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acvp_sub_kas_ecc.txt
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TBD B. Fussell, Ed.
Internet-Draft Cisco Systems, Inc.
Intended status: Informational R. Hammett, Ed.
Expires: May 11, 2019 G2, Inc.
November 7, 2018
ACVP KAS ECC JSON Specification
draft-ietf-acvp-subkasecc-0.5
Abstract
This document defines the JSON schema for using KAS ECC algorithms
with the ACVP specification.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on May 11, 2019.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Test Types and Test Coverage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Test Coverage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1.1. KAS-ECC Requirements Covered . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1.2. KAS-ECC Requirements Not Covered . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Capabilities Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1. Required Prerequisite Algorithms for KAS ECC Validations 6
3.2. KAS ECC Algorithm Capabilities JSON Values . . . . . . . 8
3.3. Supported KAS ECC Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.4. KAS ECC Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.4.1. KAS ECC Scheme Capabilities JSON Values . . . . . . . 10
3.4.2. Supported KAS ECC Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.5. KAS ECC Modes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.5.1. KAS ECC noKdfNoKc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.5.2. KAS ECC kdfNoKc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.5.3. KAS ECC kdfKc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.6. Parameter Sets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.6.1. KAS ECC Parameter Set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.6.2. KAS ECC Parameter Set Details . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.7. Supported ECC Curves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.8. Supported Hash Algorithm Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.9. Supported KAS ECC MAC Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.10. Supported KAS ECC KDF Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.10.1. Other Information Construction . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.11. Supported KAS ECC KC Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.12. Example KAS ECC Capabilities JSON Object . . . . . . . . 19
3.13. Example KAS ECC Component Capabilities JSON Object . . . 21
4. Generation requirements per party per scheme . . . . . . . . 23
5. Test Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
5.1. Test Groups JSON Schema . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
5.2. Test Case JSON Schema . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
5.3. Example Test Vectors JSON Object . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
5.4. Example Test Vectors Component JSON Object . . . . . . . 40
6. Test Vector Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
6.1. Example Test Results JSON Object . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
6.2. Example Test Results Component JSON Object . . . . . . . 44
7. ECC CDH Component Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
7.1. ECC CDH Component Capabilities JSON Values . . . . . . . 46
7.1.1. Example KAS ECC CDH-Component Capabilities JSON
Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
7.2. ECC CDH Component TestVectors JSON Values . . . . . . . . 47
7.2.1. ECC CDH Component TestGroup JSON Values . . . . . . . 47
7.2.2. ECC CDH Component TestCase JSON Values . . . . . . . 48
7.2.3. Example KAS ECC CDH-Component Test Vectors JSON
Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
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7.3. KAS CDH-Component Test Vector Responses . . . . . . . . . 50
7.4. Example KAS ECC CDH Component Test Results JSON Object . 52
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
11. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
1. Introduction
The Automated Crypto Validation Protocol (ACVP) defines a mechanism
to automatically verify the cryptographic implementation of a
software or hardware crypto module. The ACVP specification defines
how a crypto module communicates with an ACVP server, including
crypto capabilities negotiation, session management, authentication,
vector processing and more. The ACVP specification does not define
algorithm specific JSON constructs for performing the crypto
validation. A series of ACVP sub-specifications define the
constructs for testing individual crypto algorithms. Each sub-
specification addresses a specific class of crypto algorithms. This
sub-specification defines the JSON constructs for testing KAS ECC
algorithms using ACVP.
1.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
2. Test Types and Test Coverage
The ACVP server performs a set of tests on the KAS protocol in order
to assess the correctness and robustness of the implementation. A
typical ACVP validation session SHALL require multiple tests to be
performed for every supported permutation of KAS capabilities. This
section describes the design of the tests used to validate
implementations of KAS algorithms. There are two test types for KAS
testing:
"AFT" - Algorithm Function Test. In the AFT test mode, the IUT
SHALL act as a party in the Key Agreement with the ACVP server.
The server SHALL generate and provide all necessary information
for the IUT to perform a successful key agreement; both the server
and IUT MAY act as party U/V, as well as recipient/provider to key
confirmation.
"VAL" - Validation test. In the VAL test mode, The ACVP server
MUST generate a complete (from both party U and party V's
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perspectives) key agreement, and expects the IUT to be able to
determine if that agreement is valid. Various types of errors
MSUT be introduced in varying portions of the key agreement
process (changed DKM, changed key, changed hash digest, etc), that
the IUT MUST be able to detect and report on.
2.1. Test Coverage
The tests described in this document have the intention of ensuring
an implementation is conformant to [SP800-56a].
2.1.1. KAS-ECC Requirements Covered
SP 800-56a - 4.1 Key Establishment Preparations. The ACVP server
is responsible for generating domain parameters as per the IUT's
capability registration.
SP 800-56a - 4.2 Key-Agreement Process. Both the ACVP server and
IUT participate in the Key Agreement process. The server and IUT
can both take the roles of party U/V, and as such the "performer"
of steps depicted in "Figure 2: Key Agreement process" can vary.
SP 800-56a - 5.1 Cryptographic Hash Functions. All modes of
performing KAS SHALL make use of a hash function. The hash
function MAY be used for confirmation of a successfully generated
shared secret Z (noKdfNoKc), or as a primitive within the KDF
being tested (kdfNoKc and kdfKc).
SP 800-56a - 5.2 Message Authentication Code (MAC) Algorithm. A
MAC is utilized for confirmation of success for kdfNoKc and kdfKc
modes of KAS. Note - a MAC prerequisite is REQUIRED only for
kdfKc, though is utilized for both kdfNoKc and kdfKc.
SP 800-56a - 5.4 Nonce. Nonces are made use of in various KAS
schemes - both the ACVP server and IUT SHALL be expected to
generate nonces.
SP 800-56a - 5.6 Domain Parameters. Domain Parameter Generation
SHALL be performed solely from the ACVP server, with constraints
from the IUTs capabilities registration. The same set of domain
parameters SHALL generate all keypairs (party U/V, static/
ephemeral) for a single test case.
SP 800-56a - 5.6 Key-Pair Generation. While Key-Pairs are used in
each KAS scheme, the generation of said key-pairs is out of scope
for KAS testing. Random tests from the VAL groups, MAY inject bad
keypairs that the IUT MUST be able detect. These random tests are
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only present in groups given appropriate assurance functions see:
Section 3.3
SP 800-56a - 4.3 DLC-based Key-Transport Process / 5.7 DLC
Primitives. Depending on the scheme used, either Diffie Hellman
or MQV SHALL be used to negotiate a shared secret of z. Testing
and validation of such key exchanges is covered under their
respective schemes.
SP 800-56a - 5.8 Key-Derivation Methods for Key-Agreement Schemes.
All schemes/modes save noKdfNoKc (component) MUST make use of a
KDF. KDF construction SHALL utilize Section 3.10.1 for its
pattern.
SP 800-56a - 5.9 Key Confirmation. Most KAS schemes allow for a
Key Confirmation process, the ACVP server and IUT MAY be Providers
or Recipients of said confirmation. Additionally, key
confirmation MAY be performed on one or both parties (depending on
scheme).
SP 800-56a - 6 Key Agreement Schemes. All schemes specified in
referenced document are supported for validation with the ACVP
server.
2.1.2. KAS-ECC Requirements Not Covered
SP 800-56a - 4.1 Key Establishment Preparations. The ACVP server
SHALL NOT make a distinction between IUT generated keys via a
trusted third party and the IUT itself.
SP 800-56a - 5.3 Random Number Generation. The IUT MUST perform
all random number generation with a validated random number
generator. A DRBG is REQUIRED as a prerequisite to KAS, but SHALL
NOT be in the scope testing assurances.
SP 800-56a - 5.4 Nonce. Nonce generation is utilized for several
schemes. The various methods of generating a nonce described in
section 5.5 MUST be used, however their generation SHALL NOT be in
scope of KAS testing assurances
SP 800-56a - 5.5.2 Assurances of Domain-Parameter Validity. The
ACVP server SHALL generate all domain parameters, IUT validation
of such parameters is SHALL NOT be in scope for KAS testing.
SP 800-56a - 5.5.3 Domain Parameter Management. Domain Parameter
Management SHALL NOT be in scope for KAS testing.
