| title | sponsor | slug | date | findings | contest |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Aura Finance contest |
Aura Finance |
2022-05-aura |
2022-07-26 |
123 |
Code4rena (C4) is an open organization consisting of security researchers, auditors, developers, and individuals with domain expertise in smart contracts.
A C4 audit contest is an event in which community participants, referred to as Wardens, review, audit, or analyze smart contract logic in exchange for a bounty provided by sponsoring projects.
During the audit contest outlined in this document, C4 conducted an analysis of the Aura Finance smart contract system written in Solidity. The audit contest took place between May 11—May 25 2022.
109 Wardens contributed reports to the Aura Finance contest:
- csanuragjain
- cccz
- IllIllI
- 0xjuicer
- hyh
- kirk-baird
- catchup
- QuantumBrief (pedroais, GermanKuber, and fatherOfBlocks)
- WatchPug (jtp and ming)
- kenzo
- Chom
- Kumpa
- 0x52
- 0xsomeone
- xiaoming90
- MaratCerby
- BowTiedWardens (BowTiedHeron, BowTiedPickle, m4rio_eth, Dravee, and BowTiedFirefox)
- Aits
- reassor
- TerrierLover
- 0xkatana
- SmartSek (0xDjango and hake)
- defsec
- robee
- 0xNazgul
- 0x4non
- joestakey
- c3phas
- Hawkeye (0xwags and 0xmint)
- Tomio
- hansfriese
- kenta
- MiloTruck
- CertoraInc (egjlmn1, OriDabush, ItayG, and shakedwinder)
- sashik_eth
- _Adam
- fatherOfBlocks
- 0x1f8b
- Funen
- 0xf15ers (remora and twojoy)
- Kaiziron
- delfin454000
- simon135
- Waze
- ellahi
- mics
- FSchmoede
- bobirichman
- cthulhu_cult (badbird and seanamani)
- unforgiven
- Ruhum
- Tadashi
- oyc_109
- asutorufos
- sach1r0
- sikorico
- NoamYakov
- samruna
- GimelSec (rayn and sces60107)
- JC
- Kthere
- SooYa
- z3s
- jayjonah8
- zmj
- tintin
- berndartmueller
- cryptphi
- Nethermind
- PPrieditis
- Rolezn
- sorrynotsorry
- BouSalman
- p_crypt0
- sseefried
- 242
- 0xNineDec
- AlleyCat
- ch13fd357r0y3r
- JDeryl
- hubble (ksk2345 and shri4net)
- Cityscape
- 0xKitsune
- UnusualTurtle
- rfa
- 0v3rf10w
- DavidGialdi
- Fitraldys
- Randyyy
- antonttc
- minhquanym
- marcopaladin
- orion
This contest was judged by LSDan.
Final report assembled by liveactionllama.
The C4 analysis yielded an aggregated total of 23 unique vulnerabilities. Of these vulnerabilities, 1 received a risk rating in the category of HIGH severity and 22 received a risk rating in the category of MEDIUM severity.
Additionally, C4 analysis included 76 reports detailing issues with a risk rating of LOW severity or non-critical. There were also 66 reports recommending gas optimizations.
All of the issues presented here are linked back to their original finding.
The code under review can be found within the C4 Aura Finance contest repository, and is composed of 44 smart contracts written in the Solidity programming language and includes 6,034 lines of Solidity code.
C4 assesses the severity of disclosed vulnerabilities according to a methodology based on OWASP standards.
Vulnerabilities are divided into three primary risk categories: high, medium, and low/non-critical.
High-level considerations for vulnerabilities span the following key areas when conducting assessments:
- Malicious Input Handling
- Escalation of privileges
- Arithmetic
- Gas use
Further information regarding the severity criteria referenced throughout the submission review process, please refer to the documentation provided on the C4 website.
Submitted by csanuragjain
ExtraRewardsDistributor.sol#L127
User can forfeit other user rewards by giving a higher _startIndex in getReward function.
- Assume User B has not received any reward yet so that his userClaims[_token][User B]=0
- User A calls getReward function with _account as User B and _startIndex as 5
- This eventually calls _allClaimableRewards at ExtraRewardsDistributor.sol#L213 which computes epochIndex =5>0?5:0 = 5
- Assuming tokenEpochs is 10 and latestEpoch is 8, so reward will computed from epoch 5 till epoch index 7 and _allClaimableRewards will return index as 7
- _getReward will simply update userClaims[_token][User B] with 7
- This is incorrect because as per contract User B has received reward from epoch 0-7 even though he only received reward for epoch 5-7
Do not allow users to call getReward function for other users.
0xMaharishi (Aura Finance) confirmed, but disagreed with severity and commented:
This is a valid report, however, considering it is only related to the distribution of reward tokens, I have a hard time classifying this as high risk.
I agree with the high risk rating on this one. A third party could cause significant loss of expected reward funds for users across the entire protocol if so inclined.
0xMaharishi (Aura Finance) resolved:
code4rena aurafinance/aura-contracts#84
All code4rena fixes code-423n4/2022-05-aura#6
Submitted by 0xjuicer
BaseRewardPool4626 is not IERC4626 compliant.
This makes the BaseRewardPool4626 contract irrelevant as it is for now since projects won't be able to integrate with BaseRewardPool4626 using the eip-4626 standard.
You can choose to remove the BaseRewardPool4626 and save on some deployment gas or review the necessary functions and emits required on eip-4626 and add it to BaseRewardPool4626.
0xMaharishi (Aura Finance) confirmed, but disagreed with severity and commented:
Valid report. Probably should be severity 1 though.. no funds are ever at risk under any scenario.
I agree with medium risk here.
0xMaharishi (Aura Finance) resolved:
Submitted by 0x52
CrvDepositorWrapper.sol#L56-L65
Unpredictable slippage, sandwich vulnerability or frequent failed transactions
CrvDepostiorWrapper uses the TWAP provided by the 20/80 WETH/BAL. The issue is that this pool has only handled ~15 transactions per day in the last 30 days, which means that the oracle frequently goes more than an hour without updating. Each time a state changing operation is called, the following code in the balancer pool takes a snapshot of the pool state BEFORE any operation changes it:
OracleWeightedPool.sol#L156-L161
This could result in the price of the oracle frequently not reflecting the true value of the assets due to infrequency of update. Now also consider that the pool has a trading fee of 2%. Combine an inaccurate oracle with a high fee pool and trades can exhibit high levels of "slippage". To account for this outputBps in AuraStakingProxy needs to be set relatively low or risks frequent failed transactions when calling distribute due to slippage conditions not being met. The lower outputBps is set the more vulnerable distribute becomes to sandwich attacks.
Consider using chainlink oracles for both BAL and ETH to a realtime estimate of the LP value. A chainlink LP oracle implementation can be found here.
0xMaharishi (Aura Finance) confirmed and commented:
Valid finding and agree with the severity generally. Vector here is either function reverting or potentially getting sandwiched.
To mitigate this currently, there is a
keeperaddress added and the tx would be sent via flashbots, however agree that other steps could be taken to allow it to operate more fluidly.
0xMaharishi (Aura Finance) resolved and commented:
Resolution for now is to use the CrvDepositorWrapper price as a guideline and let the
keeperof AuraStakingProxy provide a minOut.
Submitted by 0xsomeone
AuraLocker.sol#L594-L609
AuraLocker.sol#L611-L618
| File | Lines | Type |
|---|---|---|
| AuraLocker.sol | L594-L609, L611-L618 | Governance Susceptibility |
The balance checkpointing system exposed by the contract for governance purposes is flawed as it does not maintain voting balances properly. In detail, the total supply of votes is tracked as the sum of all locked balances, however, the total voting power of an individual only tracks delegated balances. As a result, governance percentage thresholds will be significantly affected and potentially unmet.
The governance module may be unusable due to the significant discrepancy between "circulating" voting power supply and the actual voting power of each individual summed up.
We advise the total voting supply to properly track the delegated balances only as otherwise, any system relying on proportionate checkpointed balances will fail to function properly.
Issue is deducible by inspecting the relevant lines referenced in the issue and making note of the calculations within the getPastVotes individual voting power function as well as the getPastTotalSupply cumulative voting power function.
0xMaharishi (Aura Finance) disputed and commented:
This is intended behaviour. There is no incentive for users not to delegate their votes. And even if there were, not delegating is the equivalent to having voting power but not voting. Therefore this is not a relevant issue.
LSDan (judge) decreased severity to Medium and commented:
I'm going to leave this one in play and downgrade the severity. The warden's report is accurate; however, if the required percentages of voting cannot be met, the DAO would simply have to go on a campaign to get people to delegate their votes. This would be annoying but not critically destructive. That said, medium severity makes sense because a bad actor could potentially gather voting power and intentionally disrupt things by not delegating it. I'd recommend implementing the fix suggested by the warden.
[M-04] AuraLocker kick reward only takes last locked amount into consideration, instead of whole balance
Submitted by kenzo
The issue occurs in AuraLocker, when expired locks are processed via kicking, and if all the user locks have expired.
In this scenario, to calculate the kick reward, _processExpiredLocks multiplies the last locked amount by the number of epochs between the last lock's unlock time and the current epoch.
A comment in this section mentions "wont have the exact reward rate that you would get if looped through". However, there's no reason not to multiply user's whole locked balance by the number of epochs since the last lock's unlock time, instead of only the last locked amount.
While this will still not be as accurate as looping through, this will give a more accurate kick reward result, which is still bounded by the full amount that would have been calculated if we had looped through.
The reward calculation is inaccurate and lacking for no reason.
Kickers receive less rewards than they should.
Giving them a bigger, more accurate reward, will incentivize them better.
This is the section that calculates the kick reward if all locks have expired:
//check for kick reward
//this wont have the exact reward rate that you would get if looped through
//but this section is supposed to be for quick and easy low gas processing of all locks
//we'll assume that if the reward was good enough someone would have processed at an earlier epoch
if (_checkDelay > 0) {
uint256 currentEpoch = block.timestamp.sub(_checkDelay).div(rewardsDuration).mul(rewardsDuration);
uint256 epochsover = currentEpoch.sub(uint256(locks[length - 1].unlockTime)).div(rewardsDuration);
uint256 rRate = AuraMath.min(kickRewardPerEpoch.mul(epochsover + 1), denominator);
reward = uint256(locks[length - 1].amount).mul(rRate).div(denominator);
}
This flow is for low gas processing, so the function is not looping through all the locks (unlike the flow where some locks have not expired yet).
In this flow, the function is just calculating the reward for the last lock.
Instead of doing this, it can multiply the total amount locked by the user (locked, already saved) by the number of epochs between the last unlock time and current epoch.
The reward will still be smaller than if we had looped through all the rewards (since then each lock amount would be multiplied by more than just the last lock's number of expired epochs).
But it would be more accurate and give better incentive for kicking.
Change the last line in the code above to:
reward = uint256(locked).mul(rRate).div(denominator);
This will keep the low gas consumption of this flow, while giving a more accurate result.
0xMaharishi (Aura Finance) confirmed, but disagreed with severity and commented:
Valid, but unsure if it should be classified as medium risk. Probably 1.
I'm going to leave this one as medium because there is unnecessary fund loss over time. Good suggestions.
0xMaharishi (Aura Finance) resolved:
code4rena aurafinance/aura-contracts#84
All code4rena fixes code-423n4/2022-05-aura#6
Submitted by IllIllI
Users can grief reward distributions by spending dust.
If a reward is targeted for an epoch in the past, a user can front-run the txn in the mempool and call addRewardToEpoch() with a dust amount at an epoch after the one in question. This will cause the transaction in the mempool to revert
File: contracts/ExtraRewardsDistributor.sol #1
74 require(len == 0 || rewardEpochs[_token][len - 1] < _epoch, "Cannot backdate to this epoch");ExtraRewardsDistributor.sol#L74
Allow the backdating of rewards, which will cost more gas
0xMaharishi (Aura Finance) acknowledged, but disagreed with severity and commented:
Fair finding; however, this is a peripheral contract and only affects user reward claiming. In the Aura system, rewards are only added to the current epoch so should be fine.
0xMaharishi (Aura Finance) resolved:
All code4rena fixes code-423n4/2022-05-aura#6
code4rena aurafinance/aura-contracts#84
Submitted by 0xjuicer, also found by csanuragjain
Rewards distribution can be delayed/never distributed on AuraLocker.sol#L848
Someone malicious can delay the rewards distribution for non cvxCrv tokens distributed on AuraLocker.sol.
1: Attacker will send one wei of token that are distributed on the AuraLocker.sol to AuraStakingProxy.
2: Attacker will call distributeOther.
The function will call notifyRewardAmount that calls _notifyReward
When calling _notifyReward the rewards left to distribute over the 7 days are redistributed throughout a new period starting immediately.
uint256 remaining = uint256(rdata.periodFinish).sub(block.timestamp);
uint256 leftover = remaining.mul(rdata.rewardRate);
rdata.rewardRate = _reward.add(leftover).div(rewardsDuration).to96();
Example: If the reward rate is 1 token (10**18) per second and 3.5 days are left (302400 seconds), we get a leftover of 302400 tokens. this is then divided by 604800, the reward rate is now 0.5 and the user of the protocol will have to wait one week for tokens that were supposed to be distributed over 3.5 days. This can be repeated again and again so that some rewards are never distributed.
I can see that queueNewRewards has some protective mechanism. A new period is started only if the token that is added on top of the already distributed tokens during the duration is over 120%.
I suggest adding a similar check to queueNewRewards
0xMaharishi (Aura Finance) confirmed, but disagreed with severity
0xMaharishi (Aura Finance) resolved:
code4rena aurafinance/aura-contracts#84
code-423n4/2022-05-aura#6
[M-07] Reward may be locked forever if user doesn't claim reward for a very long time such that too many epochs have been passed
Submitted by Chom
ExtraRewardsDistributor.sol#L233-L240
AuraLocker.sol#L334-L337
Reward may be locked forever if user doesn't claim reward for a very long time such that too many epochs have been passed. The platform then forced to reimburse reward to the user that got their reward locked. Causing huge economics loss.
Can be done by reverse engineering from the affected code
for (uint256 i = epochIndex; i < tokenEpochs; i++) {
//only claimable after rewards are "locked in"
if (rewardEpochs[_token][i] < latestEpoch) {
claimableTokens += _claimableRewards(_account, _token, rewardEpochs[_token][i]);
//return index user claims should be set to
epochIndex = i + 1;
}
}
From this line you will see a loop from epochIndex to tokenEpochs which loop tokenEpochs - epochIndex times.
If tokenEpochs - epochIndex value goes high, it will consume too much gas which go beyond the limit of the chain and cause the transaction to be always failed. As a result, reward may be locked forever.
uint256 latestEpoch = auraLocker.epochCount() - 1;
// e.g. tokenEpochs = 31, 21
uint256 tokenEpochs = rewardEpochs[_token].length;
// e.g. epochIndex = 0
uint256 epochIndex = userClaims[_token][_account];
// e.g. epochIndex = 27 > 0 ? 27 : 0 = 27
epochIndex = _startIndex > epochIndex ? _startIndex : epochIndex;
- epochIndex is the maximum of _startIndex and latest index of rewardEpochs that user has claim the reward
- tokenEpochs is the number of epochs that has reward, can be added through
addRewardToEpochfunction up to latest epoch count of auraLocker - latestEpoch is epoch count of auraLocker
If you specified too high _startIndex, the reward may be skipped and these skipped reward are lost forever as the _getReward function set latest epoch that user has claim to the lastest index of rewardEpochs that can be claimed.
the aura locker epoch can be added by using checkpointEpoch function which will automatically add epochs up to current timestamp. Imagine today is 100 years from latest checkpoint and rewardsDuration is 1 day, the total of around 36500 epochs needed to be pushed into the array in single transaction which always failed due to gasLimit. The code that responsible for pushing new epochs below (in AuraLocker file)
while (epochs[epochs.length - 1].date != currentEpoch) {
uint256 nextEpochDate = uint256(epochs[epochs.length - 1].date).add(rewardsDuration);
epochs.push(Epoch({ supply: 0, date: uint32(nextEpochDate) }));
}
Even if these line are passed because the nature that checkpointEpoch is likely to be called daily and reward are added daily. if user doesn't claim the reward for 100 years, rewardEpochs[_token].length = 36500 where epochIndex = 0. Which cause an impossible loop that run 36500 times. In this case this transaction will always be failed due to gas limit. In the worst case, If this problem cause staking fund to be frozen, the only way is to trash the reward and use emergencyWithdraw to withdraw staked fund.
From above statement, we can proof that there exists a case that user reward may be locked forever due to looping too many times causing gas to be used beyond the limit thus transaction always failed.
Reverse engineering using the help of IDE.
User should be able to supply endEpochIndex to the claim reward functions. And only calculate reward from startIndex to min(auraLocker.epochCount() - 1, endEpochIndex). And also add support for partial reward claiming.
0xMaharishi (Aura Finance) acknowledged, but disagreed with severity and commented:
Valid report although given these are reward tokens and the max amount of entries is one per week, it would take some years for this to run over gas limit, during which time the contract could easily be changed.
LSDan (judge) decreased severity to Medium and commented:
I'm downgrading this to medium severity. It is unreasonable to expect contracts to be future proof to the tune of a hundred years or more, but if the frequency had been unreasonably fast this issue could have kicked in.
0xMaharishi (Aura Finance) resolved and commented:
code-423n4/2022-05-aura#6
code4rena aurafinance/aura-contracts#84
Submitted by xiaoming90
Per the documentation, AURA tokens can be locked in the AuraLocker to recieve vlAURA. vlAURA is voting power in the AURA ecosystem.
It is also possible for the users to delegate their voting power to a specific address by calling the AuraLocker.delegate(address account) function.
However, after users locked up their AURA tokens in exchange for vlAURA tokens, their voting power did not increase.
The following shows an example of Alice attempting to get some voting power by locking up her AURA tokens, but her voting power did not increase:
-
At this point, Alice has not locked any AURA token into the AuraLocker yet. Thus, when
AuraLocker.getVotes(Alice.address)is called, it returned “0” (No voting power. This is expected). -
Alice decided to get some voting power. So, Alice locked 100 AURA tokens by calling the
AuraLocker._lock()function, and gain 100 vlAURA in return. -
Alice understand that as per the design, voting power will be 0 after depositing until the next epoch. So, she waited for around 1 week.
-
After a week has passed, the
AuraLocker.getVotes(Alice.address)is called again. Alice expected it to return"100", but it still returned “0” (Still no voting power). -
Alice has locked up her AURA tokens for a week and hold 100 vlAURA, yet she has no voting power.
The following snippet of test script demonstrates the above issue, showing that the vote power remains the same after locking up the AURA tokens for a week.
it("(Debug) allows users to lock aura", async () => {
const cvxBalance = await phase4.cvx.balanceOf(stakerAddress);
const lockBefore = await phase4.cvxLocker.lockedBalances(stakerAddress);
console.log("(Debug) User Locked Balance Record = Total %s CVX (Unlockable = %s CVX, Locked = %s CVX) ",lockBefore.total, lockBefore.unlockable, lockBefore.locked);
console.log("(Debug) User is going to lock %s CVX", cvxBalance)
await phase4.cvx.connect(staker.signer).approve(phase4.cvxLocker.address, cvxBalance);
await phase4.cvxLocker.connect(staker.signer).lock(stakerAddress, cvxBalance);
const lockAfter = await phase4.cvxLocker.lockedBalances(stakerAddress);
console.log("(Debug) User Locked Balance Record = Total %s CVX (Unlockable = %s CVX, Locked = %s CVX) ",lockAfter.total, lockAfter.unlockable, lockAfter.locked);
expect(lockAfter.locked.sub(lockBefore.locked)).eq(cvxBalance);
});
it("(Debug) check user has votes after locking", async () => {
const votesBefore = await phase4.cvxLocker.getVotes(stakerAddress);
const lock = await phase4.cvxLocker.lockedBalances(stakerAddress);
console.log("(Debug) votesBefore = %s, locked CVX = %s", votesBefore, lock.locked);
console.log("(Debug) Properly locked tokens as of the most recent eligible epoch = %s", await phase4.cvxLocker.balanceOf(stakerAddress));
await increaseTime(ONE_WEEK);
console.log("After 1 week")
const votesAfter = await phase4.cvxLocker.getVotes(stakerAddress);
console.log("(Debug) votesAfter = %s, locked CVX = %s", votesBefore, lock.locked);
console.log("(Debug) Properly locked tokens as of the most recent eligible epoch = %s", await phase4.cvxLocker.balanceOf(stakerAddress));
expect(votesAfter.sub(votesBefore)).eq(lock.locked);
});
it("(Debug) check user lock balance and votes after 20 weeks", async () => {
const TWENTY_WEEKS = BN.from(60 * 60 * 24 * 7 * 20);
await increaseTime(TWENTY_WEEKS);
console.log("(Debug) After 20 weeks")
const lockAfter20 = await phase4.cvxLocker.lockedBalances(stakerAddress);
console.log("(Debug) User Locked Balance = Total %s CVX (Unlockable = %s CVX, Locked = %s CVX) ",lockAfter20.total, lockAfter20.unlockable, lockAfter20.locked);
console.log("(Debug) Properly locked tokens as of the most recent eligible epoch = %s", await phase4.cvxLocker.balanceOf(stakerAddress));
expect(lockAfter20.unlockable).eq(lockAfter20.total); // all locks should have expired after 20 weeks.
});Following is the output of the test script.
-
The first section shows that user has 800563688188805506352 vlAURA after locking up their AURA tokens
-
The second section shows that after a week, the user has 0 voting power even though the user has
800557536376417310407vlAURA tokens. Note that these vlAURA tokens are all properly locked tokens that have not been expired.
(Note: vlAURA == vlCVX and AURA == CVX in this context)
aura locker
(Debug) User Locked Balance Record = Total 0 CVX (Unlockable = 0 CVX, Locked = 0 CVX)
(Debug) User is going to lock 800563688188805506352 CVX
(Debug) User Locked Balance Record = Total 800563688188805506352 CVX (Unlockable = 0 CVX, Locked = 800563688188805506352 CVX)
✓ (Debug) allows users to lock aura
(Debug) votesBefore = 0, locked CVX = 800563688188805506352
(Debug) Properly locked tokens as of the most recent eligible epoch = 0
After 1 week
(Debug) votesAfter = 0, locked CVX = 800563688188805506352
(Debug) Properly locked tokens as of the most recent eligible epoch = 800563688188805506352
1) (Debug) check user has votes after locking
(Debug) After 20 weeks
(Debug) User Locked Balance = Total 800563688188805506352 CVX (Unlockable = 800563688188805506352 CVX, Locked = 0 CVX)
(Debug) Properly locked tokens as of the most recent eligible epoch = 0
✓ (Debug) check user lock balance and votes after 20 weeksAura Finance has implemented a checkpointing mechanism for determine user's voting power. Therefore, accounting for the votes will only happen during checkpoint when AuraLocker.checkpointDelegate() function is being
called. Therefore, the AuraLocker.getVotes() function will only consider the locked AURA tokens that have been “checkpointed” as votes. In other words, if the locked AURA tokens have not been “checkpointed” yet, it will simply remain as a balance in the AuraLocker contract, and the user’s locked AURA tokens effectively have no voting power.
Based on the source code, the root cause of this issue is that if a user does not have a delegatee, the system will not perform any checkpointing, and user's locked AURA token will not be accounted as voting power.
Following code from AuraLocker._lock() shows that checkpointing will only be performed if the user has a delegatee. Otherwise, no checkpointing will be performed when users locked their AURA tokens.
function _lock(address _account, uint256 _amount) internal {
..SNIP..
address delegatee = delegates(_account);
if (delegatee != address(0)) {
delegateeUnlocks[delegatee][unlockTime] += lockAmount;
_checkpointDelegate(delegatee, lockAmount, 0);
}
// @audit - No checkpointing performed for the rest of the code in this function
..SNIP..
}The only way for Alice could get back her voting power is to delegate to herself after locking her AURA tokens. This is a workaround. AuraLocker.delegate() sole purpose should only serve to delegate one’s voting power to another user, and should not be used as a workaround to force the system to perform checkpointing to gain voting power.
For Alice to get back her voting power, she must call the AuraLocker.delegate(Alice.address) function, which will delegate to herself. This function will in turn call the AuraLocker._checkpointDelegate() function, which will “checkpointed” Alice’s locked tokens to become votes. Only after this step, Alice’s voting power will be updated and calling AuraLocker.getVotes(Alice.address) should return “100” now.
Additionally, documentation did not mention that a user is required to delegate to oneself in order to get the voting power. Thus, it is very likely that majority of the users would not know how to get their voting power unless they review the source code or is aware of this workaround.
The impact of this issue is that users might miss the opportunity to vote on critical protocol decisions or flow of incentives (Gauge voting) due to lack of voting power as voting power is not assigned to them after locking up AURA tokens.
If the users only realised this issue in the current epoch, they would miss the chance to vote in current epoch. This is because by calling the AuraLocker.delegate(address account) function to fix the issue, the votes will only be effective in the next epoch.
The outcome of the governance or gauge voting might be impacted and might not reflect the true consensus of the community as affected users are not able to participate in the vote or have inaccurate voting power, thus affecting the protocol.
In Convex Finance, users lock their CVX tokens by calling CvxLocker._lock() function and voting power will be allocated to the users immediately. Similar strategy should be adopted.
It is recommended to update the AuraLocker._lock() function so that the user’s locked AURA tokens are “checkpointed” and converted to voting power immediately after locking up if a user has not assigned a delegatee yet. This will trigger the accounting for votes and translate the newly locked tokens into voting power immediately.
Original Code
function _lock(address _account, uint256 _amount) internal {
..SNIP..
address delegatee = delegates(_account);
if (delegatee != address(0)) {
delegateeUnlocks[delegatee][unlockTime] += lockAmount;
_checkpointDelegate(delegatee, lockAmount, 0);
}
..SNIP..
}Suggested Modification
function _lock(address _account, uint256 _amount) internal {
..SNIP..
address delegatee = delegates(_account);
if (delegatee != address(0)) {
delegateeUnlocks[delegatee][unlockTime] += lockAmount;
_checkpointDelegate(delegatee, lockAmount, 0);
} else {
// If there is no delegatee,
// then automatically delegate to the account to trigger the checkpointing
delegateeUnlocks[_account][unlockTime] += lockAmount;
_checkpointDelegate(_account, lockAmount, 0);
}
..SNIP..
}0xMaharishi (Aura Finance) disputed and commented:
Users must simply delegate to themselves to receive voting power
Valid issue. Fix the documentation or the code. If all users need to do is delegate to themselves, then auto-delegating newly minted votes to the user would solve the issue.
Submitted by csanuragjain
Reward vesting should end once endTime is reached, this is not done currently.
- Observe the fund function
- Observe that there is no check to disallow funding once endTime has been reached
Add below check
require(block.timestamp<=endTime, "Reward vesting period over");
0xMaharishi (Aura Finance) acknowledged, but disagreed with severity and commented:
This report is kind of invalid, because there would be no utility in this.. it's specifically left open ended. With that being said, adding a check to ensure that funding is made BEFORE START TIME would be good.
This should be a 0 or 1 at most.
As far as I can tell, this is totally valid. Funding in this state would cause a loss of funds in that they would never go towards a reward.
0xMaharishi (Aura Finance) resolved:
code4rena aurafinance/aura-contracts#84
All code4rena fixes code-423n4/2022-05-aura#6
Submitted by Kumpa
Without restriction on the type of address that lock the token, a bad actor could lock the token through the smart contract. Doing so enable him to make the lockedToken becomes liquidate by tokenize his smart contract which defeat the purpose of the lockedToken that is supposed to be untransferable. Moreover, a bad actor could attract people to lock the token through his smart contract instead of directly locking with AuraLocker by injecting better short-term incentives to his wrapper token. This enable the bad actor to accumulate voting power that could dictate the future of the protocol.
- A bad actor creates a smart contract
- A contract calls
lockin AuraLocker and locks the token - A bad actor tokenizes the contract
- A bad actor attracts people to lock the token through his smart contract by offering a wrapper tokens or additional incentives like high apy etc.
- A bad actor dictates the smart contract to delegate its vote to his preferred address.
It would be best to check whether the locker is the smart contract or the wallet and, if the protocol wants the smart contract to be the locker, it can implement the whitelist or blacklist.
0xMaharishi (Aura Finance) acknowledged, but disagreed with severity and commented:
Given no user funds are at risk I don't think this is a super high risk, but I do agree that there is a governance risk there and it's something to be concerned about if/when there is no multisig intermediary between aura voters and execution. With that being said, I think a good solution would be to have a blacklist that the owner can set to block non-eoa's from making any further locks:
bool canLock = isEOA(address) || !isBlacklisted(address)
LSDan (judge) decreased severity to Medium and commented:
I'll leave this in place as a medium risk because there are external factors involved. High risk is too severe.
0xMaharishi (Aura Finance) resolved:
code-423n4/2022-05-aura#6
code4rena aurafinance/aura-contracts#84
Submitted by IllIllI, also found by Aits, BowTiedWardens, and MaratCerby
If rewards are given in fee-on-transfer tokens, users may get no rewards, breaking functionality.
Med: Assets not at direct risk, but the function of the protocol or its availability could be impacted, or :::leak value with a hypothetical attack path with stated assumptions:::, but external requirements.
(emphasis mine)
The underlying BAL protocol support fee-on-transfer tokens, so should Aura.
File: contracts/ExtraRewardsDistributor.sol #1
87 function _addReward(
88 address _token,
89 uint256 _amount,
90 uint256 _epoch
91 ) internal nonReentrant {
92 // Pull before reward accrual
93 IERC20(_token).safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), _amount);
94
95 //convert to reward per token
96 uint256 supply = auraLocker.totalSupplyAtEpoch(_epoch);
97 uint256 rPerT = (_amount * 1e20) / supply;
98 rewardData[_token][_epoch] += rPerT;ExtraRewardsDistributor.sol#L87-L98
If a fee is charged the total amount available to be transferred later will be less than the _amount passed in.
Consider the following scenario:
User A holds 98% of the total supply of vlBAL (the system is being bootstrapped)
User B holds 1%
User C holds 1%
_tokenis given out as a reward. It is a fee-on-transfer token with a fee of 2%- Nobody claims the reward until it's fully available (to save gas on transaction fees)
- User A is the first to claim his/her reward and gets 98% of the reward, leaving 0 wei of the token left (since the other 2% was already taken as a fee by the token itself)
- User B tries to claim and the call reverts since there's no balance left
- User C tries to claim and the call reverts for them too
- Users B and C are angry and stop using Aura
File: contracts/ExtraRewardsDistributor.sol #2
87 function _addReward(
88 address _token,
89 uint256 _amount,
90 uint256 _epoch
91 ) internal nonReentrant {
92 // Pull before reward accrual
93 IERC20(_token).safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), _amount);
94
95 //convert to reward per token
96 uint256 supply = auraLocker.totalSupplyAtEpoch(_epoch);
97 uint256 rPerT = (_amount * 1e20) / supply;
98 rewardData[_token][_epoch] += rPerT;ExtraRewardsDistributor.sol#L87-L98
Measure the contract balance before and after the transfer, and use the difference as the amount, rather than the stated amount.
0xMaharishi (Aura Finance) disputed and commented:
This contract is optional to use - it is not supposed to support fee bearing tokens.
See my comment on issue #18: "There are several cases in the code reported where the token in question comes from an external (non-admin, non-protocol) source. One of these is the addReward functionality (ExtraRewards). This would indeed cause an accounting issue and allow a potential malicious actor to send rewards which cause distribution to fail due to lack of funds. Just because you don't plan to use fee on transfer tokens, does not mean they will not be used. This should be protected against in the scenarios where it could cause an issue.
That said, this clearly requires external factors and relies on hypothetical attack motivation that seems unlikely to me. I think it should be included as a medium risk."
Submitted by csanuragjain, also found by hyh and kirk-baird
It was observed that User will lose funds due to missing else condition.
- User call claimRewards at ClaimZap.sol#L103 with Options.LockCvx as false
- claimRewards internally calls _claimExtras
- Everything goes good until AuraClaimZap.sol#L218
if (depositCvxMaxAmount > 0) {
uint256 cvxBalance = IERC20(cvx).balanceOf(msg.sender).sub(removeCvxBalance);
cvxBalance = AuraMath.min(cvxBalance, depositCvxMaxAmount);
if (cvxBalance > 0) {
//pull cvx
IERC20(cvx).safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), cvxBalance);
if (_checkOption(options, uint256(Options.LockCvx))) {
IAuraLocker(locker).lock(msg.sender, cvxBalance);
}
}
}
- Since user cvxBalance>0 so cvxBalance is transferred from user to the contract.
- Now since Options.LockCvx was set to false in options so if (_checkOption(options, uint256(Options.LockCvx))) does not evaluate to true and does not execute
- This means User cvx funds are stuck in contract
The condition should check if user has enabled lock for cvx, otherwise cvx should not be transferred from user
if (depositCvxMaxAmount > 0 && _checkOption(options, uint256(Options.LockCvx))) {
uint256 cvxBalance = IERC20(cvx).balanceOf(msg.sender).sub(removeCvxBalance);
cvxBalance = AuraMath.min(cvxBalance, depositCvxMaxAmount);
if (cvxBalance > 0) {
//pull cvx
IERC20(cvx).safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), cvxBalance);
IAuraLocker(locker).lock(msg.sender, cvxBalance);
}
}
0xMaharishi (Aura Finance) confirmed, but disagreed with severity and commented:
This is valid, although it:
- relies on user function input
- does not affect user deposits
- requires pre-approval of tokens
Therefore, I don't think this should be a 3 severity. 2 at most.
LSDan (judge) decreased severity to Medium and commented:
This is a tough one, but I agree that medium severity makes more sense here since we're talking about a user acting on their own behalf in a very specific way. This does not open up an attack vector which would allow a malicious actor to lock a user's funds.
0xMaharishi (Aura Finance) resolved:
code4rena aurafinance/aura-contracts#84
All code4rena fixes code-423n4/2022-05-aura#6
Submitted by cccz
In the ConvexMasterChef contract, a new staking pool can be added using the add() function. The staking token for the new pool is defined using the _lpToken variable. However, there is no additional checking whether the _lpToken is the same as the reward token (cvx) or not.
function add(
uint256 _allocPoint,
IERC20 _lpToken,
IRewarder _rewarder,
bool _withUpdate
) public onlyOwner {
if (_withUpdate) {
massUpdatePools();
}
uint256 lastRewardBlock = block.number > startBlock
? block.number
: startBlock;
totalAllocPoint = totalAllocPoint.add(_allocPoint);
poolInfo.push(
PoolInfo({
lpToken: _lpToken,
allocPoint: _allocPoint,
lastRewardBlock: lastRewardBlock,
accCvxPerShare: 0,
rewarder: _rewarder
})
);
}
When the _lpToken is the same token as cvx, reward calculation for that pool in the updatePool() function can be incorrect. This is because the current balance of the _lpToken in the contract is used in the calculation of the reward. Since the _lpToken is the same token as the reward, the reward minted to the contract will inflate the value of lpSupply, causing the reward of that pool to be less than what it should be.
function updatePool(uint256 _pid) public {
PoolInfo storage pool = poolInfo[_pid];
if (block.number <= pool.lastRewardBlock) {
return;
}
uint256 lpSupply = pool.lpToken.balanceOf(address(this));
if (lpSupply == 0) {
pool.lastRewardBlock = block.number;
return;
}
uint256 multiplier = getMultiplier(pool.lastRewardBlock, block.number);
uint256 cvxReward = multiplier
.mul(rewardPerBlock)
.mul(pool.allocPoint)
.div(totalAllocPoint);
//cvx.mint(address(this), cvxReward);
pool.accCvxPerShare = pool.accCvxPerShare.add(
cvxReward.mul(1e12).div(lpSupply)
);
pool.lastRewardBlock = block.number;
}
ConvexMasterChef.sol#L96-L118
ConvexMasterChef.sol#L186-L206
Add a check that _lpToken is not cvx in the add function or mint the reward token to another contract to prevent the amount of the staked token from being mixed up with the reward token.
0xMaharishi (Aura Finance) commented:
Could potentially require not to be the reward token, but I think this is just a relevant part of dao ownership.
0xMaharishi (Aura Finance) confirmed and resolved
Submitted by kirk-baird
AuraLocker.sol#L176-L177
AuraLocker.sol#L802-L814
AuraLocker.sol#L864
There is a potential overflow in the rewards calculations which would lead to updateReward() always reverting.
The impact of this overflow is that all reward tokens will be permanently locked in the contract. User's will be unable to call any of the functions which have the updateReward() modifier, that is:
lock()getReward()_processExpiredLocks()_notifyReward()
As a result the contract will need to call shutdown() and the users will only be able to receive their staked tokens via emergencyWithdraw(), which does not transfer the users the reward tokens.
Note that if one reward token overflows this will cause a revert on all reward tokens due to the loop over reward tokens.
This issue will always be present if the staked token is one with a low number of decimal places such as USDC or USDT which have 6 decimal places. This is because the totalSupply will be limited in size by the decimal places of the stakingToken.
The overflow may occur due to the base of values in _rewardPerToken().
function _rewardPerToken(address _rewardsToken) internal view returns (uint256) {
if (lockedSupply == 0) {
return rewardData[_rewardsToken].rewardPerTokenStored;
}
return
uint256(rewardData[_rewardsToken].rewardPerTokenStored).add(
_lastTimeRewardApplicable(rewardData[_rewardsToken].periodFinish)
.sub(rewardData[_rewardsToken].lastUpdateTime)
.mul(rewardData[_rewardsToken].rewardRate)
.mul(1e18)
.div(lockedSupply)
);
}The return value of _rewardPerToken() is in terms of
(now - lastUpdateTime) * rewardRate * 10**18 / totalSupply
Here (now - lastUpdateTime) has a maximum value of rewardDuration = 6 * 10**5.
Now rewardRate is the _reward.div(rewardsDuration) as seen in _notifyRewardAmount() on line #864. Note that rewardDuration is a constant 604,800.
rewardDuration = 6 * 10**5
Thus, if we have a rewards such as AURA or WETH (or most ERC20 tokens) which have units 10**18 we can transfer 1 WETH to the reward distributor which calls _notifyRewardAmount() and sets the reward rate to,
rewardRate = 10**18 / (6 * 10**5) ~= 10**12
Finally, if this attack is run either by the first depositor they may lock() a single token which would set totalSupply = 1.
Therefore our equation in terms of units will become,
(now - lastUpdateTime) * rewardRate * 10**18 / totalSupply => 10**5 * 10**12 * 10**18 / 1 = 10**35
In since rewardPerTokenStored is a uint96 it has a maximum value of 2**96 ~= 7.9 * 10**28. Hence there will be an overflow in newRewardPerToken.to96(). Since we are unable to add more total supply due to lock() reverting there will be no way to circumvent this revert except to shutdown().
uint256 newRewardPerToken = _rewardPerToken(token);
rewardData[token].rewardPerTokenStored = newRewardPerToken.to96();Note this attack is described when we have a low totalSupply. However it is also possible to apply this attack on a larger totalSupply when there are reward tokens which have decimal places larger than 18 or tokens which such as SHIB which have small token value and so many of the tokens can be bought for cheap.
To mitigate this issue it is recommended to increase the size of the rewardPerTokenStored. Since updating this value will require another slot to be used we recommend updating this to either uint256 or to update both rewardRate and rewardPerTokenStored to be uint224.
0xMaharishi (Aura Finance) confirmed, but disagreed with severity and commented:
Given that the staked token will have 18 decimals (it's the aura token) and there will be at least 1e21 units in there before any rewards come, it would take a number of tokens equal to 7.9e49 to be distributed to get this overflow.
I think that while this is certainly a possibility, it would take an orchestrated governance attack and wouldn't necessarily put any funds at risk. That said, a solid mitigation would be to enforce
rewardRate < 1e17in the notifyRewardAmount, therefore it would never be possible for this to happen.IMO this should be a medium risk.
LSDan (judge) decreased severity to Medium and commented:
Agree with sponsor about the downgrade to medium. This requires external factors to be an issue, including potential governance collusion in the attack.
0xMaharishi (Aura Finance) resolved:
code-423n4/2022-05-aura#6
code4rena aurafinance/aura-contracts#84
Submitted by cccz
Same as code-423n4/2022-02-concur-findings#244
All calculations are rounded down, since a lack of tokens in the contracts cannot be rounding errors' fault. So the function is redundant.
On the other hand, if the contract is undersupplied with cvx tokens, this will cause depositors to be sent less tokens than needed (or none). This is especially unsafe because the tokens that were lacking are not resembled in accountings at all. Thus a depositor may invoke the safeRewardTransfer and not receive tokens they were supposed to.
ConvexMasterChef.sol#L299-L306
Use usual safeTransfer instead of safeRewardTransfer.
0xMaharishi (Aura Finance) acknowledged, but disagreed with severity and commented:
Reward tokens are transferred here before rewards start.
I agree with this report. The fallback situation in this function specifically prioritizes loss of funds over bricking the contract, which while laudable, results in what is effectively a silent failure case.
0xMaharishi (Aura Finance) resolved:
Submitted by QuantumBrief
DDOS to liquidity providers in BalLiquidityProvider.
-
bal is equal to the contract’s balance of the asset: BalLiquidityProvider.sol#L56
-
bal is required to be equal to the input parameter _request.maxAmountsIn[i]: BalLiquidityProvider.sol#L57
An attacker can front-run liquidity providers by sending 1 Wei of the asset to make the balance not equal to the input. This can be repeated and be used to impede the liquidity provider from using the function which will always revert since bal != _request.maxAmountsIn[i]
Balances shouldn't be required to be equal to an input variable. An attacker can always make the balance a little bigger. This check should be removed or changed to require (bal >= _request.maxAmountsIn[i]).
0xMaharishi (Aura Finance) acknowledged, but disagreed with severity and commented:
Fair report 👍
0xMaharishi (Aura Finance) resolved:
code-423n4/2022-05-aura#6
code4rena aurafinance/aura-contracts#84
[M-17] ConvexMasterChef's deposit and withdraw can be reentered drawing all reward funds from the contract if reward token allows for transfer flow control
Submitted by hyh
Reward token accounting update in deposit() and withdraw() happens after reward transfer. If reward token allows for the control of transfer call flow or can be upgraded to allow it in the future (i.e. have or can introduce the _beforetokentransfer, _afterTokenTransfer type of hooks; or, say, can be upgraded to ERC777), the current implementation makes it possible to drain all the reward token funds of the contract by directly reentering deposit() or withdraw() with tiny _amount.
Setting the severity to medium as this is conditional to transfer flow control assumption, but the impact is the full loss of contract reward token holdings.
Both withdraw() and deposit() have the issue, performing late accounting update and not controlling for reentrancy:
ConvexMasterChef.sol#L209-L221
function deposit(uint256 _pid, uint256 _amount) public {
PoolInfo storage pool = poolInfo[_pid];
UserInfo storage user = userInfo[_pid][msg.sender];
updatePool(_pid);
if (user.amount > 0) {
uint256 pending = user
.amount
.mul(pool.accCvxPerShare)
.div(1e12)
.sub(user.rewardDebt);
safeRewardTransfer(msg.sender, pending);
}
pool.lpToken.safeTransferFrom(ConvexMasterChef.sol#L239-L250
function withdraw(uint256 _pid, uint256 _amount) public {
PoolInfo storage pool = poolInfo[_pid];
UserInfo storage user = userInfo[_pid][msg.sender];
require(user.amount >= _amount, "withdraw: not good");
updatePool(_pid);
uint256 pending = user.amount.mul(pool.accCvxPerShare).div(1e12).sub(
user.rewardDebt
);
safeRewardTransfer(msg.sender, pending);
user.amount = user.amount.sub(_amount);
user.rewardDebt = user.amount.mul(pool.accCvxPerShare).div(1e12);
pool.lpToken.safeTransfer(address(msg.sender), _amount);Consider adding a direct reentrancy control, e.g. nonReentrant modifier:
https://docs.openzeppelin.com/contracts/2.x/api/utils#ReentrancyGuard
Also, consider finishing all internal state updates prior to external calls:
0xMaharishi (Aura Finance) confirmed and commented:
Protected by governance, but agree could be solved with simple reentrancy guard.
0xMaharishi (Aura Finance) resolved:
code-423n4/2022-05-aura#6
code4rena aurafinance/aura-contracts#84
[M-18] AuraBalRewardPool charges a penalty to all users in the pool if the AuraLocker has been shut down
Submitted by IllIllI, also found by csanuragjain
Users are charged the penalty due to admin actions, and they have no way to avoid it
When claiming their rewards, users are charged a penalty if they take the reward directly, rather than by passing it into the auraLocker. Those are the only two options:
File: contracts/AuraBalRewardPool.sol #1
176 function getReward(bool _lock) public updateReward(msg.sender) returns (bool) {
177 uint256 reward = rewards[msg.sender];
178 if (reward > 0) {
179 rewards[msg.sender] = 0;
180 if (_lock) {
181 auraLocker.lock(msg.sender, reward);
182 } else {
183 uint256 penalty = (reward * 2) / 10;
184 pendingPenalty += penalty;
185 rewardToken.safeTransfer(msg.sender, reward - penalty);
186 }AuraBalRewardPool.sol#L176-L186
If the pool has been shut down, the auraLocker.lock() call will always revert, which means the user must take the penalty path:
File: contracts/AuraLocker.sol #2
258 function _lock(address _account, uint256 _amount) internal {
259 require(_amount > 0, "Cannot stake 0");
260 require(!isShutdown, "shutdown");Don't charge the penalty if the locker has been shut down.
0xMaharishi (Aura Finance) acknowledged, but disagreed with severity and commented:
The auraBAL reward pool only runs for 2 weeks at the beginning of the protocol. It's highly unlikely the AuraLocker will be shut down.
Submitted by WatchPug
uint256 unlockAt = block.timestamp + MAXTIME;
uint256 unlockInWeeks = (unlockAt/WEEK)*WEEK;
//increase time too if over 2 week buffer
if(unlockInWeeks.sub(unlockTime) > 2){
IStaker(staker).increaseTime(unlockAt);
unlockTime = unlockInWeeks;
}In _lockCurve(), unlockInWeeks - unlockTime is being used as a number in weeks, while it actually is a number in seconds.
Thus, comparing it with 2 actually means a 2 seconds buffer instead of a 2 weeks buffer.
The intention is to wait for 2 weeks before extending the lock time again, but the current implementation allows the extension of the lock once a new week begins.
Consider changing the name of unlockTime to unlockTimeInWeeks, and:
- Change L94-102 to:
uint256 unlockAt = block.timestamp + MAXTIME;
uint256 unlockInWeeks = unlockAt / WEEK;
//release old lock if exists
IStaker(staker).release();
//create new lock
uint256 crvBalanceStaker = IERC20(crvBpt).balanceOf(staker);
IStaker(staker).createLock(crvBalanceStaker, unlockAt);
unlockTimeInWeeks = unlockInWeeks;- Change L127-L134 to:
uint256 unlockAt = block.timestamp + MAXTIME;
uint256 unlockInWeeks = unlockAt / WEEK;
//increase time too if over 2 week buffer
if(unlockInWeeks.sub(unlockTime) > 2){
IStaker(staker).increaseTime(unlockAt);
unlockTimeInWeeks = unlockInWeeks;
}0xMaharishi (Aura Finance) confirmed and resolved:
Submitted by catchup
ConvexMasterChef.sol#L178-L183
massUpdatePools() is a public function and it calls the updatePool() function for the length of poolInfo. Hence, it is an unbounded loop, depending on the length of poolInfo.
If poolInfo.length is big enough, block gas limit may be hit.
I suggest to limit the max number of loop iterations to prevent hitting block gas limit.
0xMaharishi (Aura Finance) disagreed with severity and commented:
Duplicate of #147
This is not a duplicate of Duplicate of #147 and is also clearly documented as a potential issue in the code itself. If the admin were to accidentally add too many pools the contract would be affected, but the likelihood of this is low and if it were to happen, the admin could still turn off the pools and migrate to another contract. This would, however, affect the protocol in a severely negative way. Not fully updating all of the pools would potentially cause accounting issue and lead to loss of earned rewards. Given the impact and likelihood together, I think medium is actually reasonable in this case.
IllIllI000 (warden) commented:
@LSDan- The
massUpdatePool()function was found to be non-critical in previous contests (code-423n4/2022-02-concur-findings#161) and when I filed the issue with Convex for their bug bounty, they rejected it saying it was a "non-issue" and didn't meet their criteria for a bounty. Furthermore, ConvexMasterChef.sol is not listed as in scope for this contest: https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-05-aura#contracts-of-interest
@IllIllI000- Actually the scope was all non-test contracts, https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-05-aura#repo
@IllIllI000- Unlike the other contest,
massUpdatePools()is used in this contract. I'm going to keep this as medium.
0xMaharishi (Aura Finance) confirmed and resolved
[M-21] ConvexMasterChef: When using add() and set(), it should always call massUpdatePools() to update all pools
Submitted by cccz
Same as IDX-003 in https://public-stg.inspex.co/report/Inspex_AUDIT2021024_LuckyLion_Farm_FullReport_v2.0.pdf
The totalAllocPoint variable is used to determine the portion that each pool would get from the total reward, so it is one of the main factors used in the rewards calculation. Therefore, whenever the totalAllocPoint variable is modified without updating the pending reward first, the reward of each pool will be incorrectly calculated.
For example, when _withUpdate is false, in the add() shown below, the totalAllocPoint variable will be modified without updating the rewards (massUpdatePools()).
function add(
uint256 _allocPoint,
IERC20 _lpToken,
IRewarder _rewarder,
bool _withUpdate
) public onlyOwner {
if (_withUpdate) {
massUpdatePools();
}
uint256 lastRewardBlock = block.number > startBlock
? block.number
: startBlock;
totalAllocPoint = totalAllocPoint.add(_allocPoint);
poolInfo.push(
PoolInfo({
lpToken: _lpToken,
allocPoint: _allocPoint,
lastRewardBlock: lastRewardBlock,
accCvxPerShare: 0,
rewarder: _rewarder
})
);
}
Removing the _withUpdate variable in the add() and set() functions and always calling the massUpdatePools() function before updating totalAllocPoint variable.
0xMaharishi (Aura Finance) confirmed and commented:
We didn't change this from the Convex implementation. I believe it is there to protect the contract from bricking in case there are too many pools added. The choice here is between giving admin the ability to brick, and giving admin the responsibility of adding the correct alloc points. I think we should remove as advised, because we are only likely to have a few pools.
0xMaharishi (Aura Finance) resolved:
code4rena aurafinance/aura-contracts#84
All code4rena fixes code-423n4/2022-05-aura#6
Submitted by csanuragjain, also found by cccz
It was observed that add function is not checking for duplicate lpToken which allows 2 or more pools to have exact same lpToken. This can cause issue with reward distribution
In case of duplicate lpToken, lpSupply will become incorrect (ConvexMasterChef.sol#L160), hence rewards will be calculated incorrectly
- Owner call add function and uses lpToken as A
- Owner again call add function and mistakenly provides lpToken as A
- Now 2 pools will be created with lpToken as A
- This becomes a problem while reward calculation or updatePool function which uses pool.lpToken.balanceOf(address(this)). Since both pool have same lpToken so lpSupply will be calculated as same which is wrong. Since lpSupply defines the rewardRate so this directly impact reward calculation
Add a global variable keeping track of all lpToken added for pool. In case of duplicate lpToken add function should fail.
0xMaharishi (Aura Finance) acknowledged, but disagreed with severity and commented:
Given the result of this would be a net negative to everyone (due to overall increased lp token supply) there doesn't seem to be any incentive for anyone to do this. Considering that the owner is a distributed 4 of 7 multisig, i think it is an acceptable scenario.
I'm going to let this one stand. Multisigs make mistakes and it would be trivial to prevent this one.
For this contest, 76 reports were submitted by wardens detailing low risk and non-critical issues. The report highlighted below by IllIllI received the top score from the judge.
The following wardens also submitted reports: MaratCerby, reassor, BowTiedWardens, TerrierLover, SmartSek, 0x4non, 0xNazgul, hyh, robee, tintin, catchup, defsec, Hawkeye, joestakey, _Adam, 0x1f8b, fatherOfBlocks, Funen, berndartmueller, cryptphi, hansfriese, kenta, Nethermind, PPrieditis, QuantumBrief, Rolezn, sorrynotsorry, 0xf15ers, bobirichman, BouSalman, c3phas, cccz, cthulhu_cult, FSchmoede, Kaiziron, kenzo, mics, MiloTruck, p_crypt0, Ruhum, sseefried, Tadashi, unforgiven, WatchPug, 0xkatana, CertoraInc, csanuragjain, delfin454000, ellahi, GimelSec, JC, Kthere, sashik_eth, sikorico, simon135, Waze, oyc_109, 242, 0xNineDec, AlleyCat, asutorufos, ch13fd357r0y3r, Chom, jayjonah8, JDeryl, kirk-baird, NoamYakov, sach1r0, samruna, SooYa, z3s, hubble, Cityscape, Kumpa, and zmj.
| Issue | Instances | |
|---|---|---|
| L-01 | Wrong amounts sent if arrays don't match | 1 |
| L-02 | Incorrect/misleading NatSpec | 1 |
| L-03 | Function reverts if called a second time | 1 |
| L-04 | pragma experimental ABIEncoderV2 is deprecated |
1 |
| L-05 | safeApprove() is deprecated |
36 |
| L-06 | Missing checks for address(0x0) when assigning values to address state variables |
103 |
Total: 143 instances over 6 issues
| Issue | Instances | |
|---|---|---|
| N‑01 | Unused file | 1 |
| N‑02 | Call For/From variants instead of copying an pasting code |
1 |
| N‑03 | Remove tautological code | 1 |
| N‑04 | Adding a return statement when the function defines a named return variable, is redundant |
3 |
| N‑05 | override function arguments that are unused should have the variable name removed or commented out to avoid compiler warnings |
1 |
| N‑06 | public functions not called by the contract should be declared external instead |
18 |
| N‑07 | type(uint<n>).max should be used instead of uint<n>(-1) |
8 |
| N‑08 | constants should be defined rather than using magic numbers |
47 |
| N‑09 | Redundant cast | 2 |
| N-10 | Numeric values having to do with time should use time units for readability | 4 |
| N-11 | Missing event for critical parameter change | 24 |
| N-12 | Use a more recent version of solidity | 1 |
| N-13 | Use a more recent version of solidity | 26 |
| N-14 | Use a more recent version of solidity | 1 |
| N-15 | Constant redefined elsewhere | 38 |
| N-16 | Inconsistent spacing in comments | 80 |
| N-17 | Non-library/interface files should use fixed compiler versions, not floating ones | 12 |
| N-18 | Typos | 29 |
| N-19 | File is missing NatSpec | 6 |
| N-20 | NatSpec is incomplete | 21 |
| N‑21 | Event is missing indexed fields |
66 |
Total: 390 instances over 21 issues
The caller may make a copy-paste error where they provide all amounts, but miss one of the recipients in the middle of the list they're copying. This will cause all recipients after that mistake to get the wrong amounts, and the function will not revert
There is 1 instance of this issue:
File: contracts/AuraVestedEscrow.sol #1
96: function fund(address[] calldata _recipient, uint256[] calldata _amount) external nonReentrant {The function retrieves the number of votes at the end of an epoch, not at the end of a block. Furthermore, blockNumber is not an actual variable name
There is 1 instance of this issue:
File: contracts/AuraLocker.sol #1
595: * @dev Retrieve the number of votes for `account` at the end of `blockNumber`.safeApprove() reverts if called a second time without fist calling safeApprove(0)
There is 1 instance of this issue:
File: contracts/CrvDepositorWrapper.sol #1
/// @audit `setApprovals()` is an external function that calls this function. If it's called more than once, the secondary calls will revert
51 function _setApprovals() internal {
52 IERC20(WETH).safeApprove(address(BALANCER_VAULT), type(uint256).max);
53 IERC20(BAL).safeApprove(address(BALANCER_VAULT), type(uint256).max);
54: }Use pragma abicoder v2 instead
There is 1 instance of this issue:
File: contracts/AuraLocker.sol #1
3: pragma experimental ABIEncoderV2;Deprecated in favor of safeIncreaseAllowance() and safeDecreaseAllowance(). If only setting the initial allowance to the value that means infinite, safeIncreaseAllowance() can be used instead
There are 36 instances of this issue. For details, see the warden's full report.
There are 103 instances of this issue. For details, see the warden's full report.
The file is never imported by any other file
There is 1 instance of this issue:
File: convex-platform/contracts/contracts/interfaces/BoringMath.sol #1
0: // SPDX-License-Identifier: MITDuplicating code can lead to errors when a change is made to only one of the locations
There is 1 instance of this issue:
File: contracts/AuraBalRewardPool.sol #1
/// @audit This function should call `stakeFor(msg.sender, _amount)` instead
120 function stake(uint256 _amount) public updateReward(msg.sender) returns (bool) {
121 require(_amount > 0, "RewardPool : Cannot stake 0");
122
123 _totalSupply = _totalSupply.add(_amount);
124 _balances[msg.sender] = _balances[msg.sender].add(_amount);
125
126 stakingToken.safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), _amount);
127 emit Staked(msg.sender, _amount);
128
129 return true;
130: }There is 1 instance of this issue:
File: convex-platform/contracts/contracts/CrvDepositor.sol #1
/// @audit `_lockIncentive` is always greater than or equal to zero, so the condition should be removed
75: if(_lockIncentive >= 0 && _lockIncentive <= 30){There are 3 instances of this issue:
File: contracts/AuraLocker.sol #1
678: return amount;File: contracts/AuraLocker.sol #2
778: return userRewards;File: convex-platform/contracts/contracts/VoterProxy.sol #3
196: return balance;[N-05] override function arguments that are unused should have the variable name removed or commented out to avoid compiler warnings
There is 1 instance of this issue:
File: convex-platform/contracts/contracts/BaseRewardPool4626.sol #1
134: function maxDeposit(address owner) public view virtual override returns (uint256) {Contracts are allowed to override their parents' functions and change the visibility from external to public.
There are 18 instances of this issue. For details, see the warden's full report.
There are 8 instances of this issue:
File: convex-platform/contracts/contracts/interfaces/BoringMath.sol
25: require(a <= uint128(-1), "BoringMath: uint128 Overflow");
30: require(a <= uint64(-1), "BoringMath: uint64 Overflow");
35: require(a <= uint32(-1), "BoringMath: uint32 Overflow");
40: require(a <= uint40(-1), "BoringMath: uint40 Overflow");
45: require(a <= uint112(-1), "BoringMath: uint112 Overflow");
50: require(a <= uint224(-1), "BoringMath: uint224 Overflow");
55: require(a <= uint208(-1), "BoringMath: uint208 Overflow");
60: require(a <= uint216(-1), "BoringMath: uint216 Overflow");There are 47 instances of this issue. For details, see the warden's full report.
The type of the variable is the same as the type to which the variable is being cast
There are 2 instances of this issue:
File: contracts/AuraLocker.sol #1
/// @audit uint256(_epoch)
654: uint256 epochStart = uint256(epochs[0].date).add(uint256(_epoch).mul(rewardsDuration));File: contracts/AuraLocker.sol #2
/// @audit uint256(_epoch)
718: uint256 epochStart = uint256(epochs[0].date).add(uint256(_epoch).mul(rewardsDuration));There are units for seconds, minutes, hours, days, and weeks
There are 4 instances of this issue:
File: contracts/AuraLocker.sol #1
/// @audit 86400
81: uint256 public constant rewardsDuration = 86400 * 7;File: contracts/CrvDepositorWrapper.sol #2
/// @audit 3600
60: queries[0].secs = 3600; // last hourFile: convex-platform/contracts/contracts/CrvDepositor.sol #3
/// @audit 86400
26: uint256 private constant MAXTIME = 1 * 364 * 86400;File: convex-platform/contracts/contracts/CrvDepositor.sol #4
/// @audit 86400
27: uint256 private constant WEEK = 7 * 86400;There are 24 instances of this issue. For details, see the warden's full report.
