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"Man is evidently the most intelligent animal but also, it seems, the most emotional." — D.O Hebb
We have produced this primarily to guide our own explorations in computational nonsense.
There are some gaps, but we have found that once mammals have gained some hands-on experience with a subject of models in the field, there is considerable possible transfer, and they are able to assimilate material about other models better once they have had this experience.
D.O Hebb propose that the human capacity for recognizing patterns without eye movement is possible only as the result of an intensive and prolonged visual training that goes on from the movement of birth, during every moment that the eye are open, with an increase in skill evident over a period of 12 to 16 years at least.
During the continuous, intensive, and prolonged visual training of infancy and childhood, we learn to recognize the direction of line and the distance between points, separately for each grossly separate part of the visual field.
Let us assume then that the persistence or repetition of a trace tends to induce lasting cellular changes that add to its stability.
The assumption can be precisely stated as follows: When an axon of cell A is near enough to excite a cell B and repeatedly or persistently takes part in firing it, some growth process or metabolic change takes place in one or both cells such that A's efficiency, as one of the cells firing B, is increased.
The general idea is an old one, that any two cells, or systems of cells that are repeatedly active at the same time will tend to become "associated" so that activity in one facilitates activity in the other.
One cannot guess how great the changes of growth would be; but it is conceivable, even probable, that if one knew where to look for the evidence on would find marked differences of identity in the perceptions of child and adult.
To get psychological theory out of a difficult impasse, one must find a way of reconciling tree things without recourse to animism: perceptual generalization, the stability of memory, and the instabilities of attention.
Our problem essentially is to see how a particular sensory event can have the same central effects on different occasions despite spontaneous central activity.
Considering the association areas as made up of a population of transmission units, two factors must affect the length of time needed to bring all these units under control.
One is the number of controlling fibers leading from sensory areas into association areas. The second is the number of transmission units in the association areas themselves.
We can then regard the stage of primary learning as the period of establishing a first environmental control over the association areas, and so, indirectly over behavior.
The learning occurs when the events to be associated ca already command organized trains of cortical activity; in other words, when the environment has a control of association areas that can be repeated, so that the central activity is not at random and the stimulation can impinge on the same central pattern when the training situation is repeated.
The characteristic adult learning is learning that takes place in a few trials, or in one only.
So adult learning is typically an interaction of two or perhaps three organized activities; being organized, they are capable of a continued existence after cessation of the stimulation that set them off, which gives time for the structural changes of permanent learning to take place.
This organized activity of the association areas is subject to environmental control. To the extent that the control is effective, and re-establishes the same central pattern of activity on successive trials, cumulative learning is possible.
Adult learning is thus a changed relationship between the central effects of separate stimulations, and does not directly concern the precipitating stimulus or, primary, the motor response whose control is embedded in the central activity.
The facts already discussed have indicated that one-trial learning occurs only as the association of concepts with "meaning" having, that is, a large number of associations with other concepts.
But more: the perception of an actual object that can be seen from more than one aspect, and touched, heart, smelled and tasted involves more that one phase cycle.
It must be a hierarchy: of phases, phase cycles, and a cycle of series of cycles.
"Cycle" is of course temporal: referring not to a closed anatomical pathway but to the tendency of a series of activities to recur, irregularly.
The two ideas or concepts to be associated might have not only phases, but one or more subsystems in common.
Two concepts may acquire a latent "association" without even having occurred together in the subject's past experience.
Mind is the central psychological problem, although it is no longer fashionable to say so, psychologists prefer to talk about "cognitive processes" instead.
They also, most of them, abstain from discussion of what those processes consist of and how their effects are achieved.
It is inaccurate-worse, it is misleading, to call psychology the study of behavior:
It is the study of the underlying processes, just as chemistry is the study of the atom rather than pH values and test tubes; but behavior is the primary source of data in modern psychology.
All science, from physics to physiology, is a function of its philosophic presuppositions, but psychology is more vulnerable than others to the effect of misconception in fundamental matter's because the object of its study is after all the human mind and the nature of human thought.
There is a well-developed specially called social psychology, which certainly sounds like social science; but social behavior can be considered from a biological point of view.
The idea that mind is a spirit is a theory of demonic possession, a form of the vitalism that biology got rid of a century ago.
Monism, the idea that mind and matter are not fundamentally different but different forms of the same thing: in practice in psychology, the idea that mental processes are brain processes.
Mind is the capacity for thought, consciousness, a variable state, is a present activity of thought processes in some form; and though itself is an activity of the brain.
The theory that mental events and brain events run side by side, perfectly, correlated but not causally related: in the old analogy, like two clocks that stay perfectly in step but not because either influences the other.
It has been highly regarded as a way of avoiding commitment to an interaction of mind and body, or even worse, identifying them, while recognizing how closely influences the other.
It has been highly regarded as a way of avoiding commitment to an interaction of mind and body, or even worse, identifying them, while recognizing how closely they are related.
Parallelism says that the actors in the theater, representing anger and fear did so with no guidance from their conscious minds; whatever thought there may have been in those entirely separated minds, the bodies functioned on the stage as self-programmed robots.
In the two-clock comparison with parallelism, the two clocks are separate entities by virtue of their reparation in space; if in addition to being identical in function.
They also occupied the same space, as mental activity and brain activity appear to do visual, auditory, verbal fluency, verbal comprehension, and so on each relating to particular parts of the brain, they would be on clock.
The objective evidence tells me that something complex goes on inside my head, I conclude therefore that something else is active also.
Reductionism is not a means of abolishing psychological entities and processes but a way of learning more about them.