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SP 800-56a - 5.6 Key-Pair Generation. While Key-Pairs MUST be
used in each KAS scheme, the generation, assurances, and
management of said key-pairs SHALL NOT be in scope of KAS testing.
SP 800-56a - 5.8 Key-Derivation Methods for Key-Agreement Schemes.
Two-step Key-Derivation (Extraction-then-Expansion) SHALL NOT be
utilized in KAS testing.
SP 800-56a - 5.9 Key Confirmation. KMAC is referenced in 800-56a
as being a valid MAC function; it however SHALL NOT (currently) be
supported in KAS testing.
SP 800-56a - 5.7 Rationale for Selecting a Specific Scheme. It is
expected that the IUT registers all schemes it supports in its
capabilities registration. Selecting specific schemes from a KAS
testing perspective SHALL NOT be in scope.
SP 800-56a - 8 Key Recovery. Key Recovery SHALL NOT be in scope
of KAS testing.
3. Capabilities Registration
ACVP REQUIRES crypto modules to register their capabilities. This
allows the crypto module to advertise support for specific
algorithms, notifying the ACVP server which algorithms need test
vectors generated for the validation process. This section describes
the constructs for advertising support of KAS ECC algorithms to the
ACVP server.
The algorithm capabilities are advertised as JSON objects within the
'algorithms' value of the ACVP registration message. The
'algorithms' value is an array, where each array element is an
individual JSON object defined in this section. The 'algorithms'
value is part of the 'capability_exchange' element of the ACVP JSON
registration message. See the ACVP specification for details on the
registration message. Each KDF algorithm capability advertised is a
self-contained JSON object.
3.1. Required Prerequisite Algorithms for KAS ECC Validations
Some algorithm implementations rely on other cryptographic
primitives. For example, IKEv2 uses an underlying SHA algorithm.
Each of these underlying algorithm primitives must be validated,
either separately or as part of the same submission. ACVP provides a
mechanism for specifying the required prerequisites:
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+--------------+--------------+--------------+-----------+----------+
| JSON Value | Description | JSON type | Valid | Optional |
| | | | Values | |
+--------------+--------------+--------------+-----------+----------+
| algorithm | a | value | CCM, | No |
| | prerequisite | | CMAC, | |
| | algorithm | | DRBG, | |
| | | | ECDSA, | |
| | | | HMAC, SHA | |
| | | | | |
| valValue | algorithm | value | actual | No |
| | validation | | number or | |
| | number | | "same" | |
| | | | | |
| prereqAlgVal | prerequistie | object with | see above | Yes |
| | algorithm | algorithm | | |
| | validation | and valValue | | |
| | | properties | | |
| | | | | |
+--------------+--------------+--------------+-----------+----------+
Table 1: Required Prerequisite Algorithms JSON Values
KAS has conditional prerequisite algorithms, depending on the
capabilities registered:
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+--------------+----------------------------------------------------+
| Prerequisite | Condition |
| Algorithm | |
+--------------+----------------------------------------------------+
| DRBG | Always REQUIRED |
| | |
| SHA | Always REQUIRED |
| | |
| ECDSA | ECDSA.PKV validation REQUIRED when IUT using |
| | assurance functions of "fullVal", "keyPairGen", or |
| | "keyRegen". ECDSA.KeyPair validation REQUIRED when |
| | IUT using assurances functions of "keyPairGen", or |
| | "keyRegen". |
| | |
| AES-CCM | AES-CCM validation REQUIRED when IUT is performing |
| | KeyConfirmation (KC) and utilizing AES-CCM. |
| | |
| CMAC | CMAC validation REQUIRED when IUT is performing |
| | KeyConfirmation (KC) and utilizing CMAC. |
| | |
| HMAC | HMAC validation REQUIRED when IUT is performing |
| | KeyConfirmation (KC) and utilizing HMAC. |
| | |
+--------------+----------------------------------------------------+
Table 2: Prerequisite requirement conditions
3.2. KAS ECC Algorithm Capabilities JSON Values
Each algorithm capability advertised is a self-contained JSON object
using the following values.
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+------------+----------------+--------------+-----------+----------+
| JSON Value | Description | JSON type | Valid | Optional |
| | | | Values | |
+------------+----------------+--------------+-----------+----------+
| algorithm | The algorithm | value | KAS-ECC | No |
| | under test | | | |
| | | | | |
| mode | The algorithm | value | Component | Yes |
| | mode. | | | |
| | | | | |
| prereqVals | Prerequisite | array of | See | No |
| | algorithm | prereqAlgVal | Section | |
| | validations | objects | 3.1 | |
| | | | | |
| function | Type of | array | See | No |
| | function | | Section | |
| | supported | | 3.3 | |
| | | | | |
| scheme | Array of | object | See | No |
| | supported key | | Section | |
| | agreement | | 3.4.1 | |
| | schemes each | | | |
| | having their | | | |
| | own | | | |
| | capabilities | | | |
| | | | | |
+------------+----------------+--------------+-----------+----------+
Table 3: KAS ECC Capabilities JSON Values
Note: Some optional values are required depending on the algorithm.
Failure to provide these values will result in the ACVP server
returning an error to the ACVP client during registration.
3.3. Supported KAS ECC Functions
The following function types MAY be advertised by the ACVP compliant
crypto module:
o dpGen - IUT can perform domain parameter generation (FFC only)
o dpVal - IUT can perform domain parameter validation (FFC only)
o keyPairGen - IUT can perform keypair generation.
o fullVal - IUT can perform full public key validation ( [SP800-56a]
section 5.6.2.3.1 / 5.6.2.3.3)
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o partialVal - IUT can perform partial public key validation (
[SP800-56a] section 5.6.2.3.2 / 5.6.2.3.4)
o keyRegen - IUT can regenerate keys given a specific seed and
domain parameter (pqg for FFC, curve for ECC)
3.4. KAS ECC Schemes
3.4.1. KAS ECC Scheme Capabilities JSON Values
All other scheme capabilities are advertised as a self-contained JSON
object using the following values. Note that at least one of
"noKdfNoKc", "kdfNoKc", or "kdfKc" MUST be supplied with the
registration. See Section 3.4.2 for allowed ECC scheme types.
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+-----------+-----------------------+--------+-----------+----------+
| JSON | Description | JSON | Valid | Optional |
| Value | | type | Values | |
+-----------+-----------------------+--------+-----------+----------+
| kasRole | Roles supported for | array | initiator | No |
| | key agreement | | and/or | |
| | | | responder | |
| | | | | |
| noKdfNoKc | Indicates no KDF, no | object | Section | Yes |
| | KC tests are to be | | 3.5.1 | |
| | generated. Note this | | | |
| | is a COMPONENT mode | | | |
| | only test. This | | | |
| | property MUST only be | | | |
| | used with "KAS-ECC" / | | | |
| | "Component" | | | |
| | | | | |
| kdfNoKc | Indicates KDF, no KC | object | Section | Yes |
| | tests are to be | | 3.5.2 | |
| | generated. Note this | | | |
| | is a KAS-ECC only | | | |
| | test. This mode MAY | | | |
| | only be used for | | | |
| | registrations with | | | |
| | "KAS-ECC" (no mode) | | | |
| | | | | |
| kdfKc | Indicates KDF, KC | object | Section | Yes |
| | tests are to be | | 3.5.3 | |
| | generated. Note this | | | |
| | is a KAS-ECC only | | | |
| | test. This mode MAY | | | |
| | only be used for | | | |
| | registrations with | | | |
| | "KAS-ECC" (no mode) | | | |
| | | | | |
+-----------+-----------------------+--------+-----------+----------+
Table 4: KAS ECC Capabilities JSON Values
3.4.2. Supported KAS ECC Schemes
The following schemes MAY be advertised by the ACVP compliant crypto
module:
o ephemeralUnified - keyConfirmation not supported
o fullMqv
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o fullUnified
o onePassDh - Can only provide unilateral key confirmation party V
to party U.
o onePassMqv
o onePassUnified
o staticUnified
3.5. KAS ECC Modes
3.5.1. KAS ECC noKdfNoKc
Contains properties REQUIRED for "noKdfNoKc" registration.
