From 421802015d0c4488695b410478f2de78a041a506 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miguel Young de la Sota Date: Fri, 2 Apr 2021 14:03:13 -0400 Subject: [PATCH] Formally propose a transport-agnostic Cerberus Signed-off-by: Miguel Young de la Sota --- .../RFCs/0001-Transport_Agnosticism.md | 150 ++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 150 insertions(+) create mode 100644 RoT/Protocol/RFCs/0001-Transport_Agnosticism.md diff --git a/RoT/Protocol/RFCs/0001-Transport_Agnosticism.md b/RoT/Protocol/RFCs/0001-Transport_Agnosticism.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..258b72d --- /dev/null +++ b/RoT/Protocol/RFCs/0001-Transport_Agnosticism.md @@ -0,0 +1,150 @@ +* Name: Transport_Agnosticism +* Date: 2021-04-02 +* Pull Request: [#16](https://github.com/opencomputeproject/Security/pull/16) + +# Objective + +Cerberus currently mandates that its messages be exchanged over an MCTP bus, +using a Microsoft-specific PCI vendor ID. This is a limitation for deployments +that might want to speak Cerberus over a completely different bus, such as +SPI, I3C, exotic buses like NVME, or over plain old TCP or UDP for the +purposes of conformance testing. + +This RFC describes a "transport agnostic" model for Cerberus with the following +goals: +- The existing MCTP binding of the protocol works with minimal (or no) changes. +- Cerberus can be used over an arbitrary transport layer without directly + implementing special support for it in a generic Cerberus library. +- References to MCTP in the Cerberus Challenge Protocol specification will be + moved to an appendix, describing it as a possible option for transporting + Cerberus. + +# Proposal + +"Transport agnostic" Cerberus specifies an *admissible transport* as any protocol +or bus that satisfies a set of properties. These properties reflect the +properties of MCTP already used by Cerberus. + +1. An admissible transport is a mechanism for sending a *message* (a dynamically-\ + sized buffer of bytes) from one (not necessarily addressable) endpoint to + another. In other words, the admissible transport is responsible for removing + frames from packets and assembling them in sequence. + +2. Each endpoint has a known *maximum message length*, measured in bytes. The + transport is responsible for negotiating this parameter for each device a + Cerberus device intends to speak to. This parameter must be made available + to the Cerberus protocol but Cerberus itself does not negotiate it. This + parameter must be at least 64 bytes. + +3. Each message is either the request or response half of a Cerberus command, as + defined in the Challenge Protocol. To uniquely identify the type of an + incoming message, the binding of Cerberus to the admissible transport must + specify a *transport-specific header* that contains at a minimum the following + parameters. How they are encoded is irrelevant to Cerberus, beyond that they + be computable without receiving the entire incoming message: + - The command type byte (as specified in the Challenge Protocol). + - Whether this message is the request or response half of the command. + - Whether the payload is authenticated, i.e. whether the payload carried + wether the payload carried a MAC or was encrypted using a shared secret. + - The length of the incoming message, in bytes. + - Addressing information that determines which device sent the message + (the actual contents of this information is irrelevant to Cerberus). + +4. Messages are "addressed", in two respects: + a. A server can take a request and reply to the original sender with a + response, and a client can match up requests and their responses. + b. Cerberus can use addressing information of unspecified format to + construct requests to a specific device (this opaque addressing + information could be present in a PCD, for example). + +By construction, MCTP almost fulfills the above requirements: it provides framing +of a message of arbitrary size, and the PCIe Vendor command provides a location +for the transport-specific header. Note that Cerberus itself performs the +size negotiation at the moment, so that would be moved out of the Challenge +Protocol and into the transport layer. + +The above list is everything Cerberus needs: Cerberus can be spoken over any +admissible transport with no change to the actual bytes present in the +encoded messages. + +# Specification Changelist + +This RFC seeks the following changes to the Challenge Protocol spec: + +- Chapter 3 (Protocol and Hierarchy) should be replaced with the list of + requirements given above. We do not recommend using the above text + exactly; instead, the new Chapter 3 should carefully elaborate each point, + to make it possible for third parties to evaluate whether their chosen + transport layer is admissible. + +- The current contents of Chapter 3, which describes Cerberus-over-MCTP, should + be moved into an appendix, provided as an example admissible transport layer + for I2C connections. The same should be done for Section 8.1, which describes + a legacy protocol built on top of SMBus. + +- The first few sections of Chapter 6 should be modified to not reference MTCP, + and instead refer to the abstract Cerberus header (request bit, type, length) + derived from the transport-specific header. + +- The MCTP-specific errors in Section 6.5 should be removed. Failures such + during message assembly should be handled at the transport layer; the + transport should define an error-reporting mechanism for surfacing such errors + to a client. The nature of this mechanism is not relevant to Cerberus. + +- Mentions of MCTP in Section 6.7 should be removed. The maximum message/packet + size fields should be removed, since the transport layer should negotiate + these while establishing a session, and pass the maximum message size field + along to Cerberus. + +- The same should be done for Section 6.13. + +- The same should also be done for Section 6.18. Since the response makes + reference to payload sizes, we recommend that, instead of replying with + multiple messages of maximum size, we add a "continue" bit to the Get Log + response. When this bit is set, the client must send another request, with + the offset field increased by the length of the Get Log log contents field. + +- The same applies to Sections 6.20, 6.23, and 6.31. + +# Implementation Guidance + +Manticore currently implements the above proposal via the following procedure: +1. Receive a vtable from the library user that provides a function for blocking + until a request arrives from somewhere. + +2. When that function returns, Manticore's machinery calls a different function + in the vtable for parsing the parts of the transport-specific header it needs + to select a message parser and handler (request bit and type byte). + +3. Manticore calls into the appropriate parser, which calls a third function in + the vtable that provides a `read(2)` interface over the message payload to + parse the message. + +4. Pass the parsed message into the appropriate request handler, which constructs + a response. + +5. Manticore then calls a fourth function in the vtable, passing along the type + of the response, that instructs the transport to prepare for a response. Note + that the original request contained addressing information that the vtable + tracks and re-uses for addressing the reply. + +6. The transport encodes a response header; Manticore's serializer calls into a + `write(2)` interface to encode the response. The transport may packetize + the response as its internal buffer fills up. + +7. Manticore calls the final, sixth function to flush the response, sending the + final packet. + +As the author understands it, this is somewhat close to how the Microsoft +implementation handles messages, although it calls the MCTP library directly +rather than virtually. + +Manticore's vtable interface can he found at +https://github.com/lowRISC/manticore/blob/e7a532/src/net.rs#L126. + +# Future Work + +Transport security. This proposal does not cover removing the USB-C-based +transport security from the Cerberus protocol, but we hope to give those +details a similar treatment so that Cerberus can be spoken over transports +which provide their own security such as TLS, QUIC, etc.