BSIP: 0073
Title: Match force-settlement orders with margin calls and limit orders
Author: Abit More <https://github.com/abitmore>
Status: Draft
Type: Protocol
Created: 2019-06-09
Discussion: https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/issues/181
Worker: TBD
This BSIP proposes a protocol change to improve user experience (UX) of force-settlements by trying to fill force-settlement orders (settle orders in short) at a better price and optionally fill them before expiration when certain conditions are met.
Force-settlements were designed for debt asset holders to convert an amount of the debt asset into corresponding collateral asset at a fair price when there is nobody willing to buy back the debt at a fair price.
To mitigate malious behavior and market manipulation, a delay and a price offset were designed. But the mechanism has flaws.
- If a positive offset is configured in the debt asset's options, force-settlement requesters will always "buy expensive" even when there are orders "selling low". This also leads to occasional spikes in the market history charts.
- Force-settlement requesters have to wait for the delay even when there appear traders buying the debt asset at a fair price in the market.
These flaws have led to certain confusion and anger among market participants.
Actually, when a margin call appears, it means there is somebody willing to buy back the debt. Thus, it makes sense to fill the margin calls with the settle orders.
Similarly, if there are limit orders selling the debt asset below the feed price, it makes sense to match the limit orders with the settle orders as well.
When one of these opportunities appears, it makes sense to fill certain settle orders immediately if it's desired by the owners of the settle orders.
These changes would improve user experience (UX).
A time will need to be scheduled for applying the change. In this document, terms "before the protocol upgrade", "at the protocol upgrade" and "after the protocol upgrade" may or may not be used to indicate things happen before the scheduled time, at the scheduled time and after the scheduled time.
The settle_order_object
stores current status of a force-settlement order.
A new field is needed within it:
bool fill_asap;
By default this field is set to false
, which means the order will be
processed after the delay defined in the asset's options, which is current
behavior.
If this field is set to true
, the order will be filled or partially filled
when a debt position enters margin call territory. It will also be filled or
partially filled when someone places a limit order selling the collateral
asset below the feed price.
If multiple settle orders with this field as true
exist in the market,
when filling before the delay, the order which was created first will be
filled first.
The asset_settle_operation
is used to request a force-settlement. It has
an extensions
field:
extensions_type extensions;
The data type of this field needs to be overridden so that it can include the
new fill_asap
option.
The asset_settle_evaluator
is used to evaluate and apply the
asset_settle_operation
. New logic is needed:
- only allow
fill_asap
option to be set after the protocol upgrade; - if the
fill_asap
option is specified in anasset_settle_operation
, when creating asettle_order_object
(note: it implies some conditions are met, E.G. the asset is not globally settled), assign the value of the operation'sfill_asap
field to the object'sfill_asap
field. - if the
fill_asap
option is set totrue
, and if the feed price is valid, after creation of the settle order object, try to match it against the order book immediately. In other words, treat it as a taker limit order buying at the feed price.
The proposal_create_evaluator
is used to evaluate and apply the
proposal_create_operation
, which can contain zero or more
asset_settle_operation
objects. New logic is needed:
- only allow
fill_asap
to be set after the protocol upgrade.
If the new limit order is selling the collateral asset for the debt asset, and its price is below the feed price (which implies the feed price is valid),
- current logic is to only match it with the limit orders on the opposite side of the market;
- after the protocol upgrade, the new logic would be:
- firstly match it with the limit orders on the opposite side whose buy prices are higher than the feed price;
- secondly match it with the settle orders whose
fill_asap
options were set totrue
. The matching price would be the feed price. In other words, treat the settle orders as maker limit orders buying at the feed price; - lastly match it with remaining limit orders on the opposite side.
If a margin call order appears, either due to the feed price changing, or due to the amount of collateral or the amount of debt changing (which implies the feed price is valid),
- current logic is to only match it with the limit orders on the opposite side of the market and conditionally trigger a black swan event;
- after the protocol upgrade, the new logic would be:
- firstly match it with the limit orders on the opposite side whose buy prices are higher than the feed price; if this step triggers a black swan event, apply the corresponding black swan processing logic to the market;
- secondly match it with the settle orders whose
fill_asap
options were set totrue
. The matching price would be the feed price. In other words, treat the settle orders as maker limit orders buying at the feed price; - lastly match it with remaining limit orders on the opposite side (which would possibly trigger a black swan event as well, but it's out of this document's scope).
