diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index 22784b1..6e04c8d 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -5,10 +5,12 @@ A Special Purpose DAO for the AtomOne Hub for Securing Humanity's Future.
 ## Policy Recommendations
 
  * [Reproducible Artificial Intelligence](WIP/001-reproducible-ai.md) - WIP draft phase
+ * [Staking token & Tax Treatment](WIP/002-staking-tokens-irs.md) - WIP draft phase
+ * [Secure Hardware](WIP/003-secure-hardware.md) - WIP draft phase
 
 ## Contact Us
 
-For now, please submit a github issue or email jae@tendermint.com with subject prefix "[FSA]".
+For now, please submit a github issue.
 
 # License
 
diff --git a/WIP/003-secure-hardware.md b/WIP/003-secure-hardware.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0b74c95
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+++ b/WIP/003-secure-hardware.md
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+# Assumptions
+
+ * SE "secure element" chips are by design difficult to inspect.
+ * Sub 30nm chip fabrication will become ubiquitous.
+ * Development should move toward open secure wallet hardware.
+
+# Secure Element Containment Protocol
+
+This is one proposal or recommendation for secure hardware design through the
+distinction of open and closed components.
+
+ * There are two types of elements in a secure design: the open source hardware
+   component, and one or more SE components. We can think of these as two
+   actors: one open, the other closed.
+
+ * The assumption is that the open component can and will become mature over
+   time, with a final state of provable completeness; and the closed component
+   will also mature over time but have different priorities. For example part of
+   the security goal is that the open components are probabilistically audited
+   at the circuitry level, while a perfect closed SE component(s) may not be
+   auditable by forensic inspection at all.
+
+ * We assume that the closed SE component may contain arbitrary malicious
+   circuitry; for example sub nanometer components hidden in a larger 25nm
+   frame. The goal of the open component is to isolate the closed SE component
+   such that arbitrary behavior can be tolerated.
+
+ * It is NOT safe to expose the secure element to external interfaces. That is,
+   the closed SE component may be compromised and may be conducting a
+   man-in-the-middle attack upon the open component.
+
+ * The usage of the closed SE component must be minimized as much as
+   reasonable. For example, the open component could be designed so that it
+   only requires of the closed SE component to hold a private key and to
+   produce a signature for any input. The open component would still verify the
+   resulting signature before emitting it. If this were the design of your
+   hardware wallet, you would be less concerned about your secret leaking,
+   because the closed SE component couldn't leak it even if it wanted to.
+
+ * We should assume as our security threat model the cooperation of mobile
+   device manufacturers AND SE component manufacturers. For example both could
+   be coerced by a tyrannical administration under gag order to support a key
+   extraction exploit for targeted individuals. If such an exploit were to
+   affect a significant portion of the population it could prove existential to
+   the crypto movement itself, at least for a time.
+
+ * TODO: describe probabilistic auditing of open hardware.
+
+ * TODO: describe example threat model where compromised information is
+   stenographically injected into the usual expected payload, such as frame or
+   user input data.
+
+# USB Inspection Middleware
+
+This is a separate proposal for an industry common standard.
+
+Currently we plug in a hardware wallet directly into the computer by USB, and
+we assume that the hardware wallet and computer are only interacting in the way
+that we expect. But enforcing this security assumption isn't easy without the
+aforementioned open-closed framework.
+
+We can create another type of separation at the device level to introduce
+additional security. A common USB device that sits between the computer and the
+hardware wallet, and helps inspect transaction messages and checks signatures
+for correctness, so that your hardware wallet transactions can be secure today,
+even under the extreme threat model where both the computer as well as the
+hardware wallets are compromised.
+
+An open competitive market of compatible inspection devices would help bridge
+the "big security gap" of crypto while more wallets become secure by virtue of
+the "SE containment protocol".