draft-muffett-end-to-end-secure-messaging-00.txt

individual submission                                         A. Muffett
Internet-Draft                                       Security Researcher
Intended status: Informational                                7 May 2021
Expires: 8 November 2021


          Functional Definition of End-to-End Secure Messaging
              draft-muffett-end-to-end-secure-messaging-00

Abstract

   This document defines End-to-End Secure Messaging in terms of the
   behaviours that MUST be exhibited by software that claims to
   implement it, or which claims to implement that subset which is known
   as End-to-End Encrypted Messaging.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on 8 November 2021.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.





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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Comments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.2.  Notational Conventions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Requirements for an End-to-End Secure Messenger . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Principles  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.1.  Equality of Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.2.  Transparency of Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.3.  Integrity of Participation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
       3.3.1.  Retransmission Exception  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
       3.3.2.  Non-Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.4.  Closure of Conversation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
       3.4.1.  Public Conversations and Self-Subscription  . . . . .   4
     3.5.  Management and Visibility of Participant Clients and
           Devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.1.  Participant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.2.  Conversation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.3.  Plaintext Content and Sensitive Metadata (PCASM)  . . . .   5
       4.3.1.  Content PCASM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       4.3.2.  Size PCASM  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       4.3.3.  Descriptive PCASM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       4.3.4.  Conversation Metadata (OPTIONAL)  . . . . . . . . . .   6
       4.3.5.  Non-PCASM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.4.  Backdoor  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       4.4.1.  Why call this a "backdoor"? . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   5.  Scope of a Participant in E2ESM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   6.  Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   7.  See Also  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   8.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   9.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   10. Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10

1.  Introduction

   End-to-End Secure Messaging (E2ESM) is a mechanism which offers a
   digital analogue of "closed distribution lists" for sharing message
   content amongst a set of participants, where all participants are
   visible to each other and where non-participants are excluded from
   access to message content.

   In client-server network models it is common to implement E2ESM by
   means of encryption, in order to obscure content at rest upon a
   central server.  So therefore E2ESM is often narrowly regarded in
   terms of "end-to-end encryption".




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   Other architectural approaches exist - for instance [RicochetRefresh]
   which implements closed distribution by using secure point-to-point
   [RFC7686] networking to literally restrict the distribution of
   plaintext content to relevant participants.

   Therefore we describe E2ESM in terms of functional behaviours of the
   software rather than in terms of implementation goals and
   technologies.

1.1.  Comments

   Comments are solicited and should be addressed to the working group's
   mailing list TODO and/or the author(s).

1.2.  Notational Conventions

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

2.  Requirements for an End-to-End Secure Messenger

   Software which functions as an End-to-End Secure Messenger MUST
   satisfy the following principles, and MUST satisfy these principles
   in respect of the provided definitions for all forms of communication
   and data-sharing that the software offers.

   Any software that does not satisfy these requirements is not an End-
   to-End Secure Messenger, and it does not implement End-to-End Secure
   Messaging, nor does it implement End-to-End Encrypted Messaging.

3.  Principles

   For a series of one or more "messages" each which are composed of
   "plaintext content and sensitive metadata" (PCASM) and which
   constitute a "conversation" amongst a set of "participants", to
   provide E2ESM will require:

3.1.  Equality of Participation

   All participants MUST be peers who MUST have equal access to any
   given message's PCASM.







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3.2.  Transparency of Participation

   The existence of all current conversation participants MUST be
   visible at the current time to all current conversation participants.

3.3.  Integrity of Participation

   Excusing the "retransmission exception", PCASM of any given message
   MUST only be available to the fixed set of conversation participants
   from whom, to whom, and at the time when it was sent.

3.3.1.  Retransmission Exception

   If a participant that can access an "original" message intentionally
   "retransmits" (e.g. quotes, forwards) that message to create a new
   message within the E2ESM software, then the original message's PCASM
   MAY become available to a new, additional, and possibly different set
   of conversation participants, via that new message.

3.3.2.  Non-Participation

   It follows that for any given message, all entities that exist
   outside of the above-defined sets of participants will be "non-
   participants" in respect of that message.

3.4.  Closure of Conversation

   The set of participants in a conversation SHALL NOT be increased
   except by the intentional action of one or more existing
   participants.