When the feed price changes, either due to a new price being published, or due to an old price expiring, or due to the asset's options changing, if the new feed price is valid, and if the new feed price in the direction of "X debt asset per collateral asset" is higher than the old feed price or the old feed price was invalid,
- current logic doesn't handle settle orders,
- after the protocol upgrade, the new logic would be:
- if there are limit orders selling the collateral asset below the new feed
price, and there are settle orders whose
fill_asap
options weretrue
, match the settle orders with the limit orders. In other words, treat those settle orders as taker limit orders buying at the new feed price.
- if there are limit orders selling the collateral asset below the new feed
price, and there are settle orders whose
When a settle order is filled or partially filled due to having the
fill_asap
option set to true
,
it doesn't affect force_settled_volume
(which indicates how much of the debt
asset has been force-settled in the current maintenance interval).
Currently, when filling a settle order after the delay (note: it implies
some conditions are met, E.G. the feed price is valid and total settled volume
in the current maintenance interval doesn't exceed the maximum allowed volume),
the settle order will be matched against the debt position with the least
collateral ratio, the fill price in the direction of "X debt asset
per collateral asset" would be
fill_price = feed_price * (1 + foce_settlement_offset)
.
After the protocol upgrade, when processing a settle order after the delay,
- firstly try to match it with the margin calls and the limit orders selling
below
fill_price
. In other words, treat it as a taker limit order buying atfill_price
. Note: this step doesn't affectforce_settled_volume
. - if the settle order still exists, process it with the logic before the
protocol upgrade.
Note: this step does affect
force_settled_volume
as before.
The behaviors proposed in this BSIP would be impacted by BSIP 71.
In general, this BSIP proposes that
- the settle orders whose
fill_asap
field istrue
will be treated as limit orders buying at feed price when the market engine processing limit orders or margin calls, and - when processing a settle order after the delay, it will "buy the way up"
before being matched with a debt position that need to apply
force_settlement_offset
.
APIs which return settle_order_object
need to return the new fill_asap
field in the settle_order_object
.
APIs which return a combined order book can combine settle orders whose
fill_asap
is true with the limit orders on the same side of the market.
Currently there is a settle_asset
command in CLI which can be used to
create force-settlement orders. After the protocol upgrade,
we need a command in
CLI for users to create force-settlement orders with the new fill_asap
option.
One option is to add an optional boolean parameter to the parameter list of
the existing settle_asset
command, if it doesn't break existing client
applications which rely on that wallet API. Otherwise, a new command is
needed, E.G. settle_asset_ext
.
Note: GUI changes here are only suggestions, formally they're not part of the specification.
The new fill_asap
option needs to be presented and can be used in GUI after
the protocol upgrade.
When there are settle orders with fill_asap
option set to true
, the UI
can show them
as special buy orders which are buying at the feed price in the order book.
-
With this BSIP, we provided a tool that can be used by debt asset holders to convert their debt asset holdings into corresponding collateral asset more conveniently and flexibly. However, it's not guaranteed that a settle order will be filled at a better price if the owner choose to fill it "as soon as possible". Market paticipants should always make their own decisions on whether to use the new tool.
-
From the perspective of the debt asset owners (note: "asset owners" and "asset holders" have different meanings), for the performance of the debt assets, it could be more desirable to execute force-settlements against margin calls than against market orders, because it would improve the overall collateral ratio of the asset (although it's in the price of worse experience for force-settlement requesters). In that sense it contradicts the goals of BSIP 71 (Prevent Global Settlement).
-
The proposed functionality is mostly convenience for users. Manual selling on the market is (almost) always available when it would be used automatically by this proposal (exception: new incoming limit orders).
-
The proposed functionality complicates the market engine and possibly the
get_order_book
call (see bitshares/bitshares-core#1958). It is probably harmful for performance in the long run, which is particularly undesirable for functionality that can mostly be emulated client-side.
When force-settling a SmartCoin, the user currently has to wait for the settlement delay before her tokens are exchanged for the collateral asset. This BSIP introduces a new flag that allows settlement requests to be matched with market orders during the waiting period, potentially resulting in faster settlement and a better price. It complicates the market engine thus will impact performance.
This document is placed in the public domain.