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Request: Support for STL files #876
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Huh, that's an interesting suggestion. I think a bit of a primer of how Dangerzone performs sanitization is needed here, and then I'll ask some questions: Sanitization PrimerThe main idea behind Qubes' TrustedPDF (and by extension Dangerzone) is that santization needs to happen in two stages:
Do the above make sense? Note that there are other ways to perform sanitization of course (see "Content Disarm & Reconstruction"), but they have other cons. QuestionsNow, with the above in mind, let's see how we could do this in Dangerzone:
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Oh, I didn't realize you were producing simple RGB-image PDFs from Open/Libre Office documents too. I thought you were doing some sanitation like stripping macros.
Good question. I'm still waiting to hear back from TALOS to see what their maliciously-crafted But that's quite a bit different if dangerzone currently just literally converts everything to a simple image and puts it in a PDF file.
Well, there is an equivalent: render the stl file (in your untrusted, disposable VM), take a screenshot from the [a] top, [b] bottom, [c] left, and [d] right. Then save those images to a 4-page PDF. I doubt there's a way to go from images back to some 3D file (like an But |
This ticket is a request to add support to dangerzone to sanitize
.stl
files.Why?
I maintain a security-critical GitHub repo, which includes designs for open-source hardware USB dead man switches.
Our hardware designs are maintained in OpenSCAD
.scad
files and.stl
files. The former (.scad
files) are trivial to visually diff and check for potentially-malicious content. The later (.stl
files) are plaintext, but nearly impossible for a human to read-through and scan for potentially-malicious content.The concern is not unfounded: there has been at least one historically-known vulnerability where a maliciously-crafted
.stl
file could be used to trigger a heap buffer overflow. This was identified as a HIGH severity (8.8/10) bug by NIST in CVE-2022-38072As a FOSS hardware project, it would be extremely useful if we had some way to pass
.stl
files committed to us in a PR throughdangerzone
to be sanitized before merging into our repo.Solution
A solution to this would be for
dangerzone
to support sanitizing of.stl
files.The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: