diff --git a/contents/english/2-0-information-technology-and-democracy-a-widening-gulf.md b/contents/english/2-0-information-technology-and-democracy-a-widening-gulf.md index eaee9a17..e3900599 100644 --- a/contents/english/2-0-information-technology-and-democracy-a-widening-gulf.md +++ b/contents/english/2-0-information-technology-and-democracy-a-widening-gulf.md @@ -231,12 +231,12 @@ The radical promises of these visions led many to anticipate dramatic economic a Instead of the promised explosion of economic possibility, the last half-century has seen a dramatic deceleration of economic and especially productivity growth. Figure F shows the growth in the United States of “Total Factor Productivity (TFP)”, economists’ most inclusive measure of the improvement in technology, averaged by decades from the beginning of the 20th century to today. Rates during the mid-century “Golden Age” roughly doubled their levels both before and after during the period we dub the “Digital Stagnation”. The pattern is even more dramatic in other liberal democratic countries in Europe and in most of democratic Asia, with South Korea and Taiwan notable exceptions. -To make matters worse, this period of stagnation has also been one of dramatically rising inequality, especially in the United States. Figure G shows average income growth in the US by income percentile during the Golden Age and Great Stagnation respectively. During the Golden Age, income growth was roughly constant across the distribution, but trailed off for top-income earners. During the Digital Stagnation, income growth was higher for higher earners and only exceeded the average level during the Golden Age for those in the top 1%, with even smaller groups earning the great majority of the overall much lower income gains. +To make matters worse, this period of stagnation has also been one of dramatically rising inequality, especially in the United States. Figure G shows average income growth in the US by income percentile during the Golden Age and Digital Stagnation respectively. During the Golden Age, income growth was roughly constant across the distribution, but trailed off for top-income earners. During the Digital Stagnation, income growth was higher for higher earners and only exceeded the average level during the Golden Age for those in the top 1%, with even smaller groups earning the great majority of the overall much lower income gains.
-Shows that during the Golden Age, income growth was even across the income distribution, but lower at the very top, while duing the Great Stagnation it was lower over all but high at the very top. +Shows that during the Golden Age, income growth was even across the income distribution, but lower at the very top, while duing the Digital Stagnation it was lower over all but high at the very top. -**
Figure 2-0-G. Average income growth in the US by income percentile during the Golden Age and Great Stagnation. Source: Saez and Zucman, "The Rise of Income and Wealth Inequality"[^inequality]
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Figure 2-0-G. Average income growth in the US by income percentile during the Golden Age and Digital Stagnation. Source: Saez and Zucman, "The Rise of Income and Wealth Inequality"[^inequality]
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@@ -247,9 +247,9 @@ What has gone so wrong in the last half-century compared to the one before? Eco On the first point, in a series of recent papers, Acemoglu, Pascual Restrepo, and collaborators have documented the shift in the direction of technical progress from the Golden Age to the Digital Stagnation. Figure H summarizes their results, plotting cumulative changes in productivity over time from labor automation (what they call “displacement”) and labor augmentation (what they call “reinstatement”)[^AcemogluRestrepoStudy]. During the Golden Age, reinstatement roughly balanced displacement, leaving the share of income going to workers essentially constant. During the Digital Stagnation, however, displacement has slightly accelerated while reinstatement has dramatically fallen, leading to slower overall productivity growth and a significant reduction in the share of income going to workers. Furthermore, their analysis shows that the inegalitarian effects of this imbalance have been exacerbated by the concentration of displacement among low-skilled workers.
-Figure shows the cumulative overtime changes in productivity attributable to labor displacement v. reinstatement during the Golden Age and the Great Stagnation, illustrating how much stronger displacement was during the Great Stagnation. +Figure shows the cumulative overtime changes in productivity attributable to labor displacement v. reinstatement during the Golden Age and the Digital Stagnation, illustrating how much stronger displacement was during the Digital Stagnation. -**
Figure 2-0-H. Cumulative changes in productivity over time from Displacement (labor automation) and Reinstatement (labor augmentation) during the Golden Age and Great Stagnation. Source: Acemoglu and Restrepo, "Automation and New Tasks: How Technology Displaces and Reinstates Labor"[^AcemogluRestrepo]
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Figure 2-0-H. Cumulative changes in productivity over time from Displacement (labor automation) and Reinstatement (labor augmentation) during the Golden Age and Digital Stagnation. Source: Acemoglu and Restrepo, "Automation and New Tasks: How Technology Displaces and Reinstates Labor"[^AcemogluRestrepo]
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