = 2; oneof chat_entity { @@ -108,7 +126,8 @@ message MembershipUpdateMessage { } ``` -Note that in `events`, the first element is the signature, and all other elements after are encoded `MembershipUpdateEvent`'s. +Note that in `events`, the first element is the signature, and +all other elements after are encoded `MembershipUpdateEvent`'s. where `MembershipUpdateEvent` is defined as follows: @@ -141,69 +160,102 @@ message MembershipUpdateEvent { } } ``` - -Note that the definitions for `ChatMessage` and `EmojiReaction` can be found in [chat_message.proto](https://github.com/status-im/status-go/blob/5fd9e93e9c298ed087e6716d857a3951dbfb3c1e/protocol/protobuf/chat_message.proto#L1) and [emoji_reaction.proto](https://github.com/status-im/status-go/blob/5fd9e93e9c298ed087e6716d857a3951dbfb3c1e/protocol/protobuf/emoji_reaction.proto). + +Note that the definitions for `ChatMessage` and +`EmojiReaction` can be found in +[chat_message.proto](https://github.com/status-im/status-go/blob/5fd9e93e9c298ed087e6716d857a3951dbfb3c1e/protocol/protobuf/chat_message.proto#L1) +and [emoji_reaction.proto](https://github.com/status-im/status-go/blob/5fd9e93e9c298ed087e6716d857a3951dbfb3c1e/protocol/protobuf/emoji_reaction.proto). ##### Chat Created -When creating a group chat, this is the first event that MUST be sent. -Any event with a clock value lower than this MUST be discarded. -Upon receiving this event a client MUST validate the `chat_id` provided with the update and create a chat with identified by `chat_id`. +When creating a group chat, this is the first event that MUST be sent. +Any event with a clock value lower than this MUST be discarded. +Upon receiving this event a client MUST validate the `chat_id` +provided with the update and +create a chat with identified by `chat_id`. By default, the creator of the group chat is the only group admin. ##### Name Changed To change the name of the group chat, group admins MUST use a `NAME_CHANGED` event. -Upon receiving this event a client MUST validate the `chat_id` provided with the updates and MUST ensure the author of the event is an admin of the chat, otherwise the event MUST be ignored. +Upon receiving this event, +a client MUST validate the `chat_id` provided with the updates and +MUST ensure the author of the event is an admin of the chat, +otherwise the event MUST be ignored. If the event is valid the chat name SHOULD be changed according to the provided message. ##### Members Added -To add members to the chat, group admins MUST use a `MEMBERS_ADDED` event. -Upon receiving this event a participant MUST validate the `chat_id` provided with the updates and MUST ensure the author of the event is an admin of the chat, otherwise the event MUST be ignored. -If the event is valid, a participant MUST update the list of members of the chat who have not joined, adding the members received. +To add members to the chat, group admins MUST use a `MEMBERS_ADDED` event. +Upon receiving this event, +a participant MUST validate the `chat_id` provided with the updates and +MUST ensure the author of the event is an admin of the chat, +otherwise the event MUST be ignored. +If the event is valid, +a participant MUST update the list of members of the chat who have not joined, +adding the members received. ##### Member Joined -To signal the intent to start receiving messages from a given chat, new participants MUST use a `MEMBER_JOINED` event. -Upon receiving this event a participant MUST validate the `chat_id` provided with the updates. -If the event is valid a participant MUST add the new participant to the list of participants stored locally. +To signal the intent to start receiving messages from a given chat, +new participants MUST use a `MEMBER_JOINED` event. +Upon receiving this event, +a participant MUST validate the `chat_id` provided with the updates. +If the event is valid a participant, +a participant MUST add the new participant to the list of participants stored locally. Any message sent to the group chat MUST now include the new participant. ##### Member Removed There are two ways in which a member MAY be removed from a group chat: -- A member MAY leave the chat by sending a `MEMBER_REMOVED` event, with the `members` field containing their own public key. -- An admin MAY remove a member by sending a `MEMBER_REMOVED` event, with the `members` field containing the public key of the member to be removed. -Each participant MUST validate the `chat_id` provided with the updates and MUST ensure the author of the event is an admin of the chat, otherwise the event MUST be ignored. +- A member MAY leave the chat by sending a `MEMBER_REMOVED` event, +with the `members` field containing their own public key. +- An admin MAY remove a member by sending a `MEMBER_REMOVED` event, +with the `members` field containing the public key of the member to be removed. + +Each participant MUST validate the `chat_id` provided with the updates and +MUST ensure the author of the event is an admin of the chat, +otherwise the event MUST be ignored. If the event is valid, a participant MUST update the local list of members accordingly. ##### Admins Added To promote participants to group admin, group admins MUST use an `ADMINS_ADDED` event. -Upon receiving this event, a participant MUST validate the `chat_id` provided with the updates, MUST ensure the author of the event is an admin of the chat, otherwise the event MUST be ignored. -If the event is valid, a participant MUST update the list of admins of the chat accordingly. +Upon receiving this event, +a participant MUST validate the `chat_id` provided with the updates, +MUST ensure the author of the event is an admin of the chat, +otherwise the event MUST be ignored. +If the event is valid, +a participant MUST update the list of admins of the chat accordingly. ##### Admin Removed Group admins MUST NOT be able to remove other group admins. -An admin MAY remove themselves by sending an `ADMIN_REMOVED` event, with the `members` field containing their own public key. -Each participant MUST validate the `chat_id` provided with the updates and MUST ensure the author of the event is an admin of the chat, otherwise the event MUST be ignored. +An admin MAY remove themselves by sending an `ADMIN_REMOVED` event, +with the `members` field containing their own public key. +Each participant MUST validate the `chat_id` provided with the updates and +MUST ensure the author of the event is an admin of the chat, +otherwise the event MUST be ignored. If the event is valid, a participant MUST update the list of admins of the chat accordingly. ##### Color Changed -To change the text color of the group chat name, group admins MUST use a `COLOR_CHANGED` event. +To change the text color of the group chat name, +group admins MUST use a `COLOR_CHANGED` event. ##### Image Changed -To change the display image of the group chat, group admins MUST use an `IMAGE_CHANGED` event. +To change the display image of the group chat, +group admins MUST use an `IMAGE_CHANGED` event. ## Security Considerations -1. Inherits the security considerations of the key-exchange mechanism used, e.g., [53/WAKU2-X3DH](../../waku/standards/application/53/x3dh.md) or [WAKU2-NOISE](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/master/standards/application/noise.md) +1. Inherits the security considerations of the key-exchange mechanism used, +e.g., [53/WAKU2-X3DH](../../waku/standards/application/53/x3dh.md) or [WAKU2-NOISE](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/master/standards/application/noise.md) ## Copyright @@ -213,7 +265,7 @@ Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/public 1. [53/WAKU2-X3DH](../../waku/standards/application/53/x3dh.md) 2. [WAKU2-NOISE](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/master/standards/application/noise.md) -3. [65/STATUS-ACCOUNT-ADDRESS](../65/account-address.md) +3. [65/STATUS-ACCOUNT](../65/account-address.md) 4. [54/WAKU2-X3DH-SESSIONS](../../waku/standards/application/54/x3dh-sessions.md) 5. [WAKU2-NOISE-SESSIONS](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/master/standards/application/noise-sessions.md) 6. [56/STATUS-COMMUNITIES](../56/communities.md) diff --git a/status/56/communities.md b/status/56/communities.md index 343cab390..7492d512e 100644 --- a/status/56/communities.md +++ b/status/56/communities.md @@ -13,49 +13,66 @@ contributors: ## Abstract -This document describes the design of Status Communities over Waku v2, allowing for multiple users to communicate in a discussion space. -This is a key feature for the Status messaging app. +This document describes the design of Status Communities over Waku v2, +allowing for multiple users to communicate in a discussion space. +This is a key feature for the Status messaging app. ## Background and Motivation -The purpose of Status communities, as specified in this document, is allowing for large group chats. +The purpose of Status communities, as specified in this document, +is allowing for large group chats. Communities can have further substructure, e.g. specific channels. -Smaller group chats, on the other hand, are out of scope for this document and can be built over [55/STATUS-1TO1-CHAT](../55/1to1-chat.md). -We refer to these smaller group chats simply as "group chats", to differentiate them from Communities. +Smaller group chats, on the other hand, +are out of scope for this document and +can be built over [55/STATUS-1TO1-CHAT](../55/1to1-chat.md). +We refer to these smaller group chats simply as "group chats", +to differentiate them from Communities. -For group chats based on [55/STATUS-1TO1-CHAT](../55/1to1-chat.md), the key exchange mechanism MUST be X3DH, as described in [53/WAKU2-X3DH](../../waku/standards/application/53/x3dh.md). +For group chats based on [55/STATUS-1TO1-CHAT](../55/1to1-chat.md), +the key exchange mechanism MUST be X3DH, +as described in [53/WAKU2-X3DH](../../waku/standards/application/53/x3dh.md). + +However, this method does not scale as the number of participants increases, +for the following reasons - -However, this method does not scale as the number of participants increases, for the following reasons - 1. The number of messages sent over the network increases with the number of participants. 2. Handling the X3DH key exchange for each participant is computationally expensive. Having multicast channels reduces the overhead of a group chat based on 1:1 chat. -Additionally, if all the participants of the group chat have a shared key, then the number of messages sent over the network is reduced to one per message. +Additionally, if all the participants of the group chat have a shared key, +then the number of messages sent over the network is reduced to one per message. ## Terminology - **Community**: A group of peers that can communicate with each other. - **Member**: A peer that is part of a community. -- **Admin**: A member that has administrative privileges. Used interchangeably with "owner". +- **Admin**: A member that has administrative privileges. +Used interchangeably with "owner". - **Channel**: A designated subtopic for a community. Used interchangeably with "chat". ## Design Requirements -Due to the nature of communities, the following requirements are necessary for the design of communities - +Due to the nature of communities, +the following requirements are necessary for the design of communities - 1. The creator of the Community is the owner of the Community. 2. The Community owner is trusted. 3. The Community owner can add or remove members from the Community. This extends to banning and kicking members. 4. The Community owner can add, edit and remove channels. -5. Community members can send/receive messages to the channels which they have access to. +5. Community members can send/receive messages +to the channels which they have access to. 6. Communities may be encrypted (private) or unencrypted (public). 7. A Community is uniquely identified by a public key. 8. The public key of the Community is shared out of band. -9. The metadata of the Community can be found by listening on a content topic derived from the public key of the Community. -10. Community members run their own Waku nodes, with the configuration described in [Waku-Protocols](#waku-protocols). -Light nodes solely implementing [19/WAKU2-LIGHTPUSH](../../waku/standards/core/19/lightpush.md) may not be able to run their own Waku node with the configuration described. +9. The metadata of the Community can be found by listening on a content topic +derived from the public key of the Community. +10. Community members run their own Waku nodes, +with the configuration described in [Waku-Protocols](#waku-protocols). +Light nodes solely implementing +[19/WAKU2-LIGHTPUSH](../../waku/standards/core/19/lightpush.md) +may not be able to run their own Waku node with the configuration described. ## Design @@ -64,16 +81,17 @@ Light nodes solely implementing [19/WAKU2-LIGHTPUSH](../../waku/standards/core/1 The following cryptographic primitives are used in the design - - X3DH -- Single Ratchet - - The single ratchet is used to encrypt the messages sent to the Community. - - The single ratchet is re-keyed when a member is added/removed from the Community. +- Single Ratchet + - The single ratchet is used to encrypt the messages sent to the Community. + - The single ratchet is re-keyed when a member is added/removed from the Community. ## Wire format @@ -88,7 +106,8 @@ message IdentityImage { SourceType source_type = 2; // image_type signals the image type and method of parsing the payload ImageType image_type = 3; - // encryption_keys is a list of encrypted keys that can be used to decrypt an encrypted payload + // encryption_keys is a list of encrypted keys that can be used to decrypt an + // encrypted payload repeated bytes encryption_keys = 4; // encrypted signals the encryption state of the payload, default is false. bool encrypted = 5; @@ -101,7 +120,8 @@ message IdentityImage { // ENS_AVATAR uses the ENS record's resolver get-text-data.avatar data // The `payload` field will be ignored if ENS_AVATAR is selected - // The application will read and parse the ENS avatar data as image payload data, URLs will be ignored + // The application will read and + // parse the ENS avatar data as image payload data, URLs will be ignored // The parent `ChatMessageIdentity` must have a valid `ens_name` set ENS_AVATAR = 2; } @@ -129,7 +149,8 @@ message ChatIdentity { string color = 6; string emoji = 7; repeated SocialLink social_links = 8; - // first known message timestamp in seconds (valid only for community chats for now) + // first known message timestamp in seconds + // (valid only for community chats for now) // 0 - unknown // 1 - no messages uint32 first_message_timestamp = 9; @@ -287,14 +308,17 @@ Note: The usage of the clock is described in the [Clock](#clock) section. ### Content topic usage -"Content topic" refers to the field in [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](../../waku/standards/core/14/message.md/#message-attributes), further elaborated in [10/WAKU2](../../waku/standards/core/10/waku2.md/#overview-of-protocol-interaction). +"Content topic" refers to the field in [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](../../waku/standards/core/14/message.md/#message-attributes), +further elaborated in [10/WAKU2](../../waku/standards/core/10/waku2.md/#overview-of-protocol-interaction). #### Advertising a Community -The content topic that the community is advertised on MUST be derived from the public key of the community. -The content topic MUST be the first four bytes of the keccak-256 hash of the compressed (33 bytes) public key of the community encoded into a hex string. +The content topic that the community is advertised on +MUST be derived from the public key of the community. +The content topic MUST be the first four bytes of the keccak-256 hash +of the compressed (33 bytes) public key of the community encoded into a hex string. -``` +```js hash = hex(keccak256(encodeToHex(compressedPublicKey))) topicLen = 4 @@ -314,9 +338,11 @@ contentTopic = "/waku/1/0x" + topic + "/rfc26" The unique identifier for a community channel/chat is the chat id. -The content topic that Community channels/chats use MUST be the hex-encoded keccak-256 hash of the public key of the community concatenated with the chat id. +The content topic, that Community channels/chats uses, +MUST be the hex-encoded keccak-256 hash of the public key of the community +concatenated with the chat id. -``` +```js hash = hex(keccak256(encodeToHex(compressedPublicKey + chatId))) topicLen = 4 @@ -331,13 +357,14 @@ for i = 0; i < topicLen; i++ { contentTopic = "/waku/1/0x" + topic + "/rfc26" ``` - #### Community event messages -Requests to leave, join, kick and ban, as well as key exchange messages, MUST be sent to the content topic derived from the public key of the community. -The content topic MUST be the hex-encoded keccak-256 hash of the public key of the community. +Requests to leave, join, kick and ban, as well as key exchange messages, +MUST be sent to the content topic derived from the public key of the community. +The content topic +MUST be the hex-encoded keccak-256 hash of the public key of the community. -``` +```js hash = hex(keccak256(encodeToHex(publicKey))) topicLen = 4 @@ -350,7 +377,7 @@ for i = 0; i < topicLen; i++ { } contentTopic = "/waku/1/0x" + topic + "/rfc26" -``` +``` ### Community Management @@ -359,84 +386,123 @@ The flows for Community management are as described below. #### Community Creation Flow 1. The Community owner generates a public/private key pair. -2. The Community owner configures the Community metadata, according to the wire format "CommunityDescription". -3. The Community owner publishes the Community metadata on a content topic derived from the public key of the Community. -the Community metadata SHOULD be encrypted with the public key of the Community. -The Community metadata MAY be sent during fixed intervals, to ensure that the Community metadata is available to members. +2. The Community owner configures the Community metadata, +according to the wire format "CommunityDescription". +3. The Community owner publishes the Community metadata on a content topic +derived from the public key of the Community. +the Community metadata SHOULD be encrypted with the public key of the Community. + +The Community metadata MAY be sent during fixed intervals, +to ensure that the Community metadata is available to members. The Community metadata SHOULD be sent every time the Community metadata is updated. -4. The Community owner MAY advertise the Community out of band, by sharing the public key of the Community on other mediums of communication. +4. The Community owner MAY advertise the Community out of band, +by sharing the public key of the Community on other mediums of communication. #### Community Join Flow (peer requests to join a Community) 1. A peer and the Community owner establish a 1:1 chat as described in [55/STATUS-1TO1-CHAT](../55/1to1-chat.md). -2. The peer requests to join a Community by sending a "CommunityRequestToJoin" message to the Community. -At this point, the peer MAY send a "CommunityCancelRequestToJoin" message to cancel the request. +2. The peer requests to join a Community by sending a +"CommunityRequestToJoin" message to the Community. +At this point, the peer MAY send a +"CommunityCancelRequestToJoin" message to cancel the request. 3. The Community owner MAY accept or reject the request. -4. If the request is accepted, the Community owner sends a "CommunityRequestToJoinResponse" message to the peer. -5. The Community owner then adds the member to the Community metadata, and publishes the updated Community metadata. +4. If the request is accepted, +the Community owner sends a "CommunityRequestToJoinResponse" message to the peer. +5. The Community owner then adds the member to the Community metadata, and +publishes the updated Community metadata. #### Community Join Flow (peer is invited to join a Community) 1. The Community owner and peer establish a 1:1 chat as described in [55/STATUS-1TO1-CHAT](../55/1to1-chat.md). -2. The peer is invited to join a Community by the Community owner, by sending a "CommunityInvitation" message. +2. The peer is invited to join a Community by the Community owner, +by sending a "CommunityInvitation" message. 3. The peer decrypts the "CommunityInvitation" message, and verifies the signature. -4. The peer requests to join a Community by sending a "CommunityRequestToJoin" message to the Community. +4. The peer requests to join a Community by sending a +"CommunityRequestToJoin" message to the Community. 5. The Community owner MAY accept or reject the request. -6. If the request is accepted, the Community owner sends a "CommunityRequestToJoinResponse" message to the peer. -7. The Community owner then adds the member to the Community metadata, and publishes the updated Community metadata. +6. If the request is accepted, +the Community owner sends a "CommunityRequestToJoinResponse" message to the peer. +7. The Community owner then adds the member to the Community metadata, and +publishes the updated Community metadata. #### Community Leave Flow -1. A member requests to leave a Community by sending a "CommunityRequestToLeave" message to the Community. +1. A member requests to leave a Community by sending a +"CommunityRequestToLeave" message to the Community. 2. The Community owner MAY accept or reject the request. -3. If the request is accepted, the Community owner removes the member from the Community metadata, and publishes the updated Community metadata. +3. If the request is accepted, +the Community owner removes the member from the Community metadata, +and publishes the updated Community metadata. #### Community Ban Flow -1. The Community owner adds a member to the ban list, revokes their grants, and publishes the updated Community metadata. -2. If the Community is Private, Re-keying is performed between the members of the Community, to ensure that the banned member is unable to decrypt any messages. +1. The Community owner adds a member to the ban list, revokes their grants, +and publishes the updated Community metadata. +2. If the Community is Private, +Re-keying is performed between the members of the Community, +to ensure that the banned member is unable to decrypt any messages. -### Waku Protocols +### Waku Protocols The following Waku protocols SHOULD be used to implement Status Communities - -1. [11/WAKU2-RELAY](../../waku/standards/core/11/relay.md) - To send and receive messages -2. [53/WAKU2-X3DH](../../waku/standards/application/53/x3dh.md) - To encrypt and decrypt messages -3. [54/WAKU2-X3DH-SESSIONS](../../waku/standards/application/54/x3dh-sessions.md) - To handle session keys -4. [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](../../waku/standards/core/14/message.md) - To wrap community messages in a Waku message -5. [13/WAKU2-STORE](../../waku/standards/core/13/store.md) - To store and retrieve messages for offline devices - +1. [11/WAKU2-RELAY](../../waku/standards/core/11/relay.md) - +To send and receive messages +2. [53/WAKU2-X3DH](../../waku/standards/application/53/x3dh.md) - +To encrypt and decrypt messages +3. [54/WAKU2-X3DH-SESSIONS](../../waku/standards/application/54/x3dh-sessions.md)- +To handle session keys +4. [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](../../waku/standards/core/14/message.md) - +To wrap community messages in a Waku message +5. [13/WAKU2-STORE](../../waku/standards/core/13/store.md) - +To store and retrieve messages for offline devices The following Waku protocols MAY be used to implement Status Communities - -1. [12/WAKU2-FILTER](../../waku/standards/core/12/filter.md) - Content filtering for resource restricted devices -2. [19/WAKU2-LIGHTPUSH](../../waku/standards/core/19/lightpush.md) - Allows Light clients to participate in the network +1. [12/WAKU2-FILTER](../../waku/standards/core/12/filter.md) - +Content filtering for resource restricted devices +2. [19/WAKU2-LIGHTPUSH](../../waku/standards/core/19/lightpush.md) - +Allows Light clients to participate in the network ### Backups -The member MAY back up their local settings, by encrypting it with their public key, and sending it to a given content topic. -The member MAY then rely on this backup to restore their local settings, in case of a data loss. -This feature relies on [13/WAKU2-STORE](../../waku/standards/core/13/store.md) for storing and retrieving messages. +The member MAY back up their local settings, +by encrypting it with their public key, and +sending it to a given content topic. +The member MAY then rely on this backup to restore their local settings, +in case of a data loss. +This feature relies on +[13/WAKU2-STORE](../../waku/standards/core/13/store.md) +for storing and retrieving messages. ### Clock The clock used in the wire format refers to the Lamport timestamp of the message. -The Lamport timestamp is a logical clock that is used to determine the order of events in a distributed system. -This allows ordering of messages in an asynchronous network where messages may be received out of order. +The Lamport timestamp is a logical clock that is used to determine the order of events +in a distributed system. +This allows ordering of messages in an asynchronous network +where messages may be received out of order. ## Security Considerations -1. The Community owner is a single point of failure. If the Community owner is compromised, the Community is compromised. +1. The Community owner is a single point of failure. +If the Community owner is compromised, the Community is compromised. -2. Follows the same security considerations as the [53/WAKU2-X3DH](../../waku/standards/application/53/x3dh.md) protocol. +2. Follows the same security considerations as the +[53/WAKU2-X3DH](../../waku/standards/application/53/x3dh.md) protocol. ## Future work -1. To scale and optimize the Community management, the Community metadata should be stored on a decentralized storage system, and only the references to the Community metadata should be broadcasted. The following document describes this method in more detail - [Optimizing the `CommunityDescription` dissemination](https://hackmd.io/rD1OfIbJQieDe3GQdyCRTw) +1. To scale and optimize the Community management, +the Community metadata should be stored on a decentralized storage system, and +only the references to the Community metadata should be broadcasted. +The following document describes this method in more detail - +[Optimizing the `CommunityDescription` dissemination](https://hackmd.io/rD1OfIbJQieDe3GQdyCRTw) 2. Token gating for communities -3. Sharding the content topic used for [#Community Event Messages](#community-event-messages), since members of the community don't need to receive all the control messages. +3. Sharding the content topic used for [#Community Event Messages](#community-event-messages), +since members of the community don't need to receive all the control messages. ## Copyright @@ -455,5 +521,6 @@ Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/public - [12/WAKU2-FILTER](../../waku/standards/core/12/filter.md) ### informative + - [community.go](https://github.com/status-im/status-go/blob/6072bd17ab1e5d9fc42cf844fcb8ad18aa07760c/protocol/communities/community.go) - [organisation-channels.md](https://github.com/status-im/specs/blob/403b5ce316a270565023fc6a1f8dec138819f4b0/docs/raw/organisation-channels.md) diff --git a/status/61/community-history-service.md b/status/61/community-history-service.md index 5b853ec20..a86f8c636 100644 --- a/status/61/community-history-service.md +++ b/status/61/community-history-service.md @@ -13,16 +13,31 @@ contributors: ## Abstract -Messages are stored permanently by store nodes ([13/WAKU2-STORE](../../waku/standards/core/13/store.md)) for up to a certain configurable period of time, limited by the overall storage provided by a store node. -Messages older than that period are no longer provided by store nodes, making it impossible for other nodes to request historical messages that go beyond that time range. -This raises issues in the case of Status communities, where recently joined members of a community are not able to request complete message histories of the community channels. - -This specification describes how **Control Nodes** (which are specific nodes in Status communities) archive historical message data of their communities, beyond the time range limit provided by Store Nodes using the [BitTorrent](https://bittorrent.org) protocol. -It also describes how the archives are distributed to community members via the Status network, so they can fetch them and gain access to a complete message history. +Messages are stored permanently by store nodes +([13/WAKU2-STORE](../../waku/standards/core/13/store.md)) +for up to a certain configurable period of time, +limited by the overall storage provided by a store node. +Messages older than that period are no longer provided by store nodes, +making it impossible for other nodes to request historical messages +that go beyond that time range. +This raises issues in the case of Status communities, +where recently joined members of a community + are not able to request complete message histories of the community channels. + +This specification describes how **Control Nodes** +(which are specific nodes in Status communities) +archive historical message data of their communities, +beyond the time range limit provided by Store Nodes using +the [BitTorrent](https://bittorrent.org) protocol. +It also describes how the archives are distributed to community members via +the Status network, +so they can fetch them and gain access to a complete message history. ## Terminology -The following terminology is used throughout this specification. Notice that some actors listed here are nodes that operate in Waku networks only, while others operate in the Status communities layer): +The following terminology is used throughout this specification. +Notice that some actors listed here are nodes that operate in Waku networks only, +while others operate in the Status communities layer): | Name | References | | -------------------- | --- | @@ -43,7 +58,9 @@ The following terminology is used throughout this specification. Notice that som This specification has the following assumptions: -- Store nodes([13/WAKU2-STORE](../../waku/standards/core/13/store.md)) are available 24/7, ensuring constant live message availability. +- Store nodes, +([13/WAKU2-STORE](../../waku/standards/core/13/store.md)), + are available 24/7 ensuring constant live message availability. - The storage time range limit is 30 days. - Store nodes have enough storage to persist historical messages for up to 30 days. - No store nodes have storage to persist historical messages older than 30 days. @@ -52,78 +69,141 @@ This specification has the following assumptions: Furthermore, it assumes that: -- Control nodes have enough storage to persist historical messages older than 30 days. +- Control nodes have enough storage to persist historical messages +older than 30 days. - Control nodes provide archives with historical messages **at least** every 30 days. - Control nodes receive all community messages. - Control nodes are honest. - Control nodes know at least one store node from which it can query historical messages. -These assumptions are less than ideal and will be enhanced in future work. This [forum discussion](https://forum.vac.dev/t/status-communities-protocol-and-product-point-of-view/114) provides more details. +These assumptions are less than ideal and will be enhanced in future work. +This [forum discussion](https://forum.vac.dev/t/status-communities-protocol-and-product-point-of-view/114) +provides more details. ## Overview -The following is a high-level overview of the user flow and features this specification describes. For more detailed descriptions, read the dedicated sections in this specification. +The following is a high-level overview of the user flow and +features this specification describes. + For more detailed descriptions, read the dedicated sections in this specification. ### Serving community history archives -Control nodes go through the following (high level) process to provide community members with message histories: +Control nodes go through the following +(high level) process to provide community members with message histories: -1. Community owner creates a Status community (previously known as [org channels](https://github.com/status-im/specs/pull/151)) which makes its node a Control node. -2. Community owner enables message archive capabilities (on by default but can be turned off as well - see [UI feature spec](https://github.com/status-im/feature-specs/pull/36)). -3. A special type of channel to exchange metadata about the archival data is created, this channel is not visible in the user interface. +1. Community owner creates a Status community +(previously known as [org channels](https://github.com/status-im/specs/pull/151)) +which makes its node a Control node. +2. Community owner enables message archive capabilities +(on by default but can be turned off as well - see [UI feature spec](https://github.com/status-im/feature-specs/pull/36)). +3. A special type of channel to exchange metadata about the archival data is created, +this channel is not visible in the user interface. 4. Community owner invites community members. -5. Control node receives messages published in channels and stores them into a local database. -6. After 7 days, the control node exports and compresses last 7 days worth of messages from database and bundles it together with a [message archive index](#waku-message-archive-index) into a torrent, from which it then creates a magnet link ([Magnet URI scheme](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Magnet_URI_scheme), [Extensions for Peers to Send Metadata Files](https://www.bittorrent.org/beps/bep_0009.html)). -7. Control node sends the magnet link created in step 6 to community members via special channel created in step 3 through the Waku network. -8. Every subsequent 7 days, steps 6 and 7 are repeated and the new message archive data is appended to the previously created message archive data. +5. Control node receives messages published in channels and +stores them into a local database. +6. After 7 days, the control node exports and +compresses last 7 days worth of messages from database and +bundles it together with a +[message archive index](#wakumessagearchiveindex) into a torrent, +from which it then creates a magnet link ([Magnet URI scheme](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Magnet_URI_scheme), +[Extensions for Peers to Send Metadata Files](https://www.bittorrent.org/beps/bep_0009.html)). +7. Control node sends the magnet link created in step 6 to community members via +special channel created in step 3 through the Waku network. +8. Every subsequent 7 days, +steps 6 and 7 are repeated and +the new message archive data +is appended to the previously created message archive data. ### Serving archives for missed messages -If the control node goes offline (where "offline" means, the control node's main process is no longer running), it MUST go through the following process: +If the control node goes offline +(where "offline" means, the control node's main process is no longer running), +it MUST go through the following process: 1. Control node restarts -2. Control node requests messages from store nodes for the missed time range for all channels in their community +2. Control node requests messages from store nodes +for the missed time range for all channels in their community 3. All missed messages are stored into control node's local message database -4. If 7 or more days have elapsed since the last message history torrent was created, the control node will perform step 6 and 7 of [Serving community history archives](#serving-community-history-archives) for every 7 days worth of messages in the missed time range (e.g. if the node was offline for 30 days, it will create 4 message history archives) +4. If 7 or more days have elapsed since the last message history torrent was created, +the control node will perform step 6 and +7 of [Serving community history archives](#serving-community-history-archives) +for every 7 days worth of messages in the missed time range +(e.g. if the node was offline for 30 days, it will create 4 message history archives) ### Receiving community history archives -Community member nodes go through the following (high level) process to fetch and restore community message histories: +Community member nodes go through the following (high level) process to fetch and +restore community message histories: 1. User joins community and becomes community member (see [org channels spec](../56/communities.md)) -2. By joining a community, member nodes automatically subscribe to special channel for message archive metadata exchange provided by the community -3. Member node requests live message history (last 30 days) of all the community channels including the special channel from store nodes -4. Member node receives Waku message ([14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](../../waku/standards/core/14/message.md)) that contains the metadata magnet link from the special channel -5. Member node extracts the magnet link from the Waku message and passes it to torrent client -6. Member node downloads [message archive index](#message-history-archive-index) file and determines which message archives are not downloaded yet (all or some) +2. By joining a community, +member nodes automatically subscribe to special channel for +message archive metadata exchange provided by the community +3. Member node requests live message history +(last 30 days) of all the community channels, +including the special channel from store nodes +4. Member node receives Waku message +([14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](../../waku/standards/core/14/message.md)) +that contains the metadata magnet link from the special channel +5. Member node extracts the magnet link from the Waku message and +passes it to torrent client +6. Member node downloads +[message archive index](#message-history-archive-index) file and +determines which message archives are not downloaded yet (all or some) 7. Member node fetches missing message archive data via torrent -8. Member node unpacks and decompresses message archive data to then hydrate its local database, deleting any messages for that community that the database previously stored in the same time range as covered by the message history archive +8. Member node unpacks and +decompresses message archive data to then hydrate its local database, +deleting any messages, +for that community that the database previously stored in the same time range, +as covered by the message history archive ## Storing live messages For archival data serving, the control node MUST store live messages as [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](../../waku/standards/core/14/message.md). -This is in addition to their database of application messages. -This is required to provide confidentiality, authenticity, and integrity of message data distributed via the BitTorrent layer, and later validated by community members when they unpack message history archives. +This is in addition to their database of application messages. +This is required to provide confidentiality, authenticity, +and integrity of message data distributed via the BitTorrent layer, and +later validated by community members when they unpack message history archives. -Control nodes SHOULD remove those messages from their local databases once they are older than 30 days and after they have been turned into message archives and distributed to the BitTorrent network. +Control nodes SHOULD remove those messages from their local databases +once they are older than 30 days and +after they have been turned into message archives and +distributed to the BitTorrent network. ### Exporting messages for bundling -Control nodes export Waku messages from their local database for creating and bundling history archives using the following criteria: - -- Waku messages to be exported MUST have a `contentTopic` that match any of the topics of the community channels -- Waku messages to be exported MUST have a `timestamp` that lies within a time range of 7 days - -The `timestamp` is determined by the context in which the control node attempts to create a message history archives as described below: - -1. The control node attempts to create an archive periodically for the past seven days (including the current day). In this case, the `timestamp` has to lie within those 7 days. -2. The control node has been offline (control node's main process has stopped and needs restart) and attempts to create archives for all the live messages it has missed since it went offline. In this case, the `timestamp` has to lie within the day the latest message was received and the current day. - -Exported messages MUST be restored as [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](../../waku/standards/core/14/message.md) for bundling. Waku messages that are older than 30 days and have been exported for bundling can be removed from the control node's database (control nodes still maintain a database of application messages). +Control nodes export Waku messages from their local database for creating and +bundling history archives using the following criteria: + +- Waku messages to be exported MUST have a `contentTopic` +that match any of the topics of the community channels +- Waku messages to be exported MUST have a `timestamp` +that lies within a time range of 7 days + +The `timestamp` is determined by the context in which the control node attempts +to create a message history archives as described below: + +1. The control node attempts to create an archive periodically +for the past seven days (including the current day). +In this case, the `timestamp` has to lie within those 7 days. +2. The control node has been offline +(control node's main process has stopped and needs restart) and +attempts to create archives for all the live messages it has missed +since it went offline. +In this case, +the `timestamp` has to lie within the day the latest message was received and +the current day. + +Exported messages MUST be restored as +[14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](../../waku/standards/core/14/message.md) for bundling. +Waku messages that are older than 30 days and +have been exported for bundling can be removed from the control node's database +(control nodes still maintain a database of application messages). ## Message history archives -Message history archives are represented as `WakuMessageArchive` and created from Waku messages exported from the local database. +Message history archives are represented as `WakuMessageArchive` and +created from Waku messages exported from the local database. Message history archives are implemented using the following protocol buffer. ### WakuMessageHistoryArchive @@ -135,12 +215,17 @@ The `to` field SHOULD contain a timestamp of the time range's the higher bound. The `contentTopic` field MUST contain a list of all communiity channel topics. -The `messages` field MUST contain all messages that belong into the archive given its `from`, `to` and `contentTopic` fields. +The `messages` field MUST contain all messages that belong into the archive +given its `from`, `to` and `contentTopic` fields. -The `padding` field MUST contain the amount of zero bytes needed so that the overall byte size of the protobuf encoded `WakuMessageArchive` is a multiple of the `pieceLength` used to divide the message archive data into pieces. -This is needed for seamless encoding and decoding of archival data in interation with BitTorrent as explained in [creating message archive torrents](#creating-message-archive-torrents). +The `padding` field MUST contain the amount of zero bytes needed so +that the overall byte size of the protobuf encoded `WakuMessageArchive` +is a multiple of the `pieceLength` used to divide the message archive data into pieces. +This is needed for seamless encoding and +decoding of archival data in interation with BitTorrent, +as explained in [creating message archive torrents](#creating-message-archive-torrents). -``` +```protobuf syntax = "proto3" message WakuMessageArchiveMetadata { @@ -158,21 +243,32 @@ message WakuMessageArchive { } ``` -## Message history archive index +## Message History Archive Index Control nodes MUST provide message archives for the entire community history. -The entirey history consists of a set of `WakuMessageArchive`'s where each archive contains a subset of historical `WakuMessage`s for a time range of seven days. -All the `WakuMessageArchive`s are concatenated into a single file as a byte string (see [Ensuring reproducible data pieces](#ensuring-reproducible-data-pieces)). +The entirey history consists of a set of `WakuMessageArchive`'s +where each archive contains a subset of historical `WakuMessage`s +for a time range of seven days. +All the `WakuMessageArchive`s are concatenated into a single file as a byte string +(see [Ensuring reproducible data pieces](#ensuring-reproducible-data-pieces)). -Control nodes MUST create a message history archive index (`WakuMessageArchiveIndex`) with metadata that allows receiving nodes to only fetch the message history archives they are interested in. +Control nodes MUST create a message history archive index +(`WakuMessageArchiveIndex`) with metadata that allows receiving nodes +to only fetch the message history archives they are interested in. ### WakuMessageArchiveIndex -A `WakuMessageArchiveIndex` is a map where the key is the KECCAK-256 hash of the `WakuMessageArchiveIndexMetadata` derived from a 7-day archive and the value is an instance of that `WakuMessageArchiveIndexMetadata` corresponding to that archive. +A `WakuMessageArchiveIndex` is a map where the key is the KECCAK-256 hash of +the `WakuMessageArchiveIndexMetadata` derived from a 7-day archive and +the value is an instance of that `WakuMessageArchiveIndexMetadata` +corresponding to that archive. -The `offset` field MUST contain the position at which the message history archive starts in the byte string of the total message archive data. This MUST be the sum of the length of all previously created message archives in bytes (see [Creating message archive torrents](#creating-message-archive-torrents)). +The `offset` field MUST contain the position at which the message history archive +starts in the byte string of the total message archive data. +This MUST be the sum of the length of all previously created message archives +in bytes (see [Creating message archive torrents](#creating-message-archive-torrents)). -``` +```protobuf syntax = "proto3" message WakuMessageArchiveIndexMetadata { @@ -187,45 +283,67 @@ message WakuMessageArchiveIndex { } ``` -The control node MUST update the `WakuMessageArchiveIndex` every time it creates one or more `WakuMessageArchive`s and bundle it into a new torrent. -For every created `WakuMessageArchive`, there MUST be a `WakuMessageArchiveIndexMetadata` entry in the `archives` field `WakuMessageArchiveIndex`. +The control node MUST update the `WakuMessageArchiveIndex` +every time it creates one or +more `WakuMessageArchive`s and bundle it into a new torrent. +For every created `WakuMessageArchive`, +there MUST be a `WakuMessageArchiveIndexMetadata` entry in the `archives` field `WakuMessageArchiveIndex`. -# Creating message archive torrents +## Creating message archive torrents -Control nodes MUST create a torrent file ("torrent") containing metadata to all message history archives. -To create a torrent file, and later serve the message archive data in the BitTorrent network, control nodes MUST store the necessary data in dedicated files on the file system. +Control nodes MUST create a torrent file ("torrent") +containing metadata to all message history archives. +To create a torrent file, and +later serve the message archive data in the BitTorrent network, +control nodes MUST store the necessary data in dedicated files on the file system. A torrent's source folder MUST contain the following two files: -- `data` - Contains all protobuf encoded `WakuMessageArchive`'s (as bit strings) concatenated in ascending order based on their time +- `data` - Contains all protobuf encoded `WakuMessageArchive`'s (as bit strings) +concatenated in ascending order based on their time - `index` - Contains the protobuf encoded `WakuMessageArchiveIndex` -Control nodes SHOULD store these files in a dedicated folder that is identifiable via the community id. +Control nodes SHOULD store these files in a dedicated folder that is identifiable, +via the community id. ### Ensuring reproducible data pieces -The control node MUST ensure that the byte string resulting from the protobuf encoded `data` is equal to the byte string `data` from the previously generated message archive torrent, plus the data of the latest 7 days worth of messages encoded as `WakuMessageArchive`. +The control node MUST ensure that the byte string resulting from +the protobuf encoded `data` is equal to the byte string `data` +from the previously generated message archive torrent, +plus the data of the latest 7 days worth of messages encoded as `WakuMessageArchive`. Therefore, the size of `data` grows every seven days as it's append only. -The control nodes also MUST ensure that the byte size of every individual `WakuMessageArchive` encoded protobuf is a multiple of `pieceLength: ???` (**TODO**) using the `padding` field. -If the protobuf encoded 'WakuMessageArchive` is not a multiple of `pieceLength`, its `padding` field MUST be filled with zero bytes and the `WakuMessageArchive` MUST be re-encoded until its size becomes multiple of `pieceLength`. +The control nodes also MUST ensure that the byte size of every individual `WakuMessageArchive` +encoded protobuf is a multiple of `pieceLength: ???` (**TODO**) +using the `padding` field. +If the protobuf encoded `WakuMessageArchive` is not a multiple of `pieceLength`, +its `padding` field MUST be filled with zero bytes and +the `WakuMessageArchive` MUST be re-encoded until its size becomes multiple of `pieceLength`. -This is necessary because the content of the `data` file will be split into pieces of `pieceLength` when the torrent file is created, and the SHA1 hash of every piece is then stored in the torrent file and later used by other nodes to request the data for each individual data piece. +This is necessary because the content of the `data` file +will be split into pieces of `pieceLength` when the torrent file is created, +and the SHA1 hash of every piece is then stored in the torrent file and +later used by other nodes to request the data for each individual data piece. -By fitting message archives into a multiple of `pieceLength` and ensuring they fill possible remaining space with zero bytes, control nodes prevent the **next** message archive to occupy that remaining space of the last piece, which will result in a different SHA1 hash for that piece. +By fitting message archives into a multiple of `pieceLength` and +ensuring they fill possible remaining space with zero bytes, +control nodes prevent the **next** message archive to +occupy that remaining space of the last piece, + which will result in a different SHA1 hash for that piece. #### **Example: Without padding** Let `WakuMessageArchive` "A1" be of size 20 bytes: -``` +```json 0 11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 ``` With a `pieceLength` of 10 bytes, A1 will fit into `20 / 10 = 2` pieces: -``` +```json 0 11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 // piece[0] SHA1: 0x123 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 // piece[1] SHA1: 0x456 ``` @@ -234,32 +352,37 @@ With a `pieceLength` of 10 bytes, A1 will fit into `20 / 10 = 2` pieces: Let `WakuMessageArchive` "A2" be of size 21 bytes: -``` +```json 0 11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 ``` -With a `pieceLength` of 10 bytes, A2 will fit into `21 / 10 = 2` pieces. The remainder will introduce a third piece: +With a `pieceLength` of 10 bytes, A2 will fit into `21 / 10 = 2` pieces. +The remainder will introduce a third piece: -``` +```json 0 11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 // piece[0] SHA1: 0x123 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 // piece[1] SHA1: 0x456 20 // piece[2] SHA1: 0x789 ``` -The next `WakuMessageArchive` "A3" will be appended ("#3") to the existing data and occupy the remaining space of the third data piece. The piece at index 2 will now produce a different SHA1 hash: +The next `WakuMessageArchive` "A3" will be appended ("#3") to the existing data +and occupy the remaining space of the third data piece. +The piece at index 2 will now produce a different SHA1 hash: -``` +```json 0 11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 // piece[0] SHA1: 0x123 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 // piece[1] SHA1: 0x456 20 #3 #3 #3 #3 #3 #3 #3 #3 #3 // piece[2] SHA1: 0xeef #3 #3 #3 #3 #3 #3 #3 #3 #3 #3 // piece[3] ``` -By filling up the remaining space of the third piece with A2 using its `padding` field, it is guaranteed that its SHA1 will stay the same: +By filling up the remaining space of the third piece +with A2 using its `padding` field, + it is guaranteed that its SHA1 will stay the same: -``` +```json 0 11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 // piece[0] SHA1: 0x123 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 // piece[1] SHA1: 0x456 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 // piece[2] SHA1: 0x999 @@ -269,82 +392,144 @@ By filling up the remaining space of the third piece with A2 using its `padding` ### Seeding message history archives -The control node MUST seed the [generated torrent](#creating-message-archive-torrents) until a new `WakuMessageArchive` is created. +The control node MUST seed the +[generated torrent](#creating-message-archive-torrents) +until a new `WakuMessageArchive` is created. -The control node SHOULD NOT seed torrents for older message history archives. Only one torrent at a time should be seeded. +The control node SHOULD NOT seed torrents for older message history archives. +Only one torrent at a time should be seeded. ### Creating magnet links -Once a torrent file for all message archives is created, the control node MUST derive a magnet link following the [Magnet URI scheme](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Magnet_URI_scheme) using the underlying BitTorrent protocol client. +Once a torrent file for all message archives is created, +the control node MUST derive a magnet link following the +[Magnet URI scheme](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Magnet_URI_scheme) +using the underlying BitTorrent protocol client. ### Message archive distribution -Message archives are available via the BitTorrent network as they are being [seeded by the control node](#seeding-message-history-archives). -Other community member nodes will download the message archives from the BitTorrent network once they receive a magnet link that contains a message archive index. +Message archives are available via the BitTorrent network as they are being +[seeded by the control node](#seeding-message-history-archives). +Other community member nodes will download the message archives +from the BitTorrent network once they receive a magnet link +that contains a message archive index. -The control node MUST send magnet links containing message archives and the message archive index to a special community channel. +The control node MUST send magnet links containing message archives and +the message archive index to a special community channel. The topic of that special channel follows the following format: -``` +```text /{application-name}/{version-of-the-application}/{content-topic-name}/{encoding} ``` -All messages sent with this topic MUST be instances of `ApplicationMetadataMessage` ([62/STATUS-PAYLOAD](../62/payload.md)) with a `payload` of `CommunityMessageArchiveIndex`. +All messages sent with this topic MUST be instances of `ApplicationMetadataMessage` +([62/STATUS-PAYLOAD](../62/payload.md)) with a `payload` of `CommunityMessageArchiveIndex`. -Only the control node MAY post to the special channel. Other messages on this specified channel MUST be ignored by clients. +Only the control node MAY post to the special channel. +Other messages on this specified channel MUST be ignored by clients. Community members MUST NOT have permission to send messages to the special channel. -However, community member nodes MUST subscribe to special channel to receive Waku messages containing magnet links for message archives. +However, community member nodes MUST subscribe to special channel +to receive Waku messages containing magnet links for message archives. ### Canonical message histories -Only control nodes are allowed to distribute messages with magnet links via the special channel for magnet link exchange. +Only control nodes are allowed to distribute messages with magnet links via +the special channel for magnet link exchange. Community members MUST NOT be allowed to post any messages to the special channel. -Status nodes MUST ensure that any message that isn't signed by the control node in the special channel is ignored. +Status nodes MUST ensure that any message +that isn't signed by the control node in the special channel is ignored. -Since the magnet links are created from the control node's database (and previously distributed archives), the message history provided by the control node becomes the canonical message history and single source of truth for the community. +Since the magnet links are created from the control node's database +(and previously distributed archives), +the message history provided by the control node becomes the canonical message history +and single source of truth for the community. -Community member nodes MUST replace messages in their local databases with the messages extracted from archives within the same time range. -Messages that the control node didn't receive MUST be removed and are no longer part of the message history of interest, even if it already existed in a community member node's database. +Community member nodes MUST replace messages in their local databases +with the messages extracted from archives within the same time range. +Messages that the control node didn't receive MUST be removed and +are no longer part of the message history of interest, +even if it already existed in a community member node's database. ## Fetching message history archives Generally, fetching message history archives is a three step process: -1. Receive [message archive index](#message-history-archive-index) magnet link as described in [Message archive distribution], download `index` file from torrent, then determine which message archives to download +1. Receive [message archive index](#message-history-archive-index) +magnet link as described in [Message archive distribution], +download `index` file from torrent, then determine which message archives to download 2. Download individual archives -Community member nodes subscribe to the special channel that control nodes publish magnet links for message history archives to. -There are two scenarios in which member nodes can receive such a magnet link message from the special channel: +Community member nodes subscribe to the special channel +that control nodes publish magnet links for message history archives to. +There are two scenarios in which member nodes can receive such a magnet link message +from the special channel: -1. The member node receives it via live messages, by listening to the special channel -2. The member node requests messages for a time range of up to 30 days from store nodes (this is the case when a new community member joins a community) +1. The member node receives it via live messages, by listening to the special channel +2. The member node requests messages for a time range of up to 30 days +from store nodes (this is the case when a new community member joins a community) ### Downloading message archives -When member nodes receive a message with a `CommunityMessageHistoryArchive` ([62/STATUS-PAYLOADS](../62/payloads.md)) from the aforementioned channnel, they MUST extract the `magnet_uri` and pass it to their underlying BitTorrent client so they can fetch the latest message history archive index, which is the `index` file of the torrent (see [Creating message archive torrents](#creating-message-archive-torrents)). - -Due to the nature of distributed systems, there's no guarantee that a received message is the "last" message. This is especially true when member nodes request historical messages from store nodes. -Therefore, member nodes MUST wait for 20 seconds after receiving the last `CommunityMessageArchive` before they start extracting the magnet link to fetch the latest archive index. - -Once a message history archive index is downloaded and parsed back into `WakuMessageArchiveIndex`, community member nodes use a local lookup table to determine which of the listed archives are missing using the KECCAK-256 hashes stored in the index. - -For this lookup to work, member nodes MUST store the KECCAK-256 hashes of the `WakuMessageArchiveIndexMetadata` provided by the `index` file for all of the message history archives that have been downlaoded in their local database. - -Given a `WakuMessageArchiveIndex`, member nodes can access individual `WakuMessageArchiveIndexMetadata` to download individual archives. +When member nodes receive a message with a `CommunityMessageHistoryArchive` +([62/STATUS-PAYLOADS](../62/payloads.md)) from the aforementioned channnel, +they MUST extract the `magnet_uri` and +pass it to their underlying BitTorrent client +so they can fetch the latest message history archive index, +which is the `index` file of the torrent (see [Creating message archive torrents](#creating-message-archive-torrents)). + +Due to the nature of distributed systems, +there's no guarantee that a received message is the "last" message. +This is especially true +when member nodes request historical messages from store nodes. + +Therefore, member nodes MUST wait for 20 seconds +after receiving the last `CommunityMessageArchive` +before they start extracting the magnet link to fetch the latest archive index. + +Once a message history archive index is downloaded and +parsed back into `WakuMessageArchiveIndex`, +community member nodes use a local lookup table +to determine which of the listed archives are missing +using the KECCAK-256 hashes stored in the index. + +For this lookup to work, +member nodes MUST store the KECCAK-256 hashes +of the `WakuMessageArchiveIndexMetadata` provided by the `index` file +for all of the message history archives that have been downlaoded +in their local database. + +Given a `WakuMessageArchiveIndex`, +member nodes can access individual `WakuMessageArchiveIndexMetadata` +to download individual archives. Community member nodes MUST choose one of the following options: -1. **Download all archives** - Request and download all data pieces for `data` provided by the torrent (this is the case for new community member nodes that haven't downloaded any archives yet) -2. **Download only the latest archive** - Request and download all pieces starting at the `offset` of the latest `WakuMessageArchiveIndexMetadata` (this the case for any member node that already has downloaded all previous history and is now interested in only the latst archive) -3. **Download specific archives** - Look into `from` and `to` fields of every `WakuMessageArchiveIndexMetadata` and determine the pieces for archives of a specific time range (can be the case for member nodes that have recently joined the network and are only interested in a subset of the complete history) +1. **Download all archives** - Request and +download all data pieces for `data` provided by the torrent +(this is the case for new community member nodes +that haven't downloaded any archives yet) +2. **Download only the latest archive** - +Request and download all pieces starting at the `offset` of the latest `WakuMessageArchiveIndexMetadata` +(this the case for any member node +that already has downloaded all previous history and +is now interested in only the latst archive) +3. **Download specific archives** - +Look into `from` and +`to` fields of every `WakuMessageArchiveIndexMetadata` and +determine the pieces for archives of a specific time range +(can be the case for member nodes that have recently joined the network and +are only interested in a subset of the complete history) ### Storing historical messages -When message archives are fetched, community member nodes MUST unwrap the resulting `WakuMessage` instances into `ApplicationMetadataMessage` instances and store them in their local database. +When message archives are fetched, +community member nodes MUST unwrap the resulting `WakuMessage` instances +into `ApplicationMetadataMessage` instances and store them in their local database. Community member nodes SHOULD NOT store the wrapped `WakuMessage` messages. -All message within the same time range MUST be replaced with the messages provided by the message history archive. +All message within the same time range +MUST be replaced with the messages provided by the message history archive. Community members nodes MUST ignore the expiration state of each archive message. @@ -354,39 +539,58 @@ The following are things to cosider when implementing this specification. ## Control node honesty -This spec assumes that all control nodes are honest and behave according to the spec. Meaning they don't inject their own messages into, or remove any messages from historic archives. +This spec assumes that all control nodes are honest and behave according to the spec. +Meaning they don't inject their own messages into, or +remove any messages from historic archives. ## Bandwidth consumption -Community member nodes will download the latest archive they've received from the archive index, which includes messages from the last seven days. Assuming that community members nodes were online for that time range, they have already downloaded that message data and will now download an archive that contains the same. +Community member nodes will download the latest archive +they've received from the archive index, +which includes messages from the last seven days. +Assuming that community members nodes were online for that time range, +they have already downloaded that message data and +will now download an archive that contains the same. -This means there's a possibility member nodes will download the same data at least twice. +This means there's a possibility member nodes +will download the same data at least twice. ## Multiple community owners -It is possible for control nodes to export the private key of their owned community and pass it to other users so they become control nodes as well. +It is possible for control nodes +to export the private key of their owned community and +pass it to other users so they become control nodes as well. This means, it's possible for multiple control nodes to exist. -This might conflict with the assumption that the control node serves as a single source of thruth. Multiple control nodes can have different message histories. +This might conflict with the assumption that the control node +serves as a single source of thruth. +Multiple control nodes can have different message histories. -Not only will multiple control nodes multiply the amount of archive index messages being distributed to the network, they might also contain different sets of magnet links and their corresponding hashes. +Not only will multiple control nodes +multiply the amount of archive index messages being distributed to the network, +they might also contain different sets of magnet links and their corresponding hashes. -Even if just a single message is missing in one of the histories, the hashes presented in archive indices will look completely different, resulting in the community member node to download the corresponding archive (which might be identical to an archive that was already downloaded, except for that one message). +Even if just a single message is missing in one of the histories, +the hashes presented in archive indices will look completely different, +resulting in the community member node to download the corresponding archive +(which might be identical to an archive that was already downloaded, +except for that one message). ## Copyright Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). ## References -* [13/WAKU2-STORE](../../waku/standards/core/13/store.md) -* [BitTorrent](https://bittorrent.org) -* [10/WAKU2](../../waku/standards/core/10/waku2.md) -* [11/WAKU2-RELAY](../../waku/standards/core/11/relay.md) -* [Magnet URI scheme](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Magnet_URI_scheme) -* [forum discussion](https://forum.vac.dev/t/status-communities-protocol-and-product-point-of-view/114) -* [org channels](https://github.com/status-im/specs/pull/151) -* [UI feature spec](https://github.com/status-im/feature-specs/pull/36) -* [Extensions for Peers to Send Metadata Files](https://www.bittorrent.org/beps/bep_0009.html) -* [org channels spec](../56/communities.md) -* [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](../../waku/standards/core/14/message.md) -* [62/STATUS-PAYLOADS](../62/payloads.md) + +- [13/WAKU2-STORE](../../waku/standards/core/13/store.md) +- [BitTorrent](https://bittorrent.org) +- [10/WAKU2](../../waku/standards/core/10/waku2.md) +- [11/WAKU2-RELAY](../../waku/standards/core/11/relay.md) +- [Magnet URI scheme](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Magnet_URI_scheme) +- [forum discussion](https://forum.vac.dev/t/status-communities-protocol-and-product-point-of-view/114) +- [org channels](https://github.com/status-im/specs/pull/151) +- [UI feature spec](https://github.com/status-im/feature-specs/pull/36) +- [Extensions for Peers to Send Metadata Files](https://www.bittorrent.org/beps/bep_0009.html) +- [org channels spec](../56/communities.md) +- [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](../../waku/standards/core/14/message.md) +- [62/STATUS-PAYLOADS](../62/payloads.md) diff --git a/status/62/payloads.md b/status/62/payloads.md index 078de7ba5..477a2899b 100644 --- a/status/62/payloads.md +++ b/status/62/payloads.md @@ -35,9 +35,13 @@ message StatusProtocolMessage { } ``` -`signature` is the bytes of the signed `SHA3-256` of the payload, signed with the key of the author of the message. -The node needs the signature to validate authorship of the message, so that the message can be relayed to third parties. -If a signature is not present, but an author is provided by a layer below, the message is not to be relayed to third parties, and it is considered plausibly deniable. +`signature` is the bytes of the signed `SHA3-256` of the payload, +signed with the key of the author of the message. +The node needs the signature to validate authorship of the message, +so that the message can be relayed to third parties. +If a signature is not present, but an author is provided by a layer below, +the message is not to be relayed to third parties, +and it is considered plausibly deniable. ### Encoding @@ -49,7 +53,7 @@ The node encodes the payload using [Protobuf](https://developers.google.com/prot The type `ChatMessage` represents a chat message exchanged between clients. -#### Payload +Payload The protobuf description is: @@ -134,7 +138,7 @@ message ChatMessage { | 5 | ens_name | `string` | The ENS name of the user sending the message | | 6 | chat_id | `string` | The local ID of the chat the message is sent to | | 7 | message_type | `MessageType` | The type of message, different for one-to-one, public or group chats | -| 8 | content_type | `ContentType` | The type of the content of the message | +| 8 | content_type | `ContentType` | The type of the content of the message | | 9 | payload | `Sticker` I `Image` I `Audio` I `DiscordMessage` I `bytes` I nil` | The payload of the message based on the content type | | 13 | grant | `bytes` | Grant for community chat messages | | 14 | display_name | `string` | The message author's display name | @@ -143,12 +147,15 @@ message ChatMessage { #### Content types -A node requires content types for a proper interpretation of incoming messages. Not each message is plain text but may carry different information. +A node requires content types for a proper interpretation of incoming messages. +Not each message is plain text but may carry different information. The following content types MUST be supported: + * `TEXT_PLAIN` identifies a message which content is a plaintext. There are other content types that MAY be implemented by the client: + * `STICKER` * `STATUS` * `EMOJI` @@ -160,19 +167,29 @@ There are other content types that MAY be implemented by the client: * `DISCORD_MESSAGE` * `IDENTITY_VERIFICATION` -##### Mentions +##### Mentions -A mention MUST be represented as a string with the `@0xpk` format, where `pk` is the public key of the [user account](https://specs.status.im/spec/2) to be mentioned, within the `text` field of a message with content_type `TEXT_PLAIN`. +A mention MUST be represented as a string with the `@0xpk` format, +where `pk` is the public key of the +[user account](https://specs.status.im/spec/2) to be mentioned, +within the `text` field of a message with content_type `TEXT_PLAIN`. A message MAY contain more than one mention. -This specification RECOMMENDs that the application does not require the user to enter the entire pk. -This specification RECOMMENDs that the application allows the user to create a mention by typing @ followed by the related ENS or 3-word pseudonym. -This specification RECOMMENDs that the application provides the user auto-completion functionality to create a mention. -For better user experience, the client SHOULD display a known [ens name or the 3-word pseudonym corresponding to the key](https://specs.status.im/spec/2#contact-verification) instead of the `pk`. +This specification RECOMMENDs that the application +does not require the user to enter the entire pk. +This specification RECOMMENDs that the application +allows the user to create a mention by typing @ followed by the related ENS or +3-word pseudonym. +This specification RECOMMENDs that the application +provides the user auto-completion functionality to create a mention. +For better user experience, +the client SHOULD display a known +[ens name or the 3-word pseudonym corresponding to the key](https://specs.status.im/spec/2#contact-verification) +instead of the `pk`. ##### Sticker content type -A `ChatMessage` with `STICKER` `Content/Type` MUST also specify the ID of the `Pack` and -the `Hash` of the pack, in the `Sticker` field of `ChatMessage` +A `ChatMessage` with `STICKER` `Content/Type` MUST also specify the ID of the `Pack` +and the `Hash` of the pack, in the `Sticker` field of `ChatMessage` ```protobuf message StickerMessage { @@ -183,15 +200,17 @@ message StickerMessage { ##### Image content type -A `ChatMessage` with `IMAGE` `Content/Type` MUST also specify the `payload` of the image -and the `type`. +A `ChatMessage` with `IMAGE` `Content/Type` MUST also +specify the `payload` of the image and the `type`. -Clients MUST sanitize the payload before accessing its content, in particular: -- Clients MUST choose a secure decoder -- Clients SHOULD strip metadata if present without parsing/decoding it -- Clients SHOULD NOT add metadata/exif when sending an image file for privacy and security reasons -- Clients MUST make sure that the transport layer constraints the size of the payload to limit they are able to handle securely +Clients MUST sanitize the payload before accessing its content, in particular: +* Clients MUST choose a secure decoder +* Clients SHOULD strip metadata if present without parsing/decoding it +* Clients SHOULD NOT add metadata/exif when sending an image file for privacy +and security reasons +* Clients MUST make sure that the transport layer constraints the size of the payload +to limit they are able to handle securely ```protobuf message ImageMessage { @@ -209,14 +228,18 @@ message ImageMessage { ##### Audio content type -A `ChatMessage` with `AUDIO` `Content/Type` MUST also specify the `payload` of the audio, +A `ChatMessage` with `AUDIO`, +`Content/Type` MUST also specify the `payload` of the audio, the `type` and the duration in milliseconds (`duration_ms`). -Clients MUST sanitize the payload before accessing its content, in particular: -- Clients MUST choose a secure decoder -- Clients SHOULD strip metadata if present without parsing/decoding it -- Clients SHOULD NOT add metadata/exif when sending an audio file for privacy and security reasons -- Clients MUST make sure that the transport layer constraints the size of the payload to limit they are able to handle securely +Clients MUST sanitize the payload before accessing its content, in particular: + +* Clients MUST choose a secure decoder +* Clients SHOULD strip metadata if present without parsing/decoding it +* Clients SHOULD NOT add metadata/exif when sending an audio file for privacy +and security reasons +* Clients MUST make sure that the transport layer constraints the size +of the payload to limit they are able to handle securely ```protobuf message AudioMessage { @@ -231,11 +254,13 @@ message AudioMessage { ##### Community content type -A `ChatMessage` with `COMMUNITY` `Content/Type` MUST also specify the `payload` of the community as bytes from a [CommunityDescription](#communitydescription). +A `ChatMessage` with `COMMUNITY` `Content/Type`, +MUST also specify the `payload` of the community as bytes from a [CommunityDescription](#communitydescription). ##### DiscordMessage content type -A `ChatMessage` with `DISCORD_MESSAGE` `Content/Type` MUST also specify the `payload` of the `DiscordMessage`. +A `ChatMessage` with `DISCORD_MESSAGE` `Content/Type`, +MUST also specify the `payload` of the `DiscordMessage`. ```protobuf message DiscordMessage { @@ -279,13 +304,16 @@ message DiscordMessageAttachment { #### Message types -A node requires message types to decide how to encrypt a particular message and what metadata needs to be attached when passing a message to the transport layer. +A node requires message types to decide how to encrypt a particular message and +what metadata needs to be attached when passing a message to the transport layer. For more on this, see [10/WAKU2](../../waku/standards/core/10/waku2.md). - - + The following messages types MUST be supported: + * `ONE_TO_ONE` is a message to the public group * `PUBLIC_GROUP` is a private message * `PRIVATE_GROUP` is a message to the private group. @@ -307,34 +335,56 @@ enum MessageType { #### Clock vs Timestamp and message ordering -If a user sends a new message before the messages sent while the user was offline are received, the new message is supposed to be displayed last in a chat. -This is where the basic algorithm of Lamport timestamp would fall short as it's only meant to order causally related events. +If a user sends a new message, +before the messages sent while the user was offline are received, +the new message is supposed to be displayed last in a chat. +This is where the basic algorithm of Lamport timestamp would fall short as +it's only meant to order causally related events. -The status client therefore makes a "bid", speculating that it will beat the current chat-timestamp, s.t. the status client's Lamport timestamp format is: `clock = `max({timestamp}, chat_clock + 1)` +The status client therefore makes a "bid", +speculating that it will beat the current chat-timestamp, +s.t. the status client's Lamport timestamp format is: +`clock =`max({timestamp}, chat_clock + 1)` This will satisfy the Lamport requirement, namely: a -> b then T(a) < T(b) -`timestamp` MUST be Unix time calculated, when the node creates the message, in milliseconds. +`timestamp` MUST be Unix time calculated, when the node creates the message, +in milliseconds. This field SHOULD not be relied upon for message ordering. -`clock` SHOULD be calculated using the algorithm of [Lamport timestamps](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lamport_timestamps). -When there are messages available in a chat, the node calculates `clock`'s value based on the last received message in a particular chat: `max(timeNowInMs, last-message-clock-value + 1)`. +`clock` SHOULD be calculated using the algorithm of +[Lamport timestamps](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lamport_timestamps). +When there are messages available in a chat, +the node calculates `clock`'s value +based on the last received message in a particular chat: +`max(timeNowInMs, last-message-clock-value + 1)`. If there are no messages, `clock` is initialized with `timestamp`'s value. -Messages with a `clock` greater than `120` seconds over the Whisper/Waku timestamp SHOULD be discarded, in order to avoid malicious users to increase the `clock` of a chat arbitrarily. +Messages with a `clock` greater than `120` seconds over the Whisper/Waku timestamp +SHOULD be discarded, +in order to avoid malicious users to increase the `clock` of a chat arbitrarily. -Messages with a `clock` less than `120` seconds under the Whisper/Waku timestamp might indicate an attempt to insert messages in the chat history which is not distinguishable from a `datasync` layer re-transit event. +Messages with a `clock` less than `120` seconds under the Whisper/Waku timestamp +might indicate an attempt to insert messages in the chat history, +which is not distinguishable from a `datasync` layer re-transit event. A client MAY mark this messages with a warning to the user, or discard them. -The node uses `clock` value for the message ordering. The algorithm used, and the distributed nature of the system produces casual ordering, which might produce counter-intuitive results in some edge cases. -For example, when a user joins a public chat and sends a message before receiving the exist messages, their message `clock` value might be lower and the message will end up in the past when the historical messages are fetched. +The node uses `clock` value for the message ordering. +The algorithm used, and +the distributed nature of the system produces casual ordering, +which might produce counter-intuitive results in some edge cases. +For example, when a user joins a public chat and +sends a message before receiving the exist messages, +their message `clock` value might be lower and +the message will end up in the past when the historical messages are fetched. #### Chats -Chat is a structure that helps organize messages. -It's usually desired to display messages only from a single recipient, or a group of recipients at a time and chats help to achieve that. +Chat is a structure that helps organize messages. +It's usually desired to display messages only from a single recipient, +or a group of recipients at a time and chats help to achieve that. -All incoming messages can be matched against a chat. +All incoming messages can be matched against a chat. The below table describes how to calculate a chat ID for each message type. |Message Type|Chat ID Calculation|Direction|Comment| @@ -347,7 +397,9 @@ The below table describes how to calculate a chat ID for each message type. ### ContactUpdate -`ContactUpdate` is a message exchange to notify peers that either the user has been added as a contact, or that information about the sending user have changed. +`ContactUpdate` is a message exchange to notify peers +that either the user has been added as a contact, or +that information about the sending user have changed. ```protobuf message ContactUpdate { @@ -368,7 +420,7 @@ message ContactRequestPropagatedState { } ``` -#### Payload +#### Payload Fields | Field | Name | Type | Description | | ----- | ---- | ---- | ---- | @@ -384,31 +436,38 @@ message ContactRequestPropagatedState { A client SHOULD send a `ContactUpdate` to all the contacts each time: -- The ens_name has changed -- A user edits the profile image +* The ens_name has changed +* A user edits the profile image -A client SHOULD also periodically send a `ContactUpdate` to all the contacts, the interval is up to the client, the Status official client sends these updates every 48 hours. +A client SHOULD also periodically send a `ContactUpdate` to all the contacts, +the interval is up to the client, +the Status official client sends these updates every 48 hours. ### EmojiReaction -`EmojiReaction`s represents a user's "reaction" to a specific chat message. +`EmojiReaction`s represents a user's "reaction" to a specific chat message. For more information about the concept of emoji reactions see [Facebook Reactions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Facebook_like_button#Use_on_Facebook). -This specification RECOMMENDS that the UI/UX implementation of sending `EmojiReactions` requires only a single click operation, as users have an expectation that emoji reactions are effortless and simple to perform. +This specification RECOMMENDS that the UI/UX implementation of sending `EmojiReactions` +requires only a single click operation, +as users have an expectation that emoji reactions are effortless +and simple to perform. ```protobuf message EmojiReaction { // clock Lamport timestamp of the chat message uint64 clock = 1; - // chat_id the ID of the chat the message belongs to, for query efficiency the chat_id is stored in the db even though the + // chat_id the ID of the chat the message belongs to, for query efficiency the + // chat_id is stored in the db even though the // target message also stores the chat_id string chat_id = 2; // message_id the ID of the target message that the user wishes to react to string message_id = 3; - // message_type is (somewhat confusingly) the ID of the type of chat the message belongs to + // message_type + // is (somewhat confusingly) the ID of the type of chat the message belongs to MessageType message_type = 4; // type the ID of the emoji the user wishes to react with @@ -431,20 +490,23 @@ message EmojiReaction { Clients MUST specify `clock`, `chat_id`, `message_id`, `type` and `message_type`. -This specification RECOMMENDS that the UI/UX implementation of retracting an `EmojiReaction`s requires only a single click operation, as users have an expectation that emoji reaction removals are effortless and simple to perform. +This specification RECOMMENDS that the UI/UX implementation of retracting an `EmojiReaction`s +requires only a single click operation, +as users have an expectation that emoji reaction removals are effortless and + simple to perform. ### MembershipUpdateMessage and MembershipUpdateEvent -`MembershipUpdateEvent` is a message used to propagate information about group membership changes in a group chat. +`MembershipUpdateEvent` is a message used to propagate information +about group membership changes in a group chat. The details are in the [Group chats specs](../56/communities.md). - ```protobuf message MembershipUpdateMessage { // The chat id of the private group chat string chat_id = 1; - // A list of events for this group chat, first x bytes are the signature, then is a - // protobuf encoded MembershipUpdateEvent + // A list of events for this group chat, first x bytes are the signature, + // then is a protobuf encoded MembershipUpdateEvent repeated bytes events = 2; // An optional chat message @@ -483,7 +545,7 @@ message MembershipUpdateEvent { } ``` -#### Payload +Payload | Field | Name | Type | Description | | ----- | ---- | ---- | ---- | @@ -496,7 +558,8 @@ A `MembershipUpdateMessage` includes either a `ChatMessage` or `EmojiReaction`. ### SyncInstallationContactV2 -The node uses `SyncInstallationContact` messages to synchronize in a best-effort the contacts to other devices. +The node uses `SyncInstallationContact` messages to synchronize +in a best-effort the contacts to other devices. ```protobuf message SyncInstallationContactV2 { @@ -522,16 +585,15 @@ message SyncInstallationContactV2 { } ``` - -#### Payload +Payload | Field | Name | Type | Description | | ----- | ---- | ---- | ---- | -| 1 | last_updated_locally | `uint64` | Timestamp of last local update | +| 1 | last_updated_locally | `uint64` | Timestamp of last local update | | 2 | id | `string` | id of the contact synced | | 3 | profile_image | `string` | `base64` encoded profile picture of the user | | 4 | ens_name | `string` | ENS name of the contact | -| 5 | `array[string]` | Array of `system_tags` for the user, this can currently be: `":contact/added", ":contact/blocked", ":contact/request-received"`| +| 5 | |`array[string]` | Array of `system_tags` for the user, this can currently be: `":contact/added", ":contact/blocked", ":contact/request-received"` | | 7 | local_nickname | `string` | Local display name of the contact | | 9 | added | `bool` | Wether the contact is added | | 10 | blocked | `bool` | Wether the contact is blocked | @@ -547,7 +609,8 @@ message SyncInstallationContactV2 { ### SyncInstallationPublicChat -The node uses `SyncInstallationPublicChat` message to synchronize in a best-effort the public chats to other devices. +The node uses `SyncInstallationPublicChat` message to synchronize +in a best-effort the public chats to other devices. ```protobuf message SyncInstallationPublicChat { @@ -556,16 +619,17 @@ message SyncInstallationPublicChat { } ``` -#### Payload +Payload | Field | Name | Type | Description | | ----- | ---- | ---- | ---- | -| 1 | clock | `uint64` | clock value of the chat | +| 1 | clock | `uint64` | clock value of the chat | | 2 | id | `string` | id of the chat synced | ### SyncPairInstallation -The node uses `PairInstallation` messages to propagate information about a device to its paired devices. +The node uses `PairInstallation` messages to propagate information +about a device to its paired devices. ```protobuf message SyncPairInstallation { @@ -578,18 +642,19 @@ message SyncPairInstallation { } ``` -#### Payload +Payload | Field | Name | Type | Description | | ----- | ---- | ---- | ---- | -| 1 | clock | `uint64` | clock value of the chat | +| 1 | clock | `uint64` | clock value of the chat | | 2| installation_id | `string` | A randomly generated id that identifies this device | | 3 | device_type | `string` | The OS of the device `ios`,`android` or `desktop` | | 4 | name | `string` | The self-assigned name of the device | ### ChatIdentity -`ChatIdentity` represents the user defined identity associated with their public chat key. +`ChatIdentity` represents the user defined identity associated +with their public chat key. ```protobuf message ChatIdentity { @@ -601,18 +666,19 @@ message ChatIdentity { string color = 6; string emoji = 7; repeated SocialLink social_links = 8; - // first known message timestamp in seconds (valid only for community chats for now) + // first known message timestamp in seconds + // (valid only for community chats for now) // 0 - unknown // 1 - no messages uint32 first_message_timestamp = 9; } ``` -#### Payload +Payload | Field | Name | Type | Description | | ----- | ---- | ---- | ---- | -| 1 | clock | `uint64` | Clock value of the message | +| 1 | clock | `uint64` | Clock value of the message | | 2| ens_name | `string` | A valid ENS associated with the chat key | | 3 | images | `map` | Image data associated with the chat key | | 4 | display_name | `string` | The self-assigned display_name of the chat key | @@ -624,8 +690,8 @@ message ChatIdentity { ### CommunityDescription -`CommunityDescription` represents a community metadata that is used to discover communities and share community updates. - +`CommunityDescription` represents a community metadata +that is used to discover communities and share community updates. ```protobuf message CommunityDescription { @@ -670,17 +736,20 @@ message CommunityPermissions { } bool ens_only = 1; - // https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md is a candidate for the algorithm to be used in case we want to have private communityal chats, lighter than pairwise encryption using the DR, less secure, but more efficient for large number of participants + // https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/megolm.md is a + // candidate for the algorithm to be used in case we want to have private + // communityal chats, lighter than pairwise encryption using the DR, less secure, + // but more efficient for large number of participants bool private = 2; Access access = 3; } ``` -#### Payload +Payload | Field | Name | Type | Description | | ----- | ---- | ---- | ---- | -| 1 | clock | `uint64` | Clock value of the message | +| 1 | clock | `uint64` | Clock value of the message | | 2| members | `map` | The members of the community | | 3 | permissions | `CommunityPermissions` | Image data associated with the chat key | | 4 | display_name | `string` | The self-assigned display_name of the chat key | @@ -692,9 +761,11 @@ message CommunityPermissions { ### CommunityRequestToJoin -A `CommunityRequestToJoin` represents a request to join a community, sent by a user that is not yet a member of that community. +A `CommunityRequestToJoin` represents a request to join a community, +sent by a user that is not yet a member of that community. A request to join a community includes a list of `RevealedAccount`. -These are wallet addresses that users are willing to reveal with the community's control node and admins. +These are wallet addresses that users are willing to reveal +with the community's control node and admins. ```protobuf message CommunityRequestToJoin { @@ -714,11 +785,11 @@ message RevealedAccount { } ``` -#### Payload +Payload | Field | Name | Type | Description | | ----- | ---- | ---- | ---- | -| 1 | clock | `uint64` | Clock value of the message | +| 1 | clock | `uint64` | Clock value of the message | | 2| ens_name | `string` | The ENS of the user sending the request | | 3 | chat_id | `string` | The id of the chat to request access to | | 4 | community_id | `bytes` | The public key of the community | @@ -727,7 +798,8 @@ message RevealedAccount { ### PinMessage -A `PinMessage` is a signal that tells a client that a specific message has to be marked as pinned. +A `PinMessage` is a signal that tells a client that a specific message +has to be marked as pinned. ```protobuf message PinMessage { @@ -739,22 +811,20 @@ message PinMessage { } ``` -#### Payload +Payload | Field | Name | Type | Description | | ----- | ---- | ---- | ---- | -| 1 | clock | `uint64` | Clock value of the message | +| 1 | clock | `uint64` | Clock value of the message | | 2| message_id | `string` | The id of the message to be pinned | | 3 | chat_id | `string` | The id of the chat of the message to be pinned | | 4 | pinned | `bool` | Whether the message should be pinned or unpinned | | 5 | message_type | `MessageType` | The type of message (public/one-to-one/private-group-chat) | - ### EditMessage A `EditMessage` represents an update to an existing message. - ```protobuf message EditMessage { uint64 clock = 1; @@ -773,11 +843,11 @@ message EditMessage { ``` -#### Payload +Payload | Field | Name | Type | Description | | ----- | ---- | ---- | ---- | -| 1 | clock | `uint64` | Clock value of the message | +| 1 | clock | `uint64` | Clock value of the message | | 2| text | `string` | The updated message text | | 3 | chat_id | `string` | The id of the chat of the message | | 4 | message_id | `string` | The id of the message to be edited | @@ -786,10 +856,10 @@ message EditMessage { | 7 | content_type | `ChatMessage.ContentType` | The updated content type of the message | | 8 | unfurled_links | `array` | Updated link metadata | - ### DeleteMessage -A `DeleteMessage` represents a signal to delete a message from the local database of a client. +A `DeleteMessage` represents a signal to delete a message +from the local database of a client. ```protobuf message DeleteMessage { @@ -808,21 +878,21 @@ message DeleteMessage { } ``` -#### Payload +Payload | Field | Name | Type | Description | | ----- | ---- | ---- | ---- | -| 1 | clock | `uint64` | Clock value of the message | +| 1 | clock | `uint64` | Clock value of the message | | 2 | chat_id | `string` | The id of the chat of the message | | 3 | message_id | `string` | The id of the message to delete | | 4 | grant | `bytes` | A grant for a community edit messages | | 5 | message_type | `MessageType` | The type of message | | 6 | deleted_by | `string` | The public key of the user who deleted the message | - ### CommunityMessageArchiveLink -A `CommunityMessageArchiveLink` contains a magnet uri for a community's message archive, created using [61/STATUS-Community-History-Archives](../61/community-history-service.md). +A `CommunityMessageArchiveLink` contains a magnet uri for a community's message archive, +created using [61/STATUS-Community-History-Archives](../61/community-history-service.md). ```protobuf message CommunityMessageArchiveMagnetlink { @@ -831,11 +901,11 @@ message CommunityMessageArchiveMagnetlink { } ``` -#### Payload +Payload | Field | Name | Type | Description | | ----- | ---- | ---- | ---- | -| 1 | clock | `uint64` | Clock value of the message | +| 1 | clock | `uint64` | Clock value of the message | | 2 | magnet_uri | `string` | The magnet uri of the community archive torrent | ### AcceptContactRequest @@ -850,16 +920,17 @@ message AcceptContactRequest { ``` -#### Payload +Payload | Field | Name | Type | Description | | ----- | ---- | ---- | ---- | | 1 | id | `string` | The id of the contact request | -| 2 | clock | `uint64` | Clock value of the message | +| 2 | clock | `uint64` | Clock value of the message | ### RetractContactRequest -A `RetractContractRequest` message signals to the reiver of a request that the request was retracted. +A `RetractContractRequest` message signals to the reiver, of a request, +that the request was retracted. ```protobuf message RetractContactRequest { @@ -869,12 +940,12 @@ message RetractContactRequest { ``` -#### Payload +Payload | Field | Name | Type | Description | | ----- | ---- | ---- | ---- | | 1 | id | `string` | The id of the contact request | -| 2 | clock | `uint64` | Clock value of the message | +| 2 | clock | `uint64` | Clock value of the message | ### CommunityRequestToJoinResponse @@ -891,11 +962,11 @@ message CommunityRequestToJoinResponse { } ``` -#### Payload +Payload | Field | Name | Type | Description | | ----- | ---- | ---- | ---- | -| 1 | clock | `uint64` | Clock value of the message | +| 1 | clock | `uint64` | Clock value of the message | | 2 | community | `CommunityDescription` | The community metadata | | 3 | accepted | `bool` | Whether the request was accepted | | 4 | grant | `bytes` | The grant | @@ -904,7 +975,8 @@ message CommunityRequestToJoinResponse { ### CommunityRequestToLeave -A `CommunityRequestToLeave` represents a signal to a community that a user wants to be removed from the community's member list. +A `CommunityRequestToLeave` represents a signal to a community +that a user wants to be removed from the community's member list. ```protobuf message CommunityRequestToLeave { @@ -912,17 +984,19 @@ message CommunityRequestToLeave { bytes community_id = 2; } ``` -#### Payload + +Payload | Field | Name | Type | Description | | ----- | ---- | ---- | ---- | -| 1 | clock | `uint64` | Clock value of the message | +| 1 | clock | `uint64` | Clock value of the message | | 2 | community_id | `bytes` | The id of the community | - ### RequestContactVerification -A `RequestContactVerification` is a request to verify a contact using a "challenge", which can by any string message and typically involves questions that only the contact should know. +A `RequestContactVerification` is a request to verify a contact using a "challenge", +which can by any string message and +typically involves questions that only the contact should know. ```protobuf message RequestContactVerification { @@ -930,17 +1004,18 @@ message RequestContactVerification { string challenge = 3; } ``` -#### Payload + +Payload | Field | Name | Type | Description | | ----- | ---- | ---- | ---- | -| 1 | clock | `uint64` | Clock value of the message | +| 1 | clock | `uint64` | Clock value of the message | | 2 | challenge | `string` | The challenge message used for verification | ### AcceptContactVerification -A `AcceptContactVerification` signals that a verification request was accepted and includes a response to the challenge. - +A `AcceptContactVerification` signals that a verification request was accepted and +includes a response to the challenge. ```protobuf message AcceptContactVerification { @@ -950,11 +1025,11 @@ message AcceptContactVerification { } ``` -#### Payload +Payload | Field | Name | Type | Description | | ----- | ---- | ---- | ---- | -| 1 | clock | `uint64` | Clock value of the message | +| 1 | clock | `uint64` | Clock value of the message | | 2 | id | `string` | The verification request id | | 3 | response | `string` | The response for the challenge | @@ -969,11 +1044,11 @@ message DeclineContactVerification { } ``` -#### Payload +Payload | Field | Name | Type | Description | | ----- | ---- | ---- | ---- | -| 1 | clock | `uint64` | Clock value of the message | +| 1 | clock | `uint64` | Clock value of the message | | 2 | id | `string` | The verification request id | ### CancelContactVerification @@ -987,14 +1062,13 @@ message CancelContactVerification { } ``` -#### Payload +Payload | Field | Name | Type | Description | | ----- | ---- | ---- | ---- | -| 1 | clock | `uint64` | Clock value of the message | +| 1 | clock | `uint64` | Clock value of the message | | 2 | id | `string` | The verification request id | - ### CommunityCancelRequestToJoin A `CommunityCancelRequestToJoin` cancels a pending request to join. @@ -1009,11 +1083,11 @@ message CommunityCancelRequestToJoin { } ``` -#### Payload +Payload | Field | Name | Type | Description | | ----- | ---- | ---- | ---- | -| 1 | clock | `uint64` | Clock value of the message | +| 1 | clock | `uint64` | Clock value of the message | | 2 | ens_name | `string` | The ENS name of the account cancelling the request | | 3 | chat_id | `string` | The id of the chat | | 4 | community_id | `bytes` | The id of the community | @@ -1021,7 +1095,8 @@ message CommunityCancelRequestToJoin { ### CommunityEditSharedAddresses -A `CommunityEditSharedAddresses` message allows users to edit the shared accounts they've revealed when requesting to join a community. +A `CommunityEditSharedAddresses` message allows users to edit the shared accounts +they've revealed when requesting to join a community. ```protobuf message CommunityEditSharedAddresses { @@ -1031,11 +1106,11 @@ message CommunityEditSharedAddresses { } ``` -#### Payload +Payload | Field | Name | Type | Description | | ----- | ---- | ---- | ---- | -| 1 | clock | `uint64` | Clock value of the message | +| 1 | clock | `uint64` | Clock value of the message | | 2 | community_id | `bytes` | The id of the community | | 3 | revealed_accounts | `array` | A list of revealed accounts | @@ -1043,33 +1118,32 @@ message CommunityEditSharedAddresses { There are two ways to upgrade the protocol without breaking compatibility: -- A node always supports accretion -- A node does not support deletion of existing fields or messages, which might break compatibility +* A node always supports accretion +* A node does not support deletion of existing fields or messages, +which might break compatibility ## Security Considerations -- - ## Changelog ### Version 0.5 Released [August 25, 2020](https://github.com/status-im/specs/commit/968fafff23cdfc67589b34dd64015de29aaf41f0) -- Added support for emoji reactions +* Added support for emoji reactions ### Version 0.4 Released [July 16, 2020](https://github.com/status-im/specs/commit/ad45cd5fed3c0f79dfa472253a404f670dd47396) -- Added support for images -- Added support for audio +* Added support for images +* Added support for audio ### Version 0.3 Released [May 22, 2020](https://github.com/status-im/specs/commit/664dd1c9df6ad409e4c007fefc8c8945b8d324e8) -- Added language to include Waku in all relevant places +* Added language to include Waku in all relevant places ## Copyright diff --git a/status/63/keycard-usage.md b/status/63/keycard-usage.md index abba44b02..56144e758 100644 --- a/status/63/keycard-usage.md +++ b/status/63/keycard-usage.md @@ -12,7 +12,9 @@ contributors: ## Terminology -- **Account**: A valid [BIP-32](https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0032.mediawiki) compliant key. +- **Account**: A valid +[BIP-32](https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0032.mediawiki) +compliant key. - **Multiaccount**: An account from which multiple Accounts can be derived. ## Abstract @@ -28,8 +30,11 @@ More documentation on the Status Keycard can be found [here](https://keycard.tec ## Motivation -The Status Keycard is a hardware wallet that can be used to store and sign transactions. -For the purpose of the Status App, this specification describes how the Keycard SHOULD be used to store and sign transactions. +The Status Keycard is a hardware wallet that can be used to store and +sign transactions. +For the purpose of the Status App, +this specification describes how the Keycard SHOULD be used to store and +sign transactions. ## Usage @@ -40,7 +45,7 @@ For the purpose of the Status App, this specification describes how the Keycard To initialize the keycard for use with the application. The keycard is locked with a 6 digit pin. -#### Request wire format +Request wire format ```json { @@ -48,7 +53,7 @@ The keycard is locked with a 6 digit pin. } ``` -#### Response wire format +Response wire format ```json { @@ -65,18 +70,19 @@ The application SHOULD provide a way to recover the keycard in case the pin is f To fetch if the keycard is ready to be used by the application. -#### Request wire format +Request wire format The requester MAY add a `pairing` field to filter through the generated keys + ```json { "pairing": //<256_bit_salt> OR null } ``` -#### Response wire format +Response wire format -##### If the keycard is not initialized yet +#### If the keycard is not initialized yet ```json { @@ -84,7 +90,7 @@ The requester MAY add a `pairing` field to filter through the generated keys } ``` -##### If the keycard is initialized +#### If the keycard is initialized ```json { @@ -101,9 +107,10 @@ The requester MAY add a `pairing` field to filter through the generated keys ### 3. Pairing the Keycard to the Client device (`/pair`) -To establish a secure communication channel described [here](https://keycard.tech/docs/apdu/opensecurechannel.html), the keycard and the client device need to be paired. +To establish a secure communication channel described [here](https://keycard.tech/docs/apdu/opensecurechannel.html), +the keycard and the client device need to be paired. -#### Request wire format +Request wire format ```json { @@ -111,7 +118,7 @@ To establish a secure communication channel described [here](https://keycard.tec } ``` -#### Response wire format +Response wire format ```json "//<256_bit_salt>" @@ -121,7 +128,7 @@ To establish a secure communication channel described [here](https://keycard.tec To generate a new set of keys and load them onto the keycard. -#### Request wire format +Request wire format ```json { @@ -131,7 +138,7 @@ To generate a new set of keys and load them onto the keycard. } ``` -#### Response wire format +Response wire format ```json { @@ -154,7 +161,7 @@ To generate a new set of keys and load them onto the keycard. To fetch the keys that are currently loaded on the keycard. -#### Request wire format +Request wire format ```json { @@ -163,7 +170,7 @@ To fetch the keys that are currently loaded on the keycard. } ``` -#### Response wire format +Response wire format ```json { @@ -184,9 +191,10 @@ To fetch the keys that are currently loaded on the keycard. ### 6. Sign a transaction (`/sign`) -To sign a transaction using the keycard, passing in the pairing information and the transaction to be signed. +To sign a transaction using the keycard, passing in the pairing information and +the transaction to be signed. -#### Request wire format +Request wire format ```json { @@ -197,7 +205,7 @@ To sign a transaction using the keycard, passing in the pairing information and } ``` -#### Response wire format +Response wire format ```json <256_bit_signature> @@ -205,9 +213,10 @@ To sign a transaction using the keycard, passing in the pairing information and ### 7. Export a key (`/export-key`) -To export a key from the keycard, passing in the pairing information and the path to the key to be exported. +To export a key from the keycard, passing in the pairing information and +the path to the key to be exported. -#### Request wire format +Request wire format ```json { @@ -217,17 +226,17 @@ To export a key from the keycard, passing in the pairing information and the pat } ``` -#### Response wire format +Response wire format ```json <256_bit_public_key> -``` +``` ### 8. Verify a pin (`/verify-pin`) To verify the pin of the keycard. -#### Request wire format +Request wire format ```json { @@ -235,22 +244,22 @@ To verify the pin of the keycard. } ``` -#### Response wire format +Response wire format ```json 1_digit_status_code ``` Status code reference: + - 3: PIN is valid - ### 9. Change the pin (`/change-pin`) To change the pin of the keycard. -#### Request wire format +Request wire format ```json { @@ -260,15 +269,15 @@ To change the pin of the keycard. } ``` -#### Response wire format +Response wire format -##### If the operation was successful +#### If the operation was successful ```json true ``` -##### If the operation was unsuccessful +#### If the operation was unsuccessful ```json false @@ -276,9 +285,10 @@ false ### 10. Unblock the keycard (`/unblock-pin`) -If the Keycard is blocked due to too many incorrect pin attempts, it can be unblocked using the PUK. +If the Keycard is blocked due to too many incorrect pin attempts, +it can be unblocked using the PUK. -#### Request wire format +Request wire format ```json { @@ -288,15 +298,15 @@ If the Keycard is blocked due to too many incorrect pin attempts, it can be unbl } ``` -#### Response wire format +Response wire format -##### If the operation was successful +If the operation was successful ```json true ``` -##### If the operation was unsuccessful +If the operation was unsuccessful ```json false @@ -304,7 +314,8 @@ false ## Flows -Any application that uses the Status Keycard MAY implement the following flows according to the actions listed above. +Any application that uses the Status Keycard +MAY implement the following flows according to the actions listed above. ### 1. A new user wants to use the Keycard with the application @@ -335,7 +346,6 @@ Any application that uses the Status Keycard MAY implement the following flows a 1. The user unblocks the Keycard using the `/unblock-pin` endpoint. - ## Security Considerations Inherits the security considerations of [Status Keycard](https://keycard.tech/docs/) @@ -344,7 +354,6 @@ Inherits the security considerations of [Status Keycard](https://keycard.tech/do Inherits the privacy considerations of [Status Keycard](https://keycard.tech/docs/) - ## Copyright Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). diff --git a/status/65/account-address.md b/status/65/account-address.md index e79881ac3..18eab3572 100644 --- a/status/65/account-address.md +++ b/status/65/account-address.md @@ -14,42 +14,64 @@ contributors: ## Abstract -This specification details what a Status account address is and how account addresses are created and used. +This specification details what a Status account address is and +how account addresses are created and used. ## Background -The core concept of an account in Status is a set of cryptographic keypairs. Namely, the combination of the following: +The core concept of an account in Status is a set of cryptographic keypairs. +Namely, the combination of the following: + 1. a Waku chat identity keypair 1. a set of cryptocurrency wallet keypairs -The Status node verifies or derives everything else associated with the contact from the above items, including: +The Status node verifies or +derives everything else associated with the contact from the above items, including: + - Ethereum address (future verification, currently the same base keypair) - identicon - message signatures ## Initial Key Generation -### Public/Private Keypairs -- An ECDSA (secp256k1 curve) public/private keypair MUST be generated via a [BIP43](https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0043.mediawiki) derived path from a [BIP39](https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0039.mediawiki) mnemonic seed phrase. + +### Public/Private Keypairs + +- An ECDSA (secp256k1 curve) public/private keypair MUST be generated via a +[BIP43](https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0043.mediawiki) +derived path from a +[BIP39](https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0039.mediawiki) +mnemonic seed phrase. + - The default paths are defined as such: - - Waku Chat Key (`IK`): `m/43'/60'/1581'/0'/0` (post Multiaccount integration) - - following [EIP1581](https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/blob/master/EIPS/eip-1581.md) - - Status Wallet paths: `m/44'/60'/0'/0/i` starting at `i=0` - - following [BIP44](https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0044.mediawiki) - - NOTE: this (`i=0`) is also the current (and only) path for Waku key before Multiaccount integration + - Waku Chat Key (`IK`): `m/43'/60'/1581'/0'/0` (post Multiaccount integration) + - following [EIP1581](https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/blob/master/EIPS/eip-1581.md) + - Status Wallet paths: `m/44'/60'/0'/0/i` starting at `i=0` + - following [BIP44](https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0044.mediawiki) + - NOTE: this (`i=0`) is also the current (and only) + path for Waku key before Multiaccount integration ## Account Broadcasting -- A user is responsible for broadcasting certain information publicly so that others may contact them. + +- A user is responsible for broadcasting certain information publicly so +that others may contact them. ### X3DH Prekey bundles -- Refer to [53/WAKU2-X3DH](../../waku/standards/application/53/x3dh.md) for details on the X3DH prekey bundle broadcasting, as well as regeneration. + +- Refer to [53/WAKU2-X3DH](../../waku/standards/application/53/x3dh.md) +for details on the X3DH prekey bundle broadcasting, as well as regeneration. ## Optional Account additions ### ENS Username -- A user MAY register a public username on the Ethereum Name System (ENS). This username is a user-chosen subdomain of the `stateofus.eth` ENS registration that maps to their Waku identity key (`IK`). + +- A user MAY register a public username on the Ethereum Name System (ENS). +This username is a user-chosen subdomain of the `stateofus.eth` +ENS registration that maps to their Waku identity key (`IK`). ### User Profile Picture -- An account MAY edit the `IK` generated identicon with a chosen picture. This picture will become part of the publicly broadcasted profile of the account. + +- An account MAY edit the `IK` generated identicon with a chosen picture. +This picture will become part of the publicly broadcasted profile of the account. @@ -88,11 +110,14 @@ message MultiAccount { } ``` -The above payload is broadcasted when 2 devices that belong to a user need to be paired. +The above payload is broadcasted when 2 devices +that belong to a user need to be paired. ## Security Considerations -- This specification inherits security considerations of [53/WAKU2-X3DH](../../waku/standards/application/53/x3dh.md) and [54/WAKU2-X3DH-SESSIONS](../../waku/standards/application/54/x3dh-sessions.md). +- This specification inherits security considerations of +[53/WAKU2-X3DH](../../waku/standards/application/53/x3dh.md) and +[54/WAKU2-X3DH-SESSIONS](../../waku/standards/application/54/x3dh-sessions.md). ## Copyright diff --git a/status/71/push-notification-server.md b/status/71/push-notification-server.md index d0125aeb6..02966b2bc 100644 --- a/status/71/push-notification-server.md +++ b/status/71/push-notification-server.md @@ -11,27 +11,40 @@ contributors: --- ## Abstract -A push notification server implementation for IOS devices and Android devices. -This specification provides a set of methods that allow clients to use push notification services in mobile environments. + +A push notification server implementation for IOS devices and Android devices. +This specification provides a set of methods that allow clients +to use push notification services in mobile environments. ## Background -Push notification for iOS and Android devices can only be implemented by relying on -[APN](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/NetworkingInternet/Conceptual/RemoteNotificationsPG/APNSOverview.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/TP40008194-CH8-SW1), -Apple Push Notification, service for iOS or -[Firebase](https://firebase.google.com/) for Android. - -For some Android devices, foreground services are restricted, requiring a user to grant authorization to applications to use foreground notifications. -Apple iOS devices restrict notifications to a few internal functions that every application can not use. -Applications on iOS can request execution time when they are in the background. This has a limited set of use cases for example, -it will not schedule any time if the application was closed with force quit. -Requesting execution time is not responsive enough to implement a push notification system. + +Push notification for iOS and +Android devices can only be implemented by relying on +[APN](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/NetworkingInternet/Conceptual/RemoteNotificationsPG/APNSOverview.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/TP40008194-CH8-SW1), +Apple Push Notification, service for iOS or +[Firebase](https://firebase.google.com/) for Android. + +For some Android devices, foreground services are restricted, +requiring a user to grant authorization to applications +to use foreground notifications. +Apple iOS devices restrict notifications to +a few internal functions that every application can not use. +Applications on iOS can request execution time when they are in the background. +This has a limited set of use cases for example, +it will not schedule any time if the application was closed with force quit. +Requesting execution time is not responsive enough to +implement a push notification system. Status provides a set of methods to acheive push notification services. -Since this can not be safely implemented in a privacy-preserving manner, clients need to be given an option to opt-in to receive and send push notifications. +Since this can not be safely implemented in a privacy-preserving manner, +clients need to be given an option to opt-in to receive and send push notifications. They are disabled by default. ## Specification -The key words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL NOT”, “SHOULD”, “SHOULD NOT”, “RECOMMENDED”, “MAY”, and “OPTIONAL” in this document are to be interpreted as described in [2119](https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt). + +The key words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, +“SHALL NOT”, “SHOULD”, “SHOULD NOT”, “RECOMMENDED”, “MAY”, and +“OPTIONAL” in this document are to be interpreted as described in [2119](https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt). ### Definitions @@ -42,8 +55,7 @@ The key words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL | server | A service that performs push notifications. | | Waku-Store | A Waku node that decides to provide functionality to store messages permanently and deliver the messages to requesting clients. As described in [13/WAKU-STORE](../../waku/standards/core/13/store.md) specification.| - -### Server Components +### Server Components | Components | Description | | --------------- | --------- | @@ -52,37 +64,45 @@ The key words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL | Registering Client | A client that wants to receive push notifications. | | Sending Client | A client that wants to send push notifications. | +### Requirements -### Requirements: - -The party releasing the app MUST possess a certificate for the Apple Push Notification service and it MUST run a -[gorush](https://github.com/appleboy/gorush) publicly accessible server for sending the actual notification. +The party releasing the app MUST possess a certificate +for the Apple Push Notification service and +it MUST run a [gorush](https://github.com/appleboy/gorush) +publicly accessible server for sending the actual notification. The party releasing the app MUST run its own [gorush](https://github.com/appleboy/gorush). ### Push Notification Server Flow -#### Registration Process: + +#### Registration Process ![registration](./images/registration.png) -#### Sending and Receiving Notification Process: +#### Sending and Receiving Notification Process ![notification](./images/notification.png) - ### Registering Client + Registering a client with a push notification service. -- A client MAY register with one or more push notification services in order to increase availability. +- A client MAY register with one or +more push notification services in order to increase availability. -- A client SHOULD make sure that all the notification services they registered with have the same information about their tokens. +- A client SHOULD make sure that all the notification services they registered with +have the same information about their tokens. - A `PNR message` (Push Notification Registration) MUST be sent to the -[partitioned topic](../../waku/standards/application/54/x3dh-sessions.md) for the public key of the node, encrypted with this key. +[partitioned topic](../../waku/standards/application/54/x3dh-sessions.md) +for the public key of the node, encrypted with this key. -- The message MUST be wrapped in a [`ApplicationMetadataMessage`](../62/payloads.md) with type set to `PUSH_NOTIFICATION_REGISTRATION`. +- The message MUST be wrapped in a +[`ApplicationMetadataMessage`](../62/payloads.md) with type set to `PUSH_NOTIFICATION_REGISTRATION`. -- The marshaled protobuf payload MUST also be encrypted with AES-GCM using the Diffie–Hellman key generated from the client and server identity. -This is done in order to ensure that the extracted key from the signature will be considered invalid if it can’t decrypt the payload. +- The marshaled protobuf payload MUST also be encrypted with AES-GCM +using the Diffie–Hellman key generated from the client and server identity. +This is done in order to ensure that the extracted key from the signature +will be considered invalid if it can’t decrypt the payload. The content of the message MUST contain the following [protobuf record](https://developers.google.com/protocol-buffers/): @@ -111,7 +131,9 @@ message PushNotificationRegistration { ``` A push notification server will handle the message according to the following rules: -- it MUST extract the public key of the sender from the signature and verify that the payload can be decrypted successfully. + +- it MUST extract the public key of the sender from the signature and +verify that the payload can be decrypted successfully. - it MUST verify that `token_type` is supported. @@ -119,7 +141,9 @@ A push notification server will handle the message according to the following ru - it MUST verify that `installation_id` is non empty. -- it MUST verify that `version` is non-zero and greater than the currently stored version for the public key and `installation_id` of the sender, if any. +- it MUST verify that `version` is non-zero and +greater than the currently stored version for the public key and +`installation_id` of the sender, if any. - it MUST verify that `grant` is non empty and according to the Grant Server specs. @@ -127,7 +151,8 @@ A push notification server will handle the message according to the following ru - it MUST verify that `apn_topic` is set if token_type is APN_TOKEN. -- The message MUST be wrapped in a [`ApplicationMetadataMessage`](../62/payloads.md) with type set to `PUSH_NOTIFICATION_REGISTRATION_RESPONSE`. +- The message MUST be wrapped in a +[`ApplicationMetadataMessage`](../62/payloads.md) with type set to `PUSH_NOTIFICATION_REGISTRATION_RESPONSE`. The payload of the response is: @@ -148,69 +173,97 @@ message PushNotificationRegistrationResponse { ``` -A client SHOULD listen for a response sent on the [partitioned topic](../../waku/standards/application/54/x3dh-sessions.md) that the key used to register. +A client SHOULD listen for a response sent on the +[partitioned topic](../../waku/standards/application/54/x3dh-sessions.md) +that the key used to register. If success is true the client has registered successfully. If `success` is `false`: - > If `MALFORMED_MESSAGE` is returned, the request SHOULD NOT be retried without ensuring that it is correctly formed. - > If `INTERNAL_ERROR` is returned, the request MAY be retried, but the client MUST backoff exponentially. + > If `MALFORMED_MESSAGE` is returned, +the request SHOULD NOT be retried without ensuring that it is correctly formed. + > If `INTERNAL_ERROR` is returned, the request MAY be retried, +but the client MUST backoff exponentially. + +#### Handle Errors -#### Handle Errors: - If the message can’t be decrypted, the message MUST be discarded. - If `token_type` is not supported, a response MUST be sent with `error` set to `UNSUPPORTED_TOKEN_TYPE`. -- If `token`, `installation_id`, `device_tokens`, `version` are empty, a response MUST be sent with `error` set to `MALFORMED_MESSAGE`. +- If `token`, `installation_id`, `device_tokens`, `version` are empty, +a response MUST be sent with `error` set to `MALFORMED_MESSAGE`. -- If the `version` is equal or less than the currently stored `version`, a response MUST be sent with `error` set to `VERSION_MISMATCH`. +- If the `version` is equal or less than the currently stored `version`, +a response MUST be sent with `error` set to `VERSION_MISMATCH`. - If any other error occurs the `error` SHOULD be set to `INTERNAL_ERROR`. -- If the response is successful `success` MUST be set to `true` otherwise a response MUST be sent with `success` set to `false`. +- If the response is successful `success` MUST be set to `true` otherwise +a response MUST be sent with `success` set to `false`. -- `request_id` SHOULD be set to the [`SHAKE-256`](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/fips/nist.fips.202.pdf) of the encrypted payload. +- `request_id` SHOULD be set to the +[`SHAKE-256`](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/fips/nist.fips.202.pdf) +of the encrypted payload. -- The response MUST be sent on the [partitioned topic](../../waku/standards/application/54/x3dh-sessions.md) of the sender and -MUST not be encrypted using the secure transport to facilitate the usage of ephemeral keys. +- The response MUST be sent on the +[partitioned topic](../../waku/standards/application/54/x3dh-sessions.md) +of the sender and MUST not be encrypted using +the secure transport to facilitate the usage of ephemeral keys. - If no response is returned, the request SHOULD be considered failed and MAY be retried with the same server or a different one, but clients MUST exponentially backoff after each trial. ## Push Notification Server + A node that handles receiving and sending push notifications for clients. -### Query Topic: +### Query Topic + On successful registration the server MUST be listening to the topic derived from: > `0x` + HexEncode(Shake256(CompressedClientPublicKey)) Using the topic derivation algorithm described here and listen for client queries. -#### Server Grant: -A client MUST authorize a push notification server to send them push notifications. -This is done by building a grant which is specific to a given client-server pair. -When receiving a grant, the server MUST validate that the signature matches the registering client. +#### Server Grant + +A client MUST authorize a push notification server to send them push notifications. +This is done by building a grant which is specific to a given client-server pair. +When receiving a grant, +the server MUST validate that the signature matches the registering client. -The grant is built as:
-`Signature(Keccak256(CompressedPublicKeyOfClient . CompressedPublicKeyOfServer . AccessToken), PrivateKeyOfClient)` +The grant is built as: + +```js +`Signature(Keccak256(CompressedPublicKeyOfClient.CompressedPublicKeyOfServer.AccessToken), PrivateKeyOfClient)` +``` -#### Unregistering with a Server: -- To unregister a client MUST send a `PushNotificationRegistration` request as described above with `unregister` set -to `true`, or removing their device information. -- The server MUST remove all data about this user if `unregistering` is `true`, apart from the `hash` of the public key and -the `version` of the last options, in order to make sure that old messages are not processed. -- A client MAY unregister from a server on explicit logout if multiple chat keys are used on a single device. +#### Unregistering with a Server + +- To unregister a client MUST send a `PushNotificationRegistration` +request as described above with `unregister` set to `true`, +or removing their device information. +- The server MUST remove all data about this user if `unregistering` is `true`, +apart from the `hash` of the public key and +the `version` of the last options, +in order to make sure that old messages are not processed. +- A client MAY unregister from a server on explicit logout +if multiple chat keys are used on a single device. + +#### Re-registering with a Server -#### Re-registering with a Server: - A client SHOULD re-register with the node if the APN or FIREBASE token changes. -- When re-registering a client SHOULD ensure that it has the most up-to-date `PushNotificationRegistration` and +- When re-registering a client SHOULD ensure +that it has the most up-to-date `PushNotificationRegistration` and increment `version` if necessary. - Once re-registered, a client SHOULD advertise the changes. Changing options is handled the same as re-registering. -#### Advertising a Server: -Each user registered with one or more push notification servers -SHOULD advertise periodically the push notification services they have registered with for each device they own. +#### Advertising a Server + +Each user registered with one or more push notification servers +SHOULD advertise periodically the push notification services +they have registered with for each device they own. ```protobuf message PushNotificationQueryInfo { @@ -229,22 +282,33 @@ message ContactCodeAdvertisement { ``` -#### Handle Advertisement Message: -- The message MUST be wrapped in a [`ApplicationMetadataMessage`](../62/payloads.md) with type set to `PUSH_NOTIFICATION_QUERY_INFO`. -- If no filtering is done based on public keys, the access token SHOULD be included in the advertisement. +#### Handle Advertisement Message + +- The message MUST be wrapped in a +[`ApplicationMetadataMessage`](../62/payloads.md) with type set to `PUSH_NOTIFICATION_QUERY_INFO`. +- If no filtering is done based on public keys, +the access token SHOULD be included in the advertisement. Otherwise it SHOULD be left empty. -- This SHOULD be advertised on the [contact code topic](../../waku/standards/application/53/x3dh.md) and +- This SHOULD be advertised on the +[contact code topic](../../waku/standards/application/53/x3dh.md) and SHOULD be coupled with normal contact-code advertisement. -- When a user register or re-register with a push notification service, their contact-code SHOULD be re-advertised. -- Multiple servers MAY be advertised for the same installation_id for redundancy reasons. +- When a user register or re-register with a push notification service, +their contact-code SHOULD be re-advertised. +- Multiple servers MAY be advertised for the same installation_id + for redundancy reasons. -#### Discovering a Server: -To discover a push notification service for a given user, their  -[contact code topic](../../waku/standards/application/53/x3dh.md) SHOULD be listened to. -A Waku-Store node can be queried for the specific topic to retrieve the most up-to-date contact code. +#### Discovering a Server -#### Querying a Server: -If a token is not present in the latest advertisement for a user, the server SHOULD be queried directly. +To discover a push notification service for a given user, their +[contact code topic](../../waku/standards/application/53/x3dh.md) +SHOULD be listened to. +A Waku-Store node can be queried for the specific topic +to retrieve the most up-to-date contact code. + +#### Querying a Server + +If a token is not present in the latest advertisement for a user, +the server SHOULD be queried directly. To query a server a message: @@ -255,9 +319,12 @@ message PushNotificationQuery { ``` -#### Handle Query Message: -- The message MUST be wrapped in a [`ApplicationMetadataMessage`](../62/payloads.md) with type set to `PUSH_NOTIFICATION_QUERY`. -- it MUST be sent to the server on the topic derived from the hashed public key of the key we are querying, +#### Handle Query Message + +- The message MUST be wrapped in a +[`ApplicationMetadataMessage`](../62/payloads.md) with type set to `PUSH_NOTIFICATION_QUERY`. +- it MUST be sent to the server on the topic derived from the hashed public key +of the key we are querying, [as described above](#query-topic). - An ephemeral key SHOULD be used and SHOULD NOT be encrypted using the [secure transport](../../waku/standards/application/53/x3dh.md). @@ -282,32 +349,48 @@ message PushNotificationQueryResponse { ``` -#### Handle Query Response: +#### Handle Query Response + - A `PushNotificationQueryResponse` message MUST be wrapped in a [`ApplicationMetadataMessage`](../62/payloads.md) with type set to `PUSH_NOTIFICATION_QUERY_RESPONSE`. Otherwise a response MUST NOT be sent. -- If `allowed_key_list` is not set `access_token` MUST be set and `allowed_key_list` MUST NOT be set. +- If `allowed_key_list` is not set `access_token` MUST be set +and `allowed_key_list` MUST NOT be set. -- If `allowed_key_list` is set `allowed_key_list` MUST be set and `access_token` MUST NOT be set. +- If `allowed_key_list` is set `allowed_key_list` MUST be set and +`access_token` MUST NOT be set. -- If `access_token` is returned, the `access_token` SHOULD be used to send push notifications. +- If `access_token` is returned, +the `access_token` SHOULD be used to send push notifications. -- If `allowed_key_list` are returned, the client SHOULD decrypt each token by generating an `AES-GCM` symmetric key from the Diffie–Hellman between the target client and itself. -If AES decryption succeeds it will return a valid `uuid` which is what is used for access_token. +- If `allowed_key_list` are returned, +the client SHOULD decrypt each token by generating an `AES-GCM` symmetric key +from the Diffie–Hellman between the target client and itself. +If AES decryption succeeds, +it will return a valid `uuid` which is what is used for access_token. The token SHOULD be used to send push notifications. -- The response MUST be sent on the [partitioned topic](../../waku/standards/application/54/x3dh-sessions.md) of the sender and -MUST NOT be encrypted using the [secure transport](../../waku/standards/application/53/x3dh.md) to facilitate the usage of ephemeral keys. +- The response MUST be sent on the +[partitioned topic](../../waku/standards/application/54/x3dh-sessions.md) +of the sender and +MUST NOT be encrypted using the +[secure transport](../../waku/standards/application/53/x3dh.md) +to facilitate the usage of ephemeral keys. -- On receiving a response a client MUST verify `grant` to ensure that the server has been authorized to send push notification to a given client. +- On receiving a response, +a client MUST verify `grant` to ensure that the server +has been authorized to send push notification to a given client. ### Sending Client + Sending a push notification -- When sending a push notification, only the `installation_id` for the devices targeted by the message SHOULD be used. +- When sending a push notification, +only the `installation_id` for the devices targeted by the message SHOULD be used. -- If a message is for all the user devices, all the `installation_id` known to the client MAY be used. +- If a message is for all the user devices, +all the `installation_id` known to the client MAY be used. - The number of devices MAY be capped in order to reduce resource consumption. @@ -315,7 +398,8 @@ Sending a push notification - For any device that a token is available, or that a token is successfully queried, -a push notification message SHOULD be sent to the corresponding push notification server. +a push notification message SHOULD be sent to the corresponding +push notification server. ```protobuf message PushNotification { @@ -339,14 +423,19 @@ message PushNotificationRequest { } ``` -#### Handle Notification Request: + +#### Handle Notification Request + - A `PushNotificationRequest` message MUST be wrapped in a [`ApplicationMetadataMessage`](../62/payloads.md) with type set to `PUSH_NOTIFICATION_REQUEST`. -- Where `message` is the encrypted payload of the message and `chat_id` is the `SHAKE-256` of the `chat_id`. -`message_id` is the id of the message `author` is the `SHAKE-256` of the public key of the sender. +- Where `message` is the encrypted payload of the message and +`chat_id` is the `SHAKE-256` of the `chat_id`. +`message_id` is the id of the message, +`author` is the `SHAKE-256` of the public key of the sender. -- If multiple server are available for a given push notification, only one notification MUST be sent. +- If multiple server are available for a given push notification, +only one notification MUST be sent. - If no response is received a client SHOULD wait at least 3 seconds, after which the request MAY be retried against a different server. @@ -354,7 +443,7 @@ after which the request MAY be retried against a different server. - This message SHOULD be sent using an ephemeral key. On receiving the message, the push notification server MUST validate the access token. -If the access token is valid, a notification MUST be sent to the +If the access token is valid, a notification MUST be sent to the [gorush](https://github.com/appleboy/gorush) instance with the following data: ```yaml @@ -405,39 +494,67 @@ message PushNotificationResponse { Where `message_id` is the `message_id` sent by the client. -#### Handle Notification Response: -- A `PushNotificationResponse` message MUST be wrapped in a [`ApplicationMetadataMessage`](../62/payloads.md) with type set to `PUSH_NOTIFICATION_RESPONSE`. +#### Handle Notification Response + +- A `PushNotificationResponse` message MUST be wrapped in a +[`ApplicationMetadataMessage`](../62/payloads.md) with type set to `PUSH_NOTIFICATION_RESPONSE`. -- The response MUST be sent on the [partitioned topic](../../waku/standards/application/54/x3dh-sessions.md) of the sender and -MUST not be encrypted using the [secure transport](../../waku/standards/application/53/x3dh.md) to facilitate the usage of ephemeral keys. +- The response MUST be sent on the +[partitioned topic](../../waku/standards/application/54/x3dh-sessions.md) +of the sender and +MUST not be encrypted using the +[secure transport](../../waku/standards/application/53/x3dh.md) +to facilitate the usage of ephemeral keys. -- If the request is accepted `success` MUST be set to `true`. Otherwise `success` MUST be set to `false`. +- If the request is accepted `success` MUST be set to `true`. +Otherwise `success` MUST be set to `false`. -- If `error` is `BAD_TOKEN` the client MAY query again the server for the token and retry the request. +- If `error` is `BAD_TOKEN` the client MAY query again the server for the token and +retry the request. - If `error` is `INTERNAL_ERROR` the client MAY retry the request. ### Protobuf Description -#### PushNotificationRegistration: -`token_type`: the type of token. Currently supported is `APN_TOKEN` for Apple Push.
-`device_token`: the actual push notification token sent by `Firebase` or `APN` and `FIREBASE_TOKEN` for firebase.
-`installation_id`: the `installation_id` of the device.
-`access_token`: the access token that will be given to clients to send push notifications.
-`enabled`: whether the device wants to be sent push notifications.
-`version`: a monotonically increasing number identifying the current `PushNotificationRegistration`. -Any time anything is changed in the record it MUST be increased by the client, otherwise the request will not be accepted.
-`allowed_key_list`: a list of `access_token` encrypted with the AES key generated by Diffie–Hellman between the publisher and the -allowed contact.
-`blocked_chat_list`: a list of `SHA2-256` hashes of chat ids. Any chat id in this list will not trigger a notification.
-`unregister`: whether the account should be unregistered.
-`grant`: the grant for this specific server.
-`allow_from_contacts_only`: whether the client only wants push notifications from contacts.
-`apn_topic`: the APN topic for the push notification.
-`block_mentions`: whether the client does not want to be notified on mentions.
-`allowed_mentions_chat_list`: a list of SHA2-256 hashes of chat ids where we want to receive mentions.
+#### PushNotificationRegistration + +`token_type`: the type of token. Currently supported is `APN_TOKEN` for Apple Push. + +`device_token`: the actual push notification token sent by `Firebase` or +`APN` and `FIREBASE_TOKEN` for firebase. + +`installation_id`: the `installation_id` of the device. + +`access_token`: the access token that will be given to clients to send push notifications. + +`enabled`: whether the device wants to be sent push notifications. + +`version`: a monotonically increasing number identifying the current `PushNotificationRegistration`. +Any time anything is changed in the record it MUST be increased by the client, +otherwise the request will not be accepted. + +`allowed_key_list`: a list of `access_token` encrypted with the AES key +generated by Diffie–Hellman between the publisher and the allowed contact. + +`blocked_chat_list`: a list of `SHA2-256` hashes of chat ids. +Any chat id in this list will not trigger a notification. + +`unregister`: whether the account should be unregistered. + +`grant`: the grant for this specific server. + +`allow_from_contacts_only`: whether the client only wants +push notifications from contacts. + +`apn_topic`: the APN topic for the push notification. + +`block_mentions`: whether the client does not want to be notified on mentions. + +`allowed_mentions_chat_list`: a list of SHA2-256 hashes of chat ids +where we want to receive mentions. DATA DISCLOSED + - Type of device owned by a given user. - The `FIREBASE` or `APN` push notification token, @@ -448,48 +565,71 @@ DATA DISCLOSED - The number of contacts a client has, in case `allowed_key_list` is set. -#### PushNotificationRegistrationResponse: -`success`: whether the registration was successful
-`error`: the error type, if any
-`request_id`: the `SHAKE-256` hash of the `signature` of the request
-`preferences`: the server stored preferences in case of an error
+#### PushNotificationRegistrationResponse + +`success`: whether the registration was successful + +`error`: the error type, if any + +`request_id`: the `SHAKE-256` hash of the `signature` of the request + +`preferences`: the server stored preferences in case of an error + +#### ContactCodeAdvertisement -#### ContactCodeAdvertisement: `push_notification_info`: the information for each device advertised DATA DISCLOSED + - The chat key of the sender -#### PushNotificationQuery: +#### PushNotificationQuery + `public_keys`: the `SHAKE-256` of the public keys the client is interested in DATA DISCLOSED + - The hash of the public keys the client is interested in -#### PushNotificationQueryInfo: -`access_token`: the access token used to send a push notification
-`installation_id`: the `installation_id` of the device associated with the `access_token`
-`public_key`: the `SHAKE-256` of the public key associated with this `access_token` and `installation_id`.
-`allowed_key_list`: a list of encrypted access tokens to be returned to the client in case there’s any filtering on public keys in place.
-`grant`: the grant used to register with this server.
-`version`: the version of the registration on the server.
-`server_public_key`: the compressed public key of the server.
- -#### PushNotificationQueryResponse: -`info`: a list of `PushNotificationQueryInfo`.
-`message_id`: the message id of the `PushNotificationQueryInfo` the server is replying to.
-`success`: whether the query was successful.
- -#### PushNotification: -`access_token`: the access token used to send a push notification.
-`chat_id`: the `SHAKE-256` of the `chat_id`.
-`public_key`: the `SHAKE-256` of the compressed public key of the receiving client.
-`installation_id`: the `installation_id` of the receiving client.
-`message`: the encrypted message that is being notified on.
-`type`: the type of the push notification, either `MESSAGE` or `MENTION`
+#### PushNotificationQueryInfo + +`access_token`: the access token used to send a push notification + +`installation_id`: the `installation_id` of the device associated with the `access_token`. + +`public_key`: the `SHAKE-256` of the public key associated with this `access_token` +and `installation_id`. + +`allowed_key_list`: a list of encrypted access tokens to be returned +to the client in case there’s any filtering on public keys in place. + +`grant`: the grant used to register with this server. + +`version`: the version of the registration on the server. + +`server_public_key`: the compressed public key of the server. + +#### PushNotificationQueryResponse + +`info`: a list of `PushNotificationQueryInfo`. + +`message_id`: the message id of the `PushNotificationQueryInfo` +the server is replying to. + +`success`: whether the query was successful. + +#### PushNotification + +`access_token`: the access token used to send a push notification. +`chat_id`: the `SHAKE-256` of the `chat_id`. +`public_key`: the `SHAKE-256` of the compressed public key of the receiving client. +`installation_id`: the `installation_id` of the receiving client. +`message`: the encrypted message that is being notified on. +`type`: the type of the push notification, either `MESSAGE` or `MENTION` `author`: the `SHAKE-256` of the public key of the sender Data disclosed + - The `SHAKE-256` hash of the `chat_id` the notification is to be sent for - The cypher text of the message @@ -498,55 +638,75 @@ Data disclosed - The type of notification -#### PushNotificationRequest: -`requests`: a list of PushNotification
+#### PushNotificationRequest + +`requests`: a list of PushNotification `message_id`: the [Status message id](../62/payloads.md) Data disclosed + - The status `message_id` for which the notification is for -#### PushNotificationResponse: -`message_id`: the `message_id` being notified on.
+#### PushNotificationResponse + +`message_id`: the `message_id` being notified on. `reports`: a list of `PushNotificationReport` -#### PushNotificationReport: -`success`: whether the push notification was successful.
-`error`: the type of the error in case of failure.
-`public_key`: the public key of the user being notified.
+#### PushNotificationReport + +`success`: whether the push notification was successful. +`error`: the type of the error in case of failure. +`public_key`: the public key of the user being notified. `installation_id`: the `installation_id` of the user being notified. ### Anonymous Mode -In order to preserve privacy, the client MAY provide anonymous mode of operations to propagate information about the user. -A client in anonymous mode can register with the server using a key that is different from their chat key. -This will hide their real chat key. This public key is effectively a secret and -SHOULD only be disclosed to clients approved to notify a user. -- A client MAY advertise the access token on the [contact-code topic](../../waku/standards/application/53/x3dh.md) of the key generated. +In order to preserve privacy, the client MAY provide anonymous mode of operations +to propagate information about the user. +A client in anonymous mode can register with the server +using a key that is different from their chat key. +This will hide their real chat key. This public key is effectively a secret and +SHOULD only be disclosed to clients approved to notify a user. + +- A client MAY advertise the access token on the +[contact-code topic](../../waku/standards/application/53/x3dh.md) +of the key generated. -- A client MAY share their public key contact updates in the [protobuf record](https://developers.google.com/protocol-buffers/). +- A client MAY share their public key contact updates in the +[protobuf record](https://developers.google.com/protocol-buffers/). -- A client receiving a push notification public key SHOULD listen to the contact code topic of the push notification public key for updates. +- A client receiving a push notification public key +SHOULD listen to the contact code topic of the push notification public key for updates. -The method described above effectively does not share the identity of the sender nor the receiver to the server, but -MAY result in missing push notifications as the propagation of the secret is left to the client. -This can be mitigated by [device syncing](../62/payloads.md), but not completely addressed. +The method described above effectively does not share the identity of the sender +nor the receiver to the server, but +MAY result in missing push notifications +as the propagation of the secret is left to the client. +This can be mitigated by [device syncing](../62/payloads.md), +but not completely addressed. ## Security/Privacy Considerations -If anonymous mode is not used, when registering with a push notification service a client will disclose: + +If anonymous mode is not used, +when registering with a push notification service a client will disclose: + - The devices that will receive notifications. - The chat key. A client MAY disclose: + - The hash of the `chat_id` they want to filter out. -When running in anonymous mode, the client’s chat key is not disclosed. +When running in anonymous mode, the client’s chat key is not disclosed. When querying a push notification server a client will disclose: -- That it is interested in sending push notification to another client, but -querying client’s chat key is not disclosed. + +- That it is interested in sending push notification to another client, +but querying client’s chat key is not disclosed. When sending a push notification a client will disclose: + - The `shake-256` of the `chat_id`. ## Copyright @@ -554,6 +714,7 @@ When sending a push notification a client will disclose: Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). ## References + 1. [PUSH-NOTIFICATION-SERVER, Initial Specification](https://github.com/status-im/specs/blob/master/docs/raw/push-notification-server.md) 2. [Push Notification, Apple Developer](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/NetworkingInternet/Conceptual/RemoteNotificationsPG/APNSOverview.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/TP40008194-CH8-SW1) 3. [Firebase](https://firebase.google.com) diff --git a/status/raw/simple-scaling.md b/status/raw/simple-scaling.md index 52b3a0a64..8686981de 100644 --- a/status/raw/simple-scaling.md +++ b/status/raw/simple-scaling.md @@ -13,48 +13,68 @@ contributors: ## Abstract -This document describes how to scale [56/STATUS-COMMUNITIES](../56/communities.md) as well as [55/STATUS-1TO1-CHAT](../55/1to1-chat.md) +This document describes how to scale +[56/STATUS-COMMUNITIES](../56/communities.md) as well as [55/STATUS-1TO1-CHAT](../55/1to1-chat.md) using Waku v2 protocol and components. -It also adds a few new aspects, where more sophisticated components are not yet researched and evaluated. - -> *Note:* (Parts of) this RFC will be deprecated in the future as we continue research to scale specific components -in a way that aligns better with our principles of decentralization and protecting anonymity. -This document informs about scaling at the current stage of research and shows it is practically possible. +It also adds a few new aspects, +where more sophisticated components are not yet researched and evaluated. + +> *Note:* (Parts of) this RFC will be deprecated in the future +as we continue research to scale specific components +in a way that aligns better with our principles of decentralization and +protecting anonymity. +This document informs about scaling at the current stage of research and +shows it is practically possible. Practical feasibility is also a core goal for us. -We believe in incremental improvement, i.e. having a working decentralized scaling solution with trade-offs is better than a fully centralized solution. +We believe in incremental improvement, i.e. +having a working decentralized scaling solution with trade-offs +is better than a fully centralized solution. ## Background and Motivation -[56/STATUS-COMMUNITIES](../56/communities.md) as well as [55/STATUS-1TO1-CHAT](../55/1to1-chat.md) use Waku v2 protocols. -Both use Waku content topics (see [23/WAKU2-TOPICS](../../waku/informational/23/topics.md)) for content based filtering. +[56/STATUS-COMMUNITIES](../56/communities.md) as well as +[55/STATUS-1TO1-CHAT](../55/1to1-chat.md) use Waku v2 protocols. +Both use Waku content topics +(see [23/WAKU2-TOPICS](../../waku/informational/23/topics.md)) +for content based filtering. Waku v2 currently has scaling limitations in two dimensions: -1) Messages that are part of a specific content topic have to be disseminated in a single mesh network (i.e. pubsub topic). +1) Messages that are part of a specific content topic +have to be disseminated in a single mesh network (i.e. pubsub topic). This limits scaling the number of messages disseminated in a specific content topic, and by extension, the number of active nodes that are part of this content topic. -2) Scaling a large set of content topics requires distributing these over several mesh networks (which this document refers to as pubsub topic shards). +2) Scaling a large set of content topics requires distributing these over several +mesh networks (which this document refers to as pubsub topic shards). This document focuses on the second scaling dimension. With the scaling solutions discussed in this document, -each content topics can have a large set of active users, but still has to fit in a single pubsub mesh. +each content topics can have a large set of active users, +but still has to fit in a single pubsub mesh. > *Note:* While it is possible to use the same content topic name on several shards, -each node that is interested in this content topic has to be subscribed to all respective shards, which does not scale. -Splitting content topics in a more sophisticated and efficient way will be part of a future document. +each node that is interested in this content topic +has to be subscribed to all respective shards, which does not scale. +Splitting content topics in a more sophisticated and +efficient way will be part of a future document. ## Relay Shards -Sharding the [11/WAKU2-RELAY](../../waku/standards/core/11/relay.md) network is an integral part of scaling the Status app. +Sharding the [11/WAKU2-RELAY](../../waku/standards/core/11/relay.md) +network is an integral part of scaling the Status app. -[51/WAKU2-RELAY-SHARDING](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/waku-RFC/standards/core/relay-sharding.md) specifies shards clusters, which are sets of `1024` shards (separate pubsub mesh networks). +[51/WAKU2-RELAY-SHARDING](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/waku-RFC/standards/core/relay-sharding.md) +specifies shards clusters, which are sets of `1024` shards +(separate pubsub mesh networks). Content topics specified by application protocols can be distributed over these shards. The Status app protocols are assigned to shard cluster `16`, as defined in [WAKU2-RELAY-STATIC-SHARD-ALLOC](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/waku-RFC/informational/relay-static-shard-alloc.md). -[WAKU2-RELAY-SHARDING](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/waku-RFC/standards/core/relay-sharding.md) specifies three sharding methods. -This document uses *static sharding*, which leaves the distribution of content topics to application protocols, +[WAKU2-RELAY-SHARDING](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/waku-RFC/standards/core/relay-sharding.md) +specifies three sharding methods. +This document uses *static sharding*, +which leaves the distribution of content topics to application protocols, but takes care of shard discovery. The 1024 shards within the main Status shard cluster are allocated as follows. @@ -77,24 +97,27 @@ an example for the shard with index `18` in the Status shard cluster: `/waku/2/rs/16/18` -In other words, the mesh network with the pubsub topic name `/waku/2/rs/16/18` carries messages associated with shard `18` in the Status shard cluster. +In other words, the mesh network with the pubsub topic name `/waku/2/rs/16/18`, +carries messages associated with shard `18` in the Status shard cluster. #### Implementation Suggestion -The Waku implementation should offer an interface that allows Status nodes to subscribe to Status specific content topics like +The Waku implementation should offer an interface that +allows Status nodes to subscribe to Status specific content topics like -``` +```yaml subscribe("/status/xyz", 16, 18) ``` The shard cluster index `16` can be kept in the Status app configuration, so that Status nodes can simply use -``` +```yaml subscribe("/status/xyz", 18) ``` -which means: connect to the `"status/xyz"` content topic on shard `18` within the Status shard cluster. +which means: connect to the `"status/xyz"` content topic on shard `18` +within the Status shard cluster. ### Status Communities @@ -135,31 +158,37 @@ message CommunityDescription { > *Note*: Currently, Status app has allocated shared cluster `16` in [52/WAKU2-RELAY-STATIC-SHARD-ALLOC](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/waku-RFC/informational/relay-static-shard-alloc.md). Status app could allocate more shard clusters, for instance to establish a test net. We could add the shard cluster index to the community description as well. -The recommendation for now is to keep it as a configuration option of the Status app. - -> *Note*: Once this RFC moves forward, the new community description protobuf fields should be mentioned in [56/STATUS-COMMUNITIES](../56/communities.md). +The recommendation for now, +is to keep it as a configuration option of the Status app. +> *Note*: Once this RFC moves forward, +the new community description protobuf fields should be mentioned in [56/STATUS-COMMUNITIES](../56/communities.md). Status communities can be mapped to shards in two ways: static, and owner-based. #### Static Mapping -With static mapping, communities are assigned a specific shard index within the Status shard cluster. +With static mapping, +communities are assigned a specific shard index within the Status shard cluster. This mapping is similar in nature to the shard cluster allocation in [WAKU2-RELAY-STATIC-SHARD-ALLOC](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/waku-RFC/informational/relay-static-shard-alloc.md). Shard indices allocated in that way are in the range `16 - 127`. -The Status CC community uses index `16` (not to confuse with shard cluster index `16`, which is the Status shard cluster). +The Status CC community uses index `16` +(not to confuse with shard cluster index `16`, which is the Status shard cluster). #### Owner Mapping > *Note*: This way of mapping will be specified post-MVP. -Community owners can choose to map their communities to any shard within the index range `128 - 767`. +Community owners can choose to map their communities to any shard within +the index range `128 - 767`. ### 1:1 Chat -[55/STATUS-1TO1-CHAT](../55/1to1-chat.md) uses partitioned topics to map 1:1 chats to a set of 5000 content topics. -This document extends this mapping to 8192 content topics that are, in turn, mapped to 128 shards in the index range of `768 - 895`. +[55/STATUS-1TO1-CHAT](../55/1to1-chat.md) +uses partitioned topics to map 1:1 chats to a set of 5000 content topics. +This document extends this mapping to 8192 content topics that are, in turn, +mapped to 128 shards in the index range of `768 - 895`. -``` +```js contentPartitionsNum = 8192 contentPartition = mod(publicKey, contentPartitionsNum) partitionContentTopic = "contact-discovery-" + contentPartition @@ -175,74 +204,94 @@ shardIndex = 768 + mod(publicKey, shardNum) As described in [30/ADAPTIVE-NODES](../../waku/informational/30/adaptive-nodes.md), Waku supports a continuum of node types with respect to available resources. -Infrastructure nodes are powerful nodes that have a high bandwidth connection and a high up-time. +Infrastructure nodes are powerful nodes that have a high bandwidth connection and +a high up-time. This document, which informs about simple ways of scaling Status over Waku, assumes the presence of a set of such infrastructure nodes in each shard. -Infrastructure nodes are especially important for providing connectivity in the roll-out phase. +Infrastructure nodes are especially important for +providing connectivity in the roll-out phase. -Infrastructure nodes are not limited to Status fleets, or nodes run by community owners. +Infrastructure nodes are not limited to Status fleets, or +nodes run by community owners. Anybody can run infrastructure nodes. ### Statically-Mapped Communities -Infrastructure nodes are provided by the community owner, or by members of the respective community. +Infrastructure nodes are provided by the community owner, +or by members of the respective community. ### Owner-Mapped Communities Infrastructure nodes are part of a subset of the shards in the range `128 - 767`. -Recommendations on choosing this subset will be added in a future version of this document. +Recommendations on choosing this subset will be added +in a future version of this document. Status fleet nodes make up a part of these infrastructure nodes. ### 1:1 chat -Infrastructure nodes are part of a subset of the shards in the range `768 - 985` (similar to owner-mapped communities). -Recommendations on choosing this subset will be added in a future version of this document. +Infrastructure nodes are part of a subset of the shards in the range `768 - 985` +(similar to owner-mapped communities). +Recommendations on choosing this subset will be added +in a future version of this document. Desktop clients can choose to only use filter and lightpush. > *Note*: Discussion: I'd suggest to set this as the default for the MVP. -The load on infrastructure nodes would not be higher, because they have to receive and relay each message anyways. +The load on infrastructure nodes would not be higher, because +they have to receive and relay each message anyways. This comes as a trade-off to anonymity and decentralization, but can significantly improve scaling. -We still have k-anonymity because several chat pairs are mapped into one content topic. -We could improve on this in the future, and research the applicability of PIR (private information retrieval) techniques in the future. +We still have k-anonymity because +several chat pairs are mapped into one content topic. +We could improve on this in the future, and research the applicability of PIR +(private information retrieval) techniques in the future. ## Infrastructure Shards -Waku messages are typically relayed in larger mesh networks comprised of nodes with varying resource profiles (see [30/ADAPTIVE-NODES](../../waku/informational/30/adaptive-nodes.md). -To maximise scaling, relaying of specific message types can be dedicated to shards where only infrastructure nodes with very strong resource profiles relay messages. +Waku messages are typically relayed in larger mesh networks +comprised of nodes with varying resource profiles +(see [30/ADAPTIVE-NODES](../../waku/informational/30/adaptive-nodes.md)). +To maximise scaling, relaying of specific message types can be dedicated to shards +where only infrastructure nodes with very strong resource profiles relay messages. This comes as a trade-off to decentralization. ## Control Message Shards To get the maximum scaling for select large communities for the Status scaling MVP, -specific control messages that cause significant load (at a high user number) SHOULD be moved to a separate control message shard. +specific control messages that cause significant load +(at a high user number) SHOULD be moved to a separate control message shard. These control messages comprise: * community description -* membership update +* membership update * backup * community request to join response * sync profile picture -The relay functionality of control messages shards SHOULD be provided by infrastructure nodes. +The relay functionality of control messages shards SHOULD +be provided by infrastructure nodes. Desktop clients should use light protocols as the default for control message shards. Strong Desktop clients MAY opt in to support the relay network. -Each large community (in the index range of `16 - 127`) can get its dedicated control message shard (in the index range `896 - 1023`) if deemed necessary. +Each large community (in the index range of `16 - 127`) +can get its dedicated control message shard +(in the index range `896 - 1023`) if deemed necessary. The Status CC community uses shard `896` as its control message shard. -This comes with trade-offs to decentralization and anonymity (see *Security Considerations* section). +This comes with trade-offs to decentralization and anonymity +(see *Security Considerations* section). ## Media Shards -Similar to control messages, media-heavy communities should use separate media shards (in the index range `896 - 1023`) for disseminating messages with large media data. +Similar to control messages, media-heavy communities should use separate media shards +(in the index range `896 - 1023`) for disseminating messages with large media data. The Status CC community uses shard `897` as its media shard. ## Infrastructure-focused Community -Large communities MAY choose to mainly rely on infrastructure nodes for *all* message transfers (not limited to control, and media messages). +Large communities MAY choose to mainly rely on infrastructure nodes +for *all* message transfers (not limited to control, and media messages). Desktop clients of such communities should use light protocols as the default. Strong Desktop clients MAY opt in to support the relay network. @@ -254,24 +303,29 @@ Light protocols may be used to save bandwidth, at the (global) cost of not contributing to the network. Using light protocols is RECOMMENDED for resource restricted nodes, e.g. browsers, -and devices that (temporarily) have a low bandwidth connection or a connection with usage-based billing. +and devices that (temporarily) +have a low bandwidth connection or a connection with usage-based billing. Light protocols comprise * [19/WAKU2-LIGHTPUSH](../../waku/standards/core/19/lightpush.md) for sending messages -* [12/WAKU2-FILTER](../../waku/standards/core/12/filter.md) for requesting messages with specific attributes -* [WAKU2-PEER-EXCHANGE](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/waku-RFC/standards/core/peer-exchange/peer-exchange.md) for discovering peers +* [12/WAKU2-FILTER](../../waku/standards/core/12/filter.md) +for requesting messages with specific attributes +* [WAKU2-PEER-EXCHANGE](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/waku-RFC/standards/core/peer-exchange/peer-exchange.md) +for discovering peers ## Waku Archive -Archive nodes are Waku nodes that offer the Waku archive service via the Waku store protocol ([13/WAKU2-STORE](../../waku/standards/core/13/store.md)). +Archive nodes are Waku nodes that offer the Waku archive service via +the Waku store protocol ([13/WAKU2-STORE](../../waku/standards/core/13/store.md)). They are part of a set of shards and store all messages disseminated in these shards. Nodes can request history messages via the [13/WAKU2-STORE](../../waku/standards/core/13/store.md). The store service is not limited to a Status fleet. Anybody can run a Waku Archive node in the Status shards. -> *Note*: There is no specification for discovering archive nodes associated with specific shards yet. +> *Note*: There is no specification for discovering archive nodes +associated with specific shards yet. Nodes expect archive nodes to store all messages, regardless of shard association. The recommendation for the allocation of archive nodes to shards is similar to the @@ -281,34 +335,45 @@ In fact, the archive service can be offered by infrastructure nodes. ## Discovery Shard discovery is covered by [WAKU2-RELAY-SHARDING](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/waku-RFC/standards/core/relay-sharding.md). -This allows the Status app to abstract from the discovery process and simply address shards by their index. +This allows the Status app to abstract from the discovery process and +simply address shards by their index. ### Libp2p Rendezvous and Circuit-Relay To make nodes behind restrictive NATs discoverable, this document suggests using [libp2p rendezvous](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/rendezvous/README.md). -Nodes can check whether they are behind a restrictive NAT using the [libp2p AutoNAT protocol](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/autonat/README.md). - -> *Note:* The following will move into [WAKU2-RELAY-SHARDING](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/waku-RFC/standards/core/relay-sharding.md), or [33/WAKU2-DISCV5](../../waku/standards/core/33/discv5.md): -Nodes behind restrictive NATs SHOULD not announce their publicly unreachable address via [33/WAKU2-DISCV5](../../waku/standards/core/33/discv5.md) discovery. - -It is RECOMMENDED that nodes that are part of the relay network also act as rendezvous points. -This includes accepting register queries from peers, as well as answering rendezvous discover queries. +Nodes can check whether they are behind a restrictive NAT using the +[libp2p AutoNAT protocol](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/autonat/README.md). + +> *Note:* The following will move into [WAKU2-RELAY-SHARDING](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/waku-RFC/standards/core/relay-sharding.md), +or [33/WAKU2-DISCV5](../../waku/standards/core/33/discv5.md): +Nodes behind restrictive NATs SHOULD not announce their publicly unreachable address +via [33/WAKU2-DISCV5](../../waku/standards/core/33/discv5.md) discovery. + +It is RECOMMENDED that nodes that are part of the relay network also +act as rendezvous points. +This includes accepting register queries from peers, +as well as answering rendezvous discover queries. Nodes MAY opt-out of the rendezvous functionality. -To allow nodes to initiate connections to peers behind restrictive NATs (after discovery via rendezvous), +To allow nodes to initiate connections to peers behind restrictive NATs +(after discovery via rendezvous), it is RECOMMENDED that nodes that are part of the Waku relay network also offer -[libp2p circuit relay](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/6634ca7abb2f955645243d48d1cd2fd02a8e8880/relay/circuit-v2.md) functionality. +[libp2p circuit relay](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/6634ca7abb2f955645243d48d1cd2fd02a8e8880/relay/circuit-v2.md) +functionality. To minimize the load on circuit-relay nodes, nodes SHOULD 1) make use of the [limiting](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/6634ca7abb2f955645243d48d1cd2fd02a8e8880/relay/circuit-v2.md#reservation) functionality offered by the libp2p circuit relay protocols, and -2) use [DCUtR](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/relay/DCUtR.md) to upgrade to a direct connection. +2) use [DCUtR](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/relay/DCUtR.md) +to upgrade to a direct connection. Nodes that do not announce themselves at all and only plan to use light protocols, MAY use rendezvous discovery instead of or along-side [WAKU2-PEER-EXCHANGE](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/waku-RFC/standards/core/peer-exchange/peer-exchange.md). -For these nodes, rendezvous and [WAKU2-PEER-EXCHANGE](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/waku-RFC/standards/core/peer-exchange/peer-exchange.md) offer the same functionality, +For these nodes, rendezvous and +[WAKU2-PEER-EXCHANGE](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/waku-RFC/standards/core/peer-exchange/peer-exchange.md) +offer the same functionality, but return node sets sampled in different ways. Using both can help increasing connectivity. @@ -321,119 +386,187 @@ Such nodes SHOULD, however, not register at circuit relays. Registering a namespace via [lib-p2p rendezvous](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/rendezvous/README.md#interaction) is done via a register query: -``` +```rs REGISTER{my-app, {QmA, AddrA}} ``` The app name, `my-app` contains the encoding of a single shard in string form: -``` +```rs "rs/"| to_string(<2-byte shard cluster index>) | "/" | to_string(<2-byte shard index>) ``` + The string conversion SHOULD remove leading zeros. -> *Note:* Since the [ns](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/rendezvous/README.md#protobuf) field is of type string, -a more efficient byte encoding is not utilized. +> *Note:* Since the [ns](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/rendezvous/README.md#protobuf) +field is of type string, a more efficient byte encoding is not utilized. -Registering shard 2 in the Status shard cluster (with shard cluster index 16, see [WAKU2-RELAY-STATIC-SHARD-ALLOC](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/waku-RFC/informational/relay-static-shard-alloc.md), +Registering shard 2 in the Status shard cluster (with shard cluster index 16, +see [WAKU2-RELAY-STATIC-SHARD-ALLOC](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/waku-RFC/informational/relay-static-shard-alloc.md), the register query would look like -``` +```rs REGISTER{"rs/16/2", {QmA, AddrA}} ``` -Participation in further shards is registered with further queries; one register query per shard. +Participation in further shards is registered with further queries; +one register query per shard. A discovery query for nodes that are part of this shard would look like -``` +```rs DISCOVER{ns: "rs/16/2"} ``` ## DoS Protection -Hereunder we describe the "opt-in message signing for DoS prevention" solution, designed *ad hoc* for Status MVP. - -Since publishing messages to pubsub topics has no limits, anyone can publish messages at a very high rate and DoS the network. -This would elevate the bandwidth consumption of all nodes subscribed to said pubsub topic, making it prohibitive (in terms of bandwidth) to be subscribed to it. -In order to scale, we need some mechanism to prevent this from happening, otherwise all scaling efforts will be in vain. -Since RLN is not ready yet, hereunder we describe a simpler approach designed *ad hoc* for Status use case, feasible to implement for the MVP and that validates some of the ideas that will evolve to solutions such as RLN. - -With this approach, certain pubsub topics can be optionally configured to only accept messages signed with a given key, that only trusted entities know. -This key can be pre-shared among a set of participants, that are trusted to make fair usage of the network, publishing messages at a reasonable rate/size. -Note that this key can be shared/reused among multiple participants, and only one key is whitelisted per pubsub topic. -This is an opt-in solution that operators can choose to deploy in their shards (i.e. pubsub topics), but it's not enforced in the default one. -Operators can freely choose how they want to generate, and distribute the public keys. It's also their responsibility to handle the private key, sharing it with only trusted parties and keeping proper custody of it. +Hereunder we describe the "opt-in message signing for DoS prevention" solution, +designed *ad hoc* for Status MVP. + +Since publishing messages to pubsub topics has no limits, +anyone can publish messages at a very high rate and DoS the network. +This would elevate the bandwidth consumption of all nodes subscribed +to said pubsub topic, making it prohibitive (in terms of bandwidth) +to be subscribed to it. +In order to scale, we need some mechanism to prevent this from happening, +otherwise all scaling efforts will be in vain. +Since RLN is not ready yet, +hereunder we describe a simpler approach designed *ad hoc* for Status use case, +feasible to implement for the MVP and +that validates some of the ideas that will evolve to solutions such as RLN. + +With this approach, certain pubsub topics can be optionally configured +to only accept messages signed with a given key, +that only trusted entities know. +This key can be pre-shared among a set of participants, +that are trusted to make fair usage of the network, +publishing messages at a reasonable rate/size. +Note that this key can be shared/reused among multiple participants, and +only one key is whitelisted per pubsub topic. +This is an opt-in solution that operators can choose to deploy in their shards +(i.e. pubsub topics), but it's not enforced in the default one. +Operators can freely choose how they want to generate, and +distribute the public keys. +It's also their responsibility to handle the private key, +sharing it with only trusted parties and keeping proper custody of it. The following concepts are introduced: -* `private-key-topic`: A private key of 32 bytes, that allows the holder to sign messages and it's mapped to a `protected-pubsub-topic`. -* `app-message-hash`: Application `WakuMessage` hash, calculated as `sha256(concat(pubsubTopic, payload, contentTopic, timestamp, ephemeral))` with all elements in bytes. -* `message-signature`: ECDSA signature of `application-message-hash` using a given `private-key-topic`, 64 bytes. + +* `private-key-topic`: A private key of 32 bytes, +that allows the holder to sign messages and it's mapped to a `protected-pubsub-topic`. +* `app-message-hash`: Application `WakuMessage` hash, +calculated as `sha256(concat(pubsubTopic, payload, contentTopic, timestamp, ephemeral))` + with all elements in bytes. +* `message-signature`: ECDSA signature of `application-message-hash` +using a given `private-key-topic`, 64 bytes. * `public-key-topic`: The equivalent public key of `private-key-topic`. -* `protected-pubsub-topic`: Pubsub topic that only accepts messages that were signed with `private-key-topic`, where `verify(message-signature, app-message-hash, public-key-topic)` is only correct if the `message-signature` was produced by `private-key-topic`. See ECDSA signature verification algorithm. +* `protected-pubsub-topic`: Pubsub topic that only accepts messages + that were signed with `private-key-topic`, +where `verify(message-signature, app-message-hash, public-key-topic)` +is only correct if the `message-signature` was produced by `private-key-topic`. +See ECDSA signature verification algorithm. This solution introduces two roles: -* Publisher: A node that knows the `private-key-topic` associated to `public-key-topic`, that can publish messages with a valid `message-signature` that are accepted and relayed by the nodes implementing this feature. -* Relayer: A node that knows the `public-key-topic`, which can be used to verify if the messages were signed with the equivalent `private-key-topic`. It allows distinguishing valid from invalid messages which protect the node against DoS attacks, assuming that the users of the key send messages of a reasonable size and rate. Note that a node can validate messages and relay them or not without knowing the private key. + +* Publisher: A node that knows the `private-key-topic` associated to `public-key-topic`, +that can publish messages with a valid `message-signature` that are accepted and +relayed by the nodes implementing this feature. +* Relayer: A node that knows the `public-key-topic`, +which can be used to verify if the messages were signed with the equivalent `private-key-topic`. +It allows distinguishing valid from invalid messages +which protect the node against DoS attacks, +assuming that the users of the key send messages of a reasonable size and rate. +Note that a node can validate messages and +relay them or not without knowing the private key. ### Design requirements (publisher) -A publisher that wants to send messages that are relayed in the network for a given `protected-pubsub-topic` shall: -* be able to sign messages with the `private-key-topic` configured for that topic, producing a ECDSA signature of 64 bytes using deterministic signing complying with RFC 6979. -* include the signature of the `app-message-hash` (`message-signature`) that wishes to send in the `WakuMessage` `meta` field. +A publisher that wants to send messages +that are relayed in the network for a given `protected-pubsub-topic` shall: -The `app-message-hash` of the message shall be calculated as the `sha256` hash of the following fields of the message: +* be able to sign messages with the `private-key-topic` configured for that topic, +producing a ECDSA signature of 64 bytes using +deterministic signing complying with RFC 6979. +* include the signature of the `app-message-hash` (`message-signature`) +that wishes to send in the `WakuMessage` `meta` field. -``` +The `app-message-hash` of the message shall be calculated as the `sha256` hash +of the following fields of the message: + +```rs sha256(concat(pubsubTopic, payload, contentTopic, timestamp, ephemeral)) ``` -Where fields are serialized into bytes using little-endian. Note that `ephemeral` is a boolean that is serialized to `0` if `false` and `1` if `true`. +Where fields are serialized into bytes using little-endian. +Note that `ephemeral` is a boolean that is serialized to `0` if `false` and +`1` if `true`. ### Design requirements (relay) Requirements for the relay are listed below: -* A valid `protected-pubsub-topic` shall be configured with a `public-key-topic`, (derived from a `private-key-topic`). Note that the relay does not need to know the private key. -For simplicity, there is just one key per topic. Since this approach has clear privacy implications, this configuration is not part of the waku protocol, but of the application. +* A valid `protected-pubsub-topic` shall be configured with a `public-key-topic`, +(derived from a `private-key-topic`). + Note that the relay does not need to know the private key. +For simplicity, there is just one key per topic. +Since this approach has clear privacy implications, +this configuration is not part of the waku protocol, but of the application. Requirements on the gossipsub validator: -* Relay nodes should use the existing gossipsub validators that allow to `Accept` or `Reject` messages, according to the following criteria: + +* Relay nodes should use the existing gossipsub validators that allow to `Accept` +or `Reject` messages, according to the following criteria: * If `timestamp` is not set (equals to 0) then `Reject` the message. -* If the `timestamp` is `abs(current_timestamp-timestamp) > MessageWindowInSec` then `Reject` the message. +* If the `timestamp` is `abs(current_timestamp-timestamp) > MessageWindowInSec` +then `Reject` the message. * If `meta` is empty, `Reject` the message. * If `meta` exists but its size is different than 64 bytes, `Reject` the message. -* If `meta` does not successfully verifies according to the ECDSA signature verification algorithm using `public-key-topic` and `app-message-hash`, then `Reject` the message. +* If `meta` does not successfully verifies according to the ECDSA signature +verification algorithm using `public-key-topic` and `app-message-hash`, +then `Reject` the message. * If and only if all above conditions are met then `Accept` the message. Other requirements: -* The node shall keep metrics on the messages validation output, `Accept` or `Reject`. -* (Optional). To further strengthen DoS protection, gossipsub [scoring](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/gossipsub/gossipsub-v1.1.md#extended-validators) can be used to trigger disconnections from peers sending multiple invalid messages. See `P4` penalty. -This protects each peer from DoS, since this score is used to trigger disconnections from nodes attempting to DoS them. +* The node shall keep metrics on the messages validation output, +`Accept` or `Reject`. +* (Optional). To further strengthen DoS protection, +gossipsub [scoring](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/gossipsub/gossipsub-v1.1.md#extended-validators) +can be used to trigger disconnections from peers sending multiple invalid messages. +See `P4` penalty. +This protects each peer from DoS, +since this score is used to trigger disconnections from nodes attempting to DoS them. ### Required changes -This solution is designed to be backward compatible so that nodes validating messages can coexist in the same topic with other nodes that don't perform validation. But note that only nodes that perform message validation will be protected against DoS. Nodes wishing to opt-in this DoS protection feature shall: -* Generate a `private-key-topic` and distribute it to a curated list of users, that are trusted to send messages at a reasonable rate. -* Redeploy the nodes, adding a new configuration where a `protected-pubsub-topic` is configured with a `public-key-topic`, used to verify the messages being relayed. +This solution is designed to be backward compatible so +that nodes validating messages can coexist in the same topic +with other nodes that don't perform validation. +But note that only nodes that perform message validation +will be protected against DoS. +Nodes wishing to opt-in this DoS protection feature shall: +* Generate a `private-key-topic` and distribute it to a curated list of users, +that are trusted to send messages at a reasonable rate. +* Redeploy the nodes, adding a new configuration +where a `protected-pubsub-topic` is configured with a `public-key-topic`, +used to verify the messages being relayed. ### Test vectors -Relay nodes complying with this specification shall accept the following message in the configured pubsub topic. +Relay nodes complying with this specification +shall accept the following message in the configured pubsub topic. Given the following key pair: -``` +```js private-key-topic = 5526a8990317c9b7b58d07843d270f9cd1d9aaee129294c1c478abf7261dd9e6 public-key-topic = 049c5fac802da41e07e6cdf51c3b9a6351ad5e65921527f2df5b7d59fd9b56ab02bab736cdcfc37f25095e78127500da371947217a8cd5186ab890ea866211c3f6 ``` - And the following message to send: -``` +```js protected-pubsub-topic = pubsub-topic contentTopic = content-topic payload = 1A12E077D0E89F9CAC11FBBB6A676C86120B5AD3E248B1F180E98F15EE43D2DFCF62F00C92737B2FF6F59B3ABA02773314B991C41DC19ADB0AD8C17C8E26757B @@ -443,19 +576,22 @@ ephemeral = true The message hash and meta (aka signature) are calculated as follows. -``` +```js app-message-hash = 662F8C20A335F170BD60ABC1F02AD66F0C6A6EE285DA2A53C95259E7937C0AE9 message.meta = 127FA211B2514F0E974A055392946DC1A14052182A6ABEFB8A6CD7C51DA1BF2E40595D28EF1A9488797C297EED3AAC45430005FB3A7F037BDD9FC4BD99F59E63 ``` -Using `message.meta`, the relay node shall calculate the `app-message-hash` of the received message using `public-key-topic`, and with the values above, the signature should be verified, making the node `Accept` the message and relaying it to other nodes in the network. +Using `message.meta`, the relay node shall calculate the `app-message-hash` +of the received message using `public-key-topic`, +and with the values above, the signature should be verified, +making the node `Accept` the message and relaying it to other nodes in the network. -## Owner-Mapped Communities +## Owner Mapped Communities Basic idea: Tokenized load. -### 1:1 Chat +### 1 to 1 Chat An idea we plan to explore in the future: Map 1:1 chats to community shards, if both A and B are part of the respective community. @@ -466,7 +602,8 @@ It could be rate-limited with RLN. This document makes several trade-offs to privacy and anonymity. Todo: elaborate. -See [WAKU2-ADVERSARIAL-MODELS](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/waku-RFC/informational/adversarial-models.md) for information on Waku Anonymity. +See [WAKU2-ADVERSARIAL-MODELS](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/waku-RFC/informational/adversarial-models.md) +for information on Waku Anonymity. ## Copyright @@ -496,5 +633,6 @@ Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/public * [WAKU2-ADVERSARIAL-MODELS](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/waku-RFC/informational/adversarial-models.md) ## Informative + * [Circuit Relay](https://docs.libp2p.io/concepts/nat/circuit-relay/) * [WAKU2-ENR](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/waku-RFC/standards/core/enr.md) diff --git a/status/raw/status-mvds.md b/status/raw/status-mvds.md index c6aa8ac74..465d36e93 100644 --- a/status/raw/status-mvds.md +++ b/status/raw/status-mvds.md @@ -10,20 +10,26 @@ contributors: ## Abstract -This document lists the types of messages that are using [MVDS](/vac/2/mvds.md) in the Status application. +This document lists the types of messages that are using [MVDS](/vac/2/mvds.md) +in the Status application. ## Background -Status app uses MVDS to ensure messages going through Waku are acknolwedged by the recipient. This is to ensure that the messages are not missed by any interested parties. - +Status app uses MVDS to ensure messages going through Waku +are acknolwedged by the recipient. +This is to ensure that the messages are not missed by any interested parties. ## Message types -Various Message Types contain distinct information defined by the app to facilitate convenient serialization and deserialization. +Various Message Types contain distinct information defined by the app +to facilitate convenient serialization and deserialization. -E2E reliability is a feature that ensures messages are delivered to the recipient. This is initially achieved by using MVDS in Status. +E2E reliability is a feature that ensures messages are delivered to the recipient. +This is initially achieved by using MVDS in Status. -Chat Type specifies the category of chat that a message belongs to. It can be OneToOne (aka Direct Message), GroupChat, or CommunityChat. These are the three main types of chats in Status. +Chat Type specifies the category of chat that a message belongs to. +It can be OneToOne (aka Direct Message), GroupChat, or CommunityChat. +These are the three main types of chats in Status. | Message Type | Use MVDS | Need e2e reliability | Chat Type | |----------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------| @@ -114,9 +120,6 @@ Chat Type specifies the category of chat that a message belongs to. It can be On | ApplicationMetadataMessage_COMMUNITY_SHARED_ADDRESSES_REQUEST | No | No | CommunityChat | | ApplicationMetadataMessage_COMMUNITY_SHARED_ADDRESSES_RESPONSE | No | No | CommunityChat | - - - ## Copyright Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). diff --git a/status/raw/status-waku-usage.md b/status/raw/status-waku-usage.md index 65be6f5c1..77fad1693 100644 --- a/status/raw/status-waku-usage.md +++ b/status/raw/status-waku-usage.md @@ -12,23 +12,27 @@ contributors: ## Abstract -Status is a chat application which has several features, including, but not limited to - +Status is a chat application which has several features, +including, but not limited to - + - Private 1:1 chats, described by [55/STATUS-1TO1-CHAT](/spec/55) - Large scale group chats, described by [56/STATUS-COMMUNITIES](/spec/56) -This specification describes how a Status implementation will make use of the underlying infrastructure, -Waku, which is described in [10/WAKU2](/spec/10). +This specification describes how a Status implementation will make use of +the underlying infrastructure, Waku, +which is described in [10/WAKU2](/spec/10). -## Background +## Background -The Status application aspires to achieve censorship resistance and incorporates specific privacy features, -leveraging the comprehensive set of protocols offered by Waku to enhance these attributes. -Waku protocols provide secure communication capabilities over decentralized networks. -Once integrated, an application will benefit from privacy-preserving, -censorship resistance and spam protected communcation. +The Status application aspires to achieve censorship resistance and +incorporates specific privacy features, +leveraging the comprehensive set of protocols offered by Waku to enhance these attributes. +Waku protocols provide secure communication capabilities over decentralized networks. +Once integrated, an application will benefit from privacy-preserving, +censorship resistance and spam protected communcation. -Since Status uses a large set of Waku protocols, -it is imperative to describe how each are used. +Since Status uses a large set of Waku protocols, +it is imperative to describe how each are used. ## Terminology @@ -42,23 +46,24 @@ it is imperative to describe how each are used. | Discovery | This refers to a peer discovery method used by a Waku node. | | `Pubsub Topic` / `Content Topic` | This refers to the routing of messages within the Waku network, described in [23/WAKU2-TOPICS](/spec/23/) | -### Waku Node: +### Waku Node Software that is configured with a set of Waku protocols. A Status client comprises of a Waku node that is a `RELAY` node or a non-relay node. +### Light Client -### Light Client: - -A Status client that operates within resource constrained environments is a node configured as light client. +A Status client that operates within resource constrained environments +is a node configured as light client. Light clients do not run a `RELAY`. Instead, Status light clients, can request services from other `RELAY` node that provide `LIGHTPUSH` service. ## Protocol Usage -The key words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL NOT”, “SHOULD”, “SHOULD NOT”, “RECOMMENDED”, -“NOT RECOMMENDED”, “MAY”, and “OPTIONAL” in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC 2119](https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt). +The key words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL NOT”, “SHOULD”, +“SHOULD NOT”, “RECOMMENDED”, “NOT RECOMMENDED”, “MAY”, and +“OPTIONAL” in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC 2119](https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt). The following is a list of Waku Protocols used by a Status application. @@ -66,10 +71,12 @@ The following is a list of Waku Protocols used by a Status application. The `RELAY` MUST NOT be used by Status light clients. The `RELAY` is used to broadcast messages between Status clients. -All Status messages are transformed into [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](/spec/14), which are sent over the wire. +All Status messages are transformed into [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](/spec/14), +which are sent over the wire. All Status message types are described in [62/STATUS-PAYLOAD](/spec/62). -Status Clients MUST transform the following object into a `MESSAGE` as described below - +Status Clients MUST transform the following object into a `MESSAGE` +as described below - ```go @@ -87,14 +94,16 @@ type StatusMessage struct { ``` -1. A user MUST only provide either a Symmetric key OR an Asymmetric keypair to encrypt the message. +1. A user MUST only provide either a Symmetric key OR +an Asymmetric keypair to encrypt the message. If both are received, the implementation MUST throw an error. -2. `WakuMessage.Payload` MUST be set to `StatusMessage.Payload` +2. `WakuMessage.Payload` MUST be set to `StatusMessage.Payload` 3. `WakuMessage.Key` MUST be set to `StatusMessage.SymKey` 4. `WakuMessage.Version` MUST be set to `1` 5. `WakuMessage.Ephemeral` MUST be set to `StatusMessage.Ephemeral` 6. `WakuMessage.ContentTopic` MUST be set to `StatusMessage.ContentTopic` -7. `WakuMessage.Timestamp` MUST be set to the current Unix epoch timestamp (in nanosecond precision) +7. `WakuMessage.Timestamp` MUST be set to the current Unix epoch timestamp +(in nanosecond precision) ### 2. `STORE` @@ -102,36 +111,41 @@ This protocol MUST remain optional according to the user's preferences, it MAY be enabled on Light clients as well. Messages received via [11/WAKU2-RELAY](/spec/11), are stored in a database. -When Waku node running this protocol is service node, +When Waku node running this protocol is service node, it MUST provide the complete list of network messages. Status clients SHOULD request historical messages from this service node. The messages that have the `WakuMessage.Ephemeral` flag set to true will not be stored. -The Status client MAY provide a method to prune the database of older records to save storage. +The Status client MAY provide a method to prune the database of +older records to save storage. ### 3. `FILTER` This protocol SHOULD be enabled on Light clients. -This protocol SHOULD be used to filter messages based on a given criteria, such as the `Content Topic` of a `MESSAGE`. +This protocol SHOULD be used to filter messages based on a given criteria, +such as the `Content Topic` of a `MESSAGE`. This allows a reduction in bandwidth consumption by the Status client. -#### Content filtering protocol identifers: -The `filter-subcribe` SHOULD be implemented on `RELAY` nodes to provide `FILTER` services. +#### Content filtering protocol identifers + +The `filter-subcribe` SHOULD be implemented on `RELAY` nodes +to provide `FILTER` services. `filter-subscribe`: - /vac/waku/filter-subscribe/2.0.0-beta1 +> /vac/waku/filter-subscribe/2.0.0-beta1 The `filter-push` SHOULD be implemented on light clients to receive messages. `filter-push`: - /vac/waku/filter-push/2.0.0-beta1 +> /vac/waku/filter-push/2.0.0-beta1 + +Status clients SHOULD apply a filter for all the `Content Topic` +they are interested in, such as `Content Topic` derived from - -Status clients SHOULD apply a filter for all the `Content Topic` they are interested in, -such as `Content Topic` derived from - 1. 1:1 chats with other users, described in [55/STATUS-1TO1-CHAT](/spec/55) 2. Group chats 3. Community Channels, described in [56/STATUS-COMMUNITIES](/spec/56) @@ -139,11 +153,11 @@ such as `Content Topic` derived from - ### 4. `LIGHTPUSH` The `LIGHTPUSH` protocol MUST be enabled on Status light clients. -A Status `RELAY` node MAY implement `LIGHTPUSH` to support light clients. +A Status `RELAY` node MAY implement `LIGHTPUSH` to support light clients. Peers will be able to publish messages, without running a full-fledged [11/WAKU2-RELAY](/spec/11) protocol. -When a Status client is publishing a message, +When a Status client is publishing a message, it MUST check if Light mode is enabled, and if so, it MUST publish the message via this protocol. @@ -151,21 +165,22 @@ and if so, it MUST publish the message via this protocol. A discovery method MUST be supported by Light clients and Full clients -Status clients SHOULD make use of the following peer discovery methods that are provided by Waku, -such as - +Status clients SHOULD make use of the following peer discovery methods +that are provided by Waku, such as - 1. [EIP-1459: DNS-Based Discovery](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1459) -2. [33/WAKU2-DISCV5](/spec/33): -A node discovery protocol to create decentralized network of interconnected Waku nodes. +2. [33/WAKU2-DISCV5](/spec/33): A node discovery protocol to +create decentralized network of interconnected Waku nodes. 3. [34/WAKU2-PEER-EXCHANGE](/spec/34): A peer discovery protocol for resource restricted devices. -Status clients MAY use any combination of the above peer discovery methods, +Status clients MAY use any combination of the above peer discovery methods, which is suited best for their implementation. ## Security/Privacy Considerations -This specification inherits the security and privacy considerations from the following specifications - +This specification inherits the security and +privacy considerations from the following specifications - 1. [10/WAKU2](/spec/10) 2. [11/WAKU2-RELAY](/spec/11) @@ -187,7 +202,6 @@ Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/public ## References - 1. [55/STATUS-1TO1-CHAT](/spec/55) 2. [56/STATUS-COMMUNITIES](/spec/56) 3. [10/WAKU2](/spec/10) diff --git a/vac/.DS_Store b/vac/.DS_Store new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e7408ba54 Binary files /dev/null and b/vac/.DS_Store differ diff --git a/vac/1/coss.md b/vac/1/coss.md index 0b0f4225c..4af5d751d 100644 --- a/vac/1/coss.md +++ b/vac/1/coss.md @@ -15,36 +15,48 @@ contributors: - Jimmy Debe --- -This document describes a consensus-oriented specification system (COSS) for building interoperable technical specifications. -COSS is based on a lightweight editorial process that seeks to engage the widest possible range of interested parties and move rapidly to consensus through working code. - -This specification is based on [Unprotocols 2/COSS](https://github.com/unprotocols/rfc/blob/master/2/README.md), used by the [ZeromMQ](https://rfc.zeromq.org/) project. +This document describes a consensus-oriented specification system (COSS) +for building interoperable technical specifications. +COSS is based on a lightweight editorial process that +seeks to engage the widest possible range of interested parties and +move rapidly to consensus through working code. + +This specification is based on [Unprotocols 2/COSS](https://github.com/unprotocols/rfc/blob/master/2/README.md), +used by the [ZeromMQ](https://rfc.zeromq.org/) project. It is equivalent except for some areas: -- recommending the use of a permissive licenses, such as CC0 (with the exception of this document); +- recommending the use of a permissive licenses, +such as CC0 (with the exception of this document); - miscellaneous metadata, editor, and format/link updates; - more inheritance from the [IETF Standards Process](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2026.txt), e.g. using RFC categories: Standards Track, Informational, and Best Common Practice; -- standards track specifications SHOULD follow a specific structure that both streamlines editing, - and helps implementers to quickly comprehend the specification +- standards track specifications SHOULD +follow a specific structure that both streamlines editing, +and helps implementers to quickly comprehend the specification - specifications MUST feature a header providing specific meta information - raw specifications will not be assigned numbers -- section explaining the [IFT](https://free.technology/) Request For Comments specification process managed by the Vac service department +- section explaining the [IFT](https://free.technology/) +Request For Comments specification process managed by the Vac service department ## License Copyright (c) 2008-24 the Editor and Contributors. This Specification is free software; -you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the Free Software Foundation; +you can redistribute it and/or +modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License +as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. -This specification is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; -without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. +This specification is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; +without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or +FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License for more details. -You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along with this program; -if not, see http://www.gnu.org/licenses. +You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License +along with this program; +if not, see [gnu.org](http://www.gnu.org/licenses). ## Change Process @@ -52,27 +64,33 @@ This document is governed by the [1/COSS](./coss.md) (COSS). ## Language -The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in +The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", +"SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and +"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC 2119](http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2119). ## Goals -The primary goal of COSS is to facilitate the process of writing, proving, and improving new technical specifications. -A "technical specification" defines a protocol, a process, an API, a use of language, a methodology, -or any other aspect of a technical environment that can usefully be documented for the purposes of technical or social interoperability. +The primary goal of COSS is to facilitate the process of writing, proving, and +improving new technical specifications. +A "technical specification" defines a protocol, a process, an API, a use of language, +a methodology, or any other aspect of a technical environment that +can usefully be documented for the purposes of technical or social interoperability. -COSS is intended to above all be economical and rapid, so that it is useful to small teams with little time to spend on more formal processes. +COSS is intended to above all be economical and rapid, +so that it is useful to small teams with little time to spend on more formal processes. Principles: -* We aim for rough consensus and running code; [inspired by the IETF Tao](https://www.ietf.org/about/participate/tao/). -* Specifications are small pieces, made by small teams. -* Specifications should have a clearly responsible editor. -* The process should be visible, objective, and accessible to anyone. -* The process should clearly separate experiments from solutions. -* The process should allow deprecation of old specifications. +- We aim for rough consensus and running code; [inspired by the IETF Tao](https://www.ietf.org/about/participate/tao/). +- Specifications are small pieces, made by small teams. +- Specifications should have a clearly responsible editor. +- The process should be visible, objective, and accessible to anyone. +- The process should clearly separate experiments from solutions. +- The process should allow deprecation of old specifications. -Specifications should take minutes to explain, hours to design, days to write, weeks to prove, months to become mature, and years to replace. +Specifications should take minutes to explain, hours to design, days to write, +weeks to prove, months to become mature, and years to replace. Specifications have no special status except that accorded by the community. ## Architecture @@ -80,47 +98,54 @@ Specifications have no special status except that accorded by the community. COSS is designed around fast, easy to use communications tools. Primarily, COSS uses a wiki model for editing and publishing specifications texts. -* The *domain* is the conservancy for a set of specifications. -* The *domain* is implemented as an Internet domain. -* Each specification is a document together with references and attached resources. -* A *sub-domain* is a initiative under a specific domain. +- The *domain* is the conservancy for a set of specifications. +- The *domain* is implemented as an Internet domain. +- Each specification is a document together with references and attached resources. +- A *sub-domain* is a initiative under a specific domain. -Individuals can become members of the *domain* by completing the necessary legal clearance. -The copyright, patent, and trademark policies of the domain must be clarified in an Intellectual Property policy that applies to the domain. +Individuals can become members of the *domain* +by completing the necessary legal clearance. +The copyright, patent, and trademark policies of the domain must be clarified +in an Intellectual Property policy that applies to the domain. Specifications exist as multiple pages, one page per version, (discussed below in "Branching and Merging"), which should be assigned URIs that MAY include an number identifier. -Thus, we refer to new specifications by specifying its domain, its sub-domain and short name. +Thus, we refer to new specifications by specifying its domain, +its sub-domain and short name. The syntax for a new specification reference is: // -For example, this specification should be **rfc.vac.dev/vac/COSS**, +For example, this specification should be **rfc.vac.dev/vac/COSS**, if the status were **raw**. - -A number will be assigned to the specification when obtaining **draft** status. + +A number will be assigned to the specification when obtaining **draft** status. New versions of the same specification will be assigned a new number. The syntax for a specification reference is: /// For example, this specification is **rfc.vac.dev/vac/1/COSS**. -The short form **1/COSS** may be used when referring to the specification from other specifications in the same domain. +The short form **1/COSS** may be used when referring to the specification +from other specifications in the same domain. -Specifications (excluding raw specifications) carries a different number including branches. +Specifications (excluding raw specifications) +carries a different number including branches. ## COSS Lifecycle -Every specification has an independent lifecycle that documents clearly its current status. +Every specification has an independent lifecycle that +documents clearly its current status. For a specification to receive a lifecycle status, a new specification SHOULD be presented by the team of the sub-domain. After discussion amongst the contributors has reached a rough consensus, as described in [RFC7282](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7282.html), the specification MAY begin the process to upgrade it's status. -A specification has five possible states that reflect its maturity and contractual weight: +A specification has five possible states that reflect its maturity and +contractual weight: ![Lifecycle diagram](./images/lifecycle.png) @@ -128,12 +153,13 @@ A specification has five possible states that reflect its maturity and contractu All new specifications are **raw** specifications. Changes to raw specifications can be unilateral and arbitrary. -A sub-domain MAY use the **raw** status for new specifications that live under their domain. +A sub-domain MAY use the **raw** status for new specifications +that live under their domain. Raw specifications have no contractual weight. ### Draft Specifications -When raw specifications can be demonstrated, +When raw specifications can be demonstrated, they become **draft** specifications and are assigned numbers. Changes to draft specifications should be done in consultation with users. Draft specifications are contracts between the editors and implementers. @@ -141,72 +167,89 @@ Draft specifications are contracts between the editors and implementers. ### Stable Specifications When draft specifications are used by third parties, they become **stable** specifications. -Changes to stable specifications should be restricted to cosmetic ones, errata and clarifications. +Changes to stable specifications should be restricted to cosmetic ones, +errata and clarifications. Stable specifications are contracts between editors, implementers, and end-users. ### Deprecated Specifications -When stable specifications are replaced by newer draft specifications, they become **deprecated** specifications. -Deprecated specifications should not be changed except to indicate their replacements, if any. +When stable specifications are replaced by newer draft specifications, +they become **deprecated** specifications. +Deprecated specifications should not be changed except +to indicate their replacements, if any. Deprecated specifications are contracts between editors, implementers and end-users. ### Retired Specifications -When deprecated specifications are no longer used in products, they become **retired** specifications. +When deprecated specifications are no longer used in products, +they become **retired** specifications. Retired specifications are part of the historical record. They should not be changed except to indicate their replacements, if any. Retired specifications have no contractual weight. ### Deleted Specifications -Deleted specifications are those that have not reached maturity (stable) and were discarded. +Deleted specifications are those that have not reached maturity (stable) and +were discarded. They should not be used and are only kept for their historical value. Only Raw and Draft specifications can be deleted. - + ## Editorial control A specification MUST have a single responsible editor, -the only person who SHALL change the status of the specification through the lifecycle stages. +the only person who SHALL change the status of the specification +through the lifecycle stages. A specification MAY also have additional contributors who contribute changes to it. It is RECOMMENDED to use a process similar to [C4 process](https://github.com/unprotocols/rfc/blob/master/1/README.md) to maximize the scale and diversity of contributions. -Unlike the original C4 process however, it is RECOMMENDED to use CC0 as a more permissive license alternative. +Unlike the original C4 process however, +it is RECOMMENDED to use CC0 as a more permissive license alternative. We SHOULD NOT use GPL or GPL-like license. One exception is this specification, as this was the original license for this specification. -The editor is responsible for accurately maintaining the state of specifications, -for retiring different versions that may live in other places and +The editor is responsible for accurately maintaining the state of specifications, +for retiring different versions that may live in other places and for handling all comments on the specification. ## Branching and Merging Any member of the domain MAY branch a specification at any point. -This is done by copying the existing text, and creating a new specification with the same name and content, but a new number. +This is done by copying the existing text, and +creating a new specification with the same name and content, but a new number. Since **raw** specifications are not assigned a number, -branching by any member of a sub-domain MAY differentiate specifications based on date, contributors, or +branching by any member of a sub-domain MAY differentiate specifications +based on date, contributors, or version number within the document. The ability to branch a specification is necessary in these circumstances: -* To change the responsible editor for a specification, with or without the cooperation of the current responsible editor. -* To rejuvenate a specification that is stable but needs functional changes. - This is the proper way to make a new version of a specification that is in stable or deprecated status. -* To resolve disputes between different technical opinions. +- To change the responsible editor for a specification, +with or without the cooperation of the current responsible editor. +- To rejuvenate a specification that is stable but needs functional changes. +This is the proper way to make a new version of a specification +that is in stable or deprecated status. +- To resolve disputes between different technical opinions. The responsible editor of a branched specification is the person who makes the branch. -Branches, including added contributions, are derived works and thus licensed under the same terms as the original specification. -This means that contributors are guaranteed the right to merge changes made in branches back into their original specifications. +Branches, including added contributions, are derived works and +thus licensed under the same terms as the original specification. +This means that contributors are guaranteed the right to merge changes made in branches +back into their original specifications. -Technically speaking, a branch is a *different* specification, even if it carries the same name. +Technically speaking, a branch is a *different* specification, +even if it carries the same name. Branches have no special status except that accorded by the community. ## Conflict resolution -COSS resolves natural conflicts between teams and vendors by allowing anyone to define a new specification. -There is no editorial control process except that practised by the editor of a new specification. -The administrators of a domain (moderators) may choose to interfere in editorial conflicts, +COSS resolves natural conflicts between teams and +vendors by allowing anyone to define a new specification. +There is no editorial control process except +that practised by the editor of a new specification. +The administrators of a domain (moderators) +may choose to interfere in editorial conflicts, and may suspend or ban individuals for behaviour they consider inappropriate. ## Specification Structure @@ -214,7 +257,8 @@ and may suspend or ban individuals for behaviour they consider inappropriate. ### Meta Information Specifications MUST contain the following metadata. -It is RECOMMENDED that specification metadata is specified as a YAML header (where possible). +It is RECOMMENDED that specification metadata is specified as a YAML header +(where possible). This will enable programmatic access to specification metadata. | Key | Value | Type | Example | @@ -225,55 +269,60 @@ This will enable programmatic access to specification metadata. | **category** | category | string | Best Current Practice | | **tags** | 0 or several tags | list | waku-application, waku-core-protocol | | **editor** | editor name/email | string | Oskar Thoren | -| **contributors** | contributors | list | - Pieter Hintjens
- André Rebentisch
- Alberto Barrionuevo
- Chris Puttick
- Yurii Rashkovskii | +| **contributors** | contributors | list | - Pieter Hintjens - André Rebentisch - Alberto Barrionuevo - Chris Puttick - Yurii Rashkovskii | ### IFT/Vac RFC Process > [!Note] -This section is introduced to allow contributors to understand the IFT +This section is introduced to allow contributors to understand the IFT (Institute of Free Technology) Vac RFC specification process. Other organizations may make changes to this section according to their needs. -Vac is a department under the IFT organization that provides RFC (Request For Comments) specification services. +Vac is a department under the IFT organization that provides RFC (Request For Comments) +specification services. This service works to help facilitate the RFC process, assuring standards are followed. -Contributors within the service SHOULD assist a *sub-domain* in creating a new specification, -editing a specification, and promoting the status of a specification along with other tasks. +Contributors within the service SHOULD assist a *sub-domain* in creating a new specification, +editing a specification, and +promoting the status of a specification along with other tasks. Once a specification reaches some level of maturity by rough consensus, the specification SHOULD enter the [Vac RFC](rfc.vac.dev) process. -Similar to the IETF working group adoption described in [RFC6174](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6174.html), +Similar to the IETF working group adoption described in [RFC6174](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6174.html), the Vac RFC process SHOULD facilitate all updates to the specification. -Specifications are introduced by projects, +Specifications are introduced by projects, under a specific *domain*, with the intention of becoming technically mature documents. The IFT domain currently houses the following projects: + - [Status](status.app) - [Waku](https://waku.org/) - [Codex](https://codex.storage/) - [Nimbus](https://nimbus.team/) - [Nomos](https://nomos.tech/) -When a specification is promoted to *draft* status, -the number that is assigned MAY be incremental +When a specification is promoted to *draft* status, +the number that is assigned MAY be incremental or by the *sub-domain* and the Vac RFC process. -Standards track specifications MUST be based on the [Vac RFC template](../template.md) before obtaining a new status. +Standards track specifications MUST be based on the +[Vac RFC template](../template.md) before obtaining a new status. All changes, comments, and contributions SHOULD be documented. ## Conventions Where possible editors and contributors are encouraged to: -* Refer to and build on existing work when possible, especially IETF specifications. -* Contribute to existing specifications rather than reinvent their own. -* Use collaborative branching and merging as a tool for experimentation. -* Use Semantic Line Breaks: https://sembr.org/. +- Refer to and build on existing work when possible, especially IETF specifications. +- Contribute to existing specifications rather than reinvent their own. +- Use collaborative branching and merging as a tool for experimentation. +- Use Semantic Line Breaks: [sembr](https://sembr.org/). ## Appendix A. Color Coding -It is RECOMMENDED to use color coding to indicate specification's status. Color coded specifications SHOULD use the following color scheme: +It is RECOMMENDED to use color coding to indicate specification's status. +Color coded specifications SHOULD use the following color scheme: -* ![raw](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/unprotocols/rfc/master/2/raw.svg) -* ![draft](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/unprotocols/rfc/master/2/draft.svg) -* ![stable](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/unprotocols/rfc/master/2/stable.svg) -* ![deprecated](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/unprotocols/rfc/master/2/deprecated.svg) -* ![retired](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/unprotocols/rfc/master/2/retired.svg) -* ![deleted](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/unprotocols/rfc/master/2/deleted.svg) +- ![raw](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/unprotocols/rfc/master/2/raw.svg) +- ![draft](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/unprotocols/rfc/master/2/draft.svg) +- ![stable](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/unprotocols/rfc/master/2/stable.svg) +- ![deprecated](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/unprotocols/rfc/master/2/deprecated.svg) +- ![retired](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/unprotocols/rfc/master/2/retired.svg) +- ![deleted](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/unprotocols/rfc/master/2/deleted.svg) diff --git a/vac/2/mvds.md b/vac/2/mvds.md index 5281bff79..c2a013f10 100644 --- a/vac/2/mvds.md +++ b/vac/2/mvds.md @@ -9,9 +9,14 @@ contributors: - Oskar Thorén --- -In this specification, we describe a minimum viable protocol for data synchronization inspired by the Bramble Synchronization Protocol[^1]. This protocol is designed to ensure reliable messaging between peers across an unreliable peer-to-peer (P2P) network where they may be unreachable or unresponsive. +In this specification, we describe a minimum viable protocol for +data synchronization inspired by the Bramble Synchronization Protocol[^1]. +This protocol is designed to ensure reliable messaging +between peers across an unreliable peer-to-peer (P2P) network where +they may be unreachable or unresponsive. -We present a reference implementation[^2] including a simulation to demonstrate its performance. +We present a reference implementation[^2] +including a simulation to demonstrate its performance. ## Definitions @@ -25,7 +30,11 @@ We present a reference implementation[^2] including a simulation to demonstrate ### Secure Transport -This specification does not define anything related to the transport of packets. It is assumed that this is abstracted in such a way that any secure transport protocol could be easily implemented. Likewise, properties such as confidentiality, integrity, authenticity and forward secrecy are assumed to be provided by a layer below. +This specification does not define anything related to the transport of packets. +It is assumed that this is abstracted in such a way that +any secure transport protocol could be easily implemented. +Likewise, properties such as confidentiality, integrity, authenticity and +forward secrecy are assumed to be provided by a layer below. ### Payloads @@ -50,22 +59,29 @@ message Message { } ``` -*The payload field numbers are kept more "unique" to ensure no overlap with other protocol buffers.* +*The payload field numbers are kept more "unique" to* +*ensure no overlap with other protocol buffers.* Each payload contains the following fields: -- **Acks:** This field contains a list (can be empty) of `message identifiers` informing the recipient that sender holds a specific message. -- **Offers:** This field contains a list (can be empty) of `message identifiers` that the sender would like to give to the recipient. -- **Requests:** This field contains a list (can be empty) of `message identifiers` that the sender would like to receive from the recipient. +- **Acks:** This field contains a list (can be empty) +of `message identifiers` informing the recipient that sender holds a specific message. +- **Offers:** This field contains a list (can be empty) +of `message identifiers` that the sender would like to give to the recipient. +- **Requests:** This field contains a list (can be empty) +of `message identifiers` that the sender would like to receive from the recipient. - **Messages:** This field contains a list of messages (can be empty). -**Message Identifiers:** Each `message` has a message identifier calculated by hashing the `group_id`, `timestamp` and `body` fields as follows: +**Message Identifiers:** Each `message` has a message identifier calculated by +hashing the `group_id`, `timestamp` and `body` fields as follows: -``` +```js HASH("MESSAGE_ID", group_id, timestamp, body); ``` -**Group Identifiers:** Each `message` is assigned into a **group** using the `group_id` field, groups are independent synchronization contexts between peers. +**Group Identifiers:** Each `message` is assigned into a **group** +using the `group_id` field, +groups are independent synchronization contexts between peers. The current `HASH` function used is `sha256`. @@ -73,28 +89,47 @@ The current `HASH` function used is `sha256`. ### State -We refer to `state` as set of records for the types `OFFER`, `REQUEST` and `MESSAGE` that every node SHOULD store per peer. `state` MUST NOT contain `ACK` records as we do not retransmit those periodically. The following information is stored for records: +We refer to `state` as set of records for the types `OFFER`, `REQUEST` and +`MESSAGE` that every node SHOULD store per peer. +`state` MUST NOT contain `ACK` records as we do not retransmit those periodically. +The following information is stored for records: - - **Type** - Either `OFFER`, `REQUEST` or `MESSAGE` - - **Send Count** - The amount of times a record has been sent to a peer. - - **Send Epoch** - The next epoch at which a record can be sent to a peer. +- **Type** - Either `OFFER`, `REQUEST` or `MESSAGE` +- **Send Count** - The amount of times a record has been sent to a peer. +- **Send Epoch** - The next epoch at which a record can be sent to a peer. ### Flow -A maximum of one payload SHOULD be sent to peers per epoch, this payload contains all `ACK`, `OFFER`, `REQUEST` and `MESSAGE` records for the specific peer. Payloads are created every epoch, containing reactions to previously received records by peers or new records being sent out by nodes. +A maximum of one payload SHOULD be sent to peers per epoch, +this payload contains all `ACK`, `OFFER`, `REQUEST` and +`MESSAGE` records for the specific peer. +Payloads are created every epoch, +containing reactions to previously received records by peers or +new records being sent out by nodes. -Nodes MAY have two modes with which they can send records: `BATCH` and `INTERACTIVE` mode. The following rules dictate how nodes construct payloads every epoch for any given peer for both modes. +Nodes MAY have two modes with which they can send records: +`BATCH` and `INTERACTIVE` mode. +The following rules dictate how nodes construct payloads +every epoch for any given peer for both modes. > ***NOTE:** A node may send messages both in interactive and in batch mode.* #### Interactive Mode - - A node initially offers a `MESSAGE` when attempting to send it to a peer. This means an `OFFER` is added to the next payload and state for the given peer. - - When a node receives an `OFFER`, a `REQUEST` is added to the next payload and state for the given peer. - - When a node receives a `REQUEST` for a previously sent `OFFER`, the `OFFER` is removed from the state and the corresponding `MESSAGE` is added to the next payload and state for the given peer. - - When a node receives a `MESSAGE`, the `REQUEST` is removed from the state and an `ACK` is added to the next payload for the given peer. - - When a node receives an `ACK`, the `MESSAGE` is removed from the state for the given peer. - - All records that require retransmission are added to the payload, given `Send Epoch` has been reached. +- A node initially offers a `MESSAGE` when attempting to send it to a peer. +This means an `OFFER` is added to the next payload and state for the given peer. +- When a node receives an `OFFER`, a `REQUEST` is added to the next payload and +state for the given peer. +- When a node receives a `REQUEST` for a previously sent `OFFER`, +the `OFFER` is removed from the state and +the corresponding `MESSAGE` is added to the next payload and +state for the given peer. +- When a node receives a `MESSAGE`, the `REQUEST` is removed from the state and +an `ACK` is added to the next payload for the given peer. +- When a node receives an `ACK`, +the `MESSAGE` is removed from the state for the given peer. +- All records that require retransmission are added to the payload, +given `Send Epoch` has been reached.

@@ -104,10 +139,14 @@ Nodes MAY have two modes with which they can send records: `BATCH` and `INTERACT #### Batch Mode - 1. When a node sends a `MESSAGE`, it is added to the next payload and the state for the given peer. - 2. When a node receives a `MESSAGE`, an `ACK` is added to the next payload for the corresponding peer. - 3. When a node receives an `ACK`, the `MESSAGE` is removed from the state for the given peer. - 4. All records that require retransmission are added to the payload, given `Send Epoch` has been reached. +1. When a node sends a `MESSAGE`, +it is added to the next payload and the state for the given peer. +2. When a node receives a `MESSAGE`, +an `ACK` is added to the next payload for the corresponding peer. +3. When a node receives an `ACK`, +the `MESSAGE` is removed from the state for the given peer. +4. All records that require retransmission are added to the payload, +given `Send Epoch` has been reached. @@ -117,16 +156,20 @@ Nodes MAY have two modes with which they can send records: `BATCH` and `INTERACT Figure 2: Delivery without retransmissions in batch mode.

- > ***NOTE:** Batch mode is higher bandwidth whereas interactive mode is higher latency.* ### Retransmission -The record of the type `Type` SHOULD be retransmitted every time `Send Epoch` is smaller than or equal to the current epoch. +The record of the type `Type` SHOULD be retransmitted +every time `Send Epoch` is smaller than or equal to the current epoch. -`Send Epoch` and `Send Count` MUST be increased every time a record is retransmitted. Although no function is defined on how to increase `Send Epoch`, it SHOULD be exponentially increased until reaching an upper bound where it then goes back to a lower epoch in order to prevent a record's `Send Epoch`'s from becoming too large. +`Send Epoch` and `Send Count` MUST be increased every time a record is retransmitted. +Although no function is defined on how to increase `Send Epoch`, +it SHOULD be exponentially increased until reaching an upper bound +where it then goes back to a lower epoch in order to +prevent a record's `Send Epoch`'s from becoming too large. > ***NOTE:** We do not retransmission `ACK`s as we do not know when they have arrived, therefore we simply resend them every time we receive a `MESSAGE`.* @@ -135,10 +178,11 @@ The record of the type `Type` SHOULD be retransmitted every time `Send Epoch` is MVDS has been formally specified using TLA+: . ## Acknowledgments - - Preston van Loon - - Greg Markou - - Rene Nayman - - Jacek Sieka + +- Preston van Loon +- Greg Markou +- Rene Nayman +- Jacek Sieka ## Copyright diff --git a/vac/25/libp2p-dns-discovery.md b/vac/25/libp2p-dns-discovery.md index 08b7bed62..27698cd8b 100644 --- a/vac/25/libp2p-dns-discovery.md +++ b/vac/25/libp2p-dns-discovery.md @@ -7,44 +7,56 @@ editor: Hanno Cornelius contributors: --- -`25/LIBP2P-DNS-DISCOVERY` specifies a scheme to implement [`libp2p`](https://libp2p.io/) peer discovery via DNS for Waku v2. -The generalised purpose is to retrieve an arbitrarily long, authenticated, updateable list of [`libp2p` peers](https://docs.libp2p.io/concepts/peer-id/) to bootstrap connection to a `libp2p` network. -Since [`10/WAKU2`](../../waku/standards/core/10/waku2.md) currently specifies use of [`libp2p` peer identities](https://docs.libp2p.io/concepts/peer-id/), -this method is suitable for a new Waku v2 node to discover other Waku v2 nodes to connect to. +`25/LIBP2P-DNS-DISCOVERY` specifies a scheme to implement [`libp2p`](https://libp2p.io/) +peer discovery via DNS for Waku v2. +The generalised purpose is to retrieve an arbitrarily long, authenticated, +updateable list of [`libp2p` peers](https://docs.libp2p.io/concepts/peer-id/) +to bootstrap connection to a `libp2p` network. +Since [`10/WAKU2`](../../waku/standards/core/10/waku2.md) +currently specifies use of [`libp2p` peer identities](https://docs.libp2p.io/concepts/peer-id/), +this method is suitable for a new Waku v2 node +to discover other Waku v2 nodes to connect to. This specification is largely based on [EIP-1459](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1459), with the only deviation being the type of address being encoded (`multiaddr` vs `enr`). -Also see [this earlier explainer](https://vac.dev/dns-based-discovery) for more background on the suitability of DNS based discovery for Waku v2. +Also see [this earlier explainer](https://vac.dev/dns-based-discovery) +for more background on the suitability of DNS based discovery for Waku v2. -# List encoding +## List encoding The peer list MUST be encoded as a [Merkle tree](https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Merkle_tree). -EIP-1459 specifies [the URL scheme](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1459#specification) to refer to such a DNS node list. +EIP-1459 specifies [the URL scheme](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1459#specification) +to refer to such a DNS node list. This specification uses the same approach, but with a `matree` scheme: -``` +```yaml matree://@ ``` where + - `matree` is the selected `multiaddr` Merkle tree scheme - `` is the fully qualified domain name on which the list can be found -- `` is the base32 encoding of the compressed 32-byte binary public key that signed the list. +- `` is the base32 encoding of the compressed 32-byte binary public key +that signed the list. The example URL from EIP-1459, adapted to the above scheme becomes: -``` +```yaml matree://AM5FCQLWIZX2QFPNJAP7VUERCCRNGRHWZG3YYHIUV7BVDQ5FDPRT2@peers.example.org ``` Each entry within the Merkle tree MUST be contained within a [DNS TXT record](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1035.txt) and stored in a subdomain (except for the base URL `matree` entry). -The content of any TXT record MUST be small enough to fit into the 512-byte limit imposed on UDP DNS packets, +The content of any TXT record +MUST be small enough to fit into the 512-byte limit imposed on UDP DNS packets, which limits the number of hashes that can be contained within a branch entry. -The subdomain name for each entry is the base32 encoding of the abbreviated keccak256 hash of its text content. -See [this example](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1459#dns-record-structure) of a fully populated tree for more information. +The subdomain name for each entry +is the base32 encoding of the abbreviated keccak256 hash of its text content. +See [this example](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1459#dns-record-structure) +of a fully populated tree for more information. -# Entry types +## Entry types The following entry types are derived from [EIP-1459](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1459) and adapted for use with `multiaddrs`: @@ -53,11 +65,12 @@ and adapted for use with `multiaddrs`: The tree root entry MUST use the following format: -``` +```yaml matree-root:v1 m= l= seq= sig= ``` where + - `ma-root` and `link-root` refer to the root hashes of subtrees containing `multiaddrs` and links to other subtrees, respectively - `sequence-number` is the tree's update sequence number. @@ -71,11 +84,12 @@ encoded as URL-safe base64 Branch entries MUST take the format: -``` +```yaml matree-branch:,,..., ``` where + - `,,...,` are the hashes of other subtree entries ## Leaf entries @@ -87,7 +101,7 @@ There are two types of leaf entries: For the subtree pointed to by `link-root`, leaf entries MUST take the format: -``` +```yaml matree://@ ``` @@ -98,37 +112,42 @@ which links to a different list located in another domain. For the subtree pointed to by `ma-root`, leaf entries MUST take the format: -``` +```yaml ma: ``` which contains the `multiaddr` of a `libp2p` peer. -# Client protocol +## Client protocol -A client MUST adhere to the [client protocol](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1459#client-protocol) as specified in EIP-1459, +A client MUST adhere to the [client protocol](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1459#client-protocol) +as specified in EIP-1459, and adapted for usage with `multiaddr` entry types below: To find nodes at a given DNS name a client MUST perform the following steps: -1. Resolve the TXT record of the DNS name and check whether it contains a valid `matree-root:v1` entry. + +1. Resolve the TXT record of the DNS name and +check whether it contains a valid `matree-root:v1` entry. 2. Verify the signature on the root against the known public key -and check whether the sequence number is larger than or equal to any previous number seen for that name. +and check whether the sequence number is larger than or +equal to any previous number seen for that name. 3. Resolve the TXT record of a hash subdomain indicated in the record and verify that the content matches the hash. 4. If the resolved entry is of type: - - `matree-branch`: parse the list of hashes and continue resolving them (step 3). - - `ma`: import the `multiaddr` and add it to a local list of discovered nodes. -# Copyright +- `matree-branch`: parse the list of hashes and continue resolving them (step 3). +- `ma`: import the `multiaddr` and add it to a local list of discovered nodes. + +## Copyright Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). -# References +## References 1. [`10/WAKU2`](../../waku/standards/core/10/waku2.md) 1. [EIP-1459: Client Protocol](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1459#client-protocol) -1. [EIP-1459: Node Discovery via DNS ](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1459) +1. [EIP-1459: Node Discovery via DNS](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1459) 1. [`libp2p`](https://libp2p.io/) 1. [`libp2p` peer identity](https://docs.libp2p.io/concepts/peer-id/) 1. [Merkle trees](https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Merkle_tree) diff --git a/vac/3/remote-log.md b/vac/3/remote-log.md index a7b7cbc66..dd53ec17c 100644 --- a/vac/3/remote-log.md +++ b/vac/3/remote-log.md @@ -8,7 +8,8 @@ contributors: - Dean Eigenmann --- -A remote log is a replication of a local log. This means a node can read data that originally came from a node that is offline. +A remote log is a replication of a local log. +This means a node can read data that originally came from a node that is offline. This specification is complemented by a proof of concept implementation[^1]. @@ -112,7 +113,12 @@ message RemoteLog { - + ## Synchronization @@ -122,12 +128,13 @@ There are four fundamental roles: 1. Alice 2. Bob -2. Name system (NS) -3. Content-addressed storage (CAS) +3. Name system (NS) +4. Content-addressed storage (CAS) The *remote log* protobuf is what is stored in the name system. -"Bob" can represent anything from 0 to N participants. Unlike Alice, Bob only needs read-only access to NS and CAS. +"Bob" can represent anything from 0 to N participants. Unlike Alice, +Bob only needs read-only access to NS and CAS. @@ -157,7 +164,7 @@ modes: **Data format:** -``` +```yaml | H1_3 | H2_3 | | H1_2 | H2_2 | | H1_1 | H2_1 | @@ -177,7 +184,7 @@ A remote log MAY also choose to embed the wire payloads that corresponds to the native hash. This bypasses the need for a dedicated CAS and additional round-trips, with a trade-off in bandwidth usage. -``` +```yaml | H1_3 | | C_3 | | H1_2 | | C_2 | | H1_1 | | C_1 | @@ -198,13 +205,16 @@ log. The latter is useful for things like backups on durable storage. The pointer to the 'next page' is another remote log entry, at a previous point in time. - + ### Interaction with MVDS -[vac.mvds.Message](../2/mvds.md/#payloads) payloads are the only payloads that MUST be uploaded. Other messages types MAY be uploaded, depending on the implementation. +[vac.mvds.Message](../2/mvds.md/#payloads) payloads are the only payloads +that MUST be uploaded. +Other messages types MAY be uploaded, depending on the implementation. ## Acknowledgments diff --git a/vac/32/rln-v1.md b/vac/32/rln-v1.md index 069f09256..53b74552f 100644 --- a/vac/32/rln-v1.md +++ b/vac/32/rln-v1.md @@ -15,32 +15,43 @@ contributors: ## Abstract -The following specification covers the RLN construct as well as some auxiliary libraries useful for interacting with it. -Rate limiting nullifier (RLN) is a construct based on zero-knowledge proofs that provides an anonymous rate-limited signaling/messaging framework suitable for decentralized (and centralized) environments. +The following specification covers the RLN construct +as well as some auxiliary libraries useful for interacting with it. +Rate limiting nullifier (RLN) is a construct based on zero-knowledge proofs that +provides an anonymous rate-limited signaling/messaging framework +suitable for decentralized (and centralized) environments. Anonymity refers to the unlinkability of messages to their owner. ## Motivation -RLN guarantees a messaging rate is enforced cryptographically while preserving the anonymity of the message owners. -A wide range of applications can benefit from RLN and provide desirable security features. -For example, -an e-voting system can integrate RLN to contain the voting rate while protecting the voters-vote unlinkability. -Another use case is to protect an anonymous messaging system against DDoS and +RLN guarantees a messaging rate is enforced cryptographically +while preserving the anonymity of the message owners. +A wide range of applications can benefit from RLN and +provide desirable security features. +For example, +an e-voting system can integrate RLN to contain the voting rate while +protecting the voters-vote unlinkability. +Another use case is to protect an anonymous messaging system against DDoS and spam attacks by constraining messaging rate of users. This latter use case is explained in [17/WAKU2-RLN-RELAY RFC](../../waku/standards/core/17/rln-relay.md). ## Wire Format Specification -The key words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL NOT”, “SHOULD”, “SHOULD NOT”, “RECOMMENDED”, “MAY”, and “OPTIONAL” in this document are to be interpreted as described in [2119](https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt). + +The key words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL NOT”, “SHOULD”, +“SHOULD NOT”, “RECOMMENDED”, “MAY”, and +“OPTIONAL” in this document are to be interpreted as described in [2119](https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt). ### Flow -The users participate in the protocol by first registering to an application-defined group referred by the _membership group_. +The users participate in the protocol by +first registering to an application-defined group referred by the _membership group_. Registration to the group is mandatory for signaling in the application. -After registration, group members can generate a zero-knowledge proof of membership for their signals and -can participate in the application. -Usually, the membership requires a financial or -social stake which is beneficial for the prevention of inclusion of Sybils within the _membership group_. -Group members are allowed to send one signal per external nullifier +After registration, group members can generate a zero-knowledge proof of membership +for their signals and can participate in the application. +Usually, the membership requires a financial or +social stake which is beneficial for the prevention +of inclusion of Sybils within the _membership group_. +Group members are allowed to send one signal per external nullifier (an identifier that groups signals and can be thought of as a voting booth). If a user generates more signals than allowed, the user risks being slashed - by revealing his membership secret credentials. @@ -54,20 +65,22 @@ Generally the flow can be described by the following steps: ### Registration -Depending on the application requirements, the registration can be implemented in different ways, for example: +Depending on the application requirements, +the registration can be implemented in different ways, for example: + - centralized registrations, by using a central server - decentralized registrations, by using a smart contract -The users' identity commitments +The users' identity commitments (explained in section [User Identity](#user-identity)) are stored in a Merkle tree, and the users can obtain a Merkle proof proving that they are part of the group. Also depending on the application requirements, usually a financial or social stake is introduced. -An example for financial stake is: +An example for financial stake is: For each registration a certain amount of ETH is required. -An example for social stake is using [Interep](https://interep.link/) as a registry - +An example for social stake is using [Interep](https://interep.link/) as a registry, users need to prove that they have a highly reputable social media account. #### Implementation notes @@ -85,38 +98,45 @@ The user's identity is composed of: ``` -For registration, the user MUST submit their `identity_commitment` +For registration, the user MUST submit their `identity_commitment` (along with any additional registration requirements) to the registry. -Upon registration, they SHOULD receive `leaf_index` value which represents their position in the Merkle tree. +Upon registration, they SHOULD receive `leaf_index` value +which represents their position in the Merkle tree. Receiving a `leaf_index` is not a hard requirement and is application specific. -The other way around is the users calculating the `leaf_index` themselves upon successful registration. +The other way around is +the users calculating the `leaf_index` themselves upon successful registration. ### Signaling After registration, -the users can participate in the application by sending signals to the other participants in a decentralised manner or +the users can participate in the application by +sending signals to the other participants in a decentralised manner or to a centralised server. Along with their signal, -they MUST generate a zero-knowledge proof by using the circuit with the specification described above. +they MUST generate a zero-knowledge proof by +using the circuit with the specification described above. For generating a proof, the users need to obtain the required parameters or compute them themselves, -depending on the application implementation and client libraries supported by the application. -For example, +depending on the application implementation and +client libraries supported by the application. +For example, the users MAY store the membership Merkle tree on their end and generate a Merkle proof whenever they want to generate a signal. -#### Implementation notes +#### Implementation Notes ##### Signal hash -The signal hash can be generated by hashing the raw signal (or content) using the `keccak256` hash function. +The signal hash can be generated by hashing the raw signal (or content) +using the `keccak256` hash function. ##### External nullifier -The external nullifier MUST be computed as the Poseidon hash of the current epoch -(e.g. a value equal to or derived from the current UNIX timestamp divided by the epoch length) and -the RLN identifier. +The external nullifier MUST be computed as the Poseidon hash of the current epoch +(e.g. a value equal to or +derived from the current UNIX timestamp divided by the epoch length) +and the RLN identifier. ```js @@ -124,7 +144,7 @@ external_nullifier = poseidonHash([epoch, rln_identifier]); ``` -##### Obtaining Merkle proof +##### Obtaining Merkle proof The Merkle proof SHOULD be obtained locally or from a trusted third party. By using the [incremental Merkle tree algorithm](https://github.com/appliedzkp/incrementalquintree/blob/master/ts/IncrementalQuinTree.ts), @@ -141,11 +161,12 @@ The proof (`Merkle_proof`) is composed of the following fields: ``` -1. **root** - The root of membership group Merkle tree at the time of publishing the message -2. **indices** - The index fields of the leafs in the Merkle tree - used by the Merkle tree algorithm for verification -3. **path_elements** - Auxiliary data structure used for storing the path to the leaf - -used by the Merkle proof algorithm for verificaton - +1. **root** - The root of membership group Merkle tree +at the time of publishing the message +2. **indices** - The index fields of the leafs in the Merkle tree - +used by the Merkle tree algorithm for verification +3. **path_elements** - Auxiliary data structure used for storing the path +to the leaf - used by the Merkle proof algorithm for verificaton ##### Generating proof @@ -167,9 +188,11 @@ the user MUST submit the following fields to the circuit: ##### Calculating output The proof output is calculated locally, -in order for the required fields for proof verification to be sent along with the proof. +in order for the required fields for proof verification +to be sent along with the proof. The proof output is composed of the `y` share of the secret equation and the `internal_nullifier`. -The `internal_nullifier` represents a unique fingerprint of a user for a given `epoch` and app. +The `internal_nullifier` represents a unique fingerprint of a user +for a given `epoch` and app. The following fields are needed for proof output calculation: ```js @@ -235,15 +258,16 @@ the slashing will be implemented only on the server. Otherwise if the application is distributed, the slashing will be implemented on each user's client. -#### Implementation notes +#### Notes from Implementation -Each user of the protocol +Each user of the protocol (server or otherwise) MUST store metadata for each message received by each user, for the given `epoch`. The data can be deleted when the `epoch` passes. -Storing metadata is REQUIRED, so that if a user sends more than one unique signal per `epoch`, +Storing metadata is REQUIRED, +so that if a user sends more than one unique signal per `epoch`, they can be slashed and removed from the protocol. -The metadata stored contains the `x`, `y` shares and +The metadata stored contains the `x`, `y` shares and the `internal_nullifier` for the user for each message. If enough such shares are present, the user's secret can be retreived. @@ -265,27 +289,32 @@ One way of storing received metadata (`messaging_metadata`) is the following for ##### Verification The output message verification consists of the following steps: + - `external_nullifier` correctness - non-duplicate message check - `zk_proof` zero-knowledge proof verification - spam verification **1. `external_nullifier` correctness** -Upon received `output_message`, first the `epoch` and `rln_identifier` fields are checked, +Upon received `output_message`, +first the `epoch` and `rln_identifier` fields are checked, to ensure that the message matches the current `external_nullifier`. -If the `external_nullifier` is correct the verification continues, otherwise, the message is discarded. +If the `external_nullifier` is correct the verification continues, otherwise, +the message is discarded. **2. non-duplicate message check** The received message is checked to ensure it is not duplicate. -The duplicate message check is performed by verifying that the `x` and `y` +The duplicate message check is performed by verifying that the `x` and `y` fields do not exist in the `messaging_metadata` object. -If the `x` and `y` fields exist in the `x_shares` and `y_shares` array for the `external_nullifier` and +If the `x` and `y` fields exist in the `x_shares` and +`y_shares` array for the `external_nullifier` and the `internal_nullifier` the message can be considered as a duplicate. Duplicate messages are discarded. **3. `zk_proof` verification** -The `zk_proof` SHOULD be verified by providing the `zk_proof` field to the circuit verifier along with the `public_signal`: +The `zk_proof` SHOULD be verified by providing the `zk_proof` field +to the circuit verifier along with the `public_signal`: ```js @@ -303,35 +332,42 @@ If the proof verification is correct, the verification continues, otherwise the message is discarded. **4. Double signaling verification** - -After the proof is verified the `x`, and `y` fields are added to the `x_shares` and `y_shares` -arrays of the `messaging_metadata` `external_nullifier` and `internal_nullifier` object. -If the length of the arrays is equal to the signaling threshold (`limit`), the user can be slashed. +After the proof is verified the `x`, and +`y` fields are added to the `x_shares` and `y_shares` +arrays of the `messaging_metadata` `external_nullifier` and +`internal_nullifier` object. +If the length of the arrays is equal to the signaling threshold (`limit`), +the user can be slashed. ##### Slashing -After the verification, -the user SHOULD be slashed if two different shares are present to reconstruct their `identity_secret_hash` from `x_shares` and `y_shares` fields, for their `internal_nullifier`. +After the verification, +the user SHOULD be slashed if two different shares are present +to reconstruct their `identity_secret_hash` from `x_shares` and +`y_shares` fields, for their `internal_nullifier`. The secret can be retreived by the properties of the Shamir's secret sharing scheme. In particular the secret (`a_0`) can be retrieved by computing [Lagrange polynomials](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lagrange_polynomial). After the secret is retreived, -the user's `identity_commitment` SHOULD be generated from the secret and -it can be used for removing the user from the membership Merkle tree +the user's `identity_commitment` SHOULD be generated from the secret and +it can be used for removing the user from the membership Merkle tree (zeroing out the leaf that contains the user's `identity_commitment`). -Additionally, depending on the application the `identity_secret_hash` MAY be used for taking the user's provided stake. +Additionally, depending on the application the `identity_secret_hash` +MAY be used for taking the user's provided stake. ### Technical overview -The main RLN construct is implemented using a [ZK-SNARK](https://z.cash/technology/zksnarks/) circuit. -However, it is helpful to describe the other necessary outside components for interaction with the circuit, +The main RLN construct is implemented using a +[ZK-SNARK](https://z.cash/technology/zksnarks/) circuit. +However, it is helpful to describe +the other necessary outside components for interaction with the circuit, which together with the ZK-SNARK circuit enable the above mentioned features. #### Terminology | Term | Description | |---------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| -| **ZK-SNARK** | https://z.cash/technology/zksnarks/ | +| **ZK-SNARK** | [zksnarks](https://z.cash/technology/zksnarks/) | | **Stake** | Financial or social stake required for registering in the RLN applications. Common stake examples are: locking cryptocurrency (financial), linking reputable social identity. | | **Identity secret** | An array of two unique random components (identity nullifier and identity trapdoor), which must be kept private by the user. Secret hash and identity commitment are derived from this array. | | **Identity nullifier** | Random 32 byte value used as component for identity secret generation. | @@ -344,7 +380,6 @@ which together with the ZK-SNARK circuit enable the above mentioned features. | **RLN membership tree** | Merkle tree data structure, filled with identity commitments of the users. Serves as a data structure that ensures user registrations. | | **Merkle proof** | Proof that a user is member of the RLN membership tree. | - #### RLN Zero-Knowledge Circuit specific terms | Term | Description | @@ -358,14 +393,19 @@ which together with the ZK-SNARK circuit enable the above mentioned features. #### Zero-Knowledge Circuits specification -Anonymous signaling with a controlled rate limit is enabled by proving that the user is part of a group which has high barriers to entry (form of stake) and +Anonymous signaling with a controlled rate limit +is enabled by proving that the user is part of a group +which has high barriers to entry (form of stake) and enabling secret reveal if more than 1 unique signal is produced per external nullifier. -The membership part is implemented using membership [Merkle trees](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Merkle_tree) and Merkle proofs, +The membership part is implemented using +membership [Merkle trees](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Merkle_tree) and Merkle proofs, while the secret reveal part is enabled by using the Shamir's Secret Sharing scheme. -Essentially the protocol requires the users to generate zero-knowledge proof to be able to send signals and +Essentially the protocol requires the users to generate zero-knowledge proof +to be able to send signals and participate in the application. The zero knowledge proof proves that the user is member of a group, -but also enforces the user to share part of their secret for each signal in an external nullifier. +but also enforces the user to share part of their secret +for each signal in an external nullifier. The external nullifier is usually represented by timestamp or a time interval. It can also be thought of as a voting booth in voting applications. @@ -378,24 +418,29 @@ using the [circomlib](https://docs.circom.io/) library. ##### Circuit parameters -**Public Inputs** +###### Public Inputs + - `x` - `external_nullifier` -**Private Inputs** -* `identity_secret_hash` -* `path_elements` - rln membership proof component -* `identity_path_index` - rln membership proof component +###### Private Inputs + +- `identity_secret_hash` +- `path_elements` - rln membership proof component +- `identity_path_index` - rln membership proof component + +###### Outputs -**Outputs** - `y` - `root` - the rln membership tree root - `internal_nullifier` ##### Hash function -Canonical [Poseidon hash implementation](https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/458.pdf) is used, -as implemented in the [circomlib library](https://github.com/iden3/circomlib/blob/master/circuits/poseidon.circom), according to the Poseidon paper. +Canonical [Poseidon hash implementation](https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/458.pdf) +is used, +as implemented in the [circomlib library](https://github.com/iden3/circomlib/blob/master/circuits/poseidon.circom), +according to the Poseidon paper. This Poseidon hash version (canonical implementation) uses the following parameters: | Hash inputs | `t` | `RF` | `RP`| @@ -408,23 +453,25 @@ This Poseidon hash version (canonical implementation) uses the following paramet |6 | 7 | 8 | 63| |7 | 8 | 8 | 64| |8 | 9 | 8 | 63| - + ##### Membership implementation -For a valid signal, a user's `identity_commitment` +For a valid signal, a user's `identity_commitment` (more on identity commitments below) must exist in identity membership tree. Membership is proven by providing a membership proof (witness). The fields from the membership proof REQUIRED for the verification are: `path_elements` and `identity_path_index`. -[IncrementalQuinTree](https://github.com/appliedzkp/incrementalquintree) algorithm is used for constructing the Membership Merkle tree. +[IncrementalQuinTree](https://github.com/appliedzkp/incrementalquintree) +algorithm is used for constructing the Membership Merkle tree. The circuits are reused from this repository. You can find out more details about the IncrementalQuinTree algorithm [here](https://ethresear.ch/t/gas-and-circuit-constraint-benchmarks-of-binary-and-quinary-incremental-Merkle-trees-using-the-poseidon-hash-function/7446). #### Slashing and Shamir's Secret Sharing Slashing is enabled by using polynomials and [Shamir's Secret sharing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shamir%27s_Secret_Sharing). -In order to produce a valid proof, `identity_secret_hash` as a private input to the circuit. +In order to produce a valid proof, +`identity_secret_hash` as a private input to the circuit. Then a secret equation is created in the form of: ```js @@ -440,29 +487,38 @@ in order for their proof to be verified. `x` is the hashed signal, while the `y` is the circuit output. With more than one pair of unique shares, anyone can derive `a_0`, i.e. the `identity_secret_hash`. The hash of a signal will be the evaluation point `x`. -In this way, -a member who sends more than one unique signal per `external_nullifier` risks their identity secret being revealed. +In this way, +a member who sends more than one unique signal per `external_nullifier` +risks their identity secret being revealed. -Note that shares used in different epochs and +Note that shares used in different epochs and different RLN apps cannot be used to derive the `identity_secret_hash`. -Thanks to the `external_nullifier` definition, also shares computed from same secret within same epoch but in different RLN apps cannot be used to derive the identity secret hash. +Thanks to the `external_nullifier` definition, +also shares computed from same secret within same epoch but +in different RLN apps cannot be used to derive the identity secret hash. The `rln_identifier` is a random value from a finite field, unique per RLN app, -and is used for additional cross-application security - -to protect the user secrets being compromised if they use the same credentials accross different RLN apps. +and is used for additional cross-application security - +to protect the user secrets being compromised if they use +the same credentials accross different RLN apps. If `rln_identifier` is not present, -the user uses the same credentials and +the user uses the same credentials and sends a different message for two different RLN apps using the same `external_nullifier`, -then their user signals can be grouped by the `internal_nullifier` which could lead the user's secret revealed. -This is because two separate signals under the same `internal_nullifier` can be treated as rate limiting violation. +then their user signals can be grouped by the `internal_nullifier` +which could lead the user's secret revealed. +This is because two separate signals under the same `internal_nullifier` +can be treated as rate limiting violation. With adding the `rln_identifier` field we obscure the `internal_nullifier`, -so this kind of attack can be hardened because we don't have the same `internal_nullifier` anymore. +so this kind of attack can be hardened because +we don't have the same `internal_nullifier` anymore. #### Identity credentials generation -In order to be able to generate valid proofs, the users MUST be part of the identity membership Merkle tree. -They are part of the identity membership Merkle tree if their `identity_commitment` is placed in a leaf in the tree. +In order to be able to generate valid proofs, +the users MUST be part of the identity membership Merkle tree. +They are part of the identity membership Merkle tree if +their `identity_commitment` is placed in a leaf in the tree. The identity credentials of a user are composed of: @@ -483,11 +539,13 @@ identity_secret = [identity_nullifier, identity_trapdoor]; ``` The same secret SHOULD NOT be used accross different protocols, -because revealing the secret at one protocol could break privacy for the user in the other protocols. +because revealing the secret at one protocol +could break privacy for the user in the other protocols. ##### `identity_secret_hash` -The `identity_secret_hash` is generated by obtaining a Poseidon hash of the `identity_secret` array: +The `identity_secret_hash` is generated by obtaining a Poseidon hash +of the `identity_secret` array: ```js @@ -507,47 +565,60 @@ identity_commitment = poseidonHash([identity_secret_hash]); ### Appendix A: Security Considerations -RLN is an experimental and still un-audited technology. +RLN is an experimental and still un-audited technology. This means that the circuits have not been yet audited. Another consideration is the security of the underlying primitives. zk-SNARKS require a trusted setup for generating a prover and verifier keys. -The standard for this is to use trusted [Multi-Party Computation (MPC)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secure_multi-party_computation) ceremony, -which requires two phases. +The standard for this is to use trusted +[Multi-Party Computation (MPC)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secure_multi-party_computation) + ceremony, which requires two phases. Trusted MPC ceremony has not yet been performed for the RLN circuits. #### SSS Security Assumptions -Shamir-Secret Sharing requires polynomial coefficients to be independent of each other. -However, `a_1` depends on `a_0` through the Poseidon hash algorithm. -Due to the design of Poseidon, -it is possible to [attack](https://github.com/Rate-Limiting-Nullifier/rln-circuits/pull/7#issuecomment-1416085627) the protocol. -It was decided *not* to change the circuits design, since at the moment the attack is infeasible. -Therefore, implementers must be aware that the current version provides approximately 160-bit security and not 254. +Shamir-Secret Sharing requires polynomial coefficients +to be independent of each other. +However, `a_1` depends on `a_0` through the Poseidon hash algorithm. +Due to the design of Poseidon, +it is possible to +[attack](https://github.com/Rate-Limiting-Nullifier/rln-circuits/pull/7#issuecomment-1416085627) +the protocol. +It was decided _not_ to change the circuits design, +since at the moment the attack is infeasible. +Therefore, implementers must be aware that the current version +provides approximately 160-bit security and not 254. Possible improvements: -* [change the circuit](https://github.com/Rate-Limiting-Nullifier/rln-circuits/pull/7#issuecomment-1416085627) to make coefficients independent; -* switch to other hash function (Keccak, SHA); + +- [change the circuit](https://github.com/Rate-Limiting-Nullifier/rln-circuits/pull/7#issuecomment-1416085627) +to make coefficients independent; +- switch to other hash function (Keccak, SHA); ### Appendix B: Identity Scheme Choice -The hashing scheme used is based on the design decisions which also include the Semaphore circuits. +The hashing scheme used is based on the design decisions +which also include the Semaphore circuits. Our goal was to ensure compatibility of the secrets for apps that use Semaphore and RLN circuits while also not compromising on security because of using the same secrets. For example, let's say there is a voting app that uses Semaphore, and also a chat app that uses RLN. -The UX would be better if the users would not need to care about complicated identity management -(secrets and commitments) they use for each app, +The UX would be better if +the users would not need to care about complicated identity management +(secrets and commitments) they use for each app, and it would be much better if they could use a single id commitment for this. Also in some cases these kind of dependency is required - RLN chat app using Interep as a registry (instead of using financial stake). -One potential concern about this interoperability is a slashed user on the RLN app side -having their security compromised on the semaphore side apps as well. -I.e obtaining the user's secret, +One potential concern about this interoperability is a slashed user +on the RLN app side having their security compromised +on the semaphore side apps as well. +i.e. obtaining the user's secret, anyone would be able to generate valid semaphore proofs as the slashed user. -We don't want that, -and we should keep user's app specific security threats in the domain of that app alone. +We don't want that, +and we should keep user's app specific security threats +in the domain of that app alone. -To achieve the above interoperability UX while preventing the shared app security model +To achieve the above interoperability UX +while preventing the shared app security model (i.e slashing user on an RLN app having impact on Semaphore apps), we had to do the follow in regard the identity secret and identity commitment: @@ -569,16 +640,16 @@ Secret components for generting RLN proof: - `identity_secret_hash` When a user is slashed on the RLN app side, their `identity_secret_hash` is revealed. -However, a semaphore proof can't be generated because +However, a semaphore proof can't be generated because we do not know the user's `identity_nullifier` and `identity_trapdoor`. With this design we achieve: - `identity_commitment` (Semaphore) == `identity_commitment` (RLN) secret (semaphore) != secret (RLN). -This is the only option we had for the scheme in order to satisfy the properties described above. +This is the only option we had for the scheme +in order to satisfy the properties described above. Also, for RLN we do a single secret component input for the circuit. Thus we need to hash the secret array (two components) to a secret hash, @@ -586,17 +657,20 @@ and we use that as a secret component input. ### Appendix C: Auxiliary Tooling -There are few additional tools implemented for easier integrations and usage of the RLN protocol. +There are few additional tools implemented for easier integrations and +usage of the RLN protocol. -[`zerokit`](https://github.com/vacp2p/zerokit) is a set of Zero Knowledge modules, +[`zerokit`](https://github.com/vacp2p/zerokit) is a set of Zero Knowledge modules, written in Rust and designed to be used in many different environments. Among different modules, it supports `Semaphore` and `RLN`. -[`zk-kit`](https://github.com/appliedzkp/zk-kit) is a typescript library which exposes APIs for identity credentials generation, +[`zk-kit`](https://github.com/appliedzkp/zk-kit) +is a typescript library which exposes APIs for identity credentials generation, as well as proof generation. It supports various protocols (`Semaphore`, `RLN`). -[`zk-keeper`](https://github.com/akinovak/zk-keeper) is a browser plugin which allows for safe credential storing and +[`zk-keeper`](https://github.com/akinovak/zk-keeper) +is a browser plugin which allows for safe credential storing and proof generation. You can think of MetaMask for zero-knowledge proofs. It uses `zk-kit` under the hood. @@ -690,7 +764,8 @@ assert!(verified); ``` -For more details please visit the [`zerokit`](https://github.com/vacp2p/zerokit) library. +For more details please visit the +[`zerokit`](https://github.com/vacp2p/zerokit) library. ## Copyright @@ -719,7 +794,8 @@ Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/public - [rust](https://www.rust-lang.org/) ### Informative -- [1] https://medium.com/privacy-scaling-explorations/rate-limiting-nullifier-a-spam-protection-mechanism-for-anonymous-environments-bbe4006a57d -- [2] https://research.nccgroup.com/2020/06/24/security-considerations-of-zk-snark-parameter-multi-party-computation/ -- [3] https://github.com/Rate-Limiting-Nullifier/rln-circuits/ -- [4] https://rate-limiting-nullifier.github.io/rln-docs/ + +- [1] [privacy-scaling-explorations](https://medium.com/privacy-scaling-explorations/rate-limiting-nullifier-a-spam-protection-mechanism-for-anonymous-environments-bbe4006a57d) +- [2] [security-considerations-of-zk-snark-parameter-multi-party-computation](https://research.nccgroup.com/2020/06/24/)security-considerations-of-zk-snark-parameter-multi-party-computation/ +- [3] [rln-circuits](https://github.com/Rate-Limiting-Nullifier/rln-circuits/) +- [4] [rln docs](https://rate-limiting-nullifier.github.io/rln-docs/) diff --git a/vac/4/mvds-meta.md b/vac/4/mvds-meta.md index fb1372671..d0e26bd87 100644 --- a/vac/4/mvds-meta.md +++ b/vac/4/mvds-meta.md @@ -10,15 +10,22 @@ contributors: - Oskar Thorén --- -In this specification, we describe a method to construct message history that will aid the consistency guarantees of [2/MVDS](../2/mvds.md). Additionally, we explain how data sync can be used for more lightweight messages that do not require full synchronization. +In this specification, we describe a method to construct message history that +will aid the consistency guarantees of [2/MVDS](../2/mvds.md). +Additionally, +we explain how data sync can be used for more lightweight messages that +do not require full synchronization. ## Motivation -In order for more efficient synchronization of conversational messages, information should be provided allowing a node to more effectively synchronize the dependencies for any given message. +In order for more efficient synchronization of conversational messages, +information should be provided allowing a node to more effectively synchronize +the dependencies for any given message. ## Format -We introduce the metadata message which is used to convey information about a message and how it SHOULD be handled. +We introduce the metadata message which is used to convey information about a message +and how it SHOULD be handled. ```protobuf package vac.mvds; @@ -29,7 +36,8 @@ message Metadata { } ``` -Nodes MAY transmit a `Metadata` message by extending the MVDS [message](../2/mvds.md/#payloads) with a `metadata` field. +Nodes MAY transmit a `Metadata` message by extending the MVDS [message](../2/mvds.md/#payloads) +with a `metadata` field. ```diff message Message { @@ -44,37 +52,53 @@ message Message { | Name | Description | | ---------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -| `parents` | list of parent [`message identifier`s](../2/mvds.md/#payloads) for the specific message. | +| `parents` | list of parent [`message identifier`s](../2/mvds.md/#payloads) for the specific message. | | `ephemeral` | indicates whether a message is ephemeral or not. | ## Usage ### `parents` -This field contains a list of parent [`message identifier`s](../2/mvds.md/#payloads) for the specific message. It MUST NOT contain any messages as parent whose `ack` flag was set to `false`. This establishes a directed acyclic graph (DAG)[^2] of persistent messages. +This field contains a list of parent [`message identifier`s](../2/mvds.md/#payloads) +for the specific message. +It MUST NOT contain any messages as parent whose `ack` flag was set to `false`. +This establishes a directed acyclic graph (DAG)[^2] of persistent messages. -Nodes MAY buffer messages until dependencies are satisfied for causal consistency[^3], they MAY also pass the messages straight away for eventual consistency[^4]. +Nodes MAY buffer messages until dependencies are satisfied for causal consistency[^3], +they MAY also pass the messages straight away for eventual consistency[^4]. -A parent is any message before a new message that a node is aware of that has no children. +A parent is any message before a new message that +a node is aware of that has no children. -The number of parents for a given message is bound by [0, N], where N is the number of nodes participating in the conversation, therefore the space requirements for the `parents` field is O(N). +The number of parents for a given message is bound by [0, N], +where N is the number of nodes participating in the conversation, +therefore the space requirements for the `parents` field is O(N). -If a message has no parents it is considered a root. There can be multiple roots, which might be disconnected, giving rise to multiple DAGs. +If a message has no parents it is considered a root. +There can be multiple roots, which might be disconnected, +giving rise to multiple DAGs. ### `ephemeral` -When the `ephemeral` flag is set to `false`, a node MUST send an acknowledgment when they have received and processed a message. If it is set to `true`, it SHOULD NOT send any acknowledgment. The flag is `false` by default. +When the `ephemeral` flag is set to `false`, +a node MUST send an acknowledgment when they have received and processed a message. +If it is set to `true`, it SHOULD NOT send any acknowledgment. +The flag is `false` by default. -Nodes MAY decide to not persist ephemeral messages, however they MUST NOT be shared as part of the message history. +Nodes MAY decide to not persist ephemeral messages, +however they MUST NOT be shared as part of the message history. -Nodes SHOULD send ephemeral messages in batch mode. As their delivery is not needed to be guaranteed. +Nodes SHOULD send ephemeral messages in batch mode. +As their delivery is not needed to be guaranteed. ## Copyright Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). ## Footnotes -[^1]: [2/MVDS](../2/mvds.md) -[^2]: -[^3]: Jepsen. [Causal Consistency](https://jepsen.io/consistency/models/causal). Jepsen, LLC. -[^4]: + +1: [2/MVDS](../2/mvds.md) +2: [directed_acyclic_graph](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Directed_acyclic_graph) +3: Jepsen. [Causal Consistency](https://jepsen.io/consistency/models/causal) +Jepsen, LLC. +4: diff --git a/vac/raw/decentralized-messaging-ethereum.md b/vac/raw/decentralized-messaging-ethereum.md index ec128a832..0a433ebb8 100644 --- a/vac/raw/decentralized-messaging-ethereum.md +++ b/vac/raw/decentralized-messaging-ethereum.md @@ -8,152 +8,188 @@ contributors: --- ## Abstract -This document introduces a decentralized group messaging protocol using Ethereum adresses as identifiers. -It is based in the proposal [DCGKA](https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1281) by Weidner et al. -It includes also approximations to overcome limitations related to using PKI and the multi-device setting. + +This document introduces a decentralized group messaging protocol +using Ethereum adresses as identifiers. +It is based in the proposal +[DCGKA](https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1281) by Weidner et al. +It includes also approximations to overcome limitations related to using PKI and +the multi-device setting. ## Motivation -The need for secure communications has become paramount. -Traditional centralized messaging protocols are susceptible to various security threats, -including unauthorized access, data breaches, and single points of failure. -Therefore a decentralized approach to secure communication becomes increasingly relevant, +The need for secure communications has become paramount. +Traditional centralized messaging protocols are susceptible to various security threats, +including unauthorized access, data breaches, and single points of failure. +Therefore a decentralized approach to secure communication becomes increasingly relevant, offering a robust solution to address these challenges. Secure messaging protocols used should have the following key features: -1. **Asynchronous Messaging:** Users can send messages even if the recipients are not online at the moment. + +1. **Asynchronous Messaging:** Users can send messages even if +the recipients are not online at the moment. 2. **Resilience to Compromise:** If a user's security is compromised, -the protocol ensures that previous messages remain secure through forward secrecy (FS). -This means that messages sent before the compromise cannot be decrypted by adversaries. -Additionally, the protocol maintains post-compromise security (PCS) by regularly updating keys, +the protocol ensures that previous messages remain secure +through forward secrecy (FS). +This means that messages sent before the compromise cannot be decrypted by adversaries. +Additionally, the protocol maintains post-compromise security (PCS) +by regularly updating keys, making it difficult for adversaries to decrypt future communication. -3. **Dynamic Group Management:** Users can easily add or remove group members at any time, +3. **Dynamic Group Management:** Users can easily add or +remove group members at any time, reflecting the flexible nature of communication within the app. -In this field, there exists a *trilemma*, similar to what one observes in blockchain, -involving three key aspects: +In this field, there exists a *trilemma*, similar to what one observes in blockchain, +involving three key aspects: + 1. security, -2. scalability, and -3. decentralization. +2. scalability, and +3. decentralization. -For instance, protocols like the [MLS](https://messaginglayersecurity.rocks) perform well in terms of scalability and security. +For instance, protocols like the [MLS](https://messaginglayersecurity.rocks) +perform well in terms of scalability and security. However, they falls short in decentralization. -Newer studies such as [CoCoa](https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/251) improve features related to security and scalability, +Newer studies such as [CoCoa](https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/251) +improve features related to security and scalability, but they still rely on servers, which may not be fully trusted though they are necessary. -On the other hand, -older studies like [Causal TreeKEM](https://mattweidner.com/assets/pdf/acs-dissertation.pdf) exhibit decent scalability (logarithmic) +On the other hand, +older studies like [Causal TreeKEM](https://mattweidner.com/assets/pdf/acs-dissertation.pdf) +exhibit decent scalability (logarithmic) but lack forward secrecy and have weak post-compromise security (PCS). -The creators of [DCGKA](https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1281) introduce a decentralized, -asynchronous secure group messaging protocol that supports dynamic groups. -This protocol operates effectively on various underlying networks without strict requirements on message ordering or latency. -It can be implemented in peer-to-peer or anonymity networks, -accommodating network partitions, high latency links, and disconnected operation seamlessly. -Notably, the protocol doesn't rely on servers or +The creators of [DCGKA](https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1281) introduce a decentralized, +asynchronous secure group messaging protocol that supports dynamic groups. +This protocol operates effectively on various underlying networks +without strict requirements on message ordering or latency. +It can be implemented in peer-to-peer or anonymity networks, +accommodating network partitions, high latency links, and +disconnected operation seamlessly. +Notably, the protocol doesn't rely on servers or a consensus protocol for its functionality. -This proposal provides end-to-end encryption with forward secrecy and post-compromise security, +This proposal provides end-to-end encryption with forward secrecy and +post-compromise security, even when multiple users concurrently modify the group state. ## Theory + ### Protocol overview -This protocol makes use of ratchets to provide FS by encrypting each message with a different key. +This protocol makes use of ratchets to provide FS +by encrypting each message with a different key. -In the figure one can see the ratchet for encrypting a sequence of messages. -The sender requires an initial update secret `I_1`, which is introduced in a PRG. -The PRG will produce two outputs, namely a symmetric key for AEAD encryption, and -a seed for the next ratchet state. -The associated data needed in the AEAD encryption includes the message index `i`. -The ciphertext `c_i` associated to message `m_i` is then broadcasted to all group members. +In the figure one can see the ratchet for encrypting a sequence of messages. +The sender requires an initial update secret `I_1`, which is introduced in a PRG. +The PRG will produce two outputs, namely a symmetric key for AEAD encryption, and +a seed for the next ratchet state. +The associated data needed in the AEAD encryption includes the message index `i`. +The ciphertext `c_i` associated to message `m_i` +is then broadcasted to all group members. The next step requires deleting `I_1`, `k_i` and any old ratchet state. -After a period of time the sender may replace the ratchet state with new update secrets `I_2`, `I_3`, and so on. - -To start a post-compromise security update, -a user creates a new random value known as a seed secret and -shares it with every other group member through a secure two-party channel. -Upon receiving the seed secret, -each group member uses it to calculate an update secret for both the sender's ratchet and their own. -Additionally, the recipient sends an unencrypted acknowledgment to the group confirming the update. -Every member who receives the acknowledgment updates not only the ratchet for the original sender but -also the ratchet for the sender of the acknowledgment. -Consequently, after sharing the seed secret through `n - 1` two-party messages and -confirming it with `n - 1` broadcast acknowledgments, +After a period of time the sender may replace the ratchet state with new update secrets +`I_2`, `I_3`, and so on. + +To start a post-compromise security update, +a user creates a new random value known as a seed secret and +shares it with every other group member through a secure two-party channel. +Upon receiving the seed secret, +each group member uses it to calculate an update secret for both the sender's ratchet +and their own. +Additionally, the recipient sends an unencrypted acknowledgment to the group +confirming the update. +Every member who receives the acknowledgment updates +not only the ratchet for the original sender but +also the ratchet for the sender of the acknowledgment. +Consequently, after sharing the seed secret through `n - 1` two-party messages and +confirming it with `n - 1` broadcast acknowledgments, every group member has derived an update secret and updated their ratchet accordingly. -When removing a group member, -the user who initiates the removal conducts a post-compromise security update -by sending the update secret to all group members except the one being removed. -To add a new group member, -each existing group member shares the necessary state with the new user, +When removing a group member, +the user who initiates the removal conducts a post-compromise security update +by sending the update secret to all group members except the one being removed. +To add a new group member, +each existing group member shares the necessary state with the new user, enabling them to derive their future update secrets. -Since group members may receive messages in various orders, -it's important to ensure that each sender's ratchet is updated consistently +Since group members may receive messages in various orders, +it's important to ensure that each sender's ratchet is updated consistently with the same sequence of update secrets at each group member. -The network protocol used in this scheme ensures that messages from the same sender are processed in the order they were sent. +The network protocol used in this scheme ensures that messages from the same sender +are processed in the order they were sent. ### Components of the protocol -This protocol relies in 3 components: -authenticated causal broadcast (ACB), -decentralized group membership (DGM) and +This protocol relies in 3 components: +authenticated causal broadcast (ACB), +decentralized group membership (DGM) and 2-party secure messaging (2SM). #### Authenticated causal broadcast -A causal order is a partial order relation `<` on messages. -Two messages `m_1` and `m_2` are causally ordered, or -`m_1` causally precedes `m_2` + +A causal order is a partial order relation `<` on messages. +Two messages `m_1` and `m_2` are causally ordered, or +`m_1` causally precedes `m_2` (denoted by `m_1 < m_2`), if one of the following contiditions hold: -1. `m_1` and `m_2` were sent by the same group member, and `m_1` was sent before `m_2`. +1. `m_1` and `m_2` were sent by the same group member, and +`m_1` was sent before `m_2`. 2. `m_2` was sent by a group member U, and `m_1` was received and processed by `U` before sending `m_2`. 3. There exists `m_3` such that `m_1 < m_3` and `m_3 < m_2`. -Causal broadcast requires that before processing `m`, +Causal broadcast requires that before processing `m`, a group member must process all preceding messages `{m' | m' < m}`. -The causal broadcast module used in this protocol authenticates the sender of each message, -as well as its causal ordering metadata, using a digital signature under the sender’s identity key. -This prevents a passive adversary from impersonating users or affecting causally ordered delivery. +The causal broadcast module used in this protocol +authenticates the sender of each message, +as well as its causal ordering metadata, +using a digital signature under the sender’s identity key. +This prevents a passive adversary from impersonating users or +affecting causally ordered delivery. #### Decentralized group membership -This protocol assumes the existence of a decentralized group membership function (denoted as DGM) -that takes a set of membership change messages and their causal order relantionships, -and returns the current set of group members’ IDs. + +This protocol assumes the existence of a decentralized group membership function +(denoted as DGM) that takes a set of membership change messages and +their causal order relantionships, +and returns the current set of group members’ IDs. It needs to be deterministic and depend only on causal order, and not exact order. #### 2-party secure messaging (2SM) -This protocol makes use of bidirectional 2-party secure messaging schemes, + +This protocol makes use of bidirectional 2-party secure messaging schemes, which consist of 3 algorithms: `2SM-Init`, `2SM-Send` and `2SM-Receive`. ##### 2SM-Init -This function takes two IDs as inputs: -`ID1` representing the local user and `ID2` representing the other party. + +This function takes two IDs as inputs: +`ID1` representing the local user and `ID2` representing the other party. It returns an initial protocol state `sigma`. -The 2SM protocol relies on a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) or -a key server to map these IDs to their corresponding public keys. -In practice, the PKI should incorporate ephemeral prekeys. -This allows users to send messages to a new group member, +The 2SM protocol relies on a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) or +a key server to map these IDs to their corresponding public keys. +In practice, the PKI should incorporate ephemeral prekeys. +This allows users to send messages to a new group member, even if that member is currently offline. ##### 2SM-Send -This function takes a state `sigma` and a plaintext `m` as inputs, and + +This function takes a state `sigma` and a plaintext `m` as inputs, and returns a new state `sigma’` and a ciphertext `c`. ##### 2SM-Receive -This function takes a state `sigma` and a ciphertext `c`, and + +This function takes a state `sigma` and a ciphertext `c`, and returns a new state `sigma’` and a plaintext `m`. #### 2SM Syntax The variable `sigma` denotes the state consisting in the variables below: -``` + +```rust sigma.mySks[0] = sk sigma.nextIndex = 1 sigma.receivedSk = empty_string @@ -162,26 +198,30 @@ sigma.otherPksender = “other” sigma.otherPkIndex = 0 ``` -#### 2SM-Init +#### The 2SM-Init + On input a key pair `(sk, pk)`, this functions otuputs a state `sigma`. -#### 2SM-Send -This function encrypts the message `m` using `sigma.otherPk`, -which represents the other party’s current public key. -This key is determined based on the last public key generated for the other party or -the last public key received from the other party, -whichever is more recent. -`sigma.otherPkSender` is set to `me` in the former case and `other` in the latter case. +#### The 2SM-Send + +This function encrypts the message `m` using `sigma.otherPk`, +which represents the other party’s current public key. +This key is determined based on the last public key generated +for the other party or the last public key received from the other party, +whichever is more recent. +`sigma.otherPkSender` is set to `me` in the former case and +`other` in the latter case. -Metadata including `otherPkSender` and -`otherPkIndex` are included in the message to indicate which of the recipient’s public keys is being utilized. +Metadata including `otherPkSender` and +`otherPkIndex` are included in the message to indicate +which of the recipient’s public keys is being utilized. -Additionally, this function generates a new key pair for the local user, -storing the secret key in `sigma.mySks` and sending the public key. -Similarly, it generates a new key pair for the other party, +Additionally, this function generates a new key pair for the local user, +storing the secret key in `sigma.mySks` and sending the public key. +Similarly, it generates a new key pair for the other party, sending the secret key (encrypted) and storing the public key in `sigma.otherPk`. -``` +```go sigma.mySks[sigma.nextIndex], myNewPk) = PKE-Gen() (otherNewSk, otherNewPk) = PKE-Gen() plaintext = (m, otherNewSk, sigma`.nextIndex, myNewPk) @@ -191,16 +231,17 @@ sigma.nextIndex++ return (sigma`, msg) ``` -#### 2SM-Receive +#### The 2SM-Receive -This function utilizes the metadata of the message `c` to determine which secret key to utilize for decryption, -assigning it to `sk`. -If the secret key corresponds to one generated by ourselves, -that secret key along with all keys with lower index are deleted. -This deletion is indicated by `sigma.mySks[≤ keyIndex] = empty_string`. +This function utilizes the metadata of the message `c` +to determine which secret key to utilize for decryption, +assigning it to `sk`. +If the secret key corresponds to one generated by ourselves, +that secret key along with all keys with lower index are deleted. +This deletion is indicated by `sigma.mySks[≤ keyIndex] = empty_string`. Subsequently, the new public and secret keys contained in the message are stored. -``` +```go (ciphertext, keySender, keyIndex) = c if keySender = "other" then sk = sigma.mySks[keyIndex] @@ -210,15 +251,16 @@ else sk = sigma.receivedSk sigma.otherPkSender = "other" return (sigma, m) ``` + ### PKE Syntax -The required PKE that MUST be used is ElGamal with a 2048-bit modulus `p`. +The required PKE that MUST be used is ElGamal with a 2048-bit modulus `p`. #### Parameters The following parameters must be used: -``` +```go p = 308920927247127345254346920820166145569 g = 2 ``` @@ -227,7 +269,7 @@ g = 2 Each user `u` MUST do the following: -``` +```go PKE-KGen(): a = randint(2, p-2) pk = (p, g, g^a) @@ -239,7 +281,7 @@ return (pk, sk) A user `v` encrypting a message `m` for `u` MUST follow these steps: -``` +```go PKE-Enc(pk): k = randint(2, p-2) eta = g^k % p @@ -249,24 +291,28 @@ return ((eta, delta)) #### PKE-Dec -The user `u` recovers a message `m` from a ciphertext `c` by performing the following operations: +The user `u` recovers a message `m` from a ciphertext `c` +by performing the following operations: -``` +```go PKE-Dec(sk): mu = eta^(p-1-sk) % p return ((mu * delta) % p) ``` ### DCGKA Syntax + #### Auxiliary functions -There exist 6 functions that are auxiliary for the rest of components of the protocol, namely: +There exist 6 functions that are auxiliary for the rest of components of the protocol, +namely: #### init -This function takes an `ID` as input and returns its associated initial state, denoted by `gamma`: +This function takes an `ID` as input and returns its associated initial state, +denoted by `gamma`: -``` +```go gamma.myId = ID gamma.mySeq = 0 gamma.history = empty @@ -279,25 +325,26 @@ return (gamma) #### encrypt-to -Upon reception of the recipient’s `ID` and a plaintext, -it encrypts a direct message for another group member. -Should it be the first message for a particular `ID`, -then the `2SM` protocol state is initialized and stored in `gamma.2sm[recipient.ID]`. -One then uses `2SM_Send` to encrypt the message and store the updated protocol in `gamma`. +Upon reception of the recipient’s `ID` and a plaintext, +it encrypts a direct message for another group member. +Should it be the first message for a particular `ID`, +then the `2SM` protocol state is initialized and stored in `gamma.2sm[recipient.ID]`. +One then uses `2SM_Send` to encrypt the message and +store the updated protocol in `gamma`. -``` +```go if gamma.2sm[recipient_ID] = empty_string then - gamma.2sm[recipient_ID] = 2SM_Init(gamma.myID, recipient_ID) + gamma.2sm[recipient_ID] = 2SM_Init(gamma.myID, recipient_ID) (gamma.2sm[recipient_ID], ciphertext) = 2SM_Send(gamma.2sm[recipient_ID], plaintext) return (gamma, ciphertext) ``` #### decrypt-from -After receiving the sender’s `ID` and a ciphertext, +After receiving the sender’s `ID` and a ciphertext, it behaves as the reverse function of `encrypt-to` and has a similar initialization: -``` +```go if gamma.2sm[sender_ID] = empty_string then gamma.2sm[sender_ID] = 2SM_Init(gamma.myID, sender_ID) (gamma.2sm[sender_ID], plaintext) = 2SM_Receive(gamma.2sm[sender_ID], ciphertext) @@ -306,35 +353,38 @@ return (gamma, plaintext) #### update-ratchet -This function generates the next update secret `I_update` for the group member `ID`. -The ratchet state is stored in `gamma.ratchet[ID]`. -It is required to use a HMAC-based key derivation function HKDF to combine the ratchet state with an input, +This function generates the next update secret `I_update` for the group member `ID`. +The ratchet state is stored in `gamma.ratchet[ID]`. +It is required to use a HMAC-based key derivation function HKDF +to combine the ratchet state with an input, returning an update secret and a new ratchet state. -``` +```go (updateSecret, gamma.ratchet[ID]) = HKDF(gamma.ratchet[ID], input) return (gamma, updateSecret) ``` #### member-view -This function calculates the set of group members based on the most recent control message sent by the specified user `ID`. -It filters the group membership operations to include only those observed by the specified `ID`, and +This function calculates the set of group members +based on the most recent control message sent by the specified user `ID`. +It filters the group membership operations +to include only those observed by the specified `ID`, and then invokes the DGM function to generate the group membership. -``` +```go ops = {m in gamma.history st. m was sent or acknowledged by ID} return DGM(ops) ``` #### generate-seed -This functions generates a random bit string and -sends it encrypted to each member of the group using the `2SM` mechanism. -It returns the updated protocol state and +This functions generates a random bit string and +sends it encrypted to each member of the group using the `2SM` mechanism. +It returns the updated protocol state and the set of direct messages (denoted as `dmsgs`) to send. -``` +```go gamma.nextSeed = random.randbytes() dmsgs = empty for each ID in recipients: @@ -348,17 +398,19 @@ return (gamma, dmsgs) A group is generated in a 3 steps procedure: 1. A user calls the `create` function and broadcasts a control message of type *create*. -2. Each receiver of the message processes the message and broadcasts an *ack* control message. +2. Each receiver of the message processes the message and +broadcasts an *ack* control message. 3. Each member processes the *ack* message received. #### create -This function generates a *create* control message and -calls `generate-seed` to define the set of direct messages that need to be sent. -Then it calls `process-create` to process the control message for this user. -The function `process-create` returns a tuple including an updated state gamma and + +This function generates a *create* control message and +calls `generate-seed` to define the set of direct messages that need to be sent. +Then it calls `process-create` to process the control message for this user. +The function `process-create` returns a tuple including an updated state gamma and an update secret `I`. -``` +```go control = (“create”, gamma.mySeq, IDs) (gamma, dmsgs) = generate-seed(gamma, IDs) (gamma, _, _, I, _) = process-create(gamma, gamma.myId, gamma.mySeq, IDs, empty_string) @@ -366,31 +418,36 @@ return (gamma, control, dmsgs, I) ``` #### process-seed -This function initially employs `member-view` to identify the users who were part of the group when the control message was dispatched. + +This function initially employs `member-view` to +identify the users who were part of the group when the control message was dispatched. Then, it attempts to acquire the seed secret through the following steps: 1. If the control message was dispatched by the local user, it uses the most recent invocation of `generate-seed` stored the seed secret in `gamma.nextSeed`. 2. If the `control` message was dispatched by another user, and -the local user is among its recipients, -the function utilizes `decrypt-from` to decrypt the direct message that includes the seed secret. +the local user is among its recipients, +the function utilizes `decrypt-from` to decrypt the direct message +that includes the seed secret. 3. Otherwise, it returns an `ack` message without deriving an update secret. -Afterwards, `process-seed` generates separate member secrets for each group member from the seed secret by combining the seed secret and -each user ID using HKDF. -The secret for the sender of the message is stored in `senderSecret`, -while those for the other group members are stored in `gamma.memberSecret`. -The sender's member secret is immediately utilized to update their KDF ratchet and -compute their update secret `I_sender` using `update-ratchet`. -If the local user is the sender of the control message, -the process is completed, and the update secret is returned. -However, if the seed secret is received from another user, -an `ack` control message is constructed for broadcast, +Afterwards, `process-seed` generates separate member secrets +for each group member from the seed secret by combining the seed secret and +each user ID using HKDF. +The secret for the sender of the message is stored in `senderSecret`, +while those for the other group members are stored in `gamma.memberSecret`. +The sender's member secret is immediately utilized to update their KDF ratchet and +compute their update secret `I_sender` using `update-ratchet`. +If the local user is the sender of the control message, +the process is completed, and the update secret is returned. +However, if the seed secret is received from another user, +an `ack` control message is constructed for broadcast, including the sender ID and sequence number of the message being acknowledged. -The final step computes an update secret `I_me` for the local user invoking the `process-ack` function. +The final step computes an update secret `I_me` +for the local user invoking the `process-ack` function. -``` +```go recipients = member-view(gamma, sender) - {sender} if sender = gamma.myId then seed = gamma.nextSeed; gamma.nextSeed = empty_string else if gamma.myId in recipients then (gamma, seed) = decrypt-from(gamma, sender, dmsg) @@ -406,39 +463,44 @@ control = (ack, ++gamma.mySeq, (sender, seq)) members = member-view(gamma, gamma.myId) forward = empty for ID in {members - (recipients + {sender})} - s = gamma.memberSecret[sender, seq, gamma.myId] - (gamma, msg) = encrypt-to(gamma, ID, s) - forward = forward + {(ID, msg)} + s = gamma.memberSecret[sender, seq, gamma.myId] + (gamma, msg) = encrypt-to(gamma, ID, s) + forward = forward + {(ID, msg)} (gamma, _, _, I_me, _) = process-ack(gamma, gamma.myId, gamma.mySeq, (sender, seq), empty_string) return (gamma, control, forward, I_sender, I_me) ``` #### process-create -This function is called by the sender and each of the receivers of the `create` control message. -First, it records the information from the create message in the `gamma.history+ {op}`, -which is used to track group membership changes. Then, it proceeds to call `process-seed`. -``` +This function is called by the sender and +each of the receivers of the `create` control message. +First, it records the information from the create message +in the `gamma.history+ {op}`, which is used to track group membership changes. +Then, it proceeds to call `process-seed`. + +```go op = (”create”, sender, seq, IDs) gamma.history = gamma.history + {op} return (process-seed(gamma, sender, seq, dmsg)) ``` #### process-ack -This function is called by those group members once they receive an ack message. -In `process-ack`, `ackID` and `ackSeq` are the sender and -sequence number of the acknowledged message. -Firstly, if the acknowledged message is a group membership operation, -it records the acknowledgement in `gamma.history`. + +This function is called by those group members once they receive an ack message. +In `process-ack`, `ackID` and `ackSeq` are the sender and +sequence number of the acknowledged message. +Firstly, if the acknowledged message is a group membership operation, +it records the acknowledgement in `gamma.history`. Following this, the function retrieves the relevant member secret from `gamma.memberSecret`, -which was previously obtained from the seed secret contained in the acknowledged message. +which was previously obtained from the seed secret +contained in the acknowledged message. -Finally, it updates the ratchet for the sender of the `ack` and +Finally, it updates the ratchet for the sender of the `ack` and returns the resulting update secret. -``` +```go if (ackID, ackSeq) was a create / add / remove then op = ("ack", sender, seq, ackID, ackSeq) gamma.history = gamma.history + {op}` @@ -452,21 +514,24 @@ return (gamma, empty_string, empty_string, I, empty_string) The HKDF function MUST follow RFC 5869 using the hash function SHA256. - ### Post-compromise security updates and group member removal -The functions `update` and `remove` share similarities with `create`: -they both call the function `generate-seed` to encrypt a new seed secret for each group member. -The distinction lies in the determination of the group members using `member-view`. -In the case of `remove`, the user being removed is excluded from the recipients of the seed secret. -Additionally, the control message they construct is designated with type `update` or `remove` respectively. - -Likewise, `process-update` and `process-remove` are akin to `process-create`. -The function `process-update` skips the update of `gamma.history`, +The functions `update` and `remove` share similarities with `create`: +they both call the function `generate-seed` +to encrypt a new seed secret for each group member. +The distinction lies in the determination of the group members using `member-view`. +In the case of `remove`, +the user being removed is excluded from the recipients of the seed secret. +Additionally, the control message they construct is designated with type `update` + or `remove` respectively. + +Likewise, `process-update` and `process-remove` are akin to `process-create`. +The function `process-update` skips the update of `gamma.history`, whereas `process-remove` includes a removal operation in the history. #### update -``` + +```go control = ("update", ++gamma.mySeq, empty_string) recipients = member-view(gamma, gamma.myId) - {gamma.myId} (gamma, dmsgs) = generate-seed(gamma, recipients) @@ -475,7 +540,8 @@ return (gamma, control, dmsgs, I) ``` #### remove -``` + +```go control = ("remove", ++gamma.mySeq, empty) recipients = member-view(gamma, gamma.myId) - {ID, gamma.myId} (gamma, dmsgs) = generate-seed(gamma, recipients) @@ -484,10 +550,12 @@ return (gamma, control, dmsgs, I) ``` #### process-update + `return process-seed(gamma, sender, seq, dmsg)` #### process-remove -``` + +```go op = ("remove", sender, seq, removed) gamma.history = gamma.history + {op} return process-seed(gamma, sender, seq, dmsg) @@ -496,15 +564,18 @@ return process-seed(gamma, sender, seq, dmsg) ### Group member addition #### add -When adding a new group member, -an existing member initiates the process by invoking the `add` function and -providing the ID of the user to be added. -This function prepares a control message marked as `add` for broadcast to the group. -Simultaneously, it creates a welcome message intended for the new member as a direct message. -This `welcome` message includes the current state of the sender's KDF ratchet, -encrypted using `2SM`, along with the history of group membership operations conducted so far. -``` +When adding a new group member, +an existing member initiates the process by invoking the `add` function and +providing the ID of the user to be added. +This function prepares a control message marked as `add` for broadcast to the group. +Simultaneously, it creates a welcome message intended for the new member +as a direct message. +This `welcome` message includes the current state of the sender's KDF ratchet, +encrypted using `2SM`, +along with the history of group membership operations conducted so far. + +```go control = ("add", ++gamma.mySeq, ID) (gamma, c) = encrypt-to(gamma, ID, gamma.ratchet[gamma.myId]) op = ("add", gamma.myId, gamma.mySeq, ID) @@ -514,39 +585,44 @@ return (gamma, control, (ID, welcome), I) ``` #### process-add -This function is invoked by both the sender and -each recipient of an `add` message, which includes the new group member. -If the local user is the newly added member, -the function proceeds to call `process-welcome` and then exits. + +This function is invoked by both the sender and +each recipient of an `add` message, which includes the new group member. +If the local user is the newly added member, +the function proceeds to call `process-welcome` and then exits. Otherwise, it extends `gamma.history` with the `add` operation. -Line 5 determines whether the local user was already a group member at the time the `add` message was sent; +Line 5 determines whether the local user was already a group member +at the time the `add` message was sent; this condition is typically true but may be false if multiple users were added concurrently. -On lines 6 to 8, the ratchet for the sender of the *add* message is updated twice. -In both calls to `update-ratchet`, +On lines 6 to 8, the ratchet for the sender of the *add* message is updated twice. +In both calls to `update-ratchet`, a constant string is used as the ratchet input instead of a random seed secret. -The value returned by the first ratchet update is stored in `gamma.memberSecret` as the added user’s initial member secret. -The result of the second ratchet update becomes `I_sender`, -the update secret for the sender of the `add` message. +The value returned by the first ratchet update is stored in `gamma.memberSecret` +as the added user’s initial member secret. +The result of the second ratchet update becomes `I_sender`, +the update secret for the sender of the `add` message. On line 10, if the local user is the sender, the update secret is returned. -If the local user is not the sender, an acknowledgment for the `add` message is required. -Therefore, on line 11, a control message of type `add-ack` is constructed for broadcast. -Subsequently, in line 12 the current ratchet state is encrypted using `2SM` to generate a direct message intended for the added user, -allowing them to decrypt subsequent messages sent by the sender. -Finally, in lines 13 to 15, `process-add-ack` is called to calculate the local user’s update secret (`I_me`), +If the local user is not the sender, an acknowledgment for the `add` message is required. +Therefore, on line 11, a control message of type `add-ack` is constructed for broadcast. +Subsequently, in line 12 the current ratchet state is encrypted using `2SM` +to generate a direct message intended for the added user, +allowing them to decrypt subsequent messages sent by the sender. +Finally, in lines 13 to 15, +`process-add-ack` is called to calculate the local user’s update secret (`I_me`), which is then returned along with `I_sender`. -``` +```go if added = gamma.myId then return process-welcome(gamma, sender, seq, dmsg) op = ("add", sender, seq, added) gamma.history = gamma.history + {op} if gamma.myId in member-view(gamma, sender) then - (gamma, s) = update-ratchet(gamma, sender, "welcome") - gamma.memberSecret[sender, seq, added] = s - (gamma, I_sender) = update-ratchet(gamma, sender, "add") + (gamma, s) = update-ratchet(gamma, sender, "welcome") + gamma.memberSecret[sender, seq, added] = s + (gamma, I_sender) = update-ratchet(gamma, sender, "add") else I_sender = empty_string if sender = gamma.myId then return (gamma, empty_string, empty_string, I_sender, empty_string) control = ("add-ack", ++gamma.mySeq, (sender, seq)) @@ -556,62 +632,76 @@ return (gamma, control, {(added, c)}, I_sender, I_me) ``` #### process-add-ack -This function is invoked by both the sender and each recipient of an `add-ack` message, -including the new group member. -Upon lines 1–2, the acknowledgment is added to `gamma.history`, -mirroring the process in `process-ack`. -If the current user is the new group member, -the `add-ack` message includes the direct message constructed in `process-add`; -this direct message contains the encrypted ratchet state of the sender of the `add-ack`, + +This function is invoked by both the sender and each recipient of an `add-ack` message, +including the new group member. +Upon lines 1–2, the acknowledgment is added to `gamma.history`, +mirroring the process in `process-ack`. +If the current user is the new group member, +the `add-ack` message includes the direct message constructed in `process-add`; +this direct message contains the encrypted ratchet state of the sender of the `add-ack`, then it is decrypted on lines 3–5. -Upon line 6, a check is performed to check if the local user was already a group member at the time the `add-ack` was sent. -If affirmative, a new update secret `I` for the sender of the `add-ack` is computed on line 7 by invoking `update-ratchet` with the constant string `add`. +Upon line 6, +a check is performed to check if the local user +was already a group member at the time the `add-ack` was sent. +If affirmative, a new update secret `I` for the sender of the `add-ack` +is computed on line 7 by invoking `update-ratchet` with the constant string `add`. -In the scenario involving the new member, +In the scenario involving the new member, the ratchet state was recently initialized on line 5. -This ratchet update facilitates all group members, including the new addition, +This ratchet update facilitates all group members, including the new addition, to derive each member’s update by obtaining any update secret from before their inclusion. -``` +```go op = ("ack", sender, seq, ackID, ackSeq) gamma$.history = gamma.history + {op} if dmsg != empty_string then - (gamma, s) = decrypt-from(gamma, sender, dmsg) - gamma.ratchet[sender] = s + (gamma, s) = decrypt-from(gamma, sender, dmsg) + gamma.ratchet[sender] = s if gamma.myId in member-view(gamma, sender) then - (gamma, I) = update-ratchet(gamma, sender, "add") - return (gamma, empty_string, empty_string, I, empty_string) + (gamma, I) = update-ratchet(gamma, sender, "add") + return (gamma, empty_string, empty_string, I, empty_string) else return (gamma, empty_string, empty_string, empty_string, empty_string) ``` #### process-welcome -This function serves as the second step called by a newly added group member. -In this context, `adderHistory` represents the adding user’s copy of `gamma.history` sent in their welcome message, -which is utilized to initialize the added user’s history. -Here, `c` denotes the ciphertext of the adding user’s ratchet state, + +This function serves as the second step called by a newly added group member. +In this context, `adderHistory` represents the adding user’s copy of `gamma.history` +sent in their welcome message, +which is utilized to initialize the added user’s history. +Here, `c` denotes the ciphertext of the adding user’s ratchet state, which is decrypted on line 2 using `decrypt-from`. -Once `gamma.ratchet[sender]` is initialized, -`update-ratchet` is invoked twice on lines 3 to 5 with the constant strings `welcome` and `add` respectively. -These operations mirror the ratchet operations performed by every other group member in `process-add`. -The outcome of the first `update-ratchet` call becomes the first member secret for the added user, -while the second call returns `I_sender`, the update secret for the sender of the add operation. - -Subsequently, the new group member constructs an *ack* control message to broadcast on line 6 and -calls `process-ack` to compute their initial update secret I_me. -The function `process-ack` reads from `gamma.memberSecret` and -passes it to `update-ratchet`. -The previous ratchet state for the new member is the empty string `empty`, as established by `init`, -thereby initializing the new member’s ratchet. -Upon receiving the new member’s `ack`, -every other group member initializes their copy of the new member’s ratchet in a similar manner. - -By the conclusion of `process-welcome`, -the new group member has acquired update secrets for themselves and the user who added them. +Once `gamma.ratchet[sender]` is initialized, +`update-ratchet` is invoked twice on lines 3 to 5 with the constant strings `welcome` +and `add` respectively. +These operations mirror the ratchet operations +performed by every other group member in `process-add`. +The outcome of the first `update-ratchet` call +becomes the first member secret for the added user, +while the second call returns `I_sender`, +the update secret for the sender of the add operation. + +Subsequently, the new group member constructs an *ack* control message +to broadcast on line 6 and +calls `process-ack` to compute their initial update secret I_me. +The function `process-ack` reads from `gamma.memberSecret` and +passes it to `update-ratchet`. +The previous ratchet state for the new member is the empty string `empty`, +as established by `init`, +thereby initializing the new member’s ratchet. +Upon receiving the new member’s `ack`, +every other group member initializes their copy of the new member’s ratchet +in a similar manner. + +By the conclusion of `process-welcome`, +the new group member has acquired update secrets for themselves and +the user who added them. The ratchets for other group members are initialized by `process-add-ack`. -``` +```go gamma.history = adderHistory (gamma, gamma.ratchet[sender]) = decrypt-from(gamma, sender, c) (gamma, s) = update-ratchet(gamma, sender, "welcome") @@ -625,59 +715,84 @@ return (gamma, control, empty_string , I_sender, I_me) ## Privacy Considerations ### Dependency on PKI -The [DCGKA](https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1281) proposal presents some limitations highlighted by the authors. -Among these limitations one finds the requirement of a PKI (or a key server) mapping IDs to public keys. -One method to overcome this limitation is adapting the protocol SIWE (Sign in with Ethereum) so -a user `u_1` who wants to start a communication with a user `u_2` can interact with latter’s wallet to request a public key using an Ethereum address as `ID`. +The [DCGKA](https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1281) +proposal presents some limitations highlighted by the authors. +Among these limitations one finds the requirement of a PKI +(or a key server) mapping IDs to public keys. + +One method to overcome this limitation is adapting the protocol SIWE +(Sign in with Ethereum) so a user `u_1` who wants to start a communication +with a user `u_2` can interact with latter’s wallet to request a public key +using an Ethereum address as `ID`. #### SIWE -The [SIWE](https://docs.login.xyz/general-information/siwe-overview) (Sign In With Ethereum) proposal was a suggested standard for leveraging Ethereum to authenticate and authorize users on web3 applications. -Its goal is to establish a standardized method for users to sign in to web3 applications using their Ethereum address and private key, -mirroring the process by which users currently sign in to web2 applications using their email and password. + +The [SIWE](https://docs.login.xyz/general-information/siwe-overview) +(Sign In With Ethereum) proposal was a suggested standard for leveraging Ethereum +to authenticate and authorize users on web3 applications. +Its goal is to establish a standardized method for users +to sign in to web3 applications using their Ethereum address and private key, +mirroring the process by which users currently sign in to web2 applications +using their email and password. Below follows the required steps: 1. A server generates a unique Nonce for each user intending to sign in. 2. A user initiates a request to connect to a website using their wallet. -3. The user is presented with a distinctive message that includes the Nonce and details about the website. +3. The user is presented with a distinctive message that includes the Nonce and +details about the website. 4. The user authenticates their identity by signing in with their wallet. 5. Upon successful authentication, the user's identity is confirmed or approved. 6. The website grants access to data specific to the authenticated user. #### Our approach -The idea in the [DCGKA](https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1281) setting closely resembles the procedure outlined in SIWE. Here: + +The idea in the [DCGKA](https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1281) +setting closely resembles the procedure outlined in SIWE. Here: 1. The server corresponds to user D1, -who initiates a request (instead of generating a nonce) to obtain the public key of user D2. -2. Upon receiving the request, the wallet of D2 send the request to the user, +who initiates a request (instead of generating a nonce) +to obtain the public key of user D2. +2. Upon receiving the request, the wallet of D2 send the request to the user, 3. User D2 receives the request from the wallet, and decides whether accepts or rejects. -4. The wallet and responds with a message containing the requested public key in case of acceptance by D2. +4. The wallet and responds with a message containing the requested public key +in case of acceptance by D2. -This message may be signed, allowing D1 to verify that the owner of the received public key is indeed D2. +This message may be signed, +allowing D1 to verify that the owner of the received public key is indeed D2. ### Multi-device setting -One may see the set of devices as a group and create a group key for internal communications. -One may use treeKEM for instance, -since it provides interesting properties like forward secrecy and post-compromise security. -All devices share the same `ID`, -which is held by one of them, and from other user’s point of view, they would look as a single user. - -Using servers, like in the paper [Multi-Device for Signal](https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1363), should be avoided; -but this would imply using a particular device as receiver and broadcaster within the group. -There is an obvious drawback which is having a single device working as a “server”. -Should this device be attacked or without connection, there should be a mechanism for its revocation and replacement. - -Another approach for communications between devices could be using the keypair of each device. + +One may see the set of devices as a group and create a group key for internal communications. +One may use treeKEM for instance, +since it provides interesting properties like forward secrecy and +post-compromise security. +All devices share the same `ID`, +which is held by one of them, and from other user’s point of view, +they would look as a single user. + +Using servers, +like in the paper [Multi-Device for Signal](https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1363), +should be avoided; but this would imply using a particular device as receiver and +broadcaster within the group. +There is an obvious drawback which is having a single device working as a “server”. +Should this device be attacked or without connection, +there should be a mechanism for its revocation and replacement. + +Another approach for communications between devices +could be using the keypair of each device. This could open the door to use UPKE, since keypairs should be regenerated frequently. -Each time a device sends a message, either an internal message or an external message, +Each time a device sends a message, either an internal message or an external message, it needs to replicate and broadcast it to all devices in the group. The mechanism for the substitution of misbehaving leader devices follows: 1. Each device within a group knows the details of other leader devices. -This information may come from metadata in received messages, and is replicated by the leader device. -2. To replace a leader, the user should select any other device within its group and +This information may come from metadata in received messages, and +is replicated by the leader device. +2. To replace a leader, +the user should select any other device within its group and use it to send a signed message to all other users. 3. To get the ability to sign messages, this new leader should request the keypair associated to the ID to the wallet. @@ -685,42 +800,53 @@ this new leader should request the keypair associated to the ID to the wallet. it revocates access from DCGKA to the former leader using the DCGKA protocol. 5. The new leader starts a key update in DCGKA. -Not all devices in a group should be able to send messages to other users. -Only the leader device should be in charge of sending and receiving messages. -To prevent other devices from sending messages outside their group, a requirement should be signing each message. +Not all devices in a group should be able to send messages to other users. +Only the leader device should be in charge of sending and receiving messages. +To prevent other devices from sending messages outside their group, +a requirement should be signing each message. The keys associated to the `ID` should only be in control of the leader device. -The leader device is in charge of setting the keys involved in the DCGKA. +The leader device is in charge of setting the keys involved in the DCGKA. This information must be replicated within the group to make sure it is updated. To detect missing messages or potential misbehavior, messages must include a counter. ### Using UPKE -Managing the group of devices of a user can be done either using a group key protocol such as treeKEM or -using the keypair of each device. -Setting a common key for a group of devices under the control of the same actor might be excessive, -furthermore it may imply some of the problems one can find in the usual setting of a group of different users; -for example: one of the devices may not participate in the required updating processes, representing a threat for the group. - -The other approach to managing the group of devices is using each device’s keypair, -but it would require each device updating these materia frequently, something that may not happens. - -[UPKE](https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/068) is a form of asymetric cryptography -where any user can update any other user’s key pair by running an update algorithm with (high-entropy) private coins. -Any sender can initiate a *key update* by sending a special update ciphertext. -This ciphertext updates the receiver’s public key and also, once processed by the receiver, will update their secret key. - -To the best of my knowledge, -there exists several efficient constructions both [UPKE from ElGamal](https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1189) (based in the DH assumption) and -[UPKE from Lattices]((https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1400)) (based in lattices). -None of them have been implemented in a secure messaging protocol, and this opens the door to some novel research. +Managing the group of devices of a user can be done either +using a group key protocol such as treeKEM or +using the keypair of each device. +Setting a common key for a group of devices +under the control of the same actor might be excessive, +furthermore it may imply some of the problems one can find +in the usual setting of a group of different users; +for example: one of the devices may not participate in the required updating processes, +representing a threat for the group. + +The other approach to managing the group of devices is using each device’s keypair, +but it would require each device updating these materia frequently, +something that may not happens. + +[UPKE](https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/068) is a form of asymetric cryptography +where any user can update any other user’s key pair +by running an update algorithm with (high-entropy) private coins. +Any sender can initiate a *key update* by sending a special update ciphertext. +This ciphertext updates the receiver’s public key and also, +once processed by the receiver, will update their secret key. + +To the best of my knowledge, +there exists several efficient constructions both [UPKE from ElGamal](https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1189) +(based in the DH assumption) and +[UPKE from Lattices]((https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1400)) (based in lattices). +None of them have been implemented in a secure messaging protocol, and +this opens the door to some novel research. ## Copyright Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). ## References + - [DCGKA](https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1281) - [MLS](https://messaginglayersecurity.rocks) - [CoCoa](https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/251) diff --git a/vac/raw/gossipsub-tor-push.md b/vac/raw/gossipsub-tor-push.md index 9f8f0e60b..ce0633148 100644 --- a/vac/raw/gossipsub-tor-push.md +++ b/vac/raw/gossipsub-tor-push.md @@ -18,21 +18,31 @@ Tor Push adds sender identity protection to gossipsub. **Protocol identifier**: /meshsub/1.1.0 Note: Gossipsub Tor Push does not have a dedicated protocol identifier. -It uses the same identifier as gossipsub and works with all [pubsub](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/tree/master/pubsub) based protocols. -This allows nodes that are oblivious to Tor Push to process messages received via Tor Push. +It uses the same identifier as gossipsub and +works with all [pubsub](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/tree/master/pubsub) +based protocols. +This allows nodes that are oblivious to Tor Push to process messages received via +Tor Push. ## Background Without extensions, [libp2p gossipsub](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/gossipsub/README.md) does not protect sender identities. -A possible design of an anonymity extension to gossipsub is pushing messages through an anonymization network before they enter the gossipsub network. +A possible design of an anonymity extension to gossipsub +is pushing messages through an anonymization network +before they enter the gossipsub network. [Tor](https://www.torproject.org/) is currently the largest anonymization network. It is well researched and works reliably. -Basing our solution on Tor both inherits existing security research, as well as allows for a quick deployment. +Basing our solution on Tor both inherits existing security research, +as well as allows for a quick deployment. -Using the anonymization network approach, even the first gossipsub node that relays a given message cannot link the message to its sender (within a relatively strong adversarial model). -Taking the low bandwidth overhead and the low latency overhead into consideration, Tor offers very good anonymity properties. +Using the anonymization network approach, +even the first gossipsub node that relays a given message +cannot link the message to its sender +(within a relatively strong adversarial model). +Taking the low bandwidth overhead and the low latency overhead into consideration, +Tor offers very good anonymity properties. ## Functional Operation @@ -44,17 +54,20 @@ because Tor Push uses the same Protocol ID as gossipsub. Messages are sent over Tor via [SOCKS5](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1928). Tor Push uses a dedicated libp2p context to prevent information leakage. To significantly increase resilience and mitigate circuit failures, -Tor Push establishes several connections, each to a different randomly selected gossipsub node. +Tor Push establishes several connections, +each to a different randomly selected gossipsub node. ## Specification -This section specifies the format of Tor Push messages, as well as how Tor Push messages are received and sent, respectively. +This section specifies the format of Tor Push messages, +as well as how Tor Push messages are received and sent, respectively. ### Wire Format -The wire format of a Tor Push message corresponds verbatim to a typical [libp2p pubsub message](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/tree/master/pubsub#the-message). +The wire format of a Tor Push message corresponds verbatim to a typical +[libp2p pubsub message](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/tree/master/pubsub#the-message). -``` +```protobuf message Message { optional string from = 1; optional bytes data = 2; @@ -67,12 +80,15 @@ message Message { ### Receiving Tor Push Messages -Any node supporting a protocol with ID `/meshsub/1.1.0` (e.g. gossipsub), can receive Tor Push messages. -Receiving nodes are oblivious to Tor Push and will process incoming messages according to the respective `meshsub/1.1.0` specification. +Any node supporting a protocol with ID `/meshsub/1.1.0` (e.g. gossipsub), +can receive Tor Push messages. +Receiving nodes are oblivious to Tor Push and +will process incoming messages according to the respective `meshsub/1.1.0` specification. ### Sending Tor Push Messages -In the following, we refer to nodes sending Tor Push messages as Tp-nodes (Tor Push nodes). +In the following, we refer to nodes sending Tor Push messages as Tp-nodes +(Tor Push nodes). Tp-nodes MUST setup a separate libp2p context, i.e. [libp2p switch](https://docs.libp2p.io/concepts/multiplex/switch/), which MUST NOT be used for any purpose other than Tor Push. @@ -81,29 +97,38 @@ The Tp-context MUST NOT share any data, e.g. peer lists, with the default contex Tp-peers are peers a Tp-node plans to send Tp-messages to. Tp-peers MUST support `/meshsub/1.1.0`. -For retrieving Tp-peers, Tp-nodes SHOULD use an ambient peer discovery method that retrieves a random peer sample (from the set of all peers), e.g. [33/WAKU2-DISCV5](../../waku/standards/core/33/discv5.md). - -Tp-nodes MUST establish a connection as described in sub-section [Tor Push Connection Establishment](#connection-establishment) to at least one Tp-peer. -To significantly increase resilience, Tp-nodes SHOULD establish Tp-connections to `D` peers, +For retrieving Tp-peers, +Tp-nodes SHOULD use an ambient peer discovery method +that retrieves a random peer sample (from the set of all peers), +e.g. [33/WAKU2-DISCV5](../../waku/standards/core/33/discv5.md). + +Tp-nodes MUST establish a connection as described in sub-section +[Tor Push Connection Establishment](#connection-establishment) to at least one Tp-peer. +To significantly increase resilience, +Tp-nodes SHOULD establish Tp-connections to `D` peers, where `D` is the [desired gossipsub out-degree](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/gossipsub/gossipsub-v1.0.md#parameters), with a default value of `8`. Each Tp-message MUST be sent via the Tp-context over at least one Tp-connection. -To increase resilience, Tp-messages SHOULD be sent via the Tp-context over all available Tp-connections. +To increase resilience, +Tp-messages SHOULD be sent via the Tp-context over all available Tp-connections. Control messages of any kind, e.g. gossipsub graft, MUST NOT be sent via Tor Push. #### Connection Establishment -Tp-nodes establish a `/meshsub/1.1.0` connection to tp-peers via [SOCKS5](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1928) over [Tor](https://www.torproject.org/). +Tp-nodes establish a `/meshsub/1.1.0` connection to tp-peers via +[SOCKS5](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1928) over [Tor](https://www.torproject.org/). -Establishing connections, which in turn establishes the respective Tor circuits, can be done ahead of time. +Establishing connections, which in turn establishes the respective Tor circuits, +can be done ahead of time. #### Epochs Tor Push introduces epochs. The default epoch duration is 10 minutes. -(We might adjust this default value based on experiments and evaluation in future versions of this document. +(We might adjust this default value based on experiments and +evaluation in future versions of this document. It seems a good trade-off between traceablity and circuit building overhead.) For each epoch, the Tp-context SHOULD be refreshed, which includes @@ -112,7 +137,9 @@ For each epoch, the Tp-context SHOULD be refreshed, which includes * Tp-peer list * connections to Tp-peers -Both Tp-peer selection for the next epoch and establishing connections to the newly selected peers SHOULD be done during the current epoch +Both Tp-peer selection for the next epoch and +establishing connections to the newly selected peers +SHOULD be done during the current epoch and be completed before the new epoch starts. This avoids adding latency to message transmission. @@ -120,42 +147,54 @@ This avoids adding latency to message transmission. ### Fingerprinting Attacks -Protocols that feature distinct patterns are prone to fingerprinting attacks when using them over Tor Push. +Protocols that feature distinct patterns are prone to fingerprinting attacks +when using them over Tor Push. Both malicious guards and exit nodes could detect these patterns and link the sender and receiver, respectively, to transmitted traffic. -As a mitigation, such protocols can introduce dummy messages and/or padding to hide patterns. +As a mitigation, such protocols can introduce dummy messages and/or +padding to hide patterns. ### DoS #### General DoS against Tor -Using untargeted DoS to prevent Tor Push messages from entering the gossipsub network would cost vast resources, -because Tor Push transmits messages over several circuits and the Tor network is well established. +Using untargeted DoS to prevent Tor Push messages +from entering the gossipsub network would cost vast resources, +because Tor Push transmits messages over several circuits and +the Tor network is well established. #### Targeting the Guard -Denying the service of a specific guard node blocks Tp-nodes using the respective guard. +Denying the service of a specific guard node +blocks Tp-nodes using the respective guard. Tor guard selection will replace this guard [TODO elaborate]. -Still, messages might be delayed during this window which might be critical to certain applications. +Still, messages might be delayed during this window +which might be critical to certain applications. #### Targeting the Gossipsub Network Without sophisticated rate limiting (for example using [17/WAKU2-RLN-RELAY](../../waku/standards/core/17/rln-relay.md)), attackers can spam the gossipsub network. It is not enough to just block peers that send too many messages, -because these messages might actually come from a Tor exit node that many honest Tp-nodes use. -Without Tor Push, protocols on top of gossipsub could block peers if they exceed a certain message rate. +because these messages might actually come from a Tor exit node +that many honest Tp-nodes use. +Without Tor Push, +protocols on top of gossipsub could block peers +if they exceed a certain message rate. With Tor Push, this would allow the reputation-based DoS attack described in [Bitcoin over Tor isn't a Good Idea](https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/7163022). #### Peer Discovery -The discovery mechanism could be abused to link requesting nodes to their Tor connections to discovered nodes. +The discovery mechanism could be abused to link requesting nodes +to their Tor connections to discovered nodes. An attacker that controls both the node that responds to a discovery query, and the node who’s ENR the response contains, -can link the requester to a Tor connection that is expected to be opened to the node represented by the returned ENR soon after. +can link the requester to a Tor connection +that is expected to be opened to the node represented by the returned ENR soon after. -Further, the discovery mechanism (e.g. discv5) could be abused to distribute disproportionately many malicious nodes. +Further, the discovery mechanism (e.g. discv5) +could be abused to distribute disproportionately many malicious nodes. For instance if p% of the nodes in the network are malicious, an attacker could manipulate the discovery to return malicious nodes with 2p% probability. The discovery mechanism needs to be resilient against this attack. @@ -163,8 +202,11 @@ The discovery mechanism needs to be resilient against this attack. ### Roll-out Phase During the roll-out phase of Tor Push, during which only a few nodes use Tor Push, -attackers can narrow down the senders of Tor messages to the set of gossipsub nodes that do not originate messages. -Nodes who want anonymity guarantees even during the roll-out phase can use separate network interfaces for their default context and Tp-context, respectively. +attackers can narrow down the senders of Tor messages +to the set of gossipsub nodes that do not originate messages. +Nodes who want anonymity guarantees even during the roll-out phase +can use separate network interfaces for their default context and +Tp-context, respectively. For the best protection, these contexts should run on separate physical machines. ## Copyright diff --git a/vac/raw/rln-interep-spec.md b/vac/raw/rln-interep-spec.md index 0936c1e5e..4df5139ab 100644 --- a/vac/raw/rln-interep-spec.md +++ b/vac/raw/rln-interep-spec.md @@ -10,54 +10,76 @@ contributors: ## Abstract -This spec integrates [Interep](https://interep.link) into the [RLN](../32/rln-v1.md) spec. -Interep is a group management protocol that allows for the creation of groups of users and the management of their membership. +This spec integrates [Interep](https://interep.link) +into the [RLN](../32/rln-v1.md) spec. +Interep is a group management protocol +that allows for the creation of groups of users and +the management of their membership. It is used to manage the membership of the RLN group. -Interep ties in web2 identities with reputation, and sorts the users into groups based on their reputation score. +Interep ties in web2 identities with reputation, and +sorts the users into groups based on their reputation score. For example, a GitHub user with over 100 followers is considered to have "gold" reputation. -Interep uses [Semaphore](https://semaphore.appliedzkp.org/) under the hood to allow anonymous signaling of membership in a group. -Therefore, a user with a "gold" reputation can prove the existence of their membership without revealing their identity. +Interep uses [Semaphore](https://semaphore.appliedzkp.org/) +under the hood to allow anonymous signaling of membership in a group. +Therefore, a user with a "gold" reputation can prove the existence +of their membership without revealing their identity. RLN is used for spam prevention, and Interep is used for group management. -By using Interep with RLN, we allow users to join RLN membership groups without the need for on-chain financial stake. +By using Interep with RLN, +we allow users to join RLN membership groups +without the need for on-chain financial stake. ## Motivation -To have Sybil-Resistant group management, there are [implementations](https://github.com/vacp2p/rln-contract) of RLN which make use of financial stake on-chain. +To have Sybil-Resistant group management, +there are [implementations](https://github.com/vacp2p/rln-contract) +of RLN which make use of financial stake on-chain. However, this is not ideal because it reduces the barrier of entry for honest participants. -In this case, honest participants will most likely have a web2 identity accessible to them, which can be used for joining an Interep reputation group. -By modifying the RLN spec to use Interep, we can have Sybil-Resistant group management without the need for on-chain financial stake. +In this case, +honest participants will most likely have a web2 identity accessible to them, +which can be used for joining an Interep reputation group. +By modifying the RLN spec to use Interep, +we can have Sybil-Resistant group management +without the need for on-chain financial stake. -Since RLN and Interep both use Semaphore-style credentials, it is possible to use the same set of credentials for both. +Since RLN and Interep both use Semaphore-style credentials, +it is possible to use the same set of credentials for both. ## Functional Operation Using Interep with RLN involves the following steps - -1. Generate Semaphore credentials +1. Generate Semaphore credentials 2. Verify reputation and join Interep group -3. Join RLN membership group via interaction with Smart Contract, by passing a proof of membership to the Interep group +3. Join RLN membership group via interaction with Smart Contract, +by passing a proof of membership to the Interep group ### 1. Generate Semaphore credentials -Semaphore credentials are generated in a standard way, depicted in the [Semaphore documentation](https://semaphore.appliedzkp.org/docs/guides/identities#create-deterministic-identities). +Semaphore credentials are generated in a standard way, +depicted in the [Semaphore documentation](https://semaphore.appliedzkp.org/docs/guides/identities#create-deterministic-identities). ### 2. Verify reputation and join Interep group -Using the Interep app deployed on [Goerli](https://goerli.interep.link/), the user can check their reputation tier and join the corresponding group. +Using the Interep app deployed on [Goerli](https://goerli.interep.link/), +the user can check their reputation tier and join the corresponding group. This results in a transaction to the Interep contract, which adds them to the group. ### 3. Join RLN membership group -Instead of sending funds to the RLN contract to join the membership group, the user can send a proof of membership to the Interep group. -This proof is generated by the user, and is verified by the contract. -The contract ensures that the user is a member of the Interep group, and then adds them to the RLN membership group. +Instead of sending funds to the RLN contract to join the membership group, +the user can send a proof of membership to the Interep group. +This proof is generated by the user, and +is verified by the contract. +The contract ensures that the user is a member of the Interep group, and +then adds them to the RLN membership group. -Following is the modified signature of the register function in the RLN contract - +Following is the modified signature of the register function +in the RLN contract - ```solidity /// @param groupId: Id of the group. @@ -83,19 +105,29 @@ Messages are verified the same way as in the [RLN spec](../32/rln-v1.md/#verific ## Slashing The slashing mechanism is the same as in the [RLN spec](../32/rln-v1.md/#slashing). -It is important to note that the slashing may not have the intended effect on the user, since the only consequence is that they cannot send messages. -This is due to the fact that the user can send a identity commitment in the registration to the RLN contract, which is different than the one used in the Interep group. +It is important to note that the slashing +may not have the intended effect on the user, +since the only consequence is that they cannot send messages. +This is due to the fact that the user +can send a identity commitment in the registration to the RLN contract, +which is different than the one used in the Interep group. ## Proof of Concept -A proof of concept is available at [vacp2p/rln-interp-contract](https://github.com/vacp2p/rln-interep-contract) which integrates Interep with RLN. +A proof of concept is available at +[vacp2p/rln-interp-contract](https://github.com/vacp2p/rln-interep-contract) +which integrates Interep with RLN. ## Security Considerations -1. As mentioned in [Slashing](#slashing), the slashing mechanism may not have the intended effect on the user. +1. As mentioned in [Slashing](#slashing), +the slashing mechanism may not have the intended effect on the user. 2. This spec inherits the security considerations of the [RLN spec](../32/rln-v1.md/#security-considerations). 3. This spec inherits the security considerations of [Interep](https://docs.interep.link/). -4. A user may make multiple registrations using the same Interep proofs but different identity commitments. The way to mitigate this is to check if the nullifier hash has been detected previously in proof verification. +4. A user may make multiple registrations using the same Interep proofs but +different identity commitments. +The way to mitigate this is to check if the nullifier hash has been detected +previously in proof verification. ## References diff --git a/vac/raw/rln-stealth-commitments.md b/vac/raw/rln-stealth-commitments.md index 130fff66e..5408f7a14 100644 --- a/vac/raw/rln-stealth-commitments.md +++ b/vac/raw/rln-stealth-commitments.md @@ -9,42 +9,57 @@ contributors: ## Abstract -This specification describes the usage of stealth commitments to add prospective users to a network-governed [32/RLN-V1](./32/rln-v1.md) membership set. +This specification describes the usage of stealth commitments +to add prospective users to a network-governed +[32/RLN-V1](./32/rln-v1.md) membership set. ## Motivation -When [32/RLN-V1](./32/rln-v1.md) is enforced in [10/Waku2](../waku/standards/core/10/waku2.md), +When [32/RLN-V1](./32/rln-v1.md) is enforced in [10/Waku2](../waku/standards/core/10/waku2.md), all users are required to register to a membership set. -The membership set will store user identities allowing the secure interaction within an application. -Forcing a user to do an on-chain transaction to join a membership set is an onboarding friction, +The membership set will store user identities +allowing the secure interaction within an application. +Forcing a user to do an on-chain transaction +to join a membership set is an onboarding friction, and some projects may be opposed to this method. To improve the user experience, -stealth commitments can be used by a counterparty to register identities on the user's behalf, +stealth commitments can be used by a counterparty +to register identities on the user's behalf, while maintaining the user's anonymity. This document specifies a privacy-preserving mechanism, -allowing a counterparty to utilize [32/RLN-V1](./32/rln-v1.md) to register an `identityCommitment` on-chain. -Counterparties will be able to register members to a RLN membership set without exposing the user's private keys. +allowing a counterparty to utilize [32/RLN-V1](./32/rln-v1.md) +to register an `identityCommitment` on-chain. +Counterparties will be able to register members +to a RLN membership set without exposing the user's private keys. ## Background -The [32/RLN-V1](./32/rln-v1.md) protocol, -consists of a smart contract that stores a `idenitityCommitment` in a membership set. + +The [32/RLN-V1](./32/rln-v1.md) protocol, +consists of a smart contract that stores a `idenitityCommitment` +in a membership set. In order for a user to join the membership set, the user is required to make a transaction on the blockchain. A set of public keys is used to compute a stealth commitment for a user, as described in [ERC-5564](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-5564). -This specification is an implementation of the [ERC-5564](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-5564) scheme, +This specification is an implementation of the +[ERC-5564](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-5564) scheme, tailored to the curve that is used in the [32/RLN-V1](./32/rln-v1.md) protocol. This can be used in a couple of ways in applications: -1. Applications can add users to the [32/RLN-V1](./32/rln-v1.md) membership set in a batch. -2. Users of the application can register other users to the [32/RLN-V1](./32/rln-v1.md) membership set. -This is useful when the prospective user does not have access to funds on the network that [32/RLN-V1](./32/rln-v1.md) is deployed on. +1. Applications can add users +to the [32/RLN-V1](./32/rln-v1.md) membership set in a batch. +2. Users of the application +can register other users to the [32/RLN-V1](./32/rln-v1.md) membership set. + +This is useful when the prospective user does not have access to funds +on the network that [32/RLN-V1](./32/rln-v1.md) is deployed on. ## Wire Format Specification -The two parties, the requester and the receiver, MUST exchange the following information: +The two parties, the requester and the receiver, +MUST exchange the following information: ```protobuf @@ -55,14 +70,16 @@ message Request { // The viewing public key of the requester bytes viewing_public_key = 2; } - ``` + ### Generate Stealth Commitment -The application or user SHOULD generate a `stealth_commitment` after a request to do so is received. +The application or user SHOULD generate a `stealth_commitment` +after a request to do so is received. This commitment MAY be inserted into the corresponding application membership set. -Once the membership set is updated, the receiver SHOULD exchange the following as a response to the request: +Once the membership set is updated, +the receiver SHOULD exchange the following as a response to the request: ```protobuf @@ -81,18 +98,22 @@ message Response { ``` -The receiver MUST generate an `ephemeral_public_key`, `view_tag` and `stealth_commitment`. -This will be used to check the stealth commitment used to register to the membership set, +The receiver MUST generate an `ephemeral_public_key`, +`view_tag` and `stealth_commitment`. +This will be used to check the stealth commitment +used to register to the membership set, and the user MUST be able to check ownership with their `viewing_public_key`. ## Implementation Suggestions -An implementation of the Stealth Address scheme is available in the [erc-5564-bn254](https://github.com/rymnc/erc-5564-bn254) repository, +An implementation of the Stealth Address scheme is available in the +[erc-5564-bn254](https://github.com/rymnc/erc-5564-bn254) repository, which also includes a test to generate a stealth commitment for a given user. ## Security/Privacy Considerations -This specification inherits the security and privacy considerations of the [Stealth Address](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-5564) scheme. +This specification inherits the security and privacy considerations of the +[Stealth Address](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-5564) scheme. ## Copyright diff --git a/vac/raw/rln-v2.md b/vac/raw/rln-v2.md index c34a25966..4e4ab72f9 100644 --- a/vac/raw/rln-v2.md +++ b/vac/raw/rln-v2.md @@ -9,17 +9,26 @@ contributors: ## Abstract -The protocol specified in this document is an improvement of [32/RLN-V1](../32/rln-v1.md), being more general construct, that allows to set various limits for an epoch (it's 1 message per epoch in [32/RLN-V1](../32/rln-v1.md)) while remaining almost as simple as it predecessor. -Moreover, it allows to set different rate-limits for different RLN app users based on some public data, e.g. stake or reputation. +The protocol specified in this document is an improvement of [32/RLN-V1](../32/rln-v1.md), +being more general construct, that allows to set various limits for an epoch +(it's 1 message per epoch in [32/RLN-V1](../32/rln-v1.md)) +while remaining almost as simple as it predecessor. +Moreover, it allows to set different rate-limits +for different RLN app users based on some public data, +e.g. stake or reputation. ## Motivation -The main goal of this RFC is to generalize [32/RLN-V1](../32/rln-v1.md) and expand its applications. +The main goal of this RFC is to generalize [32/RLN-V1](../32/rln-v1.md) and +expand its applications. There are two different subprotocols based on this protocol: + * RLN-Same - RLN with the same rate-limit for all users; * RLN-Diff - RLN that allows to set different rate-limits for different users. -It is important to note that by using a large epoch limit value, users will be able to remain anonymous, because their `internal_nullifiers` will not be repeated until they exceed the limit. +It is important to note that by using a large epoch limit value, +users will be able to remain anonymous, +because their `internal_nullifiers` will not be repeated until they exceed the limit. ## Flow @@ -29,11 +38,13 @@ As in [32/RLN-V1](../32/rln-v1.md), the general flow can be described by three s 2. Signaling 3. Verification and slashing -The two sub-protocols have different flows, and hence are defined separately. +The two sub-protocols have different flows, and +hence are defined separately. ### Important note -All terms and parameters used remain the same as in [32/RLN-V1](../32/rln-v1.md), more details [here](../32/rln-v1.md/#technical-overview) +All terms and parameters used remain the same as in [32/RLN-V1](../32/rln-v1.md), +more details [here](../32/rln-v1.md/#technical-overview) ## RLN-Same flow @@ -41,13 +52,11 @@ All terms and parameters used remain the same as in [32/RLN-V1](../32/rln-v1.md) The registration process in the RLN-Same subprotocol does not differ from [32/RLN-V1](../32/rln-v1.md). -### Signalling - -#### Proof generation +Signalling For proof generation, the user needs to submit the following fields to the circuit: -``` +```js { identity_secret: identity_secret_hash, path_elements: Merkle_proof.path_elements, @@ -59,11 +68,11 @@ For proof generation, the user needs to submit the following fields to the circu } ``` -#### Calculating output +Calculating output The following fields are needed for proof output calculation: -``` +```js { identity_secret_hash: bigint, external_nullifier: bigint, @@ -74,7 +83,7 @@ The following fields are needed for proof output calculation: The output `[y, internal_nullifier]` is calculated in the following way: -``` +```js a_0 = identity_secret_hash a_1 = poseidonHash([a0, external_nullifier, message_id]) @@ -85,29 +94,36 @@ internal_nullifier = poseidonHash([a_1]) ## RLN-Diff flow -### Registration +Registration -**id_commitment** in [32/RLN-V1](../32/rln-v1.md) is equal to `poseidonHash(identity_secret)`. -The goal of RLN-Diff is to set different rate-limits for different users. -It follows that **id_commitment** must somehow depend on the `user_message_limit` parameter, where 0 <= `user_message_limit` <= `message_limit`. +**id_commitment** in [32/RLN-V1](../32/rln-v1.md) is equal to `poseidonHash(identity_secret)`. +The goal of RLN-Diff is to set different rate-limits for different users. +It follows that **id_commitment** must somehow depend +on the `user_message_limit` parameter, +where 0 <= `user_message_limit` <= `message_limit`. There are few ways to do that: -1. Sending `identity_secret_hash` = `poseidonHash(identity_secret, userMessageLimit)` and zk proof that `user_message_limit` is valid (is in the right range). -This approach requires zkSNARK verification, which is an expensive operation on the blockchain. -2. Sending the same `identity_secret_hash` as in [32/RLN-V1](../32/rln-v1.md) (`poseidonHash(identity_secret)`) and a user_message_limit publicly to a server or smart-contract where `rate_commitment` = `poseidonHash(identity_secret_hash, userMessageLimit)` is calculated. -The leaves in the membership Merkle tree would be the rate_commitments of the users. -This approach requires additional hashing in the Circuit, but it eliminates the need for zk proof verification for the registration. -Both methods are correct, and the choice of the method is left to the implementer. +1. Sending `identity_secret_hash` = `poseidonHash(identity_secret, userMessageLimit)` +and zk proof that `user_message_limit` is valid (is in the right range). +This approach requires zkSNARK verification, +which is an expensive operation on the blockchain. +2. Sending the same `identity_secret_hash` as in [32/RLN-V1](../32/rln-v1.md) +(`poseidonHash(identity_secret)`) and a user_message_limit publicly to a server + or smart-contract where +`rate_commitment` = `poseidonHash(identity_secret_hash, userMessageLimit)` is calculated. +The leaves in the membership Merkle tree would be the rate_commitments of the users. +This approach requires additional hashing in the Circuit, but +it eliminates the need for zk proof verification for the registration. + +Both methods are correct, and the choice of the method is left to the implementer. It is recommended to use second method for the reasons already described. The following flow description will also be based on the second method. -### Signalling - -#### Proof generation +Signalling For proof generation, the user need to submit the following fields to the circuit: -``` +```js { identity_secret: identity_secret_hash, path_elements: Merkle_proof.path_elements, @@ -119,76 +135,92 @@ For proof generation, the user need to submit the following fields to the circui } ``` -#### Calculating output +Calculating output The Output is calculated in the same way as the RLN-Same sub-protocol. ### Verification and slashing Verification and slashing in both subprotocols remain the same as in [32/RLN-V1](../32/rln-v1.md). -The only difference that may arise is the `message_limit` check in RLN-Same, since it is now a public input of the Circuit. +The only difference that may arise is the `message_limit` check in RLN-Same, +since it is now a public input of the Circuit. ### ZK Circuits specification -The design of the [32/RLN-V1](../32/rln-v1.md) circuits is different from the circuits of this protocol. +The design of the [32/RLN-V1](../32/rln-v1.md) circuits +is different from the circuits of this protocol. RLN-v2 requires additional algebraic constraints. The membership proof and Shamir's Secret Sharing constraints remain unchanged. The ZK Circuit is implemented using a [Groth-16 ZK-SNARK](https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/260.pdf), -using the [circomlib](https://docs.circom.io/) library. +using the [circomlib](https://docs.circom.io/) library. Both schemes contain compile-time constants/system parameters: + * DEPTH - depth of membership Merkle tree -* LIMIT_BIT_SIZE - bit size of `limit` numbers, e.g. for the 16 - maximum `limit` number is 65535. +* LIMIT_BIT_SIZE - bit size of `limit` numbers, +e.g. for the 16 - maximum `limit` number is 65535. -The main difference of the protocol is that instead of a new polynomial (a new value `a_1`) for a new epoch, a new polynomial is generated for each message. -The user assigns an identifier to each message; the main requirement is that this identifier be in the range from 1 to `limit`. +The main difference of the protocol is that instead of a new polynomial +(a new value `a_1`) for a new epoch, a new polynomial is generated for each message. +The user assigns an identifier to each message; +the main requirement is that this identifier be in the range from 1 to `limit`. This is proven using range constraints. ### RLN-Same circuit #### Circuit parameters -**Public Inputs** -- `x` -- `external_nullifier` -- `message_limit` - limit per epoch +Public Inputs + +* `x` +* `external_nullifier` +* `message_limit` - limit per epoch + +Private Inputs + +* `identity_secret_hash` +* `path_elements` +* `identity_path_index` +* `message_id` -**Private Inputs** -- `identity_secret_hash` -- `path_elements` -- `identity_path_index` -- `message_id` +Outputs -**Outputs** -- `y` -- `root` -- `internal_nullifier` +* `y` +* `root` +* `internal_nullifier` ### RLN-Diff circuit -In the RLN-Diff scheme, instead of the public parameter `message_limit`, a parameter is used that is set for each user during registration (`user_message_limit`); the `message_id` value is compared to it in the same way as it is compared to `message_limit` in the case of RLN-Same. +In the RLN-Diff scheme, instead of the public parameter `message_limit`, +a parameter is used that is set for each user during registration (`user_message_limit`); +the `message_id` value is compared to it in the same way +as it is compared to `message_limit` in the case of RLN-Same. -#### Circuit parameters +Circuit parameters + +Public Inputs + +* `x` +* `external_nullifier` + +Private Inputs -**Public Inputs** -- `x` -- `external_nullifier` +* `identity_secret_hash` +* `path_elements` +* `identity_path_index` +* `message_id` +* `user_message_limit` -**Private Inputs** -- `identity_secret_hash` -- `path_elements` -- `identity_path_index` -- `message_id` -- `user_message_limit` +Outputs -**Outputs** -- `y` -- `root` -- `internal_nullifier` +* `y` +* `root` +* `internal_nullifier` ## Appendix A: Security considerations -Although there are changes in the circuits, this spec inherits all the security considerations of [32/RLN-V1](../32/rln-v1.md). +Although there are changes in the circuits, +this spec inherits all the security considerations of [32/RLN-V1](../32/rln-v1.md). ## Copyright @@ -196,6 +228,6 @@ Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/public ## References -- [1](https://zkresear.ch/t/rate-limit-nullifier-v2-circuits/102) -- [2](https://github.com/Rate-Limiting-Nullifier/rln-circuits-v2) -- [3](../32/rln-v1.md/#technical-overview) +* [1](https://zkresear.ch/t/rate-limit-nullifier-v2-circuits/102) +* [2](https://github.com/Rate-Limiting-Nullifier/rln-circuits-v2) +* [3](../32/rln-v1.md/#technical-overview) diff --git a/vac/raw/url-scheme.md b/vac/raw/url-scheme.md index c9a31d941..a640e696e 100644 --- a/vac/raw/url-scheme.md +++ b/vac/raw/url-scheme.md @@ -10,7 +10,8 @@ contributors: ## Abstract -This document describes URL scheme for previewing and deep linking content as well as for triggering actions. +This document describes URL scheme for previewing and +deep linking content as well as for triggering actions. ## Background / Rationale / Motivation @@ -53,7 +54,9 @@ A standard track RFC in `stable` status MUST feature this section. A standard track RFC in `raw` or `draft` status SHOULD feature this section. Informational RFCs (in any state) may feature this section. If there are none, this section MUST explicitly state that fact. -This section MAY contain additional relevant information, e.g. an explanation as to why there are no security consideration for the respective document. --> +This section MAY contain additional relevant information, +e.g. an explanation as to why there are no security consideration +for the respective document. --> ## Discussions diff --git a/vac/template.md b/vac/template.md index ff99054ca..48ea3222d 100644 --- a/vac/template.md +++ b/vac/template.md @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ editor: Daniel Kaiser contributors: --- -# (Info, remove this section) +## (Info, remove this section) This section contains meta info about writing RFCs. This section (including its subsections) MUST be removed. @@ -23,60 +23,69 @@ The `tags` metadata SHOULD contain a list of tags if applicable. Currently identified tags comprise * `waku/core-protocol` for Waku protocol definitions (e.g. store, relay, light push), -* `waku/application` for applications built on top of Waku protocol (e.g. eth-dm, toy-chat), +* `waku/application` for applications built on top of Waku protocol +(e.g. eth-dm, toy-chat), +## Abstract -# Abstract +## Background / Rationale / Motivation +This section serves as an introduction providing background information and +a motivation/rationale for why the specified protocol is useful. -# Background / Rationale / Motivation - -This section serves as an introduction providing background information and a motivation/rationale for why the specified protocol is useful. - -# Theory / Semantics +## Theory / Semantics A standard track RFC in `stable` status MUST feature this section. A standard track RFC in `raw` or `draft` status SHOULD feature this section. This section SHOULD explain in detail how the proposed protocol works. It may touch on the wire format where necessary for the explanation. -This section MAY also specify endpoint behaviour when receiving specific messages, e.g. the behaviour of certain caches etc. +This section MAY also specify endpoint behaviour when receiving specific messages, +e.g. the behaviour of certain caches etc. -# Wire Format Specification / Syntax +## Wire Format Specification / Syntax A standard track RFC in `stable` status MUST feature this section. A standard track RFC in `raw` or `draft` status SHOULD feature this section. -This section SHOULD not contain explanations of semantics and focus on concisely defining the wire format. +This section SHOULD not contain explanations of semantics and +focus on concisely defining the wire format. Implementations MUST adhere to these exact formats to interoperate with other implementations. It is fine, if parts of the previous section that touch on the wire format are repeated. -The purpose of this section is having a concise definition of what an implementation sends and accepts. -Parts that are not specified here are considered implementation details. Implementors are free to decide on how to implement these details. -An optional *implementation suggestions* section may provide suggestions on how to approach implementation details, and, if available, point to existing implementations for reference. - -# Implementation Suggestions (optional) +The purpose of this section is having a concise definition +of what an implementation sends and accepts. +Parts that are not specified here are considered implementation details. +Implementors are free to decide on how to implement these details. +An optional *implementation suggestions* section may provide suggestions +on how to approach implementation details, and, +if available, point to existing implementations for reference. +## Implementation Suggestions (optional) -# (Further Optional Sections) +## (Further Optional Sections) - -# Security/Privacy Considerations +## Security/Privacy Considerations A standard track RFC in `stable` status MUST feature this section. A standard track RFC in `raw` or `draft` status SHOULD feature this section. Informational RFCs (in any state) may feature this section. If there are none, this section MUST explicitly state that fact. -This section MAY contain additional relevant information, e.g. an explanation as to why there are no security consideration for the respective document. +This section MAY contain additional relevant information, +e.g. an explanation as to why there are no security consideration +for the respective document. -# Copyright +## Copyright Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). -# References +## References References MAY be subdivided into normative and informative. ## normative -A list of references that MUST be read to fully understand and/or implement this protocol. + +A list of references that MUST be read to fully understand and/or +implement this protocol. See [RFC3967 Section 1.1](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc3967#section-1.1). ## informative + A list of additional references. diff --git a/waku/.DS_Store b/waku/.DS_Store new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b86f5c407 Binary files /dev/null and b/waku/.DS_Store differ diff --git a/waku/deprecated/.DS_Store b/waku/deprecated/.DS_Store new file mode 100644 index 000000000..577738322 Binary files /dev/null and b/waku/deprecated/.DS_Store differ diff --git a/waku/deprecated/16/rpc.md b/waku/deprecated/16/rpc.md index 6fec776c8..b958939ee 100644 --- a/waku/deprecated/16/rpc.md +++ b/waku/deprecated/16/rpc.md @@ -9,13 +9,17 @@ editor: Hanno Cornelius ## Introduction -This specification describes the JSON-RPC API that Waku v2 nodes MAY adhere to. Refer to the [Waku v2 specification](../10/waku2.md) for more information on Waku v2. +This specification describes the JSON-RPC API that Waku v2 nodes MAY adhere to. +Refer to the [Waku v2 specification](../10/waku2.md) +for more information on Waku v2. ## Wire Protocol ### Transport -Nodes SHOULD expose an accessible [JSON-RPC](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification) API. The JSON-RPC version SHOULD be `2.0`. Below is an example request: +Nodes SHOULD expose an accessible +[JSON-RPC](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification) API. +The JSON-RPC version SHOULD be `2.0`. Below is an example request: ```json { @@ -37,7 +41,10 @@ Nodes SHOULD expose an accessible [JSON-RPC](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specificati ### Types -In this specification, the primitive types `Boolean`, `String`, `Number` and `Null`, as well as the structured types `Array` and `Object`, are to be interpreted according to the [JSON-RPC specification](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#conventions). It also adopts the same capitalisation conventions. +In this specification, the primitive types `Boolean`, `String`, +`Number` and `Null`, as well as the structured types `Array` and `Object`, +are to be interpreted according to the [JSON-RPC specification](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#conventions). +It also adopts the same capitalisation conventions. The following structured types are defined for use throughout the document: @@ -57,23 +64,27 @@ Refer to [`Waku Message` specification](../14/message.md) for more information. ## Method naming -The JSON-RPC methods in this document are designed to be mappable to HTTP REST endpoints. Method names follow the pattern `_waku____` +The JSON-RPC methods in this document are designed to be mappable to HTTP REST endpoints. +Method names follow the pattern `_waku____` -- ``: prefix of the HTTP method type that most closely matches the JSON-RPC function. Supported `method_type` values are `get`, `post`, `put`, `delete` or `patch`. +- ``: +prefix of the HTTP method type that most closely matches the JSON-RPC function. +Supported `method_type` values are `get`, `post`, `put`, `delete` or `patch`. - ``: Waku version. Currently **v2**. - ``: one of the listed APIs below, e.g. `store`, `debug`, or `relay`. - ``: API definition version. Currently **v1** for all APIs. - ``: the resource or resource path being addressed -The method `post_waku_v2_relay_v1_message`, for example, would map to the HTTP REST endpoint `POST /waku/v2/relay/v1/message`. +The method `post_waku_v2_relay_v1_message`, for example, +would map to the HTTP REST endpoint `POST /waku/v2/relay/v1/message`. ## Debug API -### Types +Types The following structured types are defined for use on the Debug API: -#### WakuInfo +### WakuInfo `WakuInfo` is an `Object` containing the following fields: @@ -82,9 +93,7 @@ The following structured types are defined for use on the Debug API: | `listenAddresses` | `Array`[`String`] | mandatory | Listening addresses of the node | | `enrUri` | `String` | optional | ENR URI of the node | -#### WakuInfo - -### `get_waku_v2_debug_v1_info` +`get_waku_v2_debug_v1_info` The `get_waku_v2_debug_v1_info` method retrieves information about a Waku v2 node @@ -96,94 +105,120 @@ none - [**`WakuInfo`**](#wakuinfo) - information about a Waku v2 node - ### `get_waku_v2_debug_v1_version` -The `get_waku_v2_debug_v1_version` method retrieves the version of a Waku v2 node as a string. +The `get_waku_v2_debug_v1_version` method retrieves the version of a Waku v2 node +as a string. The version SHOULD follow [semantic versioning](https://semver.org/). In case the node's current build is based on a git commit between semantic versions, -the retrieved version string MAY contain the git commit hash alone or in combination with the latest semantic version. +the retrieved version string MAY contain the git commit hash alone or +in combination with the latest semantic version. -#### Parameters +Parameters none -#### Response +Response - **`string`** - represents the version of a Waku v2 node - ## Relay API -Refer to the [Waku Relay specification](../11/relay.md) for more information on the relaying of messages. +Refer to the [Waku Relay specification](../11/relay.md) +for more information on the relaying of messages. -### `post_waku_v2_relay_v1_message` +`post_waku_v2_relay_v1_message` -The `post_waku_v2_relay_v1_message` method publishes a message to be relayed on a [PubSub `topic`](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/README.md#the-topic-descriptor) +The `post_waku_v2_relay_v1_message` method publishes a message to be relayed on a +[PubSub `topic`](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/README.md#the-topic-descriptor) -#### Parameters +Parameters | Field | Type | Inclusion | Description | | ----: | :---: | :---: |----------- | | `topic` | `String` | mandatory | The [PubSub `topic`](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/README.md#the-topic-descriptor) being published on | | `message` | [`WakuMessage`](#wakumessage) | mandatory | The `message` being relayed | -#### Response +Response -- **`Bool`** - `true` on success or an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure. +- **`Bool`** - +`true` on success or +an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure. -### `post_waku_v2_relay_v1_subscriptions` +`post_waku_v2_relay_v1_subscriptions` -The `post_waku_v2_relay_v1_subscriptions` method subscribes a node to an array of [PubSub `topics`](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/README.md#the-topic-descriptor). +The `post_waku_v2_relay_v1_subscriptions` method subscribes a node to an array of +[PubSub `topics`](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/README.md#the-topic-descriptor). -#### Parameters +Parameters | Field | Type | Inclusion | Description | | ----: | :---: | :---: |----------- | | `topics` | `Array`[`String`] | mandatory | The [PubSub `topics`](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/README.md#the-topic-descriptor) being subscribed to | -#### Response +Response -- **`Bool`** - `true` on success or an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure. +- **`Bool`** - +`true` on success or +an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure. -### `delete_waku_v2_relay_v1_subscriptions` +`delete_waku_v2_relay_v1_subscriptions` -The `delete_waku_v2_relay_v1_subscriptions` method unsubscribes a node from an array of [PubSub `topics`](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/README.md#the-topic-descriptor). +The `delete_waku_v2_relay_v1_subscriptions` method unsubscribes a node from an array + of [PubSub `topics`](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/README.md#the-topic-descriptor). -#### Parameters +Parameters | Field | Type | Inclusion | Description | | ----: | :---: | :---: |----------- | | `topics` | `Array`[`String`] | mandatory | The [PubSub `topics`](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/README.md#the-topic-descriptor) being unsubscribed from | -#### Response +Response -- **`Bool`** - `true` on success or an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure. +- **`Bool`** - +`true` on success or +an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure. -### `get_waku_v2_relay_v1_messages` +`get_waku_v2_relay_v1_messages` -The `get_waku_v2_relay_v1_messages` method returns a list of messages that were received on a subscribed [PubSub `topic`](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/README.md#the-topic-descriptor) after the last time this method was called. The server MUST respond with an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) if no subscription exists for the polled `topic`. If no message has yet been received on the polled `topic`, the server SHOULD return an empty list. This method can be used to poll a `topic` for new messages. +The `get_waku_v2_relay_v1_messages` method returns a list of messages +that were received on a subscribed +[PubSub `topic`](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/README.md#the-topic-descriptor) +after the last time this method was called. +The server MUST respond with an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) +if no subscription exists for the polled `topic`. +If no message has yet been received on the polled `topic`, +the server SHOULD return an empty list. +This method can be used to poll a `topic` for new messages. -#### Parameters +Parameters | Field | Type | Inclusion | Description | | ----: | :---: | :---: |----------- | | `topic` | `String` | mandatory | The [PubSub `topic`](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/README.md#the-topic-descriptor) to poll for the latest messages | -#### Response +Response -- **`Array`[[`WakuMessage`](#wakumessage)]** - the latest `messages` on the polled `topic` or an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure. +- **`Array`[[`WakuMessage`](#wakumessage)]** - +the latest `messages` on the polled `topic` or +an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure. ## Relay Private API -The Private API provides functionality to encrypt/decrypt `WakuMessage` payloads using either symmetric or asymmetric cryptography. This allows backwards compatibility with [Waku v1 nodes](../../legacy/6/waku1.md). -It is the API client's responsibility to keep track of the keys used for encrypted communication. Since keys must be cached by the client and provided to the node to encrypt/decrypt payloads, a Private API SHOULD NOT be exposed on non-local or untrusted nodes. +The Private API provides functionality to encrypt/decrypt `WakuMessage` payloads +using either symmetric or asymmetric cryptography. +This allows backwards compatibility with [Waku v1 nodes](../../legacy/6/waku1.md). +It is the API client's responsibility to keep track of the keys +used for encrypted communication. +Since keys must be cached by the client and +provided to the node to encrypt/decrypt payloads, +a Private API SHOULD NOT be exposed on non-local or untrusted nodes. -### Types +Types The following structured types are defined for use on the Private API: -#### KeyPair +### KeyPair `KeyPair` is an `Object` containing the following fields: @@ -194,33 +229,40 @@ The following structured types are defined for use on the Private API: ### `get_waku_v2_private_v1_symmetric_key` -Generates and returns a symmetric key that can be used for message encryption and decryption. +Generates and returns a symmetric key that can be used for message encryption and +decryption. -#### Parameters +Parameters none -#### Response +Response + - **`String`** - A new symmetric key as hex encoded data string ### `get_waku_v2_private_v1_asymmetric_keypair` -Generates and returns a public/private key pair that can be used for asymmetric message encryption and decryption. +Generates and returns a public/private key pair +that can be used for asymmetric message encryption and decryption. -#### Parameters +Parameters none -#### Response +Response + - **[`KeyPair`](#keypair)** - A new public/private key pair as hex encoded data strings -### `post_waku_v2_private_v1_symmetric_message` +`post_waku_v2_private_v1_symmetric_message` -The `post_waku_v2_private_v1_symmetric_message` method publishes a message to be relayed on a [PubSub `topic`](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/README.md#the-topic-descriptor). +The `post_waku_v2_private_v1_symmetric_message` method publishes a message +to be relayed on a [PubSub `topic`](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/README.md#the-topic-descriptor). -Before being relayed, the message payload is encrypted using the supplied symmetric key. The client MUST provide a symmetric key. +Before being relayed, +the message payload is encrypted using the supplied symmetric key. +The client MUST provide a symmetric key. -#### Parameters +Parameters | Field | Type | Inclusion | Description | | ----: | :---: | :---: |----------- | @@ -228,17 +270,22 @@ Before being relayed, the message payload is encrypted using the supplied symmet | `message` | [`WakuMessage`](#wakumessage) | mandatory | The (unencrypted) `message` being relayed | | `symkey` | `String` | mandatory | The hex encoded symmetric key to use for payload encryption. This field MUST be included if symmetric key cryptography is selected | -#### Response +Response -- **`Bool`** - `true` on success or an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure. +- **`Bool`** - +`true` on success or +an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure. -### `post_waku_v2_private_v1_asymmetric_message` +`post_waku_v2_private_v1_asymmetric_message` -The `post_waku_v2_private_v1_asymmetric_message` method publishes a message to be relayed on a [PubSub `topic`](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/README.md#the-topic-descriptor). +The `post_waku_v2_private_v1_asymmetric_message` method publishes a message +to be relayed on a [PubSub `topic`](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/README.md#the-topic-descriptor). -Before being relayed, the message payload is encrypted using the supplied public key. The client MUST provide a public key. +Before being relayed, +the message payload is encrypted using the supplied public key. +The client MUST provide a public key. -#### Parameters +Parameters | Field | Type | Inclusion | Description | | ----: | :---: | :---: |----------- | @@ -246,66 +293,88 @@ Before being relayed, the message payload is encrypted using the supplied public | `message` | [`WakuMessage`](#wakumessage) | mandatory | The (unencrypted) `message` being relayed | | `publicKey` | `String` | mandatory | The hex encoded public key to use for payload encryption. This field MUST be included if asymmetric key cryptography is selected | -#### Response +Response -- **`Bool`** - `true` on success or an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure. +- **`Bool`** - +`true` on success or +an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure. ### `get_waku_v2_private_v1_symmetric_messages` -The `get_waku_v2_private_v1_symmetric_messages` method decrypts and returns a list of messages that were received on a subscribed [PubSub `topic`](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/README.md#the-topic-descriptor) after the last time this method was called. The server MUST respond with an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) if no subscription exists for the polled `topic`. If no message has yet been received on the polled `topic`, the server SHOULD return an empty list. This method can be used to poll a `topic` for new messages. +The `get_waku_v2_private_v1_symmetric_messages` method decrypts and +returns a list of messages that were received on a subscribed +[PubSub `topic`](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/README.md#the-topic-descriptor) +after the last time this method was called. +The server MUST respond with an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) +if no subscription exists for the polled `topic`. +If no message has yet been received on the polled `topic`, +the server SHOULD return an empty list. +This method can be used to poll a `topic` for new messages. -Before returning the messages, the server decrypts the message payloads using the supplied symmetric key. The client MUST provide a symmetric key. +Before returning the messages, +the server decrypts the message payloads using the supplied symmetric key. +The client MUST provide a symmetric key. -#### Parameters +Parameters | Field | Type | Inclusion | Description | | ----: | :---: | :---: |----------- | | `topic` | `String` | mandatory | The [PubSub `topic`](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/README.md#the-topic-descriptor) to poll for the latest messages | | `symkey` | `String` | mandatory | The hex encoded symmetric key to use for payload decryption. This field MUST be included if symmetric key cryptography is selected | -#### Response +Response -- **`Array`[[`WakuMessage`](#wakumessage)]** - the latest `messages` on the polled `topic` or an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure. +- **`Array`[[`WakuMessage`](#wakumessage)]** - +the latest `messages` on the polled `topic` or +an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure. -### `get_waku_v2_private_v1_asymmetric_messages` +`get_waku_v2_private_v1_asymmetric_messages` -The `get_waku_v2_private_v1_asymmetric_messages` method decrypts and returns a list of messages that were received on a subscribed [PubSub `topic`](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/README.md#the-topic-descriptor) after the last time this method was called. The server MUST respond with an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) if no subscription exists for the polled `topic`. If no message has yet been received on the polled `topic`, the server SHOULD return an empty list. This method can be used to poll a `topic` for new messages. +The `get_waku_v2_private_v1_asymmetric_messages` method decrypts and +returns a list of messages that were received on a subscribed [PubSub `topic`](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/README.md#the-topic-descriptor) +after the last time this method was called. +The server MUST respond with an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) +if no subscription exists for the polled `topic`. +If no message has yet been received on the polled `topic`, +the server SHOULD return an empty list. +This method can be used to poll a `topic` for new messages. -Before returning the messages, the server decrypts the message payloads using the supplied private key. The client MUST provide a private key. +Before returning the messages, +the server decrypts the message payloads using the supplied private key. +The client MUST provide a private key. -#### Parameters +Parameters | Field | Type | Inclusion | Description | | ----: | :---: | :---: |----------- | | `topic` | `String` | mandatory | The [PubSub `topic`](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/README.md#the-topic-descriptor) to poll for the latest messages | | `privateKey` | `String` | mandatory | The hex encoded private key to use for payload decryption. This field MUST be included if asymmetric key cryptography is selected | -#### Response - -- **`Array`[[`WakuMessage`](#wakumessage)]** - the latest `messages` on the polled `topic` or an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure. +Response +- **`Array`[[`WakuMessage`](#wakumessage)]** - +the latest `messages` on the polled `topic` or +an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure. ## Store API -Refer to the [Waku Store specification](../13/store.md) for more information on message history retrieval. - -### Types +Refer to the [Waku Store specification](../13/store.md) +for more information on message history retrieval. The following structured types are defined for use on the Store API: -#### StoreResponse +### StoreResponse `StoreResponse` is an `Object` containing the following fields: | Field | Type | Inclusion | Description | | ----: | :---: | :---: |----------- | | `messages` | `Array`[[`WakuMessage`](#wakumessage)] | mandatory | Array of retrieved historical messages | -| `pagingOptions` | [`PagingOptions`](#pagingOptions) | [conditional](#get_waku_v2_store_v1_messages) | Paging information from which to resume further historical queries | - +| `pagingOptions` | [`PagingOptions`](#pagingoptions) | [conditional](#get_waku_v2_store_v1_messages) | Paging information from which to resume further historical queries | #### PagingOptions -`PagingOptions` is an `Object` containing the following fields: +`pagingOptions` is an `Object` containing the following fields: | Field | Type | Inclusion | Description | | ----: |:-----------------:| :---: |--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| @@ -322,7 +391,7 @@ The following structured types are defined for use on the Store API: | `digest` | `String` | mandatory | A hash for the message at this [`Index`](#index) | | `receivedTime` | `Number` | mandatory | UNIX timestamp in nanoseconds at which the message at this [`Index`](#index) was received | -#### ContentFilter +ContentFilter `ContentFilter` is an `Object` containing the following fields: @@ -330,11 +399,19 @@ The following structured types are defined for use on the Store API: | ----: | :---: | :---: |----------- | | `contentTopic` | `String` | mandatory | The content topic of a [`WakuMessage`](#wakumessage) | -### `get_waku_v2_store_v1_messages` +`get_waku_v2_store_v1_messages` -The `get_waku_v2_store_v1_messages` method retrieves historical messages on specific content topics. This method MAY be called with [`PagingOptions`](#pagingoptions), to retrieve historical messages on a per-page basis. If the request included [`PagingOptions`](#pagingoptions), the node MUST return messages on a per-page basis and include [`PagingOptions`](#pagingoptions) in the response. These [`PagingOptions`](#pagingoptions) MUST contain a `cursor` pointing to the [`Index`](#index) from which a new page can be requested. +The `get_waku_v2_store_v1_messages` method retrieves historical messages +on specific content topics. +This method MAY be called with [`PagingOptions`](#pagingoptions), +to retrieve historical messages on a per-page basis. +If the request included [`PagingOptions`](#pagingoptions), +the node MUST return messages on a per-page basis and +include [`PagingOptions`](#pagingoptions) in the response. +These [`PagingOptions`](#pagingoptions) MUST contain a `cursor` pointing +to the [`Index`](#index) from which a new page can be requested. -#### Parameters +Parameters | Field | Type | Inclusion | Description | | ----: | :---: | :---: |----------- | @@ -344,19 +421,21 @@ The `get_waku_v2_store_v1_messages` method retrieves historical messages on spec | `endTime` | `Number` | optional | The inclusive upper bound on the [`timestamp`](../14/message.md/#message-attributes) of queried [`WakuMessage`s](#wakumessage). This field holds the Unix epoch time in nanoseconds as a 64-bits integer value. | | `pagingOptions` | [`PagingOptions`](#pagingoptions) | optional | Pagination information | -#### Response +Response -- [**`StoreResponse`**](#storeresponse) - the response to a `query` for historical messages. +- [**`StoreResponse`**](#storeresponse) - +the response to a `query` for historical messages. ## Filter API -Refer to the [Waku Filter specification](../12/filter.md) for more information on content filtering. +Refer to the [Waku Filter specification](../12/filter.md) +for more information on content filtering. -### Types +Types The following structured types are defined for use on the Filter API: -#### ContentFilter +### ContentFilter `ContentFilter` is an `Object` containing the following fields: @@ -366,57 +445,73 @@ The following structured types are defined for use on the Filter API: ### `post_waku_v2_filter_v1_subscription` -The `post_waku_v2_filter_v1_subscription` method creates a subscription in a [light node](../12/filter.md/#rationale) for messages that matches a content filter and, optionally, a [PubSub `topic`](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/README.md#the-topic-descriptor). +The `post_waku_v2_filter_v1_subscription` method creates a subscription in a +[light node](../12/filter.md/#rationale) for messages that matches a content filter +and, optionally, a [PubSub `topic`](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/README.md#the-topic-descriptor). -#### Parameters +Parameters | Field | Type | Inclusion | Description | | ----: | :---: | :---: |----------- | | `contentFilters` | `Array`[[`ContentFilter`](#contentfilter)] | mandatory | Array of content filters being subscribed to | | `topic` | `String` | optional | Message topic | -#### Response +Response -- **`Bool`** - `true` on success or an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure. +- **`Bool`** - `true` on success or +an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure. -### `delete_waku_v2_filter_v1_subscription` +`delete_waku_v2_filter_v1_subscription` -The `delete_waku_v2_filter_v1_subscription` method removes subscriptions in a [light node](../12/filter.md/#rationale) matching a content filter and, optionally, a [PubSub `topic`](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/README.md#the-topic-descriptor). +The `delete_waku_v2_filter_v1_subscription` method removes subscriptions +in a [light node](../12/filter.md/#rationale) matching a content filter and, +optionally, a [PubSub `topic`](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/README.md#the-topic-descriptor). -#### Parameters +Parameters | Field | Type | Inclusion | Description | | ----: | :---: | :---: |----------- | | `contentFilters` | `Array`[[`ContentFilter`](#contentfilter)] | mandatory | Array of content filters being unsubscribed from | | `topic` | `String` | optional | Message topic | -#### Response +Response -- **`Bool`** - `true` on success or an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure. +- **`Bool`** - +`true` on success or +an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure. ### `get_waku_v2_filter_v1_messages` -The `get_waku_v2_filter_v1_messages` method returns a list of messages that were received on a subscribed content `topic` after the last time this method was called. The server MUST respond with an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) if no subscription exists for the polled content `topic`. If no message has yet been received on the polled content `topic`, the server SHOULD respond with an empty list. This method can be used to poll a content `topic` for new messages. +The `get_waku_v2_filter_v1_messages` method returns a list of messages +that were received on a subscribed content `topic` +after the last time this method was called. +The server MUST respond with an +[error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) +if no subscription exists for the polled content `topic`. +If no message has yet been received on the polled content `topic`, +the server SHOULD respond with an empty list. +This method can be used to poll a content `topic` for new messages. -#### Parameters +Parameters | Field | Type | Inclusion | Description | | ----: | :---: | :---: |----------- | | `contentTopic` | `String` | mandatory | The content topic to poll for the latest messages | -#### Response +Response -- **`Array`[[`WakuMessage`](#wakumessage)]** - the latest `messages` on the polled content `topic` or an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure. +- **`Array`[[`WakuMessage`](#wakumessage)]** - +the latest `messages` on the polled content `topic` or +an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure. ## Admin API -The Admin API provides privileged accesses to the internal operations of a Waku v2 node. - -### Types +The Admin API provides privileged accesses +to the internal operations of a Waku v2 node. The following structured types are defined for use on the Admin API: -#### WakuPeer +### WakuPeer `WakuPeer` is an `Object` containing the following fields: @@ -428,13 +523,19 @@ The following structured types are defined for use on the Admin API: ### `get_waku_v2_admin_v1_peers` -The `get_waku_v2_admin_v1_peers` method returns an array of peers registered on this node. Since a Waku v2 node may open either continuous or ad hoc connections, depending on the negotiated protocol, these peers may have different connected states. The same peer MAY appear twice in the returned array, if it is registered for more than one protocol. +The `get_waku_v2_admin_v1_peers` method returns an array of peers +registered on this node. +Since a Waku v2 node may open either continuous or ad hoc connections, +depending on the negotiated protocol, +these peers may have different connected states. +The same peer MAY appear twice in the returned array, +if it is registered for more than one protocol. -#### Parameters +Parameters -none +- none -#### Response +Response - **`Array`[[`WakuPeer`](#wakupeer)]** - Array of peers registered on this node @@ -442,30 +543,36 @@ none The `post_waku_v2_admin_v1_peers` method connects a node to a list of peers. -#### Parameters +Parameters | Field | Type | Inclusion | Description | | ----: | :---: | :---: |----------- | | `peers` | `Array`[`String`] | mandatory | Array of peer `multiaddrs` to connect to. Each `multiaddr` must contain the [location and identity addresses](https://docs.libp2p.io/concepts/addressing/) of a peer. | -#### Response - -- **`Bool`** - `true` on success or an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure. +Response +- **`Bool`** - +`true` on success or +an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure. ## Example usage -### Store API +Store API -#### `get_waku_v2_store_v1_messages` +### `get_waku_v2_store_v1_messages` -This method is part of the `store` API and the specific resources to retrieve are (historical) `messages`. The protocol (`waku`) is on `v2`, whereas the Store API definition is on `v1`. +This method is part of the `store` API and +the specific resources to retrieve are (historical) `messages`. +The protocol (`waku`) is on `v2`, whereas the Store API definition is on `v1`. -1. `get` *all* the historical messages for content topic **"/waku/2/default-content/proto"**; no paging required +1.`get` *all* the historical messages for content topic +**"/waku/2/default-content/proto"**; no paging required #### Request -```curl -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":"id","method":"get_waku_v2_store_v1_messages", "params":["", [{"contentTopic":"/waku/2/default-content/proto"}]]}' --header "Content-Type: application/json" http://localhost:8545``` +```curl +curl -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":"id","method":"get_waku_v2_store_v1_messages", "params":["", [{"contentTopic":"/waku/2/default-content/proto"}]]}' --header "Content-Type: application/json" http://localhost:8545 +``` ```jsonrpc { @@ -481,7 +588,7 @@ This method is part of the `store` API and the specific resources to retrieve ar } ``` -#### Response +Response ```jsonrpc { @@ -513,11 +620,16 @@ This method is part of the `store` API and the specific resources to retrieve ar --- -2. `get` a single page of historical messages for content topic **"/waku/2/default-content/proto"**; 2 messages per page, backward direction. Since this is the initial query, no `cursor` is provided, so paging will be performed from the end of the list. +2.`get` a single page of historical messages for content topic **"/waku/2/default-content/proto"**; +2 messages per page, backward direction. +Since this is the initial query, no `cursor` is provided, +so paging will be performed from the end of the list. -#### Request +Request -```curl -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":"id","method":"get_waku_v2_store_v1_messages", "params":[ "", [{"contentTopic":"/waku/2/default-content/proto"}],{"pageSize":2,"forward":false}]}' --header "Content-Type: application/json" http://localhost:8545``` +```curl +curl -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":"id","method":"get_waku_v2_store_v1_messages", "params":[ "", [{"contentTopic":"/waku/2/default-content/proto"}],{"pageSize":2,"forward":false}]}' --header "Content-Type: application/json" http://localhost:8545 +``` ```jsonrpc { @@ -537,7 +649,7 @@ This method is part of the `store` API and the specific resources to retrieve ar } ``` -#### Response +Response ```jsonrpc { @@ -571,11 +683,14 @@ This method is part of the `store` API and the specific resources to retrieve ar --- -3. `get` the next page of historical messages for content topic **"/waku/2/default-content/proto"**, using the cursor received above; 2 messages per page, backward direction. +3.`get` the next page of historical messages for content topic **"/waku/2/default-content/proto"**, +using the cursor received above; 2 messages per page, backward direction. -#### Request +Request -```curl -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":"id","method":"get_waku_v2_store_v1_messages", "params":[ "", [{"contentTopic":"/waku/2/default-content/proto"}],{"pageSize":2,"cursor":{"digest":"abcdef","receivedTime":1605887187000000000},"forward":false}]}' --header "Content-Type: application/json" http://localhost:8545``` +```curl +curl -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":"id","method":"get_waku_v2_store_v1_messages", "params":[ "", [{"contentTopic":"/waku/2/default-content/proto"}],{"pageSize":2,"cursor":{"digest":"abcdef","receivedTime":1605887187000000000},"forward":false}]}' --header "Content-Type: application/json" http://localhost:8545 +``` ```jsonrpc { @@ -599,7 +714,7 @@ This method is part of the `store` API and the specific resources to retrieve ar } ``` -#### Response +Response ```jsonrpc { diff --git a/waku/deprecated/18/swap.md b/waku/deprecated/18/swap.md index b0ef906d1..2326a4794 100644 --- a/waku/deprecated/18/swap.md +++ b/waku/deprecated/18/swap.md @@ -9,21 +9,49 @@ contributor: Ebube Ud ## Abstract -This specification outlines how we do accounting and settlement based on the provision and usage of resources, most immediately bandwidth usage and/or storing and retrieving of Waku message. This enables nodes to cooperate and efficiently share resources, and in the case of unequal nodes to settle the difference through a relaxed payment mechanism in the form of sending cheques. +This specification outlines how we do accounting and settlement based on the provision +and usage of resources, most immediately bandwidth usage and/or +storing and retrieving of Waku message. +This enables nodes to cooperate and efficiently share resources, +and in the case of unequal nodes to settle the difference +through a relaxed payment mechanism in the form of sending cheques. **Protocol identifier***: `/vac/waku/swap/2.0.0-beta1` ## Motivation -The Waku network makes up a service network, and some nodes provide a useful service to other nodes. We want to account for that, and when imbalances arise, settle this. The core of this approach has some theoretical backing in game theory, and variants of it have practically been proven to work in systems such as Bittorrent. The specific model use was developed by the Swarm project (previously part of Ethereum), and we re-use contracts that were written for this purpose. - -By using a delayed payment mechanism in the form of cheques, a barter-like mechanism can arise, and nodes can decide on their own policy as opposed to be strictly tied to a specific payment scheme. Additionally, this delayed settlement eases requirements on the underlying network in terms of transaction speed or costs. - -Theoretically, nodes providing and using resources over a long, indefinite, period of time can be seen as an iterated form of [Prisoner's Dilemma (PD)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prisoner%27s_dilemma). Specifically, and more intuitively, since we have a cost and benefit profile for each provision/usage (of Waku Message's, e.g.), and the pricing can be set such that mutual cooperation is incentivized, this can be analyzed as a form of donations game. +The Waku network makes up a service network, and +some nodes provide a useful service to other nodes. +We want to account for that, and when imbalances arise, settle this. +The core of this approach has some theoretical backing in game theory, and +variants of it have practically been proven to work in systems such as Bittorrent. +The specific model use was developed by the Swarm project +(previously part of Ethereum), and +we re-use contracts that were written for this purpose. + +By using a delayed payment mechanism in the form of cheques, +a barter-like mechanism can arise, and +nodes can decide on their own policy +as opposed to be strictly tied to a specific payment scheme. +Additionally, this delayed settlement eases requirements +on the underlying network in terms of transaction speed or costs. + +Theoretically, nodes providing and using resources over a long, +indefinite, period of time can be seen as an iterated form of +[Prisoner's Dilemma (PD)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prisoner%27s_dilemma). +Specifically, and more intuitively, +since we have a cost and benefit profile for each provision/usage +(of Waku Message's, e.g.), and +the pricing can be set such that mutual cooperation is incentivized, +this can be analyzed as a form of donations game. ## Game Theory - Iterated prisoner's dilemma / donation game -What follows is a sketch of what the game looks like between two nodes. We can look at it as a special case of iterated prisoner's dilemma called a [Donation game](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prisoner%27s_dilemma#Special_case:_donation_game) where each node can cooperate with some benefit `b` at a personal cost `c`, where `b>c`. +What follows is a sketch of what the game looks like between two nodes. +We can look at it as a special case of iterated prisoner's dilemma called a +[Donation game](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prisoner%27s_dilemma#Special_case:_donation_game) +where each node can cooperate with some benefit `b` at a personal cost `c`, +where `b>c`. From A's point of view: @@ -32,7 +60,11 @@ A/B | Cooperate | Defect Cooperate | b-c | -c Defect | b | 0 -What this means is that if A and B cooperates, A gets some benefit `b` minus a cost `c`. If A cooperates and B defects she only gets the cost, and if she defects and B cooperates A only gets the benefit. If both defect they get neither benefit nor cost. +What this means is that if A and B cooperates, +A gets some benefit `b` minus a cost `c`. +If A cooperates and B defects she only gets the cost, +and if she defects and B cooperates A only gets the benefit. +If both defect they get neither benefit nor cost. The generalized form of PD is: @@ -50,18 +82,32 @@ And the following holds: In our case, this means `b>b-c>0>-c` and `2(b-c)> b-c` which is trivially true. -As this is an iterated game with no clear finishing point in most circumstances, a tit-for-tat strategy is simple, elegant and functional. To be more theoretically precise, this also requires reasonable assumptions on error rate and discount parameter. This captures notions such as "does the perceived action reflect the intended action" and "how much do you value future (uncertain) actions compared to previous actions". See [Axelrod - Evolution of Cooperation (book)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Evolution_of_Cooperation) for more details. In specific circumstances, nodes can choose slightly different policies if there's a strong need for it. A policy is simply how a node chooses to act given a set of circumstances. +As this is an iterated game with no clear finishing point in most circumstances, +a tit-for-tat strategy is simple, elegant and functional. +To be more theoretically precise, +this also requires reasonable assumptions on error rate and discount parameter. +This captures notions such as +"does the perceived action reflect the intended action" and +"how much do you value future (uncertain) actions compared to previous actions". +See [Axelrod - Evolution of Cooperation (book)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Evolution_of_Cooperation) +for more details. +In specific circumstances, +nodes can choose slightly different policies if there's a strong need for it. +A policy is simply how a node chooses to act given a set of circumstances. A tit-for-tat strategy basically means: + - cooperate first (perform service/beneficial action to other node) -- defect when node stops cooperating (disconnect and similar actions), i.e. when it stops performing according to set parameters re settlement +- defect when node stops cooperating (disconnect and similar actions), +i.e. when it stops performing according to set parameters re settlement - resume cooperation if other node does so This can be complemented with node selection mechanisms. ## SWAP protocol overview -We use SWAP for accounting and settlement in conjunction with other request/reply protocols in Waku v2, +We use SWAP for accounting and +settlement in conjunction with other request/reply protocols in Waku v2, where accounting is done in a pairwise manner. It is an acronym with several possible meanings (as defined in the Book of Swarm), for example: @@ -71,39 +117,63 @@ of Swarm), for example: - send waiver as payment - start without a penny -This approach is based on communicating payment thresholds and sending cheques as indications of later payments. +This approach is based on communicating payment thresholds and +sending cheques as indications of later payments. Communicating payment thresholds MAY be done out-of-band or as part of the handshake. Sending cheques is done once payment threshold is hit. -See [Book of Swarm](https://web.archive.org/web/20210126130038/https://gateway.ethswarm.org/bzz/latest.bookofswarm.eth) section 3.2. on Peer-to-peer accounting etc., for more context and details. +See [Book of Swarm](https://web.archive.org/web/20210126130038/https://gateway.ethswarm.org/bzz/latest.bookofswarm.eth) +section 3.2. on Peer-to-peer accounting etc., for more context and details. ### Accounting -Nodes perform their own accounting for each relevant peer based on some "volume"/bandwidth metric. For now we take this to mean the number of `WakuMessage`s exchanged. +Nodes perform their own accounting for each relevant peer +based on some "volume"/bandwidth metric. +For now we take this to mean the number of `WakuMessage`s exchanged. -Additionally, a price is attached to each unit. Currently, this is simply a "karma counter" and equal to 1 per message. +Additionally, a price is attached to each unit. +Currently, this is simply a "karma counter" and equal to 1 per message. Each accounting balance SHOULD be w.r.t. to a given protocol it is accounting for. -NOTE: This may later be complemented with other metrics, either as part of SWAP or more likely outside of it. For example, online time can be communicated and attested to as a form of enhanced quality of service to inform peer selection. +NOTE: This may later be complemented with other metrics, +either as part of SWAP or more likely outside of it. +For example, online time can be communicated and +attested to as a form of enhanced quality of service to inform peer selection. ### Flow -Assuming we have two store nodes, one operating mostly as a client (A) and another as server (B). - -1. Node A performs a handshake with B node. B node responds and both nodes communicate their payment threshold. -2. Node A and B creates an accounting entry for the other peer, keep track of peer and current balance. -3. Node A issues a `HistoryRequest`, and B responds with a `HistoryResponse`. Based on the number of WakuMessages in the response, both nodes update their accounting records. -4. When payment threshold is reached, Node A sends over a cheque to reach a neutral balance. Settlement of this is currently out of scope, but would occur through a SWAP contract (to be specified). (mock and hard phase). +Assuming we have two store nodes, +one operating mostly as a client (A) and another as server (B). + +1. Node A performs a handshake with B node. +B node responds and both nodes communicate their payment threshold. +2. Node A and B creates an accounting entry for the other peer, +keep track of peer and current balance. +3. Node A issues a `HistoryRequest`, and B responds with a `HistoryResponse`. +Based on the number of WakuMessages in the response, +both nodes update their accounting records. +4. When payment threshold is reached, +Node A sends over a cheque to reach a neutral balance. +Settlement of this is currently out of scope, +but would occur through a SWAP contract (to be specified). +(mock and hard phase). 5. If disconnect threshold is reached, Node B disconnects Node A (mock and hard phase). -Note that not all of these steps are mandatory in initial stages, see below for more details. For example, the payment threshold MAY initially be set out of bounds, and policy is only activated in the mock and hard phase. +Note that not all of these steps are mandatory in initial stages, +see below for more details. +For example, the payment threshold MAY initially be set out of bounds, +and policy is only activated in the mock and hard phase. ### Protobufs -We use protobuf to specify the handshake and signature. This current protobuf is a work in progress. This is needed for mock and hard phase. +We use protobuf to specify the handshake and signature. +This current protobuf is a work in progress. +This is needed for mock and hard phase. -A handshake gives initial information about payment thresholds and possibly other information. A cheque is best thought of as a promise to pay at a later date. +A handshake gives initial information about payment thresholds and +possibly other information. +A cheque is best thought of as a promise to pay at a later date. ```protobuf @@ -126,11 +196,13 @@ message Cheque { ## Incremental integration and roll-out -To incrementally integrate this into Waku v2, we have divided up the roll-out into three phases: +To incrementally integrate this into Waku v2, +we have divided up the roll-out into three phases: - Soft - accounting only - Mock - send mock cheques and take word for it -- Hard Test - blockchain integration and deployed to public testnet (Goerli, Optimism testnet or similar) +- Hard Test - blockchain integration and deployed to public testnet +(Goerli, Optimism testnet or similar) - Hard Main - deployed to a public mainnet An implementation MAY support any of these phases. @@ -140,7 +212,8 @@ An implementation MAY support any of these phases. In the soft phase only accounting is performed, without consequence for the peers. No disconnect or sending of cheques is performed at this tage. -SWAP protocol is performed in conjunction with another request-reply protocol to account for its usage. +SWAP protocol is performed in conjunction with another request-reply protocol +to account for its usage. It SHOULD be done for [13/WAKU2-STORE](../../core/13/store.md) and it MAY be done for other request/reply protocols. @@ -151,10 +224,12 @@ and SHOULD indicate when a peer is out of bounds (either of its thresholds met). In the mock phase, we send mock cheques and send cheques/disconnect peers as appropriate. -- If a node reaches a disconnect threshold, which MUST be outside the payment threshold, it SHOULD disconnect the other peer. +- If a node reaches a disconnect threshold, +which MUST be outside the payment threshold, it SHOULD disconnect the other peer. - If a node is within payment balance, the other node SHOULD stay connected to it. - If a node receives a valid Cheque it SHOULD update its internal accounting records. -- If any node behaves badly, the other node is free to disconnect and pick another node. +- If any node behaves badly, the other node is free to disconnect and +pick another node. - Peer rating is out of scope of this specification. ### Hard phase diff --git a/waku/deprecated/5/waku0.md b/waku/deprecated/5/waku0.md index 5facfc21f..78b7b4494 100644 --- a/waku/deprecated/5/waku0.md +++ b/waku/deprecated/5/waku0.md @@ -11,11 +11,25 @@ contributors: - Kim De Mey --- -This specification describes the format of Waku messages within the ÐΞVp2p Wire Protocol. This spec substitutes [EIP-627](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-627). Waku is a fork of the original Whisper protocol that enables better usability for resource restricted devices, such as mostly-offline bandwidth-constrained smartphones. It does this through (a) light node support, (b) historic messages (with a mailserver) (c) expressing topic interest for better bandwidth usage and (d) basic rate limiting. +This specification describes the format of Waku messages within the ÐΞVp2p Wire Protocol. +This spec substitutes [EIP-627](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-627). +Waku is a fork of the original Whisper protocol that enables better usability +for resource restricted devices, +such as mostly-offline bandwidth-constrained smartphones. +It does this through (a) light node support, +(b) historic messages (with a mailserver) +(c) expressing topic interest for better bandwidth usage and +(d) basic rate limiting. ## Motivation -Waku was created to incrementally improve in areas that Whisper is lacking in, with special attention to resource restricted devices. We specify the standard for Waku messages in order to ensure forward compatibility of different Waku clients, backwards compatibility with Whisper clients, as well as to allow multiple implementations of Waku and its capabilities. We also modify the language to be more unambiguous, concise and consistent. +Waku was created to incrementally improve in areas that Whisper is lacking in, +with special attention to resource restricted devices. +We specify the standard for Waku messages +in order to ensure forward compatibility of different Waku clients, +backwards compatibility with Whisper clients, +as well as to allow multiple implementations of Waku and its capabilities. +We also modify the language to be more unambiguous, concise and consistent. ## Definitions @@ -29,23 +43,47 @@ Waku was created to incrementally improve in areas that Whisper is lacking in, w ### Use of DevP2P -For nodes to communicate, they MUST implement devp2p and run RLPx. They MUST have some way of connecting to other nodes. Node discovery is largely out of scope for this spec, but see the appendix for some suggestions on how to do this. +For nodes to communicate, they MUST implement devp2p and run RLPx. +They MUST have some way of connecting to other nodes. +Node discovery is largely out of scope for this spec, +but see the appendix for some suggestions on how to do this. ### Gossip based routing -In Whisper, messages are gossiped between peers. Whisper is a form of rumor-mongering protocol that works by flooding to its connected peers based on some factors. Messages are eligible for retransmission until their TTL expires. A node SHOULD relay messages to all connected nodes if an envelope matches their PoW and bloom filter settings. If a node works in light mode, it MAY choose not to forward envelopes. A node MUST NOT send expired envelopes, unless the envelopes are sent as a [mailserver](./mailserver.md) response. A node SHOULD NOT send a message to a peer that it has already sent before. +In Whisper, messages are gossiped between peers. +Whisper is a form of rumor-mongering protocol +that works by flooding to its connected peers based on some factors. +Messages are eligible for retransmission until their TTL expires. +A node SHOULD relay messages to all connected nodes +if an envelope matches their PoW and bloom filter settings. +If a node works in light mode, it MAY choose not to forward envelopes. +A node MUST NOT send expired envelopes, +unless the envelopes are sent as a [mailserver](./mailserver.md) response. +A node SHOULD NOT send a message to a peer that it has already sent before. ## Wire Specification ### Use of RLPx transport protocol -All Waku messages are sent as devp2p RLPx transport protocol, version 5[^1] packets. These packets MUST be RLP-encoded arrays of data containing two objects: packet code followed by another object (whose type depends on the packet code). See [informal RLP spec](https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/RLP) and the [Ethereum Yellow Paper, appendix B](https://ethereum.github.io/yellowpaper/paper.pdf) for more details on RLP. - -Waku is a RLPx subprotocol called `waku` with version `0`. The version number corresponds to the major version in the header spec. Minor versions should not break compatibility of `waku`, this would result in a new major. (Some exceptions to this apply in the Draft stage of where client implementation is rapidly change). +All Waku messages are sent as devp2p RLPx transport protocol, +version 5[^1] packets. +These packets MUST be RLP-encoded arrays of data containing two objects: +packet code followed by another object (whose type depends on the packet code). + See [informal RLP spec](https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/RLP) and +the [Ethereum Yellow Paper, appendix B](https://ethereum.github.io/yellowpaper/paper.pdf) +for more details on RLP. + +Waku is a RLPx subprotocol called `waku` with version `0`. +The version number corresponds to the major version in the header spec. +Minor versions should not break compatibility of `waku`, +this would result in a new major. +(Some exceptions to this apply in the Draft stage +of where client implementation is rapidly change). ### ABNF specification -Using [Augmented Backus-Naur form (ABNF)](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5234) we have the following format: +Using [Augmented Backus-Naur form (ABNF)](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5234) +we have the following format: ```abnf ; Packet codes 0 - 127 are reserved for Waku protocol @@ -129,21 +167,23 @@ p2p-message = 1*waku-envelope packet-format = "[" packet-code packet-format "]" required-packet = 0 status / - 1 messages / - 22 status-update / +1 messages / +22 status-update / optional-packet = 126 p2p-request / 127 p2p-message packet = "[" required-packet [ optional-packet ] "]" ``` -All primitive types are RLP encoded. Note that, per RLP specification, integers are encoded starting from `0x00`. +All primitive types are RLP encoded. Note that, per RLP specification, +integers are encoded starting from `0x00`. ### Packet Codes The message codes reserved for Waku protocol: 0 - 127. -Messages with unknown codes MUST be ignored without generating any error, for forward compatibility of future versions. +Messages with unknown codes MUST be ignored without generating any error, +for forward compatibility of future versions. The Waku sub-protocol MUST support the following packet codes: @@ -170,17 +210,25 @@ The Status message serves as a Waku handshake and peers MUST exchange this message upon connection. It MUST be sent after the RLPx handshake and prior to any other Waku messages. -A Waku node MUST await the Status message from a peer before engaging in other Waku protocol activity with that peer. -When a node does not receive the Status message from a peer, before a configurable timeout, it SHOULD disconnect from that peer. +A Waku node MUST await the Status message from a peer +before engaging in other Waku protocol activity with that peer. +When a node does not receive the Status message from a peer, +before a configurable timeout, it SHOULD disconnect from that peer. Upon retrieval of the Status message, the node SHOULD validate the message received and validated the Status message. Note that its peer might not be in the same state. When a node is receiving other Waku messages from a peer before a Status -message is received, the node MUST ignore these messages and SHOULD disconnect from that peer. Status messages received after the handshake is completed MUST also be ignored. +message is received, +the node MUST ignore these messages and SHOULD disconnect from that peer. +Status messages received after the handshake is completed MUST also be ignored. -The status message MUST contain an association list containing various options. All options within this association list are OPTIONAL, ordering of the key-value pairs is not guaranteed and therefore MUST NOT be relied on. Unknown keys in the association list SHOULD be ignored. +The status message MUST contain an association list containing various options. +All options within this association list are OPTIONAL, +ordering of the key-value pairs is not guaranteed and +therefore MUST NOT be relied on. +Unknown keys in the association list SHOULD be ignored. #### Messages @@ -188,87 +236,130 @@ This packet is used for sending the standard Waku envelopes. #### Status Update -The Status Update message is used to communicate an update of the settings of the node. +The Status Update message is used to communicate an update +of the settings of the node. The format is the same as the Status message, all fields are optional. -If none of the options are specified the message MUST be ignored and considered a noop. -Fields that are omitted are considered unchanged, fields that haven't changed SHOULD not -be transmitted. +If none of the options are specified the message MUST be ignored and +considered a noop. +Fields that are omitted are considered unchanged, +fields that haven't changed SHOULD not be transmitted. -**PoW Requirement update** +##### PoW Requirement update -When PoW is updated, peers MUST NOT deliver the sender envelopes with PoW lower than specified in this message. +When PoW is updated, peers MUST NOT deliver the sender envelopes +with PoW lower than specified in this message. -PoW is defined as average number of iterations, required to find the current BestBit (the number of leading zero bits in the hash), divided by message size and TTL: +PoW is defined as average number of iterations, +required to find the current BestBit +(the number of leading zero bits in the hash), divided by message size and TTL: - PoW = (2**BestBit) / (size * TTL) +> PoW = (2**BestBit) / (size * TTL) PoW calculation: - fn short_rlp(envelope) = rlp of envelope, excluding env_nonce field. - fn pow_hash(envelope, env_nonce) = sha3(short_rlp(envelope) ++ env_nonce) - fn pow(pow_hash, size, ttl) = 2**leading_zeros(pow_hash) / (size * ttl) - -where size is the size of the RLP-encoded envelope, excluding `env_nonce` field (size of `short_rlp(envelope)`). +```rust + fn short_rlp(envelope) = rlp of envelope, excluding env_nonce field. + fn pow_hash(envelope, env_nonce) = sha3(short_rlp(envelope) ++ env_nonce) + fn pow(pow_hash, size, ttl) = 2**leading_zeros(pow_hash) / (size * ttl) +``` -**Bloom filter update** +where size is the size of the RLP-encoded envelope, +excluding `env_nonce` field (size of `short_rlp(envelope)`). -The bloom filter is used to identify a number of topics to a peer without compromising (too much) privacy over precisely what topics are of interest. Precise control over the information content (and thus efficiency of the filter) may be maintained through the addition of bits. +##### Bloom filter update -Blooms are formed by the bitwise OR operation on a number of bloomed topics. The bloom function takes the topic and projects them onto a 512-bit slice. At most, three bits are marked for each bloomed topic. +The bloom filter is used to identify a number of topics +to a peer without compromising (too much) +privacy over precisely what topics are of interest. +Precise control over the information content (and thus efficiency of the filter) +may be maintained through the addition of bits. -The projection function is defined as a mapping from a 4-byte slice S to a 512-bit slice D; for ease of explanation, S will dereference to bytes, whereas D will dereference to bits. +Blooms are formed by the bitwise OR operation on a number of bloomed topics. +The bloom function takes the topic and projects them onto a 512-bit slice. +At most, three bits are marked for each bloomed topic. - LET D[*] = 0 - FOREACH i IN { 0, 1, 2 } DO - LET n = S[i] - IF S[3] & (2 ** i) THEN n += 256 - D[n] = 1 - END FOR +The projection function is defined as a mapping from a 4-byte slice S +to a 512-bit slice D; for ease of explanation, S will dereference to bytes, +whereas D will dereference to bits. -A full bloom filter (all the bits set to 1) means that the node is to be considered a `Full Node` and it will accept any topic. +```python + LET D[*] = 0 + FOREACH i IN { 0, 1, 2 } DO + LET n = S[i] + IF S[3] & (2 ** i) THEN n += 256 + D[n] = 1 + END FOR +``` -If both Topic Interest and bloom filter are specified, Topic Interest always takes precedence and bloom filter MUST be ignored. +A full bloom filter (all the bits set to 1) +means that the node is to be considered a `Full Node` and it will accept any topic. -If only bloom filter is specified, the current Topic Interest MUST be discarded and only the updated bloom filter MUST be used when forwarding or posting envelopes. +If both Topic Interest and bloom filter are specified, +Topic Interest always takes precedence and bloom filter MUST be ignored. -A bloom filter with all bits set to 0 signals that the node is not currently interested in receiving any envelope. +If only bloom filter is specified, the current Topic Interest MUST be discarded and +only the updated bloom filter MUST be used when forwarding or posting envelopes. -**Topic Interest update** +A bloom filter with all bits set to 0 signals +that the node is not currently interested in receiving any envelope. -This packet is used by Waku nodes for sharing their interest in messages with specific topics. It does this in a more bandwidth considerate way, at the expense of some metadata protection. Peers MUST only send envelopes with specified topics. +##### Topic Interest update +This packet is used by Waku nodes for sharing their interest +in messages with specific topics. +It does this in a more bandwidth considerate way, +at the expense of some metadata protection. +Peers MUST only send envelopes with specified topics. -It is currently bounded to a maximum of 10000 topics. If you are interested in more topics than that, this is currently underspecified and likely requires updating it. The constant is subject to change. +It is currently bounded to a maximum of 10000 topics. +If you are interested in more topics than that, +this is currently underspecified and likely requires updating it. +The constant is subject to change. -If only Topic Interest is specified, the current bloom filter MUST be discarded and only the updated Topic Interest MUST be used when forwarding or posting envelopes. +If only Topic Interest is specified, +the current bloom filter MUST be discarded and +only the updated Topic Interest MUST be used when forwarding or posting envelopes. -An empty array signals that the node is not currently interested in receiving any envelope. +An empty array signals that the node +is not currently interested in receiving any envelope. -**Rate Limits update** +##### Rate Limits update This packet is used for informing other nodes of their self defined rate limits. -In order to provide basic Denial-of-Service attack protection, each node SHOULD define its own rate limits. The rate limits SHOULD be applied on IPs, peer IDs, and envelope topics. +In order to provide basic Denial-of-Service attack protection, +each node SHOULD define its own rate limits. +The rate limits SHOULD be applied on IPs, peer IDs, and envelope topics. Each node MAY decide to whitelist, i.e. do not rate limit, selected IPs or peer IDs. If a peer exceeds node's rate limits, the connection between them MAY be dropped. -Each node SHOULD broadcast its rate limits to its peers using the rate limits packet. The rate limits MAY also be sent as an optional parameter in the handshake. +Each node SHOULD broadcast its rate limits to its peers using the rate limits packet. +The rate limits MAY also be sent as an optional parameter in the handshake. -Each node SHOULD respect rate limits advertised by its peers. The number of packets SHOULD be throttled in order not to exceed peer's rate limits. If the limit gets exceeded, the connection MAY be dropped by the peer. +Each node SHOULD respect rate limits advertised by its peers. +The number of packets SHOULD be throttled in order not to exceed peer's rate limits. +If the limit gets exceeded, the connection MAY be dropped by the peer. -**Message Confirmations update** +##### Message Confirmations update -Message confirmations tell a node that a message originating from it has been received by its peers, allowing a node to know whether a message has or has not been received. +Message confirmations tell a node that a message originating +from it has been received by its peers, +allowing a node to know whether a message has or has not been received. -A node MAY send a message confirmation for any batch of messages received with a packet Messages Code. +A node MAY send a message confirmation for any batch of messages +received with a packet Messages Code. -A message confirmation is sent using Batch Acknowledge packet or Message Response packet. The Batch Acknowledge packet is followed by a keccak256 hash of the envelopes batch data. +A message confirmation is sent using Batch Acknowledge packet or +Message Response packet. +The Batch Acknowledge packet is followed by a keccak256 hash +of the envelopes batch data. The current `version` of the message response is `1`. -Using [Augmented Backus-Naur form (ABNF)](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5234) we have the following format: +Using [Augmented Backus-Naur form (ABNF)](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5234) +we have the following format: ```abnf ; a version of the Message Response @@ -294,159 +385,268 @@ confirmation = "[" version response "]" ``` The supported codes: -`1`: means time sync error which happens when an envelope is too old or created in the future (the root cause is no time sync between nodes). - -The drawback of sending message confirmations is that it increases the noise in the network because for each sent message, a corresponding confirmation is broadcast by one or more peers. +`1`: means time sync error which happens when an envelope is too old or +created in the future (the root cause is no time sync between nodes). +The drawback of sending message confirmations +is that it increases the noise in the network because for each sent message, +a corresponding confirmation is broadcast by one or more peers. #### P2P Request -This packet is used for sending Dapp-level peer-to-peer requests, e.g. Waku Mail Client requesting old messages from the [Waku Mail Server](./mailserver.md). +This packet is used for sending Dapp-level peer-to-peer requests, +e.g. Waku Mail Client requesting old messages from the [Waku Mail Server](./mailserver.md). #### P2P Message -This packet is used for sending the peer-to-peer messages, which are not supposed to be forwarded any further. E.g. it might be used by the Waku Mail Server for delivery of old (expired) messages, which is otherwise not allowed. - +This packet is used for sending the peer-to-peer messages, +which are not supposed to be forwarded any further. +E.g. it might be used by the Waku Mail Server for delivery of old +(expired) messages, which is otherwise not allowed. ### Payload Encryption -Asymmetric encryption uses the standard Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme with SECP-256k1 public key. +Asymmetric encryption uses the standard Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme +with SECP-256k1 public key. Symmetric encryption uses AES GCM algorithm with random 96-bit nonce. ### Packet code Rationale -Packet codes `0x00` and `0x01` are already used in all Waku / Whisper versions. Packet code `0x02` and `0x03` were previously used in Whisper but are deprecated as of Waku v0.4 +Packet codes `0x00` and `0x01` are already used in all Waku / Whisper versions. +Packet code `0x02` and `0x03` were previously used in Whisper but +are deprecated as of Waku v0.4 Packet code `0x22` is used to dynamically change the settings of a node. -Packet codes `0x7E` and `0x7F` may be used to implement Waku Mail Server and Client. Without P2P messages it would be impossible to deliver the old messages, since they will be recognized as expired, and the peer will be disconnected for violating the Whisper protocol. They might be useful for other purposes when it is not possible to spend time on PoW, e.g. if a stock exchange will want to provide live feed about the latest trades. +Packet codes `0x7E` and `0x7F` may be used to implement Waku Mail Server and Client. +Without P2P messages it would be impossible to deliver the old messages, +since they will be recognized as expired, +and the peer will be disconnected for violating the Whisper protocol. +They might be useful for other purposes +when it is not possible to spend time on PoW, +e.g. if a stock exchange will want to provide live feed about the latest trades. ## Additional capabilities -Waku supports multiple capabilities. These include light node, rate limiting and bridging of traffic. Here we list these capabilities, how they are identified, what properties they have and what invariants they must maintain. +Waku supports multiple capabilities. +These include light node, rate limiting and bridging of traffic. +Here we list these capabilities, how they are identified, +what properties they have and what invariants they must maintain. -Additionally there is the capability of a mailserver which is documented in its on [specification](mailserver.md). +Additionally there is the capability of a mailserver +which is documented in its on [specification](mailserver.md). ### Light node -The rationale for light nodes is to allow for interaction with waku on resource restricted devices as bandwidth can often be an issue. +The rationale for light nodes is to allow for interaction with waku +on resource restricted devices as bandwidth can often be an issue. -Light nodes MUST NOT forward any incoming messages, they MUST only send their own messages. When light nodes happen to connect to each other, they SHOULD disconnect. As this would result in messages being dropped between the two. +Light nodes MUST NOT forward any incoming messages, +they MUST only send their own messages. +When light nodes happen to connect to each other, +they SHOULD disconnect. +As this would result in messages being dropped between the two. Light nodes are identified by the `light_node` value in the status message. ### Accounting for resources (experimental) -Nodes MAY implement accounting, keeping track of resource usage. It is heavily inspired by Swarm's [SWAP protocol](https://www.bokconsulting.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/tron-fischer-sw3.pdf), and works by doing pairwise accounting for resources. +Nodes MAY implement accounting, keeping track of resource usage. +It is heavily inspired by +Swarm's [SWAP protocol](https://www.bokconsulting.