forked from elastic/detection-rules
-
Notifications
You must be signed in to change notification settings - Fork 0
/
Copy pathcredential_access_copy_ntds_sam_volshadowcp_cmdline.toml
62 lines (53 loc) · 2.2 KB
/
credential_access_copy_ntds_sam_volshadowcp_cmdline.toml
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
[metadata]
creation_date = "2020/11/24"
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2022/03/31"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic", "Austin Songer"]
description = """
Identifies a copy operation of the Active Directory Domain Database (ntds.dit) or Security Account Manager (SAM) files.
Those files contain sensitive information including hashed domain and/or local credentials.
"""
from = "now-9m"
index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.*", "logs-windows.*"]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
max_signals = 33
name = "NTDS or SAM Database File Copied"
note = """## Config
If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.
"""
references = [
"https://thedfirreport.com/2020/11/23/pysa-mespinoza-ransomware/",
"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-3---esentutlexe-sam-copy",
]
risk_score = 73
rule_id = "3bc6deaa-fbd4-433a-ae21-3e892f95624f"
severity = "high"
tags = ["Elastic", "Host", "Windows", "Threat Detection", "Credential Access"]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"
query = '''
process where event.type in ("start", "process_started") and
(
(process.pe.original_file_name in ("Cmd.Exe", "PowerShell.EXE", "XCOPY.EXE") and
process.args : ("copy", "xcopy", "Copy-Item", "move", "cp", "mv")
) or
(process.pe.original_file_name : "esentutl.exe" and process.args : ("*/y*", "*/vss*", "*/d*"))
) and
process.args : ("*\\ntds.dit", "*\\config\\SAM", "\\*\\GLOBALROOT\\Device\\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy*\\*", "*/system32/config/SAM*")
'''
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1003"
name = "OS Credential Dumping"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/"
[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1003.002"
name = "Security Account Manager"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/002/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0006"
name = "Credential Access"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/"