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In TLS 1.3 and DTLS 1.3, the KeyUpdate message immediately precedes a change of keys.
Here, the initiator of a key update seems to change epoch after receiving a message from its peer, so that when its peer receives records encrypted with the new epoch it either has no indicator (in TLS) or only the epoch marker (in DTLS). If possible, I would prefer to avoid the use of trial decryption.
The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered:
With a Diffie-Hellman I need two messages and I had two choices:
Update the application traffic secret in both directions, or
Update the application traffic secret in the senders direction only.
I have decided to go for the latter approach since this aligns better with DTLS where a ACK in response to a Key Update is needed anyway. The downside is that two DH operations are needed to update the traffic secrets in both directions. Since such a key update is likely to be needed for higher-end devices, this does not seem to be a big issue.
In TLS 1.3 and DTLS 1.3, the KeyUpdate message immediately precedes a change of keys.
Here, the initiator of a key update seems to change epoch after receiving a message from its peer, so that when its peer receives records encrypted with the new epoch it either has no indicator (in TLS) or only the epoch marker (in DTLS). If possible, I would prefer to avoid the use of trial decryption.
The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: