From 5083822fdcdcc9988d9d8dbad0191391e4a78ad4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vahid Ahmadi Date: Wed, 6 Nov 2024 12:49:47 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] fixing style --- src/posts/articles/cgt-autumn-budget.md | 22 +++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/posts/articles/cgt-autumn-budget.md b/src/posts/articles/cgt-autumn-budget.md index 05b14c81a..0bbe4efd1 100644 --- a/src/posts/articles/cgt-autumn-budget.md +++ b/src/posts/articles/cgt-autumn-budget.md @@ -6,17 +6,17 @@ When accounting for behavioural responses, we project that these changes will ra We project the CGT reforms will raise £6.4 billion from 2025 to 2029\. -| Fiscal Year | 2024-25 | 2025-26 | 2026-27 | 2027-28 | 2028-29 | 2029-30 | Total | -| :---- | :---- | :---- | :---- | :---- | :---- | :---- | :---- | -| Revenue (£bn) | 0.0 | [1.0](https://policyengine.org/uk/policy?focus=policyOutput.policyBreakdown&reform=69739®ion=uk&timePeriod=2025&baseline=1) | [1.2](https://policyengine.org/uk/policy?focus=policyOutput.policyBreakdown&reform=69739®ion=uk&timePeriod=2026&baseline=1) | [1.4](https://policyengine.org/uk/policy?focus=policyOutput.policyBreakdown&reform=69739®ion=uk&timePeriod=2027&baseline=1) | [1.4](https://policyengine.org/uk/policy?focus=policyOutput.policyBreakdown&reform=69739®ion=uk&timePeriod=2028&baseline=1) | [1.4](https://policyengine.org/uk/policy?focus=policyOutput.policyBreakdown&reform=69739®ion=uk&timePeriod=2029&baseline=1) | 6.4 | +| Fiscal Year | 2024-25 | 2025-26 | 2026-27 | 2027-28 | 2028-29 | 2029-30 | Total | +| :------------ | :------ | :----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | :----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | :----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | :----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | :----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | :---- | +| Revenue (£bn) | 0.0 | [1.0](https://policyengine.org/uk/policy?focus=policyOutput.policyBreakdown&reform=69739®ion=uk&timePeriod=2025&baseline=1) | [1.2](https://policyengine.org/uk/policy?focus=policyOutput.policyBreakdown&reform=69739®ion=uk&timePeriod=2026&baseline=1) | [1.4](https://policyengine.org/uk/policy?focus=policyOutput.policyBreakdown&reform=69739®ion=uk&timePeriod=2027&baseline=1) | [1.4](https://policyengine.org/uk/policy?focus=policyOutput.policyBreakdown&reform=69739®ion=uk&timePeriod=2028&baseline=1) | [1.4](https://policyengine.org/uk/policy?focus=policyOutput.policyBreakdown&reform=69739®ion=uk&timePeriod=2029&baseline=1) | 6.4 | These estimates are 29% less than HMT and 26% less than the OBR. These variations may stem from different assumptions about behavioural responses. In our model, we assume individuals will adjust their capital gains realisations with an elasticity of \-0.7 with respect to the marginal tax rate; neither HMT nor OBR specify their assumptions on this front. -| Source | 2024-25 | 2025-26 | 2026-27 | 2027-28 | 2028-29 | 2029-30 | Total | -| ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- | -| PolicyEngine | 0.0 | 1.0 | 1.2 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 6.4 | -| HM Treasury | 0.1 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 2.2 | 2.5 | 9.0 | -| OBR | 0.1 | 1.4 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 2.1 | 2.4 | 8.6 | +| Source | 2024-25 | 2025-26 | 2026-27 | 2027-28 | 2028-29 | 2029-30 | Total | +| ------------ | ------- | ------- | ------- | ------- | ------- | ------- | ----- | +| PolicyEngine | 0.0 | 1.0 | 1.2 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 6.4 | +| HM Treasury | 0.1 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 2.2 | 2.5 | 9.0 | +| OBR | 0.1 | 1.4 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 2.1 | 2.4 | 8.6 | Assuming [no behavioural change](https://policyengine.org/uk/policy?focus=policyOutput.policyBreakdown&reform=69732®ion=uk&timePeriod=2025&baseline=1), we project the change to generate £22.2 billion from 2025 to 2029\. While the OBR also provides estimates it describes as static, those account for changes in realisation behaviour, making them incomparable to our static results. @@ -30,6 +30,6 @@ Our [distributional analysis](https://policyengine.org/uk/policy?focus=policyOut Read more of PolicyEngine’s Autumn Budget 2024 coverage: -- [Employer National Insurance reforms](https://policyengine.org/uk/research/autumn-budget-24-employer-ni) -- [Private school VAT changes](https://policyengine.org/uk/research/vat-school-comparison) -- [Fuel Duty freeze](https://policyengine.org/uk/research/autumn-budget-24-fuel-duty) \ No newline at end of file +- [Employer National Insurance reforms](https://policyengine.org/uk/research/autumn-budget-24-employer-ni) +- [Private school VAT changes](https://policyengine.org/uk/research/vat-school-comparison) +- [Fuel Duty freeze](https://policyengine.org/uk/research/autumn-budget-24-fuel-duty)