+--------------+---------------------+--------+----------+----------+
| JSON Value | Description | JSON | Valid | Optional |
| | | type | Values | |
+--------------+---------------------+--------+----------+----------+
| parameterSet | The parameterSet | object | Section | No |
| | options for | | 3.6.1 | |
| | "noKdfNoKc" | | | |
| | | | | |
+--------------+---------------------+--------+----------+----------+
Table 5: NoKdfNoKc Capabilities
3.5.2. KAS ECC kdfNoKc
Contains properties REQUIRED for "kdfNoKc" registration.
+--------------+---------------------+--------+----------+----------+
| JSON Value | Description | JSON | Valid | Optional |
| | | type | Values | |
+--------------+---------------------+--------+----------+----------+
| kdfOption | The kdf options for | object | Section | No |
| | "kdfNoKc" | | 3.10 | |
| | | | | |
| parameterSet | The parameterSet | object | Section | No |
| | options for | | 3.6.1 | |
| | "kdfNoKc" | | | |
| | | | | |
+--------------+---------------------+--------+----------+----------+
Table 6: kdfNoKc Capabilities
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3.5.3. KAS ECC kdfKc
Contains properties REQUIRED for "kdfKc" registration.
+--------------+---------------------+--------+----------+----------+
| JSON Value | Description | JSON | Valid | Optional |
| | | type | Values | |
+--------------+---------------------+--------+----------+----------+
| kdfOption | The kdf options for | object | Section | No |
| | "kdfNoKc" | | 3.10 | |
| | | | | |
| kcOption | The kc options for | object | Section | No |
| | "kdfNoKc" | | 3.11 | |
| | | | | |
| parameterSet | The parameterSet | object | Section | No |
| | options for | | 3.6.1 | |
| | "kdfNoKc" | | | |
| | | | | |
+--------------+---------------------+--------+----------+----------+
Table 7: kdfKc Capabilities
3.6. Parameter Sets
3.6.1. KAS ECC Parameter Set
Each parameter set advertised is a self-contained JSON object using
the following values. Note that at least one parameter set ("eb",
"ec", "ed", "ee") is REQUIRED.
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+----------+------------------+----------+---------------+----------+
| JSON | Description | JSON | Valid Values | Optional |
| Value | | type | | |
+----------+------------------+----------+---------------+----------+
| eb | The eb parameter | object | See Section | Yes |
| | set | | 3.6.2 | |
| | | | | |
| ec | The ec parameter | object | See Section | Yes |
| | set | | 3.6.2 | |
| | | | | |
| ed | The ed parameter | object | See Section | Yes |
| | set | | 3.6.2 | |
| | | | | |
| ee | The ee parameter | object | See Section | Yes |
| | set | | 3.6.2 | |
| | | | | |
+----------+------------------+----------+---------------+----------+
Table 8: KAS ECC Parameter Set Capabilities JSON Values
3.6.2. KAS ECC Parameter Set Details
eb: Len n - 224-255, min Len h - 112, min hash len - 224, min keySize
- 112, min macSize - 64
ec: Len n - 256-283, min Len h - 128, min hash len - 256, min keySize
- 128, min macSize - 64
ed: Len n - 384-511, min Len h - 192, min hash len - 384, min keySize
- 192, min macSize - 64
ee: Len n - 512+, min Len h - 256, min hash len - 512, min keySize -
256, min macSize - 64
"noKdfNoKc" REQUIRES "hashAlg"
"kdfNoKc" REQUIRES "hashAlg" and at least one valid MAC registration
"kdfKc" REQUIRES "hashAlg" and at least one valid MAC registration
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+-----------+-----------------------+--------+-----------+----------+
| JSON | Description | JSON | Valid | Optional |
| Value | | type | Values | |
+-----------+-----------------------+--------+-----------+----------+
| curve | The elliptic curve to | value | See | No |
| | use for key | | Section | |
| | generation. | | 3.7 | |
| | | | | |
| hashAlg | The hash algorithms | array | See | No |
| | to use for KDF (and | | Section | |
| | noKdfNoKc) | | 3.8 | |
| | | | | |
| macOption | The macOption(s) to | object | See | Yes |
| | use with "kdfNoKc" | | Section | |
| | and/or "kdfKc" | | 3.9 | |
| | | | | |
+-----------+-----------------------+--------+-----------+----------+
Table 9: KAS ECC Parameter Set Details Capabilities JSON Values
3.7. Supported ECC Curves
The following ECC Curves MAY be advertised by the ACVP compliant
crypto module:
+---------------+-------+---------+--------+
| Parameter Set | Prime | Koblitz | Binary |
+---------------+-------+---------+--------+
| eb | P-224 | K-233 | B-233 |
| | | | |
| ec | P-256 | K-283 | B-283 |
| | | | |
| ed | P-384 | K-409 | B-409 |
| | | | |
| ee | P-521 | K-571 | B-571 |
| | | | |
+---------------+-------+---------+--------+
Table 10: Supported Curves per parameter set.
