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bitml-examples.maude
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bitml-examples.maude
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***
*** Example 1.0
***
*** rewrite in Example-1.0 : S .
***
mod Example-1.0 is
protecting BITML .
op A : -> Participant .
op v : -> Value .
op x : -> Name .
op S : -> SemConfiguration .
*** deposit
eq S = toSemConf < A, v > x .
*** strategy
*** A does not authorize to destroy the deposit x
eq strategy(S:SemConfiguration, A authorize-destroy-of x) = false .
endm
***
*** Example 1.1
***
*** rewrite in Example-1.1 : S .
***
mod Example-1.1 is
protecting BITML .
ops A B : -> Participant .
ops v v' : -> Value .
ops x x' y y' : -> Name .
op S : -> SemConfiguration .
*** 2 deposits
eq S = toSemConf < A, v > x | < A, v > x' | < B, v' > y | < B, v' > y' .
*** strategy
*** A does not authorize to destroy any deposit, B does
*** result
*** only B's deposits will be destroyed
eq strategy(S:SemConfiguration, A authorize-destroy-of x:Name) = false .
endm
***
*** Example 1.2
***
*** rewrite in Example-1.2 : S .
***
mod Example-1.2 is
protecting BITML .
op A : -> Participant .
op v : -> Value .
op x : -> Name .
op S : -> SemConfiguration .
*** deposit
eq S = toSemConf < A, v > x .
*** strategy
*** block everything
eq strategy(S:SemConfiguration, l:Label) = false [owise] .
endm
***
*** Example 2.0
***
*** rewrite in Example-2.0 : S .
***
mod Example-2.0 is
protecting BITML .
op A : -> Participant .
op v : -> Value .
op x : -> Name .
op S : -> SemConfiguration .
*** deposit
eq S = [0 | 0 4 | x U empty | A] < A, v > x .
*** strategy
*** A does not authorize to destroy the deposit x
eq strategy([t:Nat | t^:List{Nat<} | cn:Set{Name} U cn':Set{Name} | Part:Set{Participant}] S:Configuration, A authorize-destroy-of x) =
t:Nat >= 5 .
endm
***
*** Examples Example-LIQUIDITY
***
***
mod Examples-LIQUIDITY is
protecting BITML .
ops A B C : -> Participant .
op v : -> Value .
ops a b : -> Secret .
ops t t' N M : -> Nat .
op LOTTERY : -> SemConfiguration .
op LIQUID-LOTTERY : -> SemConfiguration .
op S : Contract -> SemConfiguration .
op TCconf : Contract -> SemConfiguration .
ops WIN WIN' TC TC' TC'' : -> Contract .
eq t = 10 .
eq t' = 15 .
eq N = 1 .
eq M = 1 .
*** lottery
eq LOTTERY = S(WIN) .
eq LIQUID-LOTTERY = S(WIN') .
eq S(WIN:Contract) =
toSemConf
< split(
2 satoshi ~> ( reveal b if const(0) <= size(b) <= const(1) . withdraw B + after t : withdraw A )
2 satoshi ~> ( reveal a . withdraw A + after t : withdraw B )
2 satoshi ~> WIN:Contract
), 6 satoshi > 'x
| { A : a # N }
| { B : b # M } .
eq WIN = reveal (a, b) if size(a) == size(b) . withdraw A
+ reveal (a, b) if size(a) != size(b) . withdraw B .
eq WIN' = WIN
+ (after t' : reveal a . withdraw A)
+ (after t' : reveal b . withdraw B) .
eq TCconf(C:Contract) = toSemConf < C:Contract, 2 satoshi > 'x | {A : a # 10} | {B : b # 15} .
eq TC = reveal a . withdraw A + after t : withdraw B .
eq TC' = reveal a . (
reveal b . split(
1 satoshi ~> (withdraw A)
1 satoshi ~> (withdraw B)
)
)
+ after t : withdraw B .
eq TC'' = reveal a . (
reveal b . split(
1 satoshi ~> (withdraw A)
1 satoshi ~> (withdraw B)
)
+ after t' : withdraw A
)
+ after t : withdraw B .
*** strategies
*** A never locks her secrets
eq strategy(S:SemConfiguration, A lock-reveal a:Secret) = false .
*** A never locks her authorizations
eq strategy(S:SemConfiguration, A lock D:GuardedContract in x:Name) = false .
*** No one destroys a deposit
***eq strategy(S:SemConfiguration, A:Participant authorize-destroy-of x:Name) = false .
*** A reveals any secret (default any participant reveals any secret)
***eq strategy(S:SemConfiguration, A reveal a:Secret) = true .
*** B does not reveal any secret
***eq strategy(S:SemConfiguration, B reveal a:Secret) = false .
*** No one reveal a secret
***eq strategy(S:SemConfiguration, A:Participant reveal a:Secret) = false .
*** B authorizes any contract
***eq strategy(S:SemConfiguration, B authorize D:GuardedContract in y:Name) = true .
*** No one authorize any contract
***eq strategy(S:SemConfiguration, A:Participant authorize D:Contract in y:Name) = false .
endm
smod Examples-LIQUIDITY-CHECK is
protecting BITML-CHECK .
including Examples-LIQUIDITY .
endsm
***
***(
reduce in Examples-LIQUIDITY-CHECK : modelCheck(LOTTERY, <> contract-free, 'bitml) . *** false
reduce in Examples-LIQUIDITY-CHECK : modelCheck(LIQUID-LOTTERY, <> contract-free, 'bitml) . *** true
reduce in Examples-LIQUIDITY-CHECK : modelCheck(LIQUID-LOTTERY, []<> A has-deposit>= 4 satoshi, 'bitml) . *** true
reduce in Examples-LIQUIDITY-CHECK : modelCheck(TCconf(TC), <> contract-free, 'bitml) . *** true
reduce in Examples-LIQUIDITY-CHECK : modelCheck(TCconf(TC'), <> contract-free, 'bitml) . *** false
reduce in Examples-LIQUIDITY-CHECK : modelCheck(TCconf(TC''), <> contract-free, 'bitml) . *** true
)