Use a solidity version of at least 0.8.12 to get string.concat() to be used instead of abi.encodePacked(<str>,<str>)
There is 1 instance of this issue:
File: contracts/AuraMerkleDrop.sol #1
2: pragma solidity ^0.8.11;Use a solidity version of at least 0.8.13 to get the ability to use using for with a list of free functions
There are 26 instances of this issue. For details, see the warden's full report.
Use a solidity version of at least 0.8.4 to get bytes.concat() instead of abi.encodePacked(<bytes>,<bytes>)
Use a solidity version of at least 0.8.12 to get string.concat() instead of abi.encodePacked(<str>,<str>)
There is 1 instance of this issue:
File: convex-platform/contracts/contracts/DepositToken.sol #1
2: pragma solidity 0.6.12;Consider defining in only one contract so that values cannot become out of sync when only one location is updated. A cheap way to store constants in a single location is to create an internal constant in a library. If the variable is a local cache of another contract's value, consider making the cache variable internal or private, which will require external users to query the contract with the source of truth, so that callers don't get out of sync.
There are 38 instances of this issue. For details, see the warden's full report.
Some lines use // x and some use //x. The instances below point out the usages that don't follow the majority, within each file
There are 80 instances of this issue. For details, see the warden's full report.
There are 12 instances of this issue:
File: contracts/AuraClaimZap.sol
2: pragma solidity ^0.8.11;File: contracts/AuraMinter.sol
2: pragma solidity ^0.8.11;File: contracts/ExtraRewardsDistributor.sol
2: pragma solidity ^0.8.11;File: contracts/AuraMerkleDrop.sol
2: pragma solidity ^0.8.11;File: contracts/AuraPenaltyForwarder.sol
2: pragma solidity ^0.8.11;File: contracts/AuraBalRewardPool.sol
2: pragma solidity ^0.8.11;File: contracts/AuraLocker.sol
2: pragma solidity ^0.8.11;File: contracts/ClaimFeesHelper.sol
2: pragma solidity ^0.8.11;File: contracts/Aura.sol
2: pragma solidity ^0.8.11;File: contracts/AuraStakingProxy.sol
2: pragma solidity ^0.8.11;File: contracts/AuraVestedEscrow.sol
2: pragma solidity ^0.8.11;File: contracts/BalLiquidityProvider.sol
2: pragma solidity ^0.8.11;There are 29 instances of this issue. For details, see the warden's full report.
There are 6 instances of this issue:
File: contracts/Interfaces.sol
File: convex-platform/contracts/contracts/Interfaces.sol
File: convex-platform/contracts/contracts/interfaces/IGaugeController.sol
File: convex-platform/contracts/contracts/interfaces/IProxyFactory.sol
File: convex-platform/contracts/contracts/interfaces/IRewardHook.sol
File: convex-platform/contracts/contracts/interfaces/IRewarder.sol
There are 21 instances of this issue. For details, see the warden's full report.
Each event should use three indexed fields if there are three or more fields
There are 66 instances of this issue. For details, see the warden's full report.
0xMaharishi (Aura Finance) acknowledged
For this contest, 66 reports were submitted by wardens detailing gas optimizations. The report highlighted below by IllIllI received the top score from the judge.
The following wardens also submitted reports: BowTiedWardens, 0xkatana, Tomio, TerrierLover, defsec, 0xKitsune, c3phas, joestakey, catchup, CertoraInc, hansfriese, kenta, MaratCerby, MiloTruck, robee, sashik_eth, UnusualTurtle, _Adam, 0xf15ers, 0xNazgul, delfin454000, fatherOfBlocks, Kaiziron, simon135, WatchPug, Waze, 0x1f8b, 0x4non, ellahi, reassor, rfa, 0v3rf10w, asutorufos, DavidGialdi, mics, oyc_109, sach1r0, Fitraldys, FSchmoede, Funen, Hawkeye, NoamYakov, Randyyy, samruna, sikorico, antonttc, bobirichman, csanuragjain, cthulhu_cult, GimelSec, hyh, minhquanym, QuantumBrief, SmartSek, SooYa, unforgiven, z3s, jayjonah8, JC, Kthere, marcopaladin, orion, Ruhum, Tadashi, and zmj.
| Issue | Instances | |
|---|---|---|
| G‑01 | Remove or replace unused state variables | 1 |
| G‑02 | Multiple address mappings can be combined into a single mapping of an address to a struct, where appropriate |
8 |
| G‑03 | State variables only set in the constructor should be declared immutable |
6 |
| G‑04 | State variables can be packed into fewer storage slots | 3 |
| G‑05 | Using calldata instead of memory for read-only arguments in external functions saves gas |
6 |
| G‑06 | State variables should be cached in stack variables rather than re-reading them from storage | 60 |
| G‑07 | <x> += <y> costs more gas than <x> = <x> + <y> for state variables |
5 |
| G‑08 | internal functions only called once can be inlined to save gas |
4 |
| G‑09 | <array>.length should not be looked up in every loop of a for-loop |
13 |
| G-10 | ++i/i++ should be unchecked{++i}/unchecked{i++} when it is not possible for them to overflow, as is the case when used in for- and while-loops |
13 |
| G-11 | require()/revert() strings longer than 32 bytes cost extra gas |
1 |
| G-12 | keccak256() should only need to be called on a specific string literal once |
1 |
| G-13 | Not using the named return variables when a function returns, wastes deployment gas | 10 |
| G-14 | Using bools for storage incurs overhead |
18 |
| G-15 | Use a more recent version of solidity | 28 |
| G-16 | Using > 0 costs more gas than != 0 when used on a uint in a require() statement |
23 |
| G-17 | It costs more gas to initialize variables to zero than to let the default of zero be applied | 26 |
| G-18 | ++i costs less gas than i++, especially when it's used in for-loops (--i/i-- too) |
24 |
| G-19 | Splitting require() statements that use && saves gas |
15 |
| G-20 | Usage of uints/ints smaller than 32 bytes (256 bits) incurs overhead |
99 |
| G-21 | abi.encode() is less efficient than abi.encodePacked() |
2 |
| G-22 | Using private rather than public for constants, saves gas |
30 |
| G-23 | Don't compare boolean expressions to boolean literals | 9 |
| G-24 | Don't use SafeMath once the solidity version is 0.8.0 or greater |
2 |
| G-25 | Duplicated require()/revert() checks should be refactored to a modifier or function |
32 |
| G-26 | Multiplication/division by two should use bit shifting | 5 |
| G-27 | Stack variable used as a cheaper cache for a state variable is only used once | 1 |
| G-28 | require() or revert() statements that check input arguments should be at the top of the function |
11 |
| G-29 | Empty blocks should be removed or emit something | 6 |
| G-30 | Use custom errors rather than revert()/require() strings to save deployment gas |
101 |
| G-31 | Functions guaranteed to revert when called by normal users can be marked payable |
37 |
| G-32 | public functions not called by the contract should be declared external instead |
18 |
Total: 618 instances over 32 issues
Saves a storage slot. If the variable is assigned a non-zero value, saves Gsset (20000 gas). If it's assigned a zero value, saves Gsreset (2900 gas). If the variable remains unassigned, there is no gas savings unless the variable is public, in which case the compiler-generated non-payable getter deployment cost is saved. If the state variable is overriding an interface's public function, mark the variable as constant or immutable so that it does not use a storage slot
There is 1 instance of this issue:
File: convex-platform/contracts/contracts/RewardFactory.sol #1
28: mapping(address => uint256[]) public rewardActiveList;[G-02] Multiple address mappings can be combined into a single mapping of an address to a struct, where appropriate
Saves a storage slot for the mapping. Depending on the circumstances and sizes of types, can avoid a Gsset (20000 gas) per mapping combined. Reads and subsequent writes can also be cheaper when a function requires both values and they both fit in the same storage slot
There are 8 instances of this issue:
File: contracts/ExtraRewardsDistributor.sol
20 mapping(address => mapping(uint256 => uint256)) public rewardData;
21 // token -> epochList
22 mapping(address => uint256[]) public rewardEpochs;
23 // token -> account -> last claimed epoch index
24: mapping(address => mapping(address => uint256)) public userClaims;File: contracts/AuraBalRewardPool.sol
44 mapping(address => uint256) public userRewardPerTokenPaid;
45 mapping(address => uint256) public rewards;
46: mapping(address => uint256) private _balances;File: contracts/AuraLocker.sol
91 mapping(address => Balances) public balances;
92 mapping(address => LockedBalance[]) public userLocks;
93
94 // Voting
95 // Stored delegations
96 mapping(address => address) private _delegates;
97 // Checkpointed votes
98 mapping(address => DelegateeCheckpoint[]) private _checkpointedVotes;
99 // Delegatee balances (user -> unlock timestamp -> amount)
100: mapping(address => mapping(uint256 => uint256)) public delegateeUnlocks;File: contracts/AuraVestedEscrow.sol
35 mapping(address => uint256) public totalLocked;
36: mapping(address => uint256) public totalClaimed;File: convex-platform/contracts/contracts/VoterProxy.sol
35 mapping (address => bool) private stashPool;
36: mapping (address => bool) private protectedTokens;File: convex-platform/contracts/contracts/BaseRewardPool.sol
80 mapping(address => uint256) public userRewardPerTokenPaid;
81 mapping(address => uint256) public rewards;
82: mapping(address => uint256) private _balances;File: convex-platform/contracts/contracts/VirtualBalanceRewardPool.sol
97 mapping(address => uint256) public userRewardPerTokenPaid;
98: mapping(address => uint256) public rewards;File: convex-platform/contracts/contracts/RewardFactory.sol
27 mapping (address => bool) private rewardAccess;
28: mapping(address => uint256[]) public rewardActiveList;Avoids a Gsset (20000 gas) in the constructor, and replaces each Gwarmacces (100 gas) with a PUSH32 (3 gas).
There are 6 instances of this issue:
File: contracts/AuraLocker.sol
117: string private _name;
118: string private _symbol;File: contracts/ClaimFeesHelper.sol
23: IFeeDistributor public feeDistro;File: convex-platform/contracts/contracts/TokenFactory.sol
21: string public namePostfix;
22: string public symbolPrefix;File: convex-platform/contracts/contracts/BaseRewardPool4626.sol
26: address public override asset;If variables occupying the same slot are both written the same function or by the constructor, avoids a separate Gsset (20000 gas). Reads of the variables can also be cheaper
There are 3 instances of this issue:
File: convex-platform/contracts/contracts/CrvDepositor.sol #1
/// @audit Variable ordering with 5 slots instead of the current 6:
uint256(32):lockIncentive, uint256(32):incentiveCrv, uint256(32):unlockTime, address(20):feeManager, bool(1):cooldown, address(20):daoOperator
29: uint256 public lockIncentive = 10; //incentive to users who spend gas to lock crvBptFile: convex-platform/contracts/contracts/ExtraRewardStashV3.sol #2
/// @audit Variable ordering with 9 slots instead of the current 10:
uint256(32):pid, mapping(32):historicalRewards, mapping(32):tokenInfo, address[](32):tokenList, address(20):operator, bool(1):hasRedirected, bool(1):hasCurveRewards, address(20):staker, address(20):gauge, address(20):rewardFactory, address(20):rewardHook
33: uint256 public pid;File: convex-platform/contracts/contracts/Booster.sol #3
/// @audit Variable ordering with 18 slots instead of the current 19:
uint256(32):lockIncentive, uint256(32):stakerIncentive, uint256(32):earmarkIncentive, uint256(32):platformFee, mapping(32):feeTokens, user-defined[](32):poolInfo, mapping(32):gaugeMap, address(20):owner, bool(1):isShutdown, address(20):feeManager, address(20):poolManager, address(20):rewardFactory, address(20):stashFactory, address(20):tokenFactory, address(20):rewardArbitrator, address(20):voteDelegate, address(20):treasury, address(20):stakerRewards, address(20):lockRewards
26: uint256 public lockIncentive = 825; //incentive to crv stakersWhen a function with a memory array is called externally, the abi.decode() step has to use a for-loop to copy each index of the calldata to the memory index. Each iteration of this for-loop costs at least 60 gas (i.e. 60 * <mem_array>.length). Using calldata directly, obliviates the need for such a loop in the contract code and runtime execution. Structs have the same overhead as an array of length one
There are 6 instances of this issue:
File: contracts/Interfaces.sol
17: function getTimeWeightedAverage(OracleAverageQuery[] memory queries)
79: JoinPoolRequest memory request
83: SingleSwap memory singleSwap,
84: FundManagement memory funds,
93: ExitPoolRequest memory requestFile: convex-platform/contracts/contracts/PoolManagerSecondaryProxy.sol
68: function setUsedAddress(address[] memory usedList) external onlyOwner{The instances below point to the second+ access of a state variable within a function. Caching will replace each Gwarmaccess (100 gas) with a much cheaper stack read. Less obvious fixes/optimizations include having local storage variables of mappings within state variable mappings or mappings within state variable structs, having local storage variables of structs within mappings, having local memory caches of state variable structs, or having local caches of state variable contracts/addresses.
There are 60 instances of this issue. For details, see the warden's full report.
There are 5 instances of this issue:
File: contracts/AuraMerkleDrop.sol
137: pendingPenalty += penalty;File: contracts/AuraBalRewardPool.sol
184: pendingPenalty += penalty;File: contracts/AuraLocker.sol
363: lockedSupply -= amt;File: contracts/Aura.sol
130: minterMinted += _amount;File: contracts/AuraVestedEscrow.sol
66: require(totalTime >= 16 weeks, "!short");Not inlining costs 20 to 40 gas because of two extra JUMP instructions and additional stack operations needed for function calls.
There are 4 instances of this issue:
File: contracts/AuraClaimZap.sol #1
171 function _claimExtras( // solhint-disable-line
172 uint256 depositCrvMaxAmount,
173 uint256 minAmountOut,
174 uint256 depositCvxMaxAmount,
175 uint256 removeCrvBalance,
176 uint256 removeCvxBalance,
177: uint256 optionsFile: convex-platform/contracts/contracts/VoterProxy.sol #2
230: function _withdrawSome(address _gauge, uint256 _amount) internal returns (uint256) {File: convex-platform/contracts/contracts/ExtraRewardStashV3.sol #3
124 function checkForNewRewardTokens() internal {
125: for(uint256 i = 0; i < maxRewards; i++){File: convex-platform/contracts/contracts/Booster.sol #4
572: function _earmarkRewards(uint256 _pid) internal {The overheads outlined below are PER LOOP, excluding the first loop
- storage arrays incur a Gwarmaccess (100 gas)
- memory arrays use
MLOAD(3 gas) - calldata arrays use
CALLDATALOAD(3 gas)
Caching the length changes each of these to a DUP<N> (3 gas), and gets rid of the extra DUP<N> needed to store the stack offset
There are 13 instances of this issue:
File: contracts/AuraClaimZap.sol
143: for (uint256 i = 0; i < rewardContracts.length; i++) {
147: for (uint256 i = 0; i < extraRewardContracts.length; i++) {
151: for (uint256 i = 0; i < tokenRewardContracts.length; i++) {File: contracts/AuraLocker.sol
696: for (uint256 i = nextUnlockIndex; i < locks.length; i++) {File: contracts/AuraVestedEscrow.sol
100: for (uint256 i = 0; i < _recipient.length; i++) {File: convex-platform/contracts/contracts/ArbitartorVault.sol
49: for(uint256 i = 0; i < _toPids.length; i++){File: convex-platform/contracts/contracts/PoolManagerSecondaryProxy.sol
69: for(uint i=0; i < usedList.length; i++){File: convex-platform/contracts/contracts/BaseRewardPool.sol
214: for(uint i=0; i < extraRewards.length; i++){
230: for(uint i=0; i < extraRewards.length; i++){
262: for(uint i=0; i < extraRewards.length; i++){
296: for(uint i=0; i < extraRewards.length; i++){File: convex-platform/contracts/contracts/Booster.sol
379: for(uint i=0; i < poolInfo.length; i++){
538: for(uint256 i = 0; i < _gauge.length; i++){[G-10] ++i/i++ should be unchecked{++i}/unchecked{i++} when it is not possible for them to overflow, as is the case when used in for- and while-loops
The unchecked keyword is new in solidity version 0.8.0, so this only applies to that version or higher, which these instances are. This saves 30-40 gas PER LOOP
There are 13 instances of this issue:
File: contracts/AuraClaimZap.sol
143: for (uint256 i = 0; i < rewardContracts.length; i++) {
147: for (uint256 i = 0; i < extraRewardContracts.length; i++) {
151: for (uint256 i = 0; i < tokenRewardContracts.length; i++) {File: contracts/ExtraRewardsDistributor.sol
233: for (uint256 i = epochIndex; i < tokenEpochs; i++) {File: contracts/AuraLocker.sol
174: for (uint256 i = 0; i < rewardTokensLength; i++) {
306: for (uint256 i; i < rewardTokensLength; i++) {
410: for (uint256 i = nextUnlockIndex; i < length; i++) {
664: for (uint256 i = locksLength; i > 0; i--) {
696: for (uint256 i = nextUnlockIndex; i < locks.length; i++) {
726: for (uint256 i = epochIndex + 1; i > 0; i--) {
773: for (uint256 i = 0; i < userRewardsLength; i++) {File: contracts/AuraVestedEscrow.sol
100: for (uint256 i = 0; i < _recipient.length; i++) {File: contracts/BalLiquidityProvider.sol
51: for (uint256 i = 0; i < 2; i++) {There is 1 instance of this issue:
File: contracts/AuraLocker.sol #1
197: require(_rewardsToken != address(stakingToken), "Cannot add StakingToken as reward");It should be saved to an immutable variable, and the variable used instead. If the hash is being used as a part of a function selector, the cast to bytes4 should also only be done once
There is 1 instance of this issue:
File: convex-platform/contracts/contracts/Booster.sol #1
562: bytes memory data = abi.encodeWithSelector(bytes4(keccak256("set_rewards_receiver(address)")), stash);There are 10 instances of this issue:
File: contracts/AuraLocker.sol
603: return 0;
649: return balanceAtEpochOf(findEpochId(block.timestamp), _user);
708: return (userBalance.locked, unlockable, locked, lockData);
708: return (userBalance.locked, unlockable, locked, lockData);
708: return (userBalance.locked, unlockable, locked, lockData);
708: return (userBalance.locked, unlockable, locked, lockData);
713: return totalSupplyAtEpoch(findEpochId(block.timestamp));
740: return _time.sub(epochs[0].date).div(rewardsDuration);File: contracts/AuraVestedEscrow.sol
159: return 0;File: convex-platform/contracts/contracts/BaseRewardPool4626.sol
180: return convertToShares(assets); // Booleans are more expensive than uint256 or any type that takes up a full
// word because each write operation emits an extra SLOAD to first read the
// slot's contents, replace the bits taken up by the boolean, and then write
// back. This is the compiler's defense against contract upgrades and
// pointer aliasing, and it cannot be disabled.https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/blob/58f635312aa21f947cae5f8578638a85aa2519f5/contracts/security/ReentrancyGuard.sol#L23-L27
Use uint256(1) and uint256(2) for true/false
There are 18 instances of this issue:
File: contracts/AuraMerkleDrop.sol
34: mapping(address => bool) public hasClaimed;File: contracts/AuraLocker.sol
77: mapping(address => mapping(address => bool)) public rewardDistributors;
114: bool public isShutdown = false;File: contracts/AuraVestedEscrow.sol
33: bool public initialised = false;File: convex-platform/contracts/contracts/PoolManagerV3.sol
22: bool public protectAddPool;File: convex-platform/contracts/contracts/CrvDepositor.sol
39: bool public cooldown;File: convex-platform/contracts/contracts/PoolManagerSecondaryProxy.sol
24: bool public isShutdown;
26: mapping(address => bool) public usedMap;File: convex-platform/contracts/contracts/VoterProxy.sol
35: mapping (address => bool) private stashPool;
36: mapping (address => bool) private protectedTokens;
37: mapping (bytes32 => bool) private votes;File: convex-platform/contracts/contracts/BoosterOwner.sol
49: bool public isSealed;
53: bool public isForceTimerStarted;File: convex-platform/contracts/contracts/ExtraRewardStashV3.sol
40: bool public hasRedirected;
41: bool public hasCurveRewards;File: convex-platform/contracts/contracts/Booster.sol
54: bool public isShutdown;
67: mapping(address => bool) public gaugeMap;File: convex-platform/contracts/contracts/RewardFactory.sol
27: mapping (address => bool) private rewardAccess;Use a solidity version of at least 0.8.0 to get overflow protection without SafeMath
Use a solidity version of at least 0.8.2 to get compiler automatic inlining
Use a solidity version of at least 0.8.3 to get better struct packing and cheaper multiple storage reads
Use a solidity version of at least 0.8.4 to get custom errors, which are cheaper at deployment than revert()/require() strings
Use a solidity version of at least 0.8.10 to have external calls skip contract existence checks if the external call has a return value
There are 28 instances of this issue. For details, see the warden's full report.
This change saves 6 gas per instance
There are 23 instances of this issue:
File: contracts/AuraMerkleDrop.sol
122: require(_amount > 0, "!amount");File: contracts/AuraPenaltyForwarder.sol
52: require(bal > 0, "!empty");File: contracts/AuraBalRewardPool.sol
121: require(_amount > 0, "RewardPool : Cannot stake 0");
139: require(_amount > 0, "RewardPool : Cannot stake 0");
157: require(amount > 0, "RewardPool : Cannot withdraw 0");
210: require(rewardsAvailable > 0, "!balance");File: contracts/AuraLocker.sol
259: require(_amount > 0, "Cannot stake 0");
359: require(amt > 0, "Nothing locked");
385: require(length > 0, "no locks");
431: require(locked > 0, "no exp locks");
471: require(len > 0, "Nothing to delegate");
822: require(_rewards > 0, "No reward");
851: require(_reward > 0, "No reward");File: contracts/Aura.sol
68: require(_amount > 0, "Must mint something");File: contracts/BalLiquidityProvider.sol
70: require(balAfter > 0, "!mint");File: convex-platform/contracts/contracts/CrvDepositor.sol
169: require(_amount > 0,"!>0");File: convex-platform/contracts/contracts/PoolManagerSecondaryProxy.sol
104: require(weight > 0, "must have weight");File: convex-platform/contracts/contracts/interfaces/BoringMath.sol
20: require(b > 0, "BoringMath: division by zero");
102: require(b > 0, "BoringMath: division by zero");
123: require(b > 0, "BoringMath: division by zero");
143: require(b > 0, "BoringMath: division by zero");File: convex-platform/contracts/contracts/BaseRewardPool.sol
211: require(_amount > 0, 'RewardPool : Cannot stake 0');
227: require(amount > 0, 'RewardPool : Cannot withdraw 0');There are 26 instances of this issue. For details, see the warden's full report.
Saves 6 gas PER LOOP
There are 24 instances of this issue:
File: contracts/AuraClaimZap.sol
143: for (uint256 i = 0; i < rewardContracts.length; i++) {
147: for (uint256 i = 0; i < extraRewardContracts.length; i++) {
151: for (uint256 i = 0; i < tokenRewardContracts.length; i++) {File: contracts/ExtraRewardsDistributor.sol
233: for (uint256 i = epochIndex; i < tokenEpochs; i++) {File: contracts/AuraLocker.sol
174: for (uint256 i = 0; i < rewardTokensLength; i++) {
306: for (uint256 i; i < rewardTokensLength; i++) {
410: for (uint256 i = nextUnlockIndex; i < length; i++) {
664: for (uint256 i = locksLength; i > 0; i--) {
696: for (uint256 i = nextUnlockIndex; i < locks.length; i++) {
726: for (uint256 i = epochIndex + 1; i > 0; i--) {
773: for (uint256 i = 0; i < userRewardsLength; i++) {File: contracts/AuraVestedEscrow.sol
100: for (uint256 i = 0; i < _recipient.length; i++) {File: contracts/BalLiquidityProvider.sol
51: for (uint256 i = 0; i < 2; i++) {File: convex-platform/contracts/contracts/ArbitartorVault.sol
49: for(uint256 i = 0; i < _toPids.length; i++){File: convex-platform/contracts/contracts/PoolManagerSecondaryProxy.sol
69: for(uint i=0; i < usedList.length; i++){File: convex-platform/contracts/contracts/BoosterOwner.sol
144: for(uint256 i = 0; i < poolCount; i++){File: convex-platform/contracts/contracts/ExtraRewardStashV3.sol
125: for(uint256 i = 0; i < maxRewards; i++){
199: for(uint i=0; i < tCount; i++){File: convex-platform/contracts/contracts/BaseRewardPool.sol
214: for(uint i=0; i < extraRewards.length; i++){
230: for(uint i=0; i < extraRewards.length; i++){
262: for(uint i=0; i < extraRewards.length; i++){
296: for(uint i=0; i < extraRewards.length; i++){File: convex-platform/contracts/contracts/Booster.sol
379: for(uint i=0; i < poolInfo.length; i++){
538: for(uint256 i = 0; i < _gauge.length; i++){See this issue which describes the fact that there is a larger deployment gas cost, but with enough runtime calls, the change ends up being cheaper
There are 15 instances of this issue:
File: contracts/ExtraRewardsDistributor.sol
171: require(_index > 0 && _index < rewardEpochs[_token].length - 1, "!past");File: contracts/AuraStakingProxy.sol
90: require(_outputBps > 9000 && _outputBps < 10000, "Invalid output bps");
159: require(_token != crv && _token != cvx && _token != cvxCrv, "not allowed");
203: require(address(_token) != crv && address(_token) != cvxCrv, "not allowed");File: contracts/BalLiquidityProvider.sol
48: require(_request.assets.length == 2 && _request.maxAmountsIn.length == 2, "!valid");
57: require(bal > 0 && bal == _request.maxAmountsIn[i], "!bal");File: convex-platform/contracts/contracts/StashFactoryV2.sol
83: require(!isV1 && !isV2 && !isV3,"stash version mismatch");File: convex-platform/contracts/contracts/PoolManagerSecondaryProxy.sol
111: require(!usedMap[_lptoken] && !usedMap[_gauge], "cant force used pool");File: convex-platform/contracts/contracts/Booster.sol
220: require(lockRewards != address(0) && rewardFactory != address(0), "!initialised");
222: require(_feeToken != address(0) && _feeDistro != address(0), "!addresses");
278: require(_lockFees >= 300 && _lockFees <= 1500, "!lockFees");
279: require(_stakerFees >= 300 && _stakerFees <= 1500, "!stakerFees");
280: require(_callerFees >= 10 && _callerFees <= 100, "!callerFees");
313: require(msg.sender==poolManager && !isShutdown, "!add");
314: require(_gauge != address(0) && _lptoken != address(0),"!param");When using elements that are smaller than 32 bytes, your contract’s gas usage may be higher. This is because the EVM operates on 32 bytes at a time. Therefore, if the element is smaller than that, the EVM must use more operations in order to reduce the size of the element from 32 bytes to the desired size.
https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.8.11/internals/layout_in_storage.html Use a larger size then downcast where needed
There are 99 instances of this issue. For details, see the warden's full report.
There are 2 instances of this issue:
File: contracts/CrvDepositorWrapper.sol #1
93: abi.encode(IVault.JoinKind.EXACT_TOKENS_IN_FOR_BPT_OUT, maxAmountsIn, minOut),File: convex-platform/contracts/contracts/StashFactoryV2.sol #2
88: bytes memory data = abi.encode(rewarded_token);If needed, the value can be read from the verified contract source code. Savings are due to the compiler not having to create non-payable getter functions for deployment calldata, and not adding another entry to the method ID table
There are 30 instances of this issue. For details, see the warden's full report.
if (<x> == true) => if (<x>), if (<x> == false) => if (!<x>)
There are 9 instances of this issue:
File: contracts/AuraMerkleDrop.sol
123: require(hasClaimed[msg.sender] == false, "already claimed");File: convex-platform/contracts/contracts/ArbitartorVault.sol
54: require(shutdown==false,"pool closed");File: convex-platform/contracts/contracts/VoterProxy.sol
107: require(operator == address(0) || IDeposit(operator).isShutdown() == true, "needs shutdown");
168: if(protectedTokens[_token] == false){
171: if(protectedTokens[_gauge] == false){
190: require(protectedTokens[address(_asset)] == false, "protected");File: convex-platform/contracts/contracts/Booster.sol
400: require(pool.shutdown == false, "pool is closed");
574: require(pool.shutdown == false, "pool is closed");File: convex-platform/contracts/contracts/RewardFactory.sol
72: require(msg.sender == operator || rewardAccess[msg.sender] == true, "!auth");Version 0.8.0 introduces internal overflow checks, so using SafeMath is redundant and adds overhead
There are 2 instances of this issue:
File: contracts/AuraBalRewardPool.sol #1
5: import { SafeMath } from "@openzeppelin/contracts-0.8/utils/math/SafeMath.sol";File: contracts/AuraStakingProxy.sol #2
7: import { SafeMath } from "@openzeppelin/contracts-0.8/utils/math/SafeMath.sol";Saves deployment costs
There are 32 instances of this issue. For details, see the warden's full report.
<x> * 2 is equivalent to <x> << 1 and <x> / 2 is the same as <x> >> 1. The MUL and DIV opcodes cost 5 gas, whereas SHL and SHR only cost 3 gas
There are 5 instances of this issue:
File: contracts/AuraMerkleDrop.sol
136: uint256 penalty = address(auraLocker) == address(0) ? 0 : (_amount * 2) / 10;File: contracts/AuraBalRewardPool.sol
183: uint256 penalty = (reward * 2) / 10;File: contracts/AuraMath.sol
36: return (a / 2) + (b / 2) + (((a % 2) + (b % 2)) / 2);
36: return (a / 2) + (b / 2) + (((a % 2) + (b % 2)) / 2);
36: return (a / 2) + (b / 2) + (((a % 2) + (b % 2)) / 2);If the variable is only accessed once, it's cheaper to use the state variable directly that one time
There is 1 instance of this issue:
File: contracts/AuraLocker.sol #1
328: uint256 epochindex = epochs.length;[G-28] require() or revert() statements that check input arguments should be at the top of the function
Checks that involve constants should come before checks that involve state variables
There are 11 instances of this issue:
File: contracts/AuraMerkleDrop.sol
69: require(_expiresAfter > 2 weeks, "!expiry");
122: require(_amount > 0, "!amount");File: contracts/AuraBalRewardPool.sol
77: require(_startDelay < 2 weeks, "!delay");File: contracts/AuraLocker.sol
472: require(newDelegatee != address(0), "Must delegate to someone");
822: require(_rewards > 0, "No reward");
851: require(_reward > 0, "No reward");File: contracts/Aura.sol
68: require(_amount > 0, "Must mint something");
69: require(_minter != address(0), "Invalid minter");File: contracts/AuraStakingProxy.sol
129: require(_incentive <= 100, "too high");File: convex-platform/contracts/contracts/BaseRewardPool.sol
127: require(_reward != address(0),"!reward setting");File: convex-platform/contracts/contracts/Booster.sol
281: require(_platform <= 200, "!platform");The code should be refactored such that they no longer exist, or the block should do something useful, such as emitting an event or reverting. If the block is an empty if-statement block to avoid doing subsequent checks in the else-if/else conditions, the else-if/else conditions should be nested under the negation of the if-statement, because they involve different classes of checks, which may lead to the introduction of errors when the code is later modified (if(x){}else if(y){...}else{...} => if(!x){if(y){...}else{...}})
There are 6 instances of this issue:
File: convex-platform/contracts/contracts/VoterProxy.sol
312: }catch{}File: convex-platform/contracts/contracts/ExtraRewardStashV3.sol
116 try IRewardHook(rewardHook).onRewardClaim(){
117: }catch{}
117: }catch{}File: convex-platform/contracts/contracts/Booster.sol
361 try IStaker(staker).withdrawAll(pool.lptoken,pool.gauge){
362: }catch{}
362: }catch{}
389: }catch{}Custom errors are available from solidity version 0.8.4. The instances below match or exceed that version
There are 101 instances of this issue. For details, see the warden's full report.
If a function modifier such as onlyOwner is used, the function will revert if a normal user tries to pay the function. Marking the function as payable will lower the gas cost for legitimate callers because the compiler will not include checks for whether a payment was provided. The extra opcodes avoided are
CALLVALUE(2),DUP1(3),ISZERO(3),PUSH2(3),JUMPI(10),PUSH1(3),DUP1(3),REVERT(0),JUMPDEST(1),POP(2), which costs an average of about 21 gas per call to the function, in addition to the extra deployment cost
There are 37 instances of this issue. For details, see the warden's full report.
Contracts are allowed to override their parents' functions and change the visibility from external to public and can save gas by doing so.
There are 18 instances of this issue:
File: contracts/ExtraRewardsDistributor.sol
117: function getReward(address _account, address _token) public {
127 function getReward(
128 address _account,
129 address _token,
130: uint256 _startIndexFile: contracts/AuraMerkleDrop.sol
114 function claim(
115 bytes32[] calldata _proof,
116 uint256 _amount,
117 bool _lock
118: ) public returns (bool) {
149 function forwardPenalty() public {
150: uint256 toForward = pendingPenalty;File: contracts/AuraPenaltyForwarder.sol
47 function forward() public {
48: require(block.timestamp > lastDistribution + distributionDelay, "!elapsed");File: contracts/AuraBalRewardPool.sol
138: function stakeFor(address _for, uint256 _amount) public updateReward(_for) returns (bool) {
152 function withdraw(
153 uint256 amount,
154 bool claim,
155 bool lock
156: ) public updateReward(msg.sender) returns (bool) {
195 function forwardPenalty() public {
196: uint256 toForward = pendingPenalty;File: contracts/BalLiquidityProvider.sol
46: function provideLiquidity(bytes32 _poolId, IVault.JoinPoolRequest memory _request) public {File: convex-platform/contracts/contracts/ConvexMasterChef.sol
96 function add(
97 uint256 _allocPoint,
98 IERC20 _lpToken,
99 IRewarder _rewarder,
100 bool _withUpdate
101: ) public onlyOwner {
121 function set(
122 uint256 _pid,
123 uint256 _allocPoint,
124 IRewarder _rewarder,
125 bool _withUpdate,
126 bool _updateRewarder
127: ) public onlyOwner {
209: function deposit(uint256 _pid, uint256 _amount) public {
239: function withdraw(uint256 _pid, uint256 _amount) public {
283: function emergencyWithdraw(uint256 _pid) public {File: convex-platform/contracts/contracts/VoterProxy.sol
151: function isValidSignature(bytes32 _hash, bytes memory) public view returns (bytes4) {File: convex-platform/contracts/contracts/BaseRewardPool.sol
191 function stakeFor(address _for, uint256 _amount)
192 public
193: returns(bool)File: convex-platform/contracts/contracts/VirtualBalanceRewardPool.sol
178 function withdraw(address _account, uint256 amount)
179 public
180: updateReward(_account)File: convex-platform/contracts/contracts/Booster.sol
493: function withdrawAll(uint256 _pid) public returns(bool){C4 is an open organization governed by participants in the community.
C4 Contests incentivize the discovery of exploits, vulnerabilities, and bugs in smart contracts. Security researchers are rewarded at an increasing rate for finding higher-risk issues. Contest submissions are judged by a knowledgeable security researcher and solidity developer and disclosed to sponsoring developers. C4 does not conduct formal verification regarding the provided code but instead provides final verification.
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