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/tron-fischer-sw3.pdf), +and works by doing pairwise accounting for resources. -Each node keeps track of resource usage with all other nodes. Whenever an envelope is received from a node that is expected (fits bloom filter or topic interest, is legal, etc) this is tracked. +Each node keeps track of resource usage with all other nodes. +Whenever an envelope is received from a node that is expected +(fits bloom filter or topic interest, is legal, etc) this is tracked. -Every epoch (say, every minute or every time an event happens) statistics SHOULD be aggregated and saved by the client: +Every epoch (say, every minute or every time an event happens) +statistics SHOULD be aggregated and saved by the client: | peer | sent | received | |-------|------|----------| | peer1 | 0 | 123 | | peer2 | 10 | 40 | -In later versions this will be amended by nodes communication thresholds, settlements and disconnect logic. +In later versions this will be amended by nodes communication thresholds, +settlements and disconnect logic. ## Upgradability and Compatibility ### General principles and policy -These are policies that guide how we make decisions when it comes to upgradability, compatibility, and extensibility: +These are policies that guide how we make decisions when it comes to upgradability, +compatibility, and extensibility: 1. Waku aims to be compatible with previous and future versions. -2. In cases where we want to break this compatibility, we do so gracefully and as a single decision point. +2. In cases where we want to break this compatibility, we do so gracefully and +as a single decision point. + +3. To achieve this, +we employ the following two general strategies: -3. To achieve this, we employ the following two general strategies: - a) Accretion (including protocol negotiation) over changing data -- b) When we want to change things, we give it a new name (for example, a version number). +- b) When we want to change things, we give it a new name +(for example, a version number). Examples: -- We enable bridging between `shh/6` and `waku/0` until such a time as when we are ready to gracefully drop support for `shh/6` (1, 2, 3). -- When we add parameter fields, we (currently) do so by accreting them in a list, so old clients can ignore new fields (dynamic list) and new clients can use new capabilities (1, 3). -- To better support (2) and (3) in the future, we will likely release a new version that gives better support for open, growable maps (association lists or native map type) (3) -- When we we want to provide a new set of messages that have different requirements, we do so under a new protocol version and employ protocol versioning. This is a form of accretion at a level above - it ensures a client can support both protocols at once and drop support for legacy versions gracefully. (1,2,3) +- We enable bridging between `shh/6` and +`waku/0` until such a time as when we are ready to gracefully drop support +for `shh/6` (1, 2, 3). +- When we add parameter fields, we (currently) do so by accreting them in a list, +so old clients can ignore new fields (dynamic list) +and new clients can use new capabilities (1, 3). +- To better support (2) and (3) in the future, +we will likely release a new version that gives better support for open, +growable maps (association lists or native map type) (3) +- When we we want to provide a new set of messages that have different requirements, +we do so under a new protocol version and employ protocol versioning. +This is a form of accretion at a level above - +it ensures a client can support both protocols at once and +drop support for legacy versions gracefully. (1,2,3) ### Backwards Compatibility -Waku is a different subprotocol from Whisper so it isn't directly compatible. However, the data format is the same, so compatibility can be achieved by the use of a bridging mode as described below. Any client which does not implement certain packet codes should gracefully ignore the packets with those codes. This will ensure the forward compatibility. +Waku is a different subprotocol from Whisper so it isn't directly compatible. +However, the data format is the same, +so compatibility can be achieved by the use of a bridging mode as described below. +Any client which does not implement certain packet codes +should gracefully ignore the packets with those codes. +This will ensure the forward compatibility. ### Waku-Whisper bridging -`waku/0` and `shh/6` are different DevP2P subprotocols, however they share the same data format making their envelopes compatible. This means we can bridge the protocols naively, this works as follows. +`waku/0` and `shh/6` are different DevP2P subprotocols, +however they share the same data format making their envelopes compatible. +This means we can bridge the protocols naively, this works as follows. **Roles:** + - Waku client A, only Waku capability - Whisper client B, only Whisper capability - WakuWhisper bridge C, both Waku and Whisper capability **Flow:** + 1. A posts message; B posts message. 2. C picks up message from A and B and relays them both to Waku and Whisper. 3. A receives message on Waku; B on Whisper. -**Note**: This flow means if another bridge C1 is active, we might get duplicate relaying for a message between C1 and C2. I.e. Whisper(<>Waku<>Whisper)<>Waku, A-C1-C2-B. Theoretically this bridging chain can get as long as TTL permits. +**Note**: This flow means if another bridge C1 is active, +we might get duplicate relaying for a message between C1 and C2. +I.e. Whisper(<>Waku<>Whisper)<>Waku, A-C1-C2-B. +Theoretically this bridging chain can get as long as TTL permits. ### Forward Compatibility -It is desirable to have a strategy for maintaining forward compatibility between `waku/0` and future version of waku. Here we outline some concerns and strategy for this. - -- **Connecting to nodes with multiple versions:** The way this SHOULD be accomplished in the future is by negotiating the versions of subprotocols, within the `hello` message nodes transmit their capabilities along with a version. As suggested in [EIP-8](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-8), if a node connects that has a higher version number for a specific capability, the node with a lower number SHOULD assume backwards compatibility. The node with the higher version will decide if compatibility can be assured between versions, if this is not the case it MUST disconnect. -- **Adding new packet codes:** New packet codes can be added easily due to the available packet codes. Unknown packet codes SHOULD be ignored. Upgrades that add new packet codes SHOULD implement some fallback mechanism if no response was received for nodes that do not yet understand this packet. -- **Adding new options in `status-options`:** New options can be added to the `status-options` association list in the `status` and `status-update` packet as options are OPTIONAL and unknown option keys SHOULD be ignored. A node SHOULD NOT disconnect from a peer when receiving `status-options` with unknown option keys. +It is desirable to have a strategy for maintaining forward compatibility +between `waku/0` and future version of waku. +Here we outline some concerns and strategy for this. + +- **Connecting to nodes with multiple versions:** +The way this SHOULD be accomplished in the future +is by negotiating the versions of subprotocols, +within the `hello` message nodes transmit their capabilities along with a version. +As suggested in [EIP-8](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-8), +if a node connects that has a higher version number for a specific capability, +the node with a lower number SHOULD assume backwards compatibility. +The node with the higher version +will decide if compatibility can be assured between versions, +if this is not the case it MUST disconnect. +- **Adding new packet codes:** +New packet codes can be added easily due to the available packet codes. +Unknown packet codes SHOULD be ignored. +Upgrades that add new packet codes SHOULD implement some fallback mechanism +if no response was received for nodes that do not yet understand this packet. + +- **Adding new options in `status-options`:** +New options can be added to the `status-options` association list +in the `status` and `status-update` packet as options are OPTIONAL and +unknown option keys SHOULD be ignored. +A node SHOULD NOT disconnect from a peer +when receiving `status-options` with unknown option keys. ## Appendix A: Security considerations -There are several security considerations to take into account when running Waku. Chief among them are: scalability, DDoS-resistance and privacy. These also vary depending on what capabilities are used. The security considerations for extra capabilities such as [mailservers](./mailserver.md#security-considerations) can be found in their respective specifications. +There are several security considerations to take into account when running Waku. +Chief among them are: scalability, DDoS-resistance and privacy. +These also vary depending on what capabilities are used. +The security considerations for extra capabilities such as [mailservers](./mailserver.md#security-considerations) +can be found in their respective specifications. ### Scalability and UX **Bandwidth usage:** -In version 0 of Waku, bandwidth usage is likely to be an issue. For more investigation into this, see the theoretical scaling model described [here](https://github.com/vacp2p/research/tree/dcc71f4779be832d3b5ece9c4e11f1f7ec24aac2/whisper_scalability). +In version 0 of Waku, bandwidth usage is likely to be an issue. +For more investigation into this, +see the theoretical scaling model described [here](https://github.com/vacp2p/research/tree/dcc71f4779be832d3b5ece9c4e11f1f7ec24aac2/whisper_scalability). **Gossip-based routing:** -Use of gossip-based routing doesn't necessarily scale. It means each node can see a message multiple times, and having too many light nodes can cause propagation probability that is too low. See [Whisper vs PSS](https://our.status.im/whisper-pss-comparison/) for more and a possible Kademlia based alternative. +Use of gossip-based routing doesn't necessarily scale. +It means each node can see a message multiple times, +and having too many light nodes can cause propagation probability that is too low. +See [Whisper vs PSS](https://our.status.im/whisper-pss-comparison/) +for more and a possible Kademlia based alternative. **Lack of incentives:** -Waku currently lacks incentives to run nodes, which means node operators are more likely to create centralized choke points. +Waku currently lacks incentives to run nodes, +which means node operators are more likely to create centralized choke points. ### Privacy **Light node privacy:** -The main privacy concern with light nodes is that directly connected peers will know that a message originates from them (as it are the only ones it sends). This means nodes can make assumptions about what messages (topics) their peers are interested in. +The main privacy concern with light nodes +is that directly connected peers will know that a message originates from them +(as it are the only ones it sends). +This means nodes can make assumptions about what messages (topics) +their peers are interested in. **Bloom filter privacy:** -By having a bloom filter where only the topics you are interested in are set, you reveal which messages you are interested in. This is a fundamental tradeoff between bandwidth usage and privacy, though the tradeoff space is likely suboptimal in terms of the [Anonymity](https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/954.pdf) [trilemma](https://petsymposium.org/2019/files/hotpets/slides/coordination-helps-anonymity-slides.pdf). +By having a bloom filter where only the topics you are interested in are set, +you reveal which messages you are interested in. +This is a fundamental tradeoff between bandwidth usage and privacy, +though the tradeoff space is likely suboptimal in terms of the +[Anonymity](https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/954.pdf) [trilemma](https://petsymposium.org/2019/files/hotpets/slides/coordination-helps-anonymity-slides.pdf). **Privacy guarantees not rigorous:** -Privacy for Whisper / Waku haven't been studied rigorously for various threat models like global passive adversary, local active attacker, etc. This is unlike e.g. Tor and mixnets. +Privacy for Whisper / Waku haven't been studied rigorously for various threat models +like global passive adversary, local active attacker, etc. +This is unlike e.g. Tor and mixnets. **Topic hygiene:** -Similar to bloom filter privacy, if you use a very specific topic you reveal more information. See scalability model linked above. +Similar to bloom filter privacy, +if you use a very specific topic you reveal more information. +See scalability model linked above. ### Spam resistance **PoW bad for heterogeneous devices:** -Proof of work is a poor spam prevention mechanism. A mobile device can only have a very low PoW in order not to use too much CPU / burn up its phone battery. This means someone can spin up a powerful node and overwhelm the network. +Proof of work is a poor spam prevention mechanism. +A mobile device can only have a very low PoW +in order not to use too much CPU / burn up its phone battery. +This means someone can spin up a powerful node and overwhelm the network. ### Censorship resistance **Devp2p TCP port blockable:** -By default Devp2p runs on port `30303`, which is not commonly used for any other service. This means it is easy to censor, e.g. airport WiFi. This can be mitigated somewhat by running on e.g. port `80` or `443`, but there are still outstanding issues. See libp2p and Tor's Pluggable Transport for how this can be improved. +By default Devp2p runs on port `30303`, +which is not commonly used for any other service. +This means it is easy to censor, e.g. airport WiFi. +This can be mitigated somewhat by running on e.g. port `80` or `443`, +but there are still outstanding issues. +See libp2p and Tor's Pluggable Transport for how this can be improved. ## Appendix B: Implementation Notes @@ -461,17 +661,22 @@ By default Devp2p runs on port `30303`, which is not commonly used for any other Notes useful for implementing Waku mode. - 1. Avoid duplicate envelopes +- Avoid duplicate envelopes: - To avoid duplicate envelopes, only connect to one Waku node. Benign duplicate envelopes is an intrinsic property of Whisper which often leads to a N factor increase in traffic, where N is the number of peers you are connected to. +To avoid duplicate envelopes, only connect to one Waku node. +Benign duplicate envelopes is an intrinsic property of Whisper +which often leads to a N factor increase in traffic, +where N is the number of peers you are connected to. - 2. Topic specific recommendations +- Topic specific recommendations - - Consider partition topics based on some usage, to avoid too much traffic on a single topic. +Consider partition topics based on some usage, +to avoid too much traffic on a single topic. ### Node discovery -Resource restricted devices SHOULD use [EIP-1459](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1459) to discover nodes. +Resource restricted devices SHOULD use +[EIP-1459](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1459) to discover nodes. Known static nodes MAY also be used. @@ -487,16 +692,21 @@ Released [April 21,2020](https://github.com/vacp2p/specs/commit/9e650995f2417984 Released [March 17,2020](https://github.com/vacp2p/specs/commit/7b9dc562bc50c6bb844ac575cb221ec9cda2530a) -- Clarify the preferred way of handling unknown keys in the `status-options` association list. -- Correct spec/implementation mismatch: Change RLP keys to be the their int values in order to reflect production behavior +- Clarify the preferred way of handling unknown keys +in the `status-options` association list. +- Correct spec/implementation mismatch: +Change RLP keys to be the their int values in order to reflect production behavior ### Version 0.4 Released [February 21, 2020](https://github.com/vacp2p/specs/commit/17bd066e317bbe33af07146b721d73f24de47e88). - Simplify implementation matrix with latest state -- Introduces a new required packet code Status Code (`0x22`) for communicating option changes -- Deprecates the following packet codes: PoW Requirement (`0x02`), Bloom Filter (`0x03`), Rate limits (`0x20`), Topic interest (`0x21`) - all superseded by the new Status Code (`0x22`) +- Introduces a new required packet code Status Code (`0x22`) +for communicating option changes +- Deprecates the following packet codes: +PoW Requirement (`0x02`), Bloom Filter (`0x03`), Rate limits (`0x20`), +Topic interest (`0x21`) - all superseded by the new Status Code (`0x22`) - Increased `topic-interest` capacity from 1000 to 10000 ### Version 0.3 @@ -506,7 +716,8 @@ Released [February 13, 2020](https://github.com/vacp2p/specs/commit/73138d6ba954 - Recommend DNS based node discovery over other Discovery methods. - Mark spec as Draft mode in terms of its lifecycle. - Simplify Changelog and misc formatting. -- Handshake/Status message not compatible with shh/6 nodes; specifying options as association list. +- Handshake/Status message not compatible with shh/6 nodes; +specifying options as association list. - Include topic-interest in Status handshake. - Upgradability policy. - `topic-interest` packet code. @@ -522,7 +733,8 @@ Released [December 10, 2019](https://github.com/vacp2p/specs/blob/waku-0.2.0/wak - More details on handshake modifications. - Accounting for resources mode (experimental) - Appendix with security considerations: scalability and UX, privacy, and spam resistance. -- Appendix with implementation notes and implementation matrix across various clients with breakdown per capability. +- Appendix with implementation notes and +implementation matrix across various clients with breakdown per capability. - More details on handshake and parameters. - Describe rate limits in more detail. - More details on mailserver and mail client API. @@ -549,7 +761,6 @@ confirmations-enabled and rate-limits Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). - ## Footnotes [^1]: Felix Lange et al. [The RLPx Transport Protocol](https://github.com/ethereum/devp2p/blob/master/rlpx.md). Ethereum. diff --git a/waku/informational/.DS_Store b/waku/informational/.DS_Store new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c402fd699 Binary files /dev/null and b/waku/informational/.DS_Store differ diff --git a/waku/informational/22/toy-chat.md b/waku/informational/22/toy-chat.md index 168809cd4..c58e81355 100644 --- a/waku/informational/22/toy-chat.md +++ b/waku/informational/22/toy-chat.md @@ -19,12 +19,14 @@ This protocol is mainly used to: Currently, all main Waku v2 implementations support the toy chat protocol: [nim-waku](https://github.com/status-im/nim-waku/blob/master/examples/v2/chat2.nim), -js-waku ([NodeJS](https://github.com/status-im/js-waku/tree/main/examples/cli-chat) and [web](https://github.com/status-im/js-waku/tree/main/examples/web-chat)) +js-waku ([NodeJS](https://github.com/status-im/js-waku/tree/main/examples/cli-chat) + and [web](https://github.com/status-im/js-waku/tree/main/examples/web-chat)) and [go-waku](https://github.com/status-im/go-waku/tree/master/examples/chat2). -Note that this is completely separate from the protocol the Status app is using for its chat functionality. +Note that this is completely separate from the protocol the Status app +is using for its chat functionality. -# Design +## Design The chat protocol enables sending and receiving messages in a chat room. There is currently only one chat room, which is tied to the content topic. @@ -32,7 +34,7 @@ The messages SHOULD NOT be encrypted. The `contentTopic` MUST be set to `/toy-chat/2/huilong/proto`. -# Payloads +## Payloads ```protobuf syntax = "proto3"; @@ -48,6 +50,6 @@ message Chat2Message { - `nick`: The nickname of the user sending the message, - `payload`: The text of the messages, UTF-8 encoded. -# Copyright +## Copyright Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). diff --git a/waku/informational/23/topics.md b/waku/informational/23/topics.md index bbd0e2f79..934faeb9b 100644 --- a/waku/informational/23/topics.md +++ b/waku/informational/23/topics.md @@ -16,12 +16,12 @@ In [10/WAKU2 spec](../../standards/core/10/waku2.md) there are two types of topi - pubsub topics, used for routing - Content topics, used for content-based filtering - ## Pubsub Topics Pubsub topics are used for routing of messages (see [11/WAKU2-RELAY](../../standards/core/11/relay.md)), and can be named implicitly by Waku sharding (see [RELAY-SHARDING](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/waku-RFC/standards/core/relay-sharding.md)). -This document comprises recommendations for explicitly naming pubsub topics (e.g. when choosing *named sharding* as specified in [RELAY-SHARDING](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/waku-RFC/standards/core/relay-sharding.md)). +This document comprises recommendations for explicitly naming pubsub topics +(e.g. when choosing *named sharding* as specified in [RELAY-SHARDING](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/waku-RFC/standards/core/relay-sharding.md)). ### Pubsub Topic Format @@ -29,26 +29,32 @@ Pubsub topics SHOULD follow the following structure: `/waku/2/{topic-name}` -This namespaced structure makes compatibility, discoverability, and automatic handling of new topics easier. +This namespaced structure makes compatibility, discoverability, +and automatic handling of new topics easier. The first two parts indicate 1) it relates to the Waku protocol domain, and 2) the version is 2. -If applicable, it is RECOMMENDED to structure `{topic-name}` in a hierarchical way as well. +If applicable, it is RECOMMENDED to structure `{topic-name}` +in a hierarchical way as well. > *Note*: In previous versions of this document, the structure was `/waku/2/{topic-name}/{encoding}`. The now deprecated `/{encoding}` was always set to `/proto`, -which indicated that the [data field](../../standards/core/11/RELAY.md/#protobuf-definition) in pubsub is serialized/encoded as protobuf. +which indicated that the [data field](../../standards/core/11/RELAY.md/#protobuf-definition) +in pubsub is serialized/encoded as protobuf. The inspiration for this format was taken from [Ethereum 2 P2P spec](https://github.com/ethereum/eth2.0-specs/blob/dev/specs/phase0/p2p-interface.md#topics-and-messages). -However, because the payload of messages transmitted over [11/WAKU2-RELAY](../../standards/core/11/relay.md) must be a [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](../../standards/core/14/message.md), +However, because the payload of messages transmitted over [11/WAKU2-RELAY](../../standards/core/11/relay.md) +must be a [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](../../standards/core/14/message.md), which specifies the wire format as protobuf,`/proto` is the only valid encoding. This makes the `/proto` indication obsolete. -The encoding of the `payload` field of a Waku Message is indicated by the `/{encoding}` part of the content topic name. +The encoding of the `payload` field of a Waku Message +is indicated by the `/{encoding}` part of the content topic name. Specifying an encoding is only significant for the actual payload/data field. -Waku preserves this option by allowing to specify an encoding for the WakuMessage payload field as part of the content topic name. +Waku preserves this option by allowing to specify an encoding +for the WakuMessage payload field as part of the content topic name. ### Default PubSub Topic @@ -56,25 +62,27 @@ The Waku v2 default pubsub topic is: `/waku/2/default-waku/proto` -The `{topic name}` part is `default-waku/proto`, which indicates it is default topic for exchanging WakuMessages; +The `{topic name}` part is `default-waku/proto`, +which indicates it is default topic for exchanging WakuMessages; `/proto` remains for backwards compatibility. ### Application Specific Names Larger apps can segregate their pubsub meshes using topics named like: -``` +```text /waku/2/status/ /waku/2/walletconnect/ ``` -This indicates that these networks carry WakuMessages, but for different domains completely. +This indicates that these networks carry WakuMessages, +but for different domains completely. ### Named Topic Sharding Example The following is an example of named sharding, as specified in [RELAY-SHARDING](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/waku-RFC/standards/core/relay-sharding.md). -``` +```text waku/2/waku-9_shard-0/ ... waku/2/waku-9_shard-9/ @@ -86,10 +94,12 @@ This indicates explicitly that the network traffic has been partitioned into 10 The other type of topic that exists in Waku v2 is a content topic. This is used for content based filtering. -See [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE spec](../../standards/core/14/message.md) for where this is specified. +See [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE spec](../../standards/core/14/message.md) +for where this is specified. Note that this doesn't impact routing of messages between relaying nodes, -but it does impact how request/reply protocols such as -[12/WAKU2-FILTER](../../standards/core/12/filter.md) and [13/WAKU2-STORE](../../standards/core/13/store.md) are used. +but it does impact how request/reply protocols such as +[12/WAKU2-FILTER](../../standards/core/12/filter.md) and +[13/WAKU2-STORE](../../standards/core/13/store.md) are used. This is especially useful for nodes that have limited bandwidth, and only want to pull down messages that match this given content topic. @@ -114,16 +124,19 @@ Application names should be unique to avoid conflicting issues with other protoc Applications should specify their version (if applicable) in the version field. The `{content-topic-name}` portion of the content topic is up to the application, and depends on the problem domain. -It can be hierarchical, for instance to separate content, or to indicate different bandwidth and privacy guarantees. -The encoding field indicates the serialization/encoding scheme for the [WakuMessage payload](../../standards/core/14/message.md/#payloads) field. +It can be hierarchical, for instance to separate content, or +to indicate different bandwidth and privacy guarantees. +The encoding field indicates the serialization/encoding scheme +for the [WakuMessage payload](../../standards/core/14/message.md/#payloads) field. ## Differences with Waku v1 In [5/WAKU1](../../deprecated/5/waku0.md) there is no actual routing. All messages are sent to all other nodes. -This means that we are implicitly using the same pubsub topic that would be something like: +This means that we are implicitly using the same pubsub topic +that would be something like: -``` +```text /waku/1/default-waku/rlp ``` @@ -135,19 +148,21 @@ To bridge Waku v1 and Waku v2 we have a [15/WAKU-BRIDGE](../../standards/core/15 For mapping Waku v1 topics to Waku v2 content topics, the following structure for the content topic SHOULD be used: -``` +```text /waku/1/<4bytes-waku-v1-topic>/rfc26 ``` -The `<4bytes-waku-v1-topic>` SHOULD be the lowercase hex representation of the 4-byte Waku v1 topic. +The `<4bytes-waku-v1-topic>` SHOULD be the lowercase hex representation +of the 4-byte Waku v1 topic. A `0x` prefix SHOULD be used. `/rfc26` indicates that the bridged content is encoded according to RFC [26/WAKU2-PAYLOAD](../../standards/application/26/payload.md). -See [15/WAKU-BRIDGE](../../standards/core/15/bridge.md) for a description of the bridged fields. +See [15/WAKU-BRIDGE](../../standards/core/15/bridge.md) for a description +of the bridged fields. This creates a direct mapping between the two protocols. For example: -``` +```text /waku/1/0x007f80ff/rfc26 ``` @@ -158,13 +173,13 @@ Copyright and related rights waived via ## References -* [10/WAKU2 spec](../../standards/core/10/waku2.md) -* [11/WAKU2-RELAY](../../standards/core/11/relay.md) -* [RELAY-SHARDING](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/waku-RFC/standards/core/relay-sharding.md) -* [Ethereum 2 P2P spec](https://github.com/ethereum/eth2.0-specs/blob/dev/specs/phase0/p2p-interface.md#topics-and-messages) -* [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](../../standards/core/14/message.md) -* [12/WAKU2-FILTER](../../standards/core/12/filter.md) -* [13/WAKU2-STORE](../../standards/core/13/store.md) -* [6/WAKU1](../../deprecated/5/waku0.md) -* [15/WAKU-BRIDGE](../../standards/core/15/bridge.md) -* [26/WAKU-PAYLOAD](../../standards/application/26/payload.md) +- [10/WAKU2 spec](../../standards/core/10/waku2.md) +- [11/WAKU2-RELAY](../../standards/core/11/relay.md) +- [RELAY-SHARDING](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/waku-RFC/standards/core/relay-sharding.md) +- [Ethereum 2 P2P spec](https://github.com/ethereum/eth2.0-specs/blob/dev/specs/phase0/p2p-interface.md#topics-and-messages) +- [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](../../standards/core/14/message.md) +- [12/WAKU2-FILTER](../../standards/core/12/filter.md) +- [13/WAKU2-STORE](../../standards/core/13/store.md) +- [6/WAKU1](../../deprecated/5/waku0.md) +- [15/WAKU-BRIDGE](../../standards/core/15/bridge.md) +- [26/WAKU-PAYLOAD](../../standards/application/26/payload.md) diff --git a/waku/informational/27/peers.md b/waku/informational/27/peers.md index 334428b03..e2d06db48 100644 --- a/waku/informational/27/peers.md +++ b/waku/informational/27/peers.md @@ -7,24 +7,31 @@ editor: Hanno Cornelius contributors: --- -`27/WAKU2-PEERS` describes a recommended minimal set of peer storage and peer management features to be implemented by Waku v2 clients. +`27/WAKU2-PEERS` describes a recommended minimal set of peer storage and +peer management features to be implemented by Waku v2 clients. -In this context, peer _storage_ refers to a client's ability to keep track of discovered or statically-configured peers and their metadata. +In this context, peer _storage_ refers to a client's ability to keep track of discovered +or statically-configured peers and their metadata. It also deals with matters of peer _persistence_, or the ability to store peer data on disk to resume state after a client restart. -Peer _management_ is a closely related concept and refers to the set of actions a client MAY choose to perform based on its knowledge of its connected peers, +Peer _management_ is a closely related concept and +refers to the set of actions a client MAY choose to perform +based on its knowledge of its connected peers, e.g. triggering reconnects/disconnects, keeping certain connections alive, etc. ## Peer store -The peer store SHOULD be an in-memory data structure where information about discovered or configured peers are stored. -It SHOULD be considered the main source of truth for peer-related information in a Waku v2 client. +The peer store SHOULD be an in-memory data structure +where information about discovered or configured peers are stored. +It SHOULD be considered the main source of truth +for peer-related information in a Waku v2 client. Clients MAY choose to persist this store on-disk. ### Tracked peer metadata -It is RECOMMENDED that a Waku v2 client tracks at least the following information about each of its peers in a peer store: +It is RECOMMENDED that a Waku v2 client tracks at least the following information +about each of its peers in a peer store: | Metadata | Description | | --- | --- | @@ -36,13 +43,16 @@ It is RECOMMENDED that a Waku v2 client tracks at least the following informatio ### Peer connectivity -A Waku v2 client SHOULD track _at least_ the following connectivity states for each of its peers: - - **`NotConnected`**: The peer has been discovered or configured on this client, +A Waku v2 client SHOULD track _at least_ the following connectivity states +for each of its peers: + +- **`NotConnected`**: The peer has been discovered or configured on this client, but no attempt has yet been made to connect to this peer. This is the default state for a new peer. - - **`CannotConnect`**: The client attempted to connect to this peer, but failed. - - **`CanConnect`**: The client was recently connected to this peer and disconnected gracefully. - - **`Connected`**: The client is actively connected to this peer. +- **`CannotConnect`**: The client attempted to connect to this peer, but failed. +- **`CanConnect`**: The client was recently connected to this peer and +disconnected gracefully. +- **`Connected`**: The client is actively connected to this peer. This list does not preclude clients from tracking more advanced connectivity metadata, such as a peer's blacklist status (see [`18/WAKU2-SWAP`](../../standards/application/18/swap.md)). @@ -55,30 +65,40 @@ Peer persistence MAY be used to resume peer connections after a client restart. ## Peer management -Waku v2 clients will have different requirements when it comes to managing the peers tracked in the [**peer store**](#peer-store). +Waku v2 clients will have different requirements +when it comes to managing the peers tracked in the [**peer store**](#peer-store). It is RECOMMENDED that clients support: + - [automatic reconnection](#reconnecting-peers) to peers under certain conditions - [connection keep-alive](#connection-keep-alive) ### Reconnecting peers -A Waku v2 client MAY choose to reconnect to previously connected, managed peers under certain conditions. +A Waku v2 client MAY choose to reconnect to previously connected, +managed peers under certain conditions. Such conditions include, but are not limited to: -- Reconnecting to all `relay`-capable peers after a client restart. This will require [persistent peer storage](#persistence). + +- Reconnecting to all `relay`-capable peers after a client restart. +This will require [persistent peer storage](#persistence). If a client chooses to automatically reconnect to previous peers, -it MUST respect the [backing off period](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/gossipsub/gossipsub-v1.1.md#prune-backoff-and-peer-exchange) specified for GossipSub v1.1 before attempting to reconnect. +it MUST respect the +[backing off period](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/gossipsub/gossipsub-v1.1.md#prune-backoff-and-peer-exchange) +specified for GossipSub v1.1 before attempting to reconnect. This requires keeping track of the [last time each peer was disconnected](#tracked-peer-metadata). ### Connection keep-alive A Waku v2 client MAY choose to implement a keep-alive mechanism to certain peers. If a client chooses to implement keep-alive on a connection, -it SHOULD do so by sending periodic [libp2p pings](https://docs.libp2p.io/concepts/protocols/#ping) as per `10/WAKU2` [client recommendations](../../standards/core/10/waku2.md/#recommendations-for-clients). -The recommended period between pings SHOULD be _at most_ 50% of the shortest idle connection timeout for the specific client and transport. +it SHOULD do so by sending periodic [libp2p pings](https://docs.libp2p.io/concepts/protocols/#ping) +as per `10/WAKU2` [client recommendations](../../standards/core/10/waku2.md/#recommendations-for-clients). +The recommended period between pings SHOULD be _at most_ 50% +of the shortest idle connection timeout for the specific client and transport. For example, idle TCP connections often times out after 10 to 15 minutes. -> **Implementation note:** the `nim-waku` client currently implements a keep-alive mechanism every `5 minutes`, +> **Implementation note:** +the `nim-waku` client currently implements a keep-alive mechanism every `5 minutes`, in response to a TCP connection timeout of `10 minutes`. ## Copyright diff --git a/waku/informational/29/config.md b/waku/informational/29/config.md index 2727de3c1..3411e7682 100644 --- a/waku/informational/29/config.md +++ b/waku/informational/29/config.md @@ -7,7 +7,8 @@ editor: Hanno Cornelius contributors: --- -`29/WAKU2-CONFIG` describes the RECOMMENDED values to assign to configurable parameters for Waku v2 clients. +`29/WAKU2-CONFIG` describes the RECOMMENDED values +to assign to configurable parameters for Waku v2 clients. Since Waku v2 is built on [libp2p](https://github.com/libp2p/specs), most of the parameters and reasonable defaults are derived from there. @@ -36,7 +37,8 @@ We repeat them here with RECOMMMENDED values for `11/WAKU2-RELAY` implementation ## GossipSub v1.1 parameters GossipSub v1.1 extended GossipSub v1.0 and introduced [several new parameters](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/gossipsub/gossipsub-v1.1.md#overview-of-new-parameters). -We repeat the global parameters here with RECOMMMENDED values for `11/WAKU2-RELAY` implementations. +We repeat the global parameters here with RECOMMMENDED values +for `11/WAKU2-RELAY` implementations. | Parameter | Description | RECOMMENDED value | |----------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------| @@ -46,12 +48,15 @@ We repeat the global parameters here with RECOMMMENDED values for `11/WAKU2-RELA | `D_score` | Number of peers to retain by score when pruning from oversubscription | `D_low` | | `D_out` | Number of outbound connections to keep in the mesh. | `D_low` - 1 | -`11/WAKU2-RELAY` clients SHOULD implement a peer scoring mechanism with the parameter constraints as [specified by libp2p](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/gossipsub/gossipsub-v1.1.md#overview-of-new-parameters). +`11/WAKU2-RELAY` clients SHOULD implement a peer scoring mechanism +with the parameter constraints as +[specified by libp2p](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/gossipsub/gossipsub-v1.1.md#overview-of-new-parameters). ## Other configuration The following behavioural parameters are not specified by `libp2p`, -but nevertheless describes constraints that `11/WAKU2-RELAY` clients MAY choose to implement. +but nevertheless describes constraints that `11/WAKU2-RELAY` clients +MAY choose to implement. | Parameter | Description | RECOMMENDED value | |--------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------| diff --git a/waku/informational/30/adaptive-nodes.md b/waku/informational/30/adaptive-nodes.md index 737ddac5b..9e9374411 100644 --- a/waku/informational/30/adaptive-nodes.md +++ b/waku/informational/30/adaptive-nodes.md @@ -11,7 +11,8 @@ This is an informational spec that show cases the concept of adaptive nodes. ## Node types - a continuum -We can look at node types as a continuum, from more restricted to less restricted, fewer resources to more resources. +We can look at node types as a continuum, +from more restricted to less restricted, fewer resources to more resources. ![Node types - a continuum](./images/adaptive_node_continuum2.png) @@ -29,11 +30,13 @@ Some examples: - Desktop: download, leave in background, contribute somewhat - Cluster: expensive, upkeep, but can contribute a lot -These are also illustrative, so a node in a browser in certain environment might contribute similarly to Desktop. +These are also illustrative, +so a node in a browser in certain environment might contribute similarly to Desktop. ### Adaptive nodes -We call these nodes *adaptive nodes* to highlights different modes of contributing, such as: +We call these nodes *adaptive nodes* to highlights different modes of contributing, +such as: - Only leeching from the network - Relaying messages for one or more topics @@ -55,11 +58,18 @@ Each node can choose which protocols to support, depending on its resources and ![Protocol selection](./images/adaptive_node_protocol_selection2.png) -In the case of protocols like [11/WAKU2-RELAY](../../standards/core/11/relay.md) etc (12, 13, 19, 21) these correspond to Libp2p protocols. +In the case of protocols like [11/WAKU2-RELAY](../../standards/core/11/relay.md) +etc (12, 13, 19, 21) these correspond to Libp2p protocols. -However, other protocols like 16/WAKU2-RPC (local HTTP JSON-RPC), 25/LIBP2P-DNS-DISCOVERY, Discovery v5 (DevP2P) or interfacing with distributed storage, are running on different network stacks. +However, other protocols like 16/WAKU2-RPC +(local HTTP JSON-RPC), 25/LIBP2P-DNS-DISCOVERY, +Discovery v5 (DevP2P) or interfacing with distributed storage, +are running on different network stacks. -This is in addition to protocols that specify payloads, such as 14/WAKU2-MESSAGE, 26/WAKU2-PAYLOAD, or application specific ones. As well as specs that act more as recommendations, such as 23/WAKU2-TOPICS or 27/WAKU2-PEERS. +This is in addition to protocols that specify payloads, such as 14/WAKU2-MESSAGE, +26/WAKU2-PAYLOAD, or application specific ones. +As well as specs that act more as recommendations, +such as 23/WAKU2-TOPICS or 27/WAKU2-PEERS. ## Waku network visualization @@ -67,7 +77,8 @@ We can better visualize the network with some illustrative examples. ### Topology and topics -The first one shows an example topology with different PubSub topics for the relay protocol. +The first one shows an example topology with different PubSub topics +for the relay protocol. ![Waku Network visualization](./images/adaptive_node_network_topology_protocols2.png) @@ -75,21 +86,25 @@ The first one shows an example topology with different PubSub topics for the rel ![Waku Network visualization legend](./images/adaptive_node_network_topology_protocols_legend.png) -The dotted box shows what content topics (application-specific) a node is interested in. +The dotted box shows what content topics (application-specific) +a node is interested in. A node that is purely providing a service to the network might not care. -In this example, we see support for toy chat, a topic in Waku v1 (Status chat), WalletConnect, and SuperRare community. +In this example, we see support for toy chat, +a topic in Waku v1 (Status chat), WalletConnect, and SuperRare community. ### Auxiliary network This is a separate component with its own topology. -Behavior and interaction with other protocols specified in Vac RFCs, e.g. 25/LIBP2P-DNS-DISCOVERY, 15/WAKU-BRIDGE, etc. +Behavior and interaction with other protocols specified in Vac RFCs, +e.g. 25/LIBP2P-DNS-DISCOVERY, 15/WAKU-BRIDGE, etc. ### Node Cross Section -This one shows a cross-section of nodes in different dimensions and shows how the connections look different for different protocols. +This one shows a cross-section of nodes in different dimensions and +shows how the connections look different for different protocols. ![Node Cross Section](./images/adaptive_node_cross_section2.png) diff --git a/waku/standards/.DS_Store b/waku/standards/.DS_Store new file mode 100644 index 000000000..92eaf9956 Binary files /dev/null and b/waku/standards/.DS_Store differ diff --git a/waku/standards/application/.DS_Store b/waku/standards/application/.DS_Store new file mode 100644 index 000000000..32b85ce7a Binary files /dev/null and b/waku/standards/application/.DS_Store differ diff --git a/waku/standards/application/20/toy-eth-pm.md b/waku/standards/application/20/toy-eth-pm.md index 7dd70bc0c..6291eaa99 100644 --- a/waku/standards/application/20/toy-eth-pm.md +++ b/waku/standards/application/20/toy-eth-pm.md @@ -17,12 +17,16 @@ This specification explains the Toy Ethereum Private Message protocol which enables a peer to send an encrypted message to another peer using the Waku v2 network, and the peer's Ethereum address. -The main purpose of this specification is to demonstrate how Waku v2 can be used for encrypted messaging purposes, +The main purpose of this specification +is to demonstrate how Waku v2 can be used for encrypted messaging purposes, using Ethereum accounts for identity. -This protocol caters for Web3 wallets restrictions, allowing it to be implemented only using standard Web3 API. -In the current state, the protocol has privacy and features [limitations](#limitations), has not been audited -and hence is not fit for production usage. -We hope this can be an inspiration for developers wishing to build on top of Waku v2. +This protocol caters for Web3 wallets restrictions, +allowing it to be implemented only using standard Web3 API. +In the current state, +the protocol has privacy and features [limitations](#limitations), +has not been audited and hence is not fit for production usage. +We hope this can be an inspiration for developers +wishing to build on top of Waku v2. ## Goal @@ -42,14 +46,16 @@ Here are the variables used in the protocol and their definition: The proposed protocol MUST adhere to the following design requirements: -1. Alice knows Bob's Ethereum address, +1. Alice knows Bob's Ethereum address, 2. Bob is willing to participate to Eth-PM, and publishes `B'`, 3. Bob's ownership of `B'` MUST be verifiable, 4. Alice wants to send message `M` to Bob, 5. Bob SHOULD be able to get `M` using [10/WAKU2 spec](../../core/10/waku2.md), 6. Participants only have access to their Ethereum Wallet via the Web3 API, -7. Carole MUST NOT be able to read `M`'s content even if she is storing it or relaying it, -8. [Waku Message Version 1](../26/payload.md) Asymmetric Encryption is used for encryption purposes. +7. Carole MUST NOT be able to read `M`'s content +even if she is storing it or relaying it, +8. [Waku Message Version 1](../26/payload.md) Asymmetric Encryption +is used for encryption purposes. ## Limitations @@ -58,16 +64,20 @@ meaning that there is no programmatic way for Bob to reply to Alice or verify her identity. Private messages are sent on the same content topic for all users. -As the recipient data is encrypted, all participants must decrypt all messages which can lead to scalability issues. +As the recipient data is encrypted, +all participants must decrypt all messages which can lead to scalability issues. This protocol does not guarantee Perfect Forward Secrecy nor Future Secrecy: If Bob's private key is compromised, past and future messages could be decrypted. A solution combining regular [X3DH](https://www.signal.org/docs/specifications/x3dh/) -bundle broadcast with [Double Ratchet](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/) encryption would remove these limitations; -See the [Status secure transport spec](https://specs.status.im/spec/5) for an example of a protocol that achieves this in a peer-to-peer setting. +bundle broadcast with [Double Ratchet](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/) +encryption would remove these limitations; +See the [Status secure transport spec](https://specs.status.im/spec/5) +for an example of a protocol that achieves this in a peer-to-peer setting. Bob MUST decide to participate in the protocol before Alice can send him a message. -This is discussed in more in details in [Consideration for a non-interactive/uncoordinated protocol](#consideration-for-a-non-interactiveuncoordinated-protocol) +This is discussed in more in details in +[Consideration for a non-interactive/uncoordinated protocol](#consideration-for-a-non-interactiveuncoordinated-protocol) ## The protocol @@ -82,7 +92,8 @@ Then Bob can compute the corresponding SECP-256k1 Public Key, `B'`. For Alice to encrypt messages for Bob, Bob SHOULD broadcast his Encryption Public Key `B'`. -To prove that the Encryption Public Key `B'` is indeed owned by the owner of Bob's Ethereum Account `B`, +To prove that the Encryption Public Key `B'` +is indeed owned by the owner of Bob's Ethereum Account `B`, Bob MUST sign `B'` using `B`. ### Sign Encryption Public Key @@ -91,13 +102,15 @@ To prove ownership of the Encryption Public Key, Bob must sign it using [EIP-712](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-712) v3, meaning calling `eth_signTypedData_v3` on his Wallet's API. -Note: While v4 also exists, -it is not available on all wallets and the features brought by v4 is not needed for the current use case. +Note: While v4 also exists, it is not available on all wallets and +the features brought by v4 is not needed for the current use case. The `TypedData` to be passed to `eth_signTypedData_v3` MUST be as follows, where: -- `encryptionPublicKey` is Bob's Encryption Public Key, `B'`, in hex format, **without** `0x` prefix. -- `bobAddress` is Bob's Ethereum address, corresponding to `B`, in hex format, **with** `0x` prefix. +- `encryptionPublicKey` is Bob's Encryption Public Key, `B'`, +in hex format, **without** `0x` prefix. +- `bobAddress` is Bob's Ethereum address, corresponding to `B`, +in hex format, **with** `0x` prefix. ```js const typedData = { @@ -143,8 +156,9 @@ message PublicKeyMessage { } ``` -This MUST be wrapped in a Waku Message version 0, with the Public Key Broadcast content topic. -Finally, Bob SHOULD publish the message on Waku v2. +This MUST be wrapped in a Waku Message version 0, +with the Public Key Broadcast content topic. +Finally, Bob SHOULD publish the message on Waku v2. ## Consideration for a non-interactive/uncoordinated protocol @@ -157,63 +171,86 @@ and Alice MUST receive it before she can send him a message. Moreover, nim-waku, the reference implementation of [13/WAKU2-STORE](../../core/13/store.md), stores messages for a maximum period of 30 days. -This means that Bob would need to broadcast his public key at least every 30 days to be reachable. +This means that Bob would need to broadcast his public key +at least every 30 days to be reachable. Below we are reviewing possible solutions to mitigate this "sign up" step. ### Retrieve the public key from the blockchain -If Bob has signed at least one transaction with his account then his Public Key can be extracted from the transaction's ECDSA signature. -The challenge with this method is that standard Web3 Wallet API does not allow Alice to specifically retrieve all/any transaction sent by Bob. +If Bob has signed at least one transaction with his account +then his Public Key can be extracted from the transaction's ECDSA signature. +The challenge with this method is that standard Web3 Wallet API +does not allow Alice to specifically retrieve all/any transaction sent by Bob. -Alice would instead need to use the `eth.getBlock` API to retrieve Ethereum blocks one by one. -For each block, she would need to check the `from` value of each transaction until she finds a transaction sent by Bob. +Alice would instead need to use the `eth.getBlock` API +to retrieve Ethereum blocks one by one. +For each block, she would need to check the `from` value of each transaction +until she finds a transaction sent by Bob. -This process is resource intensive and can be slow when using services such as Infura due to rate limits in place, +This process is resource intensive and +can be slow when using services such as Infura due to rate limits in place, which makes it inappropriate for a browser or mobile phone environment. -An alternative would be to either run a backend that can connect directly to an Ethereum node, +An alternative would be to either run a backend +that can connect directly to an Ethereum node, use a centralized blockchain explorer or use a decentralized indexing service such as [The Graph](https://thegraph.com/). -Note that these would resolve a UX issue only if a sender wants to proceed with _air drops_. +Note that these would resolve a UX issue +only if a sender wants to proceed with _air drops_. Indeed, if Bob does not publish his Public Key in the first place -then it can be an indication that he simply does not participate in this protocol and hence will not receive messages. +then it can be an indication that he simply does not participate in this protocol +and hence will not receive messages. -However, these solutions would be helpful if the sender wants to proceed with an _air drop_ of messages: -Send messages over Waku for users to retrieve later, once they decide to participate in this protocol. +However, these solutions would be helpful +if the sender wants to proceed with an _air drop_ of messages: +Send messages over Waku for users to retrieve later, +once they decide to participate in this protocol. Bob may not want to participate first but may decide to participate at a later stage and would like to access previous messages. This could make sense in an NFT offer scenario: Users send offers to any NFT owner, -NFT owner may decide at some point to participate in the protocol and retrieve previous offers. +NFT owner may decide at some point to participate in the protocol and +retrieve previous offers. ### Publishing the public in long term storage -Another improvement would be for Bob not having to re-publish his public key every 30 days or less. -Similarly to above, if Bob stops publishing his public key then it may be an indication that he does not participate in the protocol anymore. +Another improvement would be for Bob not having to re-publish his public key +every 30 days or less. +Similarly to above, +if Bob stops publishing his public key +then it may be an indication that he does not participate in the protocol anymore. -In any case, the protocol could be modified to store the Public Key in a more permanent storage, such as a dedicated smart contract on the blockchain. +In any case, +the protocol could be modified to store the Public Key in a more permanent storage, +such as a dedicated smart contract on the blockchain. ## Send Private Message -Alice MAY monitor the Waku v2 to collect Ethereum Address and Encryption Public Key tuples. -Alice SHOULD verify that the `signature`s of `PublicKeyMessage`s she receives are valid as per EIP-712. +Alice MAY monitor the Waku v2 to collect Ethereum Address and +Encryption Public Key tuples. +Alice SHOULD verify that the `signature`s of `PublicKeyMessage`s she receives +are valid as per EIP-712. She SHOULD drop any message without a signature or with an invalid signature. -Using Bob's Encryption Public Key, retrieved via [10/WAKU2 spec](../../core/10/waku2.md), Alice MAY now send an encrypted message to Bob. +Using Bob's Encryption Public Key, +retrieved via [10/WAKU2 spec](../../core/10/waku2.md), +Alice MAY now send an encrypted message to Bob. -If she wishes to do so, Alice MUST encrypt her message `M` using Bob's Encryption Public Key `B'`, +If she wishes to do so, +Alice MUST encrypt her message `M` using Bob's Encryption Public Key `B'`, as per [26/WAKU-PAYLOAD Asymmetric Encryption specs](../26/payload.md/#asymmetric). Alice SHOULD now publish this message on the Private Message content topic. -# Copyright +## Copyright Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). ## References + - [10/WAKU2 spec](../../core/10/waku2.md) - [Waku Message Version 1](../26/payload.md) - [X3DH](https://www.signal.org/docs/specifications/x3dh/) @@ -222,4 +259,3 @@ Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/public - [EIP-712](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-712) - [13/WAKU2-STORE](../../core/13/store.md) - [The Graph](https://thegraph.com/) - diff --git a/waku/standards/application/21/fault-tolerant-store.md b/waku/standards/application/21/fault-tolerant-store.md index 14cdf9595..94c311bdd 100644 --- a/waku/standards/application/21/fault-tolerant-store.md +++ b/waku/standards/application/21/fault-tolerant-store.md @@ -7,23 +7,45 @@ editor: Sanaz Taheri contributors: --- - The reliability of [13/WAKU2-STORE](../../core/13/store.md) protocol heavily relies on the fact that full nodes i.e., those who persist messages have high availability and uptime and do not miss any messages. - If a node goes offline, then it will risk missing all the messages transmitted in the network during that time. - In this specification, we provide a method that makes the store protocol resilient in presence of faulty nodes. - Relying on this method, nodes that have been offline for a time window will be able to fix the gap in their message history when getting back online. - Moreover, nodes with lower availability and uptime can leverage this method to reliably provide the store protocol services as a full node. - -## Method description - As the first step towards making the [13/WAKU2-STORE](../../core/13/store.md) protocol fault-tolerant, we introduce a new type of time-based query through which nodes fetch message history from each other based on their desired time window. - This method operates based on the assumption that the querying node knows some other nodes in the store protocol which have been online for that targeted time window. + The reliability of [13/WAKU2-STORE](../../core/13/store.md) +protocol heavily relies on the fact that full nodes i.e., +those who persist messages have high availability and +uptime and do not miss any messages. +If a node goes offline, +then it will risk missing all the messages transmitted +in the network during that time. +In this specification, +we provide a method that makes the store protocol resilient +in presence of faulty nodes. +Relying on this method, +nodes that have been offline for a time window will be able to fix the gap +in their message history when getting back online. +Moreover, nodes with lower availability and +uptime can leverage this method to reliably provide the store protocol services +as a full node. + +## Method description + + As the first step +towards making the [13/WAKU2-STORE](../../core/13/store.md) protocol fault-tolerant, +we introduce a new type of time-based query through which nodes fetch message history +from each other based on their desired time window. +This method operates based on the assumption that the querying node +knows some other nodes in the store protocol +which have been online for that targeted time window. ## Security Consideration -The main security consideration to take into account while using this method is that a querying node has to reveal its offline time to the queried node. -This will gradually result in the extraction of the node's activity pattern which can lead to inference attacks. +The main security consideration to take into account +while using this method is that a querying node +has to reveal its offline time to the queried node. +This will gradually result in the extraction of the node's activity pattern +which can lead to inference attacks. ## Wire Specification -We extend the [HistoryQuery](../../core/13/store.md/#payloads) protobuf message with two fields of `start_time` and `end_time` to signify the time range to be queried. + +We extend the [HistoryQuery](../../core/13/store.md/#payloads) protobuf message +with two fields of `start_time` and `end_time` to signify the time range to be queried. ### Payloads @@ -44,24 +66,43 @@ message HistoryQuery { ### HistoryQuery RPC call to query historical messages. -- `start_time`: this field MAY be filled out to signify the starting point of the queried time window. - This field holds the Unix epoch time in nanoseconds. - The `messages` field of the corresponding [`HistoryResponse`](../../core/13/store.md/#HistoryResponse) MUST contain historical waku messages whose [`timestamp`](../../core/14/message.md/#Payloads) is larger than or equal to the `start_time`. -- `end_time` this field MAY be filled out to signify the ending point of the queried time window. - This field holds the Unix epoch time in nanoseconds. - The `messages` field of the corresponding [`HistoryResponse`](../../core/13/store.md/#HistoryResponse) MUST contain historical waku messages whose [`timestamp`](../../core/14/message.md/#Payloads) is less than or equal to the `end_time`. - - A time-based query is considered valid if its `end_time` is larger than or equal to the `start_time`. - Queries that do not adhere to this condition will not get through e.g. an open-end time query in which the `start_time` is given but no `end_time` is supplied is not valid. - If both `start_time` and `end_time` are omitted then no time-window filter takes place. - - - -In order to account for nodes asynchrony, and assuming that nodes may be out of sync for at most 20 seconds (i.e., 20000000000 nanoseconds), the querying nodes SHOULD add an offset of 20 seconds to their offline time window. -That is if the original window is [`l`,`r`] then the history query SHOULD be made for `[start_time: l - 20s, end_time: r + 20s]`. -Note that `HistoryQuery` preserves `AND` operation among the queried attributes. -As such, The `messages` field of the corresponding [`HistoryResponse`](../../core/13/store.md/#HistoryResponse) MUST contain historical waku messages that satisfy the indicated `pubsubtopic` AND `contentFilters` AND the time range [`start_time`, `end_time`]. +- `start_time`: +this field MAY be filled out to signify the starting point of the queried time window. +This field holds the Unix epoch time in nanoseconds. +The `messages` field of the corresponding +[`HistoryResponse`](../../core/13/store.md/#HistoryResponse) +MUST contain historical waku messages whose +[`timestamp`](../../core/14/message.md/#Payloads) +is larger than or equal to the `start_time`. +- `end_time`: +this field MAY be filled out to signify the ending point of the queried time window. +This field holds the Unix epoch time in nanoseconds. +The `messages` field of the corresponding +[`HistoryResponse`](../../core/13/store.md/#HistoryResponse) +MUST contain historical waku messages whose +[`timestamp`](../../core/14/message.md/#Payloads) is less than or equal to the `end_time`. + +A time-based query is considered valid if +its `end_time` is larger than or equal to the `start_time`. +Queries that do not adhere to this condition will not get through e.g. +an open-end time query in which the `start_time` is given but +no `end_time` is supplied is not valid. +If both `start_time` and +`end_time` are omitted then no time-window filter takes place. + +In order to account for nodes asynchrony, and +assuming that nodes may be out of sync for at most 20 seconds +(i.e., 20000000000 nanoseconds), +the querying nodes SHOULD add an offset of 20 seconds to their offline time window. +That is if the original window is [`l`,`r`] +then the history query SHOULD be made for `[start_time: l - 20s, end_time: r + 20s]`. + +Note that `HistoryQuery` preserves `AND` operation among the queried attributes. +As such, the `messages` field of the corresponding +[`HistoryResponse`](../../core/13/store.md/#HistoryResponse) +MUST contain historical waku messages that satisfy the indicated `pubsubtopic` AND +`contentFilters` AND the time range [`start_time`, `end_time`]. ## Copyright diff --git a/waku/standards/application/26/payload.md b/waku/standards/application/26/payload.md index d872bbf53..44fbe6317 100644 --- a/waku/standards/application/26/payload.md +++ b/waku/standards/application/26/payload.md @@ -7,23 +7,40 @@ editor: Oskar Thoren contributors: --- -This specification describes how Waku provides confidentiality, authenticity, and integrity, as well as some form of unlinkability. -Specifically, it describes how encryption, decryption and signing works in [6/WAKU1](../../legacy/6/waku1.md) and in [10/WAKU2 spec](../../core/10/waku2.md) with [14/WAKU-MESSAGE version 1](../../core/14/message.md/#version1). +This specification describes how Waku provides confidentiality, authenticity, and +integrity, as well as some form of unlinkability. +Specifically, it describes how encryption, decryption and +signing works in [6/WAKU1](../../legacy/6/waku1.md) and +in [10/WAKU2 spec](../../core/10/waku2.md) with [14/WAKU-MESSAGE version 1](../../core/14/message.md/#version1). -This specification effectively replaces [7/WAKU-DATA](../../legacy/7/data.md) as well as [6/WAKU1 Payload encryption](../../legacy/6/waku1.md/#payload-encryption) but written in a way that is agnostic and self-contained for Waku v1 and Waku v2. +This specification effectively replaces [7/WAKU-DATA](../../legacy/7/data.md) +as well as [6/WAKU1 Payload encryption](../../legacy/6/waku1.md/#payload-encryption) +but written in a way that is agnostic and self-contained for Waku v1 and Waku v2. -Large sections of the specification originate from [EIP-627: Whisper spec](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-627) as well from [RLPx Transport Protocol spec (ECIES encryption)](https://github.com/ethereum/devp2p/blob/master/rlpx.md#ecies-encryption) with some modifications. +Large sections of the specification originate from +[EIP-627: Whisper spec](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-627) as well from +[RLPx Transport Protocol spec (ECIES encryption)](https://github.com/ethereum/devp2p/blob/master/rlpx.md#ecies-encryption) +with some modifications. ## Design requirements -- *Confidentiality*: The adversary should not be able to learn what data is being sent from one Waku node to one or several other Waku nodes. -- *Authenticity*: The adversary should not be able to cause Waku endpoint to accept data from any third party as though it came from the other endpoint. -- *Integrity*: The adversary should not be able to cause a Waku endpoint to accept data that has been tampered with. +- *Confidentiality*: +The adversary should not be able to learn what data is being sent from one Waku node +to one or several other Waku nodes. +- *Authenticity*: +The adversary should not be able to cause Waku endpoint +to accept data from any third party as though it came from the other endpoint. +- *Integrity*: +The adversary should not be able to cause a Waku endpoint to +accept data that has been tampered with. Notable, *forward secrecy* is not provided for at this layer. -If this property is desired, a more fully featured secure communication protocol can be used on top, such as [Status 5/SECURE-TRANSPORT](https://specs.status.im/spec/5). +If this property is desired, +a more fully featured secure communication protocol can be used on top, +such as [Status 5/SECURE-TRANSPORT](https://specs.status.im/spec/5). It also provides some form of *unlinkability* since: + - only participants who are able to decrypt a message can see its signature - payload are padded to a fixed length @@ -35,6 +52,7 @@ It also provides some form of *unlinkability* since: - KECCAK-256 ECIES is using the following cryptosystem: + - Curve: secp256k1 - KDF: NIST SP 800-56 Concatenation Key Derivation Function, with SHA-256 option - MAC: HMAC with SHA-256 @@ -42,20 +60,27 @@ ECIES is using the following cryptosystem: ## Specification -For [6/WAKU1](../../legacy/6/waku1.md), the `data` field is used in the `waku envelope`, and the field MAY contain the encrypted payload. +For [6/WAKU1](../../legacy/6/waku1.md), +the `data` field is used in the `waku envelope`, +and the field MAY contain the encrypted payload. + +For [10/WAKU2 spec](../../core/10/waku2.md), +the `payload` field is used in `WakuMessage` and +MAY contain the encrypted payload. -For [10/WAKU2 spec](../../core/10/waku2.md), the `payload` field is used in `WakuMessage` and MAY contain the encrypted payload. +The fields that are concatenated and +encrypted as part of the `data` (Waku v1) / `payload` (Waku v2) field are: -The fields that are concatenated and encrypted as part of the `data` (Waku v1) / `payload` (Waku v2) field are: - - flags - - payload-length - - payload - - padding - - signature +- flags +- payload-length +- payload +- padding +- signature ### ABNF -Using [Augmented Backus-Naur form (ABNF)](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5234) we have the following format: +Using [Augmented Backus-Naur form (ABNF)](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5234) +we have the following format: ```abnf ; 1 byte; first two bits contain the size of payload-length field, @@ -83,29 +108,43 @@ payload = data ### Signature Those unable to decrypt the payload/data are also unable to access the signature. -The signature, if provided, is the ECDSA signature of the Keccak-256 hash of the unencrypted data using the secret key of the originator identity. -The signature is serialized as the concatenation of the `r`, `s` and `v` parameters of the SECP-256k1 ECDSA signature, in that order. +The signature, if provided, +is the ECDSA signature of the Keccak-256 hash of the unencrypted data +using the secret key of the originator identity. +The signature is serialized as the concatenation of the `r`, `s` and `v` parameters +of the SECP-256k1 ECDSA signature, in that order. `r` and `s` MUST be big-endian encoded, fixed-width 256-bit unsigned. -`v` MUST be an 8-bit big-endian encoded, non-normalized and should be either 27 or 28. +`v` MUST be an 8-bit big-endian encoded, +non-normalized and should be either 27 or 28. -See [Ethereum "Yellow paper": Appendix F Signing transactions](https://ethereum.github.io/yellowpaper/paper.pdf) for more information on signature generation, parameters and public key recovery. +See [Ethereum "Yellow paper": Appendix F Signing transactions](https://ethereum.github.io/yellowpaper/paper.pdf) +for more information on signature generation, parameters and public key recovery. ### Encryption #### Symmetric -Symmetric encryption uses AES-256-GCM for [authenticated encryption](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Authenticated_encryption). -The output of encryption is of the form (`ciphertext`, `tag`, `iv`) where `ciphertext` is the encrypted message, `tag` is a 16 byte message authentication tag and `iv` is a 12 byte initialization vector (nonce). -The message authentication `tag` and initialization vector `iv` field MUST be appended to the resulting `ciphertext`, in that order. -Note that previous specifications and some implementations might refer to `iv` as `nonce` or `salt`. +Symmetric encryption uses AES-256-GCM for +[authenticated encryption](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Authenticated_encryption). +The output of encryption is of the form (`ciphertext`, `tag`, `iv`) +where `ciphertext` is the encrypted message, +`tag` is a 16 byte message authentication tag and +`iv` is a 12 byte initialization vector (nonce). +The message authentication `tag` and +initialization vector `iv` field MUST be appended to the resulting `ciphertext`, +in that order. +Note that previous specifications and +some implementations might refer to `iv` as `nonce` or `salt`. #### Asymmetric -Asymmetric encryption uses the standard Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES) with SECP-256k1 public key. +Asymmetric encryption uses the standard Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme +(ECIES) with SECP-256k1 public key. #### ECIES -This section originates from the [RLPx Transport Protocol spec](https://github.com/ethereum/devp2p/blob/master/rlpx.md#ecies-encryption) spec with minor modifications. +This section originates from the [RLPx Transport Protocol spec](https://github.com/ethereum/devp2p/blob/master/rlpx.md#ecies-encryption) +spec with minor modifications. The cryptosystem used is: @@ -116,24 +155,39 @@ The cryptosystem used is: Special notation used: `X || Y` denotes concatenation of `X` and `Y`. -Alice wants to send an encrypted message that can be decrypted by Bob's static private key `kB`. Alice knows about Bobs static public key `KB`. - -To encrypt the message `m`, Alice generates a random number `r` and corresponding elliptic curve public key `R = r * G` and computes the shared secret `S = Px` where `(Px, Py) = r * KB`. -She derives key material for encryption and authentication as `kE || kM = KDF(S, 32)` as well as a random initialization vector `iv`. -Alice sends the encrypted message `R || iv || c || d` where `c = AES(kE, iv , m)` and `d = MAC(sha256(kM), iv || c)` to Bob. - -For Bob to decrypt the message `R || iv || c || d`, he derives the shared secret `S = Px` where `(Px, Py) = kB * R` as well as the encryption and authentication keys `kE || kM = KDF(S, 32)`. -Bob verifies the authenticity of the message by checking whether `d == MAC(sha256(kM), iv || c)` then obtains the plaintext as `m = AES(kE, iv || c)`. +Alice wants to send an encrypted message that can be decrypted by +Bob's static private key `kB`. +Alice knows about Bobs static public key `KB`. + +To encrypt the message `m`, Alice generates a random number `r` and +corresponding elliptic curve public key `R = r * G` and +computes the shared secret `S = Px` where `(Px, Py) = r * KB`. +She derives key material for encryption and +authentication as `kE || kM = KDF(S, 32)` +as well as a random initialization vector `iv`. +Alice sends the encrypted message `R || iv || c || d` where `c = AES(kE, iv , m)` +and `d = MAC(sha256(kM), iv || c)` to Bob. + +For Bob to decrypt the message `R || iv || c || d`, +he derives the shared secret `S = Px` where `(Px, Py) = kB * R` +as well as the encryption and authentication keys `kE || kM = KDF(S, 32)`. +Bob verifies the authenticity of the message +by checking whether `d == MAC(sha256(kM), iv || c)` +then obtains the plaintext as `m = AES(kE, iv || c)`. ### Padding -The padding field is used to align data size, since data size alone might reveal important metainformation. +The padding field is used to align data size, +since data size alone might reveal important metainformation. Padding can be arbitrary size. -However, it is recommended that the size of Data Field (excluding the IV and tag) before encryption (i.e. plain text) SHOULD be a multiple of 256 bytes. +However, it is recommended that the size of Data Field +(excluding the IV and tag) before encryption (i.e. plain text) +SHOULD be a multiple of 256 bytes. ### Decoding a message -In order to decode a message, a node SHOULD try to apply both symmetric and asymmetric decryption operations. +In order to decode a message, a node SHOULD try to apply both symmetric and +asymmetric decryption operations. This is because the type of encryption is not included in the message. ## Copyright diff --git a/waku/standards/application/53/x3dh.md b/waku/standards/application/53/x3dh.md index df2545e09..f68ce4f94 100644 --- a/waku/standards/application/53/x3dh.md +++ b/waku/standards/application/53/x3dh.md @@ -16,75 +16,102 @@ contributors: ## Abstract -This document describes a method that can be used to provide a secure channel between two peers, and thus provide confidentiality, integrity, authenticity and forward secrecy. +This document describes a method that can be used to provide a secure channel +between two peers, and thus provide confidentiality, integrity, +authenticity and forward secrecy. It is transport-agnostic and works over asynchronous networks. -It builds on the [X3DH](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/x3dh/) and [Double Ratchet](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/) specifications, with some adaptations to operate in a decentralized environment. +It builds on the [X3DH](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/x3dh/) +and [Double Ratchet](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/) specifications, +with some adaptations to operate in a decentralized environment. ## Motivation -Nodes on a network may want to communicate with each other in a secure manner, without other nodes network being able to read their messages. +Nodes on a network may want to communicate with each other in a secure manner, +without other nodes network being able to read their messages. ## Specification ### Definitions -- **Perfect Forward Secrecy** is a feature of specific key-agreement protocols which provide assurances that session keys will not be compromised even if the private keys of the participants are compromised. -Specifically, past messages cannot be decrypted by a third-party who manages to get a hold of a private key. - -- **Secret channel** describes a communication channel where a Double Ratchet algorithm is in use. +- **Perfect Forward Secrecy** is a feature of specific key-agreement protocols +which provide assurances that session keys will not be compromised +even if the private keys of the participants are compromised. +Specifically, past messages cannot be decrypted by a third-party +who manages to get a hold of a private key. +- **Secret channel** describes a communication channel +where a Double Ratchet algorithm is in use. ### Design Requirements -- **Confidentiality**: The adversary should not be able to learn what data is being exchanged between two Status clients. -- **Authenticity**: The adversary should not be able to cause either endpoint to accept data from any third party as though it came from the other endpoint. -- **Forward Secrecy**: The adversary should not be able to learn what data was exchanged between two clients if, at some later time, the adversary compromises one or both of the endpoints. -- **Integrity**: The adversary should not be able to cause either endpoint to accept data that has been tampered with. +- **Confidentiality**: +The adversary should not be able to learn what data is being exchanged +between two Status clients. +- **Authenticity**: +The adversary should not be able to cause either endpoint +to accept data from any third party as though it came from the other endpoint. +- **Forward Secrecy**: +The adversary should not be able to learn what data was exchanged +between two clients if, at some later time, +the adversary compromises one or both of the endpoints. +- **Integrity**: +The adversary should not be able to cause either endpoint +to accept data that has been tampered with. All of these properties are ensured by the use of [Signal's Double Ratchet](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/) ### Conventions -Types used in this specification are defined using the [Protobuf](https://developers.google.com/protocol-buffers/) wire format. - -## Specification +Types used in this specification are defined using the +[Protobuf](https://developers.google.com/protocol-buffers/) wire format. ### End-to-End Encryption -End-to-end encryption (E2EE) takes place between two clients. -The main cryptographic protocol is a Double Ratchet protocol, which is derived from the [Off-the-Record protocol](https://otr.cypherpunks.ca/Protocol-v3-4.1.1.html), using a different ratchet. -[The Waku v2 protocol](../../core/10/waku2.md) subsequently encrypts the message payload, using symmetric key encryption. -Furthermore, the concept of prekeys (through the use of [X3DH](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/x3dh/)) is used to allow the protocol to operate in an asynchronous environment. -It is not necessary for two parties to be online at the same time to initiate an encrypted conversation. +End-to-end encryption (E2EE) takes place between two clients. +The main cryptographic protocol is a Double Ratchet protocol, +which is derived from the +[Off-the-Record protocol](https://otr.cypherpunks.ca/Protocol-v3-4.1.1.html), +using a different ratchet. +[The Waku v2 protocol](../../core/10/waku2.md) +subsequently encrypts the message payload, using symmetric key encryption. +Furthermore, the concept of prekeys +(through the use of [X3DH](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/x3dh/)) +is used to allow the protocol to operate in an asynchronous environment. +It is not necessary for two parties to be online at the same time +to initiate an encrypted conversation. ### Cryptographic Protocols This protocol uses the following cryptographic primitives: + - X3DH - - Elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange (secp256k1) - - KECCAK-256 - - ECDSA - - ECIES + - Elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange (secp256k1) + - KECCAK-256 + - ECDSA + - ECIES - Double Ratchet - - HMAC-SHA-256 as MAC - - Elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange (Curve25519) - - AES-256-CTR with HMAC-SHA-256 and IV derived alongside an encryption key + - HMAC-SHA-256 as MAC + - Elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange (Curve25519) + - AES-256-CTR with HMAC-SHA-256 and IV derived alongside an encryption key The node achieves key derivation using [HKDF](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5869). ### Pre-keys Every client SHOULD initially generate some key material which is stored locally: + - Identity keypair based on secp256k1 - `IK` - A signed prekey based on secp256k1 - `SPK` - A prekey signature - `Sig(IK, Encode(SPK))` More details can be found in the `X3DH Prekey bundle creation` section of [2/ACCOUNT](https://specs.status.im/spec/2#x3dh-prekey-bundles). -Prekey bundles MAY be extracted from any peer's messages, or found via searching for their specific topic, `{IK}-contact-code`. +Prekey bundles MAY be extracted from any peer's messages, +or found via searching for their specific topic, `{IK}-contact-code`. The following methods can be used to retrieve prekey bundles from a peer's messages: + - contact codes; - public and one-to-one chats; - QR codes; @@ -94,28 +121,41 @@ The following methods can be used to retrieve prekey bundles from a peer's messa Waku SHOULD be used for retrieving prekey bundles. -Since bundles stored in QR codes or ENS records cannot be updated to delete already used keys, the bundle MAY be rotated every 24 hours, and distributed via Waku. +Since bundles stored in QR codes or +ENS records cannot be updated to delete already used keys, +the bundle MAY be rotated every 24 hours, and distributed via Waku. ### Flow The key exchange can be summarized as follows: -1. Initial key exchange: Two parties, Alice and Bob, exchange their prekey bundles, and derive a shared secret. +1. Initial key exchange: Two parties, Alice and Bob, exchange their prekey bundles, +and derive a shared secret. -2. Double Ratchet: The two parties use the shared secret to derive a new encryption key for each message they send. +2. Double Ratchet: +The two parties use the shared secret to derive a new encryption key +for each message they send. -3. Chain key update: The two parties update their chain keys. The chain key is used to derive new encryption keys for future messages. +3. Chain key update: The two parties update their chain keys. +The chain key is used to derive new encryption keys for future messages. -4. Message key derivation: The two parties derive a new message key from their chain key, and use it to encrypt a message. +4. Message key derivation: +The two parties derive a new message key from their chain key, and +use it to encrypt a message. #### 1. Initial key exchange flow (X3DH) -[Section 3 of the X3DH protocol](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/x3dh/#sending-the-initial-message) describes the initial key exchange flow, with some additional context: +[Section 3 of the X3DH protocol](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/x3dh/#sending-the-initial-message) +describes the initial key exchange flow, with some additional context: + - The peers' identity keys `IK_A` and `IK_B` correspond to their public keys; -- Since it is not possible to guarantee that a prekey will be used only once in a decentralized world, the one-time prekey `OPK_B` is not used in this scenario; -- Nodes SHOULD not send Bundles to a centralized server, but instead provide them in a decentralized way as described in the [Pre-keys section](#pre-keys). +- Since it is not possible to guarantee that a prekey will be used only once +in a decentralized world, the one-time prekey `OPK_B` is not used in this scenario; +- Nodes SHOULD not send Bundles to a centralized server, +but instead provide them in a decentralized way as described in the [Pre-keys section](#pre-keys). -Alice retrieves Bob's prekey bundle, however it is not specific to Alice. It contains: +Alice retrieves Bob's prekey bundle, however it is not specific to Alice. +It contains: ([reference wire format](https://github.com/status-im/status-go/blob/a904d9325e76f18f54d59efc099b63293d3dcad3/services/shhext/chat/encryption.proto#L12)) @@ -144,17 +184,23 @@ message SignedPreKey { } ``` -The `signature` is generated by sorting `installation-id` in lexicographical order, and concatenating the `signed-pre-key` and `version`: +The `signature` is generated by sorting `installation-id` in lexicographical order, +and concatenating the `signed-pre-key` and `version`: `installation-id-1signed-pre-key1version1installation-id2signed-pre-key2-version-2` #### 2. Double Ratchet -Having established the initial shared secret `SK` through X3DH, it SHOULD be used to seed a Double Ratchet exchange between Alice and Bob. +Having established the initial shared secret `SK` through X3DH, +it SHOULD be used to seed a Double Ratchet exchange between Alice and Bob. -Refer to the [Double Ratchet spec](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/) for more details. +Refer to the [Double Ratchet spec](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/) +for more details. -The initial message sent by Alice to Bob is sent as a top-level `ProtocolMessage` ([reference wire format](https://github.com/status-im/status-go/blob/a904d9325e76f18f54d59efc099b63293d3dcad3/services/shhext/chat/encryption.proto#L65)) containing a map of `DirectMessageProtocol` indexed by `installation-id` ([reference wire format](https://github.com/status-im/status-go/blob/1ac9dd974415c3f6dee95145b6644aeadf02f02c/services/shhext/chat/encryption.proto#L56)): +The initial message sent by Alice to Bob is sent as a top-level `ProtocolMessage` +([reference wire format](https://github.com/status-im/status-go/blob/a904d9325e76f18f54d59efc099b63293d3dcad3/services/shhext/chat/encryption.proto#L65)) +containing a map of `DirectMessageProtocol` indexed by `installation-id` +([reference wire format](https://github.com/status-im/status-go/blob/1ac9dd974415c3f6dee95145b6644aeadf02f02c/services/shhext/chat/encryption.proto#L56)): ``` protobuf message ProtocolMessage { @@ -180,21 +226,26 @@ message EncryptedMessageProtocol { bytes payload = 3; } ``` + Where: + - `X3DH_header`: the `X3DHHeader` field in `DirectMessageProtocol` contains: ([reference wire format](https://github.com/status-im/status-go/blob/a904d9325e76f18f54d59efc099b63293d3dcad3/services/shhext/chat/encryption.proto#L47)) - ``` protobuf + +```protobuf message X3DHHeader { // Alice's ephemeral key `EK_A` bytes key = 1; // Bob's bundle signed prekey bytes id = 4; } - ``` +``` -- `DR_header`: Double ratchet header ([reference wire format](https://github.com/status-im/status-go/blob/a904d9325e76f18f54d59efc099b63293d3dcad3/services/shhext/chat/encryption.proto#L31)). Used when Bob's public bundle is available: - ``` protobuf +- `DR_header`: Double ratchet header ([reference wire format](https://github.com/status-im/status-go/blob/a904d9325e76f18f54d59efc099b63293d3dcad3/services/shhext/chat/encryption.proto#L31)). +Used when Bob's public bundle is available: + +``` protobuf message DRHeader { // Alice's current ratchet public key (as mentioned in [DR spec section 2.2](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/#symmetric-key-ratchet)) bytes key = 1; @@ -205,38 +256,46 @@ Where: // Bob's bundle ID bytes id = 4; } - ``` +``` - `DH_header`: Diffie-Hellman header (used when Bob's bundle is not available): ([reference wire format](https://github.com/status-im/status-go/blob/a904d9325e76f18f54d59efc099b63293d3dcad3/services/shhext/chat/encryption.proto#L42)) - ``` protobuf + +``` protobuf message DHHeader { // Alice's compressed ephemeral public key. bytes key = 1; } - ``` +``` #### 3. Chain key update -The chain key MUST be updated according to the `DR_Header` received in the `EncryptedMessageProtocol` message, described in [2.Double Ratchet](#2-double-ratchet). +The chain key MUST be updated according to the `DR_Header` +received in the `EncryptedMessageProtocol` message, +described in [2.Double Ratchet](#2-double-ratchet). #### 4. Message key derivation -The message key MUST be derived from a single ratchet step in the symmetric-key ratchet as described in [Symmetric key ratchet](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/#symmetric-key-ratchet) +The message key MUST be derived from a single ratchet step in the symmetric-key ratchet +as described in [Symmetric key ratchet](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/#symmetric-key-ratchet) The message key MUST be used to encrypt the next message to be sent. ## Security Considerations -1. Inherits the security considerations of [X3DH](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/x3dh/#security-considerations) and [Double Ratchet](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/#security-considerations). +1. Inherits the security considerations of [X3DH](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/x3dh/#security-considerations) +and [Double Ratchet](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/#security-considerations). 2. Inherits the security considerations of the [Waku v2 protocol](../../core/10/waku2.md). -3. The protocol is designed to be used in a decentralized manner, however, it is possible to use a centralized server to serve prekey bundles. In this case, the server is trusted. +3. The protocol is designed to be used in a decentralized manner, however, +it is possible to use a centralized server to serve prekey bundles. +In this case, the server is trusted. ## Privacy Considerations -1. This protocol does not provide message unlinkability. It is possible to link messages signed by the same keypair. +1. This protocol does not provide message unlinkability. +It is possible to link messages signed by the same keypair. ## Copyright @@ -254,5 +313,3 @@ Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/public - [2/ACCOUNT](https://specs.status.im/spec/2#x3dh-prekey-bundles) - [reference wire format](https://github.com/status-im/status-go/blob/a904d9325e76f18f54d59efc099b63293d3dcad3/services/shhext/chat/encryption.proto#L12) - [Symmetric key ratchet](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/#symmetric-key-ratchet) -- -- diff --git a/waku/standards/application/54/x3dh-sessions.md b/waku/standards/application/54/x3dh-sessions.md index 4982f36da..af0221ca1 100644 --- a/waku/standards/application/54/x3dh-sessions.md +++ b/waku/standards/application/54/x3dh-sessions.md @@ -17,29 +17,37 @@ contributors: ## Abstract This document specifies how to manage sessions based on an X3DH key exchange. -This includes how to establish new sessions, how to re-establish them, how to maintain them, and how to close them. +This includes how to establish new sessions, +how to re-establish them, how to maintain them, and how to close them. -[53/WAKU2-X3DH](../53/x3dh.md) specifies the Waku `X3DH` protocol for end-to-end encryption. +[53/WAKU2-X3DH](../53/x3dh.md) specifies the Waku `X3DH` protocol +for end-to-end encryption. Once two peers complete an X3DH handshake, they SHOULD establish an X3DH session. ## Session Establishment -A node identifies a peer by their `installation-id` which MAY be interpreted as a device identifier. +A node identifies a peer by their `installation-id` +which MAY be interpreted as a device identifier. ### Discovery of pre-key bundles -The node's pre-key bundle MUST be broadcast on a content topic derived from the node's public key, so that the first message may be PFS-encrypted. -Each peer MUST publish their pre-key bundle periodically to this topic, otherwise they risk not being able to perform key-exchanges with other peers. -Each peer MAY publish to this topic when their metadata changes, so that the other peer can update their local record. +The node's pre-key bundle MUST be broadcast on a content topic +derived from the node's public key, so that the first message may be PFS-encrypted. +Each peer MUST publish their pre-key bundle periodically to this topic, +otherwise they risk not being able to perform key-exchanges with other peers. +Each peer MAY publish to this topic when their metadata changes, +so that the other peer can update their local record. -If peer A wants to send a message to peer B, it MUST derive the topic from peer B's public key, which has been shared out of band. -Partitioned topics have been used to balance privacy and efficiency of broadcasting pre-key bundles. +If peer A wants to send a message to peer B, +it MUST derive the topic from peer B's public key, which has been shared out of band. +Partitioned topics have been used to balance privacy and +efficiency of broadcasting pre-key bundles. The number of partitions that MUST be used is 5000. The topic MUST be derived as follows: -``` +```js var partitionsNum *big.Int = big.NewInt(5000) var partition *big.Int = big.NewInt(0).Mod(peerBPublicKey, partitionsNum) @@ -59,15 +67,18 @@ for i = 0; i < topicLen; i++ { ``` ### Initialization -A node initializes a new session once a successful X3DH exchange has taken place. + +A node initializes a new session once a successful X3DH exchange has taken place. Subsequent messages will use the established session until re-keying is necessary. ### Negotiated topic to be used for the session -After the peers have performed the initial key exchange, they MUST derive a topic from their shared secret to send messages on. -To obtain this value, take the first four bytes of the keccak256 hash of the shared secret encoded in hexadecimal format. +After the peers have performed the initial key exchange, +they MUST derive a topic from their shared secret to send messages on. +To obtain this value, take the first four bytes of the keccak256 hash +of the shared secret encoded in hexadecimal format. -``` +```js sharedKey, err := ecies.ImportECDSA(myPrivateKey).GenerateShared( ecies.ImportECDSAPublic(theirPublicKey), 16, @@ -90,59 +101,85 @@ for i = 0; i < topicLen; i++ { } ``` -To summarize, following is the process for peer B to establish a session with peer A: -1. Listen to peer B's Contact Code Topic to retrieve their bundle information, including a list of active devices +To summarize, +following is the process for peer B to establish a session with peer A: + +1. Listen to peer B's Contact Code Topic to retrieve their bundle information, +including a list of active devices 2. Peer A sends their pre-key bundle on peer B's partitioned topic 3. Peer A and peer B perform the key-exchange using the shared pre-key bundles -3. The negotiated topic is derived from the shared secret -4. Peers A & B exchange messages on the negotiated topic +4. The negotiated topic is derived from the shared secret +5. Peers A & B exchange messages on the negotiated topic ### Concurrent sessions -If a node creates two sessions concurrently between two peers, the one with the symmetric key first in byte order SHOULD be used, this marks that the other has expired. +If a node creates two sessions concurrently between two peers, +the one with the symmetric key first in byte order SHOULD be used, +this marks that the other has expired. ### Re-keying -On receiving a bundle from a given peer with a higher version, the old bundle SHOULD be marked as expired and a new session SHOULD be established on the next message sent. +On receiving a bundle from a given peer with a higher version, +the old bundle SHOULD be marked as expired and +a new session SHOULD be established on the next message sent. ### Multi-device support -Multi-device support is quite challenging as there is not a central place where information on which and how many devices (identified by their respective `installation-id`) a peer has, is stored. - -Furthermore, account recovery always needs to be taken into consideration, where a user wipes clean the whole device and the node loses all the information about any previous sessions. -Taking these considerations into account, the way the network propagates multi-device information using X3DH bundles, which will contain information about paired devices as well as information about the sending device. -This means that every time a new device is paired, the bundle needs to be updated and propagated with the new information, the user has the responsibility to make sure the pairing is successful. +Multi-device support is quite challenging +as there is not a central place where information on which and how many devices +(identified by their respective `installation-id`) a peer has, is stored. + +Furthermore, account recovery always needs to be taken into consideration, +where a user wipes clean the whole device and +the node loses all the information about any previous sessions. +Taking these considerations into account, +the way the network propagates multi-device information using X3DH bundles, +which will contain information about paired devices +as well as information about the sending device. +This means that every time a new device is paired, +the bundle needs to be updated and propagated with the new information, +the user has the responsibility to make sure the pairing is successful. The method is loosely based on [Signal's Sesame Algorithm](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/sesame/). ### Pairing -A new `installation-id` MUST be generated on a per-device basis. -The device should be paired as soon as possible if other devices are present. +A new `installation-id` MUST be generated on a per-device basis. +The device should be paired as soon as possible if other devices are present. -If a bundle is received, which has the same `IK` as the keypair present on the device, the devices MAY be paired. -Once a user enables a new device, a new bundle MUST be generated which includes pairing information. +If a bundle is received, which has the same `IK` as the keypair present on the device, +the devices MAY be paired. +Once a user enables a new device, +a new bundle MUST be generated which includes pairing information. The bundle MUST be propagated to contacts through the usual channels. -Removal of paired devices is a manual step that needs to be applied on each device, and consist simply in disabling the device, at which point pairing information will not be propagated anymore. +Removal of paired devices is a manual step that needs to be applied on each device, +and consist simply in disabling the device, +at which point pairing information will not be propagated anymore. ### Sending messages to a paired group -When sending a message, the peer SHOULD send a message to other `installation-id` that they have seen. -The node caps the number of devices to `n`, ordered by last activity. +When sending a message, +the peer SHOULD send a message to other `installation-id` that they have seen. +The node caps the number of devices to `n`, ordered by last activity. The node sends messages using pairwise encryption, including their own devices. Where `n` is the maximum number of devices that can be paired. ### Account recovery -Account recovery is the same as adding a new device, and it MUST be handled the same way. +Account recovery is the same as adding a new device, +and it MUST be handled the same way. ### Partitioned devices -In some cases (i.e. account recovery when no other pairing device is available, device not paired), it is possible that a device will receive a message that is not targeted to its own `installation-id`. -In this case an empty message containing bundle information MUST be sent back, which will notify the receiving end not to include the device in any further communication. +In some cases +(i.e. account recovery when no other pairing device is available, device not paired), +it is possible that a device will receive a message +that is not targeted to its own `installation-id`. +In this case an empty message containing bundle information MUST be sent back, +which will notify the receiving end not to include the device in any further communication. ## Security Considerations @@ -151,7 +188,9 @@ In this case an empty message containing bundle information MUST be sent back, w ### Recommendations 1. The value of `n` SHOULD be configured by the app-protocol. - - The default value SHOULD be 3, since a larger number of devices will result in a larger bundle size, which may not be desirable in a peer-to-peer network. + - The default value SHOULD be 3, + since a larger number of devices will result in a larger bundle size, + which may not be desirable in a peer-to-peer network. ## Copyright @@ -161,4 +200,3 @@ Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/public 1. [53/WAKU2-X3DH](../53/x3dh.md) 2. [Signal's Sesame Algorithm](https://signal.org/docs/specifications/sesame/) - diff --git a/waku/standards/core/.DS_Store b/waku/standards/core/.DS_Store new file mode 100644 index 000000000..1807b8242 Binary files /dev/null and b/waku/standards/core/.DS_Store differ diff --git a/waku/standards/core/10/waku2.md b/waku/standards/core/10/waku2.md index 76f9599d0..c326b8dab 100644 --- a/waku/standards/core/10/waku2.md +++ b/waku/standards/core/10/waku2.md @@ -15,61 +15,75 @@ contributors: ## Abstract Waku v2 is family of modular peer-to-peer protocols for secure communication. -The protocols are designed to be secure, privacy-preserving, censorship-resistant and being able to run in resource restricted environments. -At a high level, it implements Pub/Sub over [libp2p](https://github.com/libp2p/specs) and adds a set of capabilities to it. +The protocols are designed to be secure, privacy-preserving, censorship-resistant +and being able to run in resource restricted environments. +At a high level, it implements Pub/Sub over [libp2p](https://github.com/libp2p/specs) +and adds a set of capabilities to it. These capabilities are things such as: (i) retrieving historical messages for mostly-offline devices (ii) adaptive nodes, allowing for heterogeneous nodes to contribute to the network (iii) preserving bandwidth usage for resource-restriced devices -This makes Waku ideal for running a p2p protocol on mobile and in similarly restricted environments. +This makes Waku ideal for running a p2p protocol on mobile and +in similarly restricted environments. Historically, it has its roots in [6/WAKU1](../../legacy/6/waku1.md), -which stems from [Whisper](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-627), originally part of the Ethereum stack. +which stems from [Whisper](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-627), +originally part of the Ethereum stack. However, Waku v2 acts more as a thin wrapper for PubSub and has a different API. -It is implemented in an iterative manner where initial focus is on porting essential functionality to libp2p. +It is implemented in an iterative manner where initial focus +is on porting essential functionality to libp2p. See [rough road map (2020)](https://vac.dev/waku-v2-plan) for more historical context. ## Motivation and goals -Waku as a family of protocols is designed to have a set of properties that are useful for many applications: +Waku as a family of protocols is designed to have a set of properties +that are useful for many applications: -1. **Useful for generalized messaging.** +1.**Useful for generalized messaging.** -Many applications require some form of messaging protocol to communicate between different subsystems or different nodes. +Many applications require some form of messaging protocol to communicate +between different subsystems or different nodes. This messaging can be human-to-human or machine-to-machine or a mix. Waku is designed to work for all these scenarios. -2. **Peer-to-peer.** +2.**Peer-to-peer.** -Applications sometimes have requirements that make them suitable for peer-to-peer solutions: -- Censorship-resistant with no single point of failure +Applications sometimes have requirements that make them suitable +for peer-to-peer solutions: + +- Censorship-resistant with no single point of failure - Adaptive and scalable network - Shared infrastructure -3. **Runs anywhere.** +3.**Runs anywhere.** -Applications often run in restricted environments, where resources or the environment is restricted in some fashion. +Applications often run in restricted environments, +where resources or the environment is restricted in some fashion. For example: - Limited bandwidth, CPU, memory, disk, battery, etc - Not being publicly connectable - Only being intermittently connected; mostly-offline -4. **Privacy-preserving.** +4.**Privacy-preserving.** Applications often have a desire for some privacy guarantees, such as: - - Pseudonymity and not being tied to any personally identifiable information (PII) - - Metadata protection in transit - - Various forms of unlinkability, etc -5. **Modular design.** +- Pseudonymity and not being tied to any personally identifiable information (PII) +- Metadata protection in transit +- Various forms of unlinkability, etc + +5.**Modular design.