diff --git a/doc/musig-spec.mediawiki b/doc/musig-spec.mediawiki
index 7d5fca5d8..7a6eea78d 100644
--- a/doc/musig-spec.mediawiki
+++ b/doc/musig-spec.mediawiki
@@ -126,6 +126,19 @@ The algorithm ''NonceAgg(pubnonce<sub>1..u</sub>)'' is defined as:
 ** Let ''R<sub>i</sub> = R'<sub>i</sub>'' if not ''is_infinite(R'<sub>i</sub>)'', otherwise let R<sub>i</sub> = G''
 * Return ''aggnonce = cbytes(R<sub>1</sub>) || cbytes(R<sub>2</sub>)''
 
+===== Note on ''is_infinite(R'<sub>i</sub>)'' =====
+
+If ''is_infinite(R'<sub>i</sub>)'' there is at least one dishonest signer (except with negligible probability).
+If we would fail here, we will never be able to determine who it is.
+Therefore, we should continue such that the culprit is revealed when collecting and verifying partial signatures.
+However, dealing with the point at infinity requires defining a serialization and may require extra code complexity in implementations.
+Instead, we set the aggregate nonce to some arbitrary point, the generator.
+
+This modification does not affect the security of the scheme.
+''NonceAgg'' (both the original and modified version) only depends on publicly available data (the set of public pre-nonces from every signer).
+Thus in the multi-signature security game (EUF-CMA), we can consider ''NonceAgg'' to be performed by the adversary (rather than the challenger) without loss of generality.
+The modification changes neither the behavior of the EUF-CMA challenger nor the condition required to win the security game (the adversary still has to output a valid forgery according to the unmodified MuSig2* scheme). Since we've already proved that MuSig2* is secure against an arbitrary adversary, we can conclude that the modified scheme is still secure.
+
 ==== Signing ====
 
 Input:
diff --git a/src/modules/musig/session_impl.h b/src/modules/musig/session_impl.h
index 7cdcebe3e..1231b2fc0 100644
--- a/src/modules/musig/session_impl.h
+++ b/src/modules/musig/session_impl.h
@@ -362,21 +362,7 @@ int secp256k1_musig_nonce_agg(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_musig_aggn
     }
     for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
         if (secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&aggnonce_ptj[i])) {
-            /* There must be at least one dishonest signer. If we would return 0
-               here, we will never be able to determine who it is. Therefore, we
-               should continue such that the culprit is revealed when collecting
-               and verifying partial signatures.
-
-               However, dealing with the point at infinity (loading,
-               de-/serializing) would require a lot of extra code complexity.
-               Instead, we set the aggregate nonce to some arbitrary point (the
-               generator). This is secure, because it only restricts the
-               abilities of the attacker: an attacker that forces the sum of
-               nonces to be infinity by sending some maliciously generated nonce
-               pairs can be turned into an attacker that forces the sum to be
-               the generator (by simply adding the generator to one of the
-               malicious nonces), and this does not change the winning condition
-               of the EUF-CMA game. */
+            /* Set to G according to the specification */
             aggnonce_pt[i] = secp256k1_ge_const_g;
         } else {
             secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&aggnonce_pt[i], &aggnonce_ptj[i]);