3.4.1.  Public Conversations and Self-Subscription

   Existing participants MAY publicly share links, data, or other
   mechanisms to enable non-participant entities to subscribe themselves
   as conversation participants.  This MAY be considered legitimate
   "intentional action" to increase the set of participants in the
   group.

3.5.  Management and Visibility of Participant Clients and Devices

   E2ESM software MUST provide each participant entity with means to
   review or revoke access for clients or devices that can access future
   PCASM.

   E2ESM software MUST provide each participant entity with
   notifications and/or complete logs of changes to the set of clients
   or devices that can or could access message PCASM.



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4.  Definitions

   These principles MUST be measured with respect to the following
   definitions:

4.1.  Participant

   A participant is any entity - human, machine, software bot,
   conversation archiver, or other, that is bounded by the extent of
   that entity's [TrustedComputingBase].

4.2.  Conversation

   A conversation is a sequence of one or more messages over a period of
   time amongst a constant or evolving set of participants.

4.3.  Plaintext Content and Sensitive Metadata (PCASM)

   The PCASM of a message is defined as any of:

4.3.1.  Content PCASM

   Content PCASM is any data that can offer better than 50-50 certainty
   regarding the value of any given bit of the plaintext message
   content. ("content")

   Content PCASM would include, non-exclusively:

   1.  The content is "Hello, world."

   2.  The content starts with the word "Hello"

   3.  The top bit of the first byte of the content in ASCII encoding,
       is zero

   4.  The MD5 hash of the content is 080aef839b95facf73ec599375e92d47

   5.  The Salted-MD5 Hash of the content is : ...

4.3.2.  Size PCASM

   For block encryption of content, Size PCASM is the unpadded size of
   the content.

   For stream encryption of content, Size PCASM is currently undefined.

   For transport encryption of content, precise Size PCASM SHOULD NOT be
   observable.



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4.3.3.  Descriptive PCASM

   Descriptive PCASM is data that describes the "content".

   Descriptive PCASM would include, non-exclusively:

   1.  The content contains the substring "ello"

   2.  The content does not contain the word "Goodbye"

   3.  The content contains a substring from amongst the following set:
       ...

   4.  The content does not contain a substring from amongst the
       following set: ...

   5.  The hash of the content exists amongst the following set of
       hashes: ...

   6.  The hash of the content does not exist amongst the following set
       of hashes: ...

   7.  The content was matched by a machine-learning classifier with the
       following training set: ...

4.3.4.  Conversation Metadata (OPTIONAL)

   Whether per-conversation "group" metadata, such as "group titles",
   "group topics", "group icons", or "group participant lists"
   constitute PCASM, is an OPTIONAL choice for the E2ESM software, but
   that choice MUST be made apparent to participants.

4.3.5.  Non-PCASM

   Information which would not be PCASM would include, non-exclusively:

   1.  The content is sent from Alice

   2.  The content is sent to Bob

   3.  The content is between 1 and 16 bytes long

   4.  The content was sent at the following date and time: ...

   5.  The content was sent from the following IP address: ...

   6.  The content was sent from the following geolocation: ...




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   7.  The content was composed using the following platform: ...

4.4.  Backdoor

   A "backdoor" is any intentional or unintentional mechanism, in
   respect of a given message and that message's set of participants,
   where some PCASM of that message MAY become available to a non-
   participant without the intentional action of a participant.

4.4.1.  Why call this a "backdoor"?

   In software engineering there is a perpetual tension between the
   concepts of "feature" versus "bug" - and occasionally "misfeature"
   versus "misbug".  These tensions arise from the problem of [DualUse]
   - that it is not feasible to firmly and completely ascribe
   "intention" to any hardware or software mechanism.

   The information security community have experienced a historical
   spectrum of mechanisms which have assisted non-participant access to
   PCASM.  These have variously been named as "export-grade key
   restrictions" (TLS, then Logjam), "side channel attacks" (Spectre and
   Meltdown), "law enforcement access fields" (Clipper), and "key
   escrow" (Crypto Wars).

   All of these terms combine an "access facilitation mechanism" with an
   "intention or opportunity" - and for all of them an access
   facilitation mechanism is first REQUIRED.

   An access facilitation mechanism is a "door", and is inherently
   [DualUse].  Because the goal of E2ESM is to limit access to PCASM
   exclusively to a defined set of participants, then the intended means
   of access is clearly the "front door"; and any other access mechanism
   is a "back door".

   If the term "back door" is considered innately pejorative,
   alternative, uncertain constructions such as "illegitimate access
   feature", "potentially intentional data-access weakness", "legally-
   obligated exceptional access mechanism", or any other phrase, all
   MUST combine both notions of an access mechanism (e.g. "door") and a
   definite or suspected intention (e.g. "legal obligation").

   So the phrase "back door" is brief, clear, and widely understood to
   mean "a secondary means of access".  In the above definition we
   already allow for the term to be prefixed with "intentional" or
   "unintentional".






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   Thus it seems appropriate to use this term in this context, not least
   because it is also not far removed from the similar and established
   term "side channel".

5.  Scope of a Participant in E2ESM

   The term "participant" in this document exists to supercede the more
   vague notion of "end" in the phrase "end-to-end".

   Participants are defined in terms of an entity's
   [TrustedComputingBase] to acknowledge that an entity MAY legitimately
   store, forward, or access messages by means that are outside of the
   E2ESM software.

   For example: if a participant accesses their E2ESM software via
   remote desktop software, and their RDP session is hijacked by a third
   party; of if they back-up their messages in cleartext to cloud
   storage leading somehow to data exfiltration, neither of these would
   be a failure of E2ESM.  This would instead be a failure of the
   participant's [TrustedComputingBase].

6.  Rationale

   Consider FooBook, a hypothetical example company which provides
   messaging services for conversations between entities who use it.

   For each conversation FooBook MUST decide whether to represent itself
   as a conversation participant or as a non-participant.  (Transparency
   of Participation)

   If FooBook decides to represent itself as a non-participant, then it
   MUST NOT have any access to PCASM.  (Integrity of Participation /
   Non-Participation)

   If FooBook decides to represent itself as a participant, then it MUST
   NOT have privileged access to PCASM, for instance via direct database
   access, but it MAY have "normal" access to PCASM of conversations
   where it is a participant.  (Integrity of Participation, Equality of
   Participation)

   FooBook MAY retain means to eject reported abusive participants from
   a conversation.  (Decrease in Closure of Participation)

   FooBook MUST NOT retain means to forcibly insert new participants
   into a conversation.  For clarity: this specification does not
   recognise any notion of "atomic" exchange of one particpant with
   another, treating it as an ejection, followed by an "illegitimate"
   insertion.  (Increase in Closure of Participation)



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   FooBook MUST enable the user to observe and manage the complete state
   of their [TrustedComputingBase] with respect to their FooBook
   messaging services.  (Management and Visibility)

   FooBook MAY treat conversation metadata as PCASM, but it MUST
   communicate to participants whether it does, or does not.

7.  See Also

   A different approach to defining (specifically) end-to-end encryption
   is discussed in [I-D.knodel-e2ee-definition].

8.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no IANA actions.

9.  Security Considerations

   This document is entirely composed of security considerations.

10.  Informative References

   [DualUse]  Wikipedia, "Dual-use technology", 2021,
              <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dual-use_technology>.

   [I-D.knodel-e2ee-definition]
              Knodel, M., Baker, F., Kolkman, O., Celi, S., and G.
              Grover, "Definition of End-to-end Encryption", Work in
              Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-knodel-e2ee-definition-00,
              22 February 2021, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-
              knodel-e2ee-definition-00>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC7686]  Appelbaum, J. and A. Muffett, "The ".onion" Special-Use
              Domain Name", RFC 7686, DOI 10.17487/RFC7686, October
              2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7686>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RicochetRefresh]
              BlueprintForFreeSpeech, "Ricochet Refresh", 2021,
              <https://www.ricochetrefresh.net>.



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   [TrustedComputingBase]
              Wikipedia, "Trusted Computing Base", 2021,
              <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trusted_computing_base>.

Author's Address

   Alec Muffett
   Security Researcher

   Email: alec.muffett@gmail.com









































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