** -Applications often have different trade-offs when it comes to what properties they and their users value. -Waku is designed in a modular fashion where an application protocol or node can choose what protocols they run. +Applications often have different trade-offs when it comes to what properties they +and their users value. +Waku is designed in a modular fashion where an application protocol or +node can choose what protocols they run. We call this concept *adaptive nodes*. For example: + - Resource usage vs metadata protection - Providing useful services to the network vs mostly using it - Stronger guarantees for spam protection vs economic registration cost @@ -79,7 +93,8 @@ please see the [30/ADAPTIVE-NODES](../../../informational/30/adaptive-nodes.md) ## Network interaction domains -While Waku is best thought of as a single cohesive thing, there are three network interaction domains: +While Waku is best thought of as a single cohesive thing, +there are three network interaction domains: (a) gossip domain (b) discovery domain @@ -88,19 +103,24 @@ While Waku is best thought of as a single cohesive thing, there are three networ ### Protocols and identifiers Since Waku v2 is built on top of libp2p, many protocols have a libp2p protocol identifier. -The current main [protocol identifiers](https://docs.libp2p.io/concepts/protocols/) are: +The current main [protocol identifiers](https://docs.libp2p.io/concepts/protocols/) +are: 1. `/vac/waku/relay/2.0.0` 2. `/vac/waku/store/2.0.0-beta4` 3. `/vac/waku/filter/2.0.0-beta1` 4. `/vac/waku/lightpush/2.0.0-beta1` -This is in addition to protocols that specify messages, payloads, and recommended usages. -Since these aren't negotiated libp2p protocols, they are referred to by their RFC ID. +This is in addition to protocols that specify messages, payloads, and +recommended usages. +Since these aren't negotiated libp2p protocols, +they are referred to by their RFC ID. For example: -- [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](../14/message.md) and [26/WAKU-PAYLOAD](../../application/26/payload.md) for message payloads -- [23/WAKU2-TOPICS](../../../informational/23/topics.md) and [27/WAKU2-PEERS](../../../informational/27/peers.md) for recommendations around usage +- [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](../14/message.md) and +[26/WAKU-PAYLOAD](../../application/26/payload.md) for message payloads +- [23/WAKU2-TOPICS](../../../informational/23/topics.md) and +[27/WAKU2-PEERS](../../../informational/27/peers.md) for recommendations around usage There are also more experimental libp2p protocols such as: @@ -109,12 +129,14 @@ There are also more experimental libp2p protocols such as: These protocols and their semantics are elaborated on in their own specs. - ### Use of libp2p and protobuf -Unless otherwise specified, all protocols are implemented over libp2p and use Protobuf by default. +Unless otherwise specified, +all protocols are implemented over libp2p and use Protobuf by default. Since messages are exchanged over a [bi-directional binary stream](https://docs.libp2p.io/concepts/protocols/), -as a convention, libp2p protocols prefix binary message payloads with the length of the message in bytes. +as a convention, +libp2p protocols prefix binary message payloads with +the length of the message in bytes. This length integer is encoded as a [protobuf varint](https://developers.google.com/protocol-buffers/docs/encoding#varints). ### Gossip domain @@ -127,62 +149,74 @@ See [11/WAKU2-RELAY](../11/relay.md) spec for more details. For an experimental privacy-preserving economic spam protection mechanism, see [17/WAKU2-RLN-RELAY](../17/rln-relay.md). -See [23/WAKU2-TOPICS](../../../informational/23/topics.md) for more information about recommended topic usage. +See [23/WAKU2-TOPICS](../../../informational/23/topics.md) +for more information about recommended topic usage. ### Direct use of libp2p protocols -In addition to `/vac/waku/*` protocols, Waku v2 MAY directly use the following libp2p protocols: +In addition to `/vac/waku/*` protocols, +Waku v2 MAY directly use the following libp2p protocols: -* [libp2p ping protocol](https://docs.libp2p.io/concepts/protocols/#ping) with protocol id +- [libp2p ping protocol](https://docs.libp2p.io/concepts/protocols/#ping) +with protocol id -``` +```text /ipfs/ping/1.0.0 ``` for liveness checks between peers, or to keep peer-to-peer connections alive. -* [libp2p identity and identity/push](https://docs.libp2p.io/concepts/protocols/#identify) with protocol IDs +- [libp2p identity and identity/push](https://docs.libp2p.io/concepts/protocols/#identify) +with protocol IDs -``` +```text /ipfs/id/1.0.0 ``` and -``` +```text /ipfs/id/push/1.0.0 ``` respectively, as basic means for capability discovery. -These protocols are anyway used by the libp2p connection establishment layer Waku v2 is built on. -We plan to introduce a new Vac capability discovery protocol with better anonymity properties and more functionality. +These protocols are anyway used by the libp2p connection +establishment layer Waku v2 is built on. +We plan to introduce a new Vac capability discovery protocol +with better anonymity properties and more functionality. -# Transports +#### Transports Waku v2 is built in top of libp2p, and like libp2p it strives to be transport agnostic. -We define a set of recommended transports in order to achieve a baseline of interoperability between clients. +We define a set of recommended transports in order to achieve a baseline of +interoperability between clients. This section describes these recommended transports. Waku client implementations SHOULD support the TCP transport. -Where TCP is supported it MUST be enabled for both dialing and listening, even if other transports are available. - -Waku v2 nodes where the environment do not allow to use TCP directly, MAY use other transports. +Where TCP is supported it MUST be enabled for both dialing and listening, +even if other transports are available. -A Waku v2 node SHOULD support secure websockets for bidirectional communication streams, for example in a web browser context. +Waku v2 nodes where the environment do not allow to use TCP directly, +MAY use other transports. -A node MAY support unsecure websockets if required by the application or running environment. +A Waku v2 node SHOULD support secure websockets for bidirectional communication streams, +for example in a web browser context. +A node MAY support unsecure websockets if required by the application or +running environment. ### Discovery domain #### Discovery methods -Waku v2 can retrieve a list of nodes to connect to using DNS-based discovery as per [EIP-1459](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1459). +Waku v2 can retrieve a list of nodes to connect to using DNS-based discovery +as per [EIP-1459](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1459). While this is a useful way of bootstrapping connection to a set of peers, -it MAY be used in conjunction with an [ambient peer discovery](https://docs.libp2p.io/concepts/publish-subscribe/#discovery) procedure to find still other nodes to connect to, +it MAY be used in conjunction with an [ambient peer discovery](https://docs.libp2p.io/concepts/publish-subscribe/#discovery) +procedure to find still other nodes to connect to, such as [Node Discovery v5](https://github.com/ethereum/devp2p/blob/8fd5f7e1c1ec496a9d8dc1640a8548b8a8b5986b/discv5/discv5.md). More ambient peer discovery methods are being tested for Waku v2, and will be specified for wider adoption. @@ -190,13 +224,15 @@ It is possible to bypass the discovery domain by specifying static nodes. #### Use of ENR -[31/WAKU2-ENR](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/waku-RFC/standards/core/enr.md) describes the usage of [EIP-778 ENR (Ethereum Node Records)](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-778) for Waku v2 discovery purposes. -It introduces two new ENR fields, `multiaddrs` and `waku2`, that a Waku v2 node MAY use for discovery purposes. +[31/WAKU2-ENR](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/waku-RFC/standards/core/enr.md) +describes the usage of [EIP-778 ENR (Ethereum Node Records)](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-778) +for Waku v2 discovery purposes. +It introduces two new ENR fields, `multiaddrs` and +`waku2`, that a Waku v2 node MAY use for discovery purposes. These fields MUST be used under certain conditions, as set out in the spec. Both EIP-1459 DNS-based discovery and Node Discovery v5 operates on ENR, and it's reasonable to expect even wider utility for ENR in Waku v2 networks in future. - ### Request/Reply domain In addition to the Gossip domain, @@ -211,7 +247,8 @@ such as low bandwidth or being mostly offline. This is used to fetch historical messages for mostly offline devices. See [13/WAKU2-STORE spec](../13/store.md) spec for more details. -There is also an experimental fault-tolerant addition to the store protocol that relaxes the high availability requirement. +There is also an experimental fault-tolerant addition to the store protocol +that relaxes the high availability requirement. See [21/WAKU2-FT-STORE](../../application/21/fault-tolerant-store.md) #### Content filtering @@ -225,13 +262,15 @@ See [12/WAKU2-FILTER](../12/filter.md) spec for more details. **Protocol identifier***: `/vac/waku/lightpush/2.0.0-beta1` -This is used for nodes with short connection windows and limited bandwidth to publish messages into the Waku network. +This is used for nodes with short connection windows and +limited bandwidth to publish messages into the Waku network. See [19/WAKU2-LIGHTPUSH](../19/lightpush.md) spec for more details. #### Other protocols The above is a non-exhaustive list, -and due to the modular design of Waku there may be other protocols here that provide a useful service to the Waku network. +and due to the modular design of Waku, +there may be other protocols here that provide a useful service to the Waku network. ### Overview of protocol interaction @@ -241,20 +280,29 @@ See the sequence diagram below for an overview of how different protocols intera 0. We have six nodes, A-F. The protocols initially mounted are indicated as such. -The PubSub topics `pubtopic1` and `pubtopic2` is used for routing and indicates that it is subscribed to messages on that topic for relay, see [11/WAKU2-RELAY](../11/relay.md) for details. -Ditto for [13/WAKU2-STORE](../13/store.md) where it indicates that these messages are persisted on that node. +The PubSub topics `pubtopic1` and +`pubtopic2` is used for routing and +indicates that it is subscribed to messages on that topic for relay, +see [11/WAKU2-RELAY](../11/relay.md) for details. +Ditto for [13/WAKU2-STORE](../13/store.md) +where it indicates that these messages are persisted on that node. 1. Node A creates a WakuMessage `msg1` with a ContentTopic `contentTopic1`. See [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](../14/message.md) for more details. -If WakuMessage version is set to 1, we use the [6/WAKU1](../../legacy/6/waku1.md) compatible `data` field with encryption. +If WakuMessage version is set to 1, +we use the [6/WAKU1](../../legacy/6/waku1.md) compatible `data` field with encryption. See [7/WAKU-DATA](../../legacy/7/data.md) for more details. -2. Node F requests to get messages filtered by PubSub topic `pubtopic1` and ContentTopic `contentTopic1`. -Node D subscribes F to this filter and will in the future forward messages that match that filter. +2. Node F requests to get messages filtered by PubSub topic `pubtopic1` and +ContentTopic `contentTopic1`. +Node D subscribes F to this filter and +will in the future forward messages that match that filter. See [12/WAKU2-FILTER](../12/filter.md) for more details. -3. Node A publishes `msg1` on `pubtopic1` and subscribes to that relay topic pick it up. -It then gets relayed further from B to D, but not C since it doesn't subscribe to that topic. +3. Node A publishes `msg1` on `pubtopic1` and +subscribes to that relay topic pick it up. +It then gets relayed further from B to D, but +not C since it doesn't subscribe to that topic. See [11/WAKU2-RELAY](../11/relay.md). 4. Node D saves `msg1` for possible later retrieval by other nodes. @@ -272,81 +320,135 @@ Node D responds with messages meeting this (and possibly other) criteria. See [1 ### Compatibility with Waku v1 Waku v1 and Waku v2 are different protocols all together. -They use a different transport protocol underneath; Waku v1 is devp2p RLPx based while Waku v2 uses libp2p. +They use a different transport protocol underneath; +Waku v1 is devp2p RLPx based while Waku v2 uses libp2p. The protocols themselves also differ as does their data format. -Compatibility can be achieved only by using a bridge that not only talks both devp2p RLPx and libp2p, but that also transfers (partially) the content of a packet from one version to the other. +Compatibility can be achieved only by using a bridge +that not only talks both devp2p RLPx and libp2p, +but that also transfers (partially) the content of a packet from one version +to the other. See [15/WAKU-BRIDGE](../15/bridge.md) for details on a bidirectional bridge mode. -# Appendix B: Security +## Appendix B: Security -Each protocol layer of Waku v2 provides a distinct service and is associated with a separate set of security features and concerns. -Therefore, the overall security of Waku v2 depends on how the different layers are utilized. -In this section, we overview the security properties of Waku v2 protocols against a static adversarial model which is described below. -Note that a more detailed security analysis of each Waku protocol is supplied in its respective specification as well. +Each protocol layer of Waku v2 provides a distinct service and +is associated with a separate set of security features and concerns. +Therefore, the overall security of Waku v2 +depends on how the different layers are utilized. +In this section, +we overview the security properties of Waku v2 protocols +against a static adversarial model which is described below. +Note that a more detailed security analysis of each Waku protocol +is supplied in its respective specification as well. ## Primary Adversarial Model -In the primary adversarial model, we consider adversary as a passive entity that attempts to collect information from others to conduct an attack, +In the primary adversarial model, +we consider adversary as a passive entity that attempts to collect information +from others to conduct an attack, but it does so without violating protocol definitions and instructions. -The following are **not** considered as part of the adversarial model: - - An adversary with a global view of all the peers and their connections. - - An adversary that can eavesdrop on communication links between arbitrary pairs of peers - (unless the adversary is one end of the communication). - Specifically, the communication channels are assumed to be secure. +The following are **not** considered as part of the adversarial model: + +- An adversary with a global view of all the peers and their connections. +- An adversary that can eavesdrop on communication links +between arbitrary pairs of peers +(unless the adversary is one end of the communication). +Specifically, the communication channels are assumed to be secure. ## Security Features -### Pseudonymity +### Pseudonymity -Waku v2 by default guarantees pseudonymity for all of the protocol layers since parties do not have to disclose their true identity +Waku v2 by default guarantees pseudonymity for all of the protocol layers +since parties do not have to disclose their true identity and instead they utilize libp2p `PeerID` as their identifiers. -While pseudonymity is an appealing security feature, it does not guarantee full anonymity since the actions taken under the same pseudonym -i.e., `PeerID` can be linked together and potentially result in the re-identification of the true actor. +While pseudonymity is an appealing security feature, +it does not guarantee full anonymity since the actions taken under the same pseudonym +i.e., `PeerID` can be linked together and +potentially result in the re-identification of the true actor. ### Anonymity / Unlinkability -At a high level, anonymity is the inability of an adversary in linking an actor to its data/performed action (the actor and action are context-dependent). -To be precise about linkability, we use the term Personally Identifiable Information (PII) to refer to any piece of data that could potentially be used to uniquely identify a party. -For example, the signature verification key, and the hash of one's static IP address are unique for each user and hence count as PII. -Notice that users' actions can be traced through their PIIs (e.g., signatures) and hence result in their re-identification risk. -As such, we seek anonymity by avoiding linkability between actions and the actors / actors' PII. Concerning anonymity, Waku v2 provides the following features: +At a high level, +anonymity is the inability of an adversary in linking an actor +to its data/performed action (the actor and action are context-dependent). +To be precise about linkability, +we use the term Personally Identifiable Information (PII) +to refer to any piece of data that could potentially +be used to uniquely identify a party. +For example, the signature verification key, and +the hash of one's static IP address are unique for each user and +hence count as PII. +Notice that users' actions can be traced through their PIIs +(e.g., signatures) and hence result in their re-identification risk. +As such, we seek anonymity by avoiding linkability between actions and +the actors / actors' PII. Concerning anonymity, Waku v2 provides the following features: **Publisher-Message Unlinkability**: -This feature signifies the unlinkability of a publisher to its published messages in the 11/WAKU2-RELAY protocol. -The [Publisher-Message Unlinkability](../11/relay.md/#security-analysis) is enforced through the `StrictNoSign` policy due to which the data fields of pubsub messages that count as PII for the publisher must be left unspecified. +This feature signifies the unlinkability of a publisher +to its published messages in the 11/WAKU2-RELAY protocol. +The [Publisher-Message Unlinkability](../11/relay.md/#security-analysis) +is enforced through the `StrictNoSign` policy due to which the data fields +of pubsub messages that count as PII for the publisher must be left unspecified. **Subscriber-Topic Unlinkability**: -This feature stands for the unlinkability of the subscriber to its subscribed topics in the 11/WAKU2-RELAY protocol. -The [Subscriber-Topic Unlinkability](../11/relay.md/#security-analysis) is achieved through the utilization of a single PubSub topic. -As such, subscribers are not re-identifiable from their subscribed topic IDs as the entire network is linked to the same topic ID. -This level of unlinkability / anonymity is known as [k-anonymity](https://www.privitar.com/blog/k-anonymity-an-introduction/) where k is proportional to the system size (number of subscribers). -Note that there is no hard limit on the number of the pubsub topics, however, the use of one topic is recommended for the sake of anonymity. +This feature stands for the unlinkability of the subscriber +to its subscribed topics in the 11/WAKU2-RELAY protocol. +The [Subscriber-Topic Unlinkability](../11/relay.md/#security-analysis) +is achieved through the utilization of a single PubSub topic. +As such, subscribers are not re-identifiable from their subscribed topic IDs +as the entire network is linked to the same topic ID. +This level of unlinkability / anonymity is known as [k-anonymity](https://www.privitar.com/blog/k-anonymity-an-introduction/) +where k is proportional to the system size (number of subscribers). +Note that there is no hard limit on the number of the pubsub topics, however, +the use of one topic is recommended for the sake of anonymity. ### Spam protection -This property indicates that no adversary can flood the system (i.e., publishing a large number of messages in a short amount of time), either accidentally or deliberately, with any kind of message i.e. even if the message content is valid or useful. -Spam protection is partly provided in `11/WAKU2-RELAY` through the [scoring mechanism](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/gossipsub/gossipsub-v1.1.md#spam-protection-measures) provided for by GossipSub v1.1. -At a high level, peers utilize a scoring function to locally score the behavior of their connections and remove peers with a low score. +This property indicates that no adversary can flood the system +(i.e., publishing a large number of messages in a short amount of time), +either accidentally or deliberately, with any kind of message +i.e. even if the message content is valid or useful. +Spam protection is partly provided in `11/WAKU2-RELAY` +through the [scoring mechanism](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/gossipsub/gossipsub-v1.1.md#spam-protection-measures) + rovided for by GossipSub v1.1. +At a high level, +peers utilize a scoring function to locally score the behavior +of their connections and remove peers with a low score. ### Data confidentiality, Integrity, and Authenticity -Confidentiality can be addressed through data encryption whereas integrity and authenticity are achievable through digital signatures. -These features are provided for in [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE (version 1)](../14/message.md/#version-1)` through payload encryption as well as encrypted signatures. +Confidentiality can be addressed through data encryption whereas integrity and +authenticity are achievable through digital signatures. +These features are provided for in [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE (version 1)](../14/message.md/#version-1)` +through payload encryption as well as encrypted signatures. ## Security Considerations -**Lack of anonymity/unlinkability in the protocols involving direct connections including `13/WAKU2-STORE` and `12/WAKU2-FILTER` protocols**: -The anonymity/unlinkability is not guaranteed in the protocols like `13/WAKU2-STORE` and `12/WAKU2-FILTER` where peers need to have direct connections to benefit from the designated service. -This is because during the direct connections peers utilize `PeerID` to identify each other, -therefore the service obtained in the protocol is linkable to the beneficiary's `PeerID` (which counts as PII). -For `13/WAKU2-STORE`, the queried node would be able to link the querying node's `PeerID` to its queried topics. -Likewise, in the `12/WAKU2-FILTER`, a full node can link the light node's `PeerID`s to its content filter. - - - - +Lack of anonymity/unlinkability in the protocols involving direct connections +including `13/WAKU2-STORE` and `12/WAKU2-FILTER` protocols: + +The anonymity/unlinkability is not guaranteed in the protocols like `13/WAKU2-STORE` +and `12/WAKU2-FILTER` where peers need to have direct connections +to benefit from the designated service. +This is because during the direct connections peers utilize `PeerID` +to identify each other, +therefore the service obtained in the protocol is linkable +to the beneficiary's `PeerID` (which counts as PII). +For `13/WAKU2-STORE`, +the queried node would be able to link the querying node's `PeerID` +to its queried topics. +Likewise, in the `12/WAKU2-FILTER`, +a full node can link the light node's `PeerID`s to its content filter. + + + + ## Appendix C: Implementation Notes @@ -358,34 +460,35 @@ There are multiple implementations of Waku v2 and its protocols: - [go-waku (Go)](https://github.com/status-im/go-waku/) - [js-waku (NodeJS and Browser)](https://github.com/status-im/js-waku/) -Below you can find an overview of the specs that they implement as they relate to Waku v2. +Below you can find an overview of the specs that they implement +as they relate to Waku v2. This includes Waku v1 specs, as they are used for bridging between the two networks. | Spec | nim-waku (Nim) | go-waku (Go) | js-waku (Node JS) | js-waku (Browser JS) | | ---- | -------------- | ------------ | ----------------- | -------------------- | -|[6/WAKU1](../../legacy/6/waku1.md)|✔||| -|[7/WAKU-DATA](../../legacy/7/data.md)|✔|✔|| -|[8/WAKU-MAIL](../../legacy/8/mail.md)|✔||| -|[9/WAKU-RPC](../../legacy/9/rpc.md)|✔||| +|[6/WAKU1](../../legacy/6/waku1.md)|✔|||| +|[7/WAKU-DATA](../../legacy/7/data.md)|✔|✔||| +|[8/WAKU-MAIL](../../legacy/8/mail.md)|✔|||| +|[9/WAKU-RPC](../../legacy/9/rpc.md)|✔|||| |[10/WAKU2](../10/waku2.md)|✔|🚧|🚧|🚧| |[11/WAKU2-RELAY](../11/relay.md)|✔|✔|✔|✔| -|[12/WAKU2-FILTER](../12/filter.md)|✔|✔|| +|[12/WAKU2-FILTER](../12/filter.md)|✔|✔||| |[13/WAKU2-STORE](../13/store.md)|✔|✔|✔\*|✔\*| |[14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](../14/message.md))|✔|✔|✔|✔| -|[15/WAKU2-BRIDGE](../15/bridge.md)|✔||| -|[16/WAKU2-RPC](../16/rpc.md)|✔||| -|[17/WAKU2-RLN-RELAY](../17/rln-relay.md)|🚧||| -|[18/WAKU2-SWAP](../../application/18/swap.md)|🚧||| +|[15/WAKU2-BRIDGE](../15/bridge.md)|✔|||| +|[16/WAKU2-RPC](../16/rpc.md)|✔|||| +|[17/WAKU2-RLN-RELAY](../17/rln-relay.md)|🚧|||| +|[18/WAKU2-SWAP](../../application/18/swap.md)|🚧|||| |[19/WAKU2-LIGHTPUSH](../19/lightpush.md)|✔|✔|✔\**|✔\**| -|[21/WAKU2-FAULT-TOLERANT-STORE](../../application/21/fault-tolerant-store.md)|✔|✔|| +|[21/WAKU2-FAULT-TOLERANT-STORE](../../application/21/fault-tolerant-store.md)|✔|✔||| *js-waku implements [13/WAKU2-STORE](../13/store.md) as a querying node only. **js-waku only implements [19/WAKU2-LIGHTPUSH](../19/lightpush.md) requests. - ### Recommendations for clients -To implement a minimal Waku v2 client, we recommend implementing the following subset in the following order: +To implement a minimal Waku v2 client, +we recommend implementing the following subset in the following order: - [10/WAKU2](../10/waku2.md) - this spec - [11/WAKU2-RELAY](../11/relay.md) - for basic operation @@ -404,23 +507,32 @@ with periodic pings to connected peers ## Appendix D: Future work -The following features are currently experimental and under research and initial implementation: +The following features are currently experimental and under research and +initial implementation: **Economic Spam resistance**: -We aim to enable an incentivized spam protection technique to enhance `11/WAKU2-RELAY` by using rate limiting nullifiers. +We aim to enable an incentivized spam protection technique +to enhance `11/WAKU2-RELAY` by using rate limiting nullifiers. More details on this can be found in [17/WAKU2-RLN-RELAY](../17/rln-relay.md). -In this advanced method, peers are limited to a certain rate of messaging per epoch and an immediate financial penalty is enforced for spammers who break this rate. +In this advanced method, +peers are limited to a certain rate of messaging per epoch and +an immediate financial penalty is enforced for spammers who break this rate. **Prevention of Denial of Service (DoS) and Node Incentivization**: -Denial of service signifies the case where an adversarial node exhausts another node's service capacity (e.g., by making a large number of requests) and makes it unavailable to the rest of the system. +Denial of service signifies the case where an adversarial node +exhausts another node's service capacity (e.g., by making a large number of requests) +and makes it unavailable to the rest of the system. DoS attack is to be mitigated through the accounting model as described in [18/WAKU2-SWAP](../../application/18/swap.md). In a nutshell, peers have to pay for the service they obtain from each other. -In addition to incentivizing the service provider, accounting also makes DoS attacks costly for malicious peers. -The accounting model can be used in `13/WAKU2-STORE` and `12/WAKU2-FILTER` to protect against DoS attacks. - -Additionally, this gives node operators who provide a useful service to the network an incentive to perform that service. -See [18/WAKU2-SWAP](../../application/18/swap.md) for more details on this piece of work. +In addition to incentivizing the service provider, +accounting also makes DoS attacks costly for malicious peers. +The accounting model can be used in `13/WAKU2-STORE` and +`12/WAKU2-FILTER` to protect against DoS attacks. +Additionally, this gives node operators who provide a useful service to the network +an incentive to perform that service. +See [18/WAKU2-SWAP](../../application/18/swap.md) +for more details on this piece of work. ## Copyright @@ -448,7 +560,7 @@ Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/public 10. [27/WAKU2-PEERS](../../../informational/27/peers.md) -11. [bi-directional binary stream](https://docs.libp2p.io/concepts/protocols/) +11. [bi-directional binary stream](https://docs.libp2p.io/concepts/protocols/) 12. [Protobuf varint encoding](https://developers.google.com/protocol-buffers/docs/encoding#varints) @@ -497,4 +609,3 @@ Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/public 34. [18/WAKU2-SWAP spec](../../application/18/swap.md) 35. [21/WAKU2-FAULT-TOLERANT-STORE](../../application/21/fault-tolerant-store.md) - diff --git a/waku/standards/core/11/relay.md b/waku/standards/core/11/relay.md index 34b3141d1..3178db232 100644 --- a/waku/standards/core/11/relay.md +++ b/waku/standards/core/11/relay.md @@ -10,53 +10,84 @@ contributors: - Sanaz Taheri --- -`11/WAKU2-RELAY` specifies a [Publish/Subscribe approach](https://docs.libp2p.io/concepts/publish-subscribe/) to peer-to-peer messaging with a strong focus on privacy, censorship-resistance, security and scalability. -Its current implementation is a minor extension of the [libp2p GossipSub protocol](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/gossipsub/README.md) and prescribes gossip-based dissemination. -As such the scope is limited to defining a separate [`protocol id`](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/connections/README.md#protocol-negotiation) for `11/WAKU2-RELAY`, establishing privacy and security requirements, and defining how the underlying GossipSub is to be interpreted and implemented within the Waku and cryptoeconomic domain. +`11/WAKU2-RELAY` specifies a [Publish/Subscribe approach](https://docs.libp2p.io/concepts/publish-subscribe/) +to peer-to-peer messaging with a strong focus on privacy, +censorship-resistance, security and scalability. +Its current implementation is a minor extension of the +[libp2p GossipSub protocol](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/gossipsub/README.md) +and prescribes gossip-based dissemination. +As such the scope is limited to defining a separate +[`protocol id`](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/connections/README.md#protocol-negotiation) +for `11/WAKU2-RELAY`, establishing privacy and security requirements, +and defining how the underlying GossipSub is to be interpreted and +implemented within the Waku and cryptoeconomic domain. `11/WAKU2-RELAY` should not be confused with [libp2p circuit relay](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/tree/master/relay). **Protocol identifier**: `/vac/waku/relay/2.0.0` ## Security Requirements -The `11/WAKU2-RELAY` protocol is designed to provide the following security properties under a static [Adversarial Model](#adversarial-model). -Note that data confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity are currently considered out of scope for `11/WAKU2-RELAY` and must be handled by higher layer protocols such as [`14/WAKU2-MESSAGE`](../14/message.md). +The `11/WAKU2-RELAY` protocol is designed to provide the following security properties +under a static [Adversarial Model](#adversarial-model). +Note that data confidentiality, integrity, and +authenticity are currently considered out of scope for `11/WAKU2-RELAY` and +must be handled by higher layer protocols such as [`14/WAKU2-MESSAGE`](../14/message.md). +Confidentiality indicates that an adversary +should not be able to learn the data carried by the `WakuRelay` protocol. +Integrity indicates that the data transferred by the `WakuRelay` protocol +can not be tampered with by an adversarial entity without being detected. +Authenticity no adversary can forge data on behalf of a targeted publisher and +make it accepted by other subscribers as if the origin is the target. --> - **Publisher-Message Unlinkability**: -This property indicates that no adversarial entity can link a published `Message` to its publisher. -This feature also implies the unlinkability of the publisher to its published topic ID as the `Message` embodies the topic IDs. +This property indicates that no adversarial entity can link a published `Message` +to its publisher. +This feature also implies the unlinkability of the publisher +to its published topic ID as the `Message` embodies the topic IDs. - **Subscriber-Topic Unlinkability**: -This feature stands for the inability of any adversarial entity from linking a subscriber to its subscribed topic IDs. +This feature stands for the inability of any adversarial entity +from linking a subscriber to its subscribed topic IDs. - + ### Terminology -_Personally identifiable information_ (PII) refers to any piece of data that can be used to uniquely identify a user. -For example, the signature verification key, and the hash of one's static IP address are unique for each user and hence count as PII. +_Personally identifiable information_ (PII) +refers to any piece of data that can be used to uniquely identify a user. +For example, the signature verification key, +and the hash of one's static IP address are unique for each user and +hence count as PII. ## Adversarial Model -- Any entity running the `11/WAKU2-RELAY` protocol is considered an adversary. -This includes publishers, subscribers, and all the peers' direct connections. -Furthermore, we consider the adversary as a passive entity that attempts to collect information from others to conduct an attack but it does so without violating protocol definitions and instructions. -For example, under the passive adversarial model, no malicious subscriber hides the messages it receives from other subscribers as it is against the description of `11/WAKU2-RELAY`. -However, a malicious subscriber may learn which topics are subscribed to by which peers. -- The following are **not** considered as part of the adversarial model: - - An adversary with a global view of all the peers and their connections. - - An adversary that can eavesdrop on communication links between arbitrary pairs of peers (unless the adversary is one end of the communication). +- Any entity running the `11/WAKU2-RELAY` protocol is considered an adversary. +This includes publishers, subscribers, and all the peers' direct connections. +Furthermore, +we consider the adversary as a passive entity that attempts to collect information +from others to conduct an attack but +it does so without violating protocol definitions and instructions. +For example, under the passive adversarial model, +no malicious subscriber hides the messages it receives from other subscribers +as it is against the description of `11/WAKU2-RELAY`. +However, +a malicious subscriber may learn which topics are subscribed to by which peers. +- The following are **not** considered as part of the adversarial model: + - An adversary with a global view of all the peers and their connections. + - An adversary that can eavesdrop on communication links between arbitrary pairs + of peers (unless the adversary is one end of the communication). In other words, the communication channels are assumed to be secure. ## Wire Specification -The [PubSub interface specification](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/README.md) defines the protobuf RPC messages exchanged between peers participating in a GossipSub network. -We republish these messages here for ease of reference and define how `11/WAKU2-RELAY` uses and interprets each field. +The [PubSub interface specification](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/README.md) +defines the protobuf RPC messages +exchanged between peers participating in a GossipSub network. +We republish these messages here for ease of reference and +define how `11/WAKU2-RELAY` uses and interprets each field. ### Protobuf definitions @@ -86,10 +117,11 @@ message RPC { ``` > **_NOTE:_** -The various [control messages](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/gossipsub/gossipsub-v1.0.md#control-messages) defined for GossipSub are used as specified there. - +The various [control messages](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/gossipsub/gossipsub-v1.0.md#control-messages) +defined for GossipSub are used as specified there. > **_NOTE:_** -The [`TopicDescriptor`](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/README.md#the-topic-descriptor) is not currently used by `11/WAKU2-RELAY`. +The [`TopicDescriptor`](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/README.md#the-topic-descriptor) +is not currently used by `11/WAKU2-RELAY`. ### Message fields @@ -103,19 +135,25 @@ See [`14/WAKU2-MESSAGE`](../14/message.md) for more details. - The `seqno` field MUST NOT be used, following the [`StrictNoSign` signature policy](#signature-policy). -- The `topicIDs` field MUST contain the content-topics that a message is being published on. +- The `topicIDs` field MUST contain the content-topics +that a message is being published on. -- The `signature` field MUST NOT be used, following the [`StrictNoSign` signature policy](#signature-policy). +- The `signature` field MUST NOT be used, +following the [`StrictNoSign` signature policy](#signature-policy). -- The `key` field MUST NOT be used, following the [`StrictNoSign` signature policy](#signature-solicy). +- The `key` field MUST NOT be used, +following the [`StrictNoSign` signature policy](#signature-policy). ### SubOpts fields -The `SubOpts` protobuf defines the format in which subscription options are relayed between peers. -A `11/WAKU2-RELAY` node MAY decide to subscribe or unsubscribe from topics by sending updates using `SubOpts`. +The `SubOpts` protobuf defines the format +in which subscription options are relayed between peers. +A `11/WAKU2-RELAY` node MAY decide to subscribe or +unsubscribe from topics by sending updates using `SubOpts`. The following usage requirements apply: -- The `subscribe` field MUST contain a boolean, where `true` indicates subscribe and `false` indicates unsubscribe to a topic. +- The `subscribe` field MUST contain a boolean, +where `true` indicates subscribe and `false` indicates unsubscribe to a topic. - The `topicid` field MUST contain the pubsub topic. @@ -124,44 +162,93 @@ The following usage requirements apply: ### Signature Policy -The [`StrictNoSign` option](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/README.md#signature-policy-options) MUST be used, to ensure that messages are built without the `signature`, `key`, `from` and `seqno` fields. -Note that this does not merely imply that these fields be empty, but that they MUST be _absent_ from the marshalled message. +The [`StrictNoSign` option](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/README.md#signature-policy-options) +MUST be used, to ensure that messages are built without the `signature`, +`key`, `from` and `seqno` fields. +Note that this does not merely imply that these fields be empty, but +that they MUST be _absent_ from the marshalled message. ## Security Analysis - + - **Publisher-Message Unlinkability**: -To address publisher-message unlinkability, one should remove any PII from the published message. -As such, `11/WAKU2-RELAY` follows the `StrictNoSign` policy as described in [libp2p PubSub specs](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/tree/master/pubsub#message-signing). -As the result of the `StrictNoSign` policy, `Message`s should be built without the `from`, `signature` and `key` fields since each of these three fields individually counts as PII for the author of the message (one can link the creation of the message with libp2p peerId and thus indirectly with the IP address of the publisher). -Note that removing identifiable information from messages cannot lead to perfect unlinkability. -The direct connections of a publisher might be able to figure out which `Message`s belong to that publisher by analyzing its traffic. -The possibility of such inference may get higher when the `data` field is also not encrypted by the upper-level protocols. +To address publisher-message unlinkability, +one should remove any PII from the published message. +As such, `11/WAKU2-RELAY` follows the `StrictNoSign` policy as described in +[libp2p PubSub specs](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/tree/master/pubsub#message-signing). +As the result of the `StrictNoSign` policy, +`Message`s should be built without the `from`, +`signature` and `key` fields since each of these three fields individually +counts as PII for the author of the message +(one can link the creation of the message with libp2p peerId and +thus indirectly with the IP address of the publisher). +Note that removing identifiable information from messages +cannot lead to perfect unlinkability. +The direct connections of a publisher +might be able to figure out which `Message`s belong to that publisher +by analyzing its traffic. +The possibility of such inference may get higher +when the `data` field is also not encrypted by the upper-level protocols. + - **Subscriber-Topic Unlinkability:** -To preserve subscriber-topic unlinkability, it is recommended by [`10/WAKU2`](../10/waku2.md) to use a single PubSub topic in the `11/WAKU2-RELAY` protocol. -This allows an immediate subscriber-topic unlinkability where subscribers are not re-identifiable from their subscribed topic IDs as the entire network is linked to the same topic ID. -This level of unlinkability / anonymity is known as [k-anonymity](https://www.privitar.com/blog/k-anonymity-an-introduction/) where k is proportional to the system size (number of participants of Waku relay protocol). +To preserve subscriber-topic unlinkability, +it is recommended by [`10/WAKU2`](../10/waku2.md) to use a single PubSub topic +in the `11/WAKU2-RELAY` protocol. +This allows an immediate subscriber-topic unlinkability +where subscribers are not re-identifiable from their subscribed topic IDs +as the entire network is linked to the same topic ID. +This level of unlinkability / anonymity +is known as [k-anonymity](https://www.privitar.com/blog/k-anonymity-an-introduction/) +where k is proportional to the system size +(number of participants of Waku relay protocol). However, note that `11/WAKU2-RELAY` supports the use of more than one topic. -In case that more than one topic id is utilized, preserving unlinkability is the responsibility of the upper-level protocols which MAY adopt [partitioned topics technique](https://specs.status.im/spec/10#partitioned-topic) to achieve K-anonymity for the subscribed peers. +In case that more than one topic id is utilized, +preserving unlinkability is the responsibility of the upper-level protocols +which MAY adopt +[partitioned topics technique](https://specs.status.im/spec/10#partitioned-topic) +to achieve K-anonymity for the subscribed peers. ## Future work - **Economic spam resistance**: -In the spam-protected `11/WAKU2-RELAY` protocol, no adversary can flood the system with spam messages (i.e., publishing a large number of messages in a short amount of time). +In the spam-protected `11/WAKU2-RELAY` protocol, +no adversary can flood the system with spam messages +(i.e., publishing a large number of messages in a short amount of time). Spam protection is partly provided by GossipSub v1.1 through [scoring mechanism](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/gossipsub/gossipsub-v1.1.md#spam-protection-measures). -At a high level, peers utilize a scoring function to locally score the behavior of their connections and remove peers with a low score. -`11/WAKU2-RELAY` aims at enabling an advanced spam protection mechanism with economic disincentives by utilizing Rate Limiting Nullifiers. -In a nutshell, peers must conform to a certain message publishing rate per a system-defined epoch, otherwise, they get financially penalized for exceeding the rate. -More details on this new technique can be found in [`17/WAKU2-RLN-RELAY`](../17/rln-relay.md). - +At a high level, +peers utilize a scoring function to locally score the behavior of their connections +and remove peers with a low score. +`11/WAKU2-RELAY` aims at enabling an advanced spam protection mechanism +with economic disincentives by utilizing Rate Limiting Nullifiers. +In a nutshell, +peers must conform to a certain message publishing rate per a system-defined epoch, +otherwise, they get financially penalized for exceeding the rate. +More details on this new technique can be found in [`17/WAKU2-RLN-RELAY`](../17/rln-relay.md). + - Providing **Unlinkability**, **Integrity** and **Authenticity** simultaneously: -Integrity and authenticity are typically addressed through digital signatures and Message Authentication Code (MAC) schemes, however, the usage of digital signatures (where each signature is bound to a particular peer) contradicts with the unlinkability requirement (messages signed under a certain signature key are verifiable by a verification key that is bound to a particular publisher). -As such, integrity and authenticity are missing features in `11/WAKU2-RELAY` in the interest of unlinkability. -In future work, advanced signature schemes like group signatures can be utilized to enable authenticity, integrity, and unlinkability simultaneously. -In a group signature scheme, a member of a group can anonymously sign a message on behalf of the group as such the true signer is indistinguishable from other group members. +Integrity and authenticity are typically addressed through digital signatures and +Message Authentication Code (MAC) schemes, however, +the usage of digital signatures (where each signature is bound to a particular peer) +contradicts with the unlinkability requirement +(messages signed under a certain signature key are verifiable by a verification key +that is bound to a particular publisher). +As such, integrity and authenticity are missing features in `11/WAKU2-RELAY` +in the interest of unlinkability. +In future work, advanced signature schemes like group signatures +can be utilized to enable authenticity, integrity, and unlinkability simultaneously. +In a group signature scheme, a member of a group can anonymously sign a message +on behalf of the group as such the true signer +is indistinguishable from other group members. + ## Copyright diff --git a/waku/standards/core/12/.DS_Store b/waku/standards/core/12/.DS_Store new file mode 100644 index 000000000..18d011994 Binary files /dev/null and b/waku/standards/core/12/.DS_Store differ diff --git a/waku/standards/core/12/filter.md b/waku/standards/core/12/filter.md index bf06de240..66d7abc29 100644 --- a/waku/standards/core/12/filter.md +++ b/waku/standards/core/12/filter.md @@ -17,11 +17,16 @@ previous versions: [00](./previous-versions00) --- -`WakuFilter` is a protocol that enables subscribing to messages that a peer receives. This is a more lightweight version of `WakuRelay` specifically designed for bandwidth restricted devices. This is due to the fact that light nodes subscribe to full-nodes and only receive the messages they desire. +`WakuFilter` is a protocol that enables subscribing to messages that a peer receives. +This is a more lightweight version of `WakuRelay` +specifically designed for bandwidth restricted devices. +This is due to the fact that light nodes subscribe to full-nodes and +only receive the messages they desire. ## Content filtering **Protocol identifiers**: + - _filter-subscribe_: `/vac/waku/filter-subscribe/2.0.0-beta1` - _filter-push_: `/vac/waku/filter-push/2.0.0-beta1` @@ -46,24 +51,49 @@ It is worth noting that a light node could get by with only using the `store` protocol to query for a recent time window, provided it is acceptable to do frequent polling. - ## Design Requirements -The effectiveness and reliability of the content filtering service enabled by `WakuFilter` protocol rely on the *high availability* of the full nodes as the service providers. To this end, full nodes must feature *high uptime* (to persistently listen and capture the network messages) as well as *high Bandwidth* (to provide timely message delivery to the light nodes). +The effectiveness and reliability of the content filtering service enabled by +`WakuFilter` protocol rely on the _high availability_ of the full nodes +as the service providers. +To this end, full nodes must feature _high uptime_ +(to persistently listen and capture the network messages) +as well as _high Bandwidth_ (to provide timely message delivery to the light nodes). ## Security Consideration -Note that while using `WakuFilter` allows light nodes to save bandwidth, it comes with a privacy cost in the sense that they need to disclose their liking topics to the full nodes to retrieve the relevant messages. Currently, anonymous subscription is not supported by the `WakuFilter`, however, potential solutions in this regard are sketched below in [Future Work](#future-work) section. +Note that while using `WakuFilter` allows light nodes to save bandwidth, +it comes with a privacy cost in the sense that they need to +disclose their liking topics to the full nodes to retrieve the relevant messages. +Currently, anonymous subscription is not supported by the `WakuFilter`, however, +potential solutions in this regard are sketched +below in [Future Work](#future-work) section. ### Terminology -The term Personally identifiable information (PII) refers to any piece of data that can be used to uniquely identify a user. For example, the signature verification key, and the hash of one's static IP address are unique for each user and hence count as PII. + +The term Personally identifiable information (PII) +refers to any piece of data that can be used to uniquely identify a user. +For example, the signature verification key, and +the hash of one's static IP address are unique for each user and hence count as PII. ## Adversarial Model -Any node running the `WakuFilter` protocol i.e., both the subscriber node and the queried node are considered as an adversary. Furthermore, we consider the adversary as a passive entity that attempts to collect information from other nodes to conduct an attack but it does so without violating protocol definitions and instructions. For example, under the passive adversarial model, no malicious node intentionally hides the messages matching to one's subscribed content filter as it is against the description of the `WakuFilter` protocol. -The following are not considered as part of the adversarial model: - - An adversary with a global view of all the nodes and their connections. - - An adversary that can eavesdrop on communication links between arbitrary pairs of nodes (unless the adversary is one end of the communication). In specific, the communication channels are assumed to be secure. +Any node running the `WakuFilter` protocol +i.e., both the subscriber node and the queried node are considered as an adversary. +Furthermore, we consider the adversary as a passive entity +that attempts to collect information from other nodes to conduct an attack but +it does so without violating protocol definitions and instructions. +For example, under the passive adversarial model, +no malicious node intentionally hides the messages +matching to one's subscribed content filter +as it is against the description of the `WakuFilter` protocol. + +The following are not considered as part of the adversarial model: + +- An adversary with a global view of all the nodes and their connections. +- An adversary that can eavesdrop on communication links +between arbitrary pairs of nodes (unless the adversary is one end of the communication). +In specific, the communication channels are assumed to be secure. ### Protobuf @@ -106,9 +136,12 @@ message MessagePush { ### Filter-Subscribe A filter service node MUST support the _filter-subscribe_ protocol -to allow filter clients to subscribe, modify, refresh and unsubscribe a desired set of filter criteria. -The combination of different filter criteria for a specific filter client node is termed a "subscription". -A filter client is interested in receiving messages matching the filter criteria in its registered subscriptions. +to allow filter clients to subscribe, modify, refresh and +unsubscribe a desired set of filter criteria. +The combination of different filter criteria +for a specific filter client node is termed a "subscription". +A filter client is interested in receiving messages matching the filter criteria +in its registered subscriptions. Since a filter service node is consuming resources to provide this service, it MAY account for usage and adapt its service provision to certain clients. @@ -124,21 +157,29 @@ Each request MUST include a `filter_subscribe_type`, indicating the type of requ #### Filter Subscribe Response In return to any `FilterSubscribeRequest`, -a filter service node SHOULD respond with a `FilterSubscribeResponse` with a `requestId` matching that of the request. -This response MUST contain a `status_code` indicating if the request was successful or not. +a filter service node SHOULD respond with a `FilterSubscribeResponse` +with a `requestId` matching that of the request. +This response MUST contain a `status_code` indicating if the request was successful +or not. Successful status codes are in the `2xx` range. -Client nodes SHOULD consider all other status codes as error codes and assume that the requested operation had failed. -In addition, the filter service node MAY choose to provide a more detailed status description in the `status_desc` field. +Client nodes SHOULD consider all other status codes as error codes and +assume that the requested operation had failed. +In addition, +the filter service node MAY choose to provide a more detailed status description +in the `status_desc` field. #### Filter matching In the description of each request type below, -the term "filter criteria" refers to the combination of `pubsub_topic` and a set of `content_topics`. -The request MAY include filter criteria, conditional to the selected `filter_subscribe_type`. +the term "filter criteria" refers to the combination of `pubsub_topic` and +a set of `content_topics`. +The request MAY include filter criteria, +conditional to the selected `filter_subscribe_type`. If the request contains filter criteria, it MUST contain a `pubsub_topic` and the `content_topics` set MUST NOT be empty. -A `WakuMessage` matches filter criteria when its `content_topic` is in the `content_topics` set +A `WakuMessage` matches filter criteria +when its `content_topic` is in the `content_topics` set and it was published on a matching `pubsub_topic`. #### Filter Subscribe Types @@ -147,23 +188,28 @@ The following filter subscribe types are defined: ##### SUBSCRIBER_PING -A filter client that sends a `FilterSubscribeRequest` with `filter_subscribe_type` set to `SUBSCRIBER_PING` -requests that the service node SHOULD indicate if it has any active subscriptions for this client. +A filter client that sends a `FilterSubscribeRequest` with +`filter_subscribe_type` set to `SUBSCRIBER_PING` +requests that the service node SHOULD indicate if it has any active subscriptions +for this client. The filter client SHOULD exclude any filter criteria from the request. -The filter service node SHOULD respond with a success code if it has any active subscriptions for this client +The filter service node SHOULD respond with a success code +if it has any active subscriptions for this client or an error code if not. The filter service node SHOULD ignore any filter criteria in the request. ##### SUBSCRIBE -A filter client that sends a `FilterSubscribeRequest` with `filter_subscribe_type` set to `SUBSCRIBE` +A filter client that sends a `FilterSubscribeRequest` with +`filter_subscribe_type` set to `SUBSCRIBE` requests that the service node SHOULD push messages matching this filter to the client. The filter client MUST include the desired filter criteria in the request. A client MAY use this request type to _modify_ an existing subscription by providing _additional_ filter criteria in a new request. A client MAY use this request type to _refresh_ an existing subscription by providing _the same_ filter criteria in a new request. -The filter service node SHOULD respond with a success code if it successfully honored this request +The filter service node SHOULD respond with a success code +if it successfully honored this request or an error code if not. The filter service node SHOULD respond with an error code and discard the request if the subscribe request does not contain valid filter criteria, @@ -171,12 +217,17 @@ i.e. both a `pubsub_topic` _and_ a non-empty `content_topics` set. ##### UNSUBSCRIBE -A filter client that sends a `FilterSubscribeRequest` with `filter_subscribe_type` set to `UNSUBSCRIBE` -requests that the service node SHOULD _stop_ pushing messages matching this filter to the client. -The filter client MUST include the filter criteria it desires to unsubscribe from in the request. +A filter client that sends a `FilterSubscribeRequest` with +`filter_subscribe_type` set to `UNSUBSCRIBE` +requests that the service node SHOULD _stop_ pushing messages +matching this filter to the client. +The filter client MUST include the filter criteria +it desires to unsubscribe from in the request. A client MAY use this request type to _modify_ an existing subscription -by providing _a subset of_ the original filter criteria to unsubscribe from in a new request. -The filter service node SHOULD respond with a success code if it successfully honored this request +by providing _a subset of_ the original filter criteria +to unsubscribe from in a new request. +The filter service node SHOULD respond with a success code +if it successfully honored this request or an error code if not. The filter service node SHOULD respond with an error code and discard the request if the unsubscribe request does not contain valid filter criteria, @@ -184,8 +235,10 @@ i.e. both a `pubsub_topic` _and_ a non-empty `content_topics` set. ##### UNSUBSCRIBE_ALL -A filter client that sends a `FilterSubscribeRequest` with `filter_subscribe_type` set to `UNSUBSCRIBE_ALL` -requests that the service node SHOULD _stop_ pushing messages matching _any_ filter to the client. +A filter client that sends a `FilterSubscribeRequest` with +`filter_subscribe_type` set to `UNSUBSCRIBE_ALL` +requests that the service node SHOULD _stop_ pushing messages +matching _any_ filter to the client. The filter client SHOULD exclude any filter criteria from the request. The filter service node SHOULD remove any existing subscriptions for this client. It SHOULD respond with a success code if it successfully honored this request @@ -194,7 +247,8 @@ or an error code if not. ### Filter-Push A filter client node MUST support the _filter-push_ protocol -to allow filter service nodes to push messages matching registered subscriptions to this client. +to allow filter service nodes to push messages +matching registered subscriptions to this client. A filter service node SHOULD push all messages matching the filter criteria in a registered subscription @@ -205,8 +259,10 @@ This is up to the consumer of the protocol. If a message push fails, the filter service node MAY consider the client node to be unreachable. -If a specific filter client node is not reachable from the service node for a period of time, -the filter service node MAY choose to stop pushing messages to the client and remove its subscription. +If a specific filter client node is not reachable from the service node +for a period of time, +the filter service node MAY choose to stop pushing messages to the client and +remove its subscription. This period is up to the service node implementation. We consider `1 minute` to be a reasonable default. @@ -224,25 +280,58 @@ A filter client SHOULD verify that each `MessagePush` it receives originated from a service node where the client has an active subscription and that it matches filter criteria belonging to that subscription. ---- +--- + ## Future Work -**Anonymous filter subscription**: This feature guarantees that nodes can anonymously subscribe for a message filter (i.e., without revealing their exact content filter). As such, no adversary in the `WakuFilter` protocol would be able to link nodes to their subscribed content filers. The current version of the `WakuFilter` protocol does not provide anonymity as the subscribing node has a direct connection to the full node and explicitly submits its content filter to be notified about the matching messages. However, one can consider preserving anonymity through one of the following ways: -- By hiding the source of the subscription i.e., anonymous communication. That is the subscribing node shall hide all its PII in its filter request e.g., its IP address. This can happen by the utilization of a proxy server or by using Tor. - Note that the current structure of filter requests i.e., `FilterRPC` does not embody any piece of PII, otherwise, such data fields must be treated carefully to achieve anonymity. -- By deploying secure 2-party computations in which the subscribing node obtains the messages matching a content filter whereas the full node learns nothing about the content filter as well as the messages pushed to the subscribing node. Examples of such 2PC protocols are [Oblivious Transfers](https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007%2F978-1-4419-5906-5_9#:~:text=Oblivious%20transfer%20(OT)%20is%20a,information%20the%20receiver%20actually%20obtains.) and one-way Private Set Intersections (PSI). +**Anonymous filter subscription**: +This feature guarantees that nodes can anonymously subscribe for a message filter +(i.e., without revealing their exact content filter). +As such, no adversary in the `WakuFilter` protocol +would be able to link nodes to their subscribed content filers. +The current version of the `WakuFilter` protocol does not provide anonymity +as the subscribing node has a direct connection to the full node and +explicitly submits its content filter to be notified about the matching messages. +However, one can consider preserving anonymity through one of the following ways: + +- By hiding the source of the subscription i.e., anonymous communication. +That is the subscribing node shall hide all its PII in its filter request +e.g., its IP address. +This can happen by the utilization of a proxy server or by using Tor +. +Note that the current structure of filter requests +i.e., `FilterRPC` does not embody any piece of PII, otherwise, +such data fields must be treated carefully to achieve anonymity. + +- By deploying secure 2-party computations in which +the subscribing node obtains the messages matching a content filter +whereas the full node learns nothing about the content filter as well as +the messages pushed to the subscribing node. +Examples of such 2PC protocols are +[Oblivious Transfers](https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007%2F978-1-4419-5906-5_9#:~:text=Oblivious%20transfer%20(OT)%20is%20a,information%20the%20receiver%20actually%20obtains.) +and one-way Private Set Intersections (PSI). ## Changelog ### Next - Added initial threat model and security analysis. - + ### 2.0.0-beta2 Initial draft version. Released [2020-10-28](https://github.com/vacp2p/specs/commit/5ceeb88cee7b918bb58f38e7c4de5d581ff31e68) + - Fix: Ensure contentFilter is a repeated field, on implementation -- Change: Add ability to unsubscribe from filters. Make `subscribe` an explicit boolean indication. Edit protobuf field order to be consistent with libp2p. +- Change: Add ability to unsubscribe from filters. +Make `subscribe` an explicit boolean indication. +Edit protobuf field order to be consistent with libp2p. ### 2.0.0-beta1 diff --git a/waku/standards/core/12/previous-versions00/filter.md b/waku/standards/core/12/previous-versions00/filter.md index 3a3b0e718..9868713bd 100644 --- a/waku/standards/core/12/previous-versions00/filter.md +++ b/waku/standards/core/12/previous-versions00/filter.md @@ -14,7 +14,11 @@ contributors: version: 00 --- -`WakuFilter` is a protocol that enables subscribing to messages that a peer receives. This is a more lightweight version of `WakuRelay` specifically designed for bandwidth restricted devices. This is due to the fact that light nodes subscribe to full-nodes and only receive the messages they desire. +`WakuFilter` is a protocol that enables subscribing to messages that a peer receives. +This is a more lightweight version of `WakuRelay` +specifically designed for bandwidth restricted devices. +This is due to the fact that light nodes subscribe to full-nodes and +only receive the messages they desire. ## Content filtering @@ -41,24 +45,49 @@ It is worth noting that a light node could get by with only using the `store` protocol to query for a recent time window, provided it is acceptable to do frequent polling. - ## Design Requirements -The effectiveness and reliability of the content filtering service enabled by `WakuFilter` protocol rely on the *high availability* of the full nodes as the service providers. To this end, full nodes must feature *high uptime* (to persistently listen and capture the network messages) as well as *high Bandwidth* (to provide timely message delivery to the light nodes). +The effectiveness and reliability of the content filtering service +enabled by `WakuFilter` protocol rely on the *high availability* of the full nodes +as the service providers. +To this end, full nodes must feature *high uptime* +(to persistently listen and capture the network messages) +as well as *high Bandwidth* (to provide timely message delivery to the light nodes). ## Security Consideration -Note that while using `WakuFilter` allows light nodes to save bandwidth, it comes with a privacy cost in the sense that they need to disclose their liking topics to the full nodes to retrieve the relevant messages. Currently, anonymous subscription is not supported by the `WakuFilter`, however, potential solutions in this regard are sketched below in [Future Work](#future-work) section. +Note that while using `WakuFilter` allows light nodes to save bandwidth, +it comes with a privacy cost in the sense that they need to disclose their liking +topics to the full nodes to retrieve the relevant messages. +Currently, anonymous subscription is not supported by the `WakuFilter`, however, +potential solutions in this regard are sketched below in [Future Work](#future-work) +section. ### Terminology -The term Personally identifiable information (PII) refers to any piece of data that can be used to uniquely identify a user. For example, the signature verification key, and the hash of one's static IP address are unique for each user and hence count as PII. + +The term Personally identifiable information (PII) +refers to any piece of data that can be used to uniquely identify a user. +For example, the signature verification key, and +the hash of one's static IP address are unique for each user and hence count as PII. ## Adversarial Model -Any node running the `WakuFilter` protocol i.e., both the subscriber node and the queried node are considered as an adversary. Furthermore, we consider the adversary as a passive entity that attempts to collect information from other nodes to conduct an attack but it does so without violating protocol definitions and instructions. For example, under the passive adversarial model, no malicious node intentionally hides the messages matching to one's subscribed content filter as it is against the description of the `WakuFilter` protocol. -The following are not considered as part of the adversarial model: - - An adversary with a global view of all the nodes and their connections. - - An adversary that can eavesdrop on communication links between arbitrary pairs of nodes (unless the adversary is one end of the communication). In specific, the communication channels are assumed to be secure. +Any node running the `WakuFilter` protocol i.e., +both the subscriber node and the queried node are considered as an adversary. +Furthermore, we consider the adversary as a passive entity +that attempts to collect information from other nodes to conduct an attack but +it does so without violating protocol definitions and instructions. +For example, under the passive adversarial model, +no malicious node intentionally hides the messages matching +to one's subscribed content filter as it is against the description +of the `WakuFilter` protocol. + +The following are not considered as part of the adversarial model: + +- An adversary with a global view of all the nodes and their connections. +- An adversary that can eavesdrop on communication links +between arbitrary pairs of nodes (unless the adversary is one end of the communication). +In specific, the communication channels are assumed to be secure. ### Protobuf @@ -86,13 +115,14 @@ message FilterRPC { #### FilterRPC -A node MUST send all Filter messages (`FilterRequest`, `MessagePush`) wrapped inside a -`FilterRPC` this allows the node handler to determine how to handle a message as the Waku -Filter protocol is not a request response based protocol but instead a push based system. +A node MUST send all Filter messages (`FilterRequest`, `MessagePush`) +wrapped inside a `FilterRPC` this allows the node handler +to determine how to handle a message as the Waku Filter protocol +is not a request response based protocol but instead a push based system. The `requestId` MUST be a uniquely generated string. When a `MessagePush` is sent -the `requestId` MUST match the `requestId` of the subscribing `FilterRequest` whose filters -matched the message causing it to be pushed. +the `requestId` MUST match the `requestId` of the subscribing `FilterRequest` +whose filters matched the message causing it to be pushed. #### FilterRequest @@ -100,7 +130,7 @@ A `FilterRequest` contains an optional topic, zero or more content filters and a boolean signifying whether to subscribe or unsubscribe to the given filters. True signifies 'subscribe' and false signifies 'unsubscribe'. -A node that sends the RPC with a filter request and `subscribe` set to 'true' +A node that sends the RPC with a filter request and `subscribe` set to 'true' requests that the filter node SHOULD notify the light requesting node of messages matching this filter. @@ -123,7 +153,8 @@ mechanism is currently planned but underspecified. #### MessagePush A filter node that has received a filter request SHOULD push all messages that -match this filter to a light node. These [`WakuMessage`'s](../14/message.md) are likely to come from the +match this filter to a light node. These [`WakuMessage`'s](../14/message.md) +are likely to come from the `relay` protocol and be kept at the Node, but there MAY be other sources or protocols where this comes from. This is up to the consumer of the protocol. @@ -135,25 +166,54 @@ period of time (e.g. a TTL), then the filter node MAY choose to not push these messages to the node. This period is up to the consumer of the protocol and node implementation, though a reasonable default is one minute. ---- -# Future Work +--- + +## Future Work -**Anonymous filter subscription**: This feature guarantees that nodes can anonymously subscribe for a message filter (i.e., without revealing their exact content filter). As such, no adversary in the `WakuFilter` protocol would be able to link nodes to their subscribed content filers. The current version of the `WakuFilter` protocol does not provide anonymity as the subscribing node has a direct connection to the full node and explicitly submits its content filter to be notified about the matching messages. However, one can consider preserving anonymity through one of the following ways: -- By hiding the source of the subscription i.e., anonymous communication. That is the subscribing node shall hide all its PII in its filter request e.g., its IP address. This can happen by the utilization of a proxy server or by using Tor. - Note that the current structure of filter requests i.e., `FilterRPC` does not embody any piece of PII, otherwise, such data fields must be treated carefully to achieve anonymity. -- By deploying secure 2-party computations in which the subscribing node obtains the messages matching a content filter whereas the full node learns nothing about the content filter as well as the messages pushed to the subscribing node. Examples of such 2PC protocols are [Oblivious Transfers](https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007%2F978-1-4419-5906-5_9#:~:text=Oblivious%20transfer%20(OT)%20is%20a,information%20the%20receiver%20actually%20obtains.) and one-way Private Set Intersections (PSI). +**Anonymous filter subscription**: +This feature guarantees that nodes can anonymously subscribe for a message filter +(i.e., without revealing their exact content filter). + As such, no adversary in the `WakuFilter` protocol would be able to link nodes +to their subscribed content filers. +The current version of the `WakuFilter` protocol does not provide anonymity +as the subscribing node has a direct connection to the full node and +explicitly submits its content filter to be notified about the matching messages. +However, one can consider preserving anonymity through one of the following ways: + +- By hiding the source of the subscription i.e., anonymous communication. +That is the subscribing node shall hide all its PII in its filter request e.g., +its IP address. +This can happen by the utilization of a proxy server or by using Tor +. +Note that the current structure of filter requests i.e., +`FilterRPC` does not embody any piece of PII, otherwise, +such data fields must be treated carefully to achieve anonymity. + +- By deploying secure 2-party computations in which the subscribing node obtains +the messages matching a content filter whereas the full node learns nothing +about the content filter as well as the messages pushed to the subscribing node. +Examples of such 2PC protocols are [Oblivious Transfers](https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007%2F978-1-4419-5906-5_9#:~:text=Oblivious%20transfer%20(OT)%20is%20a,information%20the%20receiver%20actually%20obtains.) +and one-way Private Set Intersections (PSI). ## Changelog ### Next - Added initial threat model and security analysis. - + ### 2.0.0-beta2 Initial draft version. Released [2020-10-28](https://github.com/vacp2p/specs/commit/5ceeb88cee7b918bb58f38e7c4de5d581ff31e68) + - Fix: Ensure contentFilter is a repeated field, on implementation -- Change: Add ability to unsubscribe from filters. Make `subscribe` an explicit boolean indication. Edit protobuf field order to be consistent with libp2p. +- Change: Add ability to unsubscribe from filters. +Make `subscribe` an explicit boolean indication. +Edit protobuf field order to be consistent with libp2p. ### 2.0.0-beta1 diff --git a/waku/standards/core/13/store.md b/waku/standards/core/13/store.md index 9ed363c22..f4441e760 100644 --- a/waku/standards/core/13/store.md +++ b/waku/standards/core/13/store.md @@ -14,55 +14,72 @@ contributors: --- ## Abstract -This specification explains the `13/WAKU2-STORE` protocol which enables querying of messages received through the relay protocol and -stored by other nodes. -It also supports pagination for more efficient querying of historical messages. + +This specification explains the `13/WAKU2-STORE` protocol +which enables querying of messages received through the relay protocol and +stored by other nodes. +It also supports pagination for more efficient querying of historical messages. **Protocol identifier***: `/vac/waku/store/2.0.0-beta4` ## Terminology -The term PII, Personally Identifiable Information, -refers to any piece of data that can be used to uniquely identify a user. -For example, the signature verification key, and + +The term PII, Personally Identifiable Information, +refers to any piece of data that can be used to uniquely identify a user. +For example, the signature verification key, and the hash of one's static IP address are unique for each user and hence count as PII. ## Design Requirements -The key words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL NOT”, “SHOULD”, “SHOULD NOT”, -“RECOMMENDED”, “MAY”, and “OPTIONAL” in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119](https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt). + +The key words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL NOT”, +“SHOULD”, “SHOULD NOT”, “RECOMMENDED”, “MAY”, and +“OPTIONAL” in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119](https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt). Nodes willing to provide the storage service using `13/WAKU2-STORE` protocol, SHOULD provide a complete and full view of message history. -As such, they are required to be *highly available* and -specifically have a *high uptime* to consistently receive and store network messages. -The high uptime requirement makes sure that no message is missed out hence a complete and -intact view of the message history is delivered to the querying nodes. -Nevertheless, in case storage provider nodes cannot afford high availability, -the querying nodes may retrieve the historical messages from multiple sources to achieve a full and intact view of the past. - -The concept of `ephemeral` messages introduced in [`14/WAKU2-MESSAGE`](../14/message.md) affects `13/WAKU2-STORE` as well. -Nodes running `13/WAKU2-STORE` SHOULD support `ephemeral` messages as specified in [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](../14/message.md). -Nodes running `13/WAKU2-STORE` SHOULD NOT store messages with the `ephemeral` flag set to `true`. +As such, they are required to be *highly available* and +specifically have a *high uptime* to consistently receive and store network messages. +The high uptime requirement makes sure that no message is missed out +hence a complete and intact view of the message history +is delivered to the querying nodes. +Nevertheless, in case storage provider nodes cannot afford high availability, +the querying nodes may retrieve the historical messages from multiple sources +to achieve a full and intact view of the past. + +The concept of `ephemeral` messages introduced in +[`14/WAKU2-MESSAGE`](../14/message.md) affects `13/WAKU2-STORE` as well. +Nodes running `13/WAKU2-STORE` SHOULD support `ephemeral` messages as specified in +[14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](../14/message.md). +Nodes running `13/WAKU2-STORE` SHOULD NOT store messages +with the `ephemeral` flag set to `true`. ## Adversarial Model -Any peer running the `13/WAKU2-STORE` protocol, i.e. -both the querying node and the queried node, are considered as an adversary. -Furthermore, -we currently consider the adversary as a passive entity that attempts to collect information from other peers to conduct an attack but -it does so without violating protocol definitions and instructions. -As we evolve the protocol, + +Any peer running the `13/WAKU2-STORE` protocol, i.e. +both the querying node and the queried node, are considered as an adversary. +Furthermore, +we currently consider the adversary as a passive entity +that attempts to collect information from other peers to conduct an attack but +it does so without violating protocol definitions and instructions. +As we evolve the protocol, further adversarial models will be considered. -For example, under the passive adversarial model, -no malicious node hides or -lies about the history of messages as it is against the description of the `13/WAKU2-STORE` protocol. +For example, under the passive adversarial model, +no malicious node hides or +lies about the history of messages +as it is against the description of the `13/WAKU2-STORE` protocol. The following are not considered as part of the adversarial model: + - An adversary with a global view of all the peers and their connections. -- An adversary that can eavesdrop on communication links between arbitrary pairs of peers (unless the adversary is one end of the communication). +- An adversary that can eavesdrop on communication links +between arbitrary pairs of peers (unless the adversary is one end of the communication). In specific, the communication channels are assumed to be secure. ## Wire Specification -Peers communicate with each other using a request / response API. -The messages sent are Protobuf RPC messages which are implemented using [protocol buffers v3](https://developers.google.com/protocol-buffers/). + +Peers communicate with each other using a request / response API. +The messages sent are Protobuf RPC messages which are implemented using +[protocol buffers v3](https://developers.google.com/protocol-buffers/). The following are the specifications of the Protobuf messages. ### Payloads @@ -118,24 +135,35 @@ message HistoryRPC { #### Index -To perform pagination, -each `WakuMessage` stored at a node running the `13/WAKU2-STORE` protocol is associated with a unique `Index` that encapsulates the following parts. +To perform pagination, +each `WakuMessage` stored at a node running the `13/WAKU2-STORE` protocol +is associated with a unique `Index` that encapsulates the following parts. + - `digest`: a sequence of bytes representing the SHA256 hash of a `WakuMessage`. - The hash is computed over the concatenation of `contentTopic` and `payload` fields of a `WakuMessage` (see [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](../14/message.md)). -- `receiverTime`: the UNIX time in nanoseconds at which the `WakuMessage` is received by the receiving node. -- `senderTime`: the UNIX time in nanoseconds at which the `WakuMessage` is generated by its sender. +The hash is computed over the concatenation of `contentTopic` +and `payload` fields of a `WakuMessage` (see [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](../14/message.md)). +- `receiverTime`: the UNIX time in nanoseconds +at which the `WakuMessage` is received by the receiving node. +- `senderTime`: the UNIX time in nanoseconds +at which the `WakuMessage` is generated by its sender. - `pubsubTopic`: the pubsub topic on which the `WakuMessage` is received. #### PagingInfo -`PagingInfo` holds the information required for pagination. It consists of the following components. -- `pageSize`: A positive integer indicating the number of queried `WakuMessage`s in a `HistoryQuery` +`PagingInfo` holds the information required for pagination. +It consists of the following components. + +- `pageSize`: A positive integer indicating the number of queried `WakuMessage`s +in a `HistoryQuery` (or retrieved `WakuMessage`s in a `HistoryResponse`). - `cursor`: holds the `Index` of a `WakuMessage`. -- `direction`: indicates the direction of paging which can be either `FORWARD` or `BACKWARD`. +- `direction`: indicates the direction of paging +which can be either `FORWARD` or `BACKWARD`. #### ContentFilter -`ContentFilter` carries the information required for filtering historical messages. + +`ContentFilter` carries the information required for filtering historical messages. + - `contentTopic` represents the content topic of the queried historical `WakuMessage`. This field maps to the `contentTopic` field of the [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](../14/message.md). @@ -143,111 +171,179 @@ each `WakuMessage` stored at a node running the `13/WAKU2-STORE` protocol is ass RPC call to query historical messages. -- The `pubsubTopic` field MUST indicate the pubsub topic of the historical messages to be retrieved. - This field denotes the pubsub topic on which `WakuMessage`s are published. - This field maps to `topicIDs` field of `Message` in [`11/WAKU2-RELAY`](../11/relay.md). - Leaving this field empty means no filter on the pubsub topic of message history is requested. - This field SHOULD be left empty in order to retrieve the historical `WakuMessage` regardless of the pubsub topics on which they are published. -- The `contentFilters` field MUST indicate the list of content filters based on which the historical messages are to be retrieved. - Leaving this field empty means no filter on the content topic of message history is required. - This field SHOULD be left empty in order to retrieve historical `WakuMessage` regardless of their content topics. +- The `pubsubTopic` field MUST indicate the pubsub topic +of the historical messages to be retrieved. +This field denotes the pubsub topic on which `WakuMessage`s are published. +This field maps to `topicIDs` field of `Message` in [`11/WAKU2-RELAY`](../11/relay.md). +Leaving this field empty means no filter on the pubsub topic +of message history is requested. +This field SHOULD be left empty in order to retrieve the historical `WakuMessage` +regardless of the pubsub topics on which they are published. +- The `contentFilters` field MUST indicate the list of content filters +based on which the historical messages are to be retrieved. +Leaving this field empty means no filter on the content topic +of message history is required. +This field SHOULD be left empty in order +to retrieve historical `WakuMessage` regardless of their content topics. - `PagingInfo` holds the information required for pagination. - Its `pageSize` field indicates the number of `WakuMessage`s to be included in the corresponding `HistoryResponse`. - It is RECOMMENDED that the queried node defines a maximum page size internally. - If the querying node leaves the `pageSize` unspecified, - or if the `pageSize` exceeds the maximum page size, - the queried node SHOULD auto-paginate the `HistoryResponse` to no more than the configured maximum page size. - This allows mitigation of long response time for `HistoryQuery`. - In the forward pagination request, - the `messages` field of the `HistoryResponse` SHALL contain, at maximum, - the `pageSize` amount of `WakuMessage` whose `Index` values are larger than the given `cursor` - (and vise versa for the backward pagination). - Note that the `cursor` of a `HistoryQuery` MAY be empty (e.g., for the initial query), as such, and - depending on whether the `direction` is `BACKWARD` or `FORWARD` the last or the first `pageSize` `WakuMessage` SHALL be returned, respectively. +Its `pageSize` field indicates the number of `WakuMessage`s +to be included in the corresponding `HistoryResponse`. +It is RECOMMENDED that the queried node defines a maximum page size internally. +If the querying node leaves the `pageSize` unspecified, +or if the `pageSize` exceeds the maximum page size, +the queried node SHOULD auto-paginate the `HistoryResponse` +to no more than the configured maximum page size. +This allows mitigation of long response time for `HistoryQuery`. +In the forward pagination request, +the `messages` field of the `HistoryResponse` SHALL contain, at maximum, +the `pageSize` amount of `WakuMessage` whose `Index` +values are larger than the given `cursor` +(and vise versa for the backward pagination). +Note that the `cursor` of a `HistoryQuery` MAY be empty +(e.g., for the initial query), as such, and +depending on whether the `direction` is `BACKWARD` or +`FORWARD` the last or the first `pageSize` `WakuMessage` SHALL be returned, +respectively. #### Sorting Messages -The queried node MUST sort the `WakuMessage` based on their `Index`, -where the `senderTime` constitutes the most significant part and the `digest` comes next, and -then perform pagination on the sorted result. -As such, the retrieved page contains an ordered list of `WakuMessage` from the oldest messages to the most recent one. -Alternatively, the `receiverTime` (instead of `senderTime` ) MAY be used to sort messages during the paging process. -However, it is RECOMMENDED the use of the `senderTime` for sorting as it is invariant and + +The queried node MUST sort the `WakuMessage` based on their `Index`, +where the `senderTime` constitutes the most significant part and +the `digest` comes next, and +then perform pagination on the sorted result. +As such, the retrieved page contains an ordered list of `WakuMessage` +from the oldest messages to the most recent one. +Alternatively, the `receiverTime` (instead of `senderTime`) +MAY be used to sort messages during the paging process. +However, it is RECOMMENDED the use of the `senderTime` +for sorting as it is invariant and consistent across all the nodes. -This has the benefit of `cursor` reusability i.e., -a `cursor` obtained from one node can be consistently used to query from another node. -However, this `cursor` reusability does not hold when the `receiverTime` is utilized as the receiver time is affected by the network delay and +This has the benefit of `cursor` reusability i.e., +a `cursor` obtained from one node can be consistently used +to query from another node. +However, this `cursor` reusability does not hold when the `receiverTime` is utilized +as the receiver time is affected by the network delay and nodes' clock asynchrony. #### HistoryResponse RPC call to respond to a HistoryQuery call. + - The `messages` field MUST contain the messages found, these are [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](../14/message.md) types. -- `PagingInfo` holds the paging information based on which the querying node can resume its further history queries. - The `pageSize` indicates the number of returned Waku messages (i.e., the number of messages included in the `messages` field of `HistoryResponse`). - The `direction` is the same direction as in the corresponding `HistoryQuery`. - In the forward pagination, the `cursor` holds the `Index` of the last message in the `HistoryResponse` `messages` (and the first message in the backward paging). - Regardless of the paging direction, the retrieved `messages` are always sorted in ascending order based on their timestamp as explained in the [sorting messages](#sorting-messages) section, that is, from the oldest to the most recent. - The requester SHALL embed the returned `cursor` inside its next `HistoryQuery` to retrieve the next page of the [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](../14/message.md). - The `cursor` obtained from one node SHOULD NOT be used in a request to another node because the result may be different. -- The `error` field contains information about any error that has occurred while processing the corresponding `HistoryQuery`. - `NONE` stands for no error. - This is also the default value. - `INVALID_CURSOR` means that the `cursor` field of `HistoryQuery` does not match with the `Index` of any of the `WakuMessage` persisted by the queried node. +- `PagingInfo` holds the paging information based +on which the querying node can resume its further history queries. +The `pageSize` indicates the number of returned Waku messages +(i.e., the number of messages included in the `messages` field of `HistoryResponse`). +The `direction` is the same direction as in the corresponding `HistoryQuery`. +In the forward pagination, the `cursor` holds the `Index` of the last message +in the `HistoryResponse` `messages` (and the first message in the backward paging). +Regardless of the paging direction, +the retrieved `messages` are always sorted in ascending order +based on their timestamp as explained in the [sorting messages](#sorting-messages)section, +that is, from the oldest to the most recent. +The requester SHALL embed the returned `cursor` inside its next `HistoryQuery` +to retrieve the next page of the [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](../14/message.md). +The `cursor` obtained from one node SHOULD NOT be used in a request to another node +because the result may be different. +- The `error` field contains information about any error that has occurred +while processing the corresponding `HistoryQuery`. +`NONE` stands for no error. +This is also the default value. +`INVALID_CURSOR` means that the `cursor` field of `HistoryQuery` +does not match with the `Index` of any of the `WakuMessage` +persisted by the queried node. ## Security Consideration -The main security consideration to take into account while using this protocol is that a querying node have to reveal their content filters of interest to the queried node, hence potentially compromising their privacy. +The main security consideration to take into account +while using this protocol is that a querying node +have to reveal their content filters of interest to the queried node, +hence potentially compromising their privacy. ## Future Work -- **Anonymous query**: This feature guarantees that nodes can anonymously query historical messages from other nodes i.e., -without disclosing the exact topics of [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](../14/message.md) they are interested in. -As such, no adversary in the `13/WAKU2-STORE` protocol would be able to learn which peer is interested in which content filters i.e., -content topics of [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](../14/message.md). -The current version of the `13/WAKU2-STORE` protocol does not provide anonymity for historical queries, -as the querying node needs to directly connect to another node in the `13/WAKU2-STORE` protocol and -explicitly disclose the content filters of its interest to retrieve the corresponding messages. -However, one can consider preserving anonymity through one of the following ways: +- **Anonymous query**: This feature guarantees that nodes +can anonymously query historical messages from other nodes i.e., +without disclosing the exact topics of [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](../14/message.md) +they are interested in. +As such, no adversary in the `13/WAKU2-STORE` protocol +would be able to learn which peer is interested in which content filters i.e., +content topics of [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](../14/message.md). +The current version of the `13/WAKU2-STORE` protocol does not provide anonymity +for historical queries, +as the querying node needs to directly connect to another node +in the `13/WAKU2-STORE` protocol and +explicitly disclose the content filters of its interest +to retrieve the corresponding messages. +However, one can consider preserving anonymity through one of the following ways: - By hiding the source of the request i.e., anonymous communication. - That is the querying node shall hide all its PII in its history request e.g., its IP address. - This can happen by the utilization of a proxy server or by using Tor. - Note that the current structure of historical requests does not embody any piece of PII, otherwise, - such data fields must be treated carefully to achieve query anonymity. - - - By deploying secure 2-party computations in which the querying node obtains the historical messages of a certain topic, - the queried node learns nothing about the query. - Examples of such 2PC protocols are secure one-way Private Set Intersections (PSI). - - - -- **Robust and verifiable timestamps**: Messages timestamp is a way to show that the message existed prior to some point in time. + That is the querying node shall hide all its PII in its history request + e.g., its IP address. + This can happen by the utilization of a proxy server or by using Tor. + Note that the current structure of historical requests + does not embody any piece of PII, otherwise, + such data fields must be treated carefully to achieve query anonymity. + + - By deploying secure 2-party computations in which the querying node + obtains the historical messages of a certain topic, + the queried node learns nothing about the query. + Examples of such 2PC protocols are secure one-way Private Set Intersections (PSI). + + + + +- **Robust and verifiable timestamps**: +Messages timestamp is a way to show that the message existed +prior to some point in time. However, the lack of timestamp verifiability can create room for a range of attacks, -including injecting messages with invalid timestamps pointing to the far future. +including injecting messages with invalid timestamps pointing to the far future. To better understand the attack, -consider a store node whose current clock shows `2021-01-01 00:00:30` (and assume all the other nodes have a synchronized clocks +-20seconds). +consider a store node whose current clock shows `2021-01-01 00:00:30` +(and assume all the other nodes have a synchronized clocks +-20seconds). The store node already has a list of messages, `(m1,2021-01-01 00:00:00), (m2,2021-01-01 00:00:01), ..., (m10:2021-01-01 00:00:20)`, that are sorted based on their timestamp. An attacker sends a message with an arbitrary large timestamp e.g., -10 hours ahead of the correct clock `(m',2021-01-01 10:00:30)`. +10 hours ahead of the correct clock `(m',2021-01-01 10:00:30)`. The store node places `m'` at the end of the list, -`(m1,2021-01-01 00:00:00), (m2,2021-01-01 00:00:01), ..., (m10:2021-01-01 00:00:20), (m',2021-01-01 10:00:30)`. + +```text +(m1,2021-01-01 00:00:00), (m2,2021-01-01 00:00:01), ..., (m10:2021-01-01 00:00:20),(m',2021-01-01 10:00:30). +``` + Now another message arrives with a valid timestamp e.g., `(m11, 2021-01-01 00:00:45)`. However, since its timestamp precedes the malicious message `m'`, it gets placed before `m'` in the list i.e., -`(m1,2021-01-01 00:00:00), (m2,2021-01-01 00:00:01), ..., (m10:2021-01-01 00:00:20), (m11, 2021-01-01 00:00:45), (m',2021-01-01 10:00:30)`. + +```text +(m1,2021-01-01 00:00:00), (m2,2021-01-01 00:00:01), ..., (m10:2021-01-01 00:00:20), (m11, 2021-01-01 00:00:45), (m',2021-01-01 10:00:30). +``` + In fact, for the next 10 hours, `m'` will always be considered as the most recent message and -served as the last message to the querying nodes irrespective of how many other messages arrive afterward. +served as the last message to the querying nodes irrespective +of how many other messages arrive afterward. -A robust and verifiable timestamp allows the receiver of a message to verify that a message has been generated prior to the claimed timestamp. +A robust and verifiable timestamp allows the receiver of a message +to verify that a message has been generated prior to the claimed timestamp. One solution is the use of [open timestamps](https://opentimestamps.org/) e.g., -block height in Blockchain-based timestamps. -That is, messages contain the most recent block height perceived by their senders at the time of message generation. -This proves accuracy within a range of minutes (e.g., in Bitcoin blockchain) or -seconds (e.g., in Ethereum 2.0) from the time of origination. +block height in Blockchain-based timestamps. +That is, messages contain the most recent block height +perceived by their senders at the time of message generation. +This proves accuracy within a range of minutes (e.g., in Bitcoin blockchain) or +seconds (e.g., in Ethereum 2.0) from the time of origination. ## Copyright @@ -255,7 +351,8 @@ Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). ## References + 1. [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](../14/message.md) 2. [protocol buffers v3](https://developers.google.com/protocol-buffers/) 3. [11/WAKU2-RELAY](../11/relay.md) -4. [Open timestamps](https://opentimestamps.org/) +4. [Open timestamps](https://opentimestamps.org/) diff --git a/waku/standards/core/14/message.md b/waku/standards/core/14/message.md index 66a006ef6..694e66ce1 100644 --- a/waku/standards/core/14/message.md +++ b/waku/standards/core/14/message.md @@ -17,11 +17,14 @@ contributors: ## Abstract Waku v2 is a family of modular peer-to-peer protocols for secure communication. -These protocols are designed to be secure, privacy-preserving, and censorship-resistant and can run in resource-restricted environments. -At a high level, Waku v2 implements a Pub/Sub messaging pattern over libp2p and adds capabilities. - -The present document specifies the Waku v2 message format, a way to encapsulate the messages sent with specific information security goals, and Whisper/Waku v1 backward compatibility. +These protocols are designed to be secure, privacy-preserving, +and censorship-resistant and can run in resource-restricted environments. +At a high level, Waku v2 implements a Pub/Sub messaging pattern over libp2p and +adds capabilities. +The present document specifies the Waku v2 message format, +a way to encapsulate the messages sent with specific information security goals, +and Whisper/Waku v1 backward compatibility. ## Motivation @@ -35,38 +38,48 @@ When sending messages over Waku, there are multiple requirements: This specification attempts to provide for these various requirements. - ## Semantics ### Waku Message -A Waku message is constituted by the combination of data payload and attributes that, for example, a *publisher* sends to a *topic* and is eventually delivered to *subscribers*. +A Waku message is constituted by the combination of data payload and +attributes that, for example, a *publisher* sends to a *topic* and +is eventually delivered to *subscribers*. -Waku message attributes are key-value pairs of metadata associated with a message. -And the message data payload is the part of the transmitted Waku message that is the actual message information. +Waku message attributes are key-value pairs of metadata associated with a message. +And the message data payload is the part of the transmitted Waku message +that is the actual message information. The data payload is also treated as a Waku message attribute for convenience. ### Message Attributes -* The `payload` attribute MUST contain the message data payload to be sent. +- The `payload` attribute MUST contain the message data payload to be sent. -* The `content_topic` attribute MUST specify a string identifier that can be used for content-based filtering, +- The `content_topic` attribute MUST specify a string identifier +that can be used for content-based filtering, as described in [23/WAKU2-TOPICS](../../../informational/23/topics.md). -* The `meta` attribute, if present, contains an arbitrary application-specific variable-length byte array with a maximum length limit of 64 bytes. -This attribute can be utilized to convey supplementary details to various Waku protocols, thereby enabling customized processing based on its contents. +- The `meta` attribute, if present, +contains an arbitrary application-specific variable-length byte array +with a maximum length limit of 64 bytes. +This attribute can be utilized to convey supplementary details +to various Waku protocols, +thereby enabling customized processing based on its contents. -* The `version` attribute, if present, contains a version number to discriminate different types of payload encryption. +- The `version` attribute, if present, +contains a version number to discriminate different types of payload encryption. If omitted, the value SHOULD be interpreted as version 0. -* The `timestamp` attribute, if present, signifies the time at which the message was generated by its sender. +- The `timestamp` attribute, if present, +signifies the time at which the message was generated by its sender. This attribute MAY contain the Unix epoch time in nanoseconds. If the attribute is omitted, it SHOULD be interpreted as timestamp 0. -* The `ephemeral` attribute, if present, signifies the transient nature of the message. +- The `ephemeral` attribute, if present, signifies the transient nature of the message. For example, an ephemeral message SHOULD not be persisted by the Waku network. If this attribute is set to `true`, the message SHOULD be interpreted as ephemeral. -If, instead, the attribute is omitted or set to `false`, the message SHOULD be interpreted as non-ephemeral. +If, instead, the attribute is omitted or set to `false`, +the message SHOULD be interpreted as non-ephemeral. ## Wire Format @@ -87,14 +100,16 @@ message WakuMessage { An example proto file following this specification can be found [here (vacp2p/waku)](https://github.com/vacp2p/waku/blob/main/waku/message/v1/message.proto). - ## Payload encryption The Waku message payload MAY be encrypted. -The message `version` attribute indicates the schema used to encrypt the payload data. +The message `version` attribute indicates +the schema used to encrypt the payload data. - **Version 0:** - The payload SHOULD be interpreted as unencrypted; additionally, it CAN indicate that the message payload has been encrypted at the application layer. + The payload SHOULD be interpreted as unencrypted; additionally, + it CAN indicate that the message payload has been encrypted + at the application layer. - **Version 1:** The payload SHOULD be encrypted using Waku v1 payload encryption specified in [26/WAKU-PAYLOAD](../../application/26/payload.md). @@ -109,36 +124,49 @@ Waku Noise protocol provides symmetric encryption and asymmetric key exchange. Any `version` value not included in this list is reserved for future specification. And, in this case, the payload SHOULD be interpreted as unencrypted by the Waku layer. - ## Whisper/Waku v1 envelope compatibility Whisper/Waku v1 envelopes are compatible with Waku v2 messages format. -* Whisper/Waku v1 `topic` field SHOULD be mapped to Waku v2 message's `content_topic` attribute. -* Whisper/Waku v1 `data` field SHOULD be mapped to Waku v2 message's `payload` attribute. +- Whisper/Waku v1 `topic` field +SHOULD be mapped to Waku v2 message's `content_topic` attribute. +- Whisper/Waku v1 `data` field SHOULD be mapped to Waku v2 message's `payload` attribute. Waku v2 implements a pub/sub messaging pattern over libp2p. -This makes redundant some Whisper/Waku v1 envelope fields (e.g., `expiry`, `ttl`, `topic`, etc.), so they can be ignored. +This makes redundant some Whisper/Waku v1 envelope fields +(e.g., `expiry`, `ttl`, `topic`, etc.), so they can be ignored. ## Deterministic message hashing -In Protocol Buffers v3, the deterministic serialization is not canonical across the different implementations and languages. -It is also unstable across different builds with schema changes due to unknown fields. +In Protocol Buffers v3, +the deterministic serialization is not canonical across the different implementations +and languages. +It is also unstable across different builds with schema changes due to unknown fields. -To overcome this interoperability limitation, a Waku v2 message's hash MUST be computed following this schema: +To overcome this interoperability limitation, +a Waku v2 message's hash MUST be computed following this schema: -``` +```js message_hash = sha256(concat(pubsub_topic, message.payload, message.content_topic, message.meta, message.timestamp)) ``` -If an optional attribute, such as `meta`, is absent, the concatenation of attributes SHOULD exclude it. This recommendation is made to ensure that the concatenation process proceeds smoothly when certain attributes are missing and to maintain backward compatibility. +If an optional attribute, such as `meta`, is absent, +the concatenation of attributes SHOULD exclude it. +This recommendation is made to ensure that the concatenation process proceeds smoothly +when certain attributes are missing and to maintain backward compatibility. -This hashing schema is deemed appropriate for use cases where a cross-implementation deterministic hash is needed, such as message deduplication and integrity validation. The collision probability offered by this hashing schema can be considered negligible. This is due to the deterministic concatenation order of the message attributes, coupled with using a SHA-2 (256-bit) hashing algorithm. +This hashing schema is deemed appropriate for use cases +where a cross-implementation deterministic hash is needed, +such as message deduplication and integrity validation. +The collision probability offered by this hashing schema can be considered negligible. +This is due to the deterministic concatenation order of the message attributes, +coupled with using a SHA-2 (256-bit) hashing algorithm. ### Test vectors Waku message hash computation (`meta` size of 12 bytes): -``` + +```js pubsub_topic = "/waku/2/default-waku/proto" (0x2f77616b752f322f64656661756c742d77616b752f70726f746f) message.payload = 0x010203045445535405060708 message.content_topic = "/waku/2/default-content/proto" (0x2f77616b752f322f64656661756c742d636f6e74656e742f70726f746f) @@ -150,7 +178,7 @@ message_hash = 0x64cce733fed134e83da02b02c6f689814872b1a0ac97ea56b76095c3c72bfe0 Waku message hash computation (`meta` size of 64 bytes): -``` +```js pubsub_topic = "/waku/2/default-waku/proto" (0x2f77616b752f322f64656661756c742d77616b752f70726f746f) message.payload = 0x010203045445535405060708 message.content_topic = "/waku/2/default-content/proto" (0x2f77616b752f322f64656661756c742d636f6e74656e742f70726f746f) @@ -161,7 +189,8 @@ message_hash = 0x7158b6498753313368b9af8f6e0a0a05104f68f972981da42a43bc53fb0c1b2 ``` Waku message hash computation (`meta` attribute not present): -``` + +```js pubsub_topic = "/waku/2/default-waku/proto" (0x2f77616b752f322f64656661756c742d77616b752f70726f746f) message.payload = 0x010203045445535405060708 message.content_topic = "/waku/2/default-content/proto" (0x2f77616b752f322f64656661756c742d636f6e74656e742f70726f746f) @@ -172,7 +201,8 @@ message_hash = 0xa2554498b31f5bcdfcbf7fa58ad1c2d45f0254f3f8110a85588ec3cf10720fd ``` Waku message hash computation (`payload` length 0): -``` + +```js pubsub_topic = "/waku/2/default-waku/proto" (0x2f77616b752f322f64656661756c742d77616b752f70726f746f) message.payload = [] message.content_topic = "/waku/2/default-content/proto" (0x2f77616b752f322f64656661756c742d636f6e74656e742f70726f746f) @@ -186,29 +216,39 @@ message_hash = 0x483ea950cb63f9b9d6926b262bb36194d3f40a0463ce8446228350bd44e96de ### Confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity -The level of confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity of the Waku message payload is discretionary. -Accordingly, the application layer shall utilize the encryption and signature schemes supported by Waku v2 to meet the application-specific privacy needs. +The level of confidentiality, integrity, and +authenticity of the Waku message payload is discretionary. +Accordingly, the application layer shall utilize the encryption and +signature schemes supported by Waku v2 to meet the application-specific privacy needs. ### Reliability of the `timestamp` attribute The Waku message `timestamp` attribute is set by the sender. -Therefore, because message timestamps aren’t independently verified, this attribute is prone to exploitation and misuse. +Therefore, because message timestamps aren’t independently verified, +this attribute is prone to exploitation and misuse. It should not solely be relied upon for operations such as message ordering. -For example, a malicious actor can arbitrarily set the `timestamp` of a Waku message to a high value so that it always shows up as the most recent message in a chat application. -Applications using Waku messages’ `timestamp` attribute are recommended to use additional methods for more robust message ordering. -An example of how to deal with message ordering against adversarial message timestamps can be found in the Status protocol, see [62/STATUS-PAYLOADS](../../../../status/62/payloads.md/#clock-vs-timestamp-and-message-ordering). +For example, a malicious actor can arbitrarily set the `timestamp` of a Waku message +to a high value so that it always shows up as the most recent message +in a chat application. +Applications using Waku messages’ `timestamp` attribute +are recommended to use additional methods for more robust message ordering. +An example of how to deal with message ordering against adversarial message timestamps +can be found in the Status protocol, +see [62/STATUS-PAYLOADS](../../../../status/62/payloads.md/#clock-vs-timestamp-and-message-ordering). ### Reliability of the `ephemeral` attribute The Waku message `ephemeral` attribute is set by the sender. -Since there is currently no incentive mechanism for network participants to behave correctly, this attribute is inherently insecure. -A malicious actor can tamper with the value of a Waku message’s `ephemeral` attribute, and the receiver would not be able to verify the integrity of the message. +Since there is currently no incentive mechanism +for network participants to behave correctly, +this attribute is inherently insecure. +A malicious actor can tamper with the value of a Waku message’s `ephemeral` attribute, +and the receiver would not be able to verify the integrity of the message. ## Copyright Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). - ## References - [6/WAKU1](../../legacy/6/waku1.md) diff --git a/waku/standards/core/15/bridge.md b/waku/standards/core/15/bridge.md index 6e1dc4457..60f4bb429 100644 --- a/waku/standards/core/15/bridge.md +++ b/waku/standards/core/15/bridge.md @@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ fields. Next, before posting on the network, the bridge MUST set a new expiry and ttl and do the PoW nonce calculation. ### Security Considerations + As mentioned above, a bridge will be posting new Waku v1 envelopes, which requires doing the PoW nonce calculation. diff --git a/waku/standards/core/17/rln-relay.md b/waku/standards/core/17/rln-relay.md index 42622cea8..5a1ff9093 100644 --- a/waku/standards/core/17/rln-relay.md +++ b/waku/standards/core/17/rln-relay.md @@ -13,65 +13,87 @@ contributors: --- ## Abstract + This specification describes the `17/WAKU2-RLN-RELAY` protocol, -which is an extension of [`11/WAKU2-RELAY`](../11/relay.md) to provide spam protection using [Rate Limiting Nullifiers (RLN)](../../../../vac/32/rln-v1.md). +which is an extension of [`11/WAKU2-RELAY`](../11/relay.md) +to provide spam protection using [Rate Limiting Nullifiers (RLN)](../../../../vac/32/rln-v1.md). -The security objective is to contain spam activity in the (64/WAKU-NETWORK)[] by enforcing a global messaging rate to all the peers. -Peers that violate the messaging rate are considered spammers and +The security objective is to contain spam activity in the (64/WAKU-NETWORK)[] +by enforcing a global messaging rate to all the peers. +Peers that violate the messaging rate are considered spammers and their message is considered spam. -Spammers are also financially punished and removed from the system. +Spammers are also financially punished and removed from the system. ## Motivation -In open and anonymous p2p messaging networks, -one big problem is spam resistance. +In open and anonymous p2p messaging networks, +one big problem is spam resistance. Existing solutions, such as Whisper’s proof of work, -are computationally expensive hence not suitable for resource-limited nodes. -Other reputation-based approaches might not be desirable, +are computationally expensive hence not suitable for resource-limited nodes. +Other reputation-based approaches might not be desirable, due to issues around arbitrary exclusion and privacy. -We augment the [`11/WAKU2-RELAY`](../11/relay.md) protocol with a novel construct of [RLN](../../../../vac/32/rln-v1.md) to enable an efficient economic spam prevention mechanism that can be run in resource-constrained environments. +We augment the [`11/WAKU2-RELAY`](../11/relay.md) protocol +with a novel construct of [RLN](../../../../vac/32/rln-v1.md) +to enable an efficient economic spam prevention mechanism +that can be run in resource-constrained environments. ## Specification -The key words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL NOT”, “SHOULD”, “SHOULD NOT”, “RECOMMENDED”, “MAY”, and “OPTIONAL” in this document are to be interpreted as described in [2119](https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt). +The key words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL NOT”, “SHOULD”, +“SHOULD NOT”, “RECOMMENDED”, “MAY”, and +“OPTIONAL” in this document are to be interpreted as described in [2119](https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt). ### Flow -The messaging rate is defined by the `period` which indicates how many messages can be sent in a given period. -We define an `epoch` as $\lceil$ `unix_time` / `period` $\rceil$. -For example, if `unix_time` is `1644810116` and we set `period` to `30`, +The messaging rate is defined by the `period` +which indicates how many messages can be sent in a given period. +We define an `epoch` as $\lceil$ `unix_time` / `period` $\rceil$. +For example, if `unix_time` is `1644810116` and we set `period` to `30`, then `epoch` is $\lceil$ `(unix_time/period)` $\rceil$ `= 54827003`. > **NOTE:** The `epoch` refers to the epoch in RLN and not Unix epoch. -This means a message can only be sent every period, where the `period` is up to the application. +This means a message can only be sent every period, +where the `period` is up to the application. -See section [Recommended System Parameters](#recommended-system-parameters) for the RECOMMENDED method to set a sensible `period` value depending on the application. -Peers subscribed to a spam-protected `pubsubTopic` are only allowed to send one message per `epoch`. -The higher-level layers adopting `17/WAKU2-RLN-RELAY` MAY choose to enforce the messaging rate for `WakuMessages` with a specific `contentTopic` published on a `pubsubTopic`. +See section [Recommended System Parameters](#recommended-system-parameters) +for the RECOMMENDED method to set a sensible `period` value depending on the application. +Peers subscribed to a spam-protected `pubsubTopic` +are only allowed to send one message per `epoch`. +The higher-level layers adopting `17/WAKU2-RLN-RELAY` +MAY choose to enforce the messaging rate for `WakuMessages` +with a specific `contentTopic` published on a `pubsubTopic`. #### Setup and Registration A `pubsubTopic` that is spam-protected requires subscribed peers to form a [RLN group](../../../../vac/32/rln-v1.md). + - Peers MUST be registered to the RLN group to be able to publish messages. -- Registration MAY be moderated through a smart contract deployed on the Ethereum blockchain. +- Registration MAY be moderated through a smart contract +deployed on the Ethereum blockchain. + +Each peer has an [RLN key pair](../../../../vac/32/rln-v1.md) denoted by `sk` +and `pk`. -Each peer has an [RLN key pair](../../../../vac/32/rln-v1.md) denoted by `sk` and `pk`. - The secret key `sk` is secret data and MUST be persisted securely by the peer. -- The state of the membership contract SHOULD contain a list of all registered members' public identity keys i.e., -`pk`s. +- The state of the membership contract +SHOULD contain a list of all registered members' public identity keys i.e., `pk`s. -For registration, a peer MUST create a transaction to invoke the registration function on the contract, -which registers its `pk` in the RLN group. -- The transaction MUST transfer additional tokens to the contract to be staked. +For registration, +a peer MUST create a transaction to invoke the registration function on the contract, +which registers its `pk` in the RLN group. + +- The transaction MUST transfer additional tokens to the contract to be staked. This amount is denoted by `staked_fund` and is a system parameter. -The peer who has the secret key `sk` associated with a registered `pk` would be able to withdraw a portion `reward_portion` of the staked fund by providing valid proof. +The peer who has the secret key `sk` associated with a registered `pk` +would be able to withdraw a portion `reward_portion` +of the staked fund by providing valid proof. `reward_portion` is also a system parameter. > **NOTE:** Initially `sk` is only known to its owning peer however, -it may get exposed to other peers in case the owner attempts spamming the system i.e., -sending more than one message per `epoch`. +it may get exposed to other peers in case the owner attempts spamming the system +i.e., sending more than one message per `epoch`. An overview of registration is illustrated in Figure 1. @@ -79,28 +101,33 @@ An overview of registration is illustrated in Figure 1. #### Publishing -To publish at a given `epoch`, -the publishing peer proceeds based on the regular [`11/WAKU2-RELAY`](../11/relay.md) protocol. -However, to protect against spamming, each `WakuMessage` -(which is wrapped inside the `data` field of a PubSub message) -MUST carry a [`RateLimitProof`](##RateLimitProof) with the following fields. -Section [Payload](#payloads) covers the details about the type and encoding of these fields. +To publish at a given `epoch`, the publishing peer proceeds +based on the regular [`11/WAKU2-RELAY`](../11/relay.md) protocol. +However, to protect against spamming, each `WakuMessage` +(which is wrapped inside the `data` field of a PubSub message) +MUST carry a [`RateLimitProof`](#ratelimitproof) with the following fields. +Section [Payload](#payloads) covers the details about the type and +encoding of these fields. - The `merkle_root` contains the root of the Merkle tree. - The `epoch` represents the current epoch. -- The `nullifier` is an internal nullifier acting as a fingerprint that allows specifying whether two messages are published by the same peer during the same `epoch`. +- The `nullifier` is an internal nullifier acting as a fingerprint +that allows specifying whether two messages are published by the same peer +during the same `epoch`. - The `nullifier` is a deterministic value derived from `sk` and `epoch` therefore any two messages issued by the same peer -(i.e., using the same `sk`) for the same `epoch` are guaranteed to have identical `nullifier`s. -- The `share_x` and `share_y` can be seen as partial disclosure of peer's `sk` for the intended `epoch`. +(i.e., using the same `sk`) +for the same `epoch` are guaranteed to have identical `nullifier`s. +- The `share_x` and +`share_y` can be seen as partial disclosure of peer's `sk` for the intended `epoch`. They are derived deterministically from peer's `sk` and -current `epoch` using [Shamir secret sharing scheme](../../../../vac/32/rln-v1.md). +current `epoch` using [Shamir secret sharing scheme](../../../../vac/32/rln-v1.md). -If a peer discloses more than one such pair (`share_x`, `share_y`) for the same `epoch`, -it would allow full disclosure of its `sk` and +If a peer discloses more than one such pair (`share_x`, `share_y`) for the same `epoch`, +it would allow full disclosure of its `sk` and hence get access to its staked fund in the membership contract. -- The `proof` field is a zero-knowledge proof signifying that: +- The `proof` field is a zero-knowledge proof signifying that: 1. The message owner is the current member of the group i.e., the peer's identity commitment key, `pk`, @@ -108,73 +135,108 @@ is part of the membership group Merkle tree with the root `merkle_root`. 