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Quinn is a pure-Rust, async-compatible implementation of the IETF QUIC transport protocol. As of quinn-proto 0.11, it is possible for a server to accept(), retry(), refuse(), or ignore() an Incoming connection. However, calling retry() on an unvalidated connection exposes the server to a likely panic in the following situations: 1. Calling refuse or ignore on the resulting validated connection, if a duplicate initial packet is received. This issue can go undetected until a server's refuse()/ignore() code path is exercised, such as to stop a denial of service attack. 2. Accepting when the initial packet for the resulting validated connection fails to decrypt or exhausts connection IDs, if a similar initial packet that successfully decrypts and doesn't exhaust connection IDs is received. This issue can go undetected if clients are well-behaved. The former situation was observed in a real application, while the latter is only theoretical.
CVE-2024-45311 - High Severity Vulnerability
Vulnerable Library - iroh-quinn-proto-0.11.6.crate
State machine for the QUIC transport protocol
Library home page: https://static.crates.io/crates/iroh-quinn-proto/iroh-quinn-proto-0.11.6.crate
Path to dependency file: /Cargo.toml
Path to vulnerable library: /Cargo.toml
Dependency Hierarchy:
Found in HEAD commit: 0210244c73d8447f5fea76a1f812bd534796c09a
Found in base branch: master
Vulnerability Details
Quinn is a pure-Rust, async-compatible implementation of the IETF QUIC transport protocol. As of quinn-proto 0.11, it is possible for a server to
accept()
,retry()
,refuse()
, orignore()
anIncoming
connection. However, callingretry()
on an unvalidated connection exposes the server to a likely panic in the following situations: 1. Callingrefuse
orignore
on the resulting validated connection, if a duplicate initial packet is received. This issue can go undetected until a server'srefuse()
/ignore()
code path is exercised, such as to stop a denial of service attack. 2. Accepting when the initial packet for the resulting validated connection fails to decrypt or exhausts connection IDs, if a similar initial packet that successfully decrypts and doesn't exhaust connection IDs is received. This issue can go undetected if clients are well-behaved. The former situation was observed in a real application, while the latter is only theoretical.Publish Date: 2024-09-02
URL: CVE-2024-45311
CVSS 3 Score Details (7.5)
Base Score Metrics:
Suggested Fix
Type: Upgrade version
Origin: GHSA-vr26-jcq5-fjj8
Release Date: 2024-09-02
Fix Resolution: quinn-proto - 0.11.7
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