3.8. Supported Hash Algorithm Methods
The following SHA methods MAY be advertised by the ACVP compliant
crypto module:
o SHA2-224
o SHA2-256
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o SHA2-384
o SHA2-512
3.9. Supported KAS ECC MAC Options
The following MAC options MAY be advertised for registration under a
"kdfNoKc" and "kdfKc" kasMode:
o AES-CCM
o CMAC
o HMAC-SHA2-224
o HMAC-SHA2-256
o HMAC-SHA2-384
o HMAC-SHA2-512
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+----------+-------------+--------+---------------------+-----------+
| JSON | Description | JSON | Valid Values | Optional |
| Value | | type | | |
+----------+-------------+--------+---------------------+-----------+
| keyLen | The | Domain | AES based MACs | No |
| | supported | | limited to 128, | |
| | keyLens for | | 192, 256. HashAlg | |
| | the | | based MACs mod 8. | |
| | selected | | All keySizes | |
| | MAC. | | minimum MUST | |
| | | | conform to | |
| | | | parameter set | |
| | | | requirements See | |
| | | | Section 3.6.2 . | |
| | | | | |
| nonceLen | The nonce | value | Input as bits, | Yes |
| | len for use | | 56-104, odd byte | (required |
| | with AES- | | values only (7-13). | for AES- |
| | CCM mac | | Additionally | CCM) |
| | | | minimum MUST | |
| | | | conform to | |
| | | | parameter set | |
| | | | requirements See | |
| | | | Section 3.6.2 . | |
| | | | | |
| macLen | The mac len | value | Input as bits, mod | Yes |
| | for use | | 8, minimum MUST | (required |
| | with mac | | conform to | for AES- |
| | | | parameter set | CCM) |
| | | | requirements See | |
| | | | Section 3.6.2 , | |
| | | | maximum SHALL NOT | |
| | | | exceed block size.. | |
| | | | | |
+----------+-------------+--------+---------------------+-----------+
Table 11: KAS ECC Mac Option Details
3.10. Supported KAS ECC KDF Options
The following MAC options are available for registration under a
"kdfNoKc" and "kdfKc" kasMode:
o concatenation
o asn1
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+-----------+-----------------------+-------+------------+----------+
| JSON | Description | JSON | Valid | Optional |
| Value | | type | Values | |
+-----------+-----------------------+-------+------------+----------+
| oiPattern | The OI pattern to use | value | See | No |
| | for constructing | | Section | |
| | OtherInformation. | | 3.10.1 . | |
| | | | | |
+-----------+-----------------------+-------+------------+----------+
Table 12: KAS ECC KDF Option Details
3.10.1. Other Information Construction
Some IUTs MAY require a specific pattern for the OtherInfo portion of
the KDFs for KAS. An "oiPattern" is specified in the KDF
registration to accommodate such requirements. Regardless of the
oiPattern specified, the OI bitlength MUST be 240 for FFC, and 376
for ECC. The OI SHALL be padded with random bits (or the most
significant bits utilized) when the specified OI pattern does not
meet the bitlength requirement
Pattern candidates:
o literal[123456789ABCDEF]
* uses the specified hex within "[]". literal[123456789ABCDEF]
substitutes "123456789ABCDEF" in place of the field
o uPartyInfo
* uPartyId { || dkmNonce }
+ dkmNonce is provided by party u for static schemes
o vPartyInfo
* vPartyId
o counter
* 32bit counter starting at "1" (0x00000001)
Example (Note that party U is the server in this case "434156536964",