2. `share_x` and `share_y` are correctly computed. 3. The `nullifier` is constructed correctly. For more details about the proof generation check [RLN](../../../../vac/32/rln-v1.md) -The proof generation relies on the knowledge of two pieces of private information i.e., `sk` and `authPath`. -The `authPath` is a subset of Merkle tree nodes by which a peer can prove the inclusion of its `pk` in the group. +The proof generation relies on the knowledge of two pieces of private information +i.e., `sk` and `authPath`. +The `authPath` is a subset of Merkle tree nodes +by which a peer can prove the inclusion of its `pk` in the group. + The proof generation also requires a set of public inputs which are: the Merkle tree root `merkle_root`, the current `epoch`, and -the message for which the proof is going to be generated. -In `17/WAKU2-RLN-RELAY`, the message is the concatenation of `WakuMessage`'s `payload` filed and -its `contentTopic` i.e., `payload||contentTopic`. +the message for which the proof is going to be generated. +In `17/WAKU2-RLN-RELAY`, +the message is the concatenation of `WakuMessage`'s `payload` filed and +its `contentTopic` i.e., `payload||contentTopic`. #### Group Synchronization -Proof generation relies on the knowledge of Merkle tree root `merkle_root` and `authPath` which both require access to the membership Merkle tree. -Getting access to the Merkle tree can be done in various ways: +Proof generation relies on the knowledge of Merkle tree root `merkle_root` and +`authPath` which both require access to the membership Merkle tree. +Getting access to the Merkle tree can be done in various ways: 1. Peers construct the tree locally. -This can be done by listening to the registration and +This can be done by listening to the registration and deletion events emitted by the membership contract. Peers MUST update the local Merkle tree on a per-block basis. -This is discussed further in the [Merkle Root Validation](#merkle-root-validation) section. +This is discussed further +in the [Merkle Root Validation](#merkle-root-validation) section. 2. For synchronizing the state of slashed `pk`s, -disseminate such information through a `pubsubTopic` to which all peers are subscribed. +disseminate such information through a `pubsubTopic` to which all peers are subscribed. A deletion transaction SHOULD occur on the membership contract. -The benefit of an off-chain slashing is that it allows real-time removal of spammers as opposed to on-chain slashing in which peers get informed with a delay, +The benefit of an off-chain slashing +is that it allows real-time removal of spammers as opposed to on-chain slashing +in which peers get informed with a delay, where the delay is due to mining the slashing transaction. -For the group synchronization, -one important security consideration is that peers MUST make sure they always use the most recent Merkle tree root in their proof generation. -The reason is that using an old root can allow inference about the index of the user's `pk` in the membership tree hence compromising user privacy and breaking message unlinkability. +For the group synchronization, +one important security consideration is that peers MUST make sure they always use +the most recent Merkle tree root in their proof generation. +The reason is that using an old root can allow inference +about the index of the user's `pk` in the membership tree +hence compromising user privacy and breaking message unlinkability. #### Routing -Upon the receipt of a PubSub message via [`11/WAKU2-RELAY`](../11/relay.md) protocol, -the routing peer parses the `data` field as a `WakuMessage` and gets access to the `RateLimitProof` field. +Upon the receipt of a PubSub message via [`11/WAKU2-RELAY`](../11/relay.md) protocol, +the routing peer parses the `data` field as a `WakuMessage` and +gets access to the `RateLimitProof` field. The peer then validates the `RateLimitProof` as explained next. ##### Epoch Validation + If the `epoch` attached to the `WakuMessage` is more than `max_epoch_gap`, apart from the routing peer's current `epoch`, then the `WakuMessage` MUST be discarded and considered invalid. -This is to prevent a newly registered peer from spamming the system by messaging for all the past epochs. -`max_epoch_gap` is a system parameter for which we provide some recommendations in section [Recommended System Parameters](#recommended-system-parameters). +This is to prevent a newly registered peer from spamming the system +by messaging for all the past epochs. +`max_epoch_gap` is a system parameter +for which we provide some recommendations in section [Recommended System Parameters](#recommended-system-parameters). ##### Merkle Root Validation -The routing peers MUST check whether the provided Merkle root in the `RateLimitProof` is valid. -It can do so by maintaining a local set of valid Merkle roots, + +The routing peers MUST check whether the provided Merkle root +in the `RateLimitProof` is valid. +It can do so by maintaining a local set of valid Merkle roots, which consist of `acceptable_root_window_size` past roots. -These roots refer to the final state of the Merkle tree after a whole block consisting of group changes is processed. +These roots refer to the final state of the Merkle tree +after a whole block consisting of group changes is processed. The Merkle roots are updated on a per-block basis instead of a per-event basis. -This is done because if Merkle roots are updated on a per-event basis, some peers could send messages with a root that refers to a Merkle tree state that might get invalidated while the message is still propagating in the network, due to many registrations happening during this time frame. -By updating roots on a per-block basis instead, we will have only one root update per-block processed, regardless on how many registrations happened in a block, and peers will be able to successfully propagate messages in a time frame corresponding to roughly the size of the roots window times the block mining time. - -Atomic processing of the blocks are necessary so that even if the peer is unable to process one event, the previous roots remain valid, and can be used to generate valid RateLimitProof's. - -This also allows peers which are not well connected to the network to be able to send messages, accounting for network delay. -This network delay is related to the nature of asynchronous network conditions, which means that peers see membership changes asynchronously, and therefore may have differing local Merkle trees. -See [Recommended System Parameters](#recommended-system-parameters) on choosing an appropriate `acceptable_root_window_size`. +This is done because if Merkle roots are updated on a per-event basis, +some peers could send messages with a root that refers to a Merkle tree state +that might get invalidated while the message is still propagating in the network, +due to many registrations happening during this time frame. +By updating roots on a per-block basis instead, +we will have only one root update per-block processed, +regardless on how many registrations happened in a block, and +peers will be able to successfully propagate messages in a time frame +corresponding to roughly the size of the roots window times the block mining time. + +Atomic processing of the blocks are necessary +so that even if the peer is unable to process one event, +the previous roots remain valid, and can be used to generate valid RateLimitProof's. + +This also allows peers which are not well connected to the network +to be able to send messages, accounting for network delay. +This network delay is related to the nature of asynchronous network conditions, +which means that peers see membership changes asynchronously, and +therefore may have differing local Merkle trees. +See [Recommended System Parameters](#recommended-system-parameters) +on choosing an appropriate `acceptable_root_window_size`. ##### Proof Verification + The routing peers MUST check whether the zero-knowledge proof `proof` is valid. -It does so by running the zk verification algorithm as explained in [RLN](../../../../vac/32/rln-v1.md). -If `proof` is invalid then the message MUST be discarded. +It does so by running the zk verification algorithm as explained in [RLN](../../../../vac/32/rln-v1.md). +If `proof` is invalid then the message MUST be discarded. ##### Spam detection -To enable local spam detection and slashing, -routing peers MUST record the `nullifier`, `share_x`, and `share_y` -of incoming messages which are not discarded i.e., not found spam or with invalid proof or epoch. -To spot spam messages, the peer checks whether a message with an identical `nullifier` has already been relayed. + +To enable local spam detection and slashing, +routing peers MUST record the `nullifier`, `share_x`, and `share_y` +of incoming messages which are not discarded i.e., +not found spam or with invalid proof or epoch. +To spot spam messages, the peer checks whether a message +with an identical `nullifier` has already been relayed. 1. If such a message exists and its `share_x` and `share_y` components are different from the incoming message, then slashing takes place. @@ -183,9 +245,11 @@ of the new message and the `share'_x` and `share'_y` of the old record to reconstruct the `sk` of the message owner. The `sk` then MAY be used to delete the spammer from the group and withdraw a portion `reward_portion` of its staked funds. -3. If the `share_x` and `share_y` fields of the previously relayed message are identical to the incoming message, +2. If the `share_x` and +`share_y` fields of the previously relayed message are identical +to the incoming message, then the message is a duplicate and MUST be discarded. -4. If none is found, then the message gets relayed. +3. If none is found, then the message gets relayed. An overview of the routing procedure and slashing is provided in Figure 2. @@ -196,9 +260,10 @@ An overview of the routing procedure and slashing is provided in Figure 2. ### Payloads Payloads are protobuf messages implemented using [protocol buffers v3](https://developers.google.com/protocol-buffers/). -Nodes MAY extend the [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](../14/message.md) with a `rate_limit_proof` field to indicate that their message is not spam. +Nodes MAY extend the [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](../14/message.md) +with a `rate_limit_proof` field to indicate that their message is not spam. -```diff +```diff syntax = "proto3"; @@ -221,22 +286,27 @@ message WakuMessage { } ``` + #### WakuMessage -`rate_limit_proof` holds the information required to prove that the message owner has not exceeded the message rate limit. - +`rate_limit_proof` holds the information required to prove that the message owner +has not exceeded the message rate limit. + #### RateLimitProof + Below is the description of the fields of `RateLimitProof` and their types. -| Parameter | Type | Description | +| Parameter | Type | Description | | ----: | ----------- | ----------- | -| `proof` | array of 256 bytes uncompressed or 128 bytes compressed | the zkSNARK proof as explained in the [Publishing process](##Publishing) | +| `proof` | array of 256 bytes uncompressed or 128 bytes compressed | the zkSNARK proof as explained in the [Publishing process](#publishing) | | `merkle_root` | array of 32 bytes in little-endian order | the root of membership group Merkle tree at the time of publishing the message | | `share_x` and `share_y`| array of 32 bytes each | Shamir secret shares of the user's secret identity key `sk` . `share_x` is the Poseidon hash of the `WakuMessage`'s `payload` concatenated with its `contentTopic` . `share_y` is calculated using [Shamir secret sharing scheme](../../../../vac/32/rln-v1.md) | | `nullifier` | array of 32 bytes | internal nullifier derived from `epoch` and peer's `sk` as explained in [RLN construct](../../../../vac/32/rln-v1.md)| ### Recommended System Parameters -The system parameters are summarized in the following table, and the RECOMMENDED values for a subset of them are presented next. + +The system parameters are summarized in the following table, +and the RECOMMENDED values for a subset of them are presented next. | Parameter | Description | | ----: |----------- | @@ -247,35 +317,55 @@ The system parameters are summarized in the following table, and the RECOMMENDED | `acceptable_root_window_size` | The maximum number of past Merkle roots to store | #### Epoch Length -A sensible value for the `period` depends on the application for which the spam protection is going to be used. -For example, while the `period` of `1` second i.e., -messaging rate of `1` per second, might be acceptable for a chat application, + +A sensible value for the `period` depends on the application +for which the spam protection is going to be used. +For example, while the `period` of `1` second i.e., +messaging rate of `1` per second, might be acceptable for a chat application, might be too low for communication among Ethereum network validators. -One should look at the desired throughput of the application to decide on a proper `period` value. +One should look at the desired throughput of the application +to decide on a proper `period` value. #### Maximum Epoch Gap -We discussed in the [Routing](#routing) section that the gap between the epoch observed by the routing peer and -the one attached to the incoming message should not exceed a threshold denoted by `max_epoch_gap`. + +We discussed in the [Routing](#routing) section that the gap between the epoch +observed by the routing peer and +the one attached to the incoming message +should not exceed a threshold denoted by `max_epoch_gap`. The value of `max_epoch_gap` can be measured based on the following factors. -- Network transmission delay `Network_Delay`: the maximum time that it takes for a message to be fully disseminated in the GossipSub network. -- Clock asynchrony `Clock_Asynchrony`: The maximum difference between the Unix epoch clocks perceived by network peers which can be due to clock drifts. +- Network transmission delay `Network_Delay`: +the maximum time that it takes for a message to be fully disseminated +in the GossipSub network. +- Clock asynchrony `Clock_Asynchrony`: +The maximum difference between the Unix epoch clocks perceived +by network peers which can be due to clock drifts. -With a reasonable approximation of the preceding values, one can set `max_epoch_gap` as -`max_epoch_gap` $= \lceil \frac{\text{Network Delay} + \text{Clock Asynchrony}}{\text{Epoch Length}}\rceil$ where `period` is the length of the `epoch` in seconds. -`Network_Delay` and `Clock_Asynchrony` MUST have the same resolution as `period` . -By this formulation, `max_epoch_gap` indeed measures the maximum number of `epoch`s that can elapse since a message gets routed from its origin to all the other peers in the network. +With a reasonable approximation of the preceding values, +one can set `max_epoch_gap` as + +`max_epoch_gap` +$= \lceil \frac{\text{Network Delay} + \text{Clock Asynchrony}}{\text{Epoch Length}}\rceil$ +where `period` is the length of the `epoch` in seconds. +`Network_Delay` and `Clock_Asynchrony` MUST have the same resolution as `period`. +By this formulation, `max_epoch_gap` indeed measures the maximum number of `epoch`s +that can elapse since a message gets routed from its origin +to all the other peers in the network. -`acceptable_root_window_size` depends upon the underlying chain's average blocktime, `block_time` +`acceptable_root_window_size` depends upon the underlying chain's average blocktime, +`block_time` The lower bound for the `acceptable_root_window_size` SHOULD be set as $acceptable_root_window_size=(Network_Delay)/block_time$ `Network_Delay` MUST have the same resolution as `block_time`. -By this formulation, `acceptable_root_window_size` will provide a lower bound of how many roots can be acceptable by a routing peer. +By this formulation, +`acceptable_root_window_size` will provide a lower bound +of how many roots can be acceptable by a routing peer. -The `acceptable_root_window_size` should indicate how many blocks may have been mined during the time it takes for a peer to receive a message. -This formula represents a lower bound of the number of acceptable roots. +The `acceptable_root_window_size` should indicate how many blocks may have been mined +during the time it takes for a peer to receive a message. +This formula represents a lower bound of the number of acceptable roots. ## Copyright diff --git a/waku/standards/core/19/lightpush.md b/waku/standards/core/19/lightpush.md index d5adbcabd..4ab4a5663 100644 --- a/waku/standards/core/19/lightpush.md +++ b/waku/standards/core/19/lightpush.md @@ -13,8 +13,11 @@ contributors: ## Motivation and Goals -Light nodes with short connection windows and limited bandwidth wish to publish messages into the Waku network. -Additionally, there is sometimes a need for confirmation that a message has been received "by the network" +Light nodes with short connection windows and +limited bandwidth wish to publish messages into the Waku network. +Additionally, +there is sometimes a need for confirmation +that a message has been received "by the network" (here, at least one node). `19/WAKU2-LIGHTPUSH` is a request/response protocol for this. @@ -45,13 +48,18 @@ message PushRPC { ### Message Relaying Nodes that respond to `PushRequests` MUST either -relay the encapsulated message via [11/WAKU2-RELAY](../11/relay.md) protocol on the specified `pubsub_topic`, -or forward the `PushRequest` via 19/LIGHTPUSH on a [WAKU2-DANDELION](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/waku-RFC/standards/application/dandelion.md) stem. -If they are unable to do so for some reason, they SHOULD return an error code in `PushResponse`. +relay the encapsulated message via [11/WAKU2-RELAY](../11/relay.md) protocol +on the specified `pubsub_topic`, +or forward the `PushRequest` via 19/LIGHTPUSH on a [WAKU2-DANDELION](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/waku-RFC/standards/application/dandelion.md) +stem. +If they are unable to do so for some reason, +they SHOULD return an error code in `PushResponse`. ## Security Considerations -Since this can introduce an amplification factor, it is RECOMMENDED for the node relaying to the rest of the network to take extra precautions. +Since this can introduce an amplification factor, +it is RECOMMENDED for the node relaying to the rest of the network +to take extra precautions. This can be done by rate limiting via [17/WAKU2-RLN-RELAY](../17/rln-relay.md). Note that the above is currently not fully implemented. diff --git a/waku/standards/core/33/discv5.md b/waku/standards/core/33/discv5.md index 51c9eaa57..b4abdafd9 100644 --- a/waku/standards/core/33/discv5.md +++ b/waku/standards/core/33/discv5.md @@ -9,87 +9,125 @@ contributors: ## Abstract -`33/WAKU2-DISCV5` specifies a modified version of [Ethereum's Node Discovery Protocol v5](https://github.com/ethereum/devp2p/blob/master/discv5/discv5.md) as a means for ambient node discovery. -[10/WAKU2](../10/waku2.md) uses the `33/WAKU2-DISCV5` ambient node discovery network for establishing a decentralized network of interconnected Waku2 nodes. -In its current version, the `33/WAKU2-DISCV5` discovery network is isolated from the Ethereum Discovery v5 network. -Isolation improves discovery efficiency, which is especially significant with a low number of Waku nodes compared to the total number of Ethereum nodes. +`33/WAKU2-DISCV5` specifies a modified version of +[Ethereum's Node Discovery Protocol v5](https://github.com/ethereum/devp2p/blob/master/discv5/discv5.md) +as a means for ambient node discovery. +[10/WAKU2](../10/waku2.md) uses the `33/WAKU2-DISCV5` ambient node discovery network +for establishing a decentralized network of interconnected Waku2 nodes. +In its current version, +the `33/WAKU2-DISCV5` discovery network +is isolated from the Ethereum Discovery v5 network. +Isolation improves discovery efficiency, +which is especially significant with a low number of Waku nodes +compared to the total number of Ethereum nodes. ## Disclaimer -This version of `33/WAKU2-DISCV5` has a focus on timely deployment of an efficient discovery method for [10/WAKU2](../10/waku2.md). +This version of `33/WAKU2-DISCV5` has a focus on timely deployment +of an efficient discovery method for [10/WAKU2](../10/waku2.md). Establishing a separate discovery network is in line with this focus. -However, we are aware of potential resilience problems (see section on security considerations) and are [discussing](https://forum.vac.dev/t/waku-v2-discv5-roadmap-discussion/121/8) +However, we are aware of potential resilience problems +(see section on security considerations) and +are [discussing](https://forum.vac.dev/t/waku-v2-discv5-roadmap-discussion/121/8) and researching hybrid approaches. - ## Background and Rationale [11/WAKU2-RELAY](../11/relay.md) assumes the existence of a network of Waku2 nodes. -For establishing and growing this network, new nodes trying to join the Waku2 network need a means of discovering nodes within the network. -[10/WAKU2](../10/waku2.md) supports the following discovery methods in order of increasing decentralization +For establishing and growing this network, +new nodes trying to join the Waku2 network need a means of discovering nodes +within the network. +[10/WAKU2](../10/waku2.md) supports the following discovery methods +in order of increasing decentralization * hard coded bootstrap nodes * [`DNS discovery`](https://rfc.vac.dev/spec/10/#discovery-domain) (based on [EIP-1459](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1459)) * `peer-exchange` (work in progress) * `33/WAKU2-DISCV5` (specified in this document) -The purpose of ambient node discovery within [10/WAKU2](../10/waku2.md) is discovering Waku2 nodes in a decentralized way. -The unique selling point of `33/WAKU2-DISCV5` is its holistic view of the network, which allows avoiding hotspots and allows merging the network after a split. -While the other methods provide either a fixed or local set of nodes, `33/WAKU2-DISCV5` can provide a random sample of Waku2 nodes. -Future iterations of this document will add the possibility of efficiently discovering Waku2 nodes that have certain capabilities, e.g. holding messages of a certain time frame during which the querying node was offline. +The purpose of ambient node discovery within [10/WAKU2](../10/waku2.md) +is discovering Waku2 nodes in a decentralized way. +The unique selling point of `33/WAKU2-DISCV5` is its holistic view of the network, +which allows avoiding hotspots and allows merging the network after a split. +While the other methods provide either a fixed or local set of nodes, +`33/WAKU2-DISCV5` can provide a random sample of Waku2 nodes. +Future iterations of this document will add the possibility +of efficiently discovering Waku2 nodes that have certain capabilities, +e.g. holding messages of a certain time frame +during which the querying node was offline. ### Separate Discovery Network #### w.r.t. Waku2 Relay Network -`33/WAKU2-DISCV5` spans an overlay network separate from the [GossipSub](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/gossipsub/README.md) network [11/WAKU2-RELAY](../11/relay.md) builds on. +`33/WAKU2-DISCV5` spans an overlay network separate from the +[GossipSub](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/gossipsub/README.md) +network [11/WAKU2-RELAY](../11/relay.md) builds on. Because it is a P2P network on its own, it also depends on bootstrap nodes. -Having a separate discovery network reduces load on the bootstrap nodes, because the actual work is done by randomly discovered nodes. +Having a separate discovery network reduces load on the bootstrap nodes, +because the actual work is done by randomly discovered nodes. This also increases decentralization. - #### w.r.t. Ethereum Discovery v5 -`33/WAKU2-DISCV5` spans a discovery network isolated from the Ethereum Discovery v5 network. +`33/WAKU2-DISCV5` spans a discovery network +isolated from the Ethereum Discovery v5 network. -Another simple solution would be taking part in the Ethereum Discovery network, and filtering Waku nodes based on whether they support [WAKU2-ENR](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/waku-RFC/standards/core/enr.md). +Another simple solution would be taking part in the Ethereum Discovery network, +and filtering Waku nodes based on whether they support [WAKU2-ENR](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/waku-RFC/standards/core/enr.md). This solution is more resilient towards eclipse attacks. -However, this discovery method is very inefficient for small percentages of Waku nodes (see [estimation](https://forum.vac.dev/t/waku-v2-discv5-roadmap-discussion/121/8)). +However, this discovery method is very inefficient +for small percentages of Waku nodes +(see [estimation](https://forum.vac.dev/t/waku-v2-discv5-roadmap-discussion/121/8)). It boils down to random walk discovery and does not offer a O(log(n)) hop bound. -The rarer the requested property (in this case Waku), the longer a random walk will take until finding an appropriate node, which leads to a needle-in-the-haystack problem. -Using a dedicated Waku2 discovery network, nodes can query this discovery network for a random set of nodes -and all (well-behaving) returned nodes can serve as bootstrap nodes for other Waku2 protocols. +The rarer the requested property (in this case Waku), +the longer a random walk will take until finding an appropriate node, +which leads to a needle-in-the-haystack problem. +Using a dedicated Waku2 discovery network, +nodes can query this discovery network for a random set of nodes +and all (well-behaving) +returned nodes can serve as bootstrap nodes for other Waku2 protocols. A more sophisticated solution would be using [Discv5 topic discovery](https://github.com/ethereum/devp2p/blob/master/discv5/discv5-theory.md#topic-advertisement). -However, in its current state it also has efficiency problems for small percentages of Waku nodes and is still in the design phase ([see here](https://github.com/ethereum/devp2p/issues/199)). +However, in its current state it also has efficiency problems for small percentages +of Waku nodes and is still in the design phase +([see here](https://github.com/ethereum/devp2p/issues/199)). -Currently, the Ethereum discv5 network is very efficient in finding other discv5 nodes, -but it is not so efficient for finding discv5 nodes that have a specific property or offer specific services, e.g. Waku. +Currently, +the Ethereum discv5 network is very efficient in finding other discv5 nodes, +but it is not so efficient for finding discv5 nodes +that have a specific property or +offer specific services, e.g. Waku. -As part of our [discv5 roadmap](https://forum.vac.dev/t/waku-v2-discv5-roadmap-discussion/121), we consider two ideas for future versions of `33/WAKU2-DISCV5` +As part of our [discv5 roadmap](https://forum.vac.dev/t/waku-v2-discv5-roadmap-discussion/121), +we consider two ideas for future versions of `33/WAKU2-DISCV5` -* [Discv5 topic discovery](https://github.com/ethereum/devp2p/blob/master/discv5/discv5-theory.md#topic-advertisement) with adjustments (ideally upstream) -* a hybrid solution that uses both a separate discv5 network and a Waku-ENR-filtered Ethereum discv5 network +* [Discv5 topic discovery](https://github.com/ethereum/devp2p/blob/master/discv5/discv5-theory.md#topic-advertisement) +with adjustments (ideally upstream) +* a hybrid solution that uses both a separate discv5 network and +a Waku-ENR-filtered Ethereum discv5 network ## Semantics `33/WAKU2-DISCV5` fully inherits the [discv5 semantics](https://github.com/ethereum/devp2p/blob/master/discv5/discv5-theory.md). -Before announcing their address via Waku2 discv5, nodes SHOULD check if this address is publicly reachable. -Nodes MAY use the [libp2p AutoNAT protocol](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/autonat/README.md) to perform that check. +Before announcing their address via Waku2 discv5, +nodes SHOULD check if this address is publicly reachable. +Nodes MAY use the [libp2p AutoNAT protocol](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/autonat/README.md) +to perform that check. Nodes SHOULD only announce publicly reachable addresses via Waku2 discv5, to avoid cluttering peer lists with nodes that are not reachable. ## Wire Format Specification -`33/WAKU2-DISCV5` inherits the [discv5 wire protocol](https://github.com/ethereum/devp2p/blob/master/discv5/discv5-wire.md) except for the following differences +`33/WAKU2-DISCV5` inherits the [discv5 wire protocol](https://github.com/ethereum/devp2p/blob/master/discv5/discv5-wire.md) +except for the following differences ## WAKU2-Specific `protocol-id` Ethereum discv5: -
-
+```text
 header        = static-header || authdata
 static-header = protocol-id || version || flag || nonce || authdata-size
 protocol-id   = "discv5"
@@ -97,12 +135,12 @@ version       = 0x0001
 authdata-size = uint16    -- byte length of authdata
 flag          = uint8     -- packet type identifier
 nonce         = uint96    -- nonce of message
-
-
+ +``` `33/WAKU2-DISCV5`: -
+```text
 kcode>
 header        = static-header || authdata
 static-header = protocol-id || version || flag || nonce || authdata-size
@@ -111,56 +149,67 @@ version       = 0x0001
 authdata-size = uint16    -- byte length of authdata
 flag          = uint8     -- packet type identifier
 nonce         = uint96    -- nonce of message
-
-
+``` ## Suggestions for Implementations Existing discv5 implementations -* can be augmented to make the `protocol-id` selectable using a compile-time flag as in [this feature branch](https://github.com/kaiserd/nim-eth/blob/add-selectable-protocol-id-static/eth/p2p/discoveryv5/encoding.nim#L34) of nim-eth/discv5. +* can be augmented to make the `protocol-id` selectable using a compile-time flag + as in [this feature branch](https://github.com/kaiserd/nim-eth/blob/add-selectable-protocol-id-static/eth/p2p/discoveryv5/encoding.nim#L34) +of nim-eth/discv5. * can be forked followed by changing the `protocol-id` string as in [go-waku](https://github.com/status-im/go-waku/blob/master/waku/v2/discv5/discover.go#L135-L137). - ## Security Considerations ### Sybil attack -Implementations should limit the number of bucket entries that have the same network parameters (IP address / port) to mitigate Sybil attacks. +Implementations should limit the number of bucket entries +that have the same network parameters (IP address / port) to mitigate Sybil attacks. ### Eclipse attack Eclipse attacks aim to eclipse certain regions in a DHT. Malicious nodes provide false routing information for certain target regions. -The larger the desired eclipsed region, the more resources (i.e. controlled nodes) the attacker needs. +The larger the desired eclipsed region, +the more resources (i.e. controlled nodes) the attacker needs. This introduces an efficiency versus resilience tradeoff. -Discovery is more efficient if information about target objects (e.g. network parameters of nodes supporting Waku) are closer to a specific DHT address. -If nodes providing specific information are closer to each other, they cover a smaller range in the DHT and are easier to eclipse. +Discovery is more efficient if information about target objects +(e.g. network parameters of nodes supporting Waku) are closer to a specific DHT address. +If nodes providing specific information are closer to each other, +they cover a smaller range in the DHT and are easier to eclipse. -Sybil attacks greatly increase the power of eclipse attacks, because they significantly reduce resources necessary to mount a successful eclipse attack. +Sybil attacks greatly increase the power of eclipse attacks, +because they significantly reduce resources necessary +to mount a successful eclipse attack. ## Security Implications of a Separate Discovery Network -A dedicated Waku discovery network is more likely to be subject to successful eclipse attacks (and to DoS attacks in general). +A dedicated Waku discovery network is more likely to be subject +to successful eclipse attacks (and to DoS attacks in general). This is because eclipsing in a smaller network requires less resources for the attacker. -DoS attacks render the whole network unusable if the percentage of attacker nodes is sufficient. +DoS attacks render the whole network unusable +if the percentage of attacker nodes is sufficient. -Using random walk discovery would mitigate eclipse attacks targeted at specific capabilities, e.g. Waku. -However, this is because eclipse attacks aim at the DHT overlay structure, which is not used by random walks. +Using random walk discovery would mitigate eclipse attacks +targeted at specific capabilities, e.g. Waku. +However, this is because eclipse attacks aim at the DHT overlay structure, +which is not used by random walks. So, this mitigation would come at the cost of giving up overlay routing efficiency. The efficiency loss is especially severe with a relatively small number of Waku nodes. -Properly protecting against eclipse attacks is challenging and raises research questions that we will address in future stages of our discv5 roadmap. +Properly protecting against eclipse attacks is challenging and +raises research questions that we will address in future stages of our discv5 roadmap. ## References 1. [10/WAKU2](../10/waku2.md) 1. [11/WAKU2-RELAY](../11/relay.md) 1. [`WAKU2-ENR`](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/waku-RFC/standards/core/enr.md) -1. [Node Discovery Protocol v5 (`discv5`)](https://github.com/ethereum/devp2p/blob/master/discv5/discv5.md) +1. [Node Discovery Protocol v5 (`discv5`)](https://github.com/ethereum/devp2p/blob/master/discv5/discv5.md) 1. [`discv5` semantics](https://github.com/ethereum/devp2p/blob/master/discv5/discv5-theory.md). -1. [`discv5` wire protocol](https://github.com/ethereum/devp2p/blob/master/discv5/discv5-wire.md) +1. [`discv5` wire protocol](https://github.com/ethereum/devp2p/blob/master/discv5/discv5-wire.md) 1. [`discv5` topic discovery](https://github.com/ethereum/devp2p/blob/master/discv5/discv5-theory.md#topic-advertisement) 1. [Waku DNS discovery](https://rfc.vac.dev/spec/10/#discovery-domain) 1. [libp2p AutoNAT protocol](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/autonat/README.md) diff --git a/waku/standards/core/36/bindings-api.md b/waku/standards/core/36/bindings-api.md index edaff58f1..46d57aedd 100644 --- a/waku/standards/core/36/bindings-api.md +++ b/waku/standards/core/36/bindings-api.md @@ -9,44 +9,57 @@ contributors: - Franck Royer --- -# Introduction +## Introduction -Native applications that wish to integrate Waku may not be able to use nwaku and its JSON RPC API due to constraints +Native applications that wish to integrate Waku may not be able to use nwaku and +its JSON RPC API due to constraints on packaging, performance or executables. -An alternative is to link existing Waku implementation as a static or dynamic library in their application. +An alternative is to link existing Waku implementation as a static or +dynamic library in their application. -This specification describes the C API that SHOULD be implemented by native Waku library and that SHOULD be used to -consume them. +This specification describes the C API that SHOULD be implemented +by native Waku library and that SHOULD be used to consume them. -# Design requirements +## Design requirements The API should be generic enough, so: - it can be implemented by both nwaku and go-waku C-Bindings, -- it can be consumed from a variety of languages such as C#, Kotlin, Swift, Rust, C++, etc. +- it can be consumed from a variety of languages such as C#, Kotlin, Swift, +Rust, C++, etc. The selected format to pass data to and from the API is `JSON`. -It has been selected due to its widespread usage and easiness of use. Other alternatives MAY replace it in the future (C +It has been selected due to its widespread usage and +easiness of use. Other alternatives MAY replace it in the future (C structure, protobuf) if it brings limitations that need to be lifted. -# The API +## The API -## General +### General -### `WakuCallBack` type +#### `WakuCallBack` type -All the API functions require passing callbacks which will be executed depending on the result of the execution result. +All the API functions require passing callbacks +which will be executed depending on the result of the execution result. These callbacks are defined as + ```c typedef void (*WakuCallBack) (const char* msg, size_t len_0); ``` -With `msg` containing a `\0` terminated string, and `len_0` the length of this string. The format of the data sent to these callbacks -will depend on the function being executed. The data can be characters, numeric or json. + +With `msg` containing a `\0` terminated string, and `len_0` the length of this string. +The format of the data sent to these callbacks +will depend on the function being executed. +The data can be characters, numeric or json. ### Status Codes -The API functions return an integer with status codes depending on the execution result. The following status codes are defined: + +The API functions return an integer with status codes +depending on the execution result. +The following status codes are defined: + - `0` - Success - `1` - Error - `2` - Missing callback @@ -66,7 +79,9 @@ A Waku Message in JSON Format: Fields: -- `payload`: base64 encoded payload, [`waku_utils_base64_encode`](#extern-char-waku_utils_base64_encodechar-data) can be used for this. +- `payload`: base64 encoded payload, +[`waku_utils_base64_encode`](/) +can be used for this. - `contentTopic`: The content topic to be set on the message. - `version`: The Waku Message version number. - `timestamp`: Unix timestamp in nanoseconds. @@ -86,7 +101,8 @@ interface DecodedPayload { Fields: -- `pubkey`: Public key that signed the message (optional), hex encoded with `0x` prefix, +- `pubkey`: Public key that signed the message (optional), +hex encoded with `0x` prefix, - `signature`: Message signature (optional), hex encoded with `0x` prefix, - `data`: Decrypted message payload base64 encoded, - `padding`: Padding base64 encoded. @@ -104,10 +120,10 @@ The criteria to create subscription to a light node in JSON Format: Fields: -- `contentFilters`: Array of [`ContentFilter`](#contentfilter-type) being subscribed to / unsubscribed from. +- `contentFilters`: Array of [`ContentFilter`](#contentfilter-type) +being subscribed to / unsubscribed from. - `topic`: Optional pubsub topic. - ### `ContentFilter` type ```ts @@ -137,9 +153,12 @@ interface StoreQuery { Fields: - `pubsubTopic`: The pubsub topic on which messages are published. -- `contentFilters`: Array of [`ContentFilter`](#contentfilter-type) to query for historical messages, -- `startTime`: The inclusive lower bound on the timestamp of queried messages. This field holds the Unix epoch time in nanoseconds. -- `endTime`: The inclusive upper bound on the timestamp of queried messages. This field holds the Unix epoch time in nanoseconds. +- `contentFilters`: +Array of [`ContentFilter`](#contentfilter-type) to query for historical messages, +- `startTime`: The inclusive lower bound on the timestamp of queried messages. +This field holds the Unix epoch time in nanoseconds. +- `endTime`: The inclusive upper bound on the timestamp of queried messages. +This field holds the Unix epoch time in nanoseconds. - `pagingOptions`: Paging information in [`PagingOptions`](#pagingoptions-type) format. ### `StoreResponse` type @@ -152,10 +171,13 @@ interface StoreResponse { pagingOptions?: PagingOptions; } ``` + Fields: -- `messages`: Array of retrieved historical messages in [`JsonMessage`](#jsonmessage-type) format. -- `pagingOption`: Paging information in [`PagingOptions`](#pagingoptions-type) format from which to resume further historical queries +- `messages`: Array of retrieved historical messages +in [`JsonMessage`](#jsonmessage-type) format. +- `pagingOption`: Paging information in [`PagingOptions`](#pagingoptions-type) format +from which to resume further historical queries ### `PagingOptions` type @@ -166,10 +188,15 @@ interface PagingOptions { forward: bool; } ``` + Fields: - `pageSize`: Number of messages to retrieve per page. -- `cursor`: Message Index from which to perform pagination. If not included and forward is set to true, paging will be performed from the beginning of the list. If not included and forward is set to false, paging will be performed from the end of the list. +- `cursor`: Message Index from which to perform pagination. +If not included and forward is set to true, +paging will be performed from the beginning of the list. +If not included and forward is set to false, +paging will be performed from the end of the list. - `forward`: `true` if paging forward, `false` if paging backward ### `Index` type @@ -186,15 +213,18 @@ interface Index { Fields: - `digest`: Hash of the message at this [`Index`](#index-type). -- `receiverTime`: UNIX timestamp in nanoseconds at which the message at this [`Index`](#index-type) was received. -- `senderTime`: UNIX timestamp in nanoseconds at which the message is generated by its sender. +- `receiverTime`: UNIX timestamp in nanoseconds +at which the message at this [`Index`](#index-type) was received. +- `senderTime`: UNIX timestamp in nanoseconds at which the message is generated +by its sender. - `pubsubTopic`: The pubsub topic of the message at this [`Index`](#index-type). ## Events Asynchronous events require a callback to be registered. An example of an asynchronous event that might be emitted is receiving a message. -When an event is emitted, this callback will be triggered receiving a JSON string of type `JsonSignal`. +When an event is emitted, +this callback will be triggered receiving a JSON string of type `JsonSignal`. ### `JsonSignal` type @@ -230,7 +260,7 @@ For example: | `type` | `event` Type | |:----------|--------------------| -| `message` | `JsonMessageEvent` | +| `message` | `JsonMessageEvent` | ### `JsonMessageEvent` type @@ -248,12 +278,16 @@ Type of `event` field for a `message` event: - `messageId`: The message id. - `wakuMessage`: The message in [`JsonMessage`](#jsonmessage-type) format. -### `extern void waku_set_event_callback(WakuCallBack cb)` +### waku_set_event_callback + +```c +extern void waku_set_event_callback(WakuCallBack cb){} +``` Register callback to act as event handler and receive application signals, which are used to react to asynchronous events in Waku. -**Parameters** +Parameters 1. `WakuCallBack cb`: callback that will be executed when an async event is emitted. @@ -287,7 +321,7 @@ interface JsonConfig { } ``` -Fields: +Fields: All fields are optional. If a key is `undefined`, or `null`, a default value will be set. @@ -295,23 +329,28 @@ If a key is `undefined`, or `null`, a default value will be set. - `host`: Listening IP address. Default `0.0.0.0`. - `port`: Libp2p TCP listening port. - Default `60000`. + Default `60000`. Use `0` for random. - `advertiseAddr`: External address to advertise to other nodes. Can be ip4, ip6 or dns4, dns6. - If `null`, the multiaddress(es) generated from the ip and port specified in the config (or default ones) will be used. + If `null`, the multiaddress(es) generated from the ip and + port specified in the config (or default ones) will be used. Default: `null`. - `nodeKey`: Secp256k1 private key in Hex format (`0x123...abc`). Default random. -- `keepAliveInterval`: Interval in seconds for pinging peers to keep the connection alive. +- `keepAliveInterval`: +Interval in seconds for pinging peers to keep the connection alive. Default `20`. - `relay`: Enable relay protocol. Default `true`. -- `relayTopics`: Array of pubsub topics that WakuRelay will automatically subscribe to when the node - starts +- `relayTopics`: +Array of pubsub topics that WakuRelay will automatically subscribe to +when the node starts Default `[]` -- `gossipSubParameters`: custom gossipsub parameters. See `GossipSubParameters` section for defaults -- `minPeersToPublish`: The minimum number of peers required on a topic to allow broadcasting a message. +- `gossipSubParameters`: custom gossipsub parameters. +See `GossipSubParameters` section for defaults +- `minPeersToPublish`: The minimum number of peers required on a topic +to allow broadcasting a message. Default `0`. - `legacyFilter`: Enable Legacy Filter protocol. Default `false`. @@ -322,16 +361,19 @@ If a key is `undefined`, or `null`, a default value will be set. Default `9000` - `store`: Enable store protocol to persist message history Default `false` -- `databaseURL`: url connection string. Accepts SQLite and PostgreSQL connection strings +- `databaseURL`: url connection string. Accepts SQLite and +PostgreSQL connection strings Default: `sqlite3://store.db` - `storeRetentionMaxMessages`: max number of messages to store in the database. Default `10000` -- `storeRetentionTimeSeconds`: max number of seconds that a message will be persisted in the database. +- `storeRetentionTimeSeconds`: max number of seconds that a message will be persisted +in the database. Default `2592000` (30d) - `websocket`: custom websocket support parameters. See `Websocket` section for defaults - `dns4DomainName`: the domain name resolving to the node's public IPv4 address. For example: + ```json { "host": "0.0.0.0", @@ -344,7 +386,6 @@ For example: } ``` - ### `GossipsubParameters` type Type holding custom gossipsub configuration: @@ -382,12 +423,12 @@ interface GossipSubParameters { } ``` -Fields: +Fields: All fields are optional. If a key is `undefined`, or `null`, a default value will be set. -- `d`: optimal degree for a GossipSub topic mesh. +- `d`: optimal degree for a GossipSub topic mesh. Default `6` - `dLow`: lower bound on the number of peers we keep in a GossipSub topic mesh Default `5` @@ -395,23 +436,29 @@ If a key is `undefined`, or `null`, a default value will be set. Default `12` - `dScore`: affects how peers are selected when pruning a mesh due to over subscription. Default `4` -- `dOut`: sets the quota for the number of outbound connections to maintain in a topic mesh. +- `dOut`: sets the quota for the number of outbound connections +to maintain in a topic mesh. Default `2` - `historyLength`: controls the size of the message cache used for gossip. Default `5` -- `historyGossip`: controls how many cached message ids we will advertise in IHAVE gossip messages. +- `historyGossip`: controls how many cached message ids +we will advertise in IHAVE gossip messages. Default `3` - `dLazy`: affects how many peers we will emit gossip to at each heartbeat. Default `6` - `gossipFactor`: affects how many peers we will emit gossip to at each heartbeat. Default `0.25` -- `gossipRetransmission`: controls how many times we will allow a peer to request the same message id through IWANT gossip before we start ignoring them. +- `gossipRetransmission`: +controls how many times we will allow a peer to request the same message id +through IWANT gossip before we start ignoring them. Default `3` -- `heartbeatInitialDelayMs`: short delay in milliseconds before the heartbeat timer begins after the router is initialized. +- `heartbeatInitialDelayMs`: short delay in milliseconds before +the heartbeat timer begins after the router is initialized. Default `100` milliseconds - `heartbeatIntervalSeconds`: controls the time between heartbeats. Default `1` second -- `slowHeartbeatWarning`: duration threshold for heartbeat processing before emitting a warning. +- `slowHeartbeatWarning`: duration threshold for heartbeat processing before +emitting a warning. Default `0.1` - `fanoutTTLSeconds`: controls how long we keep track of the fanout state. Default `60` seconds @@ -419,34 +466,45 @@ If a key is `undefined`, or `null`, a default value will be set. Default `16` - `pruneBackoffSeconds`: controls the backoff time for pruned peers. Default `60` seconds -- `unsubscribeBackoffSeconds`: controls the backoff time to use when unsuscribing from a topic. +- `unsubscribeBackoffSeconds`: controls the backoff time to use when unsuscribing +from a topic. Default `10` seconds - `connectors`: number of active connection attempts for peers obtained through PX. Default `8` -- `maxPendingConnections`: maximum number of pending connections for peers attempted through px. +- `maxPendingConnections`: maximum number of pending connections +for peers attempted through px. Default `128` - `connectionTimeoutSeconds`: timeout in seconds for connection attempts. Default `30` seconds -- `directConnectTicks`: the number of heartbeat ticks for attempting to reconnect direct peers that are not currently connected. +- `directConnectTicks`: the number of heartbeat ticks +for attempting to reconnect direct peers that are not currently connected. Default `300` -- `directConnectInitialDelaySeconds`: initial delay before opening connections to direct peers. +- `directConnectInitialDelaySeconds`: initial delay before opening connections to +direct peers. Default `1` second -- `opportunisticGraftTicks`: number of heartbeat ticks for attempting to improve the mesh with opportunistic grafting. +- `opportunisticGraftTicks`: number of heartbeat ticks for attempting to +improve the mesh with opportunistic grafting. Default `60` - `opportunisticGraftPeers`: the number of peers to opportunistically graft. Default `2` -- `graftFloodThresholdSeconds`: If a GRAFT comes before GraftFloodThresholdSeconds has elapsed since the last PRUNE, then there is an extra score penalty applied to the peer through P7. +- `graftFloodThresholdSeconds`: If a GRAFT comes before GraftFloodThresholdSeconds +has elapsed since the last PRUNE, +then there is an extra score penalty applied to the peer through P7. Default `10` seconds -- `maxIHaveLength`: max number of messages to include in an IHAVE message, also controls the max number of IHAVE ids we will accept and request with IWANT from a peer within a heartbeat. +- `maxIHaveLength`: max number of messages to include in an IHAVE message, +also controls the max number of IHAVE ids we will accept and +request with IWANT from a peer within a heartbeat. Default `5000` -- `maxIHaveMessages`: max number of IHAVE messages to accept from a peer within a heartbeat. +- `maxIHaveMessages`: max number of IHAVE messages to accept from a peer +within a heartbeat. Default `10` -- `iWantFollowupTimeSeconds`: Time to wait for a message requested through IWANT following an IHAVE advertisement. +- `iWantFollowupTimeSeconds`: Time to wait for a message requested +through IWANT following an IHAVE advertisement. Default `3` seconds -- `seenMessagesTTLSeconds`: configures when a previously seen message ID can be forgotten about. +- `seenMessagesTTLSeconds`: configures when a previously seen message ID +can be forgotten about. Default `120` seconds - ### `Websocket` type Type holding custom websocket support configuration: @@ -462,99 +520,143 @@ interface Websocket { } ``` -Fields: +Fields: All fields are optional. -If a key is `undefined`, or `null`, a default value will be set. If using `secure` websockets support, `certPath` and `keyPath` become mandatory attributes. Unless selfsigned certificates are used, it will probably make sense in the `JsonConfiguration` to specify the domain name used in the certificate in the `dns4DomainName` attribute. +If a key is `undefined`, or `null`, a default value will be set. +If using `secure` websockets support, `certPath` and +`keyPath` become mandatory attributes. +Unless selfsigned certificates are used, +it will probably make sense in the `JsonConfiguration` +to specify the domain name used in the certificate in the `dns4DomainName` attribute. -- `enabled`: indicates if websockets support will be enabled +- `enabled`: indicates if websockets support will be enabled Default `false` - `host`: listening address for websocket connections Default `0.0.0.0` -- `port`: TCP listening port for websocket connection (`0` for random, binding to `443` requires root access) +- `port`: TCP listening port for websocket connection +(`0` for random, binding to `443` requires root access) Default `60001`, if secure websockets support is enabled, the default is `6443“` - `secure`: enable secure websockets support Default `false` - `certPath`: secure websocket certificate path - `keyPath`: secure websocket key path +### waku_new -### `extern int waku_new(char* jsonConfig, WakuCallBack onErrCb)` +```c +extern int waku_new(char* jsonConfig, WakuCallBack onErrCb){} +``` Instantiates a Waku node. -**Parameters** +Parameters -1. `char* jsonConfig`: JSON string containing the options used to initialize a waku node. +1. `char* jsonConfig`: +JSON string containing the options used to initialize a waku node. Type [`JsonConfig`](#jsonconfig-type). It can be `NULL` to use defaults. -2. `WakuCallBack onErrCb`: [`WakuCallBack`](#wakucallback-type). Callback to be executed if the function fails +2. `WakuCallBack onErrCb`: [`WakuCallBack`](#wakucallback-type). +Callback to be executed if the function fails -**Returns** +Returns `int` with a status code. Possible values: - - 0 - The operation was completed successfuly. - - 1 - The operation failed for any reason. `onErrCb` will be executed with the reason the function execution failed. - - 2 - The function is missing the `onErrCb` callback -### `extern int waku_start(WakuCallBack onErrCb)` +- 0 - The operation was completed successfuly. +- 1 - The operation failed for any reason. +`onErrCb` will be executed with the reason the function execution failed. +- 2 - The function is missing the `onErrCb` callback -Starts a Waku node mounting all the protocols that were enabled during the Waku node instantiation. +### waku_start -**Parameters** -1. `WakuCallBack onErrCb`: callback to be executed if the function fails +```c +extern int waku_start(WakuCallBack onErrCb){} +``` -**Returns** +Starts a Waku node mounting all the protocols that were enabled +during the Waku node instantiation. + +Parameters + +1. `WakuCallBack onErrCb`: +callback to be executed if the function fails + +Returns `int` with a status code. Possible values: - - 0 - The operation was completed successfuly. - - 1 - The operation failed for any reason. `onErrCb` will be executed with the reason the function execution failed. - - 2 - The function is missing the `onErrCb` callback -### `extern int waku_stop(WakuCallBack onErrCb)` +- 0 - The operation was completed successfuly. +- 1 - The operation failed for any reason. +`onErrCb` will be executed with the reason the function execution failed. +- 2 - The function is missing the `onErrCb` callback + +### waku_stop + +```c +extern int waku_stop(WakuCallBack onErrCb){} +``` Stops a Waku node. -**Parameters** +Parameters + 1. `WakuCallBack onErrCb`: callback to be executed if the function fails -**Returns** +Returns `int` with a status code. Possible values: - - 0 - The operation was completed successfuly. - - 1 - The operation failed for any reason. `onErrCb` will be executed with the reason the function execution failed. - - 2 - The function is missing the `onErrCb` callback -### `extern int waku_peerid(WakuCallBack onOkCb, WakuCallBack onErrCb)` +- 0 - The operation was completed successfuly. +- 1 - The operation failed for any reason. +`onErrCb` will be executed with the reason the function execution failed. +- 2 - The function is missing the `onErrCb` callback + +### waku_peerid + +```c +extern int waku_peerid(WakuCallBack onOkCb, WakuCallBack onErrCb){} +``` Get the peer ID of the waku node. -**Parameters** +Parameters 1. `WakuCallBack onOkCb`: callback to be executed if the function is succesful 2. `WakuCallBack onErrCb`: callback to be executed if the function fails -**Returns** +Returns `int` with a status code. Possible values: - - 0 - The operation was completed successfuly. `onOkCb` will receive the base58 encoded peer ID, for example `QmWjHKUrXDHPCwoWXpUZ77E8o6UbAoTTZwf1AD1tDC4KNP` - - 1 - The operation failed for any reason. `onErrCb` will be executed with the reason the function execution failed. - - 2 - The function is missing the `onOkCb` or `onErrCb` callback -### `extern int waku_listen_addresses(WakuCallBack onOkCb, WakuCallBack onErrCb)` +- 0 - The operation was completed successfuly. +`onOkCb` will receive the base58 encoded peer ID, +for example `QmWjHKUrXDHPCwoWXpUZ77E8o6UbAoTTZwf1AD1tDC4KNP` +- 1 - The operation failed for any reason. +`onErrCb` will be executed with the reason the function execution failed. +- 2 - The function is missing the `onOkCb` or `onErrCb` callback + +### waku_listen_addresses + +```c +extern int waku_listen_addresses(WakuCallBack onOkCb, WakuCallBack onErrCb){} +``` Get the multiaddresses the Waku node is listening to. -**Parameters** +Parameters 1. `WakuCallBack onOkCb`: callback to be executed if the function is succesful 2. `WakuCallBack onErrCb`: callback to be executed if the function fails -**Returns** +Returns `int` with a status code. Possible values: - - 0 - The operation was completed successfuly. `onOkCb` will receive a json array of multiaddresses. + +- 0 - The operation was completed successfuly. +`onOkCb` will receive a json array of multiaddresses. The multiaddresses are `string`s. For example: + ```json [ "/ip4/127.0.0.1/tcp/30303", @@ -562,35 +664,47 @@ The multiaddresses are `string`s. For example: "/dns4/waku.node.example/tcp/8000/wss" ] ``` - - 1 - The operation failed for any reason. `onErrCb` will be executed with the reason the function execution failed. - - 2 - The function is missing the `onOkCb` and `onErrCb` callback +- 1 - The operation failed for any reason. +`onErrCb` will be executed with the reason the function execution failed. +- 2 - The function is missing the `onOkCb` and `onErrCb` callback ## Connecting to peers -### `extern int waku_add_peer(char* address, char* protocolId, WakuCallBack onOkCb, WakuCallBack onErrCb)` +### waku_add_peer + +```c +extern int waku_add_peer(char* address, char* protocolId, WakuCallBack onOkCb, WakuCallBack onErrCb){} +``` Add a node multiaddress and protocol to the waku node's peerstore. -**Parameters** +Parameters 1. `char* address`: A multiaddress (with peer id) to reach the peer being added. 2. `char* protocolId`: A protocol we expect the peer to support. 3. `WakuCallBack onOkCb`: callback to be executed if the function is succesful 4. `WakuCallBack onErrCb`: callback to be executed if the function fails -**Returns** +Returns `int` with a status code. Possible values: - - 0 - The operation was completed successfuly. `onOkCb` will receive the base 58 peer ID of the peer that was added. - - 1 - The operation failed for any reason. `onErrCb` will be executed with the reason the function execution failed. - - 2 - The function is missing the `onOkCb` or `onErrCb` callback -### `extern int waku_connect(char* address, int timeoutMs, WakuCallBack onErrCb)` +- 0 - The operation was completed successfuly. +`onOkCb` will receive the base 58 peer ID of the peer that was added. +- 1 - The operation failed for any reason. +`onErrCb` will be executed with the reason the function execution failed. +- 2 - The function is missing the `onOkCb` or `onErrCb` callback + +### waku_connect + +```c +extern int waku_connect(char* address, int timeoutMs, WakuCallBack onErrCb){} +``` Dial peer using a multiaddress. -**Parameters** +Parameters 1. `char* address`: A multiaddress to reach the peer being dialed. 2. `int timeoutMs`: Timeout value in milliseconds to execute the call. @@ -599,80 +713,110 @@ Dial peer using a multiaddress. Use `0` for no timeout. 3. `WakuCallBack onErrCb`: callback to be executed if the function fails -**Returns** +Returns `int` with a status code. Possible values: - - 0 - The operation was completed successfuly. - - 1 - The operation failed for any reason. `onErrCb` will be executed with the reason the function execution failed. - - 2 - The function is missing the `onErrCb` callback -### `extern int waku_connect_peerid(char* peerId, int timeoutMs, WakuCallBack onErrCb)` +- 0 - The operation was completed successfuly. +- 1 - The operation failed for any reason. +`onErrCb` will be executed with the reason the function execution failed. +- 2 - The function is missing the `onErrCb` callback + +### waku_connect_peerid + +```c +extern int waku_connect_peerid(char* peerId, int timeoutMs, WakuCallBack onErrCb){} +``` Dial peer using its peer ID. -**Parameters** +Parameters 1. `char* peerID`: Peer ID to dial. The peer must be already known. - It must have been added before with [`waku_add_peer`](#extern-char-waku_add_peerchar-address-char-protocolid) - or previously dialed with [`waku_connect`](#extern-char-waku_connectchar-address-int-timeoutms). + It must have been added before with [`waku_add_peer`](#waku_add_peer) + or previously dialed with [`waku_connect`](#waku_add_peer). 2. `int timeoutMs`: Timeout value in milliseconds to execute the call. If the function execution takes longer than this value, the execution will be canceled and an error returned. Use `0` for no timeout. 3. `WakuCallBack onErrCb`: callback to be executed if the function fails -**Returns** +Returns `int` with a status code. Possible values: - - 0 - The operation was completed successfuly. - - 1 - The operation failed for any reason. `onErrCb` will be executed with the reason the function execution failed. - - 2 - The function is missing the `onErrCb` callback -### `extern int waku_disconnect(char* peerId, WakuCallBack onErrCb)` +- 0 - The operation was completed successfuly. +- 1 - The operation failed for any reason. +`onErrCb` will be executed with the reason the function execution failed. +- 2 - The function is missing the `onErrCb` callback + +### waku_disconnect + +```c +extern int waku_disconnect(char* peerId, WakuCallBack onErrCb){} +``` Disconnect a peer using its peerID -**Parameters** +Parameters 1. `char* peerID`: Peer ID to disconnect. 2. `WakuCallBack onErrCb`: callback to be executed if the function fails -**Returns** +Returns `int` with a status code. Possible values: - - 0 - The operation was completed successfuly. - - 1 - The operation failed for any reason. `onErrCb` will be executed with the reason the function execution failed. - - 2 - The function is missing the `onErrCb` callback -### `extern int waku_peer_cnt(WakuCallBack onOkCb, WakuCallBack onErrCb)` +- 0 - The operation was completed successfuly. +- 1 - The operation failed for any reason. +`onErrCb` will be executed with the reason the function execution failed. +- 2 - The function is missing the `onErrCb` callback + +### waku_peer_cnt + +```c +extern int waku_peer_cnt(WakuCallBack onOkCb, WakuCallBack onErrCb){} +``` Get number of connected peers. -**Parameters** +Parameters + 1. `WakuCallBack onOkCb`: callback to be executed if the function is succesful 2. `WakuCallBack onErrCb`: callback to be executed if the function fails -**Returns** +Returns `int` with a status code. Possible values: - - 0 - The operation was completed successfuly. `onOkCb` will receive the number of connected peers. - - 1 - The operation failed for any reason. `onErrCb` will be executed with the reason the function execution failed. - - 2 - The function is missing the `onOkCb` or `onErrCb` callback -### `extern int waku_peers(WakuCallBack onOkCb, WakuCallBack onErrCb)` +- 0 - The operation was completed successfuly. +`onOkCb` will receive the number of connected peers. +- 1 - The operation failed for any reason. +`onErrCb` will be executed with the reason the function execution failed. +- 2 - The function is missing the `onOkCb` or `onErrCb` callback + +### waku_peers + +```c +extern int waku_peers(WakuCallBack onOkCb, WakuCallBack onErrCb){} +``` Retrieve the list of peers known by the Waku node. -**Parameters** +Parameters + 1. `WakuCallBack onOkCb`: callback to be executed if the function is succesful 2. `WakuCallBack onErrCb`: callback to be executed if the function fails -**Returns** +Returns `int` with a status code. Possible values: - - 0 - The operation was completed successfuly. `onOkCb` will receive a json array with the list of peers. + +- 0 - The operation was completed successfuly. +`onOkCb` will receive a json array with the list of peers. This list has this format: + ```json [ { @@ -689,17 +833,22 @@ This list has this format: } ] ``` - - 1 - The operation failed for any reason. `onErrCb` will be executed with the reason the function execution failed. - - 2 - The function is missing the `onOkCb` or `onErrCb` callback +- 1 - The operation failed for any reason. +`onErrCb` will be executed with the reason the function execution failed. +- 2 - The function is missing the `onOkCb` or `onErrCb` callback ## Waku Relay -### `extern int waku_content_topic(char* applicationName, unsigned int applicationVersion, char* contentTopicName, char* encoding, WakuCallBack onOkCb)` +### waku_content_topic + +```c +extern int waku_content_topic(char* applicationName, unsigned int applicationVersion, char* contentTopicName, char* encoding, WakuCallBack onOkCb){} +``` Create a content topic string according to [RFC 23](../../../informational/23/topics.md). -**Parameters** +Parameters 1. `char* applicationName` 2. `unsigned int applicationVersion` @@ -707,52 +856,75 @@ Create a content topic string according to [RFC 23](../../../informational/23/to 4. `char* encoding`: depending on the payload, use `proto`, `rlp` or `rfc26` 5. `WakuCallBack onOkCb`: callback to be executed if the function is succesful -**Returns** +Returns `int` with a status code. Possible values: - - 0 - The operation was completed successfuly. `onOkCb` will receive the content topic formatted according to [RFC 23](../../../informational/23/topics.md): `/{application-name}/{version-of-the-application}/{content-topic-name}/{encoding}` - - 1 - The operation failed for any reason. - - 2 - The function is missing the `onOkCb` callback +- 0 - The operation was completed successfuly. +`onOkCb` will receive the content topic formatted according to [RFC 23](../../../informational/23/topics.md): +`/{application-name}/{version-of-the-application}/{content-topic-name}/{encoding}` +- 1 - The operation failed for any reason. +- 2 - The function is missing the `onOkCb` callback -### `extern int waku_pubsub_topic(char* name, char* encoding, WakuCallBack onOkCb)` +### waku_pubsub_topic + +```c +extern int waku_pubsub_topic(char* name, char* encoding, WakuCallBack onOkCb){} +``` Create a pubsub topic string according to [RFC 23](../../../informational/23/topics.md). -**Parameters** +Parameters 1. `char* name` 2. `char* encoding`: depending on the payload, use `proto`, `rlp` or `rfc26` 3. `WakuCallBack onOkCb`: callback to be executed if the function is succesful -**Returns** +Returns `int` with a status code. Possible values: - - 0 - The operation was completed successfuly. `onOkCb` will get populated with a pubsub topic formatted according to [RFC 23](../../../informational/23/topics.md): `/waku/2/{topic-name}/{encoding}` - - 1 - The operation failed for any reason. - - 2 - The function is missing the `onOkCb` callback -### `extern int waku_default_pubsub_topic(WakuCallBack onOkCb)` +- 0 - The operation was completed successfuly. +`onOkCb` will get populated with a pubsub topic formatted according to [RFC 23](../../../informational/23/topics.md): +`/waku/2/{topic-name}/{encoding}` +- 1 - The operation failed for any reason. +- 2 - The function is missing the `onOkCb` callback + +### waku_default_pubsub_topic + +```c +extern int waku_default_pubsub_topic(WakuCallBack onOkCb){} +``` + +Returns the default pubsub topic used for exchanging waku messages +defined in [RFC 10](../10/waku2.md). -Returns the default pubsub topic used for exchanging waku messages defined in [RFC 10](../10/waku2.md). +Parameters -**Parameters** 1. `WakuCallBack onOkCb`: callback to be executed if the function is succesful -**Returns** +Returns `int` with a status code. Possible values: - - 0 - The operation was completed successfuly. `onOkCb` will get populated with `/waku/2/default-waku/proto` - - 1 - The operation failed for any reason. - - 2 - The function is missing the `onOkCb` callback -### `extern int waku_relay_publish(char* messageJson, char* pubsubTopic, int timeoutMs, WakuCallBack onOkCb, WakuCallBack onErrCb)` +- 0 - The operation was completed successfuly. +`onOkCb` will get populated with `/waku/2/default-waku/proto` +- 1 - The operation failed for any reason. +- 2 - The function is missing the `onOkCb` callback + +### waku_relay_publish + +```c +extern int waku_relay_publish(char* messageJson, char* pubsubTopic, int timeoutMs, WakuCallBack onOkCb, WakuCallBack onErrCb){} +``` Publish a message using Waku Relay. -**Parameters** +Parameters -1. `char* messageJson`: JSON string containing the [Waku Message](../14/message.md) as [`JsonMessage`](#jsonmessage-type). +1. `char* messageJson`: +JSON string containing the [Waku Message](../14/message.md) +as [`JsonMessage`](#jsonmessage-type). 2. `char* pubsubTopic`: pubsub topic on which to publish the message. If `NULL`, it uses the default pubsub topic. 3. `int timeoutMs`: Timeout value in milliseconds to execute the call. @@ -764,51 +936,70 @@ Publish a message using Waku Relay. If the execution is successful, the `result` field contains the message ID. -**Returns** +Returns `int` with a status code. Possible values: - - 0 - The operation was completed successfuly. `onOkCb` will get populated with the message ID - - 1 - The operation failed for any reason. `onErrCb` will be executed with the reason the function execution failed. - - 2 - The function is missing the `onOkCb` or `onErrCb` callback -### `extern int waku_relay_enough_peers(char* pubsubTopic, WakuCallBack onOkCb, WakuCallBack onErrCb)` +- 0 - The operation was completed successfuly. +`onOkCb` will get populated with the message ID +- 1 - The operation failed for any reason. +`onErrCb` will be executed with the reason the function execution failed. +- 2 - The function is missing the `onOkCb` or `onErrCb` callback + +### waku_relay_enough_peers + +```c +extern int waku_relay_enough_peers(char* pubsubTopic, WakuCallBack onOkCb, WakuCallBack onErrCb){} +``` Determine if there are enough peers to publish a message on a given pubsub topic. -**Parameters** +Parameters 1. `char* pubsubTopic`: Pubsub topic to verify. If `NULL`, it verifies the number of peers in the default pubsub topic. 2. `WakuCallBack onOkCb`: callback to be executed if the function is succesful 3. `WakuCallBack onErrCb`: callback to be executed if the function fails -**Returns** +Returns `int` with a status code. Possible values: - - 0 - The operation was completed successfuly. `onOkCb` will receive a string `boolean` indicating whether there are enough peers, i.e. `true` or `false` - - 1 - The operation failed for any reason. `onErrCb` will be executed with the reason the function execution failed. - - 2 - The function is missing the `onOkCb` or `onErrCb` callback -### `extern int waku_relay_subscribe(char* topic, WakuCallBack onErrCb)` +- 0 - The operation was completed successfuly. +`onOkCb` will receive a string `boolean` indicating whether there are enough peers, +i.e. `true` or `false` +- 1 - The operation failed for any reason. +`onErrCb` will be executed with the reason the function execution failed. +- 2 - The function is missing the `onOkCb` or `onErrCb` callback + +### waku_relay_subscribe + +```c +extern int waku_relay_subscribe(char* topic, WakuCallBack onErrCb){} +``` Subscribe to a Waku Relay pubsub topic to receive messages. -**Parameters** +Parameters 1. `char* topic`: Pubsub topic to subscribe to. If `NULL`, it subscribes to the default pubsub topic. 2. `WakuCallBack onErrCb`: callback to be executed if the function fails -**Returns** +Returns `int` with a status code. Possible values: - - 0 - The operation was completed successfuly. - - 1 - The operation failed for any reason. `onErrCb` will be executed with the reason the function execution failed. - - 2 - The function is missing the `onErrCb` callback -**Events** +- 0 - The operation was completed successfuly. +- 1 - The operation failed for any reason. +`onErrCb` will be executed with the reason the function execution failed. +- 2 - The function is missing the `onErrCb` callback + +Events -When a message is received, a ``"message"` event` is emitted containing the message, pubsub topic, and node ID in which +When a message is received, +a `"message"` event is emitted containing the message, pubsub topic, +and node ID in which the message was received. The `event` type is [`JsonMessageEvent`](#jsonmessageevent-type). @@ -831,54 +1022,72 @@ For Example: } ``` -### `extern int waku_relay_subscribe(char* topic, WakuCallBack onErrCb)` +### waku_relay_unsubscribe + +```c +extern int waku_relay_unsubscribe(char* topic, WakuCallBack onErrCb) +``` Closes the pubsub subscription to a pubsub topic. No more messages will be received from this pubsub topic. -**Parameters** +Parameters 1. `char* pusubTopic`: Pubsub topic to unsubscribe from. If `NULL`, unsubscribes from the default pubsub topic. 2. `WakuCallBack onErrCb`: callback to be executed if the function fails -**Returns** +Returns `int` with a status code. Possible values: - - 0 - The operation was completed successfuly. - - 1 - The operation failed for any reason. - - 2 - The function is missing the `onErrCb` callback -### `extern int waku_relay_topics(WakuCallBack onOkCb, WakuCallBack onErrCb)` +- 0 - The operation was completed successfuly. +- 1 - The operation failed for any reason. +- 2 - The function is missing the `onErrCb` callback + +### waku_relay_topics + +```c +extern int waku_relay_topics(WakuCallBack onOkCb, WakuCallBack onErrCb) +``` Get the list of subscribed pubsub topics in Waku Relay. -**Parameters** +Parameters 1. `WakuCallBack onOkCb`: callback to be executed if the function is succesful 2. `WakuCallBack onErrCb`: callback to be executed if the function fails -**Returns** +Returns `int` with a status code. Possible values: - - 0 - The operation was completed successfuly. `onOkCb` will receive a json array of pubsub topics i.e `["pubsubTopic1", "pubsubTopic2"]` - - 1 - The operation failed for any reason. `onErrCb` will be executed with the reason the function execution failed. - - 2 - The function is missing the `onOkCb` or `onErrCb` callback +- 0 - The operation was completed successfuly. +`onOkCb` will receive a json array of pubsub topics +i.e `["pubsubTopic1", "pubsubTopic2"]` +- 1 - The operation failed for any reason. +`onErrCb` will be executed with the reason the function execution failed. +- 2 - The function is missing the `onOkCb` or `onErrCb` callback ## Waku Filter -### `extern int waku_filter_subscribe(char* filterJSON, char* peerID, int timeoutMs, WakuCallBack onOkCb, WakuCallBack onErrCb)` +### waku_filter_subscribe + +```c +extern int waku_filter_subscribe(char* filterJSON, char* peerID, int timeoutMs, WakuCallBack onOkCb, WakuCallBack onErrCb) +``` Creates a subscription to a filter full node matching a content filter.. -**Parameters** +Parameters -1. `char* filterJSON`: JSON string containing the [`FilterSubscription`](#filtersubscription-type) to subscribe to. +1. `char* filterJSON`: +JSON string containing the [`FilterSubscription`](#filtersubscription-type) +to subscribe to. 2. `char* peerID`: Peer ID to subscribe to. The peer must be already known. - It must have been added before with [`waku_add_peer`](#extern-char-waku_add_peerchar-address-char-protocolid) - or previously dialed with [`waku_connect_peer`](#extern-char-waku_connect_peerchar-address-int-timeoutms). + It must have been added before with [`waku_add_peer`](#waku_add_peer) + or previously dialed with [`waku_connect_peer`](#waku_connect). Use `NULL` to automatically select a node. 3. `int timeoutMs`: Timeout value in milliseconds to execute the call. If the function execution takes longer than this value, @@ -887,24 +1096,30 @@ Creates a subscription to a filter full node matching a content filter.. 4. `WakuCallBack onOkCb`: callback to be executed if the function is succesful 5. `WakuCallBack onErrCb`: callback to be executed if the function fails -**Returns** +Returns `int` with a status code. Possible values: - - 0 - The operation was completed successfuly. `onOkCb` will receive the subscription details, for example: -``` + +- 0 - The operation was completed successfuly. +`onOkCb` will receive the subscription details, for example: + +```json { "peerID": "....", "pubsubTopic": "...", "contentTopics": [...] } ``` - - 1 - The operation failed for any reason. `onErrCb` will be executed with the reason the function execution failed. - - 2 - The function is missing the `onOkCb` or `onErrCb` callback -**Events** +- 1 - The operation failed for any reason. +`onErrCb` will be executed with the reason the function execution failed. +- 2 - The function is missing the `onOkCb` or `onErrCb` callback -When a message is received, a ``"message"` event` is emitted containing the message, pubsub topic, and node ID in which -the message was received. +Events + +When a message is received, +a `"message"` event is emitted containing the message, pubsub topic, +and node ID in which the message was received. The `event` type is [`JsonMessageEvent`](#jsonmessageevent-type). @@ -926,64 +1141,83 @@ For Example: } ``` +### waku_filter_ping -### `extern int waku_filter_ping(char* peerID, int timeoutMs, WakuCallBack onErrCb)` +```c +extern int waku_filter_ping(char* peerID, int timeoutMs, WakuCallBack onErrCb){} +``` Used to know if a service node has an active subscription for this client -**Parameters** +Parameters 1. `char* peerID`: Peer ID to check for an active subscription The peer must be already known. - It must have been added before with [`waku_add_peer`](#extern-char-waku_add_peerchar-address-char-protocolid) - or previously dialed with [`waku_connect_peer`](#extern-char-waku_connect_peerchar-address-int-timeoutms). + It must have been added before with [`waku_add_peer`](#waku_connect) + or previously dialed with [`waku_connect_peer`](#waku_connect). 2. `int timeoutMs`: Timeout value in milliseconds to execute the call. If the function execution takes longer than this value, the execution will be canceled and an error returned. Use `0` for no timeout. 3. `WakuCallBack onErrCb`: callback to be executed if the function fails -**Returns** +Returns `int` with a status code. Possible values: - - 0 - The operation was completed successfuly. - - 1 - The operation failed for any reason. `onErrCb` will be executed with the reason the function execution failed. - - 2 - The function is missing the `onErrCb` callback -### `extern int waku_filter_unsubscribe(filterJSON *C.char, char* peerID, int timeoutMs, WakuCallBack onErrCb)` +- 0 - The operation was completed successfuly. +- 1 - The operation failed for any reason. +`onErrCb` will be executed with the reason the function execution failed. +- 2 - The function is missing the `onErrCb` callback + +### waku_filter_unsubscribe -Sends a requests to a service node to stop pushing messages matching this filter to this client. It might be used to modify an existing subscription by providing a subset of the original filter criteria +```c +extern int waku_filter_unsubscribe(filterJSON *C.char, char* peerID, int timeoutMs, WakuCallBack onErrCb){} +``` + +Sends a requests to a service node to stop pushing messages matching this filter +to this client. +It might be used to modify an existing subscription by +providing a subset of the original filter criteria -**Parameters** +Parameters -1. `char* filterJSON`: JSON string containing the [`FilterSubscription`](#filtersubscription-type) criteria to unsubscribe from +1. `char* filterJSON`: JSON string containing the [`FilterSubscription`](#filtersubscription-type) +criteria to unsubscribe from 2. `char* peerID`: Peer ID to unsubscribe from The peer must be already known. - It must have been added before with [`waku_add_peer`](#extern-char-waku_add_peerchar-address-char-protocolid) - or previously dialed with [`waku_connect_peer`](#extern-char-waku_connect_peerchar-address-int-timeoutms). + It must have been added before with [`waku_add_peer`](#waku_add_peer) + or previously dialed with [`waku_connect_peer`](#waku_connect). 3. `int timeoutMs`: Timeout value in milliseconds to execute the call. If the function execution takes longer than this value, the execution will be canceled and an error returned. Use `0` for no timeout. 4. `WakuCallBack onErrCb`: callback to be executed if the function fails -**Returns** +Returns `int` with a status code. Possible values: - - 0 - The operation was completed successfuly. - - 1 - The operation failed for any reason. `onErrCb` will be executed with the reason the function execution failed. - - 2 - The function is missing the `onOkCb` or `onErrCb` callback -### `extern int waku_filter_unsubscribe_all(char* peerID, int timeoutMs, WakuCallBack onOkCb, WakuCallBack onErrCb)` +- 0 - The operation was completed successfuly. +- 1 - The operation failed for any reason. +`onErrCb` will be executed with the reason the function execution failed. +- 2 - The function is missing the `onOkCb` or `onErrCb` callback + +### waku_filter_unsubscribe_all + +```c +extern int waku_filter_unsubscribe_all(char* peerID, int timeoutMs, WakuCallBack onOkCb, WakuCallBack onErrCb){} +``` Sends a requests to a service node (or all service nodes) to stop pushing messages -**Parameters** +Parameters 1. `char* peerID`: Peer ID to unsubscribe from The peer must be already known. - It must have been added before with [`waku_add_peer`](#extern-char-waku_add_peerchar-address-char-protocolid) - or previously dialed with [`waku_connect_peer`](#extern-char-waku_connect_peerchar-address-int-timeoutms). + It must have been added before with [`waku_add_peer`](#waku_add_peer) + or previously dialed with [`waku_connect_peer`](#waku_connect). Use `NULL` to unsubscribe from all peers with active subscriptions 2. `int timeoutMs`: Timeout value in milliseconds to execute the call. If the function execution takes longer than this value, @@ -992,11 +1226,15 @@ Sends a requests to a service node (or all service nodes) to stop pushing messag 3. `WakuCallBack onOkCb`: callback to be executed if the function is succesful 4. `WakuCallBack onErrCb`: callback to be executed if the function fails -**Returns** +Returns `int` with a status code. Possible values: - - 0 - The operation was completed successfuly. `onOkCb` will receive an array with information about the state of each unsubscription attempt (one per peer) -``` + +- 0 - The operation was completed successfuly. +`onOkCb` will receive an array +with information about the state of each unsubscription attempt (one per peer) + +```json [ { "peerID": ...., @@ -1005,23 +1243,31 @@ Sends a requests to a service node (or all service nodes) to stop pushing messag ... ] ``` - - 1 - The operation failed for any reason. `onErrCb` will be executed with the reason the function execution failed. - - 2 - The function is missing the `onOkCb` or `onErrCb` callback +- 1 - The operation failed for any reason. +`onErrCb` will be executed with the reason the function execution failed. +- 2 - The function is missing the `onOkCb` or `onErrCb` callback ## Waku Legacy Filter -### `extern int waku_legacy_filter_subscribe(char* filterJSON, char* peerID, int timeoutMs, WakuCallBack onErrCb)` +### waku_legacy_filter_subscribe -Creates a subscription in a lightnode for messages that matches a content filter and optionally a [PubSub `topic`](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/README.md#the-topic-descriptor). +```c +extern int waku_legacy_filter_subscribe(char* filterJSON, char* peerID, int timeoutMs, WakuCallBack onErrCb){} +``` + +Creates a subscription in a lightnode for messages that matches a content filter +and optionally a [PubSub `topic`](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/README.md#the-topic-descriptor). -**Parameters** +Parameters -1. `char* filterJSON`: JSON string containing the [`LegacyFilterSubscription`](#legacyfiltersubscription-type) to subscribe to. +1. `char* filterJSON`: +JSON string containing the [`LegacyFilterSubscription`](#waku_legacy_filter_subscribe) +to subscribe to. 2. `char* peerID`: Peer ID to subscribe to. The peer must be already known. - It must have been added before with [`waku_add_peer`](#extern-char-waku_add_peerchar-address-char-protocolid) - or previously dialed with [`waku_connect_peer`](#extern-char-waku_connect_peerchar-address-int-timeoutms). + It must have been added before with [`waku_add_peer`](#waku_add_peer) + or previously dialed with [`waku_connect_peer`](#waku_connect). Use `NULL` to automatically select a node. 3. `int timeoutMs`: Timeout value in milliseconds to execute the call. If the function execution takes longer than this value, @@ -1029,17 +1275,20 @@ Creates a subscription in a lightnode for messages that matches a content filter Use `0` for no timeout. 4. `WakuCallBack onErrCb`: callback to be executed if the function fails -**Returns** +Returns `int` with a status code. Possible values: - - 0 - The operation was completed successfuly. - - 1 - The operation failed for any reason. `onErrCb` will be executed with the reason the function execution failed. - - 2 - The function is missing the `onErrCb` callback -**Events** +- 0 - The operation was completed successfuly. +- 1 - The operation failed for any reason. +`onErrCb` will be executed with the reason the function execution failed. +- 2 - The function is missing the `onErrCb` callback -When a message is received, a ``"message"` event` is emitted containing the message, pubsub topic, and node ID in which -the message was received. +Events + +When a message is received, +a `"message"` event is emitted containing the message, pubsub topic, +and node ID in which the message was received. The `event` type is [`JsonMessageEvent`](#jsonmessageevent-type). @@ -1061,11 +1310,16 @@ For Example: } ``` -### `extern int waku_legacy_filter_unsubscribe(char* filterJSON, int timeoutMs, WakuCallBack onErrCb)` +### waku_legacy_filter_unsubscribe -Removes subscriptions in a light node matching a content filter and, optionally, a [PubSub `topic`](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/README.md#the-topic-descriptor). +```c +extern int waku_legacy_filter_unsubscribe(char* filterJSON, int timeoutMs, WakuCallBack onErrCb){} +``` + +Removes subscriptions in a light node matching a content filter and, +optionally, a [PubSub `topic`](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/README.md#the-topic-descriptor). -**Parameters** +Parameters 1. `char* filterJSON`: JSON string containing the [`LegacyFilterSubscription`](#filtersubscription-type). 2. `int timeoutMs`: Timeout value in milliseconds to execute the call. @@ -1074,62 +1328,79 @@ Removes subscriptions in a light node matching a content filter and, optionally, Use `0` for no timeout. 3. `WakuCallBack onErrCb`: callback to be executed if the function fails -**Returns** +Returns `int` with a status code. Possible values: - - 0 - The operation was completed successfuly. - - 1 - The operation failed for any reason. `onErrCb` will be executed with the reason the function execution failed. - - 2 - The function is missing the `onErrCb` callback + +- 0 - The operation was completed successfuly. +- 1 - The operation failed for any reason. +`onErrCb` will be executed with the reason the function execution failed. +- 2 - The function is missing the `onErrCb` callback ## Waku Lightpush -### `extern int waku_lightpush_publish(char* messageJSON, char* topic, char* peerID, int timeoutMs, WakuCallBack onOkCb, WakuCallBack onErrCb)` +### waku_lightpush_publish + +```c +extern int waku_lightpush_publish(char* messageJSON, char* topic, char* peerID, int timeoutMs, WakuCallBack onOkCb, WakuCallBack onErrCb){} +``` Publish a message using Waku Lightpush. -**Parameters** +Parameters -1. `char* messageJson`: JSON string containing the [Waku Message](../14/message.md) as [`JsonMessage`](#jsonmessage-type). +1. `char* messageJson`: +JSON string containing the [Waku Message](../14/message.md) as [`JsonMessage`](#jsonmessage-type). 2. `char* pubsubTopic`: pubsub topic on which to publish the message. If `NULL`, it uses the default pubsub topic. 3. `char* peerID`: Peer ID supporting the lightpush protocol. The peer must be already known. - It must have been added before with [`waku_add_peer`](#extern-char-waku_add_peerchar-address-char-protocolid) - or previously dialed with [`waku_connect_peer`](#extern-char-waku_connect_peerchar-address-int-timeoutms). + It must have been added before with [`waku_add_peer`](#waku_add_peer) + or previously dialed with [`waku_connect_peer`](#waku_connect). Use `NULL` to automatically select a node. -3. `int timeoutMs`: Timeout value in milliseconds to execute the call. +4. `int timeoutMs`: Timeout value in milliseconds to execute the call. If the function execution takes longer than this value, the execution will be canceled and an error returned. Use `0` for no timeout. -4. `WakuCallBack onOkCb`: callback to be executed if the function is succesful -5. `WakuCallBack onErrCb`: callback to be executed if the function fails +5. `WakuCallBack onOkCb`: callback to be executed if the function is succesful +6. `WakuCallBack onErrCb`: callback to be executed if the function fails Note: `messageJson.version` is overwritten to `0`. -**Returns** +Returns `int` with a status code. Possible values: - - 0 - The operation was completed successfuly. `onOkCb` will receive the message ID - - 1 - The operation failed for any reason. `onErrCb` will be executed with the reason the function execution failed. - - 2 - The function is missing the `onOkCb` or `onErrCb` callback +- 0 - The operation was completed successfuly. +`onOkCb` will receive the message ID +- 1 - The operation failed for any reason. +`onErrCb` will be executed with the reason the function execution failed. +- 2 - The function is missing the `onOkCb` or `onErrCb` callback ## Waku Store -### `extern int waku_store_query(char* queryJSON, char* peerID, int timeoutMs, WakuCallBack onOkCb, WakuCallBack onErrCb)` +### waku_store_query -Retrieves historical messages on specific content topics. This method may be called with [`PagingOptions`](#pagingoptions-type), -to retrieve historical messages on a per-page basis. If the request included [`PagingOptions`](#pagingoptions-type), the node -must return messages on a per-page basis and include [`PagingOptions`](#pagingoptions-type) in the response. These [`PagingOptions`](#pagingoptions-type) +```c +extern int waku_store_query(char* queryJSON, char* peerID, int timeoutMs, WakuCallBack onOkCb, WakuCallBack onErrCb){} +``` + +Retrieves historical messages on specific content topics. +This method may be called with [`PagingOptions`](#pagingoptions-type), +to retrieve historical messages on a per-page basis. +If the request included [`PagingOptions`](#pagingoptions-type), the node +must return messages on a per-page basis and +include [`PagingOptions`](#pagingoptions-type) in the response. +These [`PagingOptions`](#pagingoptions-type) must contain a cursor pointing to the Index from which a new page can be requested. -**Parameters** +Parameters 1. `char* queryJSON`: JSON string containing the [`StoreQuery`](#storequery-type). 2. `char* peerID`: Peer ID supporting the store protocol. The peer must be already known. - It must have been added before with [`waku_add_peer`](#extern-char-waku_add_peerchar-address-char-protocolid) - or previously dialed with [`waku_connect_peer`](#extern-char-waku_connect_peerchar-address-int-timeoutms). + It must have been added before with [`waku_add_peer`](#waku_add_peer) + or previously dialed with [`waku_connect_peer`](#waku_connect). 3. `int timeoutMs`: Timeout value in milliseconds to execute the call. If the function execution takes longer than this value, the execution will be canceled and an error returned. @@ -1137,21 +1408,32 @@ must contain a cursor pointing to the Index from which a new page can be request 4. `WakuCallBack onOkCb`: callback to be executed if the function is succesful 5. `WakuCallBack onErrCb`: callback to be executed if the function fails -**Returns** +Returns `int` with a status code. Possible values: - - 0 - The operation was completed successfuly. `onOkCb` will receive a [`StoreResponse`](#storeresponse-type). - - 1 - The operation failed for any reason. `onErrCb` will be executed with the reason the function execution failed. - - 2 - The function is missing the `onOkCb` or `onErrCb` callback -### `extern int waku_store_local_query(char* queryJSON, WakuCallBack onOkCb, WakuCallBack onErrCb)` +- 0 - The operation was completed successfuly. +`onOkCb` will receive a [`StoreResponse`](#storeresponse-type). +- 1 - The operation failed for any reason. +`onErrCb` will be executed with the reason the function execution failed. +- 2 - The function is missing the `onOkCb` or `onErrCb` callback + +### waku_store_local_query + +```c +extern int waku_store_local_query(char* queryJSON, WakuCallBack onOkCb, WakuCallBack onErrCb){} +``` -Retrieves locally stored historical messages on specific content topics. This method may be called with [`PagingOptions`](#pagingoptions-type), -to retrieve historical messages on a per-page basis. If the request included [`PagingOptions`](#pagingoptions-type), the node -must return messages on a per-page basis and include [`PagingOptions`](#pagingoptions-type) in the response. These [`PagingOptions`](#pagingoptions-type) +Retrieves locally stored historical messages on specific content topics. +This method may be called with [`PagingOptions`](#pagingoptions-type), +to retrieve historical messages on a per-page basis. +If the request included [`PagingOptions`](#pagingoptions-type), the node +must return messages on a per-page basis and +include [`PagingOptions`](#pagingoptions-type) in the response. +These [`PagingOptions`](#pagingoptions-type) must contain a cursor pointing to the Index from which a new page can be requested. -**Parameters** +Parameters 1. `char* queryJSON`: JSON string containing the [`StoreQuery`](#storequery-type). 2. `int timeoutMs`: Timeout value in milliseconds to execute the call. @@ -1161,23 +1443,29 @@ must contain a cursor pointing to the Index from which a new page can be request 3. `WakuCallBack onOkCb`: callback to be executed if the function is succesful 4. `WakuCallBack onErrCb`: callback to be executed if the function fails -**Returns** +Returns `int` with a status code. Possible values: - - 0 - The operation was completed successfuly. `onOkCb` will receive a [`StoreResponse`](#storeresponse-type). - - 1 - The operation failed for any reason. `onErrCb` will be executed with the reason the function execution failed. - - 2 - The function is missing the `onOkCb` or `onErrCb` callback +- 0 - The operation was completed successfuly. `onOkCb` will receive a [`StoreResponse`](#storeresponse-type). +- 1 - The operation failed for any reason. +`onErrCb` will be executed with the reason the function execution failed. +- 2 - The function is missing the `onOkCb` or `onErrCb` callback ## Encrypting messages -### `extern int waku_encode_symmetric(char* messageJson, char* symmetricKey, char* optionalSigningKey, WakuCallBack onOkCb, WakuCallBack onErrCb)` +### waku_encode_symmetric + +```c +extern int waku_encode_symmetric(char* messageJson, char* symmetricKey, char* optionalSigningKey, WakuCallBack onOkCb, WakuCallBack onErrCb){} +``` Encrypt a message using symmetric encryption and optionally sign the message -**Parameters** +Parameters -1. `char* messageJson`: JSON string containing the [Waku Message](../14/message.md) as [`JsonMessage`](#jsonmessage-type). +1. `char* messageJson`: +JSON string containing the [Waku Message](../14/message.md) as [`JsonMessage`](#jsonmessage-type). 2. `char* symmetricKey`: hex encoded secret key to be used for encryption. 3. `char* optionalSigningKey`: hex encoded private key to be used to sign the message. 4. `WakuCallBack onOkCb`: callback to be executed if the function is succesful @@ -1185,20 +1473,29 @@ Encrypt a message using symmetric encryption and optionally sign the message Note: `messageJson.version` is overwritten to `1`. -**Returns** +Returns `int` with a status code. Possible values: - - 0 - The operation was completed successfuly. `onOkCb` will receive the encrypted waku message which can be broadcasted with relay or lightpush protocol publish functions. - - 1 - The operation failed for any reason. `onErrCb` will be executed with the reason the function execution failed. - - 2 - The function is missing the `onOkCb` or `onErrCb` callback -### `extern int waku_encode_asymmetric(char* messageJson, char* publicKey, char* optionalSigningKey, WakuCallBack onOkCb, WakuCallBack onErrCb)` +- 0 - The operation was completed successfuly. +`onOkCb` will receive the encrypted waku message which can be broadcasted with relay +or lightpush protocol publish functions. +- 1 - The operation failed for any reason. +`onErrCb` will be executed with the reason the function execution failed. +- 2 - The function is missing the `onOkCb` or `onErrCb` callback + +### waku_encode_asymmetric + +```c +extern int waku_encode_asymmetric(char* messageJson, char* publicKey, char* optionalSigningKey, WakuCallBack onOkCb, WakuCallBack onErrCb){} +``` Encrypt a message using asymmetric encryption and optionally sign the message -**Parameters** +Parameters -1. `char* messageJson`: JSON string containing the [Waku Message](../14/message.md) as [`JsonMessage`](#jsonmessage-type). +1. `char* messageJson`: +JSON string containing the [Waku Message](../14/message.md) as [`JsonMessage`](#jsonmessage-type). 2. `char* publicKey`: hex encoded public key to be used for encryption. 3. `char* optionalSigningKey`: hex encoded private key to be used to sign the message. 4. `WakuCallBack onOkCb`: callback to be executed if the function is succesful @@ -1206,32 +1503,44 @@ Encrypt a message using asymmetric encryption and optionally sign the message Note: `messageJson.version` is overwritten to `1`. -**Returns** +Returns `int` with a status code. Possible values: - - 0 - The operation was completed successfuly. `onOkCb` will receive the encrypted waku message which can be broadcasted with relay or lightpush protocol publish functions. - - 1 - The operation failed for any reason. `onErrCb` will be executed with the reason the function execution failed. - - 2 - The function is missing the `onOkCb` or `onErrCb` callback +- 0 - The operation was completed successfuly. +`onOkCb` will receive the encrypted waku message which can be broadcasted with relay +or lightpush protocol publish functions. +- 1 - The operation failed for any reason. +`onErrCb` will be executed with the reason the function execution failed. +- 2 - The function is missing the `onOkCb` or `onErrCb` callback ## Decrypting messages -### `extern int waku_decode_symmetric(char* messageJson, char* symmetricKey, WakuCallBack onOkCb, WakuCallBack onErrCb)` +### waku_decode_symmetric + +```c +extern int waku_decode_symmetric(char* messageJson, char* symmetricKey, WakuCallBack onOkCb, WakuCallBack onErrCb){} +``` + Decrypt a message using a symmetric key -**Parameters** +Parameters -1. `char* messageJson`: JSON string containing the [Waku Message](../14/message.md) as [`JsonMessage`](#jsonmessage-type). +1. `char* messageJson`: +JSON string containing the [Waku Message](../14/message.md) as [`JsonMessage`](#jsonmessage-type). 2. `char* symmetricKey`: 32 byte symmetric key hex encoded. 3. `WakuCallBack onOkCb`: callback to be executed if the function is succesful 4. `WakuCallBack onErrCb`: callback to be executed if the function fails Note: `messageJson.version` is expected to be `1`. -**Returns** +Returns `int` with a status code. Possible values: - - 0 - The operation was completed successfuly. `onOkCb` will receive the decoded payload as a [`DecodedPayload`](#decodedpayload-type). + +- 0 - The operation was completed successfuly. +`onOkCb` will receive the decoded payload as a [`DecodedPayload`](#decodedpayload-type). + ```json { "pubkey": "0x......", @@ -1240,26 +1549,36 @@ Note: `messageJson.version` is expected to be `1`. "padding": "..." } ``` - - 1 - The operation failed for any reason. `onErrCb` will be executed with the reason the function execution failed. - - 2 - The function is missing the `onOkCb` or `onErrCb` callback +- 1 - The operation failed for any reason. +`onErrCb` will be executed with the reason the function execution failed. +- 2 - The function is missing the `onOkCb` or `onErrCb` callback -### `extern int waku_decode_asymmetric(char* messageJson, char* privateKey, WakuCallBack onOkCb, WakuCallBack onErrCb)` -Decrypt a message using a secp256k1 private key +### waku_decode_asymmetric + +```c +extern int waku_decode_asymmetric(char* messageJson, char* privateKey, WakuCallBack onOkCb, WakuCallBack onErrCb){} +``` -**Parameters** +Decrypt a message using a secp256k1 private key -1. `char* messageJson`: JSON string containing the [Waku Message](../14/message.md) as [`JsonMessage`](#jsonmessage-type). +Parameters + +1. `char* messageJson`: +JSON string containing the [Waku Message](../14/message.md) as [`JsonMessage`](#jsonmessage-type). 2. `char* privateKey`: secp256k1 private key hex encoded. 3. `WakuCallBack onOkCb`: callback to be executed if the function is succesful 4. `WakuCallBack onErrCb`: callback to be executed if the function fails Note: `messageJson.version` is expected to be `1`. -**Returns** +Returns `int` with a status code. Possible values: - - 0 - The operation was completed successfuly. `onOkCb` will receive the decoded payload as a [`DecodedPayload`](#decodedpayload-type). + +- 0 - The operation was completed successfuly. +`onOkCb` will receive the decoded payload as a [`DecodedPayload`](#decodedpayload-type). + ```json { "pubkey": "0x......", @@ -1268,18 +1587,25 @@ Note: `messageJson.version` is expected to be `1`. "padding": "..." } ``` - - 1 - The operation failed for any reason. `onErrCb` will be executed with the reason the function execution failed. - - 2 - The function is missing the `onOkCb` or `onErrCb` callback + +- 1 - The operation failed for any reason. +`onErrCb` will be executed with the reason the function execution failed. +- 2 - The function is missing the `onOkCb` or `onErrCb` callback ## DNS Discovery -### `extern int waku_dns_discovery(char* url, char* nameserver, int timeoutMs, WakuCallBack onOkCb, WakuCallBack onErrCb)` +### waku_dns_discovery + +```c +extern int waku_dns_discovery(char* url, char* nameserver, int timeoutMs, WakuCallBack onOkCb, WakuCallBack onErrCb){} +``` + Returns a list of multiaddress and enrs given a url to a DNS discoverable ENR tree -**Parameters** +Parameters 1. `char* url`: URL containing a discoverable ENR tree -2. `char* nameserver`: The nameserver to resolve the ENR tree url. +2. `char* nameserver`: The nameserver to resolve the ENR tree url. If `NULL` or empty, it will automatically use the default system dns. 3. `int timeoutMs`: Timeout value in milliseconds to execute the call. If the function execution takes longer than this value, @@ -1288,10 +1614,14 @@ Returns a list of multiaddress and enrs given a url to a DNS discoverable ENR tr 4. `WakuCallBack onOkCb`: callback to be executed if the function is succesful 5. `WakuCallBack onErrCb`: callback to be executed if the function fails -**Returns** +Returns `int` with a status code. Possible values: - - 0 - The operation was completed successfuly. `onOkCb` will receive an array objects describing the multiaddresses, enr and peerID each node found. + +- 0 - The operation was completed successfuly. +`onOkCb` will receive an array objects describing the multiaddresses, +enr and peerID each node found. + ```json [ { @@ -1305,30 +1635,36 @@ Returns a list of multiaddress and enrs given a url to a DNS discoverable ENR tr ... ] ``` - - 1 - The operation failed for any reason. `onErrCb` will be executed with the reason the function execution failed. - - 2 - The function is missing the `onOkCb` or `onErrCb` callback +- 1 - The operation failed for any reason. +`onErrCb` will be executed with the reason the function execution failed. +- 2 - The function is missing the `onOkCb` or `onErrCb` callback ## DiscoveryV5 -### `extern int waku_discv5_update_bootnodes(char* bootnodes, WakuCallBack onErrCb)` +### waku_discv5_update_bootnodes + +```c +extern int waku_discv5_update_bootnodes(char* bootnodes, WakuCallBack onErrCb)` +``` + Update the bootnode list used for discovering new peers via DiscoveryV5 -**Parameters** +Parameters 1. `char* bootnodes`: JSON array containing the bootnode ENRs i.e. `["enr:...", "enr:..."]` 2. `WakuCallBack onErrCb`: callback to be executed if the function fails -**Returns** +Returns `int` with a status code. Possible values: - - 0 - The operation was completed successfuly. - - 1 - The operation failed for any reason. `onErrCb` will be executed with the reason the function execution failed. - - 2 - The function is missing the `onErrCb` callback - +- 0 - The operation was completed successfuly. +- 1 - The operation failed for any reason. +`onErrCb` will be executed with the reason the function execution failed. +- 2 - The function is missing the `onErrCb` callback -# Copyright +## Copyright Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). diff --git a/waku/standards/core/64/network.md b/waku/standards/core/64/network.md index 1149eb860..5e84ad7f6 100644 --- a/waku/standards/core/64/network.md +++ b/waku/standards/core/64/network.md @@ -11,7 +11,8 @@ contributors: ## Abstract -This specification describes an opinionated deployment of [10/WAKU2](../10/waku2.md) protocols to form a coherent and +This specification describes an opinionated deployment of [10/WAKU2](../10/waku2.md) +protocols to form a coherent and shared decentralized messaging network that is open-access, useful for generalized messaging, privacy-preserving, scalable and accessible even to resource-restricted devices. @@ -24,35 +25,47 @@ All The Waku Network configuration parameters are listed [here](https://github.c ### Routing protocol -The Waku Network is built on the [17/WAKU2-RLN-RELAY](../17/rln-relay.md) routing protocol, -which in turn is an extension of [11/WAKU2-RELAY](../11/relay.md) with spam protection measures. +The Waku Network is built on the +[17/WAKU2-RLN-RELAY](../17/rln-relay.md) routing protocol, +which in turn is an extension of +[11/WAKU2-RELAY](../11/relay.md) with spam protection measures. ### Network shards -Traffic in the Waku Network is sharded into eight [17/WAKU2-RLN-RELAY](../17/rln-relay.md) pubsub topics. +Traffic in the Waku Network is sharded into eight +[17/WAKU2-RLN-RELAY](../17/rln-relay.md) pubsub topics. Each pubsub topic is named according to the static shard naming format defined in [WAKU2-RELAY-SHARDING](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/master/standards/core/relay-sharding.md) with: + * `` set to `1` * `` occupying the range `0` to `7`. In other words, the Waku Network is a [17/WAKU2-RLN-RELAY](../17/rln-relay.md) network routed on the combination of the eight pubsub topics: -``` + +```text /waku/2/rs/1/0 /waku/2/rs/1/1 ... /waku/2/rs/1/7 ``` -A node MUST use [WAKU-METADATA](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/master/standards/core/metadata.md) protocol to identify the `` that every -inbound/outbound peer that attempts to connect supports. In any of the following cases, the node MUST trigger a disconnection: -* [WAKU-METADATA](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/master/standards/core/metadata.md) dial fails. -* [WAKU-METADATA](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/master/standards/core/metadata.md) reports an empty ``. -* [WAKU-METADATA](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/master/standards/core/metadata.md) reports a `` different than `1`. +A node MUST use [WAKU-METADATA](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/master/standards/core/metadata.md) +protocol to identify the `` that every +inbound/outbound peer that attempts to connect supports. +In any of the following cases, the node MUST trigger a disconnection: + +* [WAKU-METADATA](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/master/standards/core/metadata.md) +dial fails. +* [WAKU-METADATA](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/master/standards/core/metadata.md) +reports an empty ``. +* [WAKU-METADATA](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/master/standards/core/metadata.md) +reports a `` different than `1`. ## Roles There are two distinct roles evident in the network, those of: + 1) nodes, and 2) applications. @@ -61,7 +74,7 @@ There are two distinct roles evident in the network, those of: Nodes are the individual software units using [10/WAKU2](../10/waku2.md) protocols to form a p2p messaging network. Nodes, in turn, can participate in a shard as full relayers, i.e. _relay nodes_, -or by running a combination of protocols suitable for resource-restricted environments, +or by running a combination of protocols suitable for resource-restricted environments, i.e. _non-relay nodes_. Nodes can also provide various services to the network, such as storing historical messages or protecting the network against spam. @@ -77,92 +90,131 @@ but MUST be subscribed to at least one defined shard. Each relay node SHOULD be subscribed to as many shards as it has resources to support. If a relay node supports an encapsulating application, it SHOULD be subscribed to all the shards servicing that application. -If resource restrictions prevent a relay node from servicing all shards used by the encapsulating application, +If resource restrictions prevent a relay node from servicing all shards +used by the encapsulating application, it MAY choose to support some shards as a non-relay node. #### Bootstrapping and discovery Nodes MAY use any method to bootstrap connection to the network, -but it is RECOMMENDED that each node retrieves a list of bootstrap peers to connect to using [EIP-1459 DNS-based discovery](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1459). -Relay nodes SHOULD use [33/WAKU2-DISCV5](../33/discv5.md) to continually discover other peers in the network. +but it is RECOMMENDED that each node retrieves a list of bootstrap peers to connect +to using [EIP-1459 DNS-based discovery](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1459). +Relay nodes SHOULD use [33/WAKU2-DISCV5](../33/discv5.md) to continually discover +other peers in the network. Each relay node MUST encode its supported shards into its discoverable ENR, as described in [WAKU2-RELAY-SHARDING](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/master/standards/core/relay-sharding.md/#discovery). The ENR MUST be updated if the set of supported shards change. -A node MAY choose to ignore discovered peers that do not support any of the shards in its own subscribed set. +A node MAY choose to ignore discovered peers that do not support any of the shards +in its own subscribed set. #### Transports -Relay nodes MUST follow [10/WAKU2](../10/waku2.md) specifications with regards to supporting different transports. -If TCP transport is available, each relay node MUST support it as transport for both dialing and listening. -In addition, a relay node SHOULD support secure websockets for bidirectional communication streams, +Relay nodes MUST follow [10/WAKU2](../10/waku2.md) specifications with regards +to supporting different transports. +If TCP transport is available, +each relay node MUST support it as transport for both dialing and listening. +In addition, +a relay node SHOULD support secure websockets for bidirectional communication streams, for example to allow connections from and to web browser-based clients. -A relay node MAY support unsecure websockets if required by the application or running environment. +A relay node MAY support unsecure websockets if required by the application or +running environment. #### Default services For each supported shard, each relay node SHOULD enable and support the following protocols as a service node: -1. [12/WAKU2-FILTER](../12/filter.md) to allow resource-restricted peers to subscribe to messages matching a specific content filter. -2. [13/WAKU2-STORE](../13/store.md) to allow other peers to request historical messages from this node. -3. [19/WAKU2-LIGHTPUSH](../19/lightpush.md) to allow resource-restricted peers to request publishing a message to the network on their behalf. -4. [WAKU2-PEER-EXCHANGE](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/master/standards/core/peer-exchange.md) to allow resource-restricted peers to discover more peers in a resource efficient way. + +1. [12/WAKU2-FILTER](../12/filter.md) to allow resource-restricted peers to subscribe +to messages matching a specific content filter. +2. [13/WAKU2-STORE](../13/store.md) to allow other peers to request historical messages +from this node. +3. [19/WAKU2-LIGHTPUSH](../19/lightpush.md) to allow resource-restricted peers to +request publishing a message to the network on their behalf. +4. [WAKU2-PEER-EXCHANGE](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/master/standards/core/peer-exchange.md) +to allow resource-restricted peers to discover more peers +in a resource efficient way. #### Store service nodes -Each relay node SHOULD support [13/WAKU2-STORE](../13/store.md) as a store service node, -for each supported shard. -The store SHOULD be configured to retain at least `12` hours of messages per supported shard. -Store service nodes SHOULD only store messages with a valid [`rate_limit_proof`](#message-attributes) attribute. +Each relay node SHOULD support [13/WAKU2-STORE](../13/store.md) +as a store service node, for each supported shard. +The store SHOULD be configured to retain at least `12` hours of messages +per supported shard. +Store service nodes SHOULD only store messages +with a valid [`rate_limit_proof`](#message-attributes) attribute. #### Non-relay nodes Nodes MAY opt out of relay functionality on any network shard and instead request services from relay nodes as clients using any of the defined service protocols: -1. [12/WAKU2-FILTER](../12/filter.md) to subscribe to messages matching a specific content filter. -2. [13/WAKU2-STORE](../13/store.md) to request historical messages matching a specific content filter. -3. [19/WAKU2-LIGHTPUSH](../19/lightpush.md) to request publishing a message to the network. -4. [WAKU2-PEER-EXCHANGE](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/master/standards/core/peer-exchange.md) to discover more peers in a resource efficient way. + +1. [12/WAKU2-FILTER](../12/filter.md) +to subscribe to messages matching a specific content filter. +2. [13/WAKU2-STORE](../13/store.md) +to request historical messages matching a specific content filter. +3. [19/WAKU2-LIGHTPUSH](../19/lightpush.md) +to request publishing a message to the network. +4. [WAKU2-PEER-EXCHANGE](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/master/standards/core/peer-exchange.md) +to discover more peers in a resource efficient way. #### Store client nodes -Nodes MAY request historical messages from [13/WAKU2-STORE](../13/store.md) service nodes as store clients. -A store client SHOULD discard any messages retrieved from a store service node that do not contain a valid [`rate_limit_proof`](#message-attributes) attribute. -The client MAY consider service nodes returning messages without a valid [`rate_limit_proof`](#message-attributes) attribute as untrustworthy. +Nodes MAY request historical messages from [13/WAKU2-STORE](../13/store.md) +service nodes as store clients. +A store client SHOULD discard any messages retrieved from a store service node +that do not contain a valid [`rate_limit_proof`](#message-attributes) attribute. +The client MAY consider service nodes returning messages +without a valid [`rate_limit_proof`](#message-attributes) attribute as untrustworthy. The mechanism by which this may happen is currently underdefined. ### Applications -Applications are the higher-layer projects or platforms that make use of the generalized messaging capability of the network. -In other words, an application defines a payload used in the various [10/WAKU2](../10/waku2.md) protocols. -Any participant in an application SHOULD make use of an underlying node in order to communicate on the network. +Applications are the higher-layer projects or +platforms that make use of the generalized messaging capability of the network. +In other words, +an application defines a payload used in the various [10/WAKU2](../10/waku2.md) protocols. +Any participant in an application SHOULD make use of an underlying node +in order to communicate on the network. Applications SHOULD make use of an [autosharding](#autosharding) API -to allow the underlying node to automatically select the target shard on the Waku Network. +to allow the underlying node to automatically select the target shard +on the Waku Network. See the section on [autosharding](#autosharding) for more. ## RLN rate-limiting -The [17/WAKU2-RLN-RELAY](../17/rln-relay.md) protocol uses [RLN-V2](https://github.com/vacp2p/rfc-index/blob/a5b24ac0a27da361312260f9da372a0e6e812212/vac/raw/rln-v2.md) proofs -to ensure that a pre-agreed rate limit of `x` messages every `y` seconds is not exceeded by any publisher. +The [17/WAKU2-RLN-RELAY](../17/rln-relay.md) protocol uses [RLN-V2](https://github.com/vacp2p/rfc-index/blob/a5b24ac0a27da361312260f9da372a0e6e812212/vac/raw/rln-v2.md) +proofs to ensure that a pre-agreed rate limit +of `x` messages every `y` seconds is not exceeded by any publisher. While the network is under capacity, individual relayers MAY choose to freely route messages without RLN proofs up to a discretionary bandwidth limit, after which messages without proofs MUST be discarded by relay nodes. -This bandwidth limit SHOULD be enforced using a [bandwidth validation mechanism](#free-bandwidth-exceeded) separate from a RLN rate-limiting. -This implies that quality of service and reliability is significantly lower for messages without proofs +This bandwidth limit SHOULD be enforced using a [bandwidth validation mechanism](#free-bandwidth-exceeded) +separate from a RLN rate-limiting. +This implies that quality of service and +reliability is significantly lower for messages without proofs and at times of high network utilization these messages may not be relayed at all. ### RLN Parameters The Waku Network uses the following RLN parameters: -* `rlnRelayUserMessageLimit=100`: Amount of messages that a membership is allowed to publish per epoch. Configurable between `0` and `MAX_MESSAGE_LIMIT`. +* `rlnRelayUserMessageLimit=100`: +Amount of messages that a membership is allowed to publish per epoch. +Configurable between `0` and `MAX_MESSAGE_LIMIT`. * `rlnEpochSizeSec=600`: Size of the epoch in seconds. -* `rlnRelayChainId=11155111`: Network in which the RLN contract is deployed, aka Sepolia. -* `rlnRelayEthContractAddress=0xCB33Aa5B38d79E3D9Fa8B10afF38AA201399a7e3`: Network address where RLN memberships are stored. -* `staked_fund=0`: In other words, the Waku Network does not use RLN staking. Registering a membership just requires to pay gas. -* `MAX_MESSAGE_LIMIT=100`: Maximum amount of messages allowed per epoch for any membership. Enforced in the contract. -* `max_epoch_gap=20`: Maximum allowed gap in seconds into the past or future compared to the validator's clock. +* `rlnRelayChainId=11155111`: Network in which the RLN contract is deployed, +aka Sepolia. +* `rlnRelayEthContractAddress=0xCB33Aa5B38d79E3D9Fa8B10afF38AA201399a7e3`: +Network address where RLN memberships are stored. +* `staked_fund=0`: In other words, the Waku Network does not use RLN staking. +Registering a membership just requires to pay gas. +* `MAX_MESSAGE_LIMIT=100`: +Maximum amount of messages allowed per epoch for any membership. +Enforced in the contract. +* `max_epoch_gap=20`: Maximum allowed gap in seconds into the past or +future compared to the validator's clock. Nodes MUST _reject_ messages not respecting any of these parameters. Nodes SHOULD use Network Time Protocol (NTP) to synchronize their own clocks, @@ -189,36 +241,53 @@ according to the rules discussed under [message validation](#message-validation) ### Message Attributes -- The mandatory `payload` attribute MUST contain the message data payload as crafted by the application. -- The mandatory `content_topic` attribute MUST specify a string identifier that can be used for content-based filtering. +* The mandatory `payload` attribute MUST contain the message data payload +as crafted by the application. +* The mandatory `content_topic` attribute MUST specify a string identifier +that can be used for content-based filtering. This is also crafted by the application. See [Autosharding](#autosharding) for more on the content topic format. -- The optional `meta` attribute MAY be omitted. +* The optional `meta` attribute MAY be omitted. If present, will form part of the message uniqueness vector described in [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](../14/message.md). -- The optional `version` attribute SHOULD be set to `0`. It MUST be interpreted as `0` if not present. -- The mandatory `timestamp` attribute MUST contain the Unix epoch time at which the message was generated by the application. +* The optional `version` attribute SHOULD be set to `0`. +It MUST be interpreted as `0` if not present. +* The mandatory `timestamp` attribute MUST contain the Unix epoch time +at which the message was generated by the application. The value MUST be in nanoseconds. -It MAY contain a fudge factor of up to 1 seconds in either direction to improve resistance to timing attacks. -- The optional `ephemeral` attribute MUST be set to `true` if the message should not be persisted by the Waku Network. -- The optional `rate_limit_proof` attribute SHOULD be populated with the RLN proof as set out in [RLN Proofs](#rln-proofs). +It MAY contain a fudge factor of up to 1 seconds in either direction +to improve resistance to timing attacks. +* The optional `ephemeral` attribute MUST be set to `true`, +if the message should not be persisted by the Waku Network. +* The optional `rate_limit_proof` attribute SHOULD be populated with the RLN proof +as set out in [RLN Proofs](#rln-proofs). Messages with this field unpopulated MAY be discarded from the network by relayers. This field MUST be populated if the message should be persisted by the Waku Network. ### Message Size -Any [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](../14/message.md) published to the network MUST NOT exceed an absolute maximum size of `150` kilobytes. -This limit applies to the entire message after protobuf serialization, including attributes. -It is RECOMMENDED not to exceed an average size of `4` kilobytes for [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](../14/message.md) published to the network. +Any [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](../14/message.md) published to the network +MUST NOT exceed an absolute maximum size of `150` kilobytes. +This limit applies to the entire message after protobuf serialization, +including attributes. +It is RECOMMENDED not to exceed an average size of `4` kilobytes +for [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](../14/message.md) published to the network. ### Message Validation -Relay nodes MUST apply [gossipsub v1.1 validation](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/gossipsub/gossipsub-v1.1.md#extended-validators) to each relayed message and -SHOULD apply all of the rules set out in the section below to determine the validity of a message. +Relay nodes MUST apply [gossipsub v1.1 validation](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/gossipsub/gossipsub-v1.1.md#extended-validators) +to each relayed message and +SHOULD apply all of the rules set out in the section below +to determine the validity of a message. Validation has one of three outcomes, -repeated here from the [gossipsub specification](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/gossipsub/gossipsub-v1.1.md#extended-validators) for ease of reference: -1. Accept - the message is considered valid and it MUST be delivered and forwarded to the network. -2. Reject - the message is considered invalid, MUST be rejected and SHOULD trigger a gossipsub scoring penalty against the transmitting peer. -3. Ignore - the message SHOULD NOT be delivered and forwarded to the network, but this MUST NOT trigger a gossipsub scoring penalty against the transmitting peer. +repeated here from the [gossipsub specification](https://github.com/libp2p/specs/blob/master/pubsub/gossipsub/gossipsub-v1.1.md#extended-validators) +for ease of reference: + +1. Accept - the message is considered valid and +it MUST be delivered and forwarded to the network. +2. Reject - the message is considered invalid, MUST be rejected and +SHOULD trigger a gossipsub scoring penalty against the transmitting peer. +3. Ignore - the message SHOULD NOT be delivered and forwarded to the network, +but this MUST NOT trigger a gossipsub scoring penalty against the transmitting peer. The following validation rules are defined: @@ -266,7 +335,8 @@ If a message contains an RLN proof and the relay node detects double signaling according to the verification process described in [RLN-V2](https://github.com/vacp2p/rfc-index/blob/a5b24ac0a27da361312260f9da372a0e6e812212/vac/raw/rln-v2.md), the relay node MUST _reject_ the message -for violating the agreed rate limit of `rlnRelayUserMessageLimit` messages every `rlnEpochSizeSec` second. +for violating the agreed rate limit of `rlnRelayUserMessageLimit` messages +every `rlnEpochSizeSec` second. This SHOULD trigger a penalty against the transmitting peer. ## Autosharding @@ -281,7 +351,7 @@ Applications using autosharding MUST use content topics in the format defined in [WAKU2-RELAY-SHARDING](https://github.com/waku-org/specs/blob/master/standards/core/relay-sharding.md/#content-topics-format-for-autosharding) and SHOULD use the short length format: -``` +```text /{application-name}/{version-of-the-application}/{content-topic-name}/{encoding} ``` diff --git a/waku/standards/core/66/metadata.md b/waku/standards/core/66/metadata.md index 516d9da09..7a52406b3 100644 --- a/waku/standards/core/66/metadata.md +++ b/waku/standards/core/66/metadata.md @@ -8,25 +8,30 @@ contributors: --- ## Abstract -This specification describes the metadata that can be associated with a [10/WAKU2](../10/waku2.md) node. + +This specification describes the metadata +that can be associated with a [10/WAKU2](../10/waku2.md) node. ## Metadata Protocol -Waku specifies a req/resp protocol that provides information about the node's medatadata. -Such metadata is meant to be used by the node to decide if a peer is worth connecting or not. -The node that makes the request, includes its metadata so that the receiver is aware of it, -without requiring an extra interaction. +Waku specifies a req/resp protocol that provides information about the node's medatadata. +Such metadata is meant to be used by the node to decide if a peer is worth connecting +or not. +The node that makes the request, +includes its metadata so that the receiver is aware of it, +without requiring an extra interaction. The parameters are the following: + * `clusterId`: Unique identifier of the cluster that the node is running in. * `shards`: Shard indexes that the node is subscribed to. ***Protocol Identifier*** - /vac/waku/metadata/1.0.0 +> /vac/waku/metadata/1.0.0 ### Request -```proto +```protobuf message WakuMetadataRequest { optional uint32 cluster_id = 1; repeated uint32 shards = 2; @@ -35,7 +40,7 @@ message WakuMetadataRequest { ### Response -```proto +```protobuf message WakuMetadataResponse { optional uint32 cluster_id = 1; repeated uint32 shards = 2; @@ -48,4 +53,4 @@ Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/public ## References -- [10/WAKU2](../10/waku2.md) +* [10/WAKU2](../10/waku2.md) diff --git a/waku/standards/legacy/.DS_Store b/waku/standards/legacy/.DS_Store new file mode 100644 index 000000000..895ae2614 Binary files /dev/null and b/waku/standards/legacy/.DS_Store differ diff --git a/waku/standards/legacy/6/waku1.md b/waku/standards/legacy/6/waku1.md index b29f2ed32..26f5a387e 100644 --- a/waku/standards/legacy/6/waku1.md +++ b/waku/standards/legacy/6/waku1.md @@ -11,11 +11,23 @@ contributors: - Kim De Mey --- -This specification describes the format of Waku packets within the ÐΞVp2p Wire Protocol. This spec substitutes [EIP-627](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-627). Waku is a fork of the original Whisper protocol that enables better usability for resource restricted devices, such as mostly-offline bandwidth-constrained smartphones. It does this through (a) light node support, (b) historic envelopes (with a mailserver) (c) expressing topic interest for better bandwidth usage and (d) basic rate limiting. +This specification describes the format of Waku packets within the ÐΞVp2p Wire Protocol. +This spec substitutes [EIP-627](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-627). +Waku is a fork of the original Whisper protocol +that enables better usability for resource restricted devices, +such as mostly-offline bandwidth-constrained smartphones. +It does this through (a) light node support, (b) historic envelopes +(with a mailserver) (c) expressing topic interest for better bandwidth usage +and (d) basic rate limiting. ## Motivation -Waku was created to incrementally improve in areas that Whisper is lacking in, with special attention to resource restricted devices. We specify the standard for Waku packets in order to ensure forward compatibility of different Waku clients, backwards compatibility with Whisper clients, as well as to allow multiple implementations of Waku and its capabilities. We also modify the language to be more unambiguous, concise and consistent. +Waku was created to incrementally improve in areas that Whisper is lacking in, +with special attention to resource restricted devices. +We specify the standard for Waku packets in order to ensure forward compatibility +of different Waku clients, backwards compatibility with Whisper clients, +as well as to allow multiple implementations of Waku and its capabilities. +We also modify the language to be more unambiguous, concise and consistent. ## Definitions @@ -30,34 +42,60 @@ Waku was created to incrementally improve in areas that Whisper is lacking in, w ### Use of DevP2P -For nodes to communicate, they MUST implement devp2p and run RLPx. They MUST have some way of connecting to other nodes. Node discovery is largely out of scope for this spec, but see the appendix for some suggestions on how to do this. +For nodes to communicate, they MUST implement devp2p and run RLPx. +They MUST have some way of connecting to other nodes. +Node discovery is largely out of scope for this spec, +but see the appendix for some suggestions on how to do this. This protocol needs to advertise the `waku/1` [capability](https://ethereum.gitbooks.io/frontier-guide/devp2p.html). ### Gossip based routing -In Whisper, envelopes are gossiped between peers. Whisper is a form of rumor-mongering protocol that works by flooding to its connected peers based on some factors. Envelopes are eligible for retransmission until their TTL expires. A node SHOULD relay envelopes to all connected nodes if an envelope matches their PoW and bloom filter settings. If a node works in light mode, it MAY choose not to forward envelopes. A node MUST NOT send expired envelopes, unless the envelopes are sent as a [8/WAKU-MAIL](../8/mail.md) response. A node SHOULD NOT send an envelope to a peer that it has already sent before. +In Whisper, envelopes are gossiped between peers. +Whisper is a form of rumor-mongering protocol +that works by flooding to its connected peers based on some factors. +Envelopes are eligible for retransmission until their TTL expires. +A node SHOULD relay envelopes to all connected nodes +if an envelope matches their PoW and bloom filter settings. +If a node works in light mode, it MAY choose not to forward envelopes. +A node MUST NOT send expired envelopes, +unless the envelopes are sent as a [8/WAKU-MAIL](../8/mail.md) response. +A node SHOULD NOT send an envelope to a peer that it has already sent before. ### Maximum Packet Size -Nodes SHOULD limit the maximum size of both packets and envelopes. If a packet or envelope exceeds its limit, it MUST be dropped. +Nodes SHOULD limit the maximum size of both packets and envelopes. +If a packet or envelope exceeds its limit, it MUST be dropped. - **RLPx Packet Size** - This size MUST be checked before a message is decoded. -- **Waku Envelope Size** - Each envelope contained in an RLPx packet MUST then separately be checked against the maximum envelope size. +- **Waku Envelope Size** - Each envelope contained in an RLPx packet +MUST then separately be checked against the maximum envelope size. -Clients MAY use their own maximum packet and envelope sizes. The default values are `1.5mb` for the RLPx Packet and `1mb` for a Waku envelope. +Clients MAY use their own maximum packet and envelope sizes. +The default values are `1.5mb` for the RLPx Packet and `1mb` for a Waku envelope. ## Wire Specification ### Use of RLPx transport protocol -All Waku packets are sent as devp2p RLPx transport protocol, version 5[^1] packets. These packets MUST be RLP-encoded arrays of data containing two objects: packet code followed by another object (whose type depends on the packet code). See [informal RLP spec](https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/RLP) and the [Ethereum Yellow Paper, appendix B](https://ethereum.github.io/yellowpaper/paper.pdf) for more details on RLP. +All Waku packets are sent as devp2p RLPx transport protocol, version 5[^1] packets. +These packets MUST be RLP-encoded arrays of data containing two objects: +packet code followed by another object (whose type depends on the packet code). +See [informal RLP spec](https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/RLP) and +the [Ethereum Yellow Paper, appendix B](https://ethereum.github.io/yellowpaper/paper.pdf) +for more details on RLP. -Waku is a RLPx subprotocol called `waku` with version `0`. The version number corresponds to the major version in the header spec. Minor versions should not break compatibility of `waku`, this would result in a new major. (Some exceptions to this apply in the Draft stage of where client implementation is rapidly change). +Waku is a RLPx subprotocol called `waku` with version `0`. +The version number corresponds to the major version in the header spec. +Minor versions should not break compatibility of `waku`, +this would result in a new major. +(Some exceptions to this apply in the Draft stage +of where client implementation is rapidly change). ### ABNF specification -Using [Augmented Backus-Naur form (ABNF)](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5234) we have the following format: +Using [Augmented Backus-Naur form (ABNF)](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5234) +we have the following format: ```abnf ; Packet codes 0 - 127 are reserved for Waku protocol @@ -185,13 +223,15 @@ optional-packet = 11 batch-ack / packet = "[" required-packet [ optional-packet ] "]" ``` -All primitive types are RLP encoded. Note that, per RLP specification, integers are encoded starting from `0x00`. +All primitive types are RLP encoded. Note that, per RLP specification, +integers are encoded starting from `0x00`. ### Packet Codes The packet codes reserved for Waku protocol: 0 - 127. -Packets with unknown codes MUST be ignored without generating any error, for forward compatibility of future versions. +Packets with unknown codes MUST be ignored without generating any error, +for forward compatibility of future versions. The Waku sub-protocol MUST support the following packet codes: @@ -219,17 +259,25 @@ The Status packet serves as a Waku handshake and peers MUST exchange this packet upon connection. It MUST be sent after the RLPx handshake and prior to any other Waku packets. -A Waku node MUST await the Status packet from a peer before engaging in other Waku protocol activity with that peer. -When a node does not receive the Status packet from a peer, before a configurable timeout, it SHOULD disconnect from that peer. +A Waku node MUST await the Status packet from a peer +before engaging in other Waku protocol activity with that peer. +When a node does not receive the Status packet from a peer, +before a configurable timeout, it SHOULD disconnect from that peer. Upon retrieval of the Status packet, the node SHOULD validate the packet received and validated the Status packet. Note that its peer might not be in the same state. When a node is receiving other Waku packets from a peer before a Status -packet is received, the node MUST ignore these packets and SHOULD disconnect from that peer. Status packets received after the handshake is completed MUST also be ignored. +packet is received, the node MUST ignore these packets and +SHOULD disconnect from that peer. +Status packets received after the handshake is completed MUST also be ignored. -The Status packet MUST contain an association list containing various options. All options within this association list are OPTIONAL, ordering of the key-value pairs is not guaranteed and therefore MUST NOT be relied on. Unknown keys in the association list SHOULD be ignored. +The Status packet MUST contain an association list containing various options. +All options within this association list are OPTIONAL, +ordering of the key-value pairs is not guaranteed and +therefore MUST NOT be relied on. +Unknown keys in the association list SHOULD be ignored. #### Messages @@ -237,75 +285,105 @@ This packet is used for sending the standard Waku envelopes. #### Status Update -The Status Update packet is used to communicate an update of the settings of the node. +The Status Update packet is used to communicate an update +of the settings of the node. The format is the same as the Status packet, all fields are optional. -If none of the options are specified the packet MUST be ignored and considered a noop. -Fields that are omitted are considered unchanged, fields that haven't changed SHOULD not -be transmitted. +If none of the options are specified the packet MUST be ignored and +considered a noop. +Fields that are omitted are considered unchanged, +fields that haven't changed SHOULD not be transmitted. ##### PoW Requirement Field -When PoW Requirement is updated, peers MUST NOT deliver envelopes with PoW lower than the PoW Requirement specified. +When PoW Requirement is updated, +peers MUST NOT deliver envelopes with PoW lower than the PoW Requirement specified. -PoW is defined as average number of iterations, required to find the current BestBit (the number of leading zero bits in the hash), divided by envelope size and TTL: +PoW is defined as average number of iterations, +required to find the current BestBit +(the number of leading zero bits in the hash), divided by envelope size and TTL: - PoW = (2**BestBit) / (size * TTL) + PoW = (2**BestBit) / (size * TTL) PoW calculation: - fn short_rlp(envelope) = rlp of envelope, excluding env_nonce field. - fn pow_hash(envelope, env_nonce) = sha3(short_rlp(envelope) ++ env_nonce) - fn pow(pow_hash, size, ttl) = 2**leading_zeros(pow_hash) / (size * ttl) + fn short_rlp(envelope) = rlp of envelope, excluding env_nonce field. + fn pow_hash(envelope, env_nonce) = sha3(short_rlp(envelope) ++ env_nonce) + fn pow(pow_hash, size, ttl) = 2**leading_zeros(pow_hash) / (size * ttl) -where size is the size of the RLP-encoded envelope, excluding `env_nonce` field (size of `short_rlp(envelope)`). +where size is the size of the RLP-encoded envelope, +excluding `env_nonce` field (size of `short_rlp(envelope)`). ##### Bloom Filter Field -The bloom filter is used to identify a number of topics to a peer without compromising (too much) privacy over precisely what topics are of interest. Precise control over the information content (and thus efficiency of the filter) may be maintained through the addition of bits. +The bloom filter is used to identify a number of topics to a peer without compromising +(too much) privacy over precisely what topics are of interest. +Precise control over the information content (and thus efficiency of the filter) +may be maintained through the addition of bits. -Blooms are formed by the bitwise OR operation on a number of bloomed topics. The bloom function takes the topic and projects them onto a 512-bit slice. At most, three bits are marked for each bloomed topic. +Blooms are formed by the bitwise OR operation on a number of bloomed topics. +The bloom function takes the topic and projects them onto a 512-bit slice. +At most, three bits are marked for each bloomed topic. -The projection function is defined as a mapping from a 4-byte slice S to a 512-bit slice D; for ease of explanation, S will dereference to bytes, whereas D will dereference to bits. +The projection function is defined as a mapping +from a 4-byte slice S to a 512-bit slice D; for ease of explanation, +S will dereference to bytes, whereas D will dereference to bits. - LET D[*] = 0 - FOREACH i IN { 0, 1, 2 } DO - LET n = S[i] - IF S[3] & (2 ** i) THEN n += 256 - D[n] = 1 - END FOR + LET D[*] = 0 + FOREACH i IN { 0, 1, 2 } DO + LET n = S[i] + IF S[3] & (2 ** i) THEN n += 256 + D[n] = 1 + END FOR -A full bloom filter (all the bits set to 1) means that the node is to be considered a `Full Node` and it will accept any topic. +A full bloom filter (all the bits set to 1) +means that the node is to be considered a `Full Node` and it will accept any topic. -If both topic interest and bloom filter are specified, topic interest always takes precedence and bloom filter MUST be ignored. +If both topic interest and bloom filter are specified, +topic interest always takes precedence and bloom filter MUST be ignored. -If only bloom filter is specified, the current topic interest MUST be discarded and only the updated bloom filter MUST be used when forwarding or posting envelopes. +If only bloom filter is specified, +the current topic interest MUST be discarded and +only the updated bloom filter MUST be used when forwarding or posting envelopes. -A bloom filter with all bits set to 0 signals that the node is not currently interested in receiving any envelope. +A bloom filter with all bits set to 0 signals that the node is not currently +interested in receiving any envelope. ##### Topic Interest Field -Topic interest is used to share a node's interest in envelopes with specific topics. It does this in a more bandwidth considerate way, at the expense of some metadata protection. Peers MUST only send envelopes with specified topics. +Topic interest is used to share a node's interest in envelopes with specific topics. +It does this in a more bandwidth considerate way, +at the expense of some metadata protection. +Peers MUST only send envelopes with specified topics. +It is currently bounded to a maximum of 10000 topics. +If you are interested in more topics than that, this is currently underspecified +and likely requires updating it. The constant is subject to change. -It is currently bounded to a maximum of 10000 topics. If you are interested in more topics than that, this is currently underspecified and likely requires updating it. The constant is subject to change. +If only topic interest is specified, the current bloom filter MUST be discarded and +only the updated topic interest MUST be used when forwarding or posting envelopes. -If only topic interest is specified, the current bloom filter MUST be discarded and only the updated topic interest MUST be used when forwarding or posting envelopes. - -An empty array signals that the node is not currently interested in receiving any envelope. +An empty array signals that the node is not currently interested in receiving +any envelope. ##### Rate Limits Field Rate limits is used to inform other nodes of their self defined rate limits. -In order to provide basic Denial-of-Service attack protection, each node SHOULD define its own rate limits. The rate limits SHOULD be applied on IPs, peer IDs, and envelope topics. +In order to provide basic Denial-of-Service attack protection, +each node SHOULD define its own rate limits. +The rate limits SHOULD be applied on IPs, peer IDs, and envelope topics. Each node MAY decide to whitelist, i.e. do not rate limit, selected IPs or peer IDs. If a peer exceeds node's rate limits, the connection between them MAY be dropped. -Each node SHOULD broadcast its rate limits to its peers using the `status-update` packet. The rate limits MAY also be sent as an optional parameter in the handshake. +Each node SHOULD broadcast its rate limits to its peers +using the `status-update` packet. +The rate limits MAY also be sent as an optional parameter in the handshake. -Each node SHOULD respect rate limits advertised by its peers. The number of packets SHOULD be throttled in order not to exceed peer's rate limits. If the limit gets exceeded, the connection MAY be dropped by the peer. +Each node SHOULD respect rate limits advertised by its peers. +The number of packets SHOULD be throttled in order not to exceed peer's rate limits. +If the limit gets exceeded, the connection MAY be dropped by the peer. Two rate limits strategies are applied: @@ -318,193 +396,320 @@ The size limit SHOULD be greater or equal than the maximum packet size. ##### Light Node Field -When the node's `light-node` field is set to true, the node SHOULD NOT forward Envelopes from its peers. +When the node's `light-node` field is set to true, +the node SHOULD NOT forward Envelopes from its peers. -A node connected to a peer with the `light-node` field set to true MUST NOT depend on the peer for forwarding Envelopes. +A node connected to a peer with the `light-node` field set to true +MUST NOT depend on the peer for forwarding Envelopes. ##### Confirmations Enabled Field -When the node's `confirmations-enabled` field is set to true, the node SHOULD send [message confirmations](#batch-ack-and-message-response) to its peers. +When the node's `confirmations-enabled` field is set to true, +the node SHOULD send [message confirmations](#batch-ack-and-message-response) +to its peers. #### Batch Ack and Message Response -Message confirmations tell a node that an envelope originating from it has been received by its peers, allowing a node to know whether an envelope has or has not been received. +Message confirmations tell a node that an envelope +originating from it has been received by its peers, +allowing a node to know whether an envelope has or has not been received. -A node MAY send a message confirmation for any batch of envelopes received with a Messages packet (`0x01`). +A node MAY send a message confirmation for any batch of envelopes +received with a Messages packet (`0x01`). -A message confirmation is sent using Batch Ack packet (`0x0B`) or Message Response packet (`0x0C`). The message confirmation is specified in the [ABNF specification](#abnf-specification). +A message confirmation is sent using Batch Ack packet (`0x0B`) or +Message Response packet (`0x0C`). +The message confirmation is specified in the [ABNF specification](#abnf-specification). The current `version` in the `confirmation` is `1`. The supported error codes: -- `1`: time sync error which happens when an envelope is too old or was created in the future (typically because of an unsynchronized clock of a node). -The drawback of sending message confirmations is that it increases the noise in the network because for each sent envelope, a corresponding confirmation is broadcast by one or more peers. +- `1`: time sync error which happens when an envelope is too old or +was created in the future (typically because of an unsynchronized clock of a node). + +The drawback of sending message confirmations is that it increases the noise +in the network because for each sent envelope, +a corresponding confirmation is broadcast by one or more peers. #### P2P Request -This packet is used for sending Dapp-level peer-to-peer requests, e.g. Waku Mail Client requesting historic (expired) envelopes from the [Waku Mail Server](../8/mail.md). +This packet is used for sending Dapp-level peer-to-peer requests, +e.g. Waku Mail Client requesting historic (expired) +envelopes from the [Waku Mail Server](../8/mail.md). #### P2P Message -This packet is used for sending the peer-to-peer envelopes, which are not supposed to be forwarded any further. E.g. it might be used by the Waku Mail Server for delivery of historic (expired) envelopes, which is otherwise not allowed. +This packet is used for sending the peer-to-peer envelopes, +which are not supposed to be forwarded any further. +E.g. it might be used by the Waku Mail Server for delivery of historic (expired) +envelopes, which is otherwise not allowed. #### P2P Request Complete -This packet is used to indicate that all envelopes, requested earlier with a P2P Request packet (`0x7E`), have been sent via one or more P2P Message packets (`0x7F`). +This packet is used to indicate that all envelopes, +requested earlier with a P2P Request packet (`0x7E`), +have been sent via one or more P2P Message packets (`0x7F`). The content of the packet is explained in the [Waku Mail Server](../8/mail.md) specification. ### Payload Encryption -Asymmetric encryption uses the standard Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme with SECP-256k1 public key. +Asymmetric encryption uses the standard Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme +with SECP-256k1 public key. Symmetric encryption uses AES GCM algorithm with random 96-bit nonce. ### Packet code Rationale -Packet codes `0x00` and `0x01` are already used in all Waku / Whisper versions. Packet code `0x02` and `0x03` were previously used in Whisper but are deprecated as of Waku v0.4 +Packet codes `0x00` and `0x01` are already used in all Waku / Whisper versions. +Packet code `0x02` and `0x03` were previously used in Whisper but +are deprecated as of Waku v0.4 Packet code `0x22` is used to dynamically change the settings of a node. -Packet codes `0x7E` and `0x7F` may be used to implement Waku Mail Server and Client. Without the P2P Message packet it would be impossible to deliver the historic envelopes, since they will be recognized as expired, and the peer will be disconnected for violating the Waku protocol. They might be useful for other purposes when it is not possible to spend time on PoW, e.g. if a stock exchange will want to provide live feed about the latest trades. +Packet codes `0x7E` and `0x7F` may be used to implement Waku Mail Server and +Client. +Without the P2P Message packet it would be impossible to deliver the historic envelopes, +since they will be recognized as expired, and +the peer will be disconnected for violating the Waku protocol. +They might be useful for other purposes +when it is not possible to spend time on PoW, +e.g. if a stock exchange will want to provide live feed about the latest trades. ## Additional capabilities -Waku supports multiple capabilities. These include light node, rate limiting and bridging of traffic. Here we list these capabilities, how they are identified, what properties they have and what invariants they must maintain. +Waku supports multiple capabilities. +These include light node, rate limiting and bridging of traffic. +Here we list these capabilities, how they are identified, +what properties they have and what invariants they must maintain. -Additionally there is the capability of a mailserver which is documented in its on [specification](../8/mail.md). +Additionally, +there is the capability of a mailserver which is documented in its on [specification](../8/mail.md). ### Light node -The rationale for light nodes is to allow for interaction with waku on resource restricted devices as bandwidth can often be an issue. +The rationale for light nodes is to allow for interaction with waku +on resource restricted devices as bandwidth can often be an issue. -Light nodes MUST NOT forward any incoming envelopes, they MUST only send their own envelopes. When light nodes happen to connect to each other, they SHOULD disconnect. As this would result in envelopes being dropped between the two. +Light nodes MUST NOT forward any incoming envelopes, +they MUST only send their own envelopes. +When light nodes happen to connect to each other, they SHOULD disconnect. +As this would result in envelopes being dropped between the two. Light nodes are identified by the `light_node` value in the Status packet. ### Accounting for resources (experimental) -Nodes MAY implement accounting, keeping track of resource usage. It is heavily inspired by Swarm's [SWAP protocol](https://www.bokconsulting.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/tron-fischer-sw3.pdf), and works by doing pairwise accounting for resources. +Nodes MAY implement accounting, keeping track of resource usage. +It is heavily inspired by Swarm's [SWAP protocol](https://www.bokconsulting.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/tron-fischer-sw3.pdf), +and works by doing pairwise accounting for resources. -Each node keeps track of resource usage with all other nodes. Whenever an envelope is received from a node that is expected (fits bloom filter or topic interest, is legal, etc) this is tracked. +Each node keeps track of resource usage with all other nodes. +Whenever an envelope is received from a node that is expected +(fits bloom filter or topic interest, is legal, etc) this is tracked. -Every epoch (say, every minute or every time an event happens) statistics SHOULD be aggregated and saved by the client: +Every epoch (say, every minute or every time an event happens) +statistics SHOULD be aggregated and saved by the client: | peer | sent | received | |-------|------|----------| | peer1 | 0 | 123 | | peer2 | 10 | 40 | -In later versions this will be amended by nodes communication thresholds, settlements and disconnect logic. +In later versions this will be amended by nodes communication thresholds, +settlements and disconnect logic. ## Upgradability and Compatibility ### General principles and policy -The currently advertised capability is `waku/1`. This needs to be advertised in the `hello` `ÐΞVp2p` [packet](https://ethereum.gitbooks.io/frontier-guide/devp2p.html). -If a node supports multiple versions of `waku`, those needs to be explicitly advertised. For example if both `waku/0` and `waku/1` are supported, both `waku/0` and `waku/1` MUST be advertised. +The currently advertised capability is `waku/1`. +This needs to be advertised in the `hello` `ÐΞVp2p` [packet](https://ethereum.gitbooks.io/frontier-guide/devp2p.html). +If a node supports multiple versions of `waku`, those needs to be explicitly advertised. +For example if both `waku/0` and `waku/1` are supported, +both `waku/0` and `waku/1` MUST be advertised. -These are policies that guide how we make decisions when it comes to upgradability, compatibility, and extensibility: +These are policies that guide how we make decisions when it comes to upgradability, +compatibility, and extensibility: 1. Waku aims to be compatible with previous and future versions. -2. In cases where we want to break this compatibility, we do so gracefully and as a single decision point. +2. In cases where we want to break this compatibility, +we do so gracefully and as a single decision point. 3. To achieve this, we employ the following two general strategies: + - a) Accretion (including protocol negotiation) over changing data -- b) When we want to change things, we give it a new name (for example, a version number). +- b) When we want to change things, we give it a new name +(for example, a version number). Examples: -- We enable bridging between `shh/6` and `waku/1` until such a time as when we are ready to gracefully drop support for `shh/6` (1, 2, 3). -- When we add parameter fields, we (currently) do so by accreting them in a list, so old clients can ignore new fields (dynamic list) and new clients can use new capabilities (1, 3). -- To better support (2) and (3) in the future, we will likely release a new version that gives better support for open, growable maps (association lists or native map type) (3) -- When we we want to provide a new set of packets that have different requirements, we do so under a new protocol version and employ protocol versioning. This is a form of accretion at a level above - it ensures a client can support both protocols at once and drop support for legacy versions gracefully. (1,2,3) +- We enable bridging between `shh/6` and +`waku/1` until such a time as when we are ready to gracefully drop support +for `shh/6` (1, 2, 3). +- When we add parameter fields, +we (currently) do so by accreting them in a list, +so old clients can ignore new fields (dynamic list) and +new clients can use new capabilities (1, 3). +- To better support (2) and (3) in the future, +we will likely release a new version that gives better support for open, +growable maps (association lists or native map type) (3) +- When we we want to provide a new set of packets that have different requirements, +we do so under a new protocol version and employ protocol versioning. +This is a form of accretion at a level above - +it ensures a client can support both protocols at once and +drop support for legacy versions gracefully. (1,2,3) ### Backwards Compatibility -Waku is a different subprotocol from Whisper so it isn't directly compatible. However, the data format is the same, so compatibility can be achieved by the use of a bridging mode as described below. Any client which does not implement certain packet codes should gracefully ignore the packets with those codes. This will ensure the forward compatibility. +Waku is a different subprotocol from Whisper so it isn't directly compatible. +However, the data format is the same, +so compatibility can be achieved by the use of a bridging mode as described below. +Any client which does not implement certain packet codes +should gracefully ignore the packets with those codes. +This will ensure the forward compatibility. ### Waku-Whisper bridging -`waku/1` and `shh/6` are different DevP2P subprotocols, however they share the same data format making their envelopes compatible. This means we can bridge the protocols naively, this works as follows. +`waku/1` and `shh/6` are different DevP2P subprotocols, +however they share the same data format making their envelopes compatible. +This means we can bridge the protocols naively, this works as follows. **Roles:** + - Waku client A, only Waku capability - Whisper client B, only Whisper capability - WakuWhisper bridge C, both Waku and Whisper capability **Flow:** + 1. A posts envelope; B posts envelope. 2. C picks up envelope from A and B and relays them both to Waku and Whisper. 3. A receives envelope on Waku; B on Whisper. -**Note**: This flow means if another bridge C1 is active, we might get duplicate relaying for a envelope between C1 and C2. I.e. Whisper(<>Waku<>Whisper)<>Waku, A-C1-C2-B. Theoretically this bridging chain can get as long as TTL permits. +**Note**: This flow means if another bridge C1 is active, +we might get duplicate relaying for a envelope between C1 and C2. +I.e. Whisper(<>Waku<>Whisper)<>Waku, A-C1-C2-B. +Theoretically this bridging chain can get as long as TTL permits. ### Forward Compatibility -It is desirable to have a strategy for maintaining forward compatibility between `waku/1` and future version of waku. Here we outline some concerns and strategy for this. - -- **Connecting to nodes with multiple versions:** The way this SHOULD be accomplished is by negotiating the versions of subprotocols, within the `hello` packet nodes transmit their capabilities along with a version. The highest common version should then be used. -- **Adding new packet codes:** New packet codes can be added easily due to the available packet codes. Unknown packet codes SHOULD be ignored. Upgrades that add new packet codes SHOULD implement some fallback mechanism if no response was received for nodes that do not yet understand this packet. -- **Adding new options in `status-options`:** New options can be added to the `status-options` association list in the `status` and `status-update` packet as options are OPTIONAL and unknown option keys SHOULD be ignored. A node SHOULD NOT disconnect from a peer when receiving `status-options` with unknown option keys. +It is desirable to have a strategy for maintaining forward compatibility +between `waku/1` and future version of waku. +Here we outline some concerns and strategy for this. + +- **Connecting to nodes with multiple versions:** +The way this SHOULD be accomplished is by negotiating the versions of subprotocols, +within the `hello` packet nodes transmit their capabilities along with a version. +The highest common version should then be used. +- **Adding new packet codes:** +New packet codes can be added easily due to the available packet codes. +Unknown packet codes SHOULD be ignored. +Upgrades that add new packet codes SHOULD implement some fallback mechanism +if no response was received for nodes that do not yet understand this packet. +- **Adding new options in `status-options`:** +New options can be added to the `status-options` association list in the `status` +and `status-update` packet as options are OPTIONAL and +unknown option keys SHOULD be ignored. +A node SHOULD NOT disconnect from a peer when receiving `status-options` +with unknown option keys. ## Appendix A: Security considerations -There are several security considerations to take into account when running Waku. Chief among them are: scalability, DDoS-resistance and privacy. These also vary depending on what capabilities are used. The security considerations for extra capabilities such as [mailservers](../8/mail.md#security-considerations) can be found in their respective specifications. +There are several security considerations to take into account when running Waku. +Chief among them are: scalability, DDoS-resistance and privacy. +These also vary depending on what capabilities are used. +The security considerations for extra capabilities, +such as [mailservers](../8/mail.md#security-considerations) +can be found in their respective specifications. ### Scalability and UX -#### Bandwidth usage: +#### Bandwidth usage -In version 0 of Waku, bandwidth usage is likely to be an issue. For more investigation into this, see the theoretical scaling model described [here](https://github.com/vacp2p/research/tree/dcc71f4779be832d3b5ece9c4e11f1f7ec24aac2/whisper_scalability). +In version 0 of Waku, bandwidth usage is likely to be an issue. +For more investigation into this, +see the theoretical scaling model described +[here](https://github.com/vacp2p/research/tree/dcc71f4779be832d3b5ece9c4e11f1f7ec24aac2/whisper_scalability). -#### Gossip-based routing: +#### Gossip-based routing -Use of gossip-based routing doesn't necessarily scale. It means each node can see an envelope multiple times, and having too many light nodes can cause propagation probability that is too low. See [Whisper vs PSS](https://our.status.im/whisper-pss-comparison/) for more and a possible Kademlia based alternative. +Use of gossip-based routing doesn't necessarily scale. +It means each node can see an envelope multiple times, and +having too many light nodes can cause propagation probability that is too low. +See [Whisper vs PSS](https://our.status.im/whisper-pss-comparison/) +for more and a possible Kademlia based alternative. -#### Lack of incentives: +#### Lack of incentives -Waku currently lacks incentives to run nodes, which means node operators are more likely to create centralized choke points. +Waku currently lacks incentives to run nodes, +which means node operators are more likely to create centralized choke points. ### Privacy -#### Light node privacy: +#### Light node privacy -The main privacy concern with a light node is that it has to reveal its topic interests (in addition to its IP/ID) to its directed peers. This is because when a light node publishes an envelope, its directed peers will know that the light node owns that envelope (as light nodes do not relay other envelopes). Therefore, the directed peers of a light node can make assumptions about what envelopes (topics) the light node is interested in. +The main privacy concern with a light node +is that it has to reveal its topic interests +(in addition to its IP/ID) to its directed peers. +This is because when a light node publishes an envelope, +its directed peers will know that the light node owns that envelope +(as light nodes do not relay other envelopes). +Therefore, the directed peers of a light node can make assumptions about what envelopes +(topics) the light node is interested in. +#### Mailserver client privacy -#### Mailserver client privacy: +A mailserver client fetches archival envelopes from a mailserver +through a direct connection. +In this direct connection, +the client discloses its IP/ID as well as the topics/ bloom filter +it is interested in to the mailserver. +The collection of such information allows the mailserver to link clients' IP/IDs +to their topic interests and build a profile for each client over time. +As such, the mailserver client has to trust the mailserver with this level of information. -A mailserver client fetches archival envelopes from a mailserver through a direct connection. -In this direct connection, the client discloses its IP/ID as well as the topics/ bloom filter it is interested in to the mailserver. -The collection of such information allows the mailserver to link clients' IP/IDs to their topic interests and build a profile for each client over time. -As such, the mailserver client has to trust the mailserver with this level of information. +#### Bloom filter privacy -#### Bloom filter privacy: +By having a bloom filter where only the topics you are interested in are set, +you reveal which envelopes you are interested in. +This is a fundamental tradeoff between bandwidth usage and privacy, +though the tradeoff space is likely suboptimal in terms of the [Anonymity](https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/954.pdf) +[trilemma](https://petsymposium.org/2019/files/hotpets/slides/coordination-helps-anonymity-slides.pdf). -By having a bloom filter where only the topics you are interested in are set, you reveal which envelopes you are interested in. This is a fundamental tradeoff between bandwidth usage and privacy, though the tradeoff space is likely suboptimal in terms of the [Anonymity](https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/954.pdf) [trilemma](https://petsymposium.org/2019/files/hotpets/slides/coordination-helps-anonymity-slides.pdf). +#### Privacy guarantees not rigorous -#### Privacy guarantees not rigorous: +Privacy for Whisper / Waku haven't been studied rigorously for various threat models +like global passive adversary, local active attacker, etc. +This is unlike e.g. Tor and mixnets. -Privacy for Whisper / Waku haven't been studied rigorously for various threat models like global passive adversary, local active attacker, etc. This is unlike e.g. Tor and mixnets. +#### Topic hygiene -#### Topic hygiene: - -Similar to bloom filter privacy, if you use a very specific topic you reveal more information. See scalability model linked above. +Similar to bloom filter privacy, +if you use a very specific topic you reveal more information. +See scalability model linked above. ### Spam resistance **PoW bad for heterogeneous devices:** -Proof of work is a poor spam prevention mechanism. A mobile device can only have a very low PoW in order not to use too much CPU / burn up its phone battery. This means someone can spin up a powerful node and overwhelm the network. +Proof of work is a poor spam prevention mechanism. +A mobile device can only have a very low PoW +in order not to use too much CPU / burn up its phone battery. +This means someone can spin up a powerful node and overwhelm the network. ### Censorship resistance **Devp2p TCP port blockable:** -By default Devp2p runs on port `30303`, which is not commonly used for any other service. This means it is easy to censor, e.g. airport WiFi. This can be mitigated somewhat by running on e.g. port `80` or `443`, but there are still outstanding issues. See libp2p and Tor's Pluggable Transport for how this can be improved. +By default Devp2p runs on port `30303`, +which is not commonly used for any other service. +This means it is easy to censor, e.g. airport WiFi. +This can be mitigated somewhat by running on e.g. port `80` or `443`, +but there are still outstanding issues. +See libp2p and Tor's Pluggable Transport for how this can be improved. ## Appendix B: Implementation Notes @@ -519,17 +724,23 @@ By default Devp2p runs on port `30303`, which is not commonly used for any other Notes useful for implementing Waku mode. - 1. Avoid duplicate envelopes + 1.Avoid duplicate envelopes - To avoid duplicate envelopes, only connect to one Waku node. Benign duplicate envelopes is an intrinsic property of Whisper which often leads to a N factor increase in traffic, where N is the number of peers you are connected to. + To avoid duplicate envelopes, +only connect to one Waku node. +Benign duplicate envelopes is an intrinsic property of Whisper +which often leads to a N factor increase in traffic, +where N is the number of peers you are connected to. - 2. Topic specific recommendations + 2.Topic specific recommendations - Consider partition topics based on some usage, to avoid too much traffic on a single topic. + Consider partition topics based on some usage, +to avoid too much traffic on a single topic. ### Node discovery -Resource restricted devices SHOULD use [EIP-1459](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1459) to discover nodes. +Resource restricted devices SHOULD use [EIP-1459](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1459) +to discover nodes. Known static nodes MAY also be used. @@ -567,16 +778,21 @@ Released [April 21,2020](https://github.com/vacp2p/specs/commit/9e650995f2417984 Released [March 17,2020](https://github.com/vacp2p/specs/commit/7b9dc562bc50c6bb844ac575cb221ec9cda2530a) -- Clarify the preferred way of handling unknown keys in the `status-options` association list. -- Correct spec/implementation mismatch: Change RLP keys to be the their int values in order to reflect production behavior +- Clarify the preferred way of handling unknown keys +in the `status-options` association list. +- Correct spec/implementation mismatch: +Change RLP keys to be the their int values in order to reflect production behavior ### Version 0.4 Released [February 21, 2020](https://github.com/vacp2p/specs/commit/17bd066e317bbe33af07146b721d73f24de47e88). - Simplify implementation matrix with latest state -- Introduces a new required packet code Status Code (`0x22`) for communicating option changes -- Deprecates the following packet codes: PoW Requirement (`0x02`), Bloom Filter (`0x03`), Rate limits (`0x20`), Topic interest (`0x21`) - all superseded by the new Status Code (`0x22`) +- Introduces a new required packet code Status Code (`0x22`) +for communicating option changes +- Deprecates the following packet codes: PoW Requirement (`0x02`), +Bloom Filter (`0x03`), Rate limits (`0x20`), Topic interest (`0x21`) - +all superseded by the new Status Code (`0x22`) - Increased `topic-interest` capacity from 1000 to 10000 ### Version 0.3 @@ -586,7 +802,8 @@ Released [February 13, 2020](https://github.com/vacp2p/specs/commit/73138d6ba954 - Recommend DNS based node discovery over other Discovery methods. - Mark spec as Draft mode in terms of its lifecycle. - Simplify Changelog and misc formatting. -- Handshake/Status packet not compatible with shh/6 nodes; specifying options as association list. +- Handshake/Status packet not compatible with shh/6 nodes; +specifying options as association list. - Include topic-interest in Status handshake. - Upgradability policy. - `topic-interest` packet code. @@ -602,7 +819,8 @@ Released [December 10, 2019](https://github.com/vacp2p/specs/blob/waku-0.2.0/wak - More details on handshake modifications. - Accounting for resources mode (experimental) - Appendix with security considerations: scalability and UX, privacy, and spam resistance. -- Appendix with implementation notes and implementation matrix across various clients with breakdown per capability. +- Appendix with implementation notes and +implementation matrix across various clients with breakdown per capability. - More details on handshake and parameters. - Describe rate limits in more detail. - More details on mailserver and mail client API. @@ -629,7 +847,6 @@ confirmations-enabled and rate-limits Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). - ## Footnotes [^1]: Felix Lange et al. [The RLPx Transport Protocol](https://github.com/ethereum/devp2p/blob/master/rlpx.md). Ethereum. diff --git a/waku/standards/legacy/7/data.md b/waku/standards/legacy/7/data.md index d2e9f758f..a0e4f3cbe 100644 --- a/waku/standards/legacy/7/data.md +++ b/waku/standards/legacy/7/data.md @@ -9,24 +9,29 @@ contributors: - Kim De Mey --- -This specification describes the encryption, decryption and signing of the content in the [data field used in Waku](../6/waku1.md/#abnf-specification). +This specification describes the encryption, +decryption and signing of the content in the [data field used in Waku](../6/waku1.md/#abnf-specification). ## Specification -The `data` field is used within the `waku envelope`, the field MUST contain the encrypted payload of the envelope. +The `data` field is used within the `waku envelope`, +the field MUST contain the encrypted payload of the envelope. The fields that are concatenated and encrypted as part of the `data` field are: - - flags - - auxiliary field - - payload - - padding - - signature - -In case of symmetric encryption, a `salt` (a.k.a. AES Nonce, 12 bytes) field MUST be appended. + +- flags +- auxiliary field +- payload +- padding +- signature + +In case of symmetric encryption, a `salt` +(a.k.a. AES Nonce, 12 bytes) field MUST be appended. ### ABNF -Using [Augmented Backus-Naur form (ABNF)](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5234) we have the following format: +Using [Augmented Backus-Naur form (ABNF)](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5234) +we have the following format: ```abnf ; 1 byte; first two bits contain the size of auxiliary field, @@ -53,11 +58,23 @@ data = flags auxiliary-field payload padding [signature] [salt] ### Signature -Those unable to decrypt the envelope data are also unable to access the signature. The signature, if provided, is the ECDSA signature of the Keccak-256 hash of the unencrypted data using the secret key of the originator identity. The signature is serialized as the concatenation of the `R`, `S` and `V` parameters of the SECP-256k1 ECDSA signature, in that order. `R` and `S` MUST be big-endian encoded, fixed-width 256-bit unsigned. `V` MUST be an 8-bit big-endian encoded, non-normalized and should be either 27 or 28. +Those unable to decrypt the envelope data are also unable to access the signature. +The signature, if provided, +is the ECDSA signature of the Keccak-256 hash of the unencrypted data +using the secret key of the originator identity. +The signature is serialized as the concatenation of the `R`, `S` and +`V` parameters of the SECP-256k1 ECDSA signature, in that order. +`R` and `S` MUST be big-endian encoded, fixed-width 256-bit unsigned. +`V` MUST be an 8-bit big-endian encoded, +non-normalized and should be either 27 or 28. ### Padding -The padding field is used to align data size, since data size alone might reveal important metainformation. Padding can be arbitrary size. However, it is recommended that the size of Data Field (excluding the Salt) before encryption (i.e. plain text) SHOULD be factor of 256 bytes. +The padding field is used to align data size, +since data size alone might reveal important metainformation. +Padding can be arbitrary size. +However, it is recommended that the size of Data Field (excluding the Salt) +before encryption (i.e. plain text) SHOULD be factor of 256 bytes. ## Copyright diff --git a/waku/standards/legacy/8/mail.md b/waku/standards/legacy/8/mail.md index 53a334935..3d8d54436 100644 --- a/waku/standards/legacy/8/mail.md +++ b/waku/standards/legacy/8/mail.md @@ -12,19 +12,30 @@ contributors: ## Abstract -In this specification, we describe Mailservers. These are nodes responsible for archiving envelopes and delivering them to peers on-demand. +In this specification, we describe Mailservers. +These are nodes responsible for archiving envelopes and +delivering them to peers on-demand. ## Specification -A node which wants to provide mailserver functionality MUST store envelopes from incoming Messages packets (Waku packet-code `0x01`). The envelopes can be stored in any format, however they MUST be serialized and deserialized to the Waku envelope format. +A node which wants to provide mailserver functionality MUST store envelopes +from incoming Messages packets (Waku packet-code `0x01`). +The envelopes can be stored in any format, +however they MUST be serialized and deserialized to the Waku envelope format. -A mailserver SHOULD store envelopes for all topics to be generally useful for any peer, however for specific use cases it MAY store envelopes for a subset of topics. +A mailserver SHOULD store envelopes for all topics +to be generally useful for any peer, +however for specific use cases it MAY store envelopes for a subset of topics. ### Requesting Historic Envelopes -In order to request historic envelopes, a node MUST send a packet P2P Request (`0x7e`) to a peer providing mailserver functionality. This packet requires one argument which MUST be a Waku envelope. +In order to request historic envelopes, +a node MUST send a packet P2P Request (`0x7e`) +to a peer providing mailserver functionality. +This packet requires one argument which MUST be a Waku envelope. -In the Waku envelope's payload section, there MUST be RLP-encoded information about the details of the request: +In the Waku envelope's payload section, +there MUST be RLP-encoded information about the details of the request: ```abnf ; UNIX time in seconds; oldest requested envelope's creation time @@ -55,21 +66,44 @@ payload-with-topic = "[" lower upper bloom limit cursor [ topics ] "]" payload = payload-with-topic | payload-without-topic ``` -The `Cursor` field SHOULD be filled in if a number of envelopes between `Lower` and `Upper` is greater than `Limit` so that the requester can send another request using the obtained `Cursor` value. What exactly is in the `Cursor` is up to the implementation. The requester SHOULD NOT use a `Cursor` obtained from one mailserver in a request to another mailserver because the format or the result MAY be different. +The `Cursor` field SHOULD be filled in if a number of envelopes between `Lower` and +`Upper` is greater than `Limit` so that the requester can send another request +using the obtained `Cursor` value. +What exactly is in the `Cursor` is up to the implementation. +The requester SHOULD NOT use a `Cursor` obtained from one mailserver in a request +to another mailserver because the format or the result MAY be different. -The envelope MUST be encrypted with a symmetric key agreed between the requester and Mailserver. +The envelope MUST be encrypted with a symmetric key agreed between the requester +and Mailserver. -If `Topics` is used the `Cursor` field MUST be specified for the argument order to be unambiguous. However, it MAY be set to `null`. `Topics` is used to specify which topics a node is interested in. If `Topics` is not empty, a mailserver MUST only send envelopes that belong to a topic from `Topics` list and `Bloom` value MUST be ignored. +If `Topics` is used the `Cursor` field MUST be specified +for the argument order to be unambiguous. +However, it MAY be set to `null`. +`Topics` is used to specify which topics a node is interested in. +If `Topics` is not empty, +a mailserver MUST only send envelopes that belong to a topic from `Topics` list and +`Bloom` value MUST be ignored. ### Receiving Historic Envelopes -Historic envelopes MUST be sent to a peer as a packet with a P2P Message code (`0x7f`) followed by an array of Waku envelopes. A Mailserver MUST limit the amount of messages sent, either by the `Limit` specified in the request or limited to the maximum [RLPx packet size](./waku#maximum-packet-size), whichever limit comes first. +Historic envelopes MUST be sent to a peer as a packet with a P2P Message code (`0x7f`) +followed by an array of Waku envelopes. +A Mailserver MUST limit the amount of messages sent, +either by the `Limit` specified in the request or +limited to the maximum [RLPx packet size](./waku#maximum-packet-size), +whichever limit comes first. -In order to receive historic envelopes from a mailserver, a node MUST trust the selected mailserver, that is allow to receive expired packets with the P2P Message code. By default, such packets are discarded. +In order to receive historic envelopes from a mailserver, +a node MUST trust the selected mailserver, +that is allow to receive expired packets with the P2P Message code. +By default, such packets are discarded. -Received envelopes MUST be passed through the Whisper envelope pipelines so that they are picked up by registered filters and passed to subscribers. +Received envelopes MUST be passed through the Whisper envelope pipelines +so that they are picked up by registered filters and passed to subscribers. -For a requester, to know that all envelopes have been sent by mailserver, it SHOULD handle P2P Request Complete code (`0x7d`). This code is followed by a list with: +For a requester, to know that all envelopes have been sent by mailserver, +it SHOULD handle P2P Request Complete code (`0x7d`). +This code is followed by a list with: ```abnf ; array with a Keccak-256 hash of the envelope containing the original request. @@ -84,27 +118,39 @@ cursor = *OCTET payload = "[" request-id last-envelope-hash [ cursor ] "]" ``` -If `Cursor` is not empty, it means that not all envelopes were sent due to the set `Limit` in the request. One or more consecutive requests MAY be sent with `Cursor` field filled in in order to receive the rest of the envelopes. +If `Cursor` is not empty, +it means that not all envelopes were sent due to the set `Limit` in the request. +One or more consecutive requests MAY be sent with `Cursor` field filled +in order to receive the rest of the envelopes. ### Security considerations -There are several security considerations to take into account when running or interacting with Mailservers. Chief among them are: scalability, DDoS-resistance and privacy. +There are several security considerations to take into account when running or +interacting with Mailservers. +Chief among them are: scalability, DDoS-resistance and privacy. **Mailserver High Availability requirement:** -A mailserver has to be online to receive envelopes for other nodes, this puts a high availability requirement on it. +A mailserver has to be online to receive envelopes for other nodes, +this puts a high availability requirement on it. **Mailserver client privacy:** -A mailserver client fetches archival envelopes from a mailserver through a direct connection. -In this direct connection, the client discloses its IP/ID as well as the topics/ bloom filter it is interested in to the mailserver. -The collection of such information allows the mailserver to link clients' IP/IDs to their topic interests and build a profile for each client over time. +A mailserver client fetches archival envelopes from a mailserver +through a direct connection. +In this direct connection, +the client discloses its IP/ID as well as the topics/ bloom filter +it is interested in to the mailserver. +The collection of such information allows the mailserver to link clients' IP/IDs +to their topic interests and build a profile for each client over time. As such, the mailserver client has to trust the mailserver with this level of information. -A similar concern exists for the light nodes and their direct peers which is discussed in the security considerations of [6/WAKU1](../6/waku1.md). +A similar concern exists for the light nodes and +their direct peers which is discussed in the security considerations of [6/WAKU1](../6/waku1.md). **Mailserver trusted connection:** -A mailserver has a direct TCP connection, which means they are trusted to send traffic. This means a malicious or malfunctioning mailserver can overwhelm an individual node. +A mailserver has a direct TCP connection, which means they are trusted to send traffic. +This means a malicious or malfunctioning mailserver can overwhelm an individual node. ## Changelog diff --git a/waku/standards/legacy/9/rpc.md b/waku/standards/legacy/9/rpc.md index ee72467e0..19b8127fb 100644 --- a/waku/standards/legacy/9/rpc.md +++ b/waku/standards/legacy/9/rpc.md @@ -9,8 +9,10 @@ contributors: - Oskar Thorén --- -This specification describes the RPC API that Waku nodes MAY adhere to. The unified API allows clients to easily -be able to connect to any node implementation. The API described is privileged as a node stores the keys of clients. +This specification describes the RPC API that Waku nodes MAY adhere to. +The unified API allows clients to easily +be able to connect to any node implementation. +The API described is privileged as a node stores the keys of clients. ## Introduction @@ -20,7 +22,10 @@ This API is based off the [Whisper V6 RPC API](https://github.com/ethereum/go-et ### Transport -Nodes SHOULD expose a [JSON RPC](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification) API that can be accessed. The JSON RPC version SHOULD be `2.0`. Below is an example request: +Nodes SHOULD expose a [JSON RPC](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification) API +that can be accessed. +The JSON RPC version SHOULD be `2.0`. +Below is an example request: ```json { @@ -46,7 +51,11 @@ In this section you will find objects used throughout the JSON RPC API. #### Message -The message object represents a Waku message. Below you will find the description of the attributes contained in the message object. A message is the decrypted payload and padding of an [envelope](../7/data.md) along with all of its metadata and other extra information such as the hash. +The message object represents a Waku message. +Below you will find the description of the attributes contained in the message object. +A message is the decrypted payload and +padding of an [envelope](../7/data.md) along with all of its metadata and +other extra information such as the hash. | Field | Type | Description | | ----: | :--: | ----------- | @@ -62,7 +71,8 @@ The message object represents a Waku message. Below you will find the descriptio #### Filter -The filter object represents filters that can be applied to retrieve messages. Below you will find the description of the attributes contained in the filter object. +The filter object represents filters that can be applied to retrieve messages. +Below you will find the description of the attributes contained in the filter object. | Field | Type | Description | | ----: | :--: | ----------- | @@ -73,7 +83,9 @@ The filter object represents filters that can be applied to retrieve messages. B | `topics` | array | Array of possible topics, this can also contain partial topics | | `allowP2P` | boolean | Indicates if this filter allows processing of direct peer-to-peer messages | -All fields are optional, however `symKeyID` or `privateKeyID` must be present, it cannot be both. Additionally, the `topics` field is only optional when an asymmetric key is used. +All fields are optional, however `symKeyID` or `privateKeyID` must be present, +it cannot be both. +Additionally, the `topics` field is only optional when an asymmetric key is used. ### Methods @@ -93,11 +105,11 @@ none The `waku_info` method returns information about a Waku node. -##### Parameters +Parameters none -##### Response +Response The response is an `Object` containing the following fields: @@ -108,202 +120,231 @@ The response is an `Object` containing the following fields: #### `waku_setMaxEnvelopeSize` -Sets the maximum envelope size allowed by this node. Any envelopes larger than this size both incoming and outgoing will be rejected. The envelope size can never exceed the underlying envelope size of `10mb`. +Sets the maximum envelope size allowed by this node. +Any envelopes larger than this size both incoming and outgoing will be rejected. +The envelope size can never exceed the underlying envelope size of `10mb`. -##### Parameters +Parameters - - **number** - The message size in bytes. +- **number** - The message size in bytes. -##### Response +Response -- **bool** - `true` on success or an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure. +- **bool** - +`true` on success or +an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure. #### `waku_setMinPoW` Sets the minimal PoW required by this node. -##### Parameters +Parameters - - **number** - The new PoW requirement. +- **number** - The new PoW requirement. -##### Response +Response -- **bool** - `true` on success or an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure. +- **bool** - +`true` on success or +an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure. #### `waku_markTrustedPeer` Marks a specific peer as trusted allowing it to send expired messages. -##### Parameters +Parameters - **string** - `enode` of the peer. -##### Response +Response -- **bool** - `true` on success or an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure. +- **bool** - +`true` on success or +an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure. #### `waku_newKeyPair` Generates a keypair used for message encryption and decryption. -##### Parameters +Parameters none -##### Response +Response - - **string** - Key ID on success or an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure. +- **string** - +Key ID on success or +an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure. #### `waku_addPrivateKey` Stores a key and returns its ID. -##### Parameters +Parameters - **string** - Private key as hex bytes. -##### Response +Response - - **string** - Key ID on success or an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure. +- **string** - Key ID on success or +an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure. #### `waku_deleteKeyPair` Deletes a specific key if it exists. -##### Parameters +Parameters - **string** - ID of the Key pair. -##### Response +Response -- **bool** - `true` on success or an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure. +- **bool** - `true` on success or +an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure. #### `waku_hasKeyPair` Checks if the node has a private key of a key pair matching the given ID. -##### Parameters +Parameters - **string** - ID of the Key pair. -##### Response +Response -- **bool** - `true` or `false` or an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure. +- **bool** - +`true` or +`false` or an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure. #### `waku_getPublicKey` Returns the public key for an ID. -##### Parameters +Parameters - **string** - ID of the Key. -##### Response +Response - - **string** - The public key or an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure. +- **string** - The public key or +an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure. #### `waku_getPrivateKey` Returns the private key for an ID. -##### Parameters +Parameters - **string** - ID of the Key. -##### Response +Response - - **string** - The private key or an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure. +- **string** - The private key or +an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure. #### `waku_newSymKey` -Generates a random symmetric key and stores it under an ID. This key can be used to encrypt and decrypt messages where the key is known to both parties. +Generates a random symmetric key and stores it under an ID. +This key can be used to encrypt and +decrypt messages where the key is known to both parties. -##### Parameters +Parameters none -##### Response +Response - - **string** - The key ID or an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure. +- **string** - The key ID or +an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure. #### `waku_addSymKey` Stores the key and returns its ID. -##### Parameters +Parameters - **string** - The raw key for symmetric encryption hex encoded. -##### Response +Response - - **string** - The key ID or an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure. +- **string** - The key ID or +an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure. #### `waku_generateSymKeyFromPassword` Generates the key from a password and stores it. -##### Parameters +Parameters - - **string** - The password. +- **string** - The password. -##### Response +Response - - **string** - The key ID or an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure. +- **string** - The key ID or an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) +on failure. #### `waku_hasSymKey` Returns whether there is a key associated with the ID. -##### Parameters +Parameters - **string** - ID of the Key. -##### Response +Response -- **bool** - `true` or `false` or an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure. +- **bool** - `true` or `false` or an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) +on failure. #### `waku_getSymKey` Returns the symmetric key associated with an ID. -##### Parameters +Parameters - **string** - ID of the Key. -##### Response +Response -- **string** - Raw key on success or an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) of failure. +- **string** - Raw key on success or +an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) of failure. #### `waku_deleteSymKey` Deletes the key associated with an ID. -##### Parameters +Parameters - **string** - ID of the Key. -##### Response +Response -- **bool** - `true` or `false` or an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure. +- **bool** - +`true` or `false` or +an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure. #### `waku_subscribe` -Creates and registers a new subscription to receive notifications for inbound Waku messages. +Creates and +registers a new subscription to receive notifications for inbound Waku messages. -##### Parameters +Parameters The parameters for this request is an array containing the following fields: - 1. **string** - The ID of the function call, in case of Waku this must contain the value "messages". + 1. **string** - The ID of the function call, +in case of Waku this must contain the value "messages". 2. **object** - The [message filter](#filter). -##### Response +Response -- **string** - ID of the subscription or an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure. +- **string** - ID of the subscription or +an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure. -###### Notifications +Notifications -Notifications received by the client contain a [message](#message) matching the filter. Below is an example notification: +Notifications received by the client contain a [message](#message) matching the filter. +Below is an example notification: ```json { @@ -328,81 +369,90 @@ Notifications received by the client contain a [message](#message) matching the #### `waku_unsubscribe` -Cancels and removes an existing subscription. The node MUST stop sending the client notifications. +Cancels and removes an existing subscription. +The node MUST stop sending the client notifications. -##### Parameters +Parameters - - **string** - The subscription ID. +- **string** - The subscription ID. -##### Response +Response - **bool** - `true` or `false` #### `waku_newMessageFilter` -Creates a new message filter within the node. This filter can be used to poll for new messages that match the criteria. +Creates a new message filter within the node. +This filter can be used to poll for new messages that match the criteria. -##### Parameters +Parameters -The request must contain a [message filter](#filter) as its parameter. +The request must contain a [message filter](#filter) as its parameter. -##### Response +Response - - **string** - The ID of the filter. +- **string** - The ID of the filter. #### `waku_deleteMessageFilter` Removes a message filter from the node. -##### Parameters +Parameters -- **string** - ID of the filter created with [`waku_newMessageFilter`](#waku_newMessageFilter). +- **string** - ID of the filter created with [`waku_newMessageFilter`](#waku_newmessagefilter). -##### Response +Response -- **bool** - `true` on success or an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure. +- **bool** - `true` on success or +an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure. #### `waku_getFilterMessages` -Retrieves messages that match a filter criteria and were received after the last time this function was called. +Retrieves messages that match a filter criteria and +were received after the last time this function was called. -##### Parameters +Parameters -- **string** - ID of the filter created with [`waku_newMessageFilter`](#waku_newMessageFilter). +- **string** - ID of the filter created with [`waku_newMessageFilter`](#waku_newmessagefilter). -##### Response +Response -The response contains an array of [messages](#messages) or an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure. +The response contains an array of [messages](#message) or +an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure. #### `waku_post` The `waku_post` method creates a waku envelope and propagates it to the network. -##### Parameters +Parameters The parameters is an `Object` containing the following fields: - - **`symKeyID` [string]** `optional` - The ID of the symmetric key used for encryption - - **`pubKey` [string]** `optional` - The public key for message encryption. - - **`sig` [string]** `optional` - The ID of the signing key. - - **`ttl` [number]** - The time-to-live in seconds. - - **`topic` [string]** - 4 bytes message topic. - - **`payload` [string]** - The payload to be encrypted. - - **`padding` [string]** `optional` - The padding, a byte array of arbitrary length. - - **`powTime` [number]** - Maximum time in seconds to be spent on the proof of work. - - **`powTarget` [number]** - Minimal PoW target required for this message. - - **`targetPeer` [string]** `optional` - The optional peer ID for peer-to-peer messages. - -*Either the **`symKeyID`** or the **`pubKey`** need to be present. It can not be both.* - -#### Response - -- **bool** - `true` on success or an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure. + +- **`symKeyID` [string]** `optional` - The ID of the symmetric key used for encryption +- **`pubKey` [string]** `optional` - The public key for message encryption. +- **`sig` [string]** `optional` - The ID of the signing key. +- **`ttl` [number]** - The time-to-live in seconds. +- **`topic` [string]** - 4 bytes message topic. +- **`payload` [string]** - The payload to be encrypted. +- **`padding` [string]** `optional` - The padding, a byte array of arbitrary length. +- **`powTime` [number]** - Maximum time in seconds to be spent on the proof of work. +- **`powTarget` [number]** - Minimal PoW target required for this message. +- **`targetPeer` [string]** `optional` - The optional peer ID for peer-to-peer messages. + +*Either the **`symKeyID`** or the **`pubKey`** need to be present. +It can not be both.* + +Response + +- **bool** - +`true` on success or +an [error](https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification#error_object) on failure. ## Changelog | Version | Comment | | :--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------:| ---------------- | -| [1.0.0](https://github.com/vacp2p/specs/commit/bc7e75ebb2e45d2cbf6ab27352c113e666df37c8)| Initial release. | +| [1.0.0](https://github.com/vacp2p/specs/commit/bc7e75ebb2e45d2cbf6ab27352c113e666df37c8)| Initial release. | ## Copyright