diff --git a/buildroot-patches/0019-openssh-9.8p1.patch b/buildroot-patches/0019-openssh-9.8p1.patch
index ba552a4607..4a23117124 100644
--- a/buildroot-patches/0019-openssh-9.8p1.patch
+++ b/buildroot-patches/0019-openssh-9.8p1.patch
@@ -33,6 +33,50 @@
 --- 
 -2.43.0
 -
+--- buildroot/package/openssh/0002-sshsigdie-async-signal-unsafe.patch.orig
++++ buildroot/package/openssh/0002-sshsigdie-async-signal-unsafe.patch
+@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
+-From 7f4a743171f9e6b283207d448de6562219774fbf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+-From: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org>
+-Date: Tue, 25 Jun 2024 12:24:29 +0100
+-Subject: Disable async-signal-unsafe code from the sshsigdie() function
+-
+-Address signal handler race condition: if a client does not authenticate
+-within LoginGraceTime seconds (120 by default, 600 in old OpenSSH
+-versions), then sshd's SIGALRM handler is called asynchronously, but
+-this signal handler calls various functions that are not
+-async-signal-safe (for example, syslog()).
+-
+-This is a regression from CVE-2006-5051 ("Signal handler race condition
+-in OpenSSH before 4.4 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of
+-service (crash), and possibly execute arbitrary code")
+-
+-Signed-off-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org>
+-Upstream: https://salsa.debian.org/ssh-team/openssh/-/blob/525bb16e45edac4c03b95e106380d70aecbaf27e/debian/patches/sshsigdie-async-signal-unsafe.patch
+-Patch-Name: sshsigdie-async-signal-unsafe.patch
+----
+- log.c | 2 ++
+- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+-
+-diff --git a/log.c b/log.c
+-index 6a8b1fc4a..57256660f 100644
+---- a/log.c
+-+++ b/log.c
+-@@ -452,12 +452,14 @@ void
+- sshsigdie(const char *file, const char *func, int line, int showfunc,
+-     LogLevel level, const char *suffix, const char *fmt, ...)
+- {
+-+#if 0
+- 	va_list args;
+- 
+- 	va_start(args, fmt);
+- 	sshlogv(file, func, line, showfunc, SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL,
+- 	    suffix, fmt, args);
+- 	va_end(args);
+-+#endif
+- 	_exit(1);
+- }
+- 
 --- buildroot/package/openssh/openssh.hash.orig
 +++ buildroot/package/openssh/openssh.hash
 @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
diff --git a/buildroot-patches/0019-openssh-9.8p1/buildroot/package/openssh/0002-sshsigdie-async-signal-unsafe.patch b/buildroot-patches/0019-openssh-9.8p1/buildroot/package/openssh/0002-sshsigdie-async-signal-unsafe.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e69de29bb2
diff --git a/buildroot-patches/0019-openssh-9.8p1/buildroot/package/openssh/0002-sshsigdie-async-signal-unsafe.patch.orig b/buildroot-patches/0019-openssh-9.8p1/buildroot/package/openssh/0002-sshsigdie-async-signal-unsafe.patch.orig
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..70a890e469
--- /dev/null
+++ b/buildroot-patches/0019-openssh-9.8p1/buildroot/package/openssh/0002-sshsigdie-async-signal-unsafe.patch.orig
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+From 7f4a743171f9e6b283207d448de6562219774fbf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org>
+Date: Tue, 25 Jun 2024 12:24:29 +0100
+Subject: Disable async-signal-unsafe code from the sshsigdie() function
+
+Address signal handler race condition: if a client does not authenticate
+within LoginGraceTime seconds (120 by default, 600 in old OpenSSH
+versions), then sshd's SIGALRM handler is called asynchronously, but
+this signal handler calls various functions that are not
+async-signal-safe (for example, syslog()).
+
+This is a regression from CVE-2006-5051 ("Signal handler race condition
+in OpenSSH before 4.4 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of
+service (crash), and possibly execute arbitrary code")
+
+Signed-off-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org>
+Upstream: https://salsa.debian.org/ssh-team/openssh/-/blob/525bb16e45edac4c03b95e106380d70aecbaf27e/debian/patches/sshsigdie-async-signal-unsafe.patch
+Patch-Name: sshsigdie-async-signal-unsafe.patch
+---
+ log.c | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/log.c b/log.c
+index 6a8b1fc4a..57256660f 100644
+--- a/log.c
++++ b/log.c
+@@ -452,12 +452,14 @@ void
+ sshsigdie(const char *file, const char *func, int line, int showfunc,
+     LogLevel level, const char *suffix, const char *fmt, ...)
+ {
++#if 0
+ 	va_list args;
+ 
+ 	va_start(args, fmt);
+ 	sshlogv(file, func, line, showfunc, SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ 	    suffix, fmt, args);
+ 	va_end(args);
++#endif
+ 	_exit(